What is a moral dilemma, and why is it a dilemma? — Harry Hindu

In ethical naturalism, a moral dilemma is the rational weighing of two possible methods for achieving the 'right' outcome to see which is most 'right'. Our genetics, coupled with our environment produces the concept of what is 'right', so that can be considered a brute fact, scientific investigation can determine what course of action is most likely to bring it about.

I'm not seeing what your problem is with this approach, you just keep reiterating that morality is subjective. Perhaps you could explain why you think it must be?

Did Sam Harris provide the name of the scientific field that studies what is right or wrong? — Harry Hindu

No, meta-ethics is the name of the field which studies what is right or wrong. As far as I know the term was coined by GE Moore.

What about any falsifiable theories on what if moral - did he provide any of that? — Harry Hindu

He would probably like to say he did, but personally I don't read anything very new in his work. It's really just some further justification for theories already put forward by philosophers like Williams and Foot.

Morality is the subjective perspective of another's influence on one's personal and group goals. — Harry Hindu

How do you know this?

How can science make a value judgment? It makes observations and simply tries to explain those observations in a consistent way. — Harry Hindu

The 'how' is, like many theories, complicated and is not easily expressed in a short post, but I will do my best.

Physicalism requires either determinism or randomness because there is no physical means by which free-will can make un-caused alterations to the physical universe without dualism.

If there is no free-will then the matter of what a person 'ought' to do (the value judgement about behaviour) becomes irrelevant. There is only what a person will do.

This way science can make predictions about what people will do in response to certain behaviours together with how they will feel.

As to scientists pontificating, the reason I'm happy to use such a term is partly that they are unremarkable scientists, like Krauss or Hawking. — andrewk

That seems like a really odd way of assessing the value of their contribution to the debate. I think both Kraus and Hawking, though unremarkable (I might disagree about Hawking) have both shown themselves, by their work, to be eminently capable of reaching ration conclusions and considering complex ideas. I don't see anything in their failure to produce groundbreaking physics that justifies dismissing their ideas as pontification. That quite a high bar you've set yourself. Are we only to talk about the ideas of those who have made earth-shattering advances in their field?

Your justifications, however, are your own, of course. What's more pertinent to the question are the first two elements of my response which you have yet to answer.

Claiming that science can investigate a range of problems typically covered by philosophy is not unreasonable simply by virtue of being a claim in the future tense, we make many such claims based on current knowledge.

Ethical naturalism does indeed propose a method by which science can answer questions about a field typically covered by philosophy.

So your contention that it's claims are wrong because no such answers have been forthcoming, and that a belief in the possibility of future answers is pointless because no method had been proposed, are both still wrong.

You won’t consider any arguments/ — Wayfarer

What arguments?

Lazy Google on Heidegger and Scientism:

Heidegger is not opposed to science per se insofar as he does not reject the human project of understanding nature. The most well-known basis for dismissing him as simply “anti-science” is the claim he makes repeatedly in Was Heisst Denken? that “science does not think” (WD, 4/8, et passim). But he also says often in this text that “most thought-provoking of all is that we are still not thinking” (WD, 2/4, et passim). His objection is not so much to science as to scientism, that is, the preclusion of other ways of thinking by the representational thinking of the sciences, and the marginalization, displacement, and devaluation of other methodologies and bodies of knowledge by the scientific standard of objectivity that has become epistemologically dominant in modernity.

...For Heidegger....this kind of scientism is the root of nihilism: a blind faith in science (like blind faith in God) means that people can all sink into the tiny worldviews of their immediate perceptual lives in the belief that someone or something else will take care of questions of value (moral meaning) at the same time as whatever-it-is satisfies material, teleological ends 1. — Wayfarer

Yes, I can't stand Heideggar myself, but I'm a deconstructionist (in the literary sense) about philosophical texts. It's more important to me to look at what can be usefully taken from them than it is to understand what the author actually intended to say.

I'm not so sure, however, if the "existentials" he lays out - being-in-the-world, being-with, etc. - would be accepted as properly scientific since they represent ways of being (so to speak) rather than physical properties. — Erik

I think the 'scientific' element comes from the fact that Heideggar expected some refinement or revision. That (to me) entails that there must be a 'wrong' interpretation, in order for that interpretation, to be rejected by Dasein in favour of it's later revision. Presumably then, this 'wrongness' is measurable.

Now it might be that the 'wrongness' is entirely subjective, what 'feels' wrong, but then if that's the case, then Heideggar has said nothing more than "whatever feels right, is right" which I think is about as useful as a chocolate teapot.

If, however, the 'wrongness' can be judged partly by observations of others, then we have something vaguely scientific. Refine those observations to make them more accurate, make models which fit your observations, test those models experimentally and you have social psychology.

OK - you’re stipulating any scientific evidence: — Wayfarer

No, any evidence.

I haven't heard any evidence at all yet that proves conclusively that non-empirical methods of knowledge acquisition actually produce useful results, nor that empirical methods alone must inevitably fail to do so. Therefore, the theory that empirical methods will produce the most useful results is a valid theory and remains so until you can provide conclusive evidence to the contrary.

I’m dismissing it because you yourself are stipulating, in advance, the only kinds of arguments that you are prepared to consider. — Wayfarer

The statement you quote specifies 'questions of quality', not all questions. If you're saying that how useful a theory is or whether it can obtain all that can be known, is a matter of quality, ie a subjective judgement, then why are you dismissing others who think that positivism is useful and obtains all that can be known? Surely that's just their personal feeling and you've no more reason to argue with them about it than you would argue about someone's favourite colour.

If, on the other hand, you're saying that how useful a theory is is an objective judgement, that you could in some way demonstrate to me how useful a theory is (in the way you could not possibly demonstrate to me how good your favourite colour is), then I expect you to be able to carry out that demonstration.

This is a constant theme of these philosophical arguments. When it comes to who is allowed to speak on the matter, philosophy is all manner of objective "Sam Harris doesn't know what he's talking about", "Laurence Krauss is a bad philosopher", but when asked to actually defend it's claims, philosophy becomes subjective, evidence is not required, it's all about feeling and persuasion. But a minute ago there was something to actually know (something Sam Harris evidently didn't), and something to be right about or good at (something Laurence Krauss evidently wasn't).

Either Philosophical statements can be objectively judged, in which case science has a proven record of making excellent predictions about objective judgements, or it is subjective, in which case there is no justification for making statements about who is 'good' at philosophy, nor who 'knows' what they're talking about. There is nothing to be 'good' at, nor anything to actually 'know'.

I wonder if the methods of science are the only ones that count as empirical?

I'm thinking for instance of Heidegger's phenomenological investigation (his "existential analytic") into the basic structures of human existence (Dasein) - and Being more generally - as being highly empirical if not scientific in the traditional sense. — Erik

I think that Heideggar's existential analytic is scientific. He talks specifically about a hermeneutic approach (implying that there is only an 'approaching' to the truth, not a finding of it) and he talks about it being ceaselessly open to revision.

If there is a priori knowledge, then such an investigation as Heideggar advocates would be one way to find it scientifically. Of course, other ways would be neuroscience, psychology, evolution etc.

Someone posted it here before, but it is a perfect illustration of Scientism: — Kitty

Really? That's your idea of a "perfect" illustration of someone's philosophical position, some facetious attempt to childishly ridicule your opponents by mixing up their comments rather than responding to them seriously?

Second thought, actually that is a perfect illustration of the use of the term Scientism. The use of pejorative, often facetious rhetoric to avoid having to actually argue a point.

Again you’re basically arguing that all knowledge is empirical and then demanding empirical evidence as to why it isn’t. — Wayfarer

No, I'm arguing that the idea that all knowledge might be empirical is the best theory for making practical progress in answering the questions we which collectively want to answer about our existence. That's quite some distance from you insulting caricature. And no, I'm not demanding empirical evidence as to why it isn't, any evidence at all will do.

The claim I'm making in defending Scientism is that there is not any conclusive evidence of any sort, that methods other than the use of empirical knowledge make useful progress in answering the questions we have about existence, nor that using empirical knowledge alone makes no progress at all. Therefore is is not reasonable to dismiss the theory that empirical knowledge is the only means of making progress on such questions.

You might disagree with that conclusion, you might well present non-conclusive evidence in favour of your position, I have no problem with that, I'm not claiming it's a fait accompli, I just resent the idea that it's so wrong it can be dismissed out of hand.

This is a bit of a bugbear of mine, and I know that these terms are not universally accepted by any means, but I really think it helps these discussions to stick to the distinctions between morals, ethics and met-ethics. When the terminology gets mixed up it gets very confusing to understand what people are saying.

There is a hugely significant difference between moral action (what action it is 'right' to do in a certain circumstance), ethics (the method used to decide what action is 'right'), and meta-ethics (how you know what 'right' actually is).

It sounds like you're saying that at least your meta-ethics is one of ethical naturalism, your knowledge of right and wrong just seem to come to you without you having to work them out, but your morals (what to actually do) require reason. The interesting bit, is the bit in the middle. The method your rational thought uses to work out what to do. Does that just come to you, or have you had to work out a method at some point. Might you change your method if it's not giving you the results you want?

Questions of quality are of a different order to that. — Wayfarer

How are you proving or supporting this statement? More particularly, how are you doing so in so absolutely a conclusive way that the alternative viewpoint need not even be considered?

SO your response must be: how can you scientifically prove that they’re of a different order? What is the scientific evidence that questions of meaning and quality are of a different order to the quantitative? — Wayfarer

It's not necessary to support the claim that they are of a different order. The claim is that if they are of a different order, then we have no method for answering the questions posed in those areas.

Again, rather than actually lay out any argument you've just resorted to your default "you're so wrong I'm not going to even explain why".

then you’ve essentially declared in advance that anything other than your preferred approach won’t be considered. — Wayfarer

No, you're putting a future tense into a sentence which did not contain one. The claim is that no other method thus far can ascertain an answer to the questions tackled by philosophy, not that no method ever will.

At issue is not the formation of theories about objects of perception, but

treating science as a source of values rather than as a method for ascertaining facts. — Wayfarer — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree entirely, that is what is at issue. The idea that values might be facts and if they are scientific investigation could then ascertain them.

Well it's mostly quite clearly a heap of horseshit that doesn't even do justice to the science itself, but even more obviously no one likes to have their views dismissed on a priori bases. — StreetlightX

Except of course if one's view is that scientific investigation is the only meaningful way to form public theories about reality, in which case it seems quite de rigueur do dismiss them out of hand.

It is when someone prejudges science to be the right tool for the any job without giving the question any critical thought - i.e. precisely without having a reason for it. — SophistiCat

I certainly think this gets close to what people who use the term are thinking, but how are they judging whether critical thought has gone into the judgement? It sounds a little bit like "if they didn't come up with the answer I think is right they mustn't have thought about it carefully enough".

That it can (present tense) answer these questions is demonstrably wrong because there are no scientific answers to the questions. — andrewk

I can run 27 miles, I know this because I have run several marathons. I never actually have run 27 miles, I've always stopped at 26, but I don't think anyone would dispute my claim that I can run 27 miles.

That it may, one day, be able to answer some of the questions is a tenable belief, but it is a belief of no interest, as there are no proposals for how it might happen — andrewk

This begs the question. Ethical naturalists claim to have a proposal for how science can answer questions of morality, you dismiss it out of hand by saying science is inapplicable to morality, and then you claim science has no proposals for how it might answer questions traditionally tackled by philosophy. It's just a self-fulfilling statement.

They pontificate that it's the only way to answer the questions, and that other approaches like philosophy should be discarded. — andrewk

Why is it that when scientists make arguments against certain philosophical approaches they "pontificate", yet when people like Heidegger write what many consider to be meaningless nonsense, they are great thinkers?

many people have found answers to these questions (questions like Kant's 'What Can I know? What must I do? What may I hope for?) in philosophy and/or religion, whereas nobody has found any answers for them in science. — andrewk

This is just nonsense. Either 'answers' are entirely subjective or not. If they are entirely subjective then people have obviously found such answers in science. If they are objective, then how are you judging who has 'found an answer' such that you know for a fact that no one in science has?

One can argue rationally with those of opposing views, but it’s pointless arguing against such predudicial polemics. — Wayfarer

Why is the position that Theology has something meaningful to say a reasonable one, but the position that it does not irrational prejudice?

Kind of stacks the deck, doesn’t it? — Wayfarer

Yes, but so what if it does? We're not setting out, in our joint investigation of our collective experience, to make sure that we maintain the essence of whatever viewpoints everyone started out with. Unless it is possible to eliminate some viewpoints we might as well not bother with any public investigation at all.

it's a strategy of delegitimization that invalidates claims (any claims) because they are not based on scientific understanding. — StreetlightX

I think that's not a bad definition, but what is it that you think people find so odious about that viewpoint? I mean, they're just saying that no other type of claim is valid, not that no-one can hold or talk about any other claims.

Obviously you might not agree with them in that, but I would commonly expect such disagreement to take the form "claims made using method X are valid because...", whereas all I hear in connection with the term Scientism, is the complaint that it denies claims of any other sort. Well, why shouldn't it? Surely, if one has at least a reasonable argument about epistemological claims, one is entitled to make it?

"Scientism" isn't related to science, it's related to people's dislike of someone's use of science they don't like. Science and scientism have the same relationship that magic and religion have: "Magic is religion you don't like, religion is magic you do like." — Bitter Crank

A good analogy. Reminds me of a recent debate I took part in. Cut off a baby's earlobe, that's child abuse; cut off their foreskin, that's religion.

what reality or world are we trying to describe? — Caldwell

The one we experience. Why would we have any cause to describe any other?

Why is science the default method of explanation given to whatever world we are trying to describe? — Caldwell

Because it provides models which are useful for making predictions about it which is the only purpose I can see to understanding it better in an objective sense.

As you can see, science, as that quote would have it (and I'm only relying on that one quote, as a disclaimer) determines the reality-- instead of the other way around.
Explain to me how this happened. (I'm asking a real question) — Caldwell

I don't see at all how science is determining the reality, so I can't answer your question. Presuming a Realist, Physicalist position, reality is a thing, science makes models of it. How do you think it is determining it, from a Realist perspective?

Lawrence Krauss does say it in some of his debates — PossibleAaran

Thanks, I will trawl through some of his debates (although I find him quite unpleasant to listen to so will not make quick progress). I don't suppose you happen to actually have a quote to hand do you?

I would not say 'excessive'. As a science junkie myself, too much science is never enough!

Rather, I regard it as the claim that science should be used in areas where it is not applicable. A prime example is Sam Harris's claim that moral values can be deduced by science. — andrewk

It sounds like you're just moving the goalposts, rather than actually defining the accusation. You've avoided having to define 'excessive' by replacing it with 'not applicable', but this doesn't get us any further to resolving how (and who) to define what constitutes either term. Clearly, Sam Harris, Stephen Hawking and Laurence Krauss think science is applicable in the areas they speak about (or all areas in the case of Hawking), you think it isn't. Can you prove it isn't in some way so objectively demonstrable that others could not reasonably hold a different belief?

If you cannot, then I'm still failing to see how the view that science can answer these question is not just another serious philosophical viewpoint like any other, and yet is continues to be treated with derision. I find Solipsism inappropriate to the questions of existence, but I can't prove it is, so Its just another school of thought. I might make an argument outlining why I think it is an unhelpful way of looking at things, but I don't try to get it ousted from serious debate by applying pejorative labels.

you are overthinking this. There is no such philosophical school of thought as Scientism. It is just a pejorative label; it expresses a subjective attitude. If someone throws an accusation of "scientism" in a conversation, don't agree or disagree, but ask to elaborate — SophistiCat

Curious contradiction I can't quite unpick, in the first half of the paragraph you say I'm over-thinking it, in the second half you advise asking the users of the term to elaborate. Is that not exactly what I'm doing here? Where is the line you think I've crossed between asking for elaboration and over-thinking?

I remember I called Charleton a "dick" before. I can't remember if I ever called you one. Do you remember? — T Clark

Why, is it the sort of thing you're likely to do?

Scientism and figures, such as Harris, are not really debated and taken seriously in acadamic philosophy (at least at my university), so non-academic philosophers might be more emotional when dealing with philosophy. — Nop

I'm not surprised no-one at your university debates Harris as he's a popular science writer and an academic neuroscientist (I would be surprised if no-one mentioned him in your neuroscience department though). That's not really the point. Nothing Harris is saying is new, as I say, he's a popular science writer, his job is to write scientific ideas in a way that lay people can understand, and often he does that job well, particularly within his expertise (the way we think).

I would be very surprised, however, if your university did not take his ideas seriously. That would mean never discussing Phillipa Foot, Bernard Williams, Rosalind Hursthouse, Martha Nussbaum ... Even luminaries like Gurtrude Anscombe. I know for a fact that Edinburgh do (or used to do) an entire module on Ethical Naturalism in their Ethics course, which covers biological influences, so either you go to a really weird university, or we're still not quite understanding each other regarding terms.

I prefer a good Sunday roast to pizza, but I don't describe pizza restaurants in a derogatory way. Its not that 'scientism' isn't to some people's tastes, or that it doesn't approach questions the way some people would like, that I'm confused about. I'm trying to understand why such an approach would cause people to describe it with such disdain.

To me, disdain suggests objectivity. I feel quite strong disdain for certain religions, and I would feel comfortable describing them in a derogatory fashion, but that's because I think I can point to actual harm caused by their beliefs.

With the discussion around Scientism, people seem really quite angered by that fact that those people think this way. I just can't see why.

and with that comes increased dependence on the government. — Sydasis

This is something that has always confused me about opposition to government benefits. I don't really understand the moral objection to being paid by a government. People making this argument (I don't know about you personally) generally seem to have no problem with a CEO earning more than a nurse. I'd argue its impossible to make a case that the CEO actually works harder than the nurse. You may disagree, but supposing it is the case it is clear that the amount one earns is unrelated to how hard one works.

So, a person gets paid X amount by the government to do nothing at all, how is that morally different to a famous model getting paid 100 times as much to do barely more than nothing?

Physicalism makes a ontological claim, Scientism makes a epistenmelogical claim. — Nop

You might be interested in these articles describing exactly the epistemological claims made by Physicalism.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20010220?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
https://philpapers.org/rec/KALEPA

Physicalism doesn't imply Scientism, — Nop

I think there's a good argument that Physicalism does imply the arguments made by people like Harris, but that's not really important. I'm more concerned to try and understand the reasons for the antipathy towards such an approach than I am with its correct taxonomy.

His form of Utilitarianism is philosophically quite problematic. — Nop

So when you say 'problematic' here, are you saying it produces results you don't like, or are you suggesting there's something objectively wrong with his logic?

When I hear "Scientism", I think of the idea that the only reliable way of discovering truth is the method of science. — PossibleAaran

Yes, I think a lot of people make this association, but have you ever heard or read anyone actually making this claim. I can't seem to find any quotes to that effect from anyone labelled as following Scientism.

Properly grasping something in philosophy is necessarily to the extent of one's personal satisfaction. Arguments can persuade and not persuade, and the effect the argument has is defined by personal satisfaction. Subjectivity in this sense doesn't seem problematic to me, why do you think it is problematic — Nop

It's just that you said "we" will not properly grasp... Implying that there is some sense in which you could judge that people other than yourself had not properly grasped something, that's what made me think you were making a claim to objectivity.

I don't object to the idea that people like Harris represent some branch of Physicalism, nor that such a branch might have its own name, I just don't understand why it is being applied pejoratively. He seems to have taken an entirely reasonable logical route to get from his Physicalism to his conclusion that science can determine what is moral.

I always presumed that's what a well regulated militia meant, one which knows the correct order in which to add one's condiments to one's baked goods.

Yes, but what does it mean to be useful? What is the use we are putting the theory to that you and I agree it is good at?

What do you think about my opinion on why Scientism has an "excessive" use of science? — Nop

It still seems to suffer from the same subjectivity that I was trying to get Wayfarer to define earlier. The key word in your explanation is 'properly' in "... we will not properly grasp what, lets say, perception, is.". How do you know when we have 'properly' grasped what perception is, such that you can identify at this very early stage in the investigation that the limitations of the scientific method will prevent us from getting there? What does it mean to have 'properly' grasped something as opposed to, say, having grasped it to one's personal satisfaction?

Regarding the distinctions within Physicalism, I agree that further definitions may be required, but still the claims seem to follow using established philosophical positions. Harris wishes to apply the scientific method to morality, not as an ideological principle, but as the logical consequence of his physicalism.

Moreland,for example, shows how determinism (or at least randomness) is essential under physicalism. I've shown how, for Harris (and others) determinism dissolves Humes's divide, so no further ideological positions are necessary to arrive at the conclusion that science is an appropriate tool for deriving morals. He might be wrong of course, he might have made a mistake in his logic, but no further idealogical beliefs are necessary (no further isms are required).

As mentioned, the model of masculinity that JP uses to highlight these supposedly natural gender differences, at least as I understand it, would not be seen as such in other premodern or maybe even contemporary non-Western contexts — Erik

Absolutely, take this recent study for example
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/348/6236/796

I'm not suggesting that the overwhelming majority of hunter-gatherers don't have a gender based division of labour, but it's far from Peterson's tired old capitalist cliché.

If anyone should doubt it, let them consider this latest UK scandal. — unenlightened

We're raising a militia in Cornwall as I speak.

I think that the doctrine of Positivism is much misunderstood. At its heart, positivism is simply a metaphysical claim that no other metaphysical claims are objectively meaningful because they cannot be falsfied. The claim itself, of course, can be falsified immediately should anyone present a metaphysical claim (other than that of positivism) that are objectively meaningful and so is immune to its own criticism.

As such, I think that Harris could be said to follow an extension of Positivism, in that he is claiming to have further metaphysical claims which can be falsified.

I think it is far better, however, to simply see people like Harris as Physicalist and leave the term Positivism to history. As for a difference, I can't see one. His argument seems to be an entirely logical extension from a belief that free-will does not exist (certainly not a new philosophical position). If there is no free-will, then there is no 'ought'. The concept simply doesn't make sense, so morality comes within the purview of science by virtue of the inevitably that we just 'will' act one way or another,and we just 'will' feel one way or another about the actions of others.

Yes. You learn to expect that from him. — Harry Hindu

So I'm discovering.

Science isn't suppose to address what is moral. Morality is subjective. — Harry Hindu

I understand that such a position exists, but it is not proven to be the case, its a meta-ethical position, a matter for debate, and has been for thousands of years.

Are there people within "Scientism" who are actually claiming that science proves morality is objective, certainly Sam Harris hasn't claimed that (to my knowledge). His claim is that morality seems to be objective (a meta-ethical argument), and therefore, science can tell us what is moral. You might not agree, but I don't see what is wrong with the position such as to justify a pejorative use of the term. I just sounds like an old, well-travelled philosophical position to me.

Facing the risk that you might become as hostile to me as you seem to be against Wayfarer, — Nop

Seeing as Wayfarer has just tacitly labelled some of my ideas as so wrong they're not even worthy of discussion, I'm not sure how you're reading my responses as being the 'hostile' ones, but we can put that to one side.

My question was "What is Scientism?", which I elaborated to explain that what I meant by the question was; how it differs from Physicalism or Positivism such as to require a new label and how it satisfies the claims I've read about it that it's adherents use science "excessively".

You've given me an example of someone considered to practice "Scientism" and an outline of his view on morality. What I'm not getting is how you think that differs from Physicalism or Positivism and why you think it is demonstrably an "excessive" use of science.

You mean select arguments that are easy targets and dodge them when you're faced with evidence that opposes your world-view?

The Parliament could write it. But more importantly than that, is that it should be very difficult to change the Constitution once it is written. — Agustino

So if the current parliament writes it, is that not just making rule-by-mob in perpetuity? Do you honestly trust our current parliaments to come up with a Constitution which you'd be prepared to give absolute authority to?

Equality of opportunity, for example, is very popular at the moment, it seems very likely that if current world parliaments were to write a Constitution, such a concept might well be enshrined in it, would you be happy with such a rule being immutable law?