We trust our rationality because it works, not always but often. — T Clark

I would be glad if you could direct any other critiques towards the post, and not independent of it. That would be really helpful for me...... Thanks!

Thanks a lot for the critique of my introductory paragraph. I feel that I did in fact misrepresent the essay quite a bit in the introduction, as I did not extend this idea either ways. Thank you for making me realize this, and for pointing out DCT as a majorly protestant view.

If you do feel that you can read the other parts of the essay, please do, as DCT is absent from the other sections.

As an atheist I didn't understand why the absence of divinity would necessarily lead to a world without righteousness. — ChatteringMonkey

Yeah, that is a real puzzle. Dostoevsky & Nietzsche did think that the transition of society from a theist worldview to secularism would destroy this feeling of "guilt," and let people act without limits. Nietzsche compared the religious idea to traditional tribal ideals that made people act in limits of guilt, and associated the Christian God as the ultimate figure on which people are burdened by (a feeling of guilt). Sigmund Freud also proposed religious norm instillation through his idea of superego.

But, it is still quite a discussion point I think.

That doesn't mean we have faculties of reason that are directed towards truth, just that these faculties don't always work towards their proper ends. — Bodhy

Hmm, I mention a counter to this response in my article.

Let us examine this more closely: In the case of a divine moral law above the human law which is considered objective, if we are conscious and rational so we can make both good and evil choices and at the same time trust our rationality, then we should never mix the two at all. Conclusively, anyone who appeals to the divine law must commit deeds knowing they are good or evil as one is conscious (having the freedom to choose good and evil deeds) and rational (having clear rational distinction between good and evil). If one commits an evil deed but calls it good, then clearly their rationality is clouded and they do not have access to this divine law. One may point out us as imperfect creatures with free-will, and as such not having access to the divine law as we may fall into temptation or sin. There may be an introduction of an ambiguous aspect. Perhaps, there is a divine purpose but it has not been realized completely: but would we really be rational then? — PartialFanatic

I don't think this is true. There are fully rational people who think abortion is acceptable and other fully rational people who disagree. — T Clark

that is per the defining characteristic of the premise: having trust in our rationality.

Most human activity is neither rational nor irrational, it's non-rational. — T Clark

Again, I think you are fundamentally disagreeing with the premise.

I don't see evolution as having a purpose or goal. — T Clark

Oh okay. I mean, you have a fundamental disagreement with the premise of the article. I did not author that premise, and it is what I am using to refute a sub-argument of it.

Plantinga's (flawed) evolutionary argument against atheism. — Relativist

Oh, the above-quoted message is what I am trying to refute.

makes 'the world go round' in the sense of artistic quality. — Red Sky

A pretty common description of this would inter-subjectivity.

Objectivity implies (by def.) that it is independent of human conscience. Can a book, or art, be judged independent of the mind's involvement? Probably not.

If you were to ask for a universal standard, then you would be stuck with the majority's vote unfortunately.

If you were to ask for the best conceivable standard of quality that should be universal, you would be stuck with multiple want-to-be-universal qualities as quality is in the artistic sense (by def. of it being dependent on the human conscience) is subjective. Evidently, there are many art forms which judge art by different standards. So, you may be left with pretty robust standards of quality but none can overthrow the other as art is seen through the human mind.

Interesting take!
First is the obvious problem: natural laws falling into external contingency. The laws are, as you point out, fundamental. They exist simply by their fundamental nature that need not be an external cause. PSR should also, I believe, not be presupposed by an external contingent reason as it must as well be subject to PSR. This external contingent reason would only exist if it is treated as fundamental.

and for a specific purpose — A Christian Philosophy

This is automatically true if you presuppose PSR. This should be true for all types, not necessarily requiring a free-will system.

In addition, I feel there is a lack of distinction between existential reason (reason for existence) and purpose (reason to exist) in "Man itself" section, although I feel that it is irrelevant to the core argument.

This premise is derived from John Lennox's use of theistic evolution as an appeal that we should be able to trust our rationality. The simple statement goes like: "I ask scientists how they are able to trust their theories without a belief in a purpose-driven evolution."

God is a third party, of which is the source of goodness, which was and cannot be the offended nor offender. — Bob Ross

Let's start from here. "It is good because God loves it," points out that good is derived from God. There is an equivalence proposed by Alston..... "We ought to love one another because God commands us to do so." So, loving your neighbors is morally good because God commands us to do so. It should follow then that doing anything bad is to go against God's commands.

Now, going against God's commands..... that should be real offensive to God.

As an extra, the Christian God can forgive any amount of sins that you may commit.... unless you blaspheme the holy spirit. That is when you're beyond saving.

Matthew 12:30–32: "Whoever is not with me is against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters. Therefore I tell you, people will be forgiven for every sin and blasphemy, but blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven.

I would disagree with the rigidity of this notion. Suppose this pen which I am holding has a sufficient reason for why I am spinning it. Furthermore, there is sufficient reason for my existence. So, if there is sufficient reason for my existence that is spinning this pen (with sufficient reason to spin it), it does not necessitate either determinism or free-will because PSR does not necessitate the nature of the object.

Suppose I need to choose between two doors. I would have sufficient reason to choose one door over the other. But, if I were to have free-will, and if I were to have chosen the other door, I would have sufficient reason as well.

PSR is similar to there being a sufficient reason for, say, our choices. Those choices can be either from a free-will or a deterministic system.

humans are often irrational, and not as a matter of choice — wonderer1

I try to tackle on the impossibility of irrationality that the teleological argument proposes, specifically when it is used as an appeal that we should always be able to trust our rationality; I just made that edit.

Some theists might push it onto God. But I do still believe that if you think divinely guided evolution because of which we are rational beings is right, then that also robs us of free-will as we are robbed of the capability to be irrational, specifically if you use it as an appeal that we should always be able to trust our rationality.

The theist here would argue: because it is an action warranted by God. At the least, the word 'ought' or 'should' suggests a verdict, and thus mandates a lawgiver.

The divine law being mandated by God makes it righteous and thus 'good.' So really, you ought to do good because it is..... good. And since good is derived from God, you are basically pointing to a primal reason. Without this precedence, doing good sometimes becomes arbitrary (as some atheists claim such a position).