To be experienceable, an object must disturb its surroundings and such change in the environment must be experienced by something other than itself.
I don't think it is the actual act of being experienced per se that constitutes something's existence, but rather the potential to be experienced. — Pfhorrest
I also do not think that the existence of an object depends on it being experienced. An object must exist before it is experienced. I completely agree with you in this matter, and I believe this to be a fact.
On the other hand, the idea that the potential-to-be-experienced determines the existence of an object with the potential to be experienced assumes the existence of the potential before the existence of the object, and how can a potential be a quality of something that does not yet exist? How does the potential exist prior to the object? Maybe I am wrong in assuming temporality in this case, but no matter how hard I try, I am not able to imagine a potential as being a quality of something that does not exist.
I would instead say not that to be is to be perceived, or that to be is to be experienced, but that to be is to be experienceable. — Pfhorrest
To be experienceable, an object would require the future existence or the present (concurrent) existence of that which will experience the object. This idea assumes an interaction as you mentioned. I agree in that this interaction is a requirement for the existence of the thing in question.
You say that it is its potential to be experienced and not the interaction per se which constitutes the existence of an object, correct me if I am wrong.
According to your view, a single object in the universe, a unity, a particular, may exist even if other things do not exist because it has the potential to be experienced in the future. But the potential must exist before the object (again, I might be wrong in assuming temporality).
I'd say the existence of the interaction constitutes the existence of the interacting objects. From this would follow that a single object, a unity, a particular, cannot exist.
Again, in my view, it is not interacting what determines the existence of things but the interaction itself; in this case the interaction does not exist prior to the objects since it would be impossible, but the objects' existence depends on them interacting, which again assumes the necessity of multiple things existing.