a truth matters to any given subject matter to the degree that it has bearing upon it. — StreetlightX
the index of any truth for any particular problem must belong to the problem itself: — StreetlightX
the radically stupid idea that anything goes, that anything is worth addressing, and that each and every mundanity is worth its weight in gold. — StreetlightX
It sounds like you're asking how any judgment of quality of argument that's not empirically verifiable is possible. And then asking for an empirical verification to show that that's the case! — Baden
But your criticisms of my argument already presume you're acting on the same presumption I am, and know the answer. The structure is at base, the structure of reason, which undergirds empirical verification in the first place. — Baden
Well, I disagree. I think most people come to a philosophy forum primarily to do philosophy. — Baden
And empirically based results, for example, a poll alone, won't definitively decide the answer. Theory, reason, and critique of thought would come into play. — Baden
you don't appear to want to explicitly accept regular terms of rational engagement which require us to critically analyze each other's posts in order for the conversation to be of any intellectual value. — Baden
The problem is simply that Psuedonuym has an incredibly blinkered view of not just philosophy, but - as it turns out - of basic argument in general, which he thinks can and should only be judged on the basis of truth - the 'empirically verifiable'. — StreetlightX
At this point I doubt it can be helped. He literally doesn't know what he's talking about. — StreetlightX
That's a strawman. We all know there's a difference between science and the arts in terms of empirical verification etc. — Baden
I don't see the attraction of a philosophy forum for you then. The interest for most people here is, I would suppose, in making exactly the kinds of judgments you seem to deem impossible. — Baden
Why post then if your position is it's impossible to judge the difference between a good and a bad argument on its own terms? — Baden
But your argument is the one that's self-immunizing by continuously conflating any form of judgment with personal preference. — Baden
judgements occur in a context in which they are intregrated into a system that is standardized and monitored and based on educational theory not to mention the individual's experience in the field, so it's not simply a case of what seems right. — Baden
At this point I don't even know what your positive criticism is. That there should be no level of intuitive judgment at all with regard to so-called "transcendental stupidity"? In which case, for example, university essays could be marked by computers (and I can explain to you how that would be impossibly inaccurate and unfair if you like.). Or you just don't like the name? Or you don't think it exists at all? Or something like it exists, but not in the form described by Street, or what? — Baden
No, I already gave reasons why it fit with my experience of pedagogy. — Baden
The word "democratic" doesn't apply exclusively to elections. I'm using it here in its senses of 'common/shared/available to all' etc. — Baden
Anyone who can think. — Baden
integrated with our intuitive judgements (based on experience) — Baden
The idea that we judge simply on the basis of what 'seems' right or feel we are promoting some universal truth as opposed to everyone else's ideology is bizarre. — Baden
To claim that they can't would be analogous to claiming that we can't make sound and reasonable judgements concerning each other's posts here on this forum, and can just retort to every criticism with "well, that just seems right to you". — Baden
it's about as democratic a take on stupidity as you might find: a communi stultitia. — StreetlightX
"a stupidity built into the nature of thought" could hardly be more democratic. — Baden
if someone were to use this idea as a cudgel for an ideology, they'd simply be being hypocrites in an amusing way. — Baden
"... remarks without interest or importance", what a load of supercilious bullshit. — Pseudonym
Why? — Baden
presenting it as a theory doesn't magically turn it a theory. — Akanthinos
f Pattern-chaser can say with any semblance of rectitude that Putnam's brain-in-a-vat "theory" does not provide us any evidence to support either its conclusion or its contradiction, it is exactly because it did not even attempt at becoming an hypothesis. — Akanthinos
Putnam's BIV was never about what Pattern-chaser's want it to be. Not even close. — Akanthinos
...you are doing a serious disservice to philosophy by spreading this misrepresentation. — Akanthinos
Jesus bloody Christ.
The brain in a vat scenario doesn't describe a theory — Akanthinos
What makes an apple remain 'an apple' as if 'apple' is something anywhere other than in ones own personal representations? — Blue Lux
Yes, and a male-oriented brain running a female body might explain gender dysphoria as something other than a delusion. — Pattern-chaser
'm interested then, given the proposal I formulated for speaker-oriented and addressee-oriented addressing, why you think one is better than the other. — angslan
I'm not sure I said that. — angslan
Your argument requires a premise that only admit exclusivity - and ignores non-binary and spectrum concepts of gender. — angslan
I am convinced, at this point, that your philosophy on this issue is a rationalisation for how you already feel. — angslan
What an intractable issue! If only there were some field like intersectional feminism that didn't treat all women as identical, and then this type of categorisation wouldn't be a problem. We can only hope, I guess. — angslan
I critique the foundational point. — angslan
Because it is relevant to the discussion of whether gender categories are exclusive. — angslan
if people disagree on definitions, address-oriented addressing means that both will compromise when addressing the other. — angslan
That doesn't mean that they are exclusive. I literally just wrote on this. — angslan
Did you reply about intersex people and gender identity yet? — angslan
Did you show your principles of compromise? — angslan
Did you respond regarding your concept of what is more harmful in terms of denying identity? — angslan
But just because one can reach a different conclusion rationally that doesn't mean that people do do so. Intolerance can be inferred just by the simple fact that trans persons are treated as lesser persons -- they are the butt of jokes, they are objects of violence, they face workplace discrimination, and sometimes families are churches are not as accepting as other communities. Coming out as trans can sever one from friendships or families.
It's one thing to have a question and come to a conclusion but still treat people more or less fairly, and quite another to punish them for their difference. That's intolerance. — Moliere
I don't agree that it is implied that the sets are mutually exclusive from the trans claim. In fact, the claim requires that they are not, as I pointed out earlier. Just because someone identifies as a woman does not mean that they have no qualities associated with the set {men}. In fact, in many instances people who make claims that they are a woman have a penis, so this categorically cannot be part of the claim. — angslan
I mean, we're not. That is abundantly clear from the different and distinct uses that we have currently in discussions of various sorts. — angslan
No you haven't, you have, at every turn, applied your own premises that ignore a fundamental part of trans claims - including the variety of trans claims (e.g. binary, non-binary, spectrum concepts of gender). — angslan
I've repeated it several times, including in this post. At this point I cannot tell if you are receptive to what other people write, because I don't believe you've ever responded to this content in my posts. This is, in fact, quite infuriating. — angslan
I haven't seen an argument from you regarding relative harms that suggests one set of harms is greater than the other, so I really don't know where you stand here. — angslan
I've said that how we treat (and address) people can either respect their interiority/subjectivity/identity or treat them as objects (i.e. defined and categorised by the addresser regardless of the interiority/subjectivity/identity of the addressee). I've made an argument that addressee-oriented addressing preserves self-respect because it preserves that speakers can address themselves (either explicitly and externally or self-reflectively and internally) according to the concepts that they feel are appropriate. — angslan
I think I've done a better idea of proposing a compromise. — angslan
I am trying to grasp the grammar of your first sentence as clearly as possible, and I am having a little difficulty. I think this is unfortunate, because this seems like an important statement. Is there another way to phrase it that might help me out more? — angslan
I am surprised at the claim that no offence should logically be taken - you rejected that idea for feminists who claim that addressing trans people compromises or threatens their own gender identity. — angslan
I strongly feel that you should leave this part out of your arguments for the moment - this is a whole nother can of worms to debate whether this technically constitutes a delusion or not. The DSM does not consider gender dysphoria, for example, a delusion. What it does do it start to sound like some sort of attack against trans people, which I think is going to cloud your argument. — angslan
This is why my argument engaged with respect in forms of address and not the universal application of words. None of these words are unique in their variability across times and places and people. — angslan
I don't think either group uses them generally inconsistently or incoherently, though they certainly do not agree with each other. And I think that any strict definition is going to land someone in a logical quagmire where some level of coherency falls apart when using strict definitions to make claims. — angslan
Is this discussion about language? Or relative harms? How to treat each other? Or whether trans people are delusional? — angslan
And while I think your explanation may fit for some people, I don't think it would fit for all the trans persons I've been in contact with. — Moliere
I tend to believe in taking people's word at face value, absent any other sort of basis of inference. — Moliere
I don't think these things defy definition. But I don't know enough about the biology involved even to hazard a guess. The fault is mine. I believe that human bodies are adapted to their sexual/gender differences because I can't see that one, er, configuration could adequately deal with both. Am I wrong? :chin: — Pattern-chaser
I don't assert any specific difference, only that these differences exist, yes? — Pattern-chaser
What the statement does not claim is that anyone else belong to that set. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Within this claim, therein nothing exclusionary because the womanhood they are referencing (if they have one/their feelings are accurate) is only their own. — TheWillowOfDarkness
In declaring themselves to be a women, they don't suppose any restriction or exclusion about who is a woman. — TheWillowOfDarkness
'm not 100% sure about this, but it might be determined by how you define sets. One alternative is the idea of a family resemblance, in which
things which could be thought to be connected by one essential common feature may in fact be connected by a series of overlapping similarities, where no one feature is common to all of the things. — angslan
This is contested depending upon which conceptual framework of gender you subscribe to - there are binary, non-binary, and spectrum-based concepts of gender and sex, — angslan
I mean, sure - but just as with a whole host of words, there is not one set definition is usage that all speakers agree upon at any one time. Language is constantly in evolution. There can be agreed upon meanings in certain circumstances that are strict (e.g. legal or academic definitions) but outside of that it is a bit fuzzy. I've seen a very elongated argument regarding whether a hotdog classifies as a sandwich or not, and a poll in which about half of respondents thought it was. — angslan
So I think you might follow where I disagree about this strict set membership concept that you set up early in point (1). — angslan
if someone with XY chromosomes and a penis claims that they feel like a woman, it is inherent in this claim that these chromosomes and outward sex characteristics are not necessarily correlated with how people feel about their gender. If they did, then the claim would be impossible to make in the first place. So any part of your argument that attributes this to the transgender claim is incorrect. — angslan
Oh, I see - if that is way you are perceiving it, then yes, this is the way I am suggesting to address people. — angslan
- saying, "This woman is an idiot" doesn't say something about all women.
Of course if you say, "Women are idiots" you are going to be talking about all women - but the same is true of you say, "All Bills are idiots" about Bills. — angslan
You think someone can only feel some way if there is a strict categorisation? — angslan
Except, as has been pointed out, your argument is incompatible with trans claims. So it doesn't seem to be based on trans claims at all. — angslan
The only problem I can see is determining which definition to restrict the existing words to (this may or may not be a similar debate to whether gay marriage is 'marriage'). But at the moment we don't have two different words, and I don't see that being problematic either. — angslan
No. This is a continual confusion of sex and gender. I'm not advocating people use physiological or psychological features, I'm advocating that people address others according to their own wishes on the subject, regardless of whether they even consider a distinction between the two. — angslan
Because you have provided so much evidence that the term was only applied to outward secondary sex characteristics historically? At least if you are going to ask for evidence you would think that you would also provide some information on the historical use of the term. — angslan
Yes you can. Not all women feel the same. Not all women are the same. This is fundamentally, and trivially, true.
To use your example, if I say "she is an idiot", I am not calling all women idiots. — angslan
Well, I was using both the contexts of references to bodies in earlier discussion and the examples of both anorexia and phobias you raised. — TheWillowOfDarkness
The use of delusion I was referring to also differs from hallucination. It doesn't necessarily pose a phenomenalogical appearance. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Delusion usually implies some sort or misread phenomenological presence in the world. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Firstly, the truth of an identity isn't defined by a feeling. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Secondly, the point I was making about the individual was descriptive of a state of a person feelings, not a claim about if their feelings were right. It's point about who their feeling is about about, not whether it's accurate or not. — TheWillowOfDarkness
A persons feelings about their identity reference them, not other people. In any case a person's feelings about their own identity only reference them. The feeling in question is only about them. — TheWillowOfDarkness
They are feeling they are a woman , — TheWillowOfDarkness
I guess I would say to this proverbial Mary that there's nothing lost in including Jane. — Moliere
Delusion usually implies some sort or misread phenomenological presence in the world. Seeing something which isn't there. — TheWillowOfDarkness
I would have thought the logical inference at play was obvious... we are speaking about an individual's feelings about their own identity. The very concept we are using is limited to a feeling about her own identity. She not feeling about other women's identity in this instance. The feeling is a sense of her own. — TheWillowOfDarkness
So to call someone a woman is equivelant to saying I am a woman? There is not a difference between the third and first person uses? Is that what you're saying? — Moliere
I recognize that for some feminists it does not work this way, though I'd like to know why. But it's worth noting that for some feminists it does. — Moliere
Without reference to the bodies in this way, there is no longer a standard for their feelings being false in the claimed sense of delusion. — TheWillowOfDarkness
If a mistake about the body is not at stake, we no longer have a clear reason for saying someone feelings "are false." — TheWillowOfDarkness
When someone sets out such an identity, they are only speaking for themselves. They are only talking about their feelings of sex and gender. If someone has feelings claiming to be a woman, said feelings don't act to report how anyone else is a women. Each woman has their own feelings which report (or do not report) the fact of their identity. — TheWillowOfDarkness
I mean, you're really not representing trans claims accurately at all. No matter what I've said to you, you've gone back to the same set of misinformation regarding trans claims. — angslan
'm not sure babies have such complex thoughts that they can clearly communicate to a midwife (which is the context of this statement). — angslan
I feel that there is a clear decision here to ignore the things said in posts - you've heard my answer on this twice now. — angslan
This doesn't present to me why it would be more difficult or more morally complex to learn someone's gender from them than it is to learn their name, however. — angslan
My point is the delusion story has nothing to do with bodies. — TheWillowOfDarkness