That would not seem to follow, since no distance is infinite. — Janus

Models say otherwise. For the distance to be finite, there would need to be an edge where there is stuff only on one side, and not uniform as we see it. This is true of a subjective model (one with a frame and a 'current event'), but not of any objective view. Other-worlds is necessarily a description from the outside.

How does the second sentence follow from the first? Do the universes share the same history? Why should they do that? — fishfry

They're not separate universes (especially types 1 and 3), just separate worlds in this universe. For type 1, the distant Earth is a true duplicate. The space is infinite, but the possible states in a finite space (say that of Earth) are not, so each state much eventually be duplicated given enough distance.

The same objection that Apo applies to Type 3 is relevant to type 1. Those distant hubble-spheres are just other (sometimes identical) solutions to the same equations. In both cases, there is no separate ontology to it. There is only the one universe, and not a multiverse of separately existing noninteracting things.

For those of us who prefer not to sit through a video, and who have only a nodding acquaintance with the topic, can you please remind us what a level 3 multiverse is? — fishfry

It is a Tegmark designation, and I'm not sure how much the video gets into it. Type (or level) 1: Places that are too distant to causally interact with here, ever. There is a duplicate Earth out there if you go far enough. Type 2 is other bubbles in eternal inflation theory. Those bubbles all have the same QM, but different dimensions, light speed, and other physical constants. There is a duplicate Earth there as well. Type 3 is Everett multi-worlds, essentially parallel-here. Type 4 is other structures altogether, and it is hard to argue that they're not separate universes, but ours exists no more than those others.

I didn't watch the linked video. For the record, quantum mechanics does not say the multiverse is real or is not. Not sure what 'physics' is wrong or conflicts with QM.

I think different people have different definitions of what 'is real'.
One can view the universe from within or from without and yield different answers to the same questions, and nobody is wrong or right.
So from within, only what we can sense or what possibly can effect us is real. It is not wrong to say there is no multiverse. From an objective view, there may be multiple worlds, but still one universe. These two different ways of looking at it are completely valid for not just Type 3, but also types 1 and 2.

So it seems there is no multiverse, but only because that is a poor choice of words. Everett proposed one universe with different solutions to measurements, but no 'collapse' that makes one of those solutions the actual one. That's multi-world perhaps, but not multiverse.

There doesn't seem to be a law that cleary demonstrates true regularity of any physical process. — TheMadFool

Yes there is such a law, and it is used in the articles linked. They've demonstrated the accuracy of some clock to X digits, and not by using a more accurate one.
You seem to just want to deny any answer to your query. So what's your purpose in asking then?

Every object has a separate now attached to it as a property. — guptanishank

OK, we're taking completely different things then. Ignore what I've said.

Could you explain all of this in a little more detail. I would love to get to the bottom of this. Thanks.

I know the model is mathematically consistent. The interpretation is after all, built on top of the math.
That's not the point I was trying to make. Time CANNOT be defined for all the objects this way, because of mathematical restrictions. It would be counter intuitive to say the least, that a now is not defined for every object as well. — guptanishank

Not sure what all else to explain. A photon, or anything else with no rest-mass, is missing half the properties of a classic object due to the inability to be at rest in any frame.

So every theory, built upon this concept of time, will not have a now for every object, because time itself was not defined for those objects, and we are trying to build a theory of now from the current concept of time.

This part confused me since no object has a 'now'. Events do, and 'now' is only a self-reference to that event. Pair an event with any other event and the two events can be said to have pure spatial separation (temporally simultaneous) or pure temporal separation (spatially the same place) by aligning one of the axes to go through both events. If you don't think axes can be arbitrarily assigned, I ask where any of them are? Which direction is the X axis of the universe? There isn't one. There isn't a temporal one either. Choosing one is arbitrary, as per the principle of relativity, which is older than Galileo's work, even if the implications of that principle weren't worked out until a century ago.

The problem with that specific definition is that time is not defined for light. Light has no frame of reference, and hence no time or space associated with it. — guptanishank

Exactly so. Light has no frame, travels in no specific direction, cannot rest, has no mass and exists in no time of its own. But all these things are defined by arbitrary selection of frame.
Light doesn't exist inside or outside a causal cone, but rather occupies the dimensionless singularity where the rotation of one type of dimension becomes the other type. Quite consistent with the mathematics of it all.

This definition/description does not seem to require causality? — guptanishank

Causality is what distinguishes the temporal dimension from the other ones.

if you are in a space ship somewhere in the universe and you have no clock, how can you measure the time with some approximation? — vesko

the answer is as follows :
simple way can be the measuring of our pulse which is a given by God interval we can use to measure the time . — vesko

If you have a pulse, you have a clock. Lousy precision, but a clock nevertheless. You can time the boiling of your egg by counting heartbeats.

So the time is nothing else but a counting of repeated events done by humans. — vesko

The counting can be (doesn't need to be) done by humans. The counting is not what time is. It is simply a human taking a measure of what time is. Plenty of non-human things utilize time measurement.

Plus distance is only applied for space. How are you defining distance for time. — guptanishank

In the spacetime model, the temporal dimension is distance just like the other three. There is physical distance between any two events, and that distance is temporal only if the two events are inside their mutual light cones. It is spatial only if the two events are outside those cones.

How do we know that? My watch's error can be detected by an atomic clock. How do we detect the error of an atomic clock? — TheMadFool

Read the links fdrake posted. They answer exactly this question. At the sort of accuracy they're talking, two clocks would need to be in exactly the same environment. Put them in adjacent parking spaces and the difference in latitude will get them out of sync.

So the negations of both versions of the sentence would be "Caesar is not a prime number"(which seems sensible) and "Caesar is number that is not prime." (which is bonkers) — jospehus

You were doing fine until here. That was not the negation.
The negation of the latter sentence is "Caesar is not a number that is prime".

but what if the time irregularity is in the nanoseconds or femtoseconds? — TheMadFool

I think you ask about what if the radioactive same ticked regularly. Then the decays would not be random events, but regular ones. All similar-rate samples would tick in sync. They don't. No way at all to predict when the next tick will come or which sample will yield the next tick.

My example used whole numbers and the error reveals itself quite easily but what if the time irregularity is in the nanoseconds or femtoseconds? Errors at such scales can be detected only over millions of years, right? — TheMadFool

My counter example works fine with nanoseconds. The radioactive samples might tick every nanosecond and the example still holds. The two samples would not be in sync ever, and thus are not representative of actual time. The decays are random events, much in the same way that Earth rotations are not.

Look at the history of time measurement. Started with the sun, moon and earth - wasn't accurate enough. Then we moved to pendulums - wasn't accurate enough. Now we have atomic clocks - aren't perfect. Isn't this the infinite regress I'm suggesting here?

Sun movement is way more accurate than pendulums, but inaccurate in the long run. The day used to be a lot shorter.

I see no infinite regress, or even finite. Yes, some things are more regular than others, radioactive decay being probably at the low end of the scale. Such accuracy is not needed except to verify very fine differences. You apparently don't accept that. You seem to assert that time cannot be known without some insanely accurate device. But somebody said that a day is defined as the time from noon to noon on some arbitrary day in say 1900, and that's the standard, period, even if we don't know how to translate that value into Caesium vibrations (something even more stable than Earth) to twelve places until decades later.

Science had little use for that sort of accuracy back in those days.
They worked out F=MA without need of it.
— noAxioms

Really? I thought time was part of A (acceleration)? Were Newton's laws theoretically derived? — TheMadFool

Without the precision required to navigate a boat. I didn't say it was done without time measurement.
Massive precision is needed only for more recent physics like the relativity experiments done a century ago.

Imagine a world with a radioactive element x that decays at the rate of 1 atom every true second.

Let's suppose we have a clock that is irregular too: one tick is supposed to be 1 second but actually tick1 = 1 second, tick 2 = 2 seconds, tick 3 = 1 second, tick 4 = 2 second and so on.

If we study the element x for 4 ticks (4 seconds by the defective clock) of the clock
6 atoms decayed because 6 true seconds have passed (1, 2, 1, 2)
Time passed by the clock = 4 seconds
Rate of decay = 6/4 = 1.5 atoms/second

But...

The actual time passed = 6 seconds ( 1, 2, 1, 2)
True rate of decay = 6/6 = 1 atom/second

If the defective clock is used universally then we will never notice the error.

What do you think? Thank you for your replies. I've learned a lot.

Sounds like you have the beginning of a competing set of laws in which time is defined alternatively. But it fails the falsification test.

I have two such samples. One of them does 6 ticks, and the other does 2. Next iteration, the former does 3 and the latter does 4. Clearly the radioactive samples are not measuring actual time since they're not matched.

I remember in high school I read something about the pendulum's period depending on g (acceleration due to gravity) and L (the length of the pendulum). — TheMadFool

This is true of weight pendulums like the one in a grandfather clock. Such clocks run slow on the moon for instance. There is a mass-pendulum in my watch, and in a typical 400-day clock. Those stay pretty accurate on the moon. Similarly your weight is dependent on G, but your mass is not.

However, I don't think this really solves the problem because quantification comes first in physics and time is a quantity. In other words, we need to possess accurate instruments before we can discover the quantiative laws of nature.

Right. So they know the length of the day was stable (plus/minus 30 seconds), so eventually they needed to build an instrument that said the same value day after day. The hourglass was not accurate enough. Oddly, it was the train and boat people, not the scientists, that drove the technology for the first accurate clocks. Train folks needed it to prevent crashes, and the boat people needed it for navigation. Science had little use for that sort of accuracy back in those days. They worked out F=MA without need of it.

Now, here's something that I just thought of...

If you'll agree with me that time measurement isn't as accurate as we think then could it be that all the laws of nature we've discovered so far are wrong?

The laws we know result in models that give relatively accurate predictions, and are not something that is wrong or right. If you want to posit different laws, you are welcome to do so, but if they make worse predictions, they're less useful laws.

They're just approximations at best and completely bogus at worst. What if there are no laws of nature and all the patterns we see in nature (at least those dependent on time) are simply illusions created by our failure to measure time accurately?

If there are no laws, then there is no time to measure inaccurately. The statement is thus incoherent, You're asking that if there is no map, is the territory an illusion? What if I have a completely bogus map that has no correspondence to the territory, and yet the nonsense map gets me where I want to go every single time? How bogus is the map then? Seems to be what you're asking.

Is there a physical law that proves that the day length is constant? And how do we know that? — TheMadFool

It is reasonably constant, and the Newton's laws of motion (the first two mostly) say this. This is not proof, just a very successful set of laws that make good predictions. Come up with different laws that do as well but make the day length much more variable, and then you can introduce doubt.

I say 'reasonably' constant. When precision was needed, the second was eventually redefined against something even more regular (the caesium vibrations). Each day is longer than the same day last year, a trend that will continue (assuming other variables stay nearly the same) until the day and month are the same length. Over long times, the day length is anything but stable, ranging from around 10 to 1500 hours. But it has been consistently 24 hours for the very short duration of humans measuring it, and that consistency is what made it our arbitrary standard of time.

Yes but what verifies the day? — TheMadFool

But to know this we would have to rely on another clock, say A, and to check A we need another clock B...ad infinitum. — TheMadFool

No. No clock is needed to know this.
The average length of the day is the arbitrary standard. There is nothing against which it needs to be verified.

Anyway, we know that standard is reasonably stable since it would require incredible force to alter that rotation rate. — noAxioms

But to know this we would have to rely on another clock, say A, and to check A we need another clock B...ad infinitum. — TheMadFool

No clock was used to verify this. Clocks were made to sync to this. The day verifies the clock, not the other way around.
For the length of the day to be significantly variable would require a complete rewrite of the most basic physics. The Earth rotation is regular because of the complete lack of significant force to alter it.

That is what I was saying (in the bold) in my post.

Another thing is the assumption (is there a physics law for this?) that the pendulum swing will remain constant. — TheMadFool

It is not constant. Ever notice all the complexity of the pendulum on a grandfather clock, with all those bars made of different metals? It's not just decorative. It is an attempt to cancel out the normal variations in the period of that pendulum which would significantly reduce the accuracy of the clock.

The standard of time was the average length of a day, with a second being defined as a 86400th of that. I say average length because the day is about a minute longer in December than it is in June.
It would have been more accurate to slice up the time of one rotation (about 1436 minutes) since that doesn't vary significantly over the year, but nobody had a use for hours defined that way.

Anyway, we know that standard is reasonably stable since it would require incredible force to alter that rotation rate. OK, said force does exist, and we have leap-seconds to compensate. Eventually the day will be long enough that we need more than one leap second each day. Scientific definition of a second will diverge more significantly from a clock second, the former corresponding to a day length back when it was first accurately known, and the latter being a function of whatever the current average day-length is.

We need the single best process that could be used at any time and any place. Radioactive decay would be that. — apokrisis

Multiple posts that radioactive decay makes a good clock. It is unpredictable, uncaused and makes a crappy clock. Radioactive dating is accurate to no better than several percent. It serves where no other methods are available, but accuracy is hardly it's forte.

Essentially, going by our findings so far, there simply shouldn't be a universe.

Wrong conclusion. It finds that current models don't necessarily match what is seen. If the findings were accurate, the universe should be different, but concluding that it should not exist is an absurd category error.

The universe didn't even start out with matter/antimatter that mutually annihilated. That stuff formed later. Yes, the imbalance has been noted and any model needs to account for that. Apparently not all models do.

This seems problematic (for me) because how do we know the vibrations of the atom used to define a second is regular? — TheMadFool

Because you get the exact same result from countless repeatings of the experiment.
I get different results from the time measurement of my grass to grow 5cm, so using grass growth as a clock works, but not very accurately. Good clocks use very consistent processes.

Sure, a tagged oxygen atom is likely to survive 2000 years I think, and would most likely be found still on Earth, in a place of highest oxygen density, which is probably any liquid water anywhere. Altitude has little to do with it since water isn't particularly more dense under pressure.

Not so much a science question as a statistics one. It is more likely to be in a cubic meter of water than a cubic meter of anything else on Earth except for perhaps laboratory liquid oxygen.

Events are still usually ordered under determinism. 2017 is after 1917, so the relations 'before' and 'after' have meaning just like the relations 'above' and 'below' have meaning in any space where the direction 'down' is sufficiently defined. Likewise 'then' has meaning just like 'there', so long as some point is identified. The word does not require a 'now' or 'here' respectively.

On a lighter note, I notice that time identity is not associative under presentism: "The future is now" is true, but "Now is the the future" is false. So A = B, but B ~= A, a contradiction, therefore presentism is false.
That's my attempt at the dumbest proof of etermalism ever posted.

Nope, because under eternalism, it simply isn't the case that Christmas "will exist". Christmas doesn't just pass into existence and October out of it. Instead it already exists at a part of the block universe and it is located later to where October-2017-noaxioms is located on the block. The Christmas located on a Sunday of 2016 is located earlier to the same individual. — Mr Bee

So all of language is wrong if eternalism is the case? I don't consider saying that "Xmas will be on a Monday" to be an assertion of presentism. It's just how language works.

You try to bring in talk of "will" and "was" to the mix, but that just confuses things, as they are commonly associated with the passage of time. — Mr Bee

Yes, I agree that the tenses should be avoided when speaking in eternalist terms, but only because of the lack of a reference point.

It is a basic fact that eternalism is commonly associated with the rejection of the flow of time, but I highly suggest you look at any corner of the literature if you're not convinced. This is why the article says that every event exists "right now", but I am not sure why you disagree with it. — Mr Bee

I disagree with the reference to "right now". What does that mean in eternalist terms?? There is no "right now".

Of course there are simultaneously occurring phenomenon. How else do we measure time if not by the simultaneous rotation of the Earth with a movement of the hands of a clock? — Harry Hindu

You misunderstand me. Stanford eternalism entry says that 1917 say, "exists right now", tempting one to imply that 1917 and 'now' are simultaneous. Eternalism does not assert that.

I think it legal to use these tenses, but the reference point must be explicit, lacking an objective present.
— noAxioms

No it isn't. If you don't believe in an objective flow of time then there is no meaning to saying that events have occurred or will occur. That is really the main crux of the eternalist vs presentist debate, the existence of this passage. The only tense that makes sense is to say that all things "are", which is to say that they are all exist now in the way we normally understand things existing right now. — Mr Bee

Assuming I am an eternalist (I'm not really), is it not legal for the October2017-noAxioms to say that Christmas will be on a Monday this year and last was on a Sunday? If the October2017-noAxioms can legally use those tenses, surely it is valid for the October2016-noAxioms to assert that this Christmas will be on a Sunday. Or do you disagree? Not sure what you're saying is invalid to do.

That is just a basic fact. To say that something "has happened" or "will happen" would require a flow of time. — Mr Bee

I think it legal to use these tenses, but the reference point must be explicit, lacking an objective present. So from 1910's present, WWI will happen. Events are still ordered and the tenses are not completely invalid. But to imply a present when speaking on eternalist terms is to refer to an ambiguous event.

Eternalism is not an assertion that all times 'currently exist'.
— noAxioms

From the Stanford entry:
According to Eternalism, non-present objects like Socrates and future Martian outposts exist right now, even though they are not currently present.
— Alec

What is the difference between "existing right now" and being "currently present"? — Janus

I'm on record for not liking the way Stanford words that whole section. My interpretation of that statement (You also edit out the disclaimer that explains what they mean by "existing right now") is that at any given moment ('now' for instance), the other moments ontologically exist equally. Thus I do not disagree with the entry, but I find it poorly worded. Alec interprets all moments "existing right now" to imply that they're all simultaneous, which is a temporal statement, not an ontological one. All moments are not simultaneous under eternalism.

Saying that something exists at a certain time ('now' for instance) leads one to imply that it does not exist at some other possible time. The Stanford entry says it doesn't mean that, but everybody is ignoring that disclaimer (OK, Mr Bee sees it).

This is similar to the idea that "right here" could be anywhere is space, or in other words is applicable in general to everywhere, not merely specifically to where you or I happen to be.

Yes, it is similar to exactly that: "Every point in space exists right here." That means that despite being right here, it does not imply that other locations do not exist. They all have equal ontology, and there is no preferred 'here'. Saying they all exist right here does not imply that all points are at the same location, but the statement "Every point in space exists right here." tempts one to interpret the statement exactly that way. Hence I don't like the Stanford wording.

And so they currently exist which I have quoted you as saying. — Alec

I didn't say that, unqualified like that.

This is a good example of misrepresenting what I said. Did I bring in anything temporal? I was speaking strictly and purely from an ontological standpoint, and all uses of the word "now" and its synonyms are in the ontological sense.

Stanford qualifies the difference. If it states that there is an ontological present, then it is not any form of eternalism that I'll agree with.

Like I said, everything is strictly ontological, so you can't dodge the problem like before.

In a strictly ontological sense (there is also a temporal sense), there is no 'currently'. Current with what? Eternalism is not a statement of the simultaneity of all events. Time is a dimension, not a point.

But they are all currently existing. Again, I must emphasize that part of your post. You keep saying that that they aren't. Unless you want to backtrack on that. — Alec

They are existing in an ontological sense, but not a temporal sense. I don't like to reference the present when speaking of ontological sense since it has no ontological existence. But the temporal present can still be referenced and that is what the Stanford post is doing. Such mixing of senses only serves to confuse.

Perhaps you meant to say that there is no temporal now?

Sure there is. Temporal now is today, the day this forum post is submitted.

If you're saying that there is no sense of an ontological now, then you're contradicting what you just quoted. Everything exists right now under eternalism, in the ontological sense.

Good example of mixing senses, leading to confusion. Everything exists (ontological, italics) right now (temporal, bold). Eternalism does not give temporal existence to Socrates, nor give any ontological status to 'right now'.

But if you agree that every time in the universe's history currently exists in the ontological sense, then we can move on to the bigger problem in the OP, which is how, if all times of our life currently exist, and that we are currently a 4D object that extends throughout our life, can be reconciled to our current experience of only one of those times.

I cannot agree to a statement with mixed senses like that. Be explicit. Every event (there is no 'every time' since something like '1945' is ambiguous outside the context of Earth) currently (temporal sense) exists (ontological sense).
That's utterly confusing, but at least spelled out.

Are you saying that relativity does not order my parents' birth before my own? The ordering is ambiguous or nonexistent?
— noAxioms

I would ask if you're disagreeing with the relativity of simultaneity.

No, I don't disagree with relativity of simultaneity, but my parents are still born before I was.



Going offline for quite some

Agree with the post. I've said elsewhere that it reduces to temporal realism vs. idealism.

'Simultaneous' is a temporal term, not an ontological one. So Earth, 2045 and 1945 both exist (exist now in an ontological sense), but there is no simultaneity to that. Temporally, the two years are 100 years apart and hardly simultaneous.

Relativity I suppose says that the temporal distance between the two events is frame dependent, but the ordering is not. Relativity is not a statement of ontology (despite being suggestive of it), so it is pretty mute about the ontological sense of the two events.

Sorry, but this is just false:

One version of Non-presentism is Eternalism, which says that objects from both the past and the future exist just as much as present objects. According to Eternalism, non-present objects like Socrates and future Martian outposts exist right now, even though they are not currently present. We may not be able to see them at the moment, on this view, and they may not be in the same space-time vicinity that we find ourselves in right now, but they should nevertheless be on the list of all existing things.
— Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Time (My emphasis)

Maybe you should read up on more on the view before talking about it. — Alec

It does indeed say that, with the note that Socrates is not currently present. So there's a difference, and they are apparently allowing the use of an implied reference to a present.
You cut away the distinction between temporal sense and ontological sense of the concept of 'exists right now'

It might be objected that there is something odd about attributing to a Non-presentist the claim that Socrates exists right now, since there is a sense in which that claim is clearly false. In order to forestall this objection, let us distinguish between two senses of ‘x exists now’. In one sense, which we can call the temporal location sense, this expression is synonymous with ‘x is present’. The Non-presentist will admit that, in the temporal location sense of ‘x exists now’, it is true that no non-present objects exist right now. But in the other sense of ‘x exists now’, which we can call the ontological sense, to say that x exists now is just to say that x is now in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers, whether x happens to be present, like you and me, or non-present, like Socrates. When we attribute to Non-presentists the claim that non-present objects like Socrates exist right now, we commit the Non-presentist only to the claim that these non-present objects exist now in the ontological sense (the one involving the most unrestricted quantifiers). — Stanford

So in my posts, I consider references to the present ('right now', 'currently', etc.) to be temporal references, not ontological ones. There is no ontological now, nor a time that is ontologically the current one.

No, events are still ordered if within each others' light cones. My parents were born before me, in any relativistic reference frame.
— noAxioms

There is a reason why they call it "Relativity". It's because of the fact of the relativity of simultaneity. Look it up if you disagree.

Are you saying that relativity does not order my parents' birth before my own? The ordering is ambiguous or nonexistent?

Yeah, that was my point. Eternalism doesn't say anything about simultaneity. It has probably been around before relativity was a thing but the lack of any absolute notion of simultaneity has been used to argue for the view.

Yes, the lack of absolute simultaneity is seriously suggestive, but not proof of any sort.

No, I say he exists. There is no current time.
— noAxioms

I'm sorry, but there are only three ways I could read your "exists". Either you're saying that Napoleon "did exist" or "will exist" or you're saying that he is currently existing. You somehow deny all of them, and want a fourth option, this "tenseless" form of exist, but I have no idea what that is.

Yes, all three reference the present. I mean exists ontologically, and eternalism does not give any ontological status to a present, so there is no present to reference.

I guess I should have referenced Socrates, not Napoleon.

I think you're confusing a preferred time with things currently existing. — Alec

Eternalism is not an assertion that all times 'currently exist'.

The argument from relativity states that there is nothing to determine that one set of simultaneous events should be preferred to any other, leading to the conclusion that none are.

No, events are still ordered if within each others' light cones. My parents were born before me, in any relativistic reference frame.

There are no privileged frames; this is known as the relativity of simultaneity.

Eternalism is not an assertion about simultaneity or preferred frames or the lack of them.

My emphasis on the word "exists". You seem to be using "exist" in the present tense.

Both are tenseless.

You don't say that Napoleon "did exist" or "will exist", you are saying that he currently exists.

No, I say he exists. There is no current time.

What do you mean by "relative terms"? And what inconsistency are you talking about? I don't understand. — Alec

Let me bold some:

...every moment is real in the same sense as the present is real. ... to treat them all as I do present objects, which is to say, that they currently exist, unless you have another idea of what it means to say that they are all "real". — Alec

There is no present, no present objects, since no reference has been specified. So you can say that Napoleon presently exists at Earth, 1815, which is a redundant way of saying Napoleon exists at Earth, 1815. But there is no 'the present', and 'currently' is meaningless without a temporal reference point. Whose present? Currently with what? Begging references to these things is going to make you declare the position irrational.

I was asking if you have an idea of what all moments being equally "real" or all "existing" could possibly mean if not that they exist in the present tense. If you cannot do so for whatever reason, then I can only conclude that your disagreement is irrational and that you don't know what you're talking about.

Napoleon exists, and he also exists in 1815, but does not exist in 1915 since the two times are not simultaneous. Paris exists, and Paris exists in France, but Paris does not exist in Japan since the two locations are not the same place. But that doesn't mean Paris doesn't exist just because the speaker is in Japan. It simply doesn't exist at that speaker's 'here' any more than Napoleon exists at your 'present'.

According to eternalism, every moment is real in the same sense as the present is real. I don't see how else I can make sense of all moments being real or equally real other than to say treat them all as I do present objects, which is to say, that they currently exist, unless you have a better idea of what it means to say that they are all "real". — Alec

Very well then, but use of relative terms to describe a non-relative concept is inevitably going to run into inconsistencies like that.

Distant places look younger because their light just reached us, which of course it was anxious to do. The more distant the objects, the older they are--isn't that the case? — Bitter Crank

Yes, the most distant objects are from the longest time ago. The CMB is the oldest thing visible. It is a wall beyond which nothing can be seen, at least not with the light to which our instruments are sensitive. The CMB is older than any galaxy.

I think the stars are what give galaxies light, so can't see them. Hence the dark ages for the first 0.4 billion years or so, sort of like our early solar system before the sun ignited. The mass is still under the process of collective gathering into one place.

Quasars are super-bright because of all the stars falling into the initial formation of the galactic black holes. That settles down after a while and there seem to be none left 'now'. The nearest one is only about 2 billion years away, and if there were quasars at age 11.7 billion years old, there might be a few that are the age of our galaxy here.

According to eternalism, every moment in the universe's history is real and as such exists simultaneously. — Alec

No, not simultaneously. Each moment is its own time (they're not simultaneous any more than each location is the same place). It's just that no particular moment is special any more than any particular location is the one correct 'here'.

Entropy?

Distant places look younger. There are no quazars nearby since they've all burned out.
Really distant galaxies don't have stars yet.

Also the rate of expansion is not constant, and I would think it would need to be in the steady state scenario you describe.