This is a very interesting and creative argument. I will target points where it might be vulnerable. In short, I think a physicalist could challenge (1) & (2) of your argument because (1) & (2)'s plausibility shifts based on different readings of "intrinsically morally valuable."

1. If an object is intrinsically morally valuable, then it is morally valuable in virtue of some/all of its essential properties. — Clarendon

There are at least two readings of "intrinsically morally valuable" that affect the plausibility of premise (1). You seem to take this premise as analytical, with "an object being intrinsically morally valuable" meaning "value grounded in intrinsic (or essential) properties of that object."

However, one could also read it as "valuable for its own sake." This reading is often assumed as the same as the first, but I think they are distinguishable. In this second sense, premise (1) is not definitionally true. An object may be valuable for its own sake, but this value being based on extrinsic properties of that object. For instance, the pen used by Abraham Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proclamation might be valuable "for its own sake," being something we should respect and consider when we act, but this value is based on its extrinsic property of serving a role in an important historical event. Thus, it seems at least a coherent view that objects could be taken into consideration for "their own sake" without this being grounded in their essential properties.

Still, I think you are quite explicit that the meaning you intend is the first ("essential property") for premise (1), but I believe premise (2), in turn, is only clearly plausible given the second ("for its own sake") reading. And the physicalist that is also a moral realist could then insist on the second reading to avoid the force of your argument.

2. Our minds are intrinsically morally valuable objects — Clarendon

The physicalist might accept that our minds are valuable "for their own sakes" without committing to these being based on essential properties of the mind. What is intuitive about premise (2) is that our minds should be taken into moral consideration for their own sakes. In contrast, that the moral value of our minds is grounded in their essential properties does not strike me as nearly as initially plausible. So the strength of premise (2) might be affected by a conflation the two different readings.

Just as one possible example, "having a phenomenal past," that is, having had phenomenal experiences in the past, might be necessary for us being moral ends in ourselves, but "having a phenomenal past" does not seem essential to a mind. There was a point where a mind came to be when it had no phenomenal past: when it first came into existence! If true (which is very debatable), there is a non-essential property that determines intrinsic value "for its own sake." This example is likely controversial and would need much more defense, but I think it shows that it is a coherent idea that the value of our minds "for their own sake" could be grounded in something non-essential.

Given the stipulated, essentialist sense you use, the physicalist could just deny (2) because this premise is less plausible than it seems when untangled, while still avoiding the bitter taste of moral nihilism.

In either case, again, a very interesting argument.

@Count Timothy von Icarus, you made several insightful connections. I will only focus on a few.

I am not sure if you're familiar with Byung Chul Han, but he makes a somewhat similar (although also in other ways quite different) — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. I see the connection though. The ideas sound very interesting. I'll definitely give the Agony of Eros a read in the near future.

In the Agony of Eros, the main theme is about the loss of the Other, leading to everything becoming a form of consumption in "the Inferno of the Same." There is an excess of visibility, whereby everything is stripped bare and flattened into surfaces without depth. I cannot help but see some similarity between this and forms of "anti-metaphysics." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I find this connection striking. For instance, hedonism might become "common-sense" because one struggles to comprehend something of value outside one's own experience. Ethics is obviously just personal preference, if it is anything at all. It captures the vast spread of contemporary cynicism and scientism well. Was it something in this direction you had in mind with "anti-metaphysics?"

But I think this would also apply in some ways to the distanced, ironic approach to philosophy, as well. It's a way to engage that makes no claims on a person. This might be particularly true when it comes to engagement with those areas of philosophy that claim that praxis is essential, although I can see it applying more generally. The same might be said of the tendency to "retreat" into the analytic stance so as to ascend above good and evil.

That's difficult of course, because some would probably argue that ironic detachment is the height of wisdom. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, good points. I would not take all of the ironic approach to be pornographic, but that the pornographic stance might be quite common in that approach. The quote by David Foster Wallace is well-chosen for this point. There can certainly be something gratifying in cynicism.

Still, instrumentalization extends beyond the pornographic stance. Maybe the analytic and ironic can avoid the pornographic stance, yet still often instrumentalize in a problematic manner. There is clearly more to the story than the pornographic stance.

I suspect the analytic stance is less pornographic than the ironic, at least in general. Yet, while introspecting, I can certainly see the allure even in the analytic. Only focusing on a narrow problem inside a big problem, breaking it down into conditionals and treating important questions like sterile puzzles has a strange comfort.

To be sure, non-cognitivists maintain that moral utterances are not, technically, propositions, but so what? If all you are saying is that theirs is a tortured semantics, I would tend to agree with you, but at the same time, I don't find this issue to be interesting or important enough to argue. — SophistiCat

It is fine to not find it interesting. One can be more interested in revisionism than what the actual concepts are. Such projects can be both useful and interesting.

Still, I was responding to @Truth Seeker's first question:

Is right and wrong just a matter of thinking something is right [...] and something is wrong[...]? — Truth Seeker

That question is about what "right" and "wrong" are and to answer that it is important to understand what they mean. Semantics is important in that regard. If one uses a different meaning, one is answering a different question. Dismissing semantics abandons that project.

You keep referring to "crude subjectivism" - what is that, and who propounds it? — SophistiCat

Roughly: x is right = I have a positive attitude towards x. And similar translations for other evaluative terms.

I use the term crude subjectivism to separate my critiques from more complicated variants of relativism and subjectivism. I think that is useful for the sake of revealing issues with certain anti-realist positions that share the same relevant features as crude subjectivism without distractions. It is "crude" in that it is the rudimentary form of a family of views.

It is frequently advanced in ethics classes, on forums, and informal metaethical discussions. It becomes even more frequent if one include its sibling, crude cultural relativism, which suffers from the same kind of issues. I take it as quite obvious that many hold these kinds of views in our times. It is quite a natural reading to take as the implied view in @Truth Seeker's first question. So I think it is worth critiquing.

Historical examples are always more sophisticated. Philosophers tend to go beyond the rudimentary. In either case, I think Edvard Westermarck gives an account for moral concepts that is close to crude subjectivism. There is a similar strand in a part of Thomas Hobbes. Some passages of David Hume also invite this reading, but I think he avoids fitting that mold on the whole. I'm not really sure where to put Hume metaethically, to be honest.

And why do you think that it does not adequately address the open question challenge? — SophistiCat

Because if the crude subjectivist theory is correct about our moral concepts, the meaning of the sentence (O) "I think abortion is wrong, but is it wrong?" would translate to (T) "I think I have a negative attitude towards abortion, but do I have a negative attitude towards abortion?" which makes that kind of reflection seem trivial, like "I think I'm hungry, but am I hungry?" Checking one's attitudes seems to be quite straight forward most of the time. But reading (O), it does not sound like such trivial reflection. So as a metaethical theory, we have evidence against crude subjectivism.

Any moral question worth asking is, by that very framing, not a trivial question to answer, even for a subjectivist (perhaps especially for a subjectivist). Introspection in such matters is not as easy as reading a number off a gauge. Nor does one need to be satisfied by the first subjective impression. — SophistiCat

That is a fine point well put. I think the plausibility depends on how one cashes out "attitude" but you are right that introspection is not always clear on most such views. After watching a challenging film, I might genuinely question what attitude I have towards the film while I'm driving home from the cinema.

I still think it is difficult to capture the meaning of these questions for subjectivists. Even an incredibly self-aware person that attends to their attitudes could ask those kinds of questions in a way that sounds coherent and substantial.

Brainwashing is not a good counterexample. A brainwashed subject is a morally impaired subject. — SophistiCat

I don't really see why it is not a good counter-example. What do you mean by a "morally impaired" subject? That is not clear to me. Otherwise, it risks seeming like an ad hoc fix.

In either case, here is a new version that illustrates where I think both crude subjectivism, even with your suggested fixes, don't seem to capture the meaning.

The Dying Omnivore. Adam is sitting on his porch, reflecting. Adam is a deeply self-aware person that is well-attuned to his attitudes. Tomorrow, Adam has chosen to die due to inoperable cancer. Still, he is clear-headed. In that moment on the porch, Adam asks himself, "I believe and will always believe that buying animal products is right, but is it right?" and then continues, "I'm certain I have a positive attitude towards buying animal products and that I will always have that positive attitude towards it, but is it right?"

If crude subjectivism, even with the added dimension of degrees of belief, is correct about the meaning of "right" and "wrong," it appears like the two questions by Adam should sound like trivial, settled re-asks akin to "It is snowing today, but is it snowing today?" One would probably suspect that the person was confused if they asked such a question. But Adam's questions sound coherent and substantive rather than obviously confused and trivial. So crude subjectivism probably gives the wrong account for the meaning of "right" and "wrong."

I am not sure what point you are making here, if it is not just the truth-aptness point - is it? Yes, if moral utterances are not propositions, then, trivially, they cannot be contradictory in the logical sense. But is this really important? They are opposite, contrasting, or what have you - for all intents and purposes, other than logical formalism, it comes to the same thing, doesn't it? — SophistiCat

I agree that it would be a trivial point if emotivism is assumed as the correct account of morality. Of course there would be no contradiction. However, I have not assumed emotivism, because the correctness of emotivism is part of what is in dispute when we are figuring out what "right" and "wrong" is.

My point here was that moral discourse behaves like propositions, while emotivism predicts they would not. Since emotivism goes against the linguistic data, it does probably not capture what "right" and "wrong" means.

Sorry for the late reply. I have had a lot to do. I'm also sorry for the length and I hope the content is reasonably fair.

I think emotivism can meet the open question challenge. A straightforward response would be to cache it out in terms of degrees of belief. That is to say, one can have a strong, dubious or indifferent attitude towards a moral proposition. In any event, one can be humble (as you yourself advise) and keep an open mind. "I am strongly opposed to the death penalty, but I might be persuaded to change my attitude, or perhaps some future life event could effect such a change." — SophistiCat

I think this is a stronger version of anti-realism than I originally targeted. However, I'm not sure what you exactly mean.

First though, what kind of emotivism is it you have in mind? Talking in terms of "beliefs" and "moral propositions" suggests you take moral language to be truth-apt. Emotivists typically deny that. Are you some other sort of non-cognitivist?

Also, I think your response comes at the open-question-challenge from a direction that, while more sophisticated, misses my main concerns. Sure, one can have different degrees of attitudes towards moral propositions. The point I'm pressing with the question, "I believe the death penalty is wrong, but is it wrong?" is that crude subjectivism struggles with the semantic data. I don't think your re-interpretation of the question in theory-laden terms really fixes that problem.

A further problem is that it undermines deliberation. It seems like I'm asking myself a substantial question when I question my belief in such a manner. With the crude subjectivist reading, it would trivialize that deliberation.

I doubt that your current appeal to psychological prediction of possible change in attitude helps. Suppose I know a dystopian state will brainwash me into having a positive attitude towards the death penalty tomorrow. Your re-interpretation makes "I think the death penalty is wrong, but is it wrong?" map neatly onto that prediction, yielding an obvious "no" because I know my attitude will change tomorrow. But even in that scenario, the question appears more substantive than a trivial "no." So it seems like your re-interpretation struggles to capture what that original sentence means.

If you object that this is not what the question is asking, that you want to know whether it is "really" right or wrong, then you are begging the question against the anti-realist. — SophistiCat

I'm not assuming that the question is about what is "really" right or wrong. I'm pointing to semantic and linguistic evidence that disfavors subjectivist and emotivist readings. I don't think that is question-begging. What did you have in mind?

Most moral propositions are more-or-less universalizing. When I say "I oppose the death penalty," I am not just talking about my own value judgment. To hold a moral proposition is to believe that everyone ought to hold it as well. Accordingly, an emotivist will hold concurrent attitudes towards moral agreement (positive) and disagreement (negative). — SophistiCat

Sure, you can give an account for how emotivists could want to press the convergence of attitudes, saying something like: "Everyone, disfavor the death penalty!" That helps explain morally inspired conflict.

My problem with your response to disagreement is that it does not appear to solve the issue I have in mind. In genuine disagreements we aim at contradiction. Crude subjectivism predicts we shouldn't experience the exchange as a contradiction given what it says that "right" and "wrong" means, yet linguistically we do.

Compare with a truth-apt domain:

A: "The Earth is flat!"
B: "No, the Earth is not flat!"

B is negating A's declarative statement. Both can't be true.

Moral claims appear to frequently function the same way:

C: "Abortion is wrong!"
D: "No, abortion is not wrong!"

D seems to be negating C's apparent declarative statement. Once again, both can't be true.

Here are my attempted translations inspired by your comment:

E: "Boo to abortion! Everyone, disfavor abortion!"
F: "Yay for abortion! Everyone, favor abortion!"

or (another attempt):

G: "I have a positive attitude towards abortion. Everyone should have a positive attitude towards abortion."
H: "I have a negative attitude towards abortion. Everyone should have a negative attitude towards abortion."

There is no literal contradiction between E & F or between G & H, where as there seems to be between C & D. That gap is semantic evidence against crude subjectivism (and some non-cognitivist flavors). So I believe my original objections stand (for now). Still, even if one patches these points, I have further concerns.

Have I misunderstood you?

Good write-up. I think I agree with the core of your diagnosis, though I have not read your sources. I'm sadly too ahistorical in my philosophical practice. I want to read MacIntyre soon.

In either case, inspired by your observations, I will spin for a while. The following might be a bit "out-there" but I find it to be an interesting angle.

A possible part of the story is that many take what I would call a pornographic stance towards representations of wisdom. Here, I use the term "pornographic" not in the usual, sexual sense, but rather in a generic sense that C. Thi Nguyen & Bekka Williams (2020) define as using representations of X for the sake of immediate gratification, freed from its usual costs and consequences.

Using philosophy as a form of "wisdom porn" in this sense, people gratify themselves without investing the time and effort to deeply understand the content and its context. For example, one might use bite-sized quotes from great thinkers to feel the immediate rush of sophistication without much care for what the quotes are really about.

A problem with this kind of engagement is that it risks shaping how one engages with philosophy. To gratify oneself—to feed the fantasy of being, for instance, an "alpha male"—one might avoid what is true and good, rather instrumentalizing representations of wisdom that feed this desire. If one's engagement is about gratifying a fantasy, then one has a bad incentive to fetishize the parts of philosophy that gratify instead of engaging with the parts that are worthy.

However, I'm not sure it is necessarily always bad to engage with wisdom porn. It might be a gateway to more genuine forms of engagement. One might learn important things as a side-effect. The question is, if one removed the immediate gratification, facing the difficulties of philosophy, would one still engage?

References:
Nguyen, C. T., & Williams, B. (2020). Moral outrage porn.Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 18(2).

Is right and wrong just a matter of thinking something is right (e.g. it is right to save and improve lives) and something is wrong (e.g. theft, fraud, rape, robbery, enslaving, torture and murder are wrong)? — Truth Seeker

This claim can be cashed out in many ways. I will focus on one common way. I will take the claim to be:

X is right = I have a positive attitude towards X.

I think this view of 'right' is incorrect (and the same for 'wrong'). When discussing ethics, that simply does not seem to be what is meant by the terms.

For instance, it makes sense to hold the thought "I think death penalty is right, but is it right?" Under the view above, this would translate to: "I think I have a positive attitude towards the death penalty, but do I have a positive attitude towards it?" This makes ethical reflection seem trivial, when it does not seem to be trivial. So that is a problem for the theory.

It also fails to handle disagreement. If I disagreed with the previous speaker, and said: "No, the death penalty is definitely wrong", it seems like I tried to contradict them. However, this would not be the case if I'm just reporting my own attitude. To illustrate:

A:"I have a positive attitude towards the death penalty!"

B:"No, I have a negative attitude towards the death penalty!"

A and B are not making contradictory propositions. Both can be true simultaneously. But in these exchanges, we are often trying to contradict the other person. So there is something problematic with the subjectivist theory.

Is there any way to know for sure what is right and what is wrong? — Truth Seeker

Knowing for sure might be difficult for any form of potential knowledge. Can one know for sure that one is not currently living in a simulation? Probably not. Can we still be justified in our beliefs about the external world? I think so.

One should be humble about many ethical beliefs, given that there are often clear uncertainties. Still, one must also take it seriously. Even if it is unfeasible to be absolutely sure, that does not mean we should compromise ethical beliefs, at least not fully.

If someone kicks a dog, even if I cannot be 100% sure that it is wrong, I think I'm justified to take it as such, and prohibit people from abusing their pets. One can be uncertain and serious at the same time.

If I understand you, @Dogbert, you're saying something like:

Because the universe is composed of an enormous amount of matter that all have "streams of consciousness", it is a miracle that a particular stream of consciousness is currently intelligently reflecting on the question and that that particular stream is you. And to explain why this is not miraculous luck, you are proposing that one only has something like subjective awareness during the time and in the world in which one reaches a "highest state of being".

Correct me if I've misunderstood.

My idea of the multiverse stems from pop-culture rather than quantum physics, so I have very little to say on that front. However, there is a possibly strange implication. I find it easy to imagine that there are many very similar worlds in which a stream of consciousness could reach this higher state of being. For example, there could be a world in which you had light mode rather than dark mode active on your browser. Does this not imply that a particular stream of consciousness can be several split streams: one subjectively perceiving dark mode and one light mode? Is it really subjective perspective and 'you' if it identifies a multitude of beings with differing experiences, bodies and location in a branching multiverse?

Perhaps you could explain what you mean by "higher state of being", as you suggested, if that helps clarify what you mean. Is there some filter that prevents there from being a plurality of worlds in which this "highest state of being" is achieved?

Still, I'm skeptical, even if one grants your flavor of panpsychism as true about reality, that 'you' and 'me' identify these streams of consciousness. I'm for instance not sure there even was a 'you' or 'me' before a subjective perspective, even if these underlying streams of consciousness exist at the level of matter. If that is correct, the odds of you being something else becomes incoherent. 'You' could not have remained an atom, because 'you' never were one.

That is, if 'you' only come into existence when a subjective perspective is present, then the probability of 'you' having a subjective perspective isn't a matter of miraculous luck. Instead, having a subjective perspective is a necessary condition for 'your' existence in the first place.

I suppose the underlying question I'm pressing is why believe that 'you' and 'me' could have been atoms?

A lot seems to hinge on what is "you". I'm not sure I could have been anybody else. For instance, I think I only came into existence somewhere during a certain biological organisms fetal period. Or if I'm essentially a particular organism of the species Homo sapiens, as some say, then I couldn't have been a shark. Who we are might be highly contingent, yet, could not have been different without changing identity. If something like this is true, it is not really luck that I exist as a Homo sapiens at a particular time.

Still, there being conscious beings that can reflect on the world is a genuinely puzzling thing. I'm not what best makes sense of it. I'm quite skeptical that I will ever find an answer that satisfies me.

I've tried to "solve" this problem, and the idea I've come up with is that each stream of consciousness perceives the world branch in which they reach a "highest" state of being. — Dogbert

Sounds interesting and to concern things I know very little about. Could you expand on this point?

Because it's the chemicals causing the feeling, not the thing. — Darkneos

I still don't see what you mean.

Firstly, I think it is quite arguable that the chemical reactions that cause our feelings are often themselves caused by external events, like the love I feel when I'm petting my dog. So I think my dog plays a causal role in my feelings of love towards him.

Secondly, once again, I don't see the jump. For example, my visual experience of watching my computer screen typing this reply is caused by my brain's neurochemistry and my optical system, but I don't see why that would mean that my visual experience is not about my computer screen. If one accepts that visual experiences could be about external things even if caused by our brains and optical systems, I don't see why my meaningful experiences of loving my dog that are caused by my brain and sensory systems as I interact with my dog, can't be about my dog.

That could be due to status quo bias, emotions seem to be getting in the way when the result in the end would be the same. — Darkneos

And:

That's status quo bias. — Darkneos

Status quo bias is a fair worry, particularly in the experience machine example. Still, it is less clear in the example with my dog.

Even if the results of our intuitions are biased to some extent concerning the experience machine, that is not enough to conclude that they are biased to the extent that these judgments are invalid. Status quo bias seems to influence how people respond to the thought experiment to some degree, but that does not mean it is only bias. Magnus Carlsen may have self-interest bias if he judges himself the best human chess-player in the world, but that judgment would still be valid.

Furthermore, your phrasing makes it seem like it is only bias that prevents people from accepting pure hedonism. That could be the case, but I don't think that has been established by experimental philosophy yet.

Reasoning isn't really due to chemicals. — Darkneos

Sure, that could solve the dilemma by pointing out a difference between emotions and reasoning. However, this fix seems a bit ad hoc to me. Our reasoning is dependent on our brains, no?

However, it seems to me that the obvious reason why a "genocide of infants" would be fully a "genocide" is because human infants have the potential to become human adults. They are the living continuation of families and cultures. And the destruction of this potential, even if you accept Singer's framing, represents a much greater damage to families and cultures than the killing of livestock. Yet this would also seem to undermine Singer's conclusion, in that an organism's potential seems relevant to its "moral worth," for lack of a better term. Otherwise, infant genocide would just be the same thing as an aggressive livestock culling, except that "it perhaps offends the victims' sentiment more." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Does the following argument somewhat capture your objection to Singer?

(A) If infants are non-persons akin to livestock and the infants potential personhood is not intrinsic to the infant's moral worth, then infant genocide and aggressive livestock culling would be morally equivalent as long as all extrinsic factors are equal (offense to families, etc.).
(B) Infant genocide and aggressive livestock culling are not morally equivalent when all extrinsic factors are equal.
(C) Infants are either not non-persons akin to livestock or the infants potential is intrinsic to the infants moral worth, or both.

Edit: conclusion was too strong before. Fixed for sake of validity.


I think such an argument has force if one accepts Moorean arguments. Many hold (B) with such certainty that one could argue it outweighs the plausibility of Singer's theoretical case. I'm not sure if this is exactly how you meant for your argument to be taken. Please correct me if it is incorrect.

Now, here is how Singer, or a Singer defender, could try to lower the force of your argument:

Bias. Singer would likely give debunking explanations and counter-examples for the intuitions that support (B). (B) is, in this view, without rational support. Rather, it is due to cultural and evolutionary influences that should not be trusted.

Extrinsic potential. As a utilitarian, Singer does value potential states of affairs. Preventing persons from coming into existence on a large scale as with genocide would not maximize utility. The reason why infanticide and abortion are sometimes justified fits this view. A parent may choose to delay bringing a person about via abortion or infanticide, but they are not lowering the amount of persons that would exist. In cases of genocide, this is different, and this is a relevant difference from livestock most of the time.

Emphasis. The comparison with livestock seems worse when one does not consider Singer's wider view that the treatment of non-human animals should be significantly improved. Even if Singer argues for the lower moral status of infants, which is highly counter-intuitive, it should not be taken as being meant to be a comparison to our current treatment of non-human animals which Singer vehemently opposes.

With this in mind, I think there are ways forward for those following Singer to at least temper the effect of your argument. Still, as noted before, I think your argument has force.

"Famously?" No wonder I've never heard of the guy. The underlined random assertion simply doesn't logically follow the preceding factual statement. It doesn't even seem to attempt to. So, at least for me, it doesn't ever actually reach the threshold of what constitutes "an argument". Basically, there is no "therefore" as the logic falls apart at that point so anything that comes after and is based on that non-logical assertion is akin to opinionated rambling. Yet, you seem to entertain it, which suggests perhaps I'm simply missing something. A baby does in fact have the status of personhood, legally, and socially. It's a baby person. Any disagreement of that is like saying a different ethnicity of humanity isn't a person because "I say so", at least to me. It's just another opinion. Do you disagree? — Outlander

That is an understandable reaction to Peter Singer, yet, I think you're missing some context. Singer provides far more than mere random assertions. In Practical Ethics (2011), he spends multiple chapters building the case that leads to his views on abortion and infanticide. Personhood, as he defines it, is not synonymous with species membership, legal status, or social status. Rather, it is about moral status, and, according to Singer, species membership, legal status, and social status, are not what gives a being its moral status. Moral status is about what morally relevant capacities the individual possesses.

Also, Singer actually gives a response to the sleep-killing scenario you describe. In Practical Ethics he writes:

To have a right to life, one must have, or at least at one time have had, the concept of having a continuing existence. Note that this formulation avoids any problems in dealing with sleeping or unconscious people; it is enough that they, at one time, have had the concept of continued life may be in their interests. (Singer, 2011, p. 83)

Singer further justifies this by noting that we can have desires without them being at the front of our mind (Ibid.). I might want to buy a house, but I will only have this desire at the front of my mind when reminded of it in some way. Yet, according to Singer, I still possess that desire while unaware of it. It does not apply to a being if that being has never had a concept of having a continued existence, as Singer argues is the case for, for instance, a fetus.

The intellectual version of a cookie-cutter shock jock. Can't be insightful? Be controversial. — Outlander

He is certainly shocking and even offensive. But, rather than only caring about shock-value, I think Singer is most likely just a genuinely committed utilitarian that follows his arguments to their end, even when it sharply differs from what is deemed acceptable. I disagree with Singer on many things, but I think that he is a serious philosopher.

References
Singer, P. (2011). Practical ethics (3rd ed.). Cambridge University Press.

Meaningful experiences don't tend to be about something else, it only seems that way due to the chemicals in us. You don't actually have love for your dog or anyone else, that's only the chemical flashes happening. Your love is already not accurate. — Darkneos

I don't understand the jump you're making. Let us say I accept that my affection is constituted by chemical flashes in my brain. Why does that imply my affection cannot be about another being, place or object? I don't see how that follows.

It's not striking widely, it's referring to pleasure which appears to be the main motivation behind us doing anything. And if that good feeling can be replicated there is no reason to partake in life. — Darkneos

I'm not sure that is true. Pleasure can often be a strong motivator, but I think it fails to be the main one in many important cases.

To illustrate my point, let us imagine that my dog is about to be put down due to illness. The veterinarian gives me an offer: their daughter wants to practice vivisection and my dog is perfect for this. They know it would be very upsetting for me to live with this fact, so they offer to use a hypnotist to make me forget the ordeal and make me instead believe that my dog died peacefully in my arms as a comforting memory. Furthermore, they will also pay me 100 dollars for me to spend on whatever pleases me.

I would arguably get more pleasure from taking the deal, but I would not be motivated to take it, nor do I suspect most would. I think this is due to us being motivated to care about what actually happens to the being, in this case, my dog, not just our own pleasurable sensations.

Thinking that it has anything to do with beliefs or reasoning is a strawman and dodging the question. — Darkneos

No, I disagree. I extended what seems to be the underlying assumption of your argument to other mental phenomena. This is not doing a strawman. I'm testing your assumption. I think your assumption faces a dilemma. Either, (A) accept that reasoning, which I guess would also be chemical flashes in your view, can refer to the world and be more or less accurate, but then you need to provide a reason for why other mental phenomena, like our meaningful experiences, cannot have such a reference; or (B) use the same underlying reasoning to reject reasoning itself as chemical flashes but thus ending up in a self-defeating position because your argument relies on the accuracy of reasoning.

This is not a strawman. If we were discussing act-utilitarianism and you used the trolley problem to justify your position, it would not be a strawman to bring up the transplant-surgeon case, or the utility-monster to test the position. If the underlying assumption has problems, that spells problems for the specific argument too.

Even if we did grant your point it would only serve to reinforce the argument, not undermine it. — Darkneos

Does it? How?

Also no one is talking about accuracy here. — Darkneos

Is this not one of the most important aspects of the experience machine thought experiment? People seem to care about their meaningful experiences being accurate to reality. I get that you reject this, but I think this is what is under debate and should not be dismissed.

The idea does bug me, the thought that if it's all just chemicals then there would be no real reason to not plug into it. What difference is there if we can just replicate everything? — Darkneos

And:

If everything we take to be meaningful is just the result of chemicals that can be replicated then there is nothing special about what we take to be meaningful. Treasured relationships can be replaced with a machine that just gives you the chemical rewards that having them would, it would render everyone, every thing, and every experience replaceable via a machine that can do the same. — Darkneos

From the above, your argument seems to be something like the following formalization:

(1) If something can be physically replicated in the brain, then that thing is not special.
(2) Chemical compositions can be physically replicated in the brain.
(3) Meaningful experiences are just chemical compositions.
(4) Thus, meaningful experiences are not special (from 1-3)
(5) If meaningful experiences are not special, then one has no reason to not plug into the experience machine.
(6) Thus, one has no reason to not plug into the experience machine (from 4 & 5).

Please correct any inaccuracy. Anyway, I think this is a valid argument, but ultimately I'm skeptical that it is sound. Here are two worries, targeting (1) and (3) in particular:

Aboutness. Meaningful experiences tend to be about something else. For instance, meaningful bonds seem to refer to some other being, place or object. There is an accuracy condition due to this aboutness. My love for my dog is about that existing being, and without that being existing, as it is in the case of living inside the experience machine, my love is not accurate, because the being my love refers to does not exist. If this is correct, it seems like our meaningful experiences are either more than chemical compositions, or chemical compositions can be about something else, and then there is a potential reason to opt out of a life in the experience machine.

Self-defeat. The underlying assumptions of the argument risks striking too widely. Our beliefs, justifications, reasoning, use of logic, would arguably from this perspective be chemical compositions in the brain as well. Yet, they seem to have an accuracy condition, like the one mentioned above. One can accept this accuracy condition as an emergent property of chemical compositions, but then that leaves one with a tension: Why could not meaningful experiences have this accuracy condition if other chemical compositions can? If one rather denies the accuracy condition for reasoning as well, it seems to leave us in self-defeat. Our reasoning could be manipulated to make us think anything is the case so it is not special, it does not matter if it is accurate or not, thus risking to undermine almost all of our thinking, and even the argument itself.