Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality. — ucarr

That burden is yours, to prove that the conservation laws of just this one particular universe have any objective relevance at all. It's your assertion, not mine. All I see it an attempt to slap an E1 label on an E4 definition, with some E2 thrown in since perception always seems to creep in there as well. — noAxioms

I've already presented a math theorem justifying the conservation laws of just this one particular universe.

You say E1 needs a rational justification, not an empirical one. I can point to a rational justification of E1 in the form of Noether's Theorem. It makes the prediction that WRT mass, “If a system has a continuous symmetry property, then there are corresponding quantities of mass whose values are conserved in time. – Wikipedia”
— ucarr

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem. — ucarr

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes, no statistically significant evidence has been found. Critics argue that the multiverse concept lacks testability and falsifiability, which are essential for scientific inquiry, and that it raises unresolved metaphysical issues.
-- Wikipedia

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. — ucarr

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist. — ucarr

Read the bold part. I said the opposite. You asked for an example of a relation between an existent thing and a nonexistent thing. That was one example.

Unicorns (and dragons) valuing human female virgins is another example.
If you feel that numbers exist (or you think that I assert that), then we can relative Pegasus to its count of wings, making that an example of such a relation. — noAxioms

Since I read you as thinking numbers exist and you say your words express the opposite thought, I now know you think numbers don't exist.

Consider: You're teaching numbers to your child. In your backyard you've laid two stones set apart. You walk your child to the first stone and place his hand upon it. You say aloud, "one." You coax your child to say aloud, "one." You repeat this action at the next stone. You then put the two stones close together and place your child's hand on each stone, one after the other. At each stone the little person says aloud, "one." You then say aloud, "two." While speaking, you put your hand onto one stone and then onto the other. Finally you coax the child to say aloud, "two." The child picks up a stone in each hand and runs around the yard excited, yelling, "two!"

Does the child, completely ignorant about numbers, see the difference between one stone and two stones?

Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. — ucarr

OK, how is the count of Pegasuses (Pegasi?) determined? Maybe there are 5. Subjectively Pegasus counts himself as 1, as does anybody that sees him. Not zero. It seems that you already must presume the nonexistence of Pegasus to conclude a count of zero of them, rather than determining in some way a count of zero and from that concluding nonexistence. — noAxioms

In your assessment of what I wrote, by having Pegasus count himself, you err. If he counts himself, he exists. I made the math statement Peagasus exists zero times, meaning he doesn't exist.

This is pretty easy if existence means 'in some domain'. Pegasus does not exist in Moscow, so Pegasus can count himself or his wings all he wants, but that doesn't put him in the specified domain. Predication works fine despite the nonexistence. — noAxioms

You assume Pegasus exists when you have him perform the action of counting himself. Your assumption doesn't specify which domain he occupies, and thus his absence from Moscow has no bearing upon the fact of his existence. Can you demonstrate predication sans existence without paradoxically assuming the existence of the non-existent thing?

Reversing our direction and beginning by saying two wings are a predication about a non-existent Pegasus, we cannot prove this connection between Pegasus and two wings — ucarr

Proof is not the point. We presume Pegasus has two wings. Proving a premise negates the point of it being a premise. — noAxioms

Proof is the point. You're trying to refute EPP by demonstrating predication sans existence. There's no logical refutation of EPP via demonstration of predication sans existence if it's assumed (or presumed).

We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception. — ucarr

I don't dispute that perception is mind dependent, but the topic is about predication of mind-independent things, not perception or mind dependent concepts of predication. — noAxioms

You're examining the grammar governing the ontics of material things. There are no discussions that aren't about mind-dependent perception somewhere down the line. Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications?

I don't dispute that perception is mind dependent, — noAxioms

This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition. — noAxioms

Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception, I don't see how we can apply our minds to both modes.

modify | ˈmädəˌfī

|verb (modifies, modifying, modified) [with object]
make partial or minor changes to (something), typically so as to improve it or to make it less extreme: she may be prepared to modify her views | the theory has been modified to fit subsequent experimental evidence | (as adjective modified) : a modified version of the aircraft. — ucarr

We see in the definition that "modify" is an action that changes of the state of being of the object of its action. — ucarr

Different definition. I reject this usage as how predication applies to the predicate. Predication does not imply an action of change of state over time, as does the definition quoted. Surely your dictionary had more appropriate definitions than that one. — noAxioms

predicate

noun | ˈpredəkət | Grammar
the part of a sentence or clause containing a verb and stating something about the subject (e.g., went home in John went home): [as modifier] : predicate adjective.
• Logic something that is affirmed or denied concerning an argument of a proposition.

verb | ˈpredəˌkāt | [with object]
1 Grammar & Logic state, affirm, or assert (something) about the subject of a sentence or an argument of a proposition: a word that predicates something about its subject | aggression is predicated of those who act aggressively.
2 (predicate something on/upon) found or base something on: the theory of structure on which later chemistry was predicated.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject.

Since you're not exploring nonexistence of concepts, I pointed out your example deals with an abstraction and thus it's irrelevant to non-existence of material things. — ucarr

None of my examples are about abstractions. If I meant the abstraction of X, I would have said something like 'the concept of X'. I didn't use those words, so I'm not talking about the existence of concepts, but rather the mind-independent X. The OP is very clear about this distinction. — noAxioms

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states.
So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

I read your two above quotes as evidence of you talking about abstractions towards examining whether EPP can be eliminated without causing a problem. I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract composite of all the possible states of an abstraction.

By your own understanding of mind independent reality, you cannot know it directly, but only by inference. — ucarr

You are very bad at knowing anything by inference due to your contradictory insistence of mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. As I said, you apparently can't do it. I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms

I am sorry that you cannot distinguish the two. I'm trying to help out out of that hole but I don't think I can, in which case you have no hope of justifying EPP except perhaps under E2, the only definition that you seem to be able to grasp. — noAxioms

Let's establish that here we're examining: a) a material red stop sign that's mind-independent; b) a concept of a material red stop sign that's mind-dependent.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed. The fundamental flaw, you say, is my insistence on mental perception in any consideration of mind independence.

Yes, I insist on considering mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. My justification for this insistence is simple and obvious. Our access to mind independence only occurs through mind. You acknowledge this limitation when you say, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one."

You address the core issue of this conversation when you say, "I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way."

Can we go beyond the bounds of mind in our observations of nature? We've already agreed we get beyond our own solitary mind through social reality. By observing the behavior of others, when we compare it to our own behavior in similar situations entailing similar stimuli, and when we see similar reactions, we infer other minds are perceiving what our mind perceives.

Perhaps we disagree on the interpretation of objective reality inferred from social interaction. I think the subject/object couplet is a fluid dynamic associated with entanglement of subject-object. With your talk of mind independence, and your frustration with my adherence to mind dependence and perception in application to observation of nature, you suggest to me a striving for clearly articulated separation of subject and object, as if somehow observation can be done without subjectivity.

14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time. — noAxioms

The neuronal circuits that support your articulation of your above quote do possess: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum. — ucarr

That they do, but if I was talking about those, I would have said 'concept of 14. I was not talking about the conception of it. — noAxioms

You were talking about it because whenever you talk of mind independence, that's just more neuronal circuits in your brain allowing you to entertain another concept. You've acknowledged this by saying, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one."

A key difference between our thinking has you believing we can set aside our subjectivity whereas I don't believe we can.

The universe doesn't exist within time. Neither does 14. Both these have predicates. — noAxioms

Are their predicates outside time? — ucarr

Predicates don't have coordinates. They're not objects. One can apply predicates to objects within time, such as a person having a tatoo only after a certain age, but only because a person very much does have temporal coordinates. — noAxioms

If predicates don't have temporal coordinates, then they only exist as emergent properties of their subjects. This is true of them, as it is true of all abstractions, a set that predicates belong to. Abstractions, being mind dependent, don't inhabit the realm of mind independence. Given this limitation, predicates are contingent things. Their position within the causal cone of material things establishes them as contemporaries of material things but logically subsequent to them. This argument establishes EPPL, viz., Existence Precedes Predication Logically.

EPPL establishes (E ∧ P) as a two-part complex. It precludes predication without existence because ¬(E ∧ P) = (¬E ∧ ¬P) = { }.

If predicates do have temporal coordinates, then they exist as abstractions derived from multi-part sampling of observations of individual material things linked thematically and collected into a set expressed by the abstract concept. They are materially encoded within the brain as neuronal circuits.

The number 14 does possess mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum because it is only conceivable through its attachment to its material referents (14 stones). This attachment gives 14 existential meaning and presence as a position on the number line. Detached from its material referents, 14 becomes graphic markings without ontics or physics.

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else apart from the location of Baker St within the mind-scape of abstract-only things. Conclusion: Baker St exists only in the mind-scape, but exist there it does indeed, and thus its positive existence cannot be an example of its predicates sans existence. — ucarr

Again, predicates don't have coordinates. They not predicates located at/near Baker St, but instead are predicates of Baker St itself, independent of the street's nonexistence in Moscow. — noAxioms

You're using the temporal coordinates of your neuronal circuits to make claims about predicates that don't have them. You're never independent of time, so your cognitive claims about things timeless are always based upon your temporal neural activity. You cannot set aside your material subjectivity. No material existence, no claims about immaterial things. Cognitive Baker St. is never independent of your material subjectivity.

Concerning E5 definition: — noAxioms

There is no future-to-past relationship at the time of measurement. Neither role of "cause" or "effect" exists before the connection linking the two roles. — ucarr

There is such a relationship at the time of measurement since the measurement defines the existence of the cause event relative to the measurement event.

X = 1. Where is the elapsing time in this measurement?
— noAxioms

The two events are ordered, cause first, measurement later. — noAxioms

P → Q. P is a correlation of Q. Consider P alone. Can you detect from P alone whether or not P is a correlation of Q? Consider Q alone. Can you detect from Q alone whether or not Q is a correlation of P? We only know correlative relationships through pairing. Given P → Q, where is the elapsing time in this measurement?

Correlations are not causations, but causation always implies correlation, and no laws require a uni-directional arrow of time.

...There is no coming into existence of anything. An event is an event and as such, has a time coordinate. — noAxioms

As you say, events have no time coordinates WRT existence.

E5 is not relevant to non-events, so asking of 14 exists under D5 is a category error. Oddly enough, the definition is relevant to something like the set of all possible chess states.

If non-events equal non-existence in your context here, then all events - including predications - expressed in terms of non-events, are category errors.

...this topic is not concerned with knowledge of mind-independent things, but rather the existence of them. — noAxioms

This topic, and all others, must necessarily be concerned with knowledge as facts. There is no mind independence paired with subjectivity.

The entanglement of ontology and epistemology is a big message to us from QM.

QM does not posit or conclude any role to knowledge or perception. If you think otherwise, you read too many pop articles. — noAxioms

Inference from calculations applied to experimental data detected phenomena now labeled QM. Math analysis of QM phenomena translates to the technology enabling our online dialog. QM is the basis of the information age.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them.

OK. But neither mental activity creates the object in question. Empirical perception does not create a white horse where there wasn't one without it. Hence it being mind independent. Similarly, Pegasus does pop into existence because of your imagination. It is also independent of your mind, but lacks the causal relationship that you have with the white horse. Per D5, the white horse exists relative to say your belt buckle and Pegasus does not. — noAxioms

The white horse exists relative to the mind and also to other material things. Pegasus only exists relative to the mind.

The presumed mind independence of the white horse is founded upon social interaction and its characteristic responses to public stimuli across vast numbers of individual observers. There's a presumption of mind independence within the context of mind-inter-dependence, something that reduces to individualized mind dependence.

I'm saying existence reduces to the Standard Model. — ucarr

I have no clue what you mean to say when you say existence (metaphysics) reduces to a physical model of the universe. The model isn't an ontological one. At best, one might say that things that are part of this universe (rocks and such) exist, but that's existence relative to a domain, and is essentially E4. I've shown how EPP is incompatible with any definition of the form 'exists in some restricted domain'. So maybe you're not trying to define E4 existence, but mean something else by those words.

Does 14 exist under this unclear definition? If not, is 14 an even number?

I think it incorrect to say it has no properties.

Good because nobody ever claimed such a paradoxical statement, regardless of what 'it' is.

If Ohio disappears totally, Columbus disappears totally — ucarr

Columbus is not a predicate of Ohio. 'Contains Columbus' is, but Ohio would still contain Columbus even if both no longer 'appear' to whatever is apparently defining their existence. I walk out of a room and the ball on table disappears from my view, but the ball is still round despite not appearing to me.

When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist. — ucarr

Does this statement beg EPP? — ucarr

How can you not see that? It is a mild reword of EPP, both forbidding predication of a things that don't exist, despite all my examples of predication of things that don't exist.

You want an abstract and fundamental definition of existence as it pertains to material things, and not as it pertains to abstractions, right? — ucarr

I don't restrict my scope to material things. 14 has been one of my frequent examples and it isn't a material thing, nor is it an abstraction, although abstracting is necessary to think about it.

I came up with a nonexhaustive list of 6 definiitions, one or two of which are mind dependent. None are fundamental, and being definitions, I think all 6 are abstract. Mostly I was trying to see if EPP makes any sense (has any meaning) relative to definition 1. The other five I've already analyzed.

... do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. — noAxioms
The second part of your claim marks you as a realist_materialist.

Nope, which is why I carefully put 'whatever that means' in there.

Yes, bolstered by QM, I give credence to entanglement of epistemics and ontics.

QM does not give any ontic state that is dependent on epistemics, pop articles notwithstanding.

The infinite series of negations, an asymptotic approach from existence to non-existence, the limit of existence, can't arrive at non-existence and talk about it because such talking sustains existence. True non-existence is unspeakable. Its negation is so total, it even negates itself, a type of existence. — ucarr

I could not parse much of what you said, but this bit makes it pretty clear that a mind-dependent definition of existence is being used, and 'nonexistence' is some sort of location somewhere, unreachable. I could not figure out how the size of the universe had an relevance whatsoever to a thing being talked about.

The whole comment seems irrelevant if a different definition of 'exists' is used, especially a mind-independent one that this topic is supposed to be about.

We can only talk about mind independence via use of our minds. — ucarr

I didn't say otherwise, but the mind-independent existing things don't require being talked about to exist.

My statement specifically addresses mind independence lying beyond our direct access.

So don't access it directly.

I have no trouble defining 'existence sans perception', but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way.. — noAxioms
Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.

I wasn't talking about my act of defining a phrase.

I think your final sentence above expresses your primary motivation for seeking to refute EPP.

I don't think EPP can be refuted, but perhaps my motivation for seeking its justification and not finding it.

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. — ucarr

I don't think my mind exists by all 6 definitions, so I cannot accept this statement without explicit meaning. Being self-aware is a predicate, and without presuming EPP, that awareness may very much be predication without certain kinds of existence. I've already given several examples where this must be the case, none being refuted.

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes — ucarr

I think if there was direct evidence of them, they by definition wouldn't be other universes. Most of the basic multiverse types fall necessarily out of theories that explain observation that no single classical universe theory can. For instance, Greene's inflationary multiverse (Tegmark's type II) explains the fine tuning issue, a very serious problem in a mono-universe interpretation.
The simplest (by far) quantum interpretation necessitates Greene's quantum multiverse. Sure, you can't prove or falsify any of these interpretations, but explaining their predictions without a multiverse gets either very complicated or insanely improbable, both violating Occam's razor.

The only relevant quote in the wiki multiverse page was references to existence.

"Together, these universes are presumed to comprise everything that exists: the entirety of space, time, matter, energy, information, and the physical laws and constants that describe them."
This one seems to presume a sort of E4 existence, substituting the multiverse for just our universe. Same relation, but far less anthropocentric.
Most of the references seem to use something like the E4 definition, but I think the intent is meant objectively despite the authors not thinking that out though. It isn't the point of the web page.

I now know you think numbers don't exist. — ucarr

I didn't say that either, especially since the type of existence wasn't specified. I would not make a claim that vague. You seem to be under the impression that I have beliefs instead of having an open mind to such matters. Part of learning is not presuming the answers before looking for evidence only in support of your opinions.

In your assessment of what I wrote, by having Pegasus count himself, you err. If he counts himself, he exists.

By which definition? I might agree to it with some definitions and not with others. You statement without that specification is vacuously ambiguous.

You assume Pegasus exists when you have him perform the action of counting himself. — ucarr

No, I just don't presume EPP when having him perform that. But as I said, you cannot conceive of no EPP, leaving you in no position to justify it. Trust me, there are lots of people on Earth that don't exist by your definition, and yet have no problem counting their own fingers and such. Pegasus is kind of like that, quite capable of counting wings without the bother of your sort of existence.

Proof is the point. You're trying to refute EPP by demonstrating predication sans existence.

Sure. One counterexample is plenty, and I provided several, so EPP does not hold for existence defined as any form of 'part of some limited domain', which covers E2,4,5,6. That proof is simple.
Where proof isn't the point is where it cannot be shown. EPP cannot be proven true or false under E1 or E3, so barring such proof, and it being demonstrated false with other definitions, EPP is accepted on faith, never on rational reasoning.

Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications?

I don't know what you think 'direct knowledge' is.as distinct from knowledge that isn't direct.

Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception

It does not. It is about existence independent of perception.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject. — ucarr

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication.

I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract composite of all the possible states of an abstraction. — ucarr

Spacetime is 4D and that means that all 'objects' have temporal extension. It is not just an abstraction, it is the nature of the thing in itself. To assert otherwise as you are doing here is to deny the standard model and pretty much all of consensus physics.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed.

It's not your practice of inference that I'm pointing out, it is the continuous practice of defining existence in a way that requires perception by you, counting by you, utterances by you, or in short in any way that requires you. Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them.

A key difference between our thinking has you believing we can set aside our subjectivity whereas I don't believe we can.

I also don't think I can set it aside, but the existence of some rock doesn't depend on my subjectivity.

The fundamental flaw, you say, is my insistence on mental perception in any consideration of mind independence.

It's not fundamental (outside of idealism). Yes, consideration is mind dependent, but I'm not talking about the consideration, I'm talking about the existence of the subject of predication. This exactly illustrates my point. I'm trying to talk about the subject, and you concentrate instead on the necessity of it being considered. There is no such necessity.

So yes, use your mind to consider this or that, but don't talk about the considering or the perceiving. Four consecutive examples below where you talk only of the concepts and not about the mind independent thing.


1

If predicates don't have temporal coordinates, then they only exist as emergent properties of their subjects. This is true of them, as it is true of all abstraction — ucarr

I am not talking about abstractions of predicates.

2

The number 14 does possess mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum because it is only conceivable through ...

Not talking about the concept of 14.

3

You're using the temporal coordinates of your neuronal circuits to make claims about predicates that don't have them.

I am not talking about conceptualizing or neurons.

4

Cognitive Baker St. is never independent of your material subjectivity.

And again. Not talking about cognitive Baker St. I'm talking about Baker St.

Concerning E5 definition: — noAxioms

P → Q. P is a correlation of Q. Consider P alone. Can you detect from P alone whether or not P is a correlation of Q? — ucarr

What are P & Q? Events? I am presuming so. They are effectively each a set of four coordinates

I don't know what you think it means for one event to be a correlation of another. Measurement of entangled pairs are said to be correlated, but not that one is a correlation of the other. It's a mutual thing, not an arrow going one way, I'm presuming this sort of mutual thing in my answers.

I am guessing that "is a correlation of" means that a measurement at P and Q are found at some later event R to be correlated. That means that P & Q both exist relative to R, but that neither P nor Q necessarily exists relative to the other.

Consider Q alone. Can you detect from Q alone whether or not Q is a correlation of P?

There is no P in 'Q alone'. There is just Q. P does not exist relative to Q. It is a counterfactual, and E5 does not posit counterfactuals.

Given P → Q, where is the elapsing time in this measurement?

Frame dependent, and said 'measurement' is done by R, not P or Q.

Correlations are not causations, but causation always implies correlation, and no laws require a uni-directional arrow of time.

Locality is not violated since neither P nor Q exists relative to the other, so no correlation exists relative to either of them either. The correlation only exists relative to R.

As you say, events have no time coordinates WRT existence.

Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system. The assignment of an origin event is arbitrary. Coordinate systems are frame dependent, origin dependent, and are very much abstractions. Events on the other hand, as well as intervals, are frame independent and physical.

then all events - including predications

Predications are not events. They don't have coordinates.

The presumed mind independence of the white horse is founded upon social interaction and its characteristic responses to public stimuli across vast numbers of individual observers.

Yes, such is the basis for E4, but it is still anthropocentric existence, still dependent on perception. Such is presumed by the wiki article on the multiverse, which still suggests a restriction that what exists is defined as what we see and infer from it.
E1,3,5,6 go beyond that to actual mind independence.

I'm saying existence reduces to the Standard Model. — ucarr

I have no clue what you mean to say when you say existence (metaphysics) reduces to a physical model of the universe. — noAxioms

Do you equate existence with metaphysics to the exclusion of identifying metaphysics with material things?

I equate metaphysics with cognition of the mind-scape. Specifically, I equate metaphysics with the grammar, viz., the foundational rules governing the complex (as in multi-part entity) of material reality and its emergent forms (cognitions of the mind-scape).

I think metaphysics an emergent property of material things. As such, it's part of the sub-domain of material things labeled cognition. Within cognition, metaphysics is the grammar governing both material things and cognitive things.

The model isn't an ontological one. At best, one might say that things that are part of this universe (rocks and such) exist, but that's existence relative to a domain, and is essentially E4. — noAxioms

I think the Standard Model is the source of cognition and therefore of metaphysics.

I've shown how EPP is incompatible with any definition of the form 'exists in some restricted domain'. So maybe you're not trying to define E4 existence, but mean something else by those words.[/quote]

I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context. The Standard Model, with its symmetries and conservation laws, grounds existence, the largest of all contexts.

I think it likely your E1-E6 do not cover all facets of my definition of existence. For example, E2, your only statement about subjectivity, nevertheless says nothing about QM entanglement and its
subject-object complex.

Does 14 exist under this unclear definition? If not, is 14 an even number? — noAxioms

You seem to be asking whether math is encompassed within The Standard Model. Yes, it's contained within cognition.

I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. — ucarr

Good because nobody ever claimed such a paradoxical statement, regardless of what 'it' is. — noAxioms

For proper understanding of my intended communication, my quote needs to be presented and evaluated in its entirety.

I want to modify your characterization of general existence. I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. Like white light within the visible light spectrum, which contains RGB, viz., all of the colors, general existence contains The Quintet (mass_energy_force-motion_space_time), viz., all of the properties. Temporal forms of material things are emergent forms whose properties are funded by The Quintet. I don't expect any modern physicist to deny any property is connected to the Standard Model. In effect, assertion of predication sans existence is a claim that properties exist apart from the Standard Model. As an example, this is tantamount to saying the color red of an apple has nothing to do with the electromagnetism of the elementary charged particles inhabiting the visible light spectrum. — ucarr

The main point of my argument points to the generality of existence in terms of its grasp of all of the forms taken by emergent material things. Saying existence has no properties is like saying variable x doesn't signify a specific number because its range encompasses all numbers (when you add (a+bi) to the mix).

If Ohio disappears totally, Columbus disappears totally — ucarr

Columbus is not a predicate of Ohio. 'Contains Columbus' is, but Ohio would still contain Columbus even if both no longer 'appear' to whatever is apparently defining their existence. I walk out of a room and the ball on table disappears from my view, but the ball is still round despite not appearing to me. — noAxioms

We have options for predicating the Venn diagram relationship linking Columbus and Ohio. For example, "Columbus implies Ohio." By this statement we see Columbus is always a predicate of Ohio.

When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist. — ucarr

Does this statement beg EPP? — noAxioms

How can you not see that? It is a mild reword of EPP, both forbidding predication of a things that don't exist, despite all my examples of predication of things that don't exist. — noAxioms

I argue my statement doesn't assume EPP in route to proving it because of the statement, "Modifiers attach to their objects." This isn't a re-wording of EPP. It's a stipulation by definition pertaining to the application of "modify" WRT EPP. For example, an adjective changes the perceivable state of its object-noun by giving the reader more information about the attributes of the object-noun. I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun. Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication, I don't see how it's an example of begging EPP.

Perhaps you think because I say, "there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist." that means I'm assuming existence instead of proving it. I'm not trying to prove existence. I'm trying to prove existence precedes predication. Given this fact, the assumption of the existence of existence is allowed.

You want an abstract and fundamental definition of existence as it pertains to material things, and not as it pertains to abstractions, right? — ucarr

I don't restrict my scope to material things. 14 has been one of my frequent examples and it isn't a material thing, nor is it an abstraction, although abstracting is necessary to think about it. — noAxioms

Can you explain how abstracting to 14 isn't an example of rendering 14 as an abstraction?

I was trying to see if EPP makes any sense (has any meaning) relative to definition 1. — noAxioms

I see we both place our main focus on E1 WRT to EPP. I seek to defend EPP and, as you say, you're examining its status. An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated.

If language cannot prove anything, then language cannot demand proof. — ucarr

Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. You're crossing that line. — noAxioms

The second part of your claim marks you as a realist_materialist. — ucarr

Nope, which is why I carefully put 'whatever that means' in there. — noAxioms

My main point is that language - in the form of logic - seeks to evaluate to valid conclusions as proof of truth content in statements.

realism | ˈrēəˌliz(ə)m |
noun
Philosophy the doctrine that universals or abstract concepts have an objective or absolute existence. The theory that universals have their own reality is sometimes called Platonic realism because it was first outlined by Plato's doctrine of “forms” or ideas. Often contrasted with nominalism.
• the doctrine that matter as the object of perception has real existence and is neither reducible to
universal mind or spirit nor dependent on a perceiving agent. Often contrasted with idealism (sense
2). - The Apple Dictionary

Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works" doesn't make a definitive statement about the independence of the ontological from the epistemological towards aligning you with realism? I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement, then it means what the dictionary says it means:

reality | rēˈalədē |
noun
2 the state or quality of having existence or substance.
•Philosophy existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subject to human decisions or conventions. - The Apple Dictionary

Do you equate existence with metaphysics to the exclusion of identifying metaphysics with material things? — ucarr

What I equate 'existence' with is definition dependent. Most of them don't exclude material things.

I equate metaphysics with cognition of the mind-scape.[/quote]Metaphysics is nowhere defined as any kind of cognition or grammar. Please use a definition that is at least slightly close to "the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space"

I think the Standard Model is the source of cognition and therefore of metaphysics

Cognition has been going on long before there was a standard model.

I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context.

OK, but you defined existence as cognition, which is emergent from the larger context of material (still a very restricted context), so you seem to contradict yourself. The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things.

For example, E2, your only statement about subjectivity, nevertheless says nothing about QM entanglement and its subject-object complex.

That's because QM says nothing about the role of subjectivity in any of its predictions.

I want to modify your characterization of general existence. I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. Like white light within the visible light spectrum, which contains RGB, viz., all of the colors, general existence contains The Quintet (mass_energy_force-motion_space_time), viz., all of the properties. Temporal forms of material things are emergent forms whose properties are funded by The Quintet. I don't expect any modern physicist to deny any property is connected to the Standard Model. In effect, assertion of predication sans existence is a claim that properties exist apart from the Standard Model. As an example, this is tantamount to saying the color red of an apple has nothing to do with the electromagnetism of the elementary charged particles inhabiting the visible light spectrum. — ucarr — ucarr

All that is your characterization of existence, not in any way a modification of any of mine (any one of the six). It seems to be existence relative to a model, and a model is an abstraction of something else. So this is closest to my E2. The standard model makes no mention of apples, so apparently apples don't exist by this definition. You've provided more definitions than I have probably, but all of them mind dependent.

We have options for predicating the Venn diagram relationship linking Columbus and Ohio. For example, "Columbus implies Ohio." By this statement we see Columbus is always a predicate of Ohio.

Not true. You can conclude ¬O → ¬C from that, but not O → C

For example, an adjective changes the perceivable state of its object-noun by giving the reader more information about the attributes of the object-noun. I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun.

But there is a subject noun. The subject just doesn't necessarily meet some of the definitions of existence. You seem to be using a mind-dependent one here, which makes the whole comment pretty irrelevant to my experimental denial of mind-independent EPP.

Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication

Predication is not a procedure, except perhaps under your mental definitions.

I'm not trying to prove existence. I'm trying to prove existence precedes predication. Given this fact, the assumption of the existence of existence is allowed.

You're directly saying that begging your conclusion is not fallacious.

Can you explain how abstracting to 14 isn't an example of rendering 14 as an abstraction? — ucarr

I cannot. Best to ask whoever asserts that.

I see we both place our main focus on E1 WRT to EPP.

I don't see this since your focus is always on E2, occasionally E4 which is still mind-dependent.

I seek to defend EPP and, as you say, you're examining its status. An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated.

It is important, because your insistence on approaching it from subjectivity prevents any analysis of E1.

My main point is that language - in the form of logic - seeks to evaluate to valid conclusions as proof of truth content in statements.

Disagree. Language is used for far more than just proofs and finding of truth.

Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works"

The way it is typically put: Language (and models) describe, they do not proscribe.

realism:
1 Philosophy the doctrine that universals or abstract concepts have an objective or absolute existence...
. .
reality:
2 the state or quality of having existence or substance.
•Philosophy existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subject to human decisions or conventions.
- The Apple Dictionary

I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement, then it means what the dictionary says it means

The dictionary definitions you quoted do not specify which usage of 'exists' it is referencing. OK, the realism definition says 'absolute' and not 'objective as opposed to subjective', but it's reference to abstractions also suggests the latter meaning.

The 'absolute' reference suggests R1. Definitions from other dictionaries vary.

Yes, bolstered by QM, I give credence to entanglement of epistemics and ontics.

QM does not give any ontic state that is dependent on epistemics, pop articles notwithstanding. — noAxioms

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

The issue of measurement within QM adds complexity and uncertainty of interpretation WRT the subject-object binary. There's evidence supporting the view they're entangled. The Schrödinger Equation allows us to infer super-position, but we never see it. Does the wave function collapse under observation? The measurement issue links directly to your ability to examine mind-independent existence. It fogs over your clear vision of its measurement.

The infinite series of negations, an asymptotic approach from existence to non-existence, the limit of existence, can't arrive at non-existence and talk about it because such talking sustains existence. True non-existence is unspeakable. Its negation is so total, it even negates itself, a type of existence. — ucarr

I could not parse much of what you said, but this bit makes it pretty clear that a mind-dependent definition of existence is being used, and 'nonexistence' is some sort of location somewhere, unreachable. — noAxioms

We've already discussed the scope of existence within my definition; it includes mind-dependent abstractions of the mind and also presumed mind-independent material things understood by inference from social interactions revealing similar responses to perceived stimuli.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. — ucarr

OK. But neither mental activity creates the object in question. Empirical perception does not create a white horse where there wasn't one without it. Hence it being mind independent. Similarly, Pegasus does pop into existence because of your imagination. It is also independent of your mind, but lacks the causal relationship that you have with the white horse. Per D5, the white horse exists relative to say your belt buckle and Pegasus does not. — noAxioms

The whole comment seems irrelevant if a different definition of 'exists' is used, especially a mind-independent one that this topic is supposed to be about. — noAxioms

Is Pegasus independent of all human minds, or do all human minds assemble Pegasus internally from their memory banks? I'm familiar with E1-E6. What is D5?

We can only talk about mind independence via use of our minds. — ucarr

I didn't say otherwise, but the mind-independent existing things don't require being talked about to exist. — noAxioms

Your opening clause, independent, is inconsistent with your second clause, dependent. Your use of "mind-independent" as a modifier for real things shows their independence is only rendered as fact through the activity of the mind that asserts mind-independence. Mind-independence can't be conceived without mind, and thus it is encompassed within mind, a fact making it clear "mind-independence" is never apart from mind.

My statement specifically addresses mind-independence lying beyond our direct access. Direct access to mind-independence means having no mind which means not existing in the first person perspective. Since all of our talk about mind-independence must be by inference, we only experiencing mind-independence as a part of mind-dependence. — ucarr

So don't access it directly. — noAxioms

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. — ucarr

OK. — noAxioms

I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms

Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.

I wasn't talking about my act of defining a phrase. — noAxioms

This is a declaration. Where's your argument supporting it?

I think your final sentence above expresses your primary motivation for seeking to refute EPP.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

Saying, "So an apple is red only if the apple exists..." examples our inability to refute the existence of something without first assuming its existence. In the situation of the true non-existence of a thing, no thought of its refutation would occur. We can think of things not known to exist independent of mind, and the language here says the important thing, we can think of things only extant within the mind. Indeed, within the mind they do exist, so likewise in the mind, we can think about refuting their existence. Yes, mental-only things have a type of existence that can be made the object of refutation. Truly non-existent things cannot even be thought of.

Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it. — noAxioms

Santa is not non-existent. Santa exists as a mental simulation of a mind-independent man.

So what are the arguments against? Without begging the principle being questioned, what contradiction results from its rejection? — noAxioms

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence (The newborn cries out in response to the doctor slapping his bottom. The newborn doesn't know he has a mind.) If we generalize from here, we see that pre-existent mind makes all thoughts - including mind independence - possible. If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.

What is your response?

I don't think EPP can be refuted, but perhaps my motivation for seeking its justification and not finding it. — noAxioms

Have you considered the insuperability of your mind as the reason? Its prior to all of your predications.

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. — ucarr

I don't think my mind exists by all 6 definitions, so I cannot accept this statement without explicit meaning. Being self-aware is a predicate, and without presuming EPP, that awareness may very much be predication without certain kinds of existence. I've already given several examples where this must be the case, none being refuted. — noAxioms

I can think of several definitions of 'exists' that one might use, but some possibilities: — noAxioms

E1 Existence is a member of all that is part of objective reality

Objective Reality → E

E2 Existence is what is known

Mind → E

E3 Existence has predicates

E → Phenomena

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)

E ∈ Objective Reality = {A,B,C,D,E...}

E5 Y exists IFF Y is part of the causal history of X

X (Causal History) ↔︎ Y

E6 "existential quantification", where 51 is not prime because there exists an even divisor that is neither 1 nor 51.

( ∃ x ) ( | x | > 5 )

Your stipulation prohibiting assumption of EPP en route to evaluating to EPP is invalid. A clarifying parallel goes as follows: Stipulation 01: Evaluate to math given: for m = math, ( ∃ m ) ( | m | m < ∞ ∧m > 0). This statement quantifies the existence of math such that math has a positive value and therefore math exists. Stipulation 02: Evaluate to the existence of math without using math logic. Since math is essential to math logic, you cannot evaluate to math existence using math logic without assumption of math. Likewise, you can't evaluate to mind exists if you stipulate no assumption of MPP (Mind Precedes Predication) because without MPP you can't make the predication of "Math exists." without presumption of (and use of) the prior mind that makes the predication.

Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality. — ucarr

That burden is yours, to prove that the conservation laws of just this one particular universe have any objective relevance at all. It's your assertion, not mine. All I see it an attempt to slap an E1 label on an E4 definition, with some E2 thrown in since perception always seems to creep in there as well. — noAxioms

I've already presented a math theorem justifying the conservation laws of just this one particular universe. — ucarr

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes, no statistically significant evidence has been found. Critics argue that the multiverse concept lacks testability and falsifiability, which are essential for scientific inquiry, and that it raises unresolved metaphysical issues.
-- Wikipedia — ucarr

Sure, you can't prove or falsify any of these interpretations, but explaining their predictions without a multiverse gets either very complicated or insanely improbable, both violating Occam's razor. — noAxioms

I conclude your multi-verse attack on the pertinence of the symmetries and their conservation laws of our universe fizzles into irrelevance. The symmetries and their conservation laws connect all material things as emergent forms temporal. There are no empirical non-existences, whether directly observed or logically inferred.

Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent
number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist. — ucarr

Read the bold part. I said the opposite. You asked for an example of a relation between an existent thing and a nonexistent thing. That was one example.

Unicorns (and dragons) valuing human female virgins is another example.
If you feel that numbers exist (or you think that I assert that), then we can relative Pegasus to its count of wings, making that an example of such a relation. — noAxioms

Since I read you as thinking numbers exist and you say your words express the opposite thought, I now know you think numbers don't exist. — ucarr

I didn't say that either, especially since the type of existence wasn't specified. I would not make a claim that vague. You seem to be under the impression that I have beliefs instead of having an open mind to such matters. Part of learning is not presuming the answers before looking for evidence only in support of your opinions. — noAxioms

Parsing existence into separate categories is a falsehood. All material things are emergent forms temporal. Existence cannot be analyzed. Avoid confusing analysis of emergent forms temporal with analysis of existence general. You can analyze the attributes of yourself as an emergent form temporal. You cannot analyze the brute fact of your existence.

In your assessment of what I wrote, by having Pegasus count himself, you err. If he counts himself, he exists. I made the math statement Pegasus exists zero times, meaning he doesn't exist. — ucarr

By which definition? I might agree to it with some definitions and not with others. You statement without that specification is vacuously ambiguous. — noAxioms

Your division of existence into separate categories has no bearing on the symmetries, so, WRT general existence, your categories merge into general existence. I expect you to counter-narrate this, so I'll pick E1, as I've been doing throughout the conversation.

You assume Pegasus exists when you have him perform the action of counting himself. — ucarr

...there are lots of people on Earth that don't exist by your definition, and yet have no problem counting their own fingers and such. Pegasus is kind of like that, quite capable of counting wings without the bother of your sort of existence. — noAxioms

Pegasus exists as a material thing in the form of a memory-based simulation emergent from neuronal activity of the brain.

...EPP does not hold for existence defined as any form of 'part of some limited domain', which covers E2,4,5,6. — noAxioms

Scope-limiters applied to existence by definition get over-ridden by the symmetries and their conservation laws. For example, if you define Pegasus as a winged horse of the mind, then Pegasus exists as a memory-based simulation emergent from neuronal activity of the brain. All of the activity of the brain and mind are emergent from a pre-existing fund of conserved physics. The imaginative cognition of mind can configure Pegasus however it wishes, but that cognition is an emergent temporal form drawn from the pre-existing fund of conserved physics.

You're examining the grammar governing the ontics of material things. There are no discussions that aren't about mind-dependent perception somewhere down the line. Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

I don't know what you think 'direct knowledge' is.as distinct from knowledge that isn't direct. — noAxioms

With your empirical eyes, you look at a white horse racing around the paddock of a horse ranch. This is direct observation because your eyes are detecting something external to your mind.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. In fact, WRT Pegasus with wings, your eyes aren't detecting anything at all. Your brain is "seeing" Pegasus with wings by means of its ability to evaluate to an "image" of Pegasus with wings by means of your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite. — ucarr

This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition. — noAxioms

Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception, I don't see how we can apply our minds to both modes (mind-dependent/mind-independent). — ucarr

It does not. It is about existence independent of perception. — noAxioms

I'm not referring to your choice to focus on mind-independent reality. I'm referring to the fact that all things within the lens of perception, whether detected empirically or logically, hold within mind-dependence.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject. — ucarr

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication. — noAxioms

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind?

I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract composite of all the possible states of an abstraction. — ucarr

Spacetime is 4D and that means that all 'objects' have temporal extension. It is not just an abstraction, it is the nature of the thing in itself. To assert otherwise as you are doing here is to deny the standard model and pretty much all of consensus physics. — noAxioms

I'm not putting myself at odds with physics because my point is based in the belief abstractions - although platformed by temporal neuronal circuits of the brain - signify their meanings in terms of atemporal samplings of multiple instances of a state of a system condensed to a generalization.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed.

It's not your practice of inference that I'm pointing out, it is the continuous practice of defining existence in a way that requires perception by you, counting by you, utterances by you, or in short in any way that requires you. Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them. — noAxioms

I've established my allegiance to mind independence through social consensus based upon empirical evidence that similarity of human behavior as a reaction to stimuli denotes similarity of stimuli independent of one observer. I acknowledge my belief what is real depends, ultimately, upon the mind in conversation with other minds.

A key difference between our thinking has you believing we can set aside our subjectivity whereas I don't believe we can.

I also don't think I can set it aside, but the existence of some rock doesn't depend on my subjectivity. — noAxioms

Saying you can't set aside your mind WRT reality acknowledges a through-line of connection linking your mind to the rock. This tells us the existence of the rock, as you know it, does depend upon your mind's perception of it. It doesn't matter if you see the rock with your physical eyes, or with your mind's eye. Either way, the empirical reality of the rock you can experience always involves your mind.

...I'm talking about the existence of the subject of predication. This exactly illustrates my point. I'm trying to talk about the subject, and you concentrate instead on the necessity of it being considered. There is no such necessity. — noAxioms

Directly below your words show that you, like me, believe a stop sign holds existence apart from its predication.

I don't think it makes sense to say a thing is in a state of being red, except under idealism where 'things' are just ideals and a red ideal is logically consistent. I don't think a stop sign is red, it just appears that way to some of us. — noAxioms

I am guessing that "is a correlation of" means that a measurement at P and Q are found at some later event R to be correlated. That means that P & Q both exist relative to R, but that neither P nor Q necessarily exists relative to the other. — noAxioms

Correlation simply means that as the value of P changes, so does the value of Q. Moreover, causation implies correlation. If A makes you sick, removal of A from your presence cures your sickness. This is to say that as A becomes zero, so S for sickness becomes zero.

Consider Q alone. Can you detect from Q alone whether or not Q is a correlation of P?

There is no P in 'Q alone'. There is just Q. P does not exist relative to Q. It is a counterfactual, and E5 does not posit counterfactuals. — noAxioms

The point is that correlations, like causal relationships, involve correspondents. P alone doesn't imply Q. Given P → Q, there's a correlation because of correspondence. Red, as an adjective, by definition, implies a subject it makes predication about. Predication, with no existing subject to make a predication about, examples nonsense.

Given P → Q, where is the elapsing time in this measurement?

Frame dependent, and said 'measurement' is done by R, not P or Q. — noAxioms

Inertial frames of reference for different actions are about the differential rate of elapsing time between the inertial frames. If you believe elapsing time pertains to P → Q, then you should be able to measure the amount of time it takes for P to imply Q. So tell me, how much time does it take for P to imply Q?

Locality is not violated since neither P nor Q exists relative to the other, so no correlation exists relative to either of them either. The correlation only exists relative to R. — noAxioms

P → Q specifically establishes a correlation between the two variables.

Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system. The assignment of an origin event is arbitrary. Coordinate systems are frame dependent, origin dependent, and are very much abstractions. Events on the other hand, as well as intervals, are frame independent and physical. — noAxioms

Existence, like other abstractions, localizes in the temporal forms of emergent material things.

Coordinate systems map to material things local.

E1,3,5,6 go beyond that to actual mind independence. — noAxioms

Do you believe in mind independence outside of social consensus?

Is Pegasus independent of all human minds — ucarr

So now human minds are special? If that's true, then Pegasus probably doesn't exist.

I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms
Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.

No contradiction since nowhere does it suggest an absence of perception in the act of defining something.

I wasn't talking about my act of defining a phrase. — noAxioms
This is a declaration. Where's your argument supporting it?

OP disclaimer says what I am talking about.

Santa is not non-existent. — ucarr

Definition dependent, and definition not specified.
Santa being nonexistent is different than there not being an existing Santa. Santa being anything is a predication.

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind.

No, not that at all. It's due to my mind being involved in the act of abstracting, preventing by some definitions the direct (causal?) access to this mind-independent thing.

Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence

It's existence is unknown (definition dependent again).

What is your response?

I am not concerned about how a mind works, and how it develops in an infant. Off topic.

Have you considered the insuperability of your mind as the reason? Its prior to all of your predications. — ucarr

Doesn't seem to be.

E1 Existence is a member of all that is part of objective reality

Objective Reality → E

Yes, but sans EPP, objective reality could be empty, a property that nothing has, that nothing needs. Hence it seems empty in absence of justification, and an unjustified assumption of EPP seems its only justification.

E3 Existence has predicates

No, E3 says X exists if X has predicates. It doesn't say any thing about existence itself (whatever that means) having predicates.

E → Phenomena

Arrow potnkints the wrong way, but yes, this is a definition that directly leverages EPP. Any predication implies existence, hence I think therefore I am.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)

Not objective. Part of 'the' universe, like the one that humans find happens to be the preferred one. All very anthropocentric, and thus very questionably mind independent.

E5 Y exists IFF Y is part of the causal history of X

X (Causal History) ↔︎ Y

Y exists relative to X .... This doesn't mean that Y exists. Existence is a realation, and a 1-way relation, not 2-way like you drew it.

E6 "existential quantification", where 51 is not prime because there exists an even divisor that is neither 1 nor 51.

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes, no statistically significant evidence has been found. Critics argue that the multiverse concept lacks testability and falsifiability, which are essential for scientific inquiry, and that it raises unresolved metaphysical issues.
-- Wikipedia — ucarr

I agree. Explanatory power does not constitute testability, and lack of alternative explanation does not constitute falsification of not-multiverse.

Existence cannot be analyzed.

By some apparently.

You cannot analyze the brute fact of your existence.

You can, just not by starting with an assumption of it being brute fact.

so I'll pick E1, as I've been doing throughout the conversation.

Fine. Pegasus has no access (no way to test for) E1 existence. It in no way helps or hinders his ability to count his wings.
If Pegasus wasn't logically possible, that's another story. That would inhibit said ability. I didn't even list 'logcially possible' as one of my definitions. Should have.

[direct knowledge is] With your empirical eyes, you look at a white horse racing around the paddock of a horse ranch. This is direct observation because your eyes are detecting something external to your mind. — ucarr

Direct is a relation, by your description. If it implies existence, then existence relative to you, nothing at all objective.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them.

So indirect is imagination. You called it knowledge? Of what? That you are imagining a flying horse? I'd say you have direct knowledge of that.

I'm not referring to your choice to focus on mind-independent reality. I'm referring to the fact that all things within the lens of perception, whether detected empirically or logically, hold within mind-dependence.

I don't consider that to be fact, nor does any realist.
I also do not presume anything's specific membership in objective reality (R1), in contrast with said realists. I'm not big on presuming things.

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind?

My making statements is not a mind independent activity.

I also don't think I can set it aside, but the existence of some rock doesn't depend on my subjectivity. — noAxioms


Saying you can't set aside your mind WRT reality acknowledges a through-line of connection linking your mind to the rock.

Maybe, but the ontology of the rock is unaffected by my perception of it, link or no link. I will actually question this for the apple. I suspect there are no mind-independent apples, meaning no apples in worlds lacking minds. Not so much with the rocks.

This tells us the existence of the rock, as you know it, does depend upon your mind's perception of it.

So, no, it does not tell me that, and existence is undefined here.

Correlation simply means that as the value of P changes, so does the value of Q.

OK, so you're talking about a different sort of correlation than what you get with say entangled particle measurements.

Inertial frames of reference for different actions are about the differential rate of elapsing time between the inertial frames. If you believe elapsing time pertains to P → Q, then you should be able to measure the amount of time it takes for P to imply Q. So tell me, how much time does it take for P to imply Q?

Frame dependent, and no, that's not how inertial frames work. Elapsed time between two events is a difference in one abstract coordinate of each of those two events. and that difference is frame dependent.

P → Q specifically establishes a correlation between the two variables.

No, just one way. Q does not exist relative to P under E5.

Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system.— noAxioms

Existence, like other abstractions, localizes in the temporal forms of emergent material things.

No idea what those words mean, but perhaps you can tell me Earth's location relative to existence. Can't do that? Case in point.

Do you believe in mind independence outside of social consensus?

Social consensus is an argument against solipsism, but it's still a form of mind dependence.

You're examining the grammar governing the ontics of material things. There are no discussions that aren't about mind-dependent perception somewhere down the line. Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

I don't know what you think 'direct knowledge' is.as distinct from knowledge that isn't direct. — noAxioms

IIn your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. In fact, WRT Pegasus with wings, your eyes aren't detecting anything at all. Your brain is "seeing" Pegasus with wings by means of its ability to evaluate to an "image" of Pegasus with wings by means of your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite. — ucarr

Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

Sure. One counter example is plenty, and I provided several, so EPP does not hold for existence defined as any form of 'part of some limited domain', which covers E2,4,5,6. That proof is simple. Where proof isn't the point is where it cannot be shown. EPP cannot be proven true or false under E1 or E3, so barring such proof, and it being demonstrated false with other definitions, EPP is accepted on faith, never on rational reasoning. — noAxioms

E2 Existence is what is known; E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)

EPP in the context of E1 is neither true nor false, but EPP in the context of E4 does not hold? Does this tell us we can specify that EPP does not hold by restricting the domain of existence?

This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition. — noAxioms

[Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception, I don't see how we can apply our minds to both modes (mind-dependent/mind-independent). — ucarr

It does not. It is about existence independent of perception. — noAxioms

I'm referring to our conversation about existence independent of perception. Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject. — ucarr

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication. — noAxioms

This is why I say in our exchange immediately above that, "Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind."

I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract — ucarr

Spacetime is 4D and that means that all 'objects' have temporal extension. It is not just an abstraction, it is the nature of the thing in itself. To assert otherwise as you are doing here is to deny the standard model and pretty much all of consensus physics. — noAxioms

The neuronal circuits supporting abstract concepts are temporal, but the logical relations posited are atemporal. For example, we can let x stand for any number, and this function is atemporal. We never talk about the rate at which a function outputs a y in place of x.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed. The fundamental flaw, you say, is my insistence of mental perception in any consideration of mind independence.

Yes, I insist on considering mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. My justification for this insistence is simple and obvious. Our access to mind independence only occurs through mind. You acknowledge this limitation when you say, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one." — ucarr

It's not your practice of inference that I'm pointing out, it is the continuous practice of defining existence in a way that requires perception by you, counting by you, utterances by you, or in short in any way that requires you. Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them. — noAxioms

Of course my definition of existence depends upon me, as yours depends upon you. When you declare, "Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them." you likewise don't perceive them except through actions completely internal to you. Unless you're claiming to have seen a winged horse alongside a crowd of other human observers at a horse show, I know your description of Pegasus is based upon your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite.

Do you equate existence with metaphysics to the exclusion of identifying metaphysics with material things? — ucarr

What I equate 'existence' with is definition dependent. Most of them don't exclude material things. — noAxioms

I equate metaphysics with cognition of the mind-scape. — ucarr

Metaphysics is nowhere defined as any kind of cognition or grammar. Please use a definition that is at least slightly close to "the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space" — noAxioms

Consider your posted definition of metaphysics, "...the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space."

You're claiming principles and abstract concepts have no relationship with cognition? Consider the two definitions below.

principle | ˈprinsəp(ə)l |
noun
1 a fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behavior or for a chain of reasoning: the basic principles of Christianity.
• (usually principles) a rule or belief governing one's personal behavior: struggling to be true to their own principles | she resigned over a matter of principle.
• morally correct behavior and attitudes: a man of principle.
2 a general scientific theorem or law that has numerous special applications across a wide field.
• a natural law forming the basis for the construction or working of a machine: these machines all operate on the same general principle.

cognition | ˌkäɡˈniSH(ə)n |
noun
the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses: these infections can adversely affect cognition and educational achievement | a scientific study of human cognition.
• a perception, sensation, idea, or intuition resulting from the process of cognition: greater emphasis should be placed on examining cognitions of individual family members.

I think the Standard Model is the source of cognition and therefore of metaphysics. — ucarr

Cognition has been going on long before there was a standard model. — noAxioms

I'm referring to the Standard Model as a centerpiece of modern science that has referents within the scope of elementary particles. Of course the cognition of the scientists who established the Standard Model precedes its expression.

Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

You define direct knowledge as that learned through perception, so here you seem to be asking me to demonstrate perception apart from perception, which would be a contradiction.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain) — ucarr

If it is 'of this universe', it is part of a limited domain, a relation, not an objective existence. So E4 is 'part of this universe', and there's no 'objective' about that. The word 'this' is a reference to humanity, making it anthropocentric if not outright mind dependent.

but EPP in the context of E4 does not hold?

I've given counterexamples, so no, it doesn't hold. Let's suppose a roughly rectangular rock exists in (is part of some other domain of: )some other universe. It is rectangular and yet does not exist in this universe, so it doesn't exist under E4, despite having that 'roughly rectangular' predication.

Does this tell us we can specify that EPP does not hold by restricting the domain of existence?

I think so.

Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind.

Agree, but by definition, the ontology of the independent thing doesn't depend on it being thus examined.

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication. — noAxioms

This seems to be a mis-statement. The perception is possible but not mandatory for predication and separately for existence. Some mind-independent things nevertheless have an audience.

When you declare, "Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them." you likewise don't perceive them except through actions completely internal to you.

Not talking about the concept of Pegasus.

Consider your posted definition of metaphysics, "...the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space."

You're claiming principles and abstract concepts have no relationship with cognition? — ucarr

Not claiming that, nor is the quoted definition.

I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context. The Standard Model, with its symmetries and conservation laws, grounds existence, the largest of all contexts. — ucarr

OK, but you defined existence as cognition, which is emergent from the larger context of material (still a very restricted context), so you seem to contradict yourself. The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things. — noAxioms

The unedited version of my quote above makes it clear I think the Standard Model the material ground of existence, and moreover, the material ground of the elementary particles is not a very restricted context. Apparently you think abstractions immaterial whereas I don't. We agree that cognition is an emergent property of the elementary particles. If this is correct so far, then you're the one holding inconsistent beliefs as, per my view, emergent cognition that supports abstract thought demonstrates abstract thought, like cognition, being grounded in elementary particles, and thus not immaterial.

The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things. — noAxioms

This is your main interpretation of what I have to say on the topic of defending EPP, my purpose in our dialogue. It is wrong. You are confusing MPP, viz., Mind Precedes Predication with EPP. Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. Given this chain of reasoning, it follows that mind doesn't precede objective reality.
Another important clarification: mind does precede expression of existence as an abstract idea. The mind-independent reality of objective reality is something we can only infer from social consensus, a premise I've discussed repeatedly.

I think it likely your E1-E6 do not cover all facets of my definition of existence. For example, E2, your only statement about subjectivity, nevertheless says nothing about QM entanglement and its subject-object complex. — ucarr

That's because QM says nothing about the role of subjectivity in any of its predictions. — noAxioms

Below we have one of your quotes. It talks about the impact of subjectivity upon the QM state of super-position (inferred from Schrödinger's Equation).

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

The observer interacts with QM super-position and collapses it to a definite outcome.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

I want to modify your characterization of general existence [within the context of EPP]. I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. Like white light within the visible light spectrum, which contains RGB, viz., all of the colors, general existence contains The Quintet (mass_energy_force-motion_space_time), viz., all of the properties. Temporal forms of material things are emergent forms whose properties are funded by The Quintet. I don't expect any modern physicist to deny any property is connected to the Standard Model. In effect, assertion of predication sans existence is a claim that properties exist apart from the Standard Model. As an example, this is tantamount to saying the color red of an apple has nothing to do with the electromagnetism of the elementary charged particles inhabiting the visible light spectrum. — ucarr

All that is your characterization of existence, not in any way a modification of any of mine (any one of the six). It seems to be existence relative to a model, and a model is an abstraction of something else. So this is closest to my E2. The standard model makes no mention of apples, so apparently apples don't exist by this definition. You've provided more definitions than I have probably, but all of them mind dependent. — noAxioms

No. Given your stated definition of existence within the context of EPP:

There is the commonly held principle... that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. — noAxioms

Whether the pronoun refers to existence, or to predication, either way, per your characterization of EPP, property must pre-exist. Property before existence is illogical; property after predication posits predication as the idealism of objective reality by verbal utterance.

My definition of existence implicitly refutes E2 and E6. By equating existence with the quintet, the idealism of E2 is refuted and, likewise, the limitation of the scope of existence of E6 is refuted.

We have options for predicating the Venn diagram relationship linking Columbus and Ohio. For example, "Columbus implies Ohio." By this statement we see Columbus is always a predicate of Ohio.

Not true. You can conclude ¬O → ¬C from that, but not O → C — noAxioms

You say, "¬O → ¬C." This means that because Columbus is encompassed by Ohio, Ohio, which includes all of Columbus plus more, necessarily implies Columbus and thus its negation implies Columbus' negation. This means Columbus is always included within the scope of Ohio. Given this, how is it not true that O → C? Perhaps you're arguing from the premise, "There are parts of Ohio not Columbus." This separation of territory cannot be inferred from O without the restriction O ≠ C. So O ≠ C = ¬(O → C).

I argue my statement doesn't assume EPP in route to proving it because of the statement, "Modifiers attach to their objects." This isn't a re-wording of EPP. It's a stipulation by definition pertaining to the application of "modify" WRT EPP. For example, an adjective changes the perceivable state of its object-noun by giving the reader more information about the attributes of the object-noun. I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun. Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication, I don't see how it's an example of begging EPP. — ucarr

But there is a subject noun. The subject just doesn't necessarily meet some of the definitions of existence. You seem to be using a mind-dependent one here, which makes the whole comment pretty irrelevant to my experimental denial of mind-independent EPP. — noAxioms

In the case of predication, the subject noun is always the object of the predication. When we say, "The predication makes a claim about the subject regarding: a) the state of being of the subject; b) the actions of the subject." we're saying the subject is the object of the predication, and thus predication is a modifying function. Perhaps now you can see why predication about a non-existent subject evaluates to zero. The existence of the predication as a modifier depends upon the existence of its object, which is the subject.

Yes, my definition of existence here is mind-dependent. However, as explained above, I've been invoking MPP throughout our conversation. EPP is prior to MPP, so MPP applied to E2 also implies EPP applied to E2.

I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun. Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication, I don't see how it's an example of begging EPP. — ucarr

Predication is not a procedure, except perhaps under your mental definitions. — noAxioms

Don't conflate the application of A with A. The former is about the use of A within a context. The latter is about what term is being applied within a context.

Perhaps you think because I say, "there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist." that means I'm assuming existence instead of proving it. I'm not trying to prove existence. I'm trying to prove existence precedes modification. Given this fact, the predication of the existence of existence is allowed. — ucarr

You're directly saying that begging your conclusion is not fallacious. — noAxioms

Can you show me how EPP doesn't assume existence? Existence Precedes Predication is a statement, not a question. This means the existence of existence is presumed. The presumption of its existence is necessary to examining it relationship to something else, in this case, predication, right? The existential precedence of existence vis-á-vis predication is clearly something different from the brute fact of existence, right? Perhaps you think the proximity of "predication" with "existence" shows a mind-dependent declaration establishing "existence," the thing to be proven. The omnipresence of cognition within all human inquiries and exams supports MPP. Can you show yourself examining EPP, or anything else, without making use of your cognition?

Can you explain how abstracting to 14 isn't an example of rendering 14 as an abstraction?

I cannot. Best to ask whoever asserts that. — noAxioms

I don't restrict my scope to material things. 14 has been one of my frequent examples and it isn't a material thing, nor is it an abstraction, although abstracting is necessary to think about it.[/quote]

Define the domain that lies between material thing and abstraction.

I see we both place our main focus on E1 WRT to EPP. I seek to defend EPP and, as you say, you're examining its status. An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated. — ucarr

[/quote]

I don't see this since your focus is always on E2, occasionally E4 which is still mind-dependent. — noAxioms

Your declarations about mind-independence have kept much of my focus upon MPP.

An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated. — ucarr

It is important, because your insistence on approaching it from subjectivity prevents any analysis of E1. — noAxioms

Can you develop a chain of reasoning from non-existent subject to analysis?

Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works" doesn't make a definitive statement about the independence of the ontological from the epistemological towards aligning you with realism? I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement, then it means what the dictionary says it means:

reality | rēˈalədē |
noun
2 the state or quality of having existence or substance.
•Philosophy existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subject to human decisions or conventions. - The Apple Dictionary — ucarr

I think your statement above in bold aligns you closely with E1. I, too, am closely aligned with E1. The difference between us is that, in context, I ascribe foundational importance to E2 in the examination of EPP.

The dictionary definitions you quoted do not specify which usage of 'exists' it is referencing. OK, the realism definition says 'absolute' and not 'objective as opposed to subjective', but it's reference to abstractions also suggests the latter meaning.

The 'absolute' reference suggests R1. Definitions from other dictionaries vary. — noAxioms

Regardless of the spectrum of definitions of existence in context, your statement in bold aligns you with the Standard Model regarding existence. You frequently pivot away from E1 to the others, but allegiance to E1 aligns you with me on the relationship between the Standard Model and existence.

The unedited version of my quote above makes it clear I think the Standard Model the material ground of existence — ucarr

Sure, but so many of your other quotes make it quite clear that you consider perception to be the mental ground for existence. So you regularly switch between two primary definitions of E2 or E4. If E4, then cognition has nothing to do with it. If E2, then material emerges from mind, not the other way around.

Now E2 & E4 are just definitions, and being definitions and not theories, they're not things that are metaphysically true or not, but just different usages of a word in different contexts. It is valid to use both E2 and E4 without contradictions, but in doing so, they lose all metaphysical existence.

Apparently you think abstractions immaterial — ucarr

Not sure where you get this. Human abstraction (a human process) is material since a human consists of material. Something immaterial doing its own abstracting would be an example of immaterial abstraction, so I can conclude that abstraction is not necessarily material, but my own abstracting seems to be a material process.

This is your main interpretation of what I have to say on the topic of defending EPP, my purpose in our dialogue. It is wrong. You are confusing MPP, viz., Mind Precedes Predication with EPP.

I am not since nowhere am I discussing mind. I keep batting away all your comments talking about concepts instead of the thing itself.

So above you confine existence to material things. 14 has been my example of an immaterial thing (it's an integer, not a material object subject to supposed conservation laws), and it has a predicate (among thousands of them) of being even. Thus EPP fails. No mention of mind appears anywhere in that example.

Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. Given this chain of reasoning, it follows that mind doesn't precede objective reality. — ucarr

That doesn't follow from that chain of reasoning due to the bolded word above. The first statement is trivially true since the two words are essentially synonyms. What follows from that statement is "if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind doesn't precede objective reality", but you said something else, something that doesn't follow at all.

Another important clarification: mind does precede expression of existence as an abstract idea.

Depends on definitions. There are plenty of those on these forums that restrict the word 'mind' to 'human mind', meaning that if something nonhuman does the exact same thing, it isn't mind and it probably isn't abstracting. Anyway, I will accept the statement if it doesn't come with the anthropocentric baggage.

The mind-independent reality of objective reality is something we can only infer from social consensus, a premise I've discussed repeatedly.

Social consensus is still a form of mind-dependency. Material is what's real only because human infer it in that manner. But the inference is a starting point, and one hopes that one can infer more than just what is immediately seen. All of this is still a restricted relational existence, nothing objective about it despite it frequently being asserted that way.

Below we have one of your quotes. It talks about the impact of subjectivity upon the QM state of super-position (inferred from Schrödinger's Equation).

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms — ucarr

No mention of subjectivity (except the phrase 'not mind-specific) appeared anywhere in my statement you quoted. I explicitly state that mind/subjectivity plays no role.

The observer interacts with QM super-position and collapses it to a definite outcome.

No. 'obsersver' carries a connotation of human subjectivity, and QM does not give humans any special role. We're just piles of atoms, just like any other system. Use a different word than 'observer'.

No. Given your stated definition of existence within the context of EPP:

E3 seems to be the only definition 'within the context of EPP".

Property before existence is illogical; property after predication posits predication as the idealism of objective reality by verbal utterance.

I'm not in any way talking about verbal utterances. None of my definitions (not even E2) mentioned that.

My definition of existence implicitly refutes E2 and E6.
...
likewise, the limitation of the scope of existence of E6 is refuted

I can reword your definition to fit E6, so this is wrong. Your definition very much limits scope to a very restricted domain (of material), so illustrated, not refuted.

You say, "¬O → ¬C." This means that because Columbus is encompassed by Ohio, Ohio, which includes all of Columbus plus more, necessarily implies Columbus and thus its negation implies Columbus' negation.

No, the statement does not mean that. It was what could be concluded from "Columbus implies Ohio", which in this case is, in the absence of Ohio, there is no Columbus.

This means Columbus is always included within the scope of Ohio.

Not it doesn't. An Ohio without Columbus is completely consistent with the statement "Columbus implies Ohio". This is trivial logic.

When we say, "The predication makes a claim about the subject regarding: a) the state of being of the subject; b) the actions of the subject."

In the absence of EPP, a) is false. b) is false regardless since there's no necessity of 'action'. There is no necessity of claim. So for instance with 14 being even, "is even" is the predicate. That predicate is performing no action and is not something making a claim. It is just a property that applies to some integers and not to others.
No mention of existence is there, except as part of the domain of integers. Is pi not even? Unclear if the predicate applies at all to something not an integer. So 14 being even gives it a certain E6 kind of existence. There exists in the set of integers, 14, which happens to be even.

Can you show me how EPP doesn't assume existence?

No, the principle seems to assume existence, and worse, it seems to assume E1 existence, but as worded, it's not explicit about that, only demonstrably false with some of the others.

This means the existence of existence is presumed.

That doesn't even make syntactic sense, let alone follow from anything. Maybe you mean some sort of empty tautology, that all that exists exists.

The presumption of its existence is necessary to examining it relationship to something else, in this case, predication, right?

Wrong. I have zero trouble examining relationships without presuming E1 existence. You didn't specify E1 though.

Can you show yourself examining EPP, or anything else, without making use of your cognition?

I can't, but no such claim was ever made.

I don't restrict my scope to material things. — ucarr

See your definition quoted at the top then, defining existence grounded in material.

Define the domain that lies between material thing and abstraction.

Didn't know there was one.

Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works" doesn't make a definitive statement about the independence of the ontological from the epistemological towards aligning you with realism?

But it does make such a statement.

I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement

The statement is valid with most definitions of the word, except definitions where existence/reality is dependent on language rules..

I, too, am closely aligned with E1.

Your 'material' definition above aligns with E4, not E1. There are empirical tests for existence under E4, and not under E1.

The difference between us is that, in context, I ascribe foundational importance to E2 in the examination of EPP.

E2 isn't foundational under E1. Neither is the standard model.

Is Pegasus independent of all human minds — ucarr

So now human minds are special? If that's true, then Pegasus probably doesn't exist. — noAxioms

My question aims at perceiving whether Pegasus is mind-independent. Pegasus exists as a mind-dependent entity. Put another way, Pegasus (the natural horse) has never been directly detected by a pair of eyes. Only the mind's eye of the imaginative person has seen Pegasus.

I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms

Your quoted statement, ”I have no trouble defining existence sans perception…” can be read as: a) I can define existence without (using my) perception; b) I can define a type of existence that lacks perception. In response to the latter definition, nearly anyone might say, “Oh, yeah. I know whatcha mean. Take for example a rock.” In response to the former definition, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way." we see that it, when compared with "Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works." reveals serious conflict between the two statements.

Your main purpose in this conversation is to examine mind-independent reality with an eye towards using this examination to establish that EPP cannot be eliminated without creating a contradiction. Doing this would establish the necessity of EPP.

You first say you can't find objective existence logically meaningful. Next you say the rules of language do not in anyway influence the workings of mind-independent reality. If the latter is true, then you know that mind-independent reality has rules not governed by rules of language. You can't make this claim without inferring logical rules in application to objective existence. This claim is incompatible with your other claim you can't find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. Some of your language implies you believe in EPP.

Your language statement, a realist position, undermines catastrophically your exam of EPP concerning the establishment of predication without existence. If, as you imply, mind-independent reality has rules (metaphysics) not influenced by language, then it produces material things predication, a linguistic entity, cannot impact. This is existence prior to (and isolated from) predication. Therefore, elimination of EPP leads to predications about things isolated from predication. Such predications are tantamount to empty sets. Predication without existence doesn’t undermine EPP because an empty set ≠ a set containing paradoxes called “non-existent things with predications.”

Santa is not non-existent — ucarr

Definition dependent, and definition not specified. Santa being nonexistent is different than there not being an existing Santa. Santa being anything is a predication. — noAxioms

Santa does not exist. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T

Santa is non-existent. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T

If it's true the two statements have the same evaluation for E1-E6, then they're not different by force of "Santa being anything is a predication." So “Santa is there-not-being-an-existing-Santa.” equals “Santa is non-existent.”

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind.

No, not that at all. It's due to my mind being involved in the act of abstracting, preventing by some definitions the direct (causal?) access to this mind-independent thing. — noAxioms

Explain how you can have direct experience of a mind-independent thing (or of anything) without a mind?

Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence. — ucarr

It's existence is unknown (definition dependent again) — noAxioms

No. We know the newborn has a brain before it knows that. We know the newborn uses its brain to live before it knows it's using its brain. This is social-consensus verification of objective reality not affected by a theoretician's definitions. Theoretical exploration in definitions is language play and, as you say, "...the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works."

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat.

Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it.

So what are the arguments against? Without begging the principle being questioned, what contradiction results from its rejection? — noAxioms

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence (The newborn cries out in response to the doctor slapping his bottom. The newborn doesn't know he has a mind.) If we generalize from here, we see that pre-existent mind makes all thoughts - including mind independence - possible. If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.

Here I present an argument that evaluates to a contradiction resulting from the rejection of EPP. It’s the rejection of MPP that necessarily concludes in a contradiction. Since MPP is dependent upon EPP, rejection of MPP implies rejection of EPP.

I am not concerned about how a mind works, and how it develops in an infant. Off topic. — noAxioms

If this is your response to my delivery of a refutation of EPP necessitating a contradiction without begging the question, then I’ve reasoned to your own conclusion to the effect of saying:

I don't think EPP can be refuted, but perhaps my motivation for seeking its justification and not finding it. — noAxioms

and thus predication without the priority of EPP and MPP is impossible.

Put another way, Pegasus (the natural horse) has never been directly detected by a pair of eyes. — ucarr

Best to pick something unobserved (and not alive) if you're going to assert that.
Being unobserved is not what makes something mind-independent since the moon seems mind independent despite being observed. Does it exist (E1)? That's a different question.

Your quoted statement, ”I have no trouble defining existence sans perception…” can be read as: a) I can define existence without (using my) perception; b) I can define a type of existence that lacks perception.

Both wrong. Perhaps a type of existence that lacks the necessity of perception. Else the stop sign doesn't exist because you perceive it.

In response to the latter definition, nearly anyone might say, “Oh, yeah. I know whatcha mean. Take for example a rock.” In response to the former definition, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way." we see that it, when compared with "Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works." reveals serious conflict between the two statements.

I don't see one. Language and proofs are the media of concepts and epistemology, but none of that has any effect on mind-independent existence, only our potential knowledge of it.

Your main purpose in this conversation is to examine mind-independent reality with an eye towards using this examination to establish that EPP cannot be eliminated without creating a contradiction. Doing this would establish the necessity of EPP.

Agree

You first say you can't find objective existence logically meaningful. Next you say the rules of language do not in anyway influence the workings of mind-independent reality.

Yes, it seems that an immediate contradiction would follow if this 2nd statement were not the case.

If the latter is true, then you know that mind-independent reality has rules not governed by rules of language. You can't make this claim without inferring logical rules in application to objective existence.

Still agree, but keep separate the making of the claim, knowledge of the way things work, and the actual way things work, the latter of which would be entirely independent of the others.

This claim is incompatible with your other claim you can't find objective existence meaningful in any logical way.

How so? Objective existence seemed not even mentioned anywhere except the statement that I didn't find a way it would be meaningful, at least in the absence of EPP. With EPP, E1 and E3 are almost identical. Almost...

If, as you imply, mind-independent reality has rules (metaphysics) not influenced by language

I imply that only with some definitions. E3 or E5 for instance have rules, which can be described by language, but are not a product of language. Most of the others seem to select some arbitrary domain to suit the purposes of the chooser of the definition, and that does seem to make them mind dependent. E1 stands out as having no mind dependence, but also having no particular rules.

... , then [mind-independent reality] produces material things predication, a linguistic entity, cannot impact.

How did 'material things' suddenly appear from that sequence? I hadn't specified material as being in any way special. It might be under some forms of E4 existence, but I maintain that any such definition is just a less solipsistic version of human-mind-dependent reality.

This is existence prior to (and isolated from) predication.

It does not since I gave so many counterexamples of predication without existence, especially when one of the 'restricted domain' definitions was used.

Therefore, elimination of EPP leads to predications about things isolated from predication.

Wait, I didn't see that argued, and there's no example. I don't see how this follows from lack of EPP. What does it mean to be 'isolated from predication'? That concept was never introduced.

Such predications are tantamount to empty sets.

An empty set has zero members, which is a predicate of an empty set. Pegasus is not an empty set. The set of all existing Pegasus' is (for the sake of argument) empty, but Pegasus having 2 wings does not directly contradict that.

... a set containing paradoxes called “non-existent things with predications.”

"“non-existent things with predications.” has not been shown to be paradoxical.
You seem to be trying to show this, but my critiques need to be addressed.

Santa does not exist. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T
Santa is non-existent. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T

For either, E3=F, E4=T E6=domain dependent. Seems I disagree with half of your assessments. Still, pretty nice demonstration that 'does not exist' and 'is nonexistent' mean the same thing in an ontological sense.

So “Santa is there-not-being-an-existing-Santa.” equals “Santa is non-existent.”

So why did I say otherwise? Suppose EPP is the case. Then the former might be true, but the latter is paradoxical, listing a predicate of a nonexistent thing. That's the distinction I was referencing, but it isn't an ontological distinction, so the assessment of E1-E6 is unchanged.

Why did I agree to Santa not existing (E1)? Probably because Santa is contradictory, and while I don't see a lot of rules for E1, 'is possible' seems to be a reasonable one.

No, not that at all. It's due to my mind being involved in the act of abstracting, preventing by some definitions the direct (causal?) access to this mind-independent thing. — noAxioms

Wow, even that is wrong, since a rock is supposedly mind-independent and yet I have empirical access to it. I need to be more careful with my wordings.

Explain how you can have direct experience of a mind-independent thing (or of anything) without a mind? — ucarr

Ask somebody who claims that.

We know the newborn has a brain before it knows that.

How a baby's brain works is irrelevant. Epistemology is almost on-topic since there is the issue of how one might know something exists. Answer E1:No test E2 by definition, E3 everything E4 empirical E5 ill-phrased E6 domain dependent

If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.

I don't know what 'pre-existent' means in the context of this topic. If it is true that nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then EPP holds at least for minds, but not necessarily anything else. And if that is not true, then EPP does not hold at all.

Since MPP is dependent upon EPP, rejection of MPP implies rejection of EPP.

That doesn't follow at all. It only implies that rejection of EPP means that MPP also doesn't hold, and even then only if the premise is true.
For example, a chandelier is dependent on the chain from which it hangs. You're saying that absence of the chandelier implies the absence of the chain, but it could still be there, holding a plant hook or something. This is basic logic.

I am not concerned about how a mind works, and how it develops in an infant. Off topic. — noAxioms
If this is your response to my delivery of a refutation of EPP necessitating a contradiction without begging the question

The example didn't show this. Here's what you said:

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence — ucarr

The bold part is straight up begging EPP by asserting the existence of this mind without justification, and without specifying even what kind of existence. Not even under E2 does mind existence precede the predication of self-awareness.

And, as I said, how an infant's brain works is irrelevant to my rejection of that act of begging.

Have you considered the insuperability of your mind as the reason? Its prior to all of your predications. — ucarr

Doesn't seem to be. — noAxioms

You had a mind in the womb. Did you make predications in the womb?

E5 Y exists IFF Y is part of the causal history of X

X (Causal History) ↔︎ Y
Y exists relative to X .... This doesn't mean that Y exists. Existence is a realation, and a 1-way relation, not 2-way like you drew it. — noAxioms

You don't use IFF unless you mean bi-conditional relationship which is X ↔︎ Y.

E3 Existence has predicates

E → Phenomena — ucarr

No, E3 says X exists if X has predicates. It doesn't say any thing about existence itself (whatever that means) having predicates. — noAxioms

Temporal predicates imply the S-MPP (Standard Model Prior to Predicates). Nothing is prior to the standard model as the fundamental particles and their forces are neither created nor destroyed.

Arrow potnkints the wrong way, but yes, this is a definition that directly leverages EPP. Any predication implies existence, hence I think therefore I am. — noAxioms

Any predication implies existence of mind; MPP → EPP.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)

E ∈ Objective Reality = {A,B,C,D,E...} — ucarr

Existence, like other abstractions, localizes in the temporal forms of emergent material things. — ucarr

No idea what those words mean, but perhaps you can tell me Earth's location relative to existence. Can't do that? Case in point. — noAxioms

The earth is emergent from the singularity.

Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

You define direct knowledge as that learned through perception, so here you seem to be asking me to demonstrate perception apart from perception, which would be a contradiction. — noAxioms

You make my point. Your talk of mind-independent things is a contradiction because it assumes perception while denying it by definition.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain) — ucarr

If it is 'of this universe', it is part of a limited domain, a relation, not an objective existence. So E4 is 'part of this universe', and there's no 'objective' about that. The word 'this' is a reference to humanity, making it anthropocentric if not outright mind dependent. — noAxioms

No idea what those words mean, but perhaps you can tell me Earth's location relative to existence. Can't do that? Case in point. — noAxioms

You make an argument against my interpretation of E4. In making this argument, you assume existence doesn't exist because you assume its lack of a measurable position. If you're right and existence lacks a measurable position, then your argument fails because it must assume an attribute (lack of measurable position) establishing its existence. If you're wrong and existence possesses a measurable position, then your argument succeeds with the proviso existence exists.

EPP in the context of E1 is neither true nor false, but EPP in the context of E4 does not hold? Does this tell us we can specify that EPP does not hold by restricting the domain of existence? — ucarr

I think so. — noAxioms

I'm referring to our conversation about existence independent of perception. Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind. — ucarr

Agree, but by definition, the ontology of the independent thing doesn't depend on it being thus examined. — noAxioms

If the ontology of the independent thing doesn't depend on it being thus examined by mind, and you know that by definition, and thus you know it by mind, then claiming its independence from mind is a contradiction.

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication. — noAxioms

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind? — ucarr

This seems to be a mis-statement. The perception is possible but not mandatory for predication and separately for existence. Some mind-independent things nevertheless have an audience. — noAxioms

Possibility of perception by an audience destroys mind independence because you can't know this about a mind-independent thing. Generalizing from here, we know the possibility of mind independent things is impossible because the conceptualization of such a possibility is mind-dependent. Truly mind-independent things cannot be conceived of.

When you declare, "Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them." you likewise don't perceive them except through actions completely internal to you.

Not talking about the concept of Pegasus. — noAxioms

You can only state things about the concept of Pegasus. Barring that, we're back to:

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind? — ucarr

Consider your posted definition of metaphysics, "...the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space."

You're claiming principles and abstract concepts have no relationship with cognition? — ucarr

Not claiming that, nor is the quoted definition. — noAxioms

Metaphysics is nowhere defined as any kind of cognition or grammar. Please use a definition that is at least slightly close to "the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space" — noAxioms

Explain how your quote denying any connection between metaphysics and cognition, holds consistent with:

"...the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts..." — noAxioms

You had a mind in the womb. Did you make predications in the womb? — ucarr

I made my mother nauseous, so I guess that counts as making a predication.

You don't use IFF unless you mean bi-conditional relationship which is X ↔︎ Y.

It means if and only if, and I very much use it in a one way relationship. X being part of the cause of Y in no way implies that Y is part of the cause of X. That would be retrocausality.

Temporal predicates imply the S-MPP (Standard Model Prior to Predicates).

There are plenty of other temporal relationships that in no way involve the standard model, so this is false.

Any predication implies existence of mind;

Not talking about idealism.

The earth is emergent from the singularity.

I asked for Earth's location relative to existence, not from the singularity. And where is Earth relative to the singularity? Can you point in the general direction of the singularity, perhaps give a rough estimate how far Earth is from it?

You make my point. Your talk of mind-independent things is a contradiction because it assumes perception while denying it by definition.

You need to review what it means for something to be mind-independent.

In making this argument, you assume existence doesn't exist because you assume its lack of a measurable position.

No, I just think it's a category error-, but under E4, all existing things have a location (except the singularity, which is why it's a singularity). With any other definition, I can think of plenty of potentially existing things that don't have a location. But you were talking about E4 with this comment, so my request of it's location is valid.

Rather than worry about this, let's first define what you think 'existence' is, that it would meaningfully be something that exists or not by whatever definition you choose.

If the ontology of the independent thing doesn't depend on it being thus examined by mind, and you know that by definition, and thus you know it by mind, then claiming its independence from mind is a contradiction.

Non-sequitur. I agree with all but your claim of a contradiction. Maybe you should rewrite as a more formal argument. Mind-independence doesn't mean that nobody is thinking of a thing, but you seem to be proceeding as if this was the case, as evidenced by the following nonsense statement:

Possibility of perception by an audience destroys mind independence because you can't know this about a mind-independent thing.

You seem to think that mind-independent existence depends on the lack of mind, but any dependence on say lack of perception would make it very much mind dependent since it would be exactly the lack of perception that defines its existence.

You can only state things about the concept of Pegasus.

Perhaps you are thus impaired, but I am very explicitly am talking about something else, per the disclaimer in the OP.

Barring that, we're back to:

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind? — ucarr

I can use E4 definition and suggest that some rock masses one Kg, and use my perception to verify that. Is it fact? Maybe the rock is an illusion, but it remains an empirical fact about a rock that has mind-independent existence per E4. It being mind independent means that the rock would still mass 1 Kg even if I wasn't there to perceive it.

Metaphysics is nowhere defined as any kind of cognition or grammar — noAxioms

Explain how your quote denying any connection between metaphysics and cognition

You'll first have to quote where I made this denial.
I left the part you bolded, which I presume you take to be such a denial, nowhere is there a denial of any connection between the two, only a denial that no standard (not one you deliberately made up) definition of the word defines it as any kind of cognition. The study of metaphysics certainly involves cognition, and the definition quoted does not deny that, and the study of cognition itself has certain metaphysical elements to it. Dualism vs physicalism is arguably a metaphysical issue (and arguably not).

The unedited version of my quote above makes it clear I think the Standard Model the material ground of existence. — ucarr

Sure, but so many of your other quotes make it quite clear that you consider perception to be the mental ground for existence. So you regularly switch between two primary definitions of E2 or E4. If E4, then cognition has nothing to do with it. If E2, then material emerges from mind, not the other way around. — noAxioms

Maybe it's now clear the big difference between our points of view. If, as it appears to me from what you say above, you make a hard separation between cognition (acquiring knowledge and understanding by reasoning from sensory input), and the physics of objective reality, then that puts a big difference between your view of reality and mine. I don't believe there exists such a hard separation between the two. In my view, E2 and E4 are not polar opposites. Considering this, my oscillations between E2 and E4 are not contradictory. My simple explanation says, "cognition is a mental activity emergent from the elementary particles that make up the physics of the brain. If one holds this view, then there's nothing perplexing about claiming, "All temporal things material and emergent from the Standard Model - such as the human brain - are only known about and understood by means of the abstract and reasoning mind." Regarding E2 and material emerging from the mind, I say the opposite, "mind emerges from the physics of the elementary particles making neuronal circuits of the brain possible."

Now E2 & E4 are just definitions, and being definitions and not theories, they're not things that are metaphysically true or not, but just different usages of a word in different contexts. It is valid to use both E2 and E4 without contradictions, but in doing so, they lose all metaphysical existence. — noAxioms

There's a strong link between definitions and theories. Can you cite an example of a definition and a theory both viable and contradictory?

Metaphysics is merely the conclusions of reasoning at the scope of broad generality within a given discipline. In this conversation you endeavor to examine metaphysical claims about mind-independent reality and its inhabitants. You think general existence an empty predication suggesting the need for its de facto abandonment. I think mind-independent reality a second-order emergence of abstract reasoning, itself an emergent property of brain activity. This chain link of connections confines mind-independent reality within the mental architecture of cognition. We can theorize about what it might be like, but our closest approach to it finds us still standing firmly within our physics-dependent cognition grounded within the Standard Model.

MPP is no article of faith because articles of faith and rational beliefs alike are mind-dependent. If this is true, then clearly all notions of mind-independence are thoroughly mind-dependent.

If MPP is dependent on EPP, then E2 and E3 are based upon clear-eyed reasoning, not upon blind trust. E2, E4, E5 and E6 are rationalistic partitions of EPP. If so, it follows they can't exist without EPP. My views herein follow Sartre's, "Existence precedes essence," an early expression of mind emergent from matter.

Apparently you think abstractions immaterial — ucarr

Not sure where you get this. Human abstraction (a human process) is material since a human consists of material. Something immaterial doing its own abstracting would be an example of immaterial abstraction, so I can conclude that abstraction is not necessarily material, but my own abstracting seems to be a material process. — noAxioms

Regarding your method of ontological perception, you seem inclined to hedge every boundary you encounter, thinking it keeps your options at maximum. That you think abstraction not necessarily material is my impression of you based upon some of the evidence quoted below:

I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context. The Standard Model, with its symmetries and conservation laws, grounds existence, the largest of all contexts. — ucarr

OK, but you defined existence as cognition, which is emergent from the larger context of material (still a very restricted context), so you seem to contradict yourself. The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things. — noAxioms

The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things. — noAxioms

You allow yourself to flow between opposites while charging me with self-contradiction for doing same. I think your view of the partitioning of opposites harder than mine, viz., I navigate the grayscale between polarities more than you do. Why is it okay for you to use both E1 and E2 and not for me?

This is your main interpretation of what I have to say on the topic of defending EPP, my purpose in our dialogue. It is wrong. You are confusing MPP, viz., Mind Precedes Predication with EPP. Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. Given this chain of reasoning, it follows that mind doesn't precede objective reality. — ucarr

I am not since nowhere am I discussing mind. I keep batting away all your comments talking about concepts instead of the thing itself. — noAxioms

This is part of our trench warfare; herein we're slugging it out. In response to your batting away, I keep batting away your supposition we can do otherwise than talk about concepts of things.

So above you confine existence to material things. 14 has been my example of an immaterial thing (it's an integer, not a material object subject to supposed conservation laws), and it has a predicate (among thousands of them) of being even. Thus EPP fails. No mention of mind appears anywhere in that example. — noAxioms

Saying I confine existence to material things is a simplification. I ground existence in material things, a complex interweave of physics and its emergent properties.

The ontological status of numbers is a topic too complex and undecided to make it a good example in our context. For example, numbers represent points in space. This corresponds with material things in motion. Heisenberg Uncertainty is math-inferred physics about the possibility of the completeness of measurement of things in motion. The measurement problem, distinct from Heisenberg Uncertainty, remains unresolved. There's no easy evaluation to a definitive ontology of numbers. Claiming the number 14 causes EPP to fail is jumping to an unsupported conclusion.

Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. Given this chain of reasoning, it follows that mind doesn't precede objective reality. — ucarr

That doesn't follow from that chain of reasoning due to the bolded word above. The first statement is trivially true since the two words are essentially synonyms. What follows from that statement is "if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind doesn't precede objective reality", but you said something else, something that doesn't follow at all. — noAxioms

You think cognition and objective reality equal? By asserting their equality, you endorse my side of our central argument: mind-independent reality is wholly contained within mind-dependent cognition. My declaration assumes mind-independent reality coincides with objective reality.

My statement about objective reality and mind follows the form of Objective Reality → Mind. Mind → Cognition. In consequence, the mind's cognition, examining objective reality, sees its dependence upon the environment of nature, which is objective reality.

Another important clarification: mind does precede expression of existence as an abstract idea. — ucarr

Social consensus is still a form of mind-dependency. Material is what's real only because human infer it in that manner. But the inference is a starting point, and one hopes that one can infer more than just what is immediately seen. All of this is still a restricted relational existence, nothing objective about it despite it frequently being asserted that way. — noAxioms

The whole of cognition - which includes social consensus - is a form of mind-dependency.

Inference beyond empirical experience, or pure reason, is the most extreme form of mind-dependency.

Nothing in existence, as it is rendered to the understanding, lies outside of the inter-relatedness linking all material and material-based existences. This is the general meaning of symmetry, the conservation laws and the Standard Model. Why do you think the pursuit of super-symmetry is called the theory of everything?

Below we have one of your quotes. It talks about the impact of subjectivity upon the QM state of super-position (inferred from Schrödinger's Equation). — ucarr

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

No mention of subjectivity (except the phrase 'not mind-specific) appeared anywhere in my statement you quoted. I explicitly state that mind/subjectivity plays no role. — noAxioms

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the subject of an action upon it (measurement), how can the action be prior to it?

The observer interacts with QM super-position and collapses it to a definite outcome. — ucarr

No. 'obsersver' carries a connotation of human subjectivity, and QM does not give humans any special role. We're just piles of atoms, just like any other system. Use a different word than 'observer'. — noAxioms

When you say, "...measurement is what collapses a wave function..." you're talking about an observer doing a measurement, such as an experimenter calculating with Schrödinger's Equation. This unless you think calculating with Schrödinger's Equation can be done without an entity doing the calculation.

My definition of existence implicitly refutes E2 and E6. By equating existence with the quintet, the idealism of E2 is refuted and, likewise, the limitation of the scope of existence of E6 is refuted. — ucarr

There is the commonly held principle... that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. — noAxioms

Whether the pronoun refers to existence, or to predication, either way, per your characterization of EPP, property must pre-exist. Property before existence is illogical; property after predication posits predication as the idealism of objective reality by verbal utterance. — ucarr

I'm not in any way talking about verbal utterances. None of my definitions (not even E2) mentioned that. — noAxioms

Predication is verbal.

I can reword your definition to fit E6, so this is wrong. Your definition very much limits scope to a very restricted domain (of material), so illustrated, not refuted. — noAxioms

My definition of existence says, "Existence has two parts: a) the local and temporal material forms emergent from the quintet; b) the non-local part (the quintet) that funds the local part.

Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system. The assignment of an origin event is arbitrary. Coordinate systems are frame dependent, origin dependent, and are very much abstractions. Events on the other hand, as well as intervals, are frame independent and physical. — noAxioms

Gauge Theory establishes the symmetries of the quantum fields of the Standard Model. The Standard Model elementary particles fund the physics of nature and the presumed mind-independent things. What is known (the cognition/materialism relationship un-clarified) and what is math-restricted in scope (equation symmetry un-clarified) sums to a pair of artificially parsed definitions of limited existence inconsistent with my two-part definition describing existence as an all-encompassing context both local and non-local.