When we talk about things being real, the paradigmatic cases are chairs and rocks and the screen on which you are reading this text. Or "This is a hand". — Banno

Yes, that's utilizing the pragmatic definition, but such a definition is necessarily confined to the entity finding utility in the definition, illustrating my point that such definitions are dependent on said entity, which presumably has something that qualifies as mental processes.
To reach for objectivity, one has to abandon the mind-dependent paradigm. The suggestion of a causal entities is floated as one way to go about it. I tend to go for examples not too close to what most of use would choose, so an example of a causal structure is Conway's Game of Life (GoL). It describes a 2D space+1D time structure where each 2D state is determined from application of its 'laws of physics' to the prior state. That makes it a causal structure. So an 'object' like a glider exists by such a causal definition, and yet you won't find one on your coffee table.

I should have that as exists-to-me. That might signal that the existence referenced is not existence qua, but instead existence-to-(a someone). — tim wood

a something, not a someone. Yes, it is a relation, and there can be no necessity of a 'someone' if it is to be mind independent. So yes, presuming such a relational definition, you get this:

And that leaves the question of existence itself - does the stone exist?

The question is meaningless with the relational definition, so a different meaning is implied by that usage. Does it exist? Does it matter? Would 2+2 not equal 4 if the 2's lacked existence? Must fire be breathed into the equation for it to be fact?

And this gets Kantian.

Which sucks because what little I know of Kant is his idealism, which seems off topic for a discussion of mind-independence, but what do I know of what Kant might contribute?

As a practical matter of course the stone exists. In some sciences the presupposition is that the stone exists, And in some other sciences, "exists" and "stone" might have to be defined as terms of art.

That practical usage is a relational one, despite most missing that there's a relation implied. I'm trying to go well beyond that practicality. I don't thing the existence of the stone is any sort of illusion. The true nature of it is hardly classical like it's treated, but classical treatment is quite pragmatic. The stone relates to me, and typically that is simplified to objectivity. Why not?

I've evolved - no cleverness on my part, just through reading - to an understanding that there is no such thing as a cause — tim wood

Physics being causal and there being 'a cause' are different things. Got some examples? I mean, a butterfly yawns in Brazil and a hurricane happens 3 months later. Had the butterfly not yawned (like they even can, I know...), the hurricane would not be, but other ones would Is the butterfly the cause of it? Heck no, but it contributed. Is there one cause of the storm? Is there one cause of the murder? Of course not. Does that mean that the guy that shoved in the knife isn't responsible? Probably not.

Maybe I'm off track and your example can let me know what is mean by their being no such thing as a cause.

You argue it does not exist? — tim wood

The stone stands out to me, so it exists to me. But that's expressed as a relation. Most people's concept of existence is a relation, even if they don't call it that.

Kindly make that argument clear and explicit. I myself distinguish between ideas and (material) things, both real — tim wood

So do I, to the point where at any point I want to reference the idea, I will say 'perception of X', 'concept of X', or whatever.

If ideas are real then how can you say that they do not independently exist? — Harry Hindu

Not independent at least of the process via which they are implemented.

You might say that ideas of rocks need rocks to exist — Harry Hindu

Nah... My ideas of unicorns exist despite the typical assertion of the nonexistence of the unicorns.

I have no problem at least holding to a mind-independent view or notion or idea, of reality, given a particular set of presuppositions, those in turn given from the kind of intelligence supposed as immediately in play. — Mww

Cannot parse this. Are you speaking of the intelligence making the presuppositions? Would that be you? Is reality dependent on your suppositions?
How is a presupposition distinct from a supposition?

If it isn't idealism then it must be some form of panpsychism. — Harry Hindu

You seem to misunderstand the OP. I'm not suggesting that mind causes the existence of things, but rather that the minds cause the concept of existence of things. Whether that concept corresponds to objective fact is an open issue. People tend to assert the existence of things perceived. (They're presumed to exist) because they are perceived, but I think you're reading it more as They're presumed to (exist because they are perceived). The latter is the idealism I'm not talking about.

Minds are not fundamental. Information is. — Harry Hindu

:up:

What do we take away from all this? Perhaps that ontology runs backwards. The existence of a causal thing is not objective, but rather works backwards from the arrow of time. Future measurements cause past measured events to come into existence, at least relative to the measurement done. And by 'measurement', I mean any physical interaction, not a mind-dependent experiment does with intention. Such a definition would be quite consistent with the Eleatic Principle, no? — noAxioms

Sure, but what about your mind? Is your mind in the past? — Harry Hindu

More to the point, are 'you' in the past, and per the reasoning quoted above, the answer is yes. A relational view is described there, and Rovelli (from Relational Quantum Mechanics) says that a system at a moment in time does not exist since it hasn't measured itself. It can only measure the past, so only prior events exist relative to a measuring event.

Based on what you are saying, another's observation of your brain would be in the past, but your mind, for you, is in the present. — Harry Hindu

Well, not being a presentist, I would word such comments more in B-series. Any particular brain state includes observation of past states, binding those states into a meaningful identity. I (some arbitrary noAxioms state event) have but one causal past (a worldline terminating at said event), but no causal future since no subsequent state is measured.

This is quite different from a more classical presentist view where only current state exists (all unmeasured, all counterfactual), and the past is but a memory, not real.

If you're going to make an argument for causal systems being real — Harry Hindu

Eleatic Principle says that all causal states are real. The principle has an objective wording, not the weird backwards-arrow causal ontology described by the paragraph quoted.

BTW, minds do not come into play with either definition. Your example involved a mind, but it didn't need to.

If you're saying it's backwards then you are saying that complexity is fundamental and simplicity arises from complexity

No, no complexity required at all. Just causal interactions.

Frege wrote:

If we want to emerge from the subjective at all, from the realm of ideas, we must conceive of knowledge as an activity that does not create what is known but grasps what is already there. — Basic Laws of Arithmetic, 23 — J

Quite agree with this. Grasping what is objective truth. Does it being fact imply that 'it is already there'? Do the phrases mean the same thing?

Not so sure about McCarthy's quotes

1. There is an objective reality, independent of, but accessible to human knowledge. — J

If it's objective, there's an incredible lot more of it that the tiny spec accessible to humans. So I cannot agree with this statement, or that it follows from the Frege quote. Natural sciences seem to be only relevant to our world, not objectively relevant as is the case with mathematics.

Here's what I would not defend:

1. A use of the term "objective" to mean "out there in a timeless, changeless way that is not only independent of how human consciousness pictures it, but also somehow identical to it." (Frege probably did believe this.)

If reality isn't out there in a timeless way, then it is contained by time, a larger reality than 'all of reality', which seems very contradictory. Time seems very much to be a property of this world (and any other causal structure). Intuition might say otherwise, but truth is not the purpose of intuition.

The problem here, in my opinion, is that if every physical object is taken to qualify as an 'observer' (which seems to be implied by your assertion that any physical interaction is a measurement), then the number of 'perspective' is probably to high. — boundless

Some clarification then. I use 'observer' to mean something like people, any entity which can gather information and attempt to glean its own nature. 'Measure' on the other hand comes from quantum mechanics, the most simple interaction between two 'physical' states, say a rock measuring rain by getting wet and getting a jolt of momentum from the drop. That's a measurement, but not an observation.

If QM could be in principle be applied at all scales, if you consider, say, the fall of a pen on a table, the 'perspectives' are incredibly many. — boundless

Yes, hence there being an incomprehensible quantity of worlds under something like MWI. You list a classical interaction, but the tiny ones are far more frequent.

Personally, I prefer to interpret QM epistemically, in which case there is no 'causal' role of the observer. — boundless

Go Copenhagen then. It's the point of that interpretation. There's no causal role of the observer in any interpretation except the Wigner interpretation, which Wigner himself abandoned due to it leading to solipsism.

However, it might mean that there is a limit of that we can know about mind-independent physical reality. — boundless

I'm not too worried about not knowing about it. But positing that only the parts that we know are all that exists is what makes such a premise in an observer-dependent definition of existence.

I do believe that positing a mind-independent reality is simply necessary to do science — boundless

Positing that the stuff we see is mind independent is indeed necessary to do science. But positing that all of reality is confined to the stuff we see is what I typically see in assertions of what exists. It's a very pragmatic way of looking at it, but not an objective way of looking at it at all.

First we have to consider the meta-metaphysics of "mind-independence"; should mind-independence be understood to be an existential claim that the world literally exists independent of the senses? Or is mind-independence merely a semantic proposal that physical concepts are definitionally not reducible to the senses? — sime

You see the distinction then, articulating it in a different way than I had.

Let's say you have a compact disk of Mozart pieces. In a mindless universe, that disk is just a collection of particles assembled in a disk with a bunch of tiny pits. There's no musical information, right? — RogueAI

A CD player will still produce the air vibrations of the music. Nothing will be around to interpret those patterns as music though. Tree falls in forest. Ground shakes, as does air, but it that making a sound?

What about numbers? — RogueAI
What about them? A number is an idea. — tim wood

I think there is a thing in itself behind the idea. Sure, isolated minds can independently come up with the same mathematics (unlike any God story), so that's pretty hard evidence of it having more existence than just a shared idea.

As if causal processes were clearer than the chair on which I sit. — Banno

I think they are clearer. OK, the chair affects you personally, but I cannot conceive of any observer sans some sort of causality being involved. For as old as the definition is, I find it to be elegant and still applicable.

Most other philosophers who see any worth in SR or GR seem to motivate the notion that the central lesson to be learned from said theories is their strong emphasis on causality defining many familiar notions. — substantivalism

Causality has been defining most of those familiar notions a lot further back than those theories. The eleatic principle dates back to the Greeks.

Yes, Simultaneity is conventional under SR, an abstraction, not anything physical, even if the convention uses causal means. That did change from the physical simultaneity that was presumed before, and is still presumed under presentism.

Classical physics is completely fine with conceptually expanding their ontologies or metaphysics to accommodate unseen entities which possess no casual import.

Hmm, like what? The existence of a preferred moment in time? What else? I can think of more, but the list gets more hand-wavy the further you go. What's classical physics got to do with it? What has post-classical physics taken away that classical allowed? It seems like post-classical actually added more to the metaphysics, not taken it away.

Is gravity curved because it can only be modeled with curvature?

Gravity is curved? You mean a model where gravity is explained by curvature of spacetime? There are alternate models to that, so your 'only' doesn't hold.

Why would time seem to pass more quickly in a more objective frame? — Metaphysician Undercover

Under realist physics, time seeming to subjectively pass faster or slower seems to be a function of boredom vs productivity and has nothing to do with where you are or how fast you're going.

Under idealism, there's nothing with which to compare one's own perception of time passage.

Just classical existence realism. — substantivalism

Both presentist and eternalist views fit in with that, so I'm fine with it. 'Realist' is an adjective, so one can be realist about one thing and not another. Said Berkeley idealist is realist about mind for instance, but that is admittedly not the classic realism of <the matter I see is real> (which sound an awful lot like idealism to me).

The eleatic principle you mentioned above is a very mind-independent worded principle:
"only entities with the capacity to cause changes or be affected by them are real"
But the only literature I can find that references this principle ignores what it says and drags in their mind-dependenct biases. See the paper by Colyvan, which seems to be about half the hits on a google search of the term.

rabid berkeley idealists.

Very often any view different from your own looks rabid.

As there is not definite future or past. . . THEY DON'T EXIST under presentism remember.

Quite the opposite. The terms 'future', 'present' and 'past' are only ontologically meaningful under presentism, the view that divides all events into those three categories. There being no such division under eternalism, all events share identical ontology. Hence the lack of tensed verbs when discussing the view since tensed verbs make reference to something that the view does not posit.

As for past and future events existing, they do under some versions of presentism (I listed maybe 5 flavors above) and not under other versions. The 3D version says only present events exist and the others do not. There is just space and the current state of matter, which evolves in place.


Derailments aside, the topic was supposed to be about absolute frames and presentism. Under said realist view, presentism seems to require absolutism, and absolutism directly contradicts the premises of special relativity. That doesn't make either view wrong, only mutually incompatible. SR premises can be reworded in an epistemic manner instead of ontic, and then the contradiction goes away.

Do you agree with any of that?

We don't know how time passes. — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't even know if it passes, so yea, I agree.

Doesn't relativity indicate that the time experienced is unique to the spatial conditions of the individual?

Relativity says the opposite: First postulate is that physics (including the experience of anybody, anywhere) is frame and location independent. Time is thus experienced identically for everybody. If this were not so, you could identify a more objective frame by the experience of time passing more quickly there.

If it's true that one's experience is frame dependent, then relativity is open to blatant falsification.
Of course, from an idealist PoV, flow of time is all that is experienced, and the rest is fiction.

I wonder if time isn't the thing we experience — flannel jesus

Depends on one's definition of time. I can think of 3 kinds right off, and proper time is the one experienced. The others are coordinate time (computed, not experienced), and the flow of the present (zero empirical impact).

I don't think you can have an experience in just a snapshot of existence. — flannel jesus

That's an interesting topic in itself. Experience seems to be a process, not a state. A process is at minimum a change of state over some finite time. The issue of Boltzmann brains gets into this, where you don't so much hold beliefs, but you hold memories of beliefs (same thing?).

Existence CANNOT wait to be decided. — substantivalism

In a classical universe, this sort of thing might work, but our universe is not classical, and the vast majority of interpretations of physics do not have things/states existing until after measurement. Photons for instance seem to only exist in the past. Interesting problem for the presentists, but they get around it.

Look up 'principle of counterfactual definiteness' (which says pretty much what you just said) and then note how very few quantum interpretations accept this principle. Bohmian mechanics is the only well known one that does.

we cannot just say that nature doesn't know what things there are until the time when you do observe it. Before it's observed, during, and after nature should always give an answer on this if we demand its objectivity.

This is trivially falsified. I cannot demand of nature to tell me the state of some event that has 'happened' but is further away that light could travel in the elapsed time.

... nature 'knows' instantaneously what things exist and what things don't WITHOUT delay.

Anthropomorphising nature, and per the first paragraph above, no it doesn't.

Nature doesn't have to wait for you to get light from andromeda to say whether it exists

That's because its presence in the past has been measured, and it's kind of a big thing to somehow have vanished in that small time, so its existence now is highly probable.

... when the light is emitted. . . when it travels. . . and when it finally gets to your eyes. . . IT ALWAYS STILL EXISTED.

Yes. Light has classical existence, but the universe is not classical. Photons do not have classical existence. The one is a probability thing, just like 'Andromeda is probably still there, as is the moon.

. while light is emitted. . . travels. . . and gets to your eyes is also objectively answered.

Subjectively actually. Empirical data yields subjective existence, not objective. The former is a relation, as in your 'being a part of the same reality' relation.

Hasn't Eternalism also given itself numerous other unsolvable problems? — substantivalism

Can you name some? Can you name some for presentism? Neither works for M-U because he's an idealist and both are real interpretations of time. Eternalism not being compatible with it isn't a falsification of eternalism any more than the validity of eternalism being a falsification of idealism.

That's right, I do not experience you listening. — Metaphysician Undercover

I cannot think of any view that suggests that you would. I may have suggested that you experience the time during which I was listening instead of being stuck experiencing only the time that you are talking.

And to determine what I am experiencing at the same time (simultaneously) as you listening requires principles of measurement.

You misunderstand. I am not asking for a determination of when that time is, only that you must inevitably be simultaneous with it at some point, unless you are skipping over swaths of time
Let's say you are on Earth an I am on Mars, 15-light minutes away. You speak a short message. I get it anywhere from almost instantly to a half hour later. Unless you doze off during that half hour, you're going to experience the time during which I am listening to the message.

Oddly enough, under presentism, that half hours is a proper half hour, not an actual one. There is no way to know how long it takes for an actual hour to pass since one does not experience the actual flow of time, but rather one experiences proper time, same as what clocks measure.

I'm arguing that physical you does move along a number line; it's called the timeline of your personal history — ucarr

The correct term is 'worldline', and I am everywhere present on it, and thus it is not something along which I move. Yes, that is an example of physical extension, and there are examples of physical motion. The part I'm denying is numbers supervening on physics instead of the other way around.

You're saying quantum fields are mind-dependent? — ucarr

I don't recall saying that, but if the existence of the world in which those fields apply is grounded in human presence in that world, then yes, they, like the rocks, seem pretty mind dependent. I meet few realists who go beyond that bias. Tegmark is one, but he goes to the extent of 'everything exists' or maybe 'everything possible', which is a problematic stance.

Quantum fields are measured.

They probably wouldn't be posited if they were not measured, yes.

I should've written, "If it's a necessary premise that cannot be justified - as with a first-order system - it's axiomatic.

Hence the axioms of mathematics for instance. Without careful selection of axioms, mathematics as a tool would be pretty useless. So better written, yes.
I don't find EPP necessary. 'We need to do something about that asteroid headed for us' works just fine without adding 'only if it objectively exists' to the end. We can see the asteroid coming. It shares the same objective ontology as do we, and exactly what that objective state is doesn't seem to be relevant to the situation at hand.

This puts you fundamentally at odds with science because all scientific theories are axiomatic to the extent that they cannot be proven.

Science doesn't depend much on a specific stance on metaphysics. It pragmatically uses a definition like E4, even if E4 is mind dependent, because science is all about knowing and predicting, which is also mind dependent.

If it's true nothing can be asserted prior to existent mind (MPP) ...

That would be EMPA (existing mind precedes asserting, and also MPA: mind preceding asserting). Predication (a rock being massive) is different than a mind noting a predication. Hence the rock can be massive sans mind (MPP false), but it still takes a mind to conceive of predication (MPCP). This is per my OP where concept of X needs to be explicitly distinguished from X.
None of MPP, MPA, nor MPCP specify an existing mind. It just say mind, which may or may not exist depending on definitions chosen.
I accept MPA and MPCP, and EMPA only with EPP, but not MPP. It seems logical that mind would precede any mental constructs.

Anyway, the bold part of your argument begs the conclusion, so the demonstration says no more than: "If EPP is true, then EPP being false entails a contradiction".

Where is yours?

I'm not making a positive claim. A negative cannot be demonstrated, only falsified by counterexample.

If you doubt the objectivity inferable from social interaction, then you've fallen into solipsism.

You mistake a relation for objectivity. Social interaction establishes a common relation. I'm totally fine with a relational (finite domain) definition of existence, even if EPP doesn't hold under it.

You do exist in Moscow because your residence in ¬ Moscow, if true, is a fact in Moscow.

OK, but you're changing domains to say that, and the existence of something in one domain is not always a fact in another. What about something that resides on a planet near the star Deneb? Its presence there is not a fact in Moscow (it might be under some non-local interpretation of QM where retrocausality is allowed). That example is one of a more disjoint domain, and they get more disjoint than that. The thing residing near Deneb has predicates, and yet said existence is not factual in Moscow. For that matter, Moscow is not factual relative to the described thing.

You suspect general existence has the ontological status of numbers.

You should quote where you think I said or implied that. The bit about the existence of existence seems pretty circular to me.

Why do you think position non-causal?

I don't.remember saying it was.

In Eternalism of ANY other variety — substantivalism

Eternalism has varieties? It seems to have but one: The lack of the premise of a preferred moment in time. All events share the same ontology. I was unaware of variants of that.

To exist physically is to be in this spacetime and not to be is to. . . not exist. That relation (or grounding) is something you don't have to call a physical causal relation but rather a special spacetime connection but it seems like semantics to me.

I'm good with the definition, but it isn't objective. It's a relation to our spacetime. Under presentism, it usually means being grounded in the present: To exist physically is to be currently in this space. There are variants of this, such as asserting that some (or all) of the other events exist, but are in some way not preferred.

In either situation you have things which exist, tons of things, and you need to somehow link them together on the same playing ground (tenselessly or not).

They're linked by existing simultaneously.

There has to be some grounding even in Eternalism that makes all these things exist even if that is a tenseless relation.

You grounded this existence by having a location in spacetime. That's enough. That wording carries no requirement for causality at all.

What's outside spacetime?

You make it sound like a location, like spacetime is bounded, has an edge beyond which is something else, even if a void. That model doesn't work.

Further, any proposal of separate physical objects interacting has to either make use of action-at-a-distance

That they do. I make a phone call. You pick up, a reaction to my action. Hard to deny action at a distance. But it taking time is also hard to deny.

So how does reality keep track of it still being there when not interacted with? What grounds it?

What not being there? Nothing vanishes in either model. Under presentism, my dialing of the phone no longer exists at the time that your phone is ringing. Is that your issue? That's is as it should be since your phone ringing while I'm still typing in the number would constitute retrocausality.

It's possible that while that interaction takes place that the other thing could cease to exist or change in such a manner as to not be identical with it.

Yes. I can get smote by a meteor, and your phone will continue to ring. Life is harsh.

You don't seem to have any examples of necessity of instant causality over a distance.

My present is the time of speaking. Your present is the time of hearing. — Metaphysician Undercover

You make it sound like you're stuck in a moment, and never experience the later time when I am 'listening'. I think your idealism is getting in the way of what is an interpretation of a non-idealistic model.

Presentism requires absolutism, else simultaneity would not work. — noAxioms
Are you sure about this? — Metaphysician Undercover

No actually. I can think of an exception: A solipsistic view would use its past light cone as the hypersurface delimiting past, present and future. It means nothing exists except what you see. Addition of a second observer makes this not work.

Relativity divides events into 3 categories relative to a given event: Past (including the light cone), future, and other (any events space-like separated from said given event. Relativity of simultaneity is valid only within this space-like region.

Is there any presentist precept which dictates that my present must be the same as your present?

A non-solipsistic attempt. Given a block and a moving spotlight for each person, defining not a hypersurface of simultaneity, but simply a worldline, you could indeed have multiple spotlights that are time-like separated, but then all the events would have to be real (no growing block), so the spotlights would be epiphenomenal minds, sort of like a movie film being run through multiple projectors in different rooms rather than having multiple copies of the film. I wonder if any theater has ever tried that.

Why would a thing here have the same present as a thing over there?

First of all, what model are we talking? Growing block? Just 3D universe? Spotlights on a 4D universe? The idea you propose works with some of those and not others.

The fundamental problem of presentism is that it cannot support any type of simultaneity, because it is based in the subjective experience of the present, which is inherently unshared.

I don't see why one present cannot be shared. There is one 3D state, and everybody experiences their spatial location in it. Why doesn't that work? (Not that I support presentism, but I've not seen a falsification of it)

If, for example, I assume to be able to speak to you, I must allow that the present in which I speak the words is distinct from the present in which you hear the words

The time of speaking and time of hearing are different, yes, but both those times are 'the present' when they occur, for everybody.

It's just spatialized metaphor to talk about time. — substantivalism

It may be metaphor, or it may be actual extension, measured in meters and everything. That's apparently a difference between realism and instrumentalism.

Well. . . how does one make sense of the present? What is its nature besides mere postulation? How can I MAKE that thing over there PRESENT to me?

OK, you seem to be talking about instant causality rather than spooky action. Nobody posits that. It is quickly falsified.

If you are say, a relationist, who only allows for physical relations to give meaning to both 'being simultaneous with' or 'spatial separation' then in either case if you want to say two things exist in the same moment is tantamount to saying they casually interact with each other neigh instantaneously.

No, it is not tantamount to that at all. Causality (per locality at least) moves at light speed at best. I cannot talk instantly to somebody on Mars. Takes a long time. Phone calls don't work. Not sure why you're proposing otherwise.

If you are fine with espousing some doctrine of the vacuum or void of nothing residing between atoms then the only way you can 'link' two distinct objects as pegs on the same board is if they are interacting with each other at a distance.

Nobody suggests that except you apparently.

... I.E. to exist is to be able to or actively be interacted with.

Actively interacted with, sure, but not instantly. Interaction takes time.



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It's because of [W.L.Craig's] belief in God and his philosophical attempts to bolster it. He is pretty transparent on that. — substantivalism

I don't think Craig believes in God any more than does Trump. He's paid a lot to say otherwise, but I think Craig would strive for more valid arguments if there was belief since he's very smart and cannot fool himself with his own fallacies. The guy simply knows how to separate sheep from their money.

Remove any one of these links in the chain and the purposeful life of a sentient being collapses into non-functional incoherence. — ucarr

Not discussing purpose of life though.

Has anyone established the point of contact that proves the intersection of material and immaterial states of existence coherent and functional?

Dunno. Who posits such a point of contact?

You're saying quantum fields are mind-dependent?

A field has no location or bounds and is thus not the same category as an object.

If it cannot be justified, then it's logically deemed axiomatic..

Wow, we think so differently. I find it unnecessary precisely because it cannot be justified.

In your examination of predication without existence, your supposition there's non-existence that supports predication means you are able to demonstrate a non-existent thing performing some action, or expressing some state of being.

No, it doesn't mean I can demonstrate it any more than your premise can be demonstrated.

Go ahead and establish your non-existence while being something or doing something.

But I do exist, by the usual reasoning, and it is even justified. It just isn't objective. That's the part that holds no water.

Partitioning existence into definitions that support or deny existence won't work because that would be simultaneous existence and non-existence, and we've agreed the two modes are mutually exclusive.

We do not agree. I don't exist in Moscow, but I exist in some other town. No contradiction there.

How does thinking occur in the absence of body, brain and mind? — ucarr

You think binary computing machines are self-willed info processors?

No, not any more than I am self-willed into one.

But an empty existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence. — noAxioms
If lack of objective existence equals non-existence, then I agree.

I meant empty objective existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence. Lacking objective existence doesn't imply lack of other kinds (relational say) of existence.


All that aside, I was referred to an interesting bit about the Eleatic Principle, which seems on-topic.
It says "An entity is to be counted as real iff it is capable of participating in causal processes".

Of significant note, it says 'counted as real' which is support for my notion that existence might just be a concept without a thing in itself.

The principle as given is mind-independent, but only applies to causal structures. So the states of Conway's game of life exist, but 14 does not. That game and our universe might supervene on numbers and mathematics, but it is a gray area as to whether such supervention constitutes participation in causal processes.

I found an interesting article that attempts to justify it, but it dismisses other causal structures by several references to 'the world', a very anthropocentric assumption that this world is somehow special over other causal structures, violating the wording of the principle taken from that very article.

I may open a new topic on this.

"moving spotlight" may have a 4d view of the universe as a whole, but still a 3d view of the present moment, just like presentism, right? — flannel jesus

The present is 3D in all forms. I have heard of 2-state presentism where the prior state exists until the subsequent state fully exists. A simulation is this form of presentism. Moving spotlight says all events exist, but the spotlight determines which of these are at the present. Interestingly, the spotlight can move in either direction, and even jump around. Growing block logically seems to forbid that.

You can even have 4D spacetime with very limited temporal extension, say 12 hours each side of the 3D present. So the immediate past and future exist, but the more distant past and future do not.
$5 says you cannot name who/where that is suggested.

I consider 'moving spotlight' to be a form of presentism - maybe you could call it "weak presentism", because instead of it saying "the present is the only thing that exists", it's saying "every time 'exists' in some sense, but the present ESPECIALLY exists, exists in some unique elevated way".

It very much is presentism, but I agree that it gets you two (three?) kinds of existence. The model works really quite well for epiphenomenalism sort of like watching a first-person movie. You (the experiencer external to the universe) can jump in anywhere you want, experience a life, rewind, fast-forward at will, but with no volition to change the plot of the story. The whole movie reel exists, but the one discreet frame under the projector light exists harder.

Time travel makes a little sense with personal moving spotlight. Not so much with the others.

With the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions, there is no distance between one number and any other number. You can't move along the linear space of the number line. — ucarr

You make it sound like a number line is something that physical I move along. I don't buy that for a moment.

Why do you claim the chemical bonding of elements (Na + Cl = NaCl (salt)) into a compound is not physical?

It being an object (compound in this case) seems to be an ideal. Physics seems to have no mind-independent test for where an object is bounded, per the topic I linked. It is off topic for this ontology discussion. You posted to that other topic. Re-read if you're interested.

Your body, as a point of reference (a location in space), determines your frame of reference, viz., your context.

This contradicts your description of my going to the kitchen, which utilizes an abstract choice of frame different from the one determined by my body.

Yes, [existence is] axiomatic precisely because it cannot be justified. I have a strong aversion to assuming things for no reason. — noAxioms
So, you seek to contradict your own belief existence is axiomatic?

It's axiomatic to others, not to me, per stated aversion to such axioms.

If you're independent of existence, you can't posit EPP.

You seem to be doing that just fine. Positing things is easy. Justifying them not so much.

How does thinking occur in the absence of body, brain and mind?

An information processor need not be implemented by what is considered to be a biological body, brain or mind. The 'mind' word seems to reference the information processing itself rather than the hardware implementing the process.

How does thinking occur in the absence of egg, sperm and fertilized egg?

I don't think sperms and eggs and such do a whole lot of thinking. Sure, people do thinking. I only fail to accept the necessity of any objective ontology to them.

I assume all of these absences as part of independence from existence. This with independent defined as "not a part of."

Even this assumes that there is such a thing as 'objective existence', perhaps completely empty as the nihilists suggest. But an empty existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence.

The "absolute frame" is known as "absolute time", and this is quite different from presentism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Different yes, but not so different. Presentism requires absolutism, else simultaneity would not work. But absolutism doesn't require presentism of any form. An absolute frame can be 3D space or a block.

Remember too that LET and SR are both special models that do not model the universe, so any absolute frame in the real universe cannot be an inertial frame since such a frame cannot describe the universe. It took over a century to generalize the absolutist premises, but it has been done, The theory denies things predicted by relativity such as black holes and the big bang.


Straight up presentism is 3D, but other forms like growing block and moving spotlight are 4D models. All are absolute.

Only things exist in the paper thin present. — substantivalism

This seems to presume a 4D model, with time being extended, but only one moment in time being the present. Sounds like a moving spotlight model.

If they are postulating an absolute present. . . I.E. a way of giving an absolute simultaneity. . . then aren't they a presentist? — substantivalism

If they posit a present, then obviously they're a presentist. But if they merely posit absolutism (LET for instance), that come with absolute simultaneity, but does not necessarily imply a preferred moment in time.

Presentism, by most accounts is something different from claiming an absolute present. — Metaphysician Undercover

You seem to differ. How are these two distinct? Can you give an example?

I don't think that the universal aether theory proposed by Lorentz was capable of providing for absolute simultaneity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it requires absolute simultaneity. That comes with any absolutist theory.

Not unless you inevitable added in action at a distance in some form. — substantivalism

What does action at a distance have to do with any of this? It seems to be a quantum concept, not an interpretation of time issue.

quote="substantivalism;981431"]... William Lane Craig famously seemed to be in favor of it but with a growing block theory of time?[/quote]
Not sure why he wants growing block. What purpose is served by an existing past? Evidence? Not needed by anything. Why nonexistent future? That probably feeds his notion of free will, despite the posited onmiscience serving the exact same role as an existing future.

Mind you. Craig is not known for putting together valid arguments. They just have to sound good enough to confirm the biases of his paying audiences.

Try to do a calculation with the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions. Whether on paper, or on the ground, can you do it? — ucarr

Effortless actually since I utilize a number line in almost no calculations. They're handy for graphs though.

When you count objects, you're counting objects with distinct positions in space.

I could count the number of times the light blinks. 3 blinks, all in the same physical space. I don't conclude that 3 has a physical location from this.

When two objects in space become one object in space

Two objects becoming one seems to be an ideal, not anything physical. I did a topic on it here. You seem to have commented on that topic.

You imply your body holds no distinct position in space. Please explain your denial.

My body has extension. It is physically present at events (events are physical) but the spatial location of those events varies from frame to frame, and frames are abstractions. So for instance you talked about me going to the kitchen, but maybe the kitchen goes to me when I need a drink. It changes location, not me, since I am at all times 'here' (also an abstraction). Anyway, I said I knew what you meant.

A book, when read, is the extreme opposite of isolation.

Yea, but I didn't say anything was reading it. It's in isolation we said.

Existence has no explanation.

And here I am looking for one. Yes, it's axiomatic precisely because it cannot be justified. I have a strong aversion to assuming things for no reason.

The set of real numbers is uncountable, but its members, even its irrationals, are individually mappable to material things, as in the case of pi.

Pi is definitely early on the countable list. It is easily expressed with a couple characters. Most numbers cannot be expressed at all. I cannot, by definition, give an example.

Can you stand independent of existence while you make your study of it?

Sure. Just don't posit EPP.

Your volition balks at the assumption, but your ability to balk establishes your existence.

I don't assume that. I said it in the OP. 'I think therefore I am' is a non-sequitur without EPP. But 'I think, therefore I decide Io posit that I am' seems to work far better. There is no fallacy to that, just as there is no fallacy in saying "'I balk, yet I decline Io posit that I am'. It becomes a personal choice instead of a logical conclusion. There is a pragmatic utility to making the first choice, but logic seems not to forbid the second choice. As you said, it's an axiom, an assumed thing, not something necessarily the case.

Show me the number 14 doing something mathematical without reference to its distance in space from another number. — ucarr

I think there are entire math text books that never once reference 'distance in space'. The ones that do are probably using an example from physical space (like the length of a rod) rather than spatial separation of numbers.

My example was about counting objects, like nuts on one's hand. There's no 'space' between 13 and 14 when doing that. It's just the difference between one more nut being there or not.

When you say, "Numbers (as concepts) probably came...from roots of positive integers." does "roots" in your context mean something other than a mathematical root, such as 2 is the square root of 4?

No, I mean the earliest usage of numbers, when humans first came aware of them and began assigning symbols (holding up fingers?) to them. Visualization of number lines came thousands of years later. You seem to only be able to visualize numbers this way.

Let's suppose you sit in a chair before your computer when you read my posts to you. Do you have a unique position within the space where you read my posts?

Actually no, but I know what you mean. You're describing physical space.

Something in total isolation (not possible) has no meaning.

If we're talking about a symbol, then sure, a symbol in isolation is meaningless. But an encyclopedia in isolation does not seem meaningless, even in the absence of something that knows what the symbols mean. The meaning is there and can be gleaned.

So in this change of stance, things don't exist because they're material, but rather things are material because they exist, kind of destroying any distinction between the two words.
Is material also matter? Are you asserting that 14 consists of atoms or something? Are larger numbers made of more material? What color is 14? Is a square square material but a round square is not, or are both material? — noAxioms

I notice that you did not answer this question, instead telling me about things that we both agree are physical. I don't think that the count of nuts in my hand is physically present at mostly to the far right of a police lineup, even if there is a reference to the number there.

The vast majority of numbers cannot have a physical representation since there are countable many ways to represent numbers, but the reals are not countable.

Don't bother with trying to answer the question, "Why existence?" It's a brute fact that can't be analyzed. This is another way of saying, "Existence is insuperable."

Exactly. I've noticed that. I question it. Everybody else just assumes it, calling it 'brute fact' despite the lack of justification. The nature of it seems very different than what most assume.

There can be no mixing of the two modes because the attempt to do so annihilates non-existence

Mixing it also seems to annihilate existence, leaving you in neither state.

Firstly, you present a segment of an infinite series, which is all anybody can do; this because an actual infinite series is a limit forever approached, never arrived at. Secondly, notice I say, "supposition" of an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end.

But I was supposing an infinite series. Clearly I cannot post each element since there is a posting limit on this forum. But the supposition is there.

As I go on to explain in my paragraph above, existence is insuperable to sentients because consciousness assumes existence

Yours might. Mine is not making any such assumption.

although we easily infer you're probably making a predication about a subject.

I would consider it to be noticing a predicate, not making it. Not that I can't make a predicate. I can paint a car, and subsequently the car has the predicate of being a different color.

Numbers derive their meaning from their representation of points in space. — ucarr

Numbers are independent of space. Number lines are an abstract way of visualizing them. Yes, it is a space of sorts, hence the x being greater than y sort of thing. Numbers (as concepts) probably came not from space, but from counting of objects, thus from roots of positive integers. The rest came later.

Numbers are not necessarily linear, but complex and quaternions are still arguably representable by space. Space seems to represent numbers more than numbers seem to represent space. Just my thoughts. These are not assertions.

Without connection to a unique position,14 is merely two meaningless shapes juxtaposed

14 is never a shape. You're instead referencing a numeral (symbol), not a number (a quantity maybe). Don't confuse the two.

nyone with knowledge of basic math will know exactly where you stand on the real number line whenever 14 predicates you there. This physical reality is universally true.

I disagree that either 14 or a number line is anything physical.

Existing things, being a part of general existence, an insuperable context, possess temporal material forms. These forms possess presence and meaning. Presence is the ability to hold a specific and measurable position materially. Meaning is the context of every position relating it to the real number line.

The meaning of number 14 places it within a context which gives it 13 and 15 as its integer neighbors.

Yes and No. Yes: a relation and a predicate. No: I am cautious about the distinction of 14 meaning something and being something. I would have chosen the latter. The numeral (as a symbol) means something. Again, thoughts, not assertions.

14 – placing you in a specific position in context of the real number line – is a material thing that articulates a predication of position, a material reality in the context of existence.

So in this change of stance, things don't exist because they're material, but rather things are material because they exist, kind of destroying any distinction between the two words.
Is material also matter? Are you asserting that 14 consists of atoms or something? Are larger numbers made of more material? What color is 14? Is a square square material but a round square is not, or are both material?
Anyway, I know of nobody that has published any such suggestion. Sounds made up.

Non-existence – a supposition of an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end.

Existence – an infinite series of affirmations of material presence with neither beginning nor end.

About these, what about the case of a finite series of affirmations or negations of presence, or a mixed series, finite or not. Does the thing exist or not? It just seems like you left a lot of cases not covered by these two definitions which are supposed to handle any case.

For instance, I have an infinite series for all displacements from arbitrary origin X:
{...,
ucarr not present at X-13,
ucarr not present at X-12,
ucarr is present at X-11,
ucarr not present at X-10,
ucarr not present at X-9,
ucarr not present at X-8,
...}
That is an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end, and one affirmation of material presence. Therefore you don't exist by your definitions above.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe

So it's a predicate then? States of something are predicates. 'apple is ripe', 'Santa is fat'. Universe is existing.

1.02
Did I win? — unenlightened

1.4, but only because I tend to reply to multiple comments in one post.

And no, I do not win, because I'm sure there are some with ratios greater than 3, and they're terrible contributors for it. Joe comes in, makes an interesting OP (gathering 20 replies), but Joe never comes back and tends his topic. I see that a lot.

If [...] you make a hard separation between cognition (acquiring knowledge and understanding by reasoning from sensory input), and the physics of objective reality, then that puts a big difference between your view of reality and mine. — ucarr

1) Not a hard separation because I consider cognition to be a function of said physics. A dualist might make such a hard separation.
2) There is not 'physics of objective reality' since the physics we know is the physics of only this universe and not others. There are no objective physical rules. So reword as 'physics of this universe', and leave off the word 'reality' entirely.
3) I have no particular 'view of reality' since the word has different definitions in different contexts. I tend to use the word in an epistemic sense, and epistemology has little to do with ontology unless ontology is defined in such terms (E2, E4).

I don't believe there exists such a hard separation between the two. In my view, E2 and E4 are not polar opposites.

Agree with both. In fact, I see little difference between E2 and E4 to the point where I wonder if they should be separately listed. The mind dependence is very explicit under E2 and only implicit under E4. That seems to be one significant difference.
Another difference: E2 seems more presentist. If humans go extinct, then nothing would exist under E2, but under E4, Earth is presumed (by humans now) to endure beyond the time of human extinction.
E2 is not necessarily idealism where only concepts exist, and not actual apples and such, but the reality of an idealist probably still falls under E2.

My simple explanation says, "cognition is a mental activity emergent from the elementary particles that make up the physics of the brain. If one holds this view, then there's nothing perplexing about claiming, "All temporal things material and emergent from the Standard Model - such as the human brain - are only known about and understood by means of the abstract and reasoning mind."

OK, that's pretty straight up E4. If you took out the reference to the standard model, it would be more inclusive of other universes with different physics but still with what could be considered 'temporal things material'. It excludes non-temporal things like 14 or triangles or round squares.

Regarding E2 and material emerging from the mind

Not emerging from mind, but nevertheless asserted to exist precisely because it is perceived. This part is also true of E4.

There's a strong link between definitions and theories. Can you cite an example of a definition and a theory both viable and contradictory?

I cannot think of a statement that is worded as both a definition and as a theory. A definition simply says how a word is being used in a particular context. A theory is something that makes predictions, is testable.

You think general existence an empty predication suggesting the need for its de facto abandonment. I think mind-independent reality a second-order emergence of abstract reasoning, itself an emergent property of brain activity.

I can agree with both, and I don't see any conflict between the two statements. You're saying that mind-independent reality is but a concept, with no ding-an-sich associated with it. I cannot argue against that. It would explain why I don't identify as a realist.
But I do not put mind as fundamental as would an idealist. That constitutes being realist about mind, which seems entirely circular.

The mistake made by most seems to be forgetting that all these relational definitions of reality are still relations. The relation is most often implied, but it's still there. Being implied, it is forgotten, and one presumes, totally unjustified, a sort of objective (E1) existence. E1 is truly mind independent (as is E5), and it simply does not follow from the above lines of reasoning.

This chain link of connections confines mind-independent reality within the mental architecture of cognition. We can theorize about what it might be like, but our closest approach to it finds us still standing firmly within our physics-dependent cognition grounded within the Standard Model.

Well, your definition might be thus mind-grounded, but I'm reaching for something less anthropocentric than that, and yes, one can conceive of such things, even if you personally choose not to.

MPP is no article of faith

MPP seems to be a principle. Acceptance of MPP (like acceptance of any other philosophical principle) is very much an article of faith, and MPP leads to idealism, a complete denial of any distinction between a thing and the concept of a thing. Acceptance of MPP contrasts heavily with the assertion of mental activity being emergent from particles doing their thing.

If this is true, then clearly all notions of mind-independence are thoroughly mind-dependent.

Even if it's not true, all notions of anything are mind-dependent simply by any reasonable definition of ;'notion'.

If MPP is dependent on EPP,

Oddly enough, it isn't.

You allow yourself to flow between opposites while charging me with self-contradiction for doing same.

Indeed, because I consider the opposites as premises, one at a time, and you assert opposites to both be true at once, typically existence being grounded in perception, and existence being grounded in material law of this universe.

Why is it okay for you to use both E1 and E2 and not for me?

I don't ever combine those. They're not compatible. E2 and E4 are subsets of E5 and E6 so there is a bit compatibility with some combinations.

I am not since nowhere am I discussing mind. I keep batting away all your comments talking about concepts instead of the thing itself. — noAxioms

This is part of our trench warfare; herein we're slugging it out. In response to your batting away, I keep batting away your supposition we can do otherwise than talk about concepts of things.

The literature is full of realist distinctions between the concept of a thing (apple say) and the apple itself (ding an sich). Your comment seems to take the stance, without justification, that there cannot be such a distinction, the position is necessarily wrong .You say you ground existence in material thing, yet here you seem to deny material, and only acknowledge the concept of material. This seems contradictory.

I am admittedly becoming moved to the position that 'existence' is nothing but an abstraction, something made up by thinking entities to separate that which in some way pertains to their interaction with their environment and that which doesn't. God exists. Why? Because God is meaningful to whoever says that. But my search for existence beyond the concept seems to not be productive. Maybe there is no mind-independent ontology. Not to say that mind creates existence (idealism), but it creates only the concept of it. Human cognition still supervenes on matter, but the existence of matter is nothing but a label pasted onto it.
I'm not asserting all that, but I am definitely considering it. Existence being not mind-dependent, but nevertheless a mental product, like any other conception. So not 'I think, therefore I am', but "I think, therefore I decide that I am'. Does that make sense?
EPP, as stated in the OP, sort of implies such an abstract definition of existence by saying that existence is conceptually prior to predication, instead of saying that existence is prior to predication.
EPP is arguably true given such a definition, but I also might arguably find a counterexample to that. Jury still out.

The ontological status of numbers is a topic too complex and undecided to make it a good example in our context. For example, numbers represent points in space.

Numbers are part of what can be used to identify a point in space, but they do not themselves represent such points. Your wording makes it sound like all numbers constitutes spatial references.

There's no easy evaluation to a definitive ontology of numbers.

If ontology is nothing but an abstraction as I described just above, then the ontology of number is simply a matter of personal choice. The ongoing debate about say anti or pro-Platonic-existence of numbers is a debate simply between two different choices being made, with no actual fact to the matter either way.

Claiming the number 14 causes EPP to fail is jumping to an unsupported conclusion.

I didn't say it causes EPP to fail. I said it causes EPP to fail given a definition of existence grounded in material. 14 is not a material thing, so it doesn't exist by that definition. But 14 is even, so it has predicates. Therefore EPP is wrong given E4. If you think that logic is invalid, you need to specifically point out where. EPP might hold given a different definition of existence, so I make no claim that 14 causes EPP to fail.

Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. — ucarr
You think cognition and objective reality equal?

No, mind and cognition, the two words compared in your fairly tautological statement above. For purposes of this discussion, I find them to be synonymous.

My statement about objective reality and mind follows the form of Objective Reality → Mind. Mind → Cognition. In consequence, the mind's cognition, examining objective reality, sees its dependence upon the environment of nature, which is objective reality.

Mind is not objective (unless asserted to be so, which makes it grounded on that assertion, a contradiction). Objective reality cannot depend on nature since there is no objective nature, no objective laws. Other universes have different laws. Even differenter universes don't even have what could be considered 'laws'. Objective existence cannot be grounded in anything more fundamental since any such grounding is a restriction of domain.

The whole of cognition - which includes social consensus - is a form of mind-dependency. — ucarr

Agree. Some realists would probably not agree, but I am (for that and some other reasons) not 'some realist'.

Inference beyond empirical experience, or pure reason, is the most extreme form of mind-dependency.

With that I do not agree, but given that 'by choice' definition I explored above, all existence is mind dependent, EPP is backwards, and no form is more or less extreme than any other.
Your assertion above actually kind of holds for existence grounded in material.

Nothing in existence, as it is rendered to the understanding

Mind independent existence is in no way necessarily 'rendered to the understanding'. There are definitions of existence where this simply is not the case.

Why do you think the pursuit of super-symmetry is called the theory of everything?

Because it combines all theories of this universe (a limited domain), not that it in any way describes all domains. ToE is a cute catch phrase, but no theory will ever describe everything.

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the subject of an action upon it (measurement), how can the action be prior to it?

What you call 'measurement' is an effect, not an action. The latter word implies intent. So does 'measurement' or 'observer', which is why I shy from using it rather than something like 'interaction'. There is no significance of mind or intent under E5, and these comments were made in context of E5.

When you say, "...measurement is what collapses a wave function..." you're talking about an observer doing a measurement, such as an experimenter calculating with Schrödinger's Equation.

Told you those words carry that connotation, but no, there is no role of an experimenter in any of quantum theory. Human involvement is necessary for epistemology only, and has no effect on how physics works.

This unless you think calculating with Schrödinger's Equation can be done without an entity doing the calculation.

There are interpretations where said equation is ontic, and ones where it is but abstract. Quatum theory does not say. 'Calculating' is something that requires some sort of information processor, but 'calculating' has not effect on what happens, 'observed' or not.

You had a mind in the womb. Did you make predications in the womb? — ucarr

I made my mother nauseous, so I guess that counts as making a predication.

You don't use IFF unless you mean bi-conditional relationship which is X ↔︎ Y.

It means if and only if, and I very much use it in a one way relationship. X being part of the cause of Y in no way implies that Y is part of the cause of X. That would be retrocausality.

Temporal predicates imply the S-MPP (Standard Model Prior to Predicates).

There are plenty of other temporal relationships that in no way involve the standard model, so this is false.

Any predication implies existence of mind;

Not talking about idealism.

The earth is emergent from the singularity.

I asked for Earth's location relative to existence, not from the singularity. And where is Earth relative to the singularity? Can you point in the general direction of the singularity, perhaps give a rough estimate how far Earth is from it?

You make my point. Your talk of mind-independent things is a contradiction because it assumes perception while denying it by definition.

You need to review what it means for something to be mind-independent.

In making this argument, you assume existence doesn't exist because you assume its lack of a measurable position.

No, I just think it's a category error-, but under E4, all existing things have a location (except the singularity, which is why it's a singularity). With any other definition, I can think of plenty of potentially existing things that don't have a location. But you were talking about E4 with this comment, so my request of it's location is valid.

Rather than worry about this, let's first define what you think 'existence' is, that it would meaningfully be something that exists or not by whatever definition you choose.

If the ontology of the independent thing doesn't depend on it being thus examined by mind, and you know that by definition, and thus you know it by mind, then claiming its independence from mind is a contradiction.

Non-sequitur. I agree with all but your claim of a contradiction. Maybe you should rewrite as a more formal argument. Mind-independence doesn't mean that nobody is thinking of a thing, but you seem to be proceeding as if this was the case, as evidenced by the following nonsense statement:

Possibility of perception by an audience destroys mind independence because you can't know this about a mind-independent thing.

You seem to think that mind-independent existence depends on the lack of mind, but any dependence on say lack of perception would make it very much mind dependent since it would be exactly the lack of perception that defines its existence.

You can only state things about the concept of Pegasus.

Perhaps you are thus impaired, but I am very explicitly am talking about something else, per the disclaimer in the OP.

Barring that, we're back to:

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind? — ucarr

I can use E4 definition and suggest that some rock masses one Kg, and use my perception to verify that. Is it fact? Maybe the rock is an illusion, but it remains an empirical fact about a rock that has mind-independent existence per E4. It being mind independent means that the rock would still mass 1 Kg even if I wasn't there to perceive it.

Metaphysics is nowhere defined as any kind of cognition or grammar — noAxioms

Explain how your quote denying any connection between metaphysics and cognition

You'll first have to quote where I made this denial.
I left the part you bolded, which I presume you take to be such a denial, nowhere is there a denial of any connection between the two, only a denial that no standard (not one you deliberately made up) definition of the word defines it as any kind of cognition. The study of metaphysics certainly involves cognition, and the definition quoted does not deny that, and the study of cognition itself has certain metaphysical elements to it. Dualism vs physicalism is arguably a metaphysical issue (and arguably not).

Put another way, Pegasus (the natural horse) has never been directly detected by a pair of eyes. — ucarr

Best to pick something unobserved (and not alive) if you're going to assert that.
Being unobserved is not what makes something mind-independent since the moon seems mind independent despite being observed. Does it exist (E1)? That's a different question.

Your quoted statement, ”I have no trouble defining existence sans perception…” can be read as: a) I can define existence without (using my) perception; b) I can define a type of existence that lacks perception.

Both wrong. Perhaps a type of existence that lacks the necessity of perception. Else the stop sign doesn't exist because you perceive it.

In response to the latter definition, nearly anyone might say, “Oh, yeah. I know whatcha mean. Take for example a rock.” In response to the former definition, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way." we see that it, when compared with "Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works." reveals serious conflict between the two statements.

I don't see one. Language and proofs are the media of concepts and epistemology, but none of that has any effect on mind-independent existence, only our potential knowledge of it.

Your main purpose in this conversation is to examine mind-independent reality with an eye towards using this examination to establish that EPP cannot be eliminated without creating a contradiction. Doing this would establish the necessity of EPP.

Agree

You first say you can't find objective existence logically meaningful. Next you say the rules of language do not in anyway influence the workings of mind-independent reality.

Yes, it seems that an immediate contradiction would follow if this 2nd statement were not the case.

If the latter is true, then you know that mind-independent reality has rules not governed by rules of language. You can't make this claim without inferring logical rules in application to objective existence.

Still agree, but keep separate the making of the claim, knowledge of the way things work, and the actual way things work, the latter of which would be entirely independent of the others.

This claim is incompatible with your other claim you can't find objective existence meaningful in any logical way.

How so? Objective existence seemed not even mentioned anywhere except the statement that I didn't find a way it would be meaningful, at least in the absence of EPP. With EPP, E1 and E3 are almost identical. Almost...

If, as you imply, mind-independent reality has rules (metaphysics) not influenced by language

I imply that only with some definitions. E3 or E5 for instance have rules, which can be described by language, but are not a product of language. Most of the others seem to select some arbitrary domain to suit the purposes of the chooser of the definition, and that does seem to make them mind dependent. E1 stands out as having no mind dependence, but also having no particular rules.

... , then [mind-independent reality] produces material things predication, a linguistic entity, cannot impact.

How did 'material things' suddenly appear from that sequence? I hadn't specified material as being in any way special. It might be under some forms of E4 existence, but I maintain that any such definition is just a less solipsistic version of human-mind-dependent reality.

This is existence prior to (and isolated from) predication.

It does not since I gave so many counterexamples of predication without existence, especially when one of the 'restricted domain' definitions was used.

Therefore, elimination of EPP leads to predications about things isolated from predication.

Wait, I didn't see that argued, and there's no example. I don't see how this follows from lack of EPP. What does it mean to be 'isolated from predication'? That concept was never introduced.

Such predications are tantamount to empty sets.

An empty set has zero members, which is a predicate of an empty set. Pegasus is not an empty set. The set of all existing Pegasus' is (for the sake of argument) empty, but Pegasus having 2 wings does not directly contradict that.

... a set containing paradoxes called “non-existent things with predications.”

"“non-existent things with predications.” has not been shown to be paradoxical.
You seem to be trying to show this, but my critiques need to be addressed.

Santa does not exist. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T
Santa is non-existent. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T

For either, E3=F, E4=T E6=domain dependent. Seems I disagree with half of your assessments. Still, pretty nice demonstration that 'does not exist' and 'is nonexistent' mean the same thing in an ontological sense.

So “Santa is there-not-being-an-existing-Santa.” equals “Santa is non-existent.”

So why did I say otherwise? Suppose EPP is the case. Then the former might be true, but the latter is paradoxical, listing a predicate of a nonexistent thing. That's the distinction I was referencing, but it isn't an ontological distinction, so the assessment of E1-E6 is unchanged.

Why did I agree to Santa not existing (E1)? Probably because Santa is contradictory, and while I don't see a lot of rules for E1, 'is possible' seems to be a reasonable one.

No, not that at all. It's due to my mind being involved in the act of abstracting, preventing by some definitions the direct (causal?) access to this mind-independent thing. — noAxioms

Wow, even that is wrong, since a rock is supposedly mind-independent and yet I have empirical access to it. I need to be more careful with my wordings.

Explain how you can have direct experience of a mind-independent thing (or of anything) without a mind? — ucarr

Ask somebody who claims that.

We know the newborn has a brain before it knows that.

How a baby's brain works is irrelevant. Epistemology is almost on-topic since there is the issue of how one might know something exists. Answer E1:No test E2 by definition, E3 everything E4 empirical E5 ill-phrased E6 domain dependent

If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.

I don't know what 'pre-existent' means in the context of this topic. If it is true that nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then EPP holds at least for minds, but not necessarily anything else. And if that is not true, then EPP does not hold at all.

Since MPP is dependent upon EPP, rejection of MPP implies rejection of EPP.

That doesn't follow at all. It only implies that rejection of EPP means that MPP also doesn't hold, and even then only if the premise is true.
For example, a chandelier is dependent on the chain from which it hangs. You're saying that absence of the chandelier implies the absence of the chain, but it could still be there, holding a plant hook or something. This is basic logic.

I am not concerned about how a mind works, and how it develops in an infant. Off topic. — noAxioms
If this is your response to my delivery of a refutation of EPP necessitating a contradiction without begging the question

The example didn't show this. Here's what you said:

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence — ucarr

The bold part is straight up begging EPP by asserting the existence of this mind without justification, and without specifying even what kind of existence. Not even under E2 does mind existence precede the predication of self-awareness.

And, as I said, how an infant's brain works is irrelevant to my rejection of that act of begging.

The unedited version of my quote above makes it clear I think the Standard Model the material ground of existence — ucarr

Sure, but so many of your other quotes make it quite clear that you consider perception to be the mental ground for existence. So you regularly switch between two primary definitions of E2 or E4. If E4, then cognition has nothing to do with it. If E2, then material emerges from mind, not the other way around.

Now E2 & E4 are just definitions, and being definitions and not theories, they're not things that are metaphysically true or not, but just different usages of a word in different contexts. It is valid to use both E2 and E4 without contradictions, but in doing so, they lose all metaphysical existence.

Apparently you think abstractions immaterial — ucarr

Not sure where you get this. Human abstraction (a human process) is material since a human consists of material. Something immaterial doing its own abstracting would be an example of immaterial abstraction, so I can conclude that abstraction is not necessarily material, but my own abstracting seems to be a material process.

This is your main interpretation of what I have to say on the topic of defending EPP, my purpose in our dialogue. It is wrong. You are confusing MPP, viz., Mind Precedes Predication with EPP.

I am not since nowhere am I discussing mind. I keep batting away all your comments talking about concepts instead of the thing itself.

So above you confine existence to material things. 14 has been my example of an immaterial thing (it's an integer, not a material object subject to supposed conservation laws), and it has a predicate (among thousands of them) of being even. Thus EPP fails. No mention of mind appears anywhere in that example.

Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. Given this chain of reasoning, it follows that mind doesn't precede objective reality. — ucarr

That doesn't follow from that chain of reasoning due to the bolded word above. The first statement is trivially true since the two words are essentially synonyms. What follows from that statement is "if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind doesn't precede objective reality", but you said something else, something that doesn't follow at all.

Another important clarification: mind does precede expression of existence as an abstract idea.

Depends on definitions. There are plenty of those on these forums that restrict the word 'mind' to 'human mind', meaning that if something nonhuman does the exact same thing, it isn't mind and it probably isn't abstracting. Anyway, I will accept the statement if it doesn't come with the anthropocentric baggage.

The mind-independent reality of objective reality is something we can only infer from social consensus, a premise I've discussed repeatedly.

Social consensus is still a form of mind-dependency. Material is what's real only because human infer it in that manner. But the inference is a starting point, and one hopes that one can infer more than just what is immediately seen. All of this is still a restricted relational existence, nothing objective about it despite it frequently being asserted that way.

Below we have one of your quotes. It talks about the impact of subjectivity upon the QM state of super-position (inferred from Schrödinger's Equation).

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms — ucarr

No mention of subjectivity (except the phrase 'not mind-specific) appeared anywhere in my statement you quoted. I explicitly state that mind/subjectivity plays no role.

The observer interacts with QM super-position and collapses it to a definite outcome.

No. 'obsersver' carries a connotation of human subjectivity, and QM does not give humans any special role. We're just piles of atoms, just like any other system. Use a different word than 'observer'.

No. Given your stated definition of existence within the context of EPP:

E3 seems to be the only definition 'within the context of EPP".

Property before existence is illogical; property after predication posits predication as the idealism of objective reality by verbal utterance.

I'm not in any way talking about verbal utterances. None of my definitions (not even E2) mentioned that.

My definition of existence implicitly refutes E2 and E6.
...
likewise, the limitation of the scope of existence of E6 is refuted

I can reword your definition to fit E6, so this is wrong. Your definition very much limits scope to a very restricted domain (of material), so illustrated, not refuted.

You say, "¬O → ¬C." This means that because Columbus is encompassed by Ohio, Ohio, which includes all of Columbus plus more, necessarily implies Columbus and thus its negation implies Columbus' negation.

No, the statement does not mean that. It was what could be concluded from "Columbus implies Ohio", which in this case is, in the absence of Ohio, there is no Columbus.

This means Columbus is always included within the scope of Ohio.

Not it doesn't. An Ohio without Columbus is completely consistent with the statement "Columbus implies Ohio". This is trivial logic.

When we say, "The predication makes a claim about the subject regarding: a) the state of being of the subject; b) the actions of the subject."

In the absence of EPP, a) is false. b) is false regardless since there's no necessity of 'action'. There is no necessity of claim. So for instance with 14 being even, "is even" is the predicate. That predicate is performing no action and is not something making a claim. It is just a property that applies to some integers and not to others.
No mention of existence is there, except as part of the domain of integers. Is pi not even? Unclear if the predicate applies at all to something not an integer. So 14 being even gives it a certain E6 kind of existence. There exists in the set of integers, 14, which happens to be even.

Can you show me how EPP doesn't assume existence?

No, the principle seems to assume existence, and worse, it seems to assume E1 existence, but as worded, it's not explicit about that, only demonstrably false with some of the others.

This means the existence of existence is presumed.

That doesn't even make syntactic sense, let alone follow from anything. Maybe you mean some sort of empty tautology, that all that exists exists.

The presumption of its existence is necessary to examining it relationship to something else, in this case, predication, right?

Wrong. I have zero trouble examining relationships without presuming E1 existence. You didn't specify E1 though.

Can you show yourself examining EPP, or anything else, without making use of your cognition?

I can't, but no such claim was ever made.

I don't restrict my scope to material things. — ucarr

See your definition quoted at the top then, defining existence grounded in material.

Define the domain that lies between material thing and abstraction.

Didn't know there was one.

Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works" doesn't make a definitive statement about the independence of the ontological from the epistemological towards aligning you with realism?

But it does make such a statement.

I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement

The statement is valid with most definitions of the word, except definitions where existence/reality is dependent on language rules..

I, too, am closely aligned with E1.

Your 'material' definition above aligns with E4, not E1. There are empirical tests for existence under E4, and not under E1.

The difference between us is that, in context, I ascribe foundational importance to E2 in the examination of EPP.

E2 isn't foundational under E1. Neither is the standard model.

Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

You define direct knowledge as that learned through perception, so here you seem to be asking me to demonstrate perception apart from perception, which would be a contradiction.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain) — ucarr

If it is 'of this universe', it is part of a limited domain, a relation, not an objective existence. So E4 is 'part of this universe', and there's no 'objective' about that. The word 'this' is a reference to humanity, making it anthropocentric if not outright mind dependent.

but EPP in the context of E4 does not hold?

I've given counterexamples, so no, it doesn't hold. Let's suppose a roughly rectangular rock exists in (is part of some other domain of: )some other universe. It is rectangular and yet does not exist in this universe, so it doesn't exist under E4, despite having that 'roughly rectangular' predication.

Does this tell us we can specify that EPP does not hold by restricting the domain of existence?

I think so.

Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind.

Agree, but by definition, the ontology of the independent thing doesn't depend on it being thus examined.

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication. — noAxioms

This seems to be a mis-statement. The perception is possible but not mandatory for predication and separately for existence. Some mind-independent things nevertheless have an audience.

When you declare, "Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them." you likewise don't perceive them except through actions completely internal to you.

Not talking about the concept of Pegasus.

Consider your posted definition of metaphysics, "...the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space."

You're claiming principles and abstract concepts have no relationship with cognition? — ucarr

Not claiming that, nor is the quoted definition.

Is Pegasus independent of all human minds — ucarr

So now human minds are special? If that's true, then Pegasus probably doesn't exist.

I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms
Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.

No contradiction since nowhere does it suggest an absence of perception in the act of defining something.

I wasn't talking about my act of defining a phrase. — noAxioms
This is a declaration. Where's your argument supporting it?

OP disclaimer says what I am talking about.

Santa is not non-existent. — ucarr

Definition dependent, and definition not specified.
Santa being nonexistent is different than there not being an existing Santa. Santa being anything is a predication.

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind.

No, not that at all. It's due to my mind being involved in the act of abstracting, preventing by some definitions the direct (causal?) access to this mind-independent thing.

Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence

It's existence is unknown (definition dependent again).

What is your response?

I am not concerned about how a mind works, and how it develops in an infant. Off topic.

Have you considered the insuperability of your mind as the reason? Its prior to all of your predications. — ucarr

Doesn't seem to be.

E1 Existence is a member of all that is part of objective reality

Objective Reality → E

Yes, but sans EPP, objective reality could be empty, a property that nothing has, that nothing needs. Hence it seems empty in absence of justification, and an unjustified assumption of EPP seems its only justification.

E3 Existence has predicates

No, E3 says X exists if X has predicates. It doesn't say any thing about existence itself (whatever that means) having predicates.

E → Phenomena

Arrow potnkints the wrong way, but yes, this is a definition that directly leverages EPP. Any predication implies existence, hence I think therefore I am.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)

Not objective. Part of 'the' universe, like the one that humans find happens to be the preferred one. All very anthropocentric, and thus very questionably mind independent.

E5 Y exists IFF Y is part of the causal history of X

X (Causal History) ↔︎ Y

Y exists relative to X .... This doesn't mean that Y exists. Existence is a realation, and a 1-way relation, not 2-way like you drew it.

E6 "existential quantification", where 51 is not prime because there exists an even divisor that is neither 1 nor 51.

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes, no statistically significant evidence has been found. Critics argue that the multiverse concept lacks testability and falsifiability, which are essential for scientific inquiry, and that it raises unresolved metaphysical issues.
-- Wikipedia — ucarr

I agree. Explanatory power does not constitute testability, and lack of alternative explanation does not constitute falsification of not-multiverse.

Existence cannot be analyzed.

By some apparently.

You cannot analyze the brute fact of your existence.

You can, just not by starting with an assumption of it being brute fact.

so I'll pick E1, as I've been doing throughout the conversation.

Fine. Pegasus has no access (no way to test for) E1 existence. It in no way helps or hinders his ability to count his wings.
If Pegasus wasn't logically possible, that's another story. That would inhibit said ability. I didn't even list 'logcially possible' as one of my definitions. Should have.

[direct knowledge is] With your empirical eyes, you look at a white horse racing around the paddock of a horse ranch. This is direct observation because your eyes are detecting something external to your mind. — ucarr

Direct is a relation, by your description. If it implies existence, then existence relative to you, nothing at all objective.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them.

So indirect is imagination. You called it knowledge? Of what? That you are imagining a flying horse? I'd say you have direct knowledge of that.

I'm not referring to your choice to focus on mind-independent reality. I'm referring to the fact that all things within the lens of perception, whether detected empirically or logically, hold within mind-dependence.

I don't consider that to be fact, nor does any realist.
I also do not presume anything's specific membership in objective reality (R1), in contrast with said realists. I'm not big on presuming things.

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind?

My making statements is not a mind independent activity.

I also don't think I can set it aside, but the existence of some rock doesn't depend on my subjectivity. — noAxioms


Saying you can't set aside your mind WRT reality acknowledges a through-line of connection linking your mind to the rock.

Maybe, but the ontology of the rock is unaffected by my perception of it, link or no link. I will actually question this for the apple. I suspect there are no mind-independent apples, meaning no apples in worlds lacking minds. Not so much with the rocks.

This tells us the existence of the rock, as you know it, does depend upon your mind's perception of it.

So, no, it does not tell me that, and existence is undefined here.

Correlation simply means that as the value of P changes, so does the value of Q.

OK, so you're talking about a different sort of correlation than what you get with say entangled particle measurements.

Inertial frames of reference for different actions are about the differential rate of elapsing time between the inertial frames. If you believe elapsing time pertains to P → Q, then you should be able to measure the amount of time it takes for P to imply Q. So tell me, how much time does it take for P to imply Q?

Frame dependent, and no, that's not how inertial frames work. Elapsed time between two events is a difference in one abstract coordinate of each of those two events. and that difference is frame dependent.

P → Q specifically establishes a correlation between the two variables.

No, just one way. Q does not exist relative to P under E5.

Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system.— noAxioms

Existence, like other abstractions, localizes in the temporal forms of emergent material things.

No idea what those words mean, but perhaps you can tell me Earth's location relative to existence. Can't do that? Case in point.

Do you believe in mind independence outside of social consensus?

Social consensus is an argument against solipsism, but it's still a form of mind dependence.

Do you equate existence with metaphysics to the exclusion of identifying metaphysics with material things? — ucarr

What I equate 'existence' with is definition dependent. Most of them don't exclude material things.

I equate metaphysics with cognition of the mind-scape.[/quote]Metaphysics is nowhere defined as any kind of cognition or grammar. Please use a definition that is at least slightly close to "the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space"

I think the Standard Model is the source of cognition and therefore of metaphysics

Cognition has been going on long before there was a standard model.

I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context.

OK, but you defined existence as cognition, which is emergent from the larger context of material (still a very restricted context), so you seem to contradict yourself. The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things.

For example, E2, your only statement about subjectivity, nevertheless says nothing about QM entanglement and its subject-object complex.

That's because QM says nothing about the role of subjectivity in any of its predictions.

I want to modify your characterization of general existence. I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. Like white light within the visible light spectrum, which contains RGB, viz., all of the colors, general existence contains The Quintet (mass_energy_force-motion_space_time), viz., all of the properties. Temporal forms of material things are emergent forms whose properties are funded by The Quintet. I don't expect any modern physicist to deny any property is connected to the Standard Model. In effect, assertion of predication sans existence is a claim that properties exist apart from the Standard Model. As an example, this is tantamount to saying the color red of an apple has nothing to do with the electromagnetism of the elementary charged particles inhabiting the visible light spectrum. — ucarr — ucarr

All that is your characterization of existence, not in any way a modification of any of mine (any one of the six). It seems to be existence relative to a model, and a model is an abstraction of something else. So this is closest to my E2. The standard model makes no mention of apples, so apparently apples don't exist by this definition. You've provided more definitions than I have probably, but all of them mind dependent.

We have options for predicating the Venn diagram relationship linking Columbus and Ohio. For example, "Columbus implies Ohio." By this statement we see Columbus is always a predicate of Ohio.

Not true. You can conclude ¬O → ¬C from that, but not O → C

For example, an adjective changes the perceivable state of its object-noun by giving the reader more information about the attributes of the object-noun. I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun.

But there is a subject noun. The subject just doesn't necessarily meet some of the definitions of existence. You seem to be using a mind-dependent one here, which makes the whole comment pretty irrelevant to my experimental denial of mind-independent EPP.

Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication

Predication is not a procedure, except perhaps under your mental definitions.

I'm not trying to prove existence. I'm trying to prove existence precedes predication. Given this fact, the assumption of the existence of existence is allowed.

You're directly saying that begging your conclusion is not fallacious.

Can you explain how abstracting to 14 isn't an example of rendering 14 as an abstraction? — ucarr

I cannot. Best to ask whoever asserts that.

I see we both place our main focus on E1 WRT to EPP.

I don't see this since your focus is always on E2, occasionally E4 which is still mind-dependent.

I seek to defend EPP and, as you say, you're examining its status. An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated.

It is important, because your insistence on approaching it from subjectivity prevents any analysis of E1.

My main point is that language - in the form of logic - seeks to evaluate to valid conclusions as proof of truth content in statements.

Disagree. Language is used for far more than just proofs and finding of truth.

Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works"

The way it is typically put: Language (and models) describe, they do not proscribe.

realism:
1 Philosophy the doctrine that universals or abstract concepts have an objective or absolute existence...
. .
reality:
2 the state or quality of having existence or substance.
•Philosophy existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subject to human decisions or conventions.
- The Apple Dictionary

I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement, then it means what the dictionary says it means

The dictionary definitions you quoted do not specify which usage of 'exists' it is referencing. OK, the realism definition says 'absolute' and not 'objective as opposed to subjective', but it's reference to abstractions also suggests the latter meaning.

The 'absolute' reference suggests R1. Definitions from other dictionaries vary.

I'm saying existence reduces to the Standard Model. — ucarr

I have no clue what you mean to say when you say existence (metaphysics) reduces to a physical model of the universe. The model isn't an ontological one. At best, one might say that things that are part of this universe (rocks and such) exist, but that's existence relative to a domain, and is essentially E4. I've shown how EPP is incompatible with any definition of the form 'exists in some restricted domain'. So maybe you're not trying to define E4 existence, but mean something else by those words.

Does 14 exist under this unclear definition? If not, is 14 an even number?

I think it incorrect to say it has no properties.

Good because nobody ever claimed such a paradoxical statement, regardless of what 'it' is.

If Ohio disappears totally, Columbus disappears totally — ucarr

Columbus is not a predicate of Ohio. 'Contains Columbus' is, but Ohio would still contain Columbus even if both no longer 'appear' to whatever is apparently defining their existence. I walk out of a room and the ball on table disappears from my view, but the ball is still round despite not appearing to me.

When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist. — ucarr

Does this statement beg EPP? — ucarr

How can you not see that? It is a mild reword of EPP, both forbidding predication of a things that don't exist, despite all my examples of predication of things that don't exist.

You want an abstract and fundamental definition of existence as it pertains to material things, and not as it pertains to abstractions, right? — ucarr

I don't restrict my scope to material things. 14 has been one of my frequent examples and it isn't a material thing, nor is it an abstraction, although abstracting is necessary to think about it.

I came up with a nonexhaustive list of 6 definiitions, one or two of which are mind dependent. None are fundamental, and being definitions, I think all 6 are abstract. Mostly I was trying to see if EPP makes any sense (has any meaning) relative to definition 1. The other five I've already analyzed.

... do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. — noAxioms
The second part of your claim marks you as a realist_materialist.

Nope, which is why I carefully put 'whatever that means' in there.

Yes, bolstered by QM, I give credence to entanglement of epistemics and ontics.

QM does not give any ontic state that is dependent on epistemics, pop articles notwithstanding.

The infinite series of negations, an asymptotic approach from existence to non-existence, the limit of existence, can't arrive at non-existence and talk about it because such talking sustains existence. True non-existence is unspeakable. Its negation is so total, it even negates itself, a type of existence. — ucarr

I could not parse much of what you said, but this bit makes it pretty clear that a mind-dependent definition of existence is being used, and 'nonexistence' is some sort of location somewhere, unreachable. I could not figure out how the size of the universe had an relevance whatsoever to a thing being talked about.

The whole comment seems irrelevant if a different definition of 'exists' is used, especially a mind-independent one that this topic is supposed to be about.

We can only talk about mind independence via use of our minds. — ucarr

I didn't say otherwise, but the mind-independent existing things don't require being talked about to exist.

My statement specifically addresses mind independence lying beyond our direct access.

So don't access it directly.

I have no trouble defining 'existence sans perception', but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way.. — noAxioms
Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.

I wasn't talking about my act of defining a phrase.

I think your final sentence above expresses your primary motivation for seeking to refute EPP.

I don't think EPP can be refuted, but perhaps my motivation for seeking its justification and not finding it.

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. — ucarr

I don't think my mind exists by all 6 definitions, so I cannot accept this statement without explicit meaning. Being self-aware is a predicate, and without presuming EPP, that awareness may very much be predication without certain kinds of existence. I've already given several examples where this must be the case, none being refuted.

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes — ucarr

I think if there was direct evidence of them, they by definition wouldn't be other universes. Most of the basic multiverse types fall necessarily out of theories that explain observation that no single classical universe theory can. For instance, Greene's inflationary multiverse (Tegmark's type II) explains the fine tuning issue, a very serious problem in a mono-universe interpretation.
The simplest (by far) quantum interpretation necessitates Greene's quantum multiverse. Sure, you can't prove or falsify any of these interpretations, but explaining their predictions without a multiverse gets either very complicated or insanely improbable, both violating Occam's razor.

The only relevant quote in the wiki multiverse page was references to existence.

"Together, these universes are presumed to comprise everything that exists: the entirety of space, time, matter, energy, information, and the physical laws and constants that describe them."
This one seems to presume a sort of E4 existence, substituting the multiverse for just our universe. Same relation, but far less anthropocentric.
Most of the references seem to use something like the E4 definition, but I think the intent is meant objectively despite the authors not thinking that out though. It isn't the point of the web page.

I now know you think numbers don't exist. — ucarr

I didn't say that either, especially since the type of existence wasn't specified. I would not make a claim that vague. You seem to be under the impression that I have beliefs instead of having an open mind to such matters. Part of learning is not presuming the answers before looking for evidence only in support of your opinions.

In your assessment of what I wrote, by having Pegasus count himself, you err. If he counts himself, he exists.

By which definition? I might agree to it with some definitions and not with others. You statement without that specification is vacuously ambiguous.

You assume Pegasus exists when you have him perform the action of counting himself. — ucarr

No, I just don't presume EPP when having him perform that. But as I said, you cannot conceive of no EPP, leaving you in no position to justify it. Trust me, there are lots of people on Earth that don't exist by your definition, and yet have no problem counting their own fingers and such. Pegasus is kind of like that, quite capable of counting wings without the bother of your sort of existence.

Proof is the point. You're trying to refute EPP by demonstrating predication sans existence.

Sure. One counterexample is plenty, and I provided several, so EPP does not hold for existence defined as any form of 'part of some limited domain', which covers E2,4,5,6. That proof is simple.
Where proof isn't the point is where it cannot be shown. EPP cannot be proven true or false under E1 or E3, so barring such proof, and it being demonstrated false with other definitions, EPP is accepted on faith, never on rational reasoning.

Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications?

I don't know what you think 'direct knowledge' is.as distinct from knowledge that isn't direct.

Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception

It does not. It is about existence independent of perception.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject. — ucarr

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication.

I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract composite of all the possible states of an abstraction. — ucarr

Spacetime is 4D and that means that all 'objects' have temporal extension. It is not just an abstraction, it is the nature of the thing in itself. To assert otherwise as you are doing here is to deny the standard model and pretty much all of consensus physics.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed.

It's not your practice of inference that I'm pointing out, it is the continuous practice of defining existence in a way that requires perception by you, counting by you, utterances by you, or in short in any way that requires you. Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them.

A key difference between our thinking has you believing we can set aside our subjectivity whereas I don't believe we can.

I also don't think I can set it aside, but the existence of some rock doesn't depend on my subjectivity.

The fundamental flaw, you say, is my insistence on mental perception in any consideration of mind independence.

It's not fundamental (outside of idealism). Yes, consideration is mind dependent, but I'm not talking about the consideration, I'm talking about the existence of the subject of predication. This exactly illustrates my point. I'm trying to talk about the subject, and you concentrate instead on the necessity of it being considered. There is no such necessity.

So yes, use your mind to consider this or that, but don't talk about the considering or the perceiving. Four consecutive examples below where you talk only of the concepts and not about the mind independent thing.


1

If predicates don't have temporal coordinates, then they only exist as emergent properties of their subjects. This is true of them, as it is true of all abstraction — ucarr

I am not talking about abstractions of predicates.

2

The number 14 does possess mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum because it is only conceivable through ...

Not talking about the concept of 14.

3

You're using the temporal coordinates of your neuronal circuits to make claims about predicates that don't have them.

I am not talking about conceptualizing or neurons.

4

Cognitive Baker St. is never independent of your material subjectivity.

And again. Not talking about cognitive Baker St. I'm talking about Baker St.

Concerning E5 definition: — noAxioms

P → Q. P is a correlation of Q. Consider P alone. Can you detect from P alone whether or not P is a correlation of Q? — ucarr

What are P & Q? Events? I am presuming so. They are effectively each a set of four coordinates

I don't know what you think it means for one event to be a correlation of another. Measurement of entangled pairs are said to be correlated, but not that one is a correlation of the other. It's a mutual thing, not an arrow going one way, I'm presuming this sort of mutual thing in my answers.

I am guessing that "is a correlation of" means that a measurement at P and Q are found at some later event R to be correlated. That means that P & Q both exist relative to R, but that neither P nor Q necessarily exists relative to the other.

Consider Q alone. Can you detect from Q alone whether or not Q is a correlation of P?

There is no P in 'Q alone'. There is just Q. P does not exist relative to Q. It is a counterfactual, and E5 does not posit counterfactuals.

Given P → Q, where is the elapsing time in this measurement?

Frame dependent, and said 'measurement' is done by R, not P or Q.

Correlations are not causations, but causation always implies correlation, and no laws require a uni-directional arrow of time.

Locality is not violated since neither P nor Q exists relative to the other, so no correlation exists relative to either of them either. The correlation only exists relative to R.

As you say, events have no time coordinates WRT existence.

Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system. The assignment of an origin event is arbitrary. Coordinate systems are frame dependent, origin dependent, and are very much abstractions. Events on the other hand, as well as intervals, are frame independent and physical.

then all events - including predications

Predications are not events. They don't have coordinates.

The presumed mind independence of the white horse is founded upon social interaction and its characteristic responses to public stimuli across vast numbers of individual observers.

Yes, such is the basis for E4, but it is still anthropocentric existence, still dependent on perception. Such is presumed by the wiki article on the multiverse, which still suggests a restriction that what exists is defined as what we see and infer from it.
E1,3,5,6 go beyond that to actual mind independence.

I have a route to this contradiction that extends from my definition of "existence" already presented but forgotten by you.

Non-existence, an infinite series of negations... negates anything in its presence, even itself. Attributes, like the things they predicate, are negated in the presence of non-existence. Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible. — ucarr — ucarr

I already commented on that definition. What is a negation in this context? Usually it is a transform of a logical statement, like A -> ~B negates to B -> ~A. Why does a finite series of negations not equate to nonexistence? What does it mean to negate a nonexistent thing? Sounds like predication to me.

Your definition also is based on perception. I didn't forget it, I ignored it as irrelevant to mind independent existence.

you cannot experience a time when you were not alive and therefore non-existent.

Not being alive is not necessarily equated with nonexistence. A rock isn't alive and you probably consider it to exist (I don't think it follows with the rock either, at least not without presuming EPP).

By your own understanding of mind independent reality, you cannot know it directly, but only by inference. — ucarr

You are very bad at knowing anything by inference due to your contradictory insistence of mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. As I said, you apparently can't do it. I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way.

Per my definition of non-existence as an infinite series of negations, to attempt an approach to it, you must negate everything you can think of as part of an unending series that gains no purchase upon non-existence.

I don't know what it means to negate a 'thing'. I don't know what 'purchase upon nonexistence' means at all. I don't see any proof here, just words that I cannot make out. Maybe if you formalized it and defined the terms, I could critique it. It all sounds very mind dependent. If I think of a thing, no amount of negating will make it not exist in an E2 sort of way.
Without knowing what these words mean, why cannot I negate human existence as part of an unending series? There is no mention of humans in there, and yet you claim this somehow proves human existence by this baffling definition of nonexistence.

Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality. — ucarr

That burden is yours, to prove that the conservation laws of just this one particular universe have any objective relevance at all. It's your assertion, not mine. All I see it an attempt to slap an E1 label on an E4 definition, with some E2 thrown in since perception always seems to creep in there as well.

a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms
Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist.

Read the bold part. I said the opposite. You asked for an example of a relation between an existent thing and a nonexistent thing. That was one example.

Unicorns (and dragons) valuing human female virgins is another example.
If you feel that numbers exist (or you think that I assert that), then we can relative Pegasus to its count of wings, making that an example of such a relation.

Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. — ucarr

OK, how is the count of Pegasuses (Pegasi?) determined? Maybe there are 5. Subjectively Pegasus counts himself as 1, as does anybody that sees him. Not zero. It seems that you already must presume the nonexistence of Pegasus to conclude a count of zero of them, rather than determining in some way a count of zero and from that concluding nonexistence.
This is pretty easy if existence means 'in some domain'. Pegasus does not exist in Moscow, so Pegasus can count himself or his wings all he wants, but that doesn't put him in the specified domain. Predication works fine despite the nonexistence. But if you mean E1 existence, then there's no domain. The thing either exists or not, and Pegasus counting himself isn't empirical evidence one way or the other.

If we stipulate Pegasus existed in the past — ucarr

I didn't even put temporal restrictions in my list of 6. Exists in the (abstract) domain of 'now', which has a general form of existence within a restricted domain.

Reversing our direction and beginning by saying two wings are a predication about a non-existent Pegasus, we cannot prove this connection between Pegasus and two wings

Proof is not the point. We presume Pegasus has two wings. Proving a premise negates the point of it being a premise.

unless we posit the contradiction of Pegasus simultaneously existing and not existing.

No such premise is required for nonexistent Pegasus to have two wings since existence of anything was not mentioned, let alone posited, in the above description. You've not justified why anything needs to exist in this scenario that explicitly references only nonexistent things.

We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception. — ucarr

I don't dispute that perception is mind dependent, but the topic is about predication of mind-independent things, not perception or mind dependent concepts of predication. How many times do I have to remind you of that? This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition.

We see in the definition that "modify" is an action that changes of the state of being of the object of its action. — ucarr

Different definition. I reject this usage as how predication applies to the predicate. Predication does not imply an action of change of state over time, as does the definition quoted. Surely your dictionary had more appropriate definitions than that one.

Since you're not exploring nonexistence of concepts, I pointed out your example deals with an abstraction

None of my examples are about abstractions. If I meant the abstraction of X, I would have said something like 'the concept of X'. I didn't use those words, so I'm not talking about the existence of concepts, but rather the mind-independent X. The OP is very clear about this distinction.

I am sorry that you cannot distinguish the two. I'm trying to help out out of that hole but I don't think I can, in which case you have no hope of justifying EPP except perhaps under E2, the only definition that you seem to be able to grasp.

14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time. — noAxioms

The neuronal circuits that support your articulation of your above quote do possess: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum. — ucarr

That they do, but if I was talking about those, I would have said 'concept of 14'. I was not talking about the conception of it.

Are their predicates outside time?

Predicates don't have coordinates. They're not objects. One can apply predicates to objects within time, such as a person having a tatoo only after a certain age, but only because a person very much does have temporal coordinates.

Similarly I can talk about 14 being even, despite 14 not having a time coordinate (nor a spatial coordinate).

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow

Again, predicates don't have coordinates. They not predicates located at/near Baker St, but instead are predicates of Baker St itself, independent of the street's nonexistence in Moscow.



Concerning E5 definition:

There is no future-to-past relationship at the time of measurement. Neither role of "cause" or "effect" exists before the connection linking the two roles. — ucarr

There is such a relationship at the time of measurement since the measurement defines the existence of the cause event relative to the measurement event. The two events are ordered, cause first, measurement later. That part of the definition holding to the principle of locality. There is no coming into existence of anything. An event is an event and as such, has a time coordinate. E5 is not relevant to non-events, so asking of 14 exists under D5 is a category error. Oddly enough, the definition is relevant to something like the set of all possible chess states.

Speaking reciprocally, material things without the awareness of sentient beings knowing them would be a thicket of unparsed redundancies, which is pretty close to the vacuous circularity of knowledge. — ucarr

No, it would be a vacuous absence of knowledge, but this topic is not concerned with knowledge of mind-independent things, but rather the existence of them.

The entanglement of ontology and epistemology is a big message to us from QM.

QM does not posit or conclude any role to knowledge or perception. If you think otherwise, you read too many pop articles.

With your empirical eyes, you look at a white horse racing around the paddock of a horse ranch. This is direct observation because your eyes are detecting something external to your mind. — ucarr

Oh you do have a concept of something external to your own mind.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them.

OK. But neither mental activity creates the object in question. Empirical perception does not create a white horse where there wasn't one without it. Hence it being mind independent. Similarly, Pegasus does pop into existence because of your imagination. It is also independent of your mind, but lacks the causal relationship that you have with the white horse. Per D5, the white horse exists relative to say your belt buckle and Pegasus does not.

I'll maintain that it is. In which case science and the scientists it consist of is free to scientifically study such things as ESP. — javra

Just so, and I've seen it (the study) done for water dowsing. It seemed to fail spectacularly under controlled conditions and yet it seems to work in the field. I tried it, and it worked for me (I was a kid at the time), but didn't work well. I quickly forgot how to hold the stick.
If it worked, there is probably a natural explanation for it. Maybe even ESP.
Dualism makes some really obvious empirical predictions, and yet these are never investigated AFAIK.

And yes, all that sort of falls under 'magic'.

BTW, in relation to this boogieman word "magic": even for a naturalistic pantheist who most can't hardly distinguish from a diehard atheistic physicalist, the whole of reality can only of itself be, in one word, magic.

I actually agree with that, which is why I don't label myself a realist.

To disprove this affirmation one would need to find a cogent reason for being's so being.

Exactly. The old 'why is there something instead of nothing?'. Wrong first question. Better to ask, 'is there something?', and only after justifying that one way or another go on to what follows. But naturalistic rules cannot explain being's being.

If people are saying determinism is compatible with randomness — flannel jesus

They (the ones using the D1 definition) are not saying that about determinism defined roughly as 'not randomness'. It's a different definition than that one, different from the scientific definition given in wiki, which is (wait for it) not random.

I've edited the linked post, and removed 'philosophical' from the description of E1.

Given what you've previously said - namely, that the opposite of "philosophical determinism" is not randomness but supernaturalism - this term of "science-determinism" would be akin to calling all scientists atheists — javra

You seem to confuse science with scientist. There are plenty of theists in the science world, but science itself, since around the renaissance has operated under methodological naturalism, which is indeed the presumption of no magic. So science operates as if there is no god, true, but it makes no demand on the beliefs of the people doing the science.
Heck, I believe stuff that I know is wrong. I hold contradictory beliefs. I don't explode because of this.

I was educated in a Christian school since the public ones were in serious need of help. My school taught good science, but not all of them do.

Which, to be blunt, is quite contrary to facts.

Could well be, yes.
I'm just trying to clarify definitions, and I don't want to coin the phrase scientific-determinism, but the science glossary would give a definition that is essentially "not-random"

As to the adjective "philosophical", determinism, being of itself a purely metaphysical stance regarding what ontically is, can only be philosophical. (That in itself threw me off a bit.)

True. All six are philosophical. Maybe I should have referred to it as dictionary-determinism, but then you'd google that and still come down on me for making up how other people use the word instead of just making up names.

Can only hope I can return the phrase to you some day.

Not likely. What do I know? I've avoided opinion in this topic as much as I can, so it's not like there's anything new I'm likely to spout.

Do I believe in determinism? I find belief to be very restrictive, a door closed for no reason. The way I look at things, the word isn't even meaningful without a bunch of premises I don't presume.

In trying to presume the best here: your usage of the term does not equate to the usage of the term. — javra

You said it's your term. Now you're saying it's "very much used that way" — flannel jesus

The people that use it in the D1 way (it seems pretty prevalent) just call it 'determinism'. I added the adjective, as I said above, since it is a dictionary definition used in philosophy discussions (not all discussions) as opposed to D2-5 which are physics definitions of 'deterministic' (and also used in philosophy discussions like this one). I could have called those 'science-determinism' but there are several kinds of that.

D6 is a form, but admittedly the theology people that push that view do not call the omniscience 'determinism'. I've never seen it used that way, but it's still a form of the 'inevitability' meaning.
Izzat so? : "a theism which upholds theological determinism" in the following post. I stand corrected.

I think this equivocation on your part between "philosophical determinism" and "naturalism" is where our disagreement might likely primarily reside. — javra

There are many valid definitions of various words, and that definition is the first one that comes up if I ask for determinism, definition. The adjective 'philiosophical' is something I put there to distinguish this definition from the others. The definition is real, and seems to be the one most often used by proponents of dualist free will. They don't care if physics has randomness or not. They care that the physics isn't involved in the making of the choice. Naturalism is something they deny, but they call it determinism because it means one's will is determined by causal physics. I agree it's a stupid choice of words because by their assertion, their will is 'determined' by their immaterial mind. How is that any less 'determinism' the way they're using it?

Ah, I don't think javra was assuming you're just making the term and the meaning of it up. — flannel jesus

The adjective I made up. None of the rest.

I agree with javra that calling such a concept "determinism" is very confusing

Lumping it with the others is perhaps confusing, but the word is very much used that way, and it needed to be on my list. All six of my definitions have different meanings and sometimes one can glean the definition used by context, and sometimes not.


This topic got kind of sidetracked. The argument in the OP I feel is a strong one against the libertarian (dualist) view being any more 'free' than one that uses physics, hard-deterministic or not.

Maybe we can focus on what it means to bear responsibility, and which view support and don't support that. Not sure if that discussion belongs here.

Since monism too comes in different flavors - to include both neutral monism and idealism - it can only be a naturalism in the form of physicalism/materialism. — javra

So does naturalism. If 'dualism' is actually how things work, then it's by definition natural. I can see why the dualist want to pick a different word for something they don't consider to reflect how natural things work.

How is the <usual> definition of naturalism different from physicalism? Materialism is quite controversial, but those two are almost the same, and neither is necessarily a realist position, stating only that mential processes supervene on the physical. I see no obvious distinction.

Hopefully he takes the feedback and just doesn't continue to insist on calling this "philosophical determinism". — flannel jesus

I'll find something else. Does it belong on my list of 6 at all then? When people talk about determinism vs randomness, they're not using that definition. But if they talk about determinism vs free will, they are using it.

you're saying that Philosophical Determinism allows for randomness, because Philosophical Determinism is somehow substantially different from Causal Determinism? — flannel jesus

'Philosophical determinism' is my term, and is often the sort of determinism referenced by the dualists. It means naturalism, but that sounds good, and they don't want their stance to be 'unnaturalism', so they pick a word 'determinism' that means that your decisions are determined by natural physics and not by you (the immaterial thing they envision themselves to be). So D1 boils down to 'not dualism', and has nothing to do with the presence or absence of randomness in natural law.

I am not sure if that's the definition that SEP talks about with the term 'causal determinism'. The page is pretty vague about single or multiple evolutions being possible from a given state, but their definition of 'determinism' (not the causal determinism definition higher up) has the word 'fixed' in it, which sort of implies that.

Yes. God rolling dice, as Einstein put it. — noAxioms

Want to point out that this example is not good, though. Given a metaphysics of determinism, though epistemically unpredictable in it's outcome, a rolling of the dice can only be ontically determinate. — javra

Disagree. Given metaphysics of determinism (D2, 3 say), there is no dice rolling at all. I was defining ontic indeterminism, anything where true randomness is going on.
None of this has anything to do with predictability. A simple program running very deterministic code can be utterly unpredictable, as proven by Turing. Unpredictability is a feature of our universe. There's no getting around that, even in principle.

If determinism and randomness are ontological opposites - as we then here agree - then, logically, how can "a determinism in which randomness occurs" yet be validly assigned the term "determinism

Determinism and randomness are ontological opposites only under D2 and D3. The opposite of D1 is supernaturalism, which makes the physical universe not a closed system, open to external causes from outside. Those causes are presumably not random but rather conveying intent.

D2 - D5, however, are all models of physics which are construed to be different types of determinism only in so far as they can each be deemed a subcategory of D1. — javra

Yes, D2-5 are all naturalistic views. D6 is not.

Because of this, the only one of the six categories listed which validly counts toward a "philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing" will strictly be that of D1.

To this effect, I for example found this article in relation to "D2":

Why Bohm was never a determinist

Marij van Strien

Forthcoming in Guiding Waves In Quantum Mechanics: 100 Years of de Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave
Theory (ed. Andrea Oldofredi). Oxford University Press, 2024.

Abstract
Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics has generally been received as an attempt to restore
the determinism of classical physics. However, although this interpretation, as Bohm initially
proposed it in 1952, does indeed have the feature of being deterministic, for Bohm this was never
the main point. In fact, in other publications and in correspondence from this period, he argued that
the assumption that nature is deterministic is unjustified and should be abandoned. Whereas it has
been argued before that Bohm’s commitment to determinism was connected to his interest in
Marxism, I argue for the opposite: Bohm found resources in Marxist philosophy for developing a non-
deterministic notion of causality, which is based on the idea of infinite complexity and an infinite
number of levels of nature. From ca. 1954 onwards, Bohm’s conception of causality further
weakened, as he developed the idea of a dialectical relation between causality and chance. — https://philarchive.org/archive/VANWBW

Cool. I saw the interpretation not as an attempt to restore the determinism of classical physics (which classical physics never was), but to restore a classical feature to quantum physics. It is a full embrace of the intuitive principle of counterfactual definiteness, at the expense of the classical notion of locality. But I can agree that the goal never was to keep determinism. Some other (far simpler) interpretations also keep that.
Funny that Marxism held resources for any of this.

It allows for it, but does not necessitate it. — noAxioms

Your answer is unjustified.

I don't understand the question then.

Haven't you ever been in a situation where the future outcomes of options were unclear to you? How could reason help you in such a situation?. — MoK

Only if I ignore reasons for the choice. Say I am crossing the street. I can ignore reason and just choose a time to do it. Or I can look both ways and use the information about the traffic as my reason for when it is a safe time to cross.

I can eat when I get hungry instead of randomly, and even randomly, I cannot eat because my random gyrations don't result in food being ingested. Knowing where the food is constitutes a reason to reach in that direction. In short, decisions without reason result in unfitness. You'd not survive 10 minutes.

Like when "experts" say the universe is infinite and expanding. That's called mental masturbation. A bad habit — Gregory

While the "experts" might say something like that, the experts don't. Space is expanding, but saying the universe is expanding implies that it has a size, which it doesn't if it isn't bounded.

I said the continuous doesn't make sense because spatial infinity squished into a finite size makes no sense. — Gregory

Zeno did not describe infinite space squished into finite something. It was never spatial infinity.

These comments will also not help you Infinity isn't a hard concept to grasp, but giving it a bound when by definition there isn't one is always going to run into trouble.

First, I take it that we then agree that by randomness we are not addressing mere unpredictability but, instead, some ontic attribute of reality. — javra

Yes. God rolling dice, as Einstein put it.

You did nitpick but then agreed with the definition of randomness I provided. It is here that I'm not understanding your premises. What, to you, then is ontic randomness?

Your definition: "an event within the cosmos [...] that as event has no reason whatsoever for its so occurring."
I would perhaps have said '... occurring exactly as it does'. A neutron decays because there's a neutron there, but exactly when could be random. Under determinism (D2,3) there's no such randomness.
D4 would not say that a subsequent state can be determined from a prior state, but it is determined in the same way that the past is fixed under presentism. I'd probably not put D4 in the classification with 2&3.

To maybe clarify this question: Is it deterministic?

What, randomness? By definition of 'not random', it cannot be, but that's not to say that a completely different definition of determinism allowing randomness.

If [randomness is] not deterministic, how then does randomness's occurrence not contradict the determinism otherwise upheld.

I don't think that in such cases the determinism is otherwise upheld, at least not by definition D2 or D3.

You'll notice the SEP article on D1 nowhere mentions that the determinism therein addressed allows for ontic randomness (when understood as not deterministic).

I'll accept that, except then I'm not sure of their distinction between determinism and causal determinism.
The oxford dictionary definition was pretty clear as it made no mention of inevitable or fixed subsequent states.

Randomness is not address until section "3.3 Determinism and Chaos"

That section seems to concern epistemology and our ability to glean if determinism is the case. I personally don't see how chaos theory is relevant to that other than it being illustrative of the incalculability of even simple systems.

Nevertheless, the mathematical exploration of chaos in dynamical systems helps us to understand some of the pitfalls that may attend our efforts to know whether our world is genuinely deterministic or not.

OK. I'll buy that. If they imply that such knowledge can every be known, I have news. They're looking at a complex chaotic classical system, when a simple double-slit will do. Prove or disprove the system to be deterministic or not. Not gonna happen.

One could view D1 as equivalent to naturalism. (This being contingent on how "nature" itself is defined, but this is a different issue.) But that does not then of itself allow for ontic randomness (of a non-deterministic kind) in D1.

It allows for it, but does not necessitate it.

Just so you know, though I'm currently confident in my position, I'm of course open to the possibility of being wrong.

I'm not sure I have a position to be confident in.

1 is out since it allows randomness — noAxioms


This is the principle area where I'm losing what you're trying to say (all other differences of opinion to me follow suit): If determinism, of any variety, can be said to allow for randomness, doesn't this then imply that, since its determinism, the randomness addressed must have been itself determined by antecedent givens (things, events, etc.)? — javra

I've encountered plenty of people that use definition 1, the one in the dictionary, which yes, doesn't seem like determinism at all to me. That D1 allows it does not in any way imply that the others do. D1 just says naturalism: no magic going on. No interfering miracles or anything like that.

If so, then one gets randomness only in the sense of notions such as chaos theory

No. Chaos theory is entirely consistent with any kind of determinism, and says only that small differences in initial conditions result in large difference later on. Determinism (D2,3,4) says that a given initial condition can evolve only one way. D5 asserts this, but D5 is demonstrably wrong. D6 paradoxically says that it will evolve but the one <predicted> way, but it 'could have' evolved a different way. We could do a whole topic trying to justify that one, or have its proponents attempt the feat.

As for epistemic randomness, it is pretty trivially proven that a system cannot be predicted from inside the system, no matter the processing power of the predictor, and no matter the impossible knowledge of the initial state. As for Chaos theory, you put 3 equal Newtonian point masses stationary in a 3-4-5 triangle arrangement and let them go. We can predict that one of them will fly off at escape velocity leaving the other two in a stable orbit, but we cannot predict which mass or which speed/direction the exit takes place. Doing so requires more precision that can reasonably be achieved, but it's possible in principle since the calculation is outside the simple closed system.

Question: Can it be shown that one mass will escape under relativity theory? I think it depends on the masses, whereas the Newtonian case did not. So certainly different evolution.

Ontologically, there is no randomness. And so everything ontologically remains causally inevitable.

Correct, for D2,3,4

Edit: And so completely necessary in every respect; thereby completely fixed; and thus fully equivalent to eternalism in its ontic being.

D4 is less specific and can be single (D2) or multi-world (D3).
Is calling it 'similar in Ontic being' correct? Eternalism says that all moments in time have equal ontic status, while E2 under say presentism says that future events are inevitable, but still nonexistent, which seems to be an ontic difference.

Maybe we should better define what "randomness" is intended to here specify. I'll start by defining it as an event within the cosmos (with the cosmos here understood to be the totality of all that is, to include multiple worlds or universes where such to occur) that as event has no reason whatsoever for its so occurring.

Not 'no reason'. I mean, a neutron decay happens because there's a free neutron with a half life of say a second, but the exact moment it decays is what's random. Ditto with the photon/slits. The thing has to end up somewhere, but there's randomness to exactly where. Both are caused, but not precisely caused.

This then to me generally conforms to this definition of randomness:

I'm fine with your definition, despite my instinct to pick at it.

Do you mean something different by the word such that randomness would be something not deterministic in terms of ontology (rather than in terms of mere epistemology as just previously addressed)?

Definitely ontic since epistemic randomness is not in question.


Edit: D5 has been shown nondeterministic, hence should not be on my list at all.
Norton's dome is a demonstration of the indeterminacy of Newtonian physics.

The statement "An apple is red only if the apple exists," describes the scope of objective reality IFF the apple examples complex objectivity in the form of: a) non-locality by means of symmetry and conservation and b) temporary formal change emergent from the quintet of mass_energy_force-motion_space_time. — ucarr

None of those criteria have objective meaning, so you're saying nothing exists (E1)?
The bold part directly begs EPP. As I said, you just cannot set it aside long enough to drive its absence to contradiction.

You can't separate a sphere from the curvature of its surface area.

Not trying to. I'm trying to separate the curvature of the sphere from the existence of the sphere, to see if that breaks something.

A predication without a mind-independent dynamic system examples an attribute perceiving from the outside the encompassing perimeter that is its insuperable container.

In the specifics of an example, it's the curvature of the surface area of a sphere standing outside of the sphere

This wording seems to presume that predication has a location, which seems to make no sense. The thing predicated might not have a location to be outside of.
Maybe I'm just not getting the poetic way you word things.

My argument supporting my defense of EPP draws a parallel: a) 'has wings' modifies an object that lacks existence; b) the factor 2 multiplied by the null set. This expresses as 2 { } = 0. When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist. — ucarr

The last bold bit begs EPP, invalidating the reasoning since the opening premise is that EPP is explicitly being denied.
As for the funny multiplication bit, 2 wings multiplied by the number of existing entities with them results in zero existing wings. I don't dispute that. The nonexistent object still has wings without contradiction. I never claimed the wings (or the object, or the predicates) have the property of existence. I only claim that the predication modifies the object.

You embrace the relativity of simultaneity?

It comes with embrace of spacetime, big bang, black holes, all of which are described only by relativity theory and denied by absolutist theories. Relativity of simultaneity directly follows from the premises of special relativity. The absolutist alternatives deny both of those premises. You are of course free to join that group.

If language cannot prove anything, then language cannot demand proof.

Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. You're crossing that line.

"Something non-existent" is a contradiction.

Still not demonstrated, only asserted.
Sherlock is one example of something (supposedly) nonexistent. No contradiction is entailed if I assert that.

As to determinism vs. fatalism, do you not find that determinism as concept entails necessitarianism. — javra

That sounds like 'hard determinism' or D2, but I notice that they use the word 'world' like there are other worlds and therefore this particular world is no more necessitated than the others.

If things are "fixed" (irrespective of why), then there will only be "exactly one way for the world to be"

Agree..#1 was causal determinism, which didn't use that word.

I ask because, as far as I can see, if necessitarianism is entailed by determinism

OK, let's compare it to my list of 6. 1 is out since it allows randomness. 3 allows (demands?) all outcomes, necessitating no particular world. 4 (eternalism) seems to fit the bill. 5 is falsifiable since the universe is not classical. 6?? Depends on how you spin it.

So sure, necessitarianism is entailed by determinism under definitions 2 and 4.

then determinism is necessarily fatalistic when contemplated in terms of events occurring over time.

No, fatalism is completely different, saying that there's one end outcome even if initial conditions are different. None of the other isms say anything like that. Fatalism says I will die eventually. This is consistent with non-determinism that allows all sorts of crazy paths to that end.

I only intend that if necessitarianism, we are then fated or else destined to do what we will do by reality at large, irrespective of how its workings get to be construed, such that the future can only be in fixed and, hence, can only take one particular course of events.

Fine. Sounds valid. I have no problem with it, and find no particular impact to the way I live if it turns out to be true or not.

How are you going to deal with the dichotomy that I presented? — MoK

Easy. By not asserting that I have the kind of free will that you define. I make decisions for reasons. You apparently assert that you don't, which I suppose explains some things, but doesn't explain how you are alive enough to post to a forum.

The decision seems random from the third perspective but not the first perspective since it is up to the person want to choose one option or another. — MoK

Making a choice based on what you want is doing it for a reason.

Are you sure you provided the correct link? — javra

Apparently not. Here is the correct one, and I fixed the prior post link. Hopefully I did it right this time.
The SEP article is here and is not linked by that post, but you seem to have found it below.
It matches the idea conveyed by just a google search of the word 'determinism', which seems to be an alternate term for naturalism, even thought there are natural interpretations that are not deterministic in the sense of subsequent specific states being inevitable.

The list of six is just something I came up with. You are free to disagree with any of them (especially #6).
Turns out that most people arguing for free will define determinism with #1 whereas I defined it by default to #2, causing us to talk past each other.

I searched SEP again, and the only entry that stands out is this one, which defines causal determinism in the same old way: in short as entailing causal inevitability. — javra

That's the one. It isn't crystal clear on its definition:
"roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature."
The google search yielded a similar statement:
"all events in the universe are caused by prior events or natural laws "
It says that all states evolve only from prior states per the laws of nature (naturalism), but is vague about things like quantum mechanics which seems probabilistic according to said laws of nature.
Hence it seems to be a statement more about naturalism and not explicitly 'hard' determinism.

This from Oxford dictionary entry for determinism:
"the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions."
That definition is exactly #1, just saying that the will is determined (a function entirely of) causes external to the will. No mention is made of there being one inevitable outcome from a given state.

Biological determinism, also known as genetic determinism,[1] is the belief that human behaviour is directly controlled by an individual's genes or some component of their physiology, generally at the expense of the role of the environment, whether in embryonic development or in learning — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_determinism — javra

I suppose I could just have looked that up. Not sure if it belongs on my list, but while my genetics may very well determine my general nature and thus choices in the long run, it is not directly consulted when making a decision. For instance, somebody was shown to have a genetic preference for cinnamon. That general nature definitely influences choices of which foods to pick, but the gene involved here is not part of that decision. If the genes of that person was suddenly to change (all cells at once), the preference would still be there. Changing the blueprint after the building is finished doesn't change the building, but it might change the way it is subsequently maintained.

Again, I read nothing in the linked post to that effect.

Again, apologies. Better proof reading next time, eh?

But then, if we agree on this, then #6 as specified in the parentheses does not apply to the issue at hand. Period.

I'm fine with that. The correct linked post also says that only the first four are important.

#3 MWI

No. You don't do otherwise. You by entailment do both in causally inevitable manners, each being done in a different world, with no ability to do otherwise to speak of. — javra

OK. Yes, each done in a different world. Is it you doing both then? Identity is not really preserved over time with MWI, so the question is ill framed. Not only can you not have chosen chocolate, but it wasn't even you that had chosen vanilla. It was somebody else. Identity becomes an abstract concept under MWI, without physical meaning, and abstractly, yes, you chose vanilla.

#1 is a synonym for naturalism, meaning that will is a function of natural physics. — noAxioms

Again, provide a link to reference this. — javra

#1 is 'causal determinism' as opposed to 'determinism', distinguished in the SEP article. It later gives a less rough definition of the former that attempts to cover as many bases as possible.
"Determinism is true of the world if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. "
This makes a declaration and an assumption. First, it asserts the subsequent state is fixed, which is the inevitable part, even though 'inevitable' is not used this way in the article. But it also says "given a specified way things are" at some time, and that wording is a counterfactual, something not physically verifiable. Some quantum interpretations (#2 in particular) posit the principle of counterfactual definiteness. Almost all the other ones do not, rendering statements like the one above meaningless.
SEP begins to address this when it questions the phrase "way things are". It talks about speed of light and locality (not by name), but no mention is made of counterfactuals. Locality is more important to the authors, as it is with me, but omitting something relevant is a mistake.

Almost all philosophy sites ignore (assume?) that principle, but almost no philosophers know their physics enough to realize that it's important to be explicit about it, and what the implications of positing it are (such as retro-causality). Almost all the philosophers presume a classical universe despite the fact that it has been proven to be otherwise.

Hence the lack of links in my posts. Such issues are rarely discussed, and the physics people often don't know or don't care about the philosophical implications of the prevailing views. I do care, so I had to learn the physics myself, enough that I'm a moderator on a science forum (medium fish in very small pond), but I know the science only enough to do the philosophy that wasn't being done by anybody else.

I did a internet search on "philosophical determinism" and nothing came up to this effect — javra

I called it that because it's what most forum users are referencing with the word 'determinism', but 'causal determinism' seems to be the more correct term.
Most proponents of free will seem to argue not against determinism, but rather against fatalism, which is a different thing and has no place on my list any more than does superdeterminism. Their strawman notion of determinism is actually a description of fatalism, where subsequent events are inevitable even if different choices were made.


SEP mentions a Popper definition where determinism is equated to subjective predictability. That is trivially proven false and doesn't belong on my list.


Thank you for engaging with my posts. Much of it is mine, leaving you quite free to tell me I'm full of it.


Cool comic, and leaving unclear which side to identify with since both of them seem to fail to make a distinction between choice and free choice.

By this definition, any free choice is irrational. — noAxioms

Call it whatever you like! — MoK

It's what you're saying, not me.
You assert you have free will, and then assert that will isn't free if it is based on a reason. Hence your asserted free choices are not based on any reason, which is by definition irrational.

In this example, Pegasus exists as a cognitive entity of the mind-scape. — ucarr

Fine. Then we're talking past each other because I'm not exploring nonexistence of concepts.

I'm building my arguments from E1 & E2. The pillars of my argument are: a) the quintet: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time; b) the symmetries and their conservation laws.

None of those exist under E2. Concepts of them do, but a concept of say mass does not have mass.
None of those have objective meaning since they are all but properties of objects in our universe,. So I don't see how you're going to build an argument for EPP under E1 using these empirical notions.

My main premise says, mind-independent things and cognitive things have two parts: a) local part: a mind-independent material thing measurable in its dimensions and also in its location; b) non-local part: the quintet that funds the physics of the temporary forms of emergent physical things and the cognitive things of sentience.

Your premise seems to presume that only 'material' things have objective existence, which confines them to our universe or one very much like it, pretty much an E4 definition. What if your premise is wrong? I mean, 14 is even (a predicate) and yet 14 is not material, so it doesn't exist by your premise. That seems to be a counterexample to your premise. And remember, I'm talking about 14 and not the concept of 14, the latter of which does not have the listed predicate.
14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time.

All modes of existence, whether mind-independent or cognitive, exist within time

The universe doesn't exist within time. Neither does 14. Both these have predicates.

Before I give a response, I need you to define the sense in which "measured" is being used in your two paragraphs above.

event A is measured by event B if the state of event B is in any way a function of the state at event A. This is a definition of 'measure' as used by E5. My paragraphs were meant as examples illustrating how it worked.

Yes, E4 is very anthropocentric, and likewise your conversation here notwithstanding your stipulation for the exclusion of E2.

The stipulation is logical. The topic is about mind independent existence, and E2 is by definition mind dependent existence. I'm not saying it's wrong, it's just not mind independent.

Fundamental to this conversation, as well as to all of the rest of the entire universe of human cognition, lies mind dependence by knowledge.

I am discussing ontology, not epistemology.

When you say, "I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..."as I understand you, you refer to a flying horse defined by physics.

Not sure if physics defines Pegasus. That specific creature is, after all, in violation of our physics. Physics does allow a winged thing that in a reasonable way otherwise resembles a horse, so I'll accept the comment.

Let's suppose imaginary-impossibles inhabit an imaginary plane. Having two parts: a) real-imaginary; b) imaginary-imaginary. When you ask about “…the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..." you’re asking about a) the real-imaginary part. EPP, as I understand it, does not deny the existence of Pegasus part a) the real-imaginary part. Pegasus defined by physical dimensions exists as an “as if” physical horse with wings in terms of part b) the imaginary-imaginary part. This “as if” version of a mind-independent, physically real horse differs from a non “as-if” mind-independent, physically real horse because it is not directly observable, whereas the other is directly observable.

I don't understand almost any of that, but in the end you draw a distinction between something observable or not. Not sure how Pegasus can not be observable since it, being a life form, is an observer, whether it exists or not.

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else. — ucarr

False, since Baker St is present in London, no mere abstraction. The example shows its nonexistence in a chosen domain, and yet still having predication. This is a counterexample to EPP for existence in a domain.

E1"Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" says there is no objective reality of things not embedded within existence defined by E1.

This seems to say that there cannot be more than one objective reality, or one OR embedded within another. With that I can agree, but tell me if I parsed it wrong, because it's obfuscated wording.

Moreover, as you say, if you try to exclude Sherlock Holmes from E1, you get a contradiction forbidding that exclusion. For Sherlock Holmes, or anything else, to exist, it must be part of E1.

Nothing is 'part of E1'. E1 is a definition. So anything that exists is part of objective reality (OR), by definition. If Sherlock Holmes is not part of OR (and I had presumed this), then I see no contradiction still. X exists. Y does not. I see no contradiction in some things being part of OR and other things not.
The only rule seems to be that if X and Y interact, they must have similar ontology. I can interact with ghosts only if ghosts are real or if I'm not real.
Anyway, you said 'get a contradiction from excluding Holmes from OR. Please spell out that contradiction since I do not see one. It is asserted, but in no way demonstrated.

Causal relationships are not temporal.

By definition they very much are.

When your parents conceived you, they became cause to your effect, and not a moment before.

I was talking about the E5 definition, and this isn't true under E5. They are not the cause to my effect until my effect measures them, and that doesn't happen for over half a century after said conception event. E5 is not a standard ontology definition. Rovelli is the only one that got close to its wording.

That my seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical change, is my point. The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me. — ucarr

I didn't say it was. I said that under E5 definition, its existence relative to you is due to your measurement of it. That measurement has zero to do with epistemology. Rocks measure things in this sense just as much as a biological system. E5 is a completely mind independent definition.

The inconceivability of universe without spacetime supports emergence.

Wow, I have no trouble conceiving of a universe without spacetime.

The link you provide does not provide links to philosophical references regarding the term "determinism." — javra

The SEP article on the subject is the best I can do, and it opens with using #1 as its definition, and touching on some of the others.

I got into philosophy precisely due to the lack of any articles from people that know their physics. So I learned the physics myself and payed little attention to any philosopher that wasn't aware of physics up to about a century ago.

What is 'biological determinism'? Sounds like biological things operate deterministically, but robots don't.

Maybe I should have specified "as pertains to the concept of free will as context".

All of them pertain.

(with full libertarian free will on #6) — noAxioms

How on earth do you rationally justify this claim? If omniscient X knows all that they will choose in the future (entailed by their omniscience) they can't have libertarian free will on account of all their future choices already being pre-established. No?

If you read my linked post, I ask exactly that. You have to ask those that assert the omniscient god also granting us (and only us) free will. There are articles about this one since the contradiction is so obvious. They wave hands almost as hard as the people trying to rationalize the Millennium Falcon being so fast that it "made the Kessel Run in less than twelve parsecs" which is a unit of distance, not time.

and #3 does not entail phenomenal inevitability. — noAxioms
Irrelevant to the issue of causal inevitability, which it does entail.

Sort of. If the initial state is far enough back, you choose both vanilla and chocolate. You do otherwise. Both are causally inevitable.

As for an example of something that is not obviously causally inevitable, radioactive decay comes to mind. — noAxioms
How is this in any way relevant?

It (along with double slit) are flagships of hard determinism vs randomness. The former says that the decay will happen at time X. Quantum theory gives only probabilities of when it will decay (a half life). Most interpretations consider such decay to be totally uncaused, just like where the photon gets detected after passing through the double slits.

but #1 does not entail this inevitability — noAxioms
How do you figure that?

#1 is a synonym for naturalism, meaning that will is a function of natural physics. It stands opposed to supernaturalism (dualism) where this is not the case. Most modern incompatibilist proponents of free will presume dualism. Anyway, naturalism does not necessarily imply inevitability. As I said, quantum theory (very much part of naturalism) is empirically probabilistic.

If a decision is based on a reason, then that decision is not free. — MoK

By this definition, any free choice is irrational.

Can you provide even one philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing? — javra

I had counted six kinds of determinism.
Short summary:
1 philosophical determinism
2 Bohmian (hard)
3 MWI
4 eternalism
5 classical
6 onmiscience

Of these, 2,4,5,6 can probably be pitched as entailing causal inevitability (with full libertarian free will on #6), but #1 does not entail this inevitability, and #3 does not entail phenomenal inevitability.

Decision making probably falls under class 5 for the short term.
As for an example of something that is not obviously causally inevitable, radioactive decay comes to mind. This is phenomenally inevitable only under 2,4,6

When Achilles runs the one yard, the tortoise is a tenth-of-a-yard ahead. And so on, without end. — Nemo2124

Without end? Sure, it's an infinite series, but it ends when Achilles has run 111 1/9 yards. That's a finite time and a finite distance, simply expressed as a limit of an infinite series. So where is the paradox identified.

There's all sorts of interesting ways to make it more fun, really giving Zeno's argument a run for its money.
You have a FIFO queue, a pipeline of sorts. At 1 second, you put in numbered balls 1 & 2, and take out the next ball, which is '1'. The next half second, you put in 3 & 4 and take out the 2. Each iteration puts in two balls and takes out 1. They're numbered and put in and taken out in order. After the series completes in 2 seconds, how many balls are in the queue? Answer: None since there is no ball that doesn't have a defined time at which it was inserted and another time at which it was removed.

Precisely, by mathematical summation the series gives unity, but in practice - physically - it's impossible. — Nemo2124

The physical has not been shown to be any different than the mathematical model in this scenario, especially since it's a mathematical mind-experiment, not a physical one.

We ought to remove those points, those beginnings and ends, from the representation of the movement of the thing itself — Metaphysician Undercover

The two are admittedly modeled as points, which works if you consider say their centers of gravity or their most-forward point. But by your assertion, do you mean that the tortoise is never at these intermediate points, only, the regions between?

I don't think that Achilles can ever reach the tortoise, unless it reaches some sort of Planckian limit in distance and suddenly quantum leaps to become 'the winner' — Nemo2124

You think that space being continuous is disproven by this story then. Quantum theory AFAIK has never suggested quantizing spacetime.

By relativity theory, an object is always moving, and cannot actually be at a fixed position. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry to find a nit in everything, even stuff irrelevant to the OP, but relativity theory doesn't say this. In the frame of Earth, Earth is stationary. There's noting invalid about this frame.

Zeno's paradoxes when interpreted mathematically, pose fundamental questions concerning the relationship between mathematics and logic, and in particular the question as to the logical foundation of calculus. — sime

:100:

How can nature have anything infinite within it? — Gregory

I don't see why it would be a problem. For instance, there doesn't seem to be a bound to space or time, making both infinite. Nothing stops working due to that model.