I find the idea more plausible than not. If Earth now gets clobbered by a big asteroid, it will eject tons of life into space, plenty to drops some seeds on some fertile planet somewhere. The hardest part is getting the shrapnel up to escape velocity in order to make the trip to other star systems before those stars die out. A few billion years is hardly enough to make the trip.

It just pushes the origin question to another planet. — T Clark

Indeed, it does not answer the origin question, but it opens up possibilities to the origin being in some environment that would never plausibly be found here.

Actually they make the case that some epidemics originate from extra-terrestrial material. — Wayfarer

This one seems pretty unlikely. Earth has made life its own, evolving well beyond whatever may have dropped from space. Any virus from space would not have evolved to infect terrestrial life. Epidemics are home grown I would think.

That's Newton, which at the end may be closer to nature than Relativity. — Rich

Yes, I said it was Newton. I also said that equation went unaltered by relativity. Zero force still means zero acceleration, in any frame.

All this is utterly wrong. The stay-home person is not accelerating in the frame of the rocket twin. It takes force to accelerate, and no force is being applied.
— noAxioms

I don't see how either twin knows this or how the clocks know this. Do the feel it? To the twin on Earth, it appears that he is accelerating away from the rocket. Where in the the equations does it identify which twin to choose? — Rich

F=MA.
No force means no acceleration. That's a Newton equation, and relativity didn't even need to modify that one.

The twin paradox can be illustrated with nothing but SR rules using a tag team and no acceleration and no significant masses screwing with gravity. I put one together that I think has no flaws. I can post it if you like. As I said, both subjects can be accelerating equally and yet one will age more than the other. Acceleration is not required.

The equations do not identify which twin is to be considered accelerating. Either one can be chosen since from either twin's frame of reference, it can be accelerating from the other. — Rich

The equations should be reciprocal. I don't know how you pick which one is accelerating. — Rich

All this is utterly wrong. The stay-home person is not accelerating in the frame of the rocket twin. It takes force to accelerate, and no force is being applied.
Velocity is not a frame independent property of an object, but acceleration very much is.

However, as we all know, acceleration can be felt, and therefore may be biological effects as a result of the actual real duration of acceleration. In other words, there may be real effects but independent of Relativity which assumes no privileged frame of reference. — Rich

One twin getting older than the other is not a function of acceleration. Suppose both get on a rocket, and one accelerates at so many G straight out and back, and the other furriously orbits with similar acceleration. They both experience the same acceleration but the orbiting one is much older (more proper time in his worldline) when they meet. So it is not biological effects of being under acceleration. It's not the velocity since in the frame of each, it is the other one that has all the velocity.
But one has a greater moment of acceleration, and that is the difference.

An accelerating frame of reference is privileged. Only inertial frames of reference aren't. — Agustino

Privileged means it is the one correct frame. There is no correct accelerated or inertial frame, so none is privileged. Or are you just yanking Rich's chain?

Scientific time is measurement of simultaneous events. — Rich

I know you're anti-science, but what does that statement even mean???

Agustino, I would have said that scientific time is the time in scientific equations, like velocity * time = distance. Such time is frame dependent since none of the terms above (velocity, time, or distance) is meaningful without a frame.
This is opposed to proper time which is a frame independent duration on a world-line between two events on that world-line. Experienced-time is proper time of the experiencer, or his real age.

And would you agree that if I take a man and fly him close to the speed of light he will age slower than one that remains on Earth? — Agustino

In scientific time, each man ages faster than his counterpart since for each man, it is the other that has all the velocity. Sans acceleration, they cannot ever meet but once and have a meaningful comparison of age.
In proper time, they age at the same pace, but their world lines are different lengths so if they meet, they are not the same age.

A materialist would probably answer yes, rendering the conception of the philosopher moot.

In effect, the philosopher thinks of time as transcendent. — Agustino

Have not read all the replies, but the language in the OP is summarized by that snippet. One is a materialist or a philosopher. It seems that materialism is not presented as a philosophical stance.

And my point is that it doesn't matter. Sure, a simulation of Paris is not the same as Paris. That is why it's called a simulation. But that doesn't affect the fact that we do not know if the Paris we know is one or the other. Apart from that, I don't see your point. — Alec

It apparently does matter if you give meaning to the distinction between the Paris we know being real or a simulation. If a thing cannot be a simulation (only be simulated), then the Paris we know is not one. It only then doesn't matter since there is no distinction between the two cases because there are not two cases.

Evidence of this lack of distinction is that it is impossible to do a "I'm in a simulation" test armed with only subjective knowledge, no matter how inaccurate the simulation.

Note I did give a distinction there. Given non-subjective knowledge, there is a distinction since there is suddenly existence of information from outside the universe. It isn't really a simulation then anymore, but just a sub-process within a larger universe. So for instance, if God created this universe and communicates in any way (imparts state inconsistent with the physics), then the universe is not really a universe, but just a sub-process/object (not a simulation), part of a larger universe containing the full explanation of all empirical data including the said communication.

And again, I must stress that you move away from talk about the self. The simulation argument deals more with the world we are in rather than ourselves and I feel like ignoring that would lead to more confusion than not.

No self needed here. Paris has a library with books describing different physics than the physics of the Paris being inaccurately simulated. That's inconsistent. Such inconsistencies are detectable.

It indeed cannot be exact, and yes, it works fine that way. I suppose our universe could be simulated down to the quantum level, but not on any simulating equipment that I can envision. It seems unnecessary unless there is a quantum amplifier (like the one that kills Schrodinger's cat) that needs to be simulated. Biology seems not to have them, nor does electronics for the most part. History cannot be reproduced, but a functional world of sorts can be simulated. It would work. A transistor for instance has very simulatable macroscopic behavior, and I've actually worked with transistor simulations which are cheaper to test than real chips. But transistors rely on quantum effects to function. They wouldn't work without that. Doesn't matter: The simulation does not simulate at the quantum level. It simply simulates it as a macroscopic switch with this and that delay, threshold, and EM noise. The neuro-chemical nature of brain cells seem to have similar macroscopic function. The simulation need not be more detailed than that.
— noAxioms

Didn't know you were implying quantum phenomena here by the use of "macroscopic".

Never said that. I said macroscopic rules will usually do unless the simulation needs a quantum amplifier, which cannot be simulated properly with a macroscopic simulation.

I must first start off by saying that my knowledge of physics is only basic (some Pop Sci. Books and a rough knowledge of the history), but I do not see how quantum phenomena cannot in principle be simulated.

It can be, but not with simulator running macroscopic rules, and not even in principle if predictable results are expected, since quantum events are not predicable.

Indeed, aren't some physicists already simulating quantum phenomenon in their research?
I can imagine it is impractical sure but not impossible.

Sure they do, but those simulations do not predict unpredictable events like when the atom will decay. The simulations necessarily have randomness built into them, something not particularly needed at the macroscopic level.

In addition, we should not imagine that the world running a simulation of our physics needs to run on the same rules. That was the point of what I said earlier. The ancestor world can run on an entirely different set of laws, one that makes the simulation of the quantum more practically feasible.

That's right, but it wouldn't be an ancestor simulation then, but merely a dumbed down fictional virtual reality.

However, the simulation would still run on the same fundamental principles of computation that we have for our own computers.

No, that cannot be. The nature of our universe is not one that can be accurately simulated on the principles on which our computers operate. I cannot even figure out how to express the position and state of the most trivial particle given unlimited computing resources. An accurate simulation of us would require something fundamentally different I would think.

And that is the key point in all this. In order to demonstrate that something cannot in principle be simulated, it must not be able to run on a computer. Computers, as far as I can tell, are digital, they run on binary, they use an algorithm and are finite.

OK, so we can simulate Paris, at least on a macroscopic level. Anything that can be put in a box. Hard to put Paris in a box since it has continuous interaction with its neighbors, but perhaps the whole Earth with pared down simulation of celestial activity which is pretty easy to predict most times.
A simpler case is a locked room. The whole simulation can be confined to that. I assert that barring information inconsistent with the simulation, it is impossible for the simulated thing to distinguish reality from the simulation. If it were possible, it would be a simulation of a different reality, and thus the distinction would be in error.

You mentioned infinity, which is something that our ideal computer cannot simulate,due to its limitations.

Hence the need for a box. The box confines some of the infinities.

Other examples of phenomena which cannot be simulated are continuity and true randomness.

That is an interesting point. Does randomness need to be true? I think so, since if it was not true randomness, it would be predictable, and that conflicts with QM. It would not be a simulation of our reality. If it is a macroscopic simulation, I don't think randomness is needed at all, true or otherwise.

There are computers with true randomness. It just requires a small randomness device, and they probably fit on a chip. Not so hard.

I've seen 3-body simulations that had poor continuity implementation. The objects seemed to always gain energy. So point taken again.

Unless the intelligent race is somehow able to tap into the infinity and create the ultimate computer, then we can safely assume that their simulations are limited (thus excluding the infinitely small and the infinitely big). And the same goes for true randomness, as computers are necessarily deterministic.

That the running-on-the-same-rules point. Said super-race might have physics that effortlessly let them do infinities in their computations, but again, they would not be running an ancestor simulation by simulating us here.

However, the problem with these possibilities, when I was thinking about them, was that it was impossible for us to know whether or not they were true. Unless we are able to go to the ends of the universe, then we cannot determine if there really is an end to space or not.

Not too hard to know that. People didn't know where the Earth ended either, nobody having visited the edge. Then they found out it had a geometery with no edge and the problem went away. The geometry of the universe has no edge, and no center (not in space at least). There is no vantage from which there are stars only on one side and not the other.

Sorry for slow reply. Been busy and I wanted to not post this until I reviewed it a couple times.

I believe there are a couple of assumptions that you've made that I've pointed out below. I am not sure what you mean by dualism though, if you consider BIV to require it. As far as I can tell BIV works perfectly fine with most positions about the mind. — Alec

I don't consider BIV to require it. There is a mind, and it has zero access to the nature of itself or reality, so it can trust no knowledge. I am discounting that scenario from my discussion.

A more dualistic BIV scenario is a very immersive video game. You are Lara Croft in Tomb Raider, and so convinced of it that you forget you're something else. But you can tell: Lara's head is empty and contains no mechanism for thought and experience, which is served by the 'immaterial' player. The physics of Tomb Raider is obviously not deterministic, so no simulation of Lara physics will result in her acting like she does with the player component.

This statement presumes that the simulation is the simulated.
— noAxioms
Okay, then we are not sure if we are talking about something simulated when we are talking about the world we live in. Whichever way you word it, the fact is that we still have no clue.

Don't know how to explain it better. The simulation is of a real thing. The simulation is not the thing, and thus at no point are we in a simulation, be we simulated or not. So my stance is that we cannot be a simulation. If a simulation is run and it is not perfect (does not simulate what was intended), then the simulation is just of something else with different physics, but the simulated thing is still not a simulation.

It perhaps comes down to a language quibble, but one I feel is important. I can be simulated in principle, but I cannot be a simulation. Running a simulation is not an ontological act any more than the running of a 'real' universe. All it does is execute a simulation process.

Your possibility tries to undermine the simulation scenario just as much as the first two possibilities do. That's just how it is.

Yea, I guess it does. It seems that my position is not just another possibility, but it debunks the whole argument. The argument works from the presumption that the states universe are things (objects??) that happen or are executed, which I find absurd.

The simulation's macroscopic rules don't necessarily have to be the same as the rules in the world of the simulation.

Agree, but is it an 'ancestor simulation' as described by the OP if the simulation is of a different world that the one running the simulation? Conway's Game of Life is a simulation, but not one of our physics. No structure in that game can detect that it is in a simulation because no structure is actually in one. They are being simulated, but are not simulations. See what I'm saying?

And even if the simulation world's rule do mimic the macroscopic rules, there is no requirement that it has to be an exact representation.

It indeed cannot be exact, and yes, it works fine that way. I suppose our universe could be simulated down to the quantum level, but not on any simulating equipment that I can envision. It seems unnecessary unless there is a quantum amplifier (like the one that kills Schrodinger's cat) that needs to be simulated. Biology seems not to have them, nor does electronics for the most part. History cannot be reproduced, but a functional world of sorts can be simulated. It would work. A transistor for instance has very simulatable macroscopic behavior, and I've actually worked with transistor simulations which are cheaper to test than real chips. But transistors rely on quantum effects to function. They wouldn't work without that. Doesn't matter: The simulation does not simulate at the quantum level. It simply simulates it as a macroscopic switch with this and that delay, threshold, and EM noise. The neuro-chemical nature of brain cells seem to have similar macroscopic function. The simulation need not be more detailed than that.

So I have a hard time with the assertion that the simulation could be so good that we can't know we're in one.
— noAxioms

I have to correct my own comment there. If the simulation is so 'imperfect' or size-limited, then it is simply a different thing being simulated. The thing can know it is not in a simulation. It simply exists in a small limited simpler universe.

The true universe (the world that isn't simulated) does not necessarily have to be infinite either.

A true universe I would say, or 'ours'. I speak repeatedly of other universes (say the Conway GoL one) in this post. There is our universe, but I don't think ours is any more or less true than another. Perhaps we need a more concrete definition of 'universe'.

As for determining if the universe is infinite and therefore not a simulation, I am not sure what kind of experiment could be done to even determine such a fact anyways (though I am open to hearing proposals), so it seems like we're lost there too.

My solution solves this problem. Can't be a simulation because things are not simulations (by definition), even if simulated.

Never said you assumed BIVs. I merely used the case of BIVs to demonstrate what I think is a wild assumption with your approach. — Alec

My assumption is no dualism, not necessarily true, but hardly a wild assumption. I consider BIV to be dualism, essentially a mind being fed lies about its true nature.

As far as I see it, the only way for your argument to undermine the simulation argument to work is for you to somehow point out some feature or element about the nature of our understanding of the world (or our experience of it) that cannot in principle be replicated by a computer program.

I'm not undermining the argument. I'm listing additional possibilities than the three listed. I have no problem with a computer program simulating consciousness.

If it can be, then we cannot ascertain whether or not we are looking at a simulation when talking about the world we live in.

This statement presumes that the simulation is the simulated. Not sure if I've driven home the difference. The simulation is a tool for yielding information to the simulator (the creator of the simulation). So if say a human set up and ran a simulation of a bat, the running of the simulation would behave like a bat, but would not impart the human with knowledge of what it is like to be a bat. Meanwhile, the bat in the simulation would know what it is like to be a bat, whether or not the simulation is actually run or not.

Hope this helps.

Of course, this sort of discovery seems as likely as the discovery that there is a feature of our experience that is impossible to replicate, whether by a BIV, or demon, or a vivid dream scenario. Now you may not be alone in thinking this. I believe this is the sort of suggestion made in the "Answering the Skeptic" thread, but as for my own take on it I find it to be a bit too extraordinary for my own liking.

Hence my disclaimer/presumption about experience being essentially a macroscopic physical process. If it isn't, not sure if such simulation is possible, so I'm considering only the case where it is.

Your example deals with a conscious person, but again, I must point out that the simulation argument (as well as the BIV argument) is more about the world we find ourselves in rather than who we are.

The simulation runs on macroscopic rules, and suddenly the simulated guy starts doing non-macroscopic experiments in his simulated lab and the simulation cannot handle that. He'd be able to tell. So the simulation has to be good enough to mimic even that, and at that point I have a hard time agreeing that it is possible even in principle.
Likewise, the simulation needs to be confined somehow, limiting resources. An infinite universe cannot be fully simulated even macroscopically. The simulated guy would possibly notice that he is in the center of a finite place, just like we were centuries ago. So I have a hard time with the assertion that the simulation could be so good that we can't know we're in one.

Well if the odds are not 50/50, then what are they? — XanderTheGrey

You've not defined the problem. The odds of having the best poker hand at a given time is 1/number-of-players, and that does not equate to the odds of winning the hand, but it helps.

What are the odds that the Cubs win the last world Series? Point of view matters a lot in answering a question like that, hence my asking for a problem definition, but I cannot think of a way to word it where the odds work out to 50/50.

You might say we would have to calculate the odds by examining all things that could effect the outcome of the situation; even things that manipulate time and space, and in this case the things that could effect the situation to go in any direction or arive at any outcome are infinite.

Odds calculations are usually an epistemological issue. In the case of a poker hand, the presumption is that the order of the cards in the deck is sufficiently unknown as to be considered functionally random.

I do not know when exactly I took this stance, but yes. I think of it this way; in the bigger picture, considering an infinite time span, infinite space, matter & energy; a being somewhere could win a in gambling every single time it plays(lets say several times a day) for 90 years of its 100 year life. Thats event is a possibility. — XanderTheGrey

OK, no argument with it being a possibility. It is the expressing of the odds of this possible situation as 50/50 that I didn't understand. If you are beginning to question doing so, then I approve.

The problem is, once we start applying your reasoning to things in general, then it seems to amount to us saying that the experiences that we have of an external world cannot be replicated by a simulation or otherwise. That'd be extraordinary indeed, if we can somehow prove definitively that we cannot be brains in vats or living in a vivid dream world. Unfortunately, I think it's more likely that that isn't the case, hence the persistence of skepticism. — Alec

My reasoning assumes no BIV, a separate thing that experiences a sensory stream that is not the same sort of thing that is the experiencer. It assumes (and does not assert) that consciousness is just a physical process, no more. If this is not true, then all rules are off concerning whether a simulation of anything can exist at all.

So given my assumption, it is easily proven that a perfect simulation of some actual state of the universe (say a chosen person) is impossible. But an imperfect one is not, say simulated as a neural-chemical body with a finite world to inhabit. This simulation, being finite and imperfect, would have a different history than the real person who is being modeled, but the simulated person would be conscious (again, given the assumption of consciousness is a physical process, and for the most part, not a quantum process). If the simulation took a scan of my body as part of the initial state, then the simulated person would not know it was not me, but might quickly figure it out if the finite nature of the world is at all obvious.

Now the main part of my point: The simulation need not run at all for the simulated person to be conscious. All that is needed is the initial definition of state and the definition of how the simulation is to proceed from that state. This is what I meant by the fact that 3+3 is equal to 6 even if the arithmetic is not actually performed by some mechanism.

Or that a one in 1million, 1billion, or 1trillion year winning streak dosen't happen to me. — XanderTheGrey

That winning streak happens or it doesn't. 50/50, right? Or am I misunderstanding your stance that you stood by since you were 7?

I think the simulation argument is less about us and more about the world we live in. — Alec

Granted. I must reword then.

This whole set of logic presupposes that what things are is the instantiation, or execution, of whatever physics makes defines. But a simulation of thing X is not an instance of X. X already exists (is defined, and the definition is enough), and the simulation simply imparts some truth about X to whatever is executing the simulation.

That said, there is another presupposition that IS about us and not just things: That what we are is just a physical thing/process and not in need of some immaterial experiencer of the thing X, simulated or otherwise. I agree with that assumption, but it is still an assumption. This sort of groups under item 1: An ancestor simulation is not possible because a simulation of an ancestor is not a full simulation of that ancestor unless there is a way to grant the immaterial experiencer to the simulation. Something like that.

Possibility 5 then: The real world (the one running the simulation) is not a human civilization at all, but a much higher tech thing which can execute simulations of trivial things like a human civilization at will. The simulation need not be a simulation of its native underlying reality. I don't think that scenario is covered in any of your options.
My possibility 4 stands in such a scenario: Such a simulation is not the creation of this reality, but merely an analysis tool to learn about the already-defined reality.

The simulation argument:

1. The fraction of human-level civilizations that reach a posthuman stage (that is, one capable of running high-fidelity ancestor simulations) is very close to zero, or
2. The fraction of posthuman civilizations that are interested in running ancestor-simulations is very close to zero, or
3. The fraction of all people with our kind of experiences that are living in a simulation is very close to one — Michael

If there are more Sims than there are non-Sims then we're more likely to be Sims. — Michael

This whole set of logic presupposes that what we are is the instantiation, or execution, of whatever physics makes us up. But a simulation of thing X is not an instance of X. X already exists (is defined, and the definition is enough), and the simulation simply imparts some truth about X to whatever is executing the simulation.
So the list above leaves off the 4th possibility: that what we are is not the execution of the steps. Is 3+3 not equal to 6 until something performs that arithmetic? There are arguments for both sides of that debate, so I will not present it as truth, just a 4th option.

My thoughts are that I'd like to play poker with you.

Hmmm. What I think we've observed is red shifted galaxies relative to us. It could be that those closest to the centre (we need a centre for a big bang or for a new convergence place) are moving faster than us toward the centre, just as those further from the centre are moving slower relative to us. It would make sense as gravity grows stronger - almost like a singularity toward the centre. — MikeL

If this were so, the red shift would be greatest towards the mass that is pulling everything in since acceleration would be greatest there. Smaller red shift in the opposite, and blue shift in the other 4 directions as things parallel to us all get sucked closer to this mass. This tendency is called tidal force: expansion in 2 dimensions and contraction in the other 4, and is a signature of a strong gravitational field.

As for us or the other galaxies dong the receding, it doesn't matter if it is us or them receding. Those are just different choices of frames. Point is, separation between us is increasing.

I find it reassuring that not any objection to the consensus is blindly accepted. I understand the need for Science to be conservative, and set the bar higher. At the same time, discussions of what seems to be an eternal truth should not be silenced. — Hachem

Challenging accepted view is fine, but doing so without bothering with the work of making some predictions (this idea makes plenty, and they all fail) is not science. Great minds do the work when positing something new. The rest of us get educated.

The universe hasn't changed in terms of physical laws since animal life emerged.
— fdrake
We have no evidence of this one way or another.

Nothing requires consciousness
— fdrake
No evidence one way or another. — Rich

You seem to be unclear on the difference between evidence and proof. Yes, there is no disproof of idealism, but evidence abounds. It is also illogical to debate idealism since you're having a debate with a consciousness that cannot be experienced, and hence doesn't exist.

Probabilistic is not determined. — Rich

Didn't say it was.

There is zero support for determinism.

So you've repeatedly asserted. You are free to deny any evidence that does not convenience your faith.

You and the OP late looking for some hidden variables that are deterministic.

I think hidden variable interpretation is bunk, but it would be an example of deterministic physics if it were the case.

QM reigns and it is probabilistic. Zero determinism. — Rich

Probabilistic is not undetermined. For that matter, determined does not mean determinable.

an intent and subsequent action may have quantum origins but the effect is macro-scale (the world we see, hear and feel) and this world is deterministic.
— TheMadFool

People often say this. They can't, however, model it.

Planning would be pointless if the world weren't predictable.
— TheMadFool

On the contrary: if the world were predictable, there would be no need to plan. — mcdoodle

Agree with TMF here, sort of. The world is for the most part predictable, but that does not in any way imply deterministic.

Planning would indeed be pointless of the world were not predictable. No point in planning if there is zero idea of what's to come. Most life forms are evolved to be excellent predictors despite the imperfect nature of any prediction made. I draw breath not because it benefits me, but I predict it will benefit me in 15 seconds.

If the world were no predictable, planning would be pointless I would think.

You mean, for example, we can derive the laws of motion from QM principles? — TheMadFool

Yes.

I thought for a choice to hold the math has to make sense.

The math makes sense in all of them, else they'd not be valid interpretations, but rather disproved hypotheses.

Fine, then give some evidence for determinism. — Rich

The primary one that drove Einstein which is relativity of simultaneity. There seems to be no ontological status difference between different times of a given object. Is it possible that Napoleon of 1781 does not become emperor and die 40 years later? Quantum theory is oddly mute on this point.
To say that 'it could have happened differently' is very interpretative language and implies that things can be put back into a not-yet-happened state, in violation of the ontological status consistency suggested by Einstein's work.

Of the three more major interpretations of QM, two (hidden variables, no-collapse) are deterministic. But this is evidence only of consistency, not direct evidence for or against determinism.

On a less scientific and more philosophical front: A non-deterministic universe seems in need of creation, meaning it is a byproduct of a larger universe in which it was created, and thus not really a universe at all, but just another object/process among other things. That's a circular inconsistency that is too often dismissed by asserting that is against the rules to question the logical consistency of the parent universe.

Some qestions i have for anyone with environmental and wether sciences knowladge is:

Can the relase of methane cause widespread increase in forrest fires and how does it work? — XanderTheGrey

Have not heard this. Hmm, climate change makes it rain less on certain forests and increase fire risk? This is just a guess.

Can it cuase an increase in hurricanes and or tornadoes and how does it work?

Any global warming makes for warmer oceans, and ocean heat is what fuels hurricanes. Tornadoes is different dynamics, and I don't see a methane connection. Methane or global warming has little effect on conditions of cold air above warmer air.

Will it effect lightning? In what way, and how?

Methane would seem to have no effect on this. Not like concentrations would reach levels where it could ignite.

What temperature can a human being survive at individually?

About 35c skin temperature I'm told.

The standard determinism story (and all if it is just a story) is that if everything is known coupled with the musical Laws of Nature then everything can be known. — Rich

It is trivial to disprove such epistemology even given a simpler natural law that is not probabilistic. Determinism is not a claim of what can be known.

as for determinism zero evidence to support it. — Rich

No proof perhaps, but zero evidence is a pathetic claim. There is in fact quite a bit of evidence for both sides of the debate. You seem to have chosen a side and justify that bias by refusing to acknowledge existence of evidence to the contrary. Cherry picking is always a good way to bolster your biases, but it sucks as a method for real discovery. Embrace contrary evidence and win past it. Hiding from it only demonstrates that you fear to face it.

If you are a determinist, — Rich

Haven't stated my position. Not sure if I have one,
You have a stated faith in God. I suppose that usually necessitates a non-deterministic stance, but said stance is then backed by the faith, not by any evidence.

I guess if everything is unpredictable then there is zero evidence to support determinism. — Rich

And you repeat the mistake again.
Determinism makes no claim of predictability, and lack of predictability is zero evidence against determinism. Is that the 'quite clear' evidence against it?

It just becomes a matter of faith, — Rich

If the evidence was as clear as you claim, it would not be a matter of faith, but rather a matter of holding a belief in a position inconsistent with evidence.

And as science understands the behavior of matter it all probabilistic, which hopefully answers the OP. — Rich

It does answer the OP, but the OP wasn't about determinism. I'm saying that your dragging that into the conversation was irrelevant to the subject at hand.

Determinists? You know, all those who believe that everything is fated ever since the Big Bang blew its top. — Rich

They don't claim predictability though, and your arguments are against that perceived claim of predictability.

In any case, science is quite clear, there is no determinism though it doesn't stop scientists and educators from perpetuating the belief.

What 'clear' evidence have you against the determinism aspect? The fact that we can't predict things (trivial, isolated systems for instance)?
For that matter, what evidence is laid out there FOR determinism, that it would be perpetuated as fact as you say is done?

If course. Old ideas die hard. There is no such thing as precise prediction of anything. — Rich

Who is clinging to these old ideas of perfect predictability? Anybody who knows their mathematics, never mind their physics?
Or is your stance that lack of predictability implies lack of determinism that you so spit against?

Materialists-Determinists who view themselves as objective scientists seem to have a very difficult time with their faith. — Rich

Materialist-Determinist is a philosophical stance, not a scientific one. Science does not depend on the stance, even if some scientists hold the stance in faith, as you do whatever yours might be.

Quantum physics, which I don't understand, aside, the world on the human scale (macroscopic world?) is governed by fixed natural laws of matter, energy and force. — TheMadFool

Quite the opposite. Natural law is derived from QM, not the other way around.

Even the roll of a dice or the toss of a coin are governed by laws of mechanics.

In a pure Newtonian set of physical rules, this is true.

I've heard that, for instance, radioactive decay is objectively a chance thing - which atom will decay is entirely random (so they say).

QM does not say it this way. This is interpretive language, which you are free to use, but such language is not QM.

He is restating a 17th century philosophical faith that someday science will discover the Laws of Nature that will enable scientists to predict everything. — Rich

Even in hard deterministic universe without QM, such predictability is easily disproved. Inability to predict has nothing to do with determinism or lack of it. You seem pretty bent on a different stance.

I'm saying that probability is deeply linked to ignorance. The process by which we conclude whether or not a certain process/thing is probabilistic or not is exclusion.

What I mean is, first, we assume the existence of a general law that governs a process. If we find one, we name the law and express it mathematically. Only if not, are we warranted to think the process/entity is probabilistic. — TheMadFool

Wait, what if the law above is a probabilistic one? It means the mathematical model has probability baked in. Interpretation of that model on the other hand is open. There are multiple consistent (valid) interpretations, and if it is meaningful that one of them is more correct, then that's where the ignorance comes in: There is no way to choose among valid interpretations, so the typical course of action is to choose based on what you want to be true.

Mr. Reductionist says that the actions and behaviors of anything in that ecosystem can be explained by the motions of its constituent particles, since it's all made of matter anyway. — Pneumenon

While I do think the situation can be reduced to particle physics, at no point in that view is there a 'thing' which does an 'action'. There is never a definition of a fist or the anger that drives it. I voted for talking past each other.

I voted substantive mainly because you seem to have ruled it out by setting up the idea that an ecosystem is equivalent to a bunch of billiard balls. So the image you provoke in my mind is of a deterministic system, such as life-game. In such a world, glider guns, gliders, and all the myriad more complex constructions are strictly reducible to the deterministic laws. In such a world, Mr Irreductionist is simply wrong, and the disagreement is substantial.

On the other hand, if the world is not deterministic, Mr reductionist is simply wrong. — unenlightened

The lack of determinism seems to have little impact on reductionist particle descriptions of an ecosystem. OK, in neither the reductionist nor the holistic view can future states be determined, but absent agency from outside the ecosystem (which would be information actually leveraged from the dice rolling), behavioral states seem to follow the classic predictable rules of billiard balls. The only quantum amplifiers I know about are those in physics labs.

Will try to take the time to watch that. Would prefer a transcript.
<edit> Will be looking through the atlantic link instead. Far better.

I tend to agree with the base concept: The world as we see it is effectively mind-derived naive realism, and the thing-in-itself behind snakes and trains bears pretty much unrecognizable correspondence to the 'desk icons' that are our representations of them.

But I draw no dualism conclusions from this. Mind still seems to be a physical process supervening on this thing-in-itself matter. I see no reason to suppose that mind is special in this sense. A machine observer would have the same naive realist view, even if it comes from the biases put there by its programmer instead of evolution. I want to see Hoffman's take on that to see what conclusions are drawn on this front.

Found a pretty comprehensive article on the problem. Goes on for 5 pages and leaves few stones unturned, including the accretion suggested this thread posits. Also higher Earth spin (shorter day) and all sorts of physical and not necessarily biological explanations. So looking only to the biologists might indeed not be the right thing.

It considers a different gravitational constant G, and doesn't reject it for enough reasons. If G was less back then, the Earth would be cold because it would be much further from the sun. The author seems unaware of that part, but at least is unwilling propose such a fundamental hit to physics.

Some interesting points: The descendents of dinosaurs are birds, most of which are already far less dense than water. Maybe the dinos had that as well and simply didn't mass as much as would an alligator that size.

In the end, a pretty plausible explanation relates to the know small variance in temperature between various latitudes back then. The poles were nearly as warm as anywhere else, suggesting a much more dense atmosphere which would buoy up the large creatures. Maybe Earth was more like Venus back then. What evidence do we have against that? Such a suggestion implies we're losing atmosphere quickly and there won't be much left after not too long. They already predict the oceans will be gone soon, but I thought it more from a warming sun than from just losing it all to space.

I did acknowledge that earlier in the thread. It remains mysterious, however, why the mega-fauna of that age was so much bigger than anything that exists today. Some of the brachiopods weighed as much as today's whales. I was wondering if there is any global change that might explain this disparity. — Wayfarer

So look to the biologists for answers. As a side note, I visited the Alaskan rain forest and also a small patch of woods just outside that zone which we dubbed 'honey I shrunk the kids'. Many plants were recognizable (the same ones I have at home), but about 4x the size I normally see. The dandelions stood about a meter high for instance.

Concerning gravity: Of the eight planets, five of them (including Earth) have pretty similar gravity, but the closest one to us is Saturn, despite massing over 100x as much. So additional mass alone does not necessarily translate to a weight difference. Mars and Mercury weight are almost identical at 3/8 Earth, and Jupiter is in a class by itself at 2.5x.

2. Then, according to Gödel’s theorem, F cannot prove its own consistency.
3. We, as human beings, can see that F is consistent.
4. Therefore, since F captures our reasoning, F could prove that F is consistent. — deepideas

3 is worded entirely differently. You've not stated that F cannot see that F is consistent, nor that humans can prove that F is consistent. So nothing seems to have been demonstrated at all. Line 4 does not follow at all.

Perhaps you can restate your steps using consistent terms.
I did not read linked page. The argument posted here thus far has not enticed me to do so.

All the responses so far seem to revolve around a good-female partner.
In absence of her suitability as a partner, what might be meant by a 'good woman'?

↪noAxioms

The first, and best-known, ontological argument was proposed by St. Anselm of Canterbury in the 11th. century C.E. In his Proslogion, St. Anselm claims to derive the existence of God from the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived. St. Anselm reasoned that, if such a being fails to exist, then a greater being—namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived, and which exists—can be conceived. But this would be absurd: nothing can be greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived. So a being than which no greater can be conceived—i.e., God—exists
— Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I'm thinking conceive = imagine

Am I wrong still? What's the difference between ''conceive'' and ''imagine''? — TheMadFool

I stand corrected. It really was about an imaginary or conceptual god.
From a strictly logical standpoint, the argument seems to fall apart since it references an existing god, and the nonexisting one does not meet the criteria specified. In effect, the argument seems to say that if God doesn't exist, he wouldn't be God, and the conflict stated isn't conflicting at all.

From a modal logic point of view, a world in which there is this god would be consistent, and a world in which there is not this god is also consistent. The argument seems to be a simple tautology. St Anselm tried to argue that the later world is inconsistent there because the nonexistent god did not meet the existing-god requirement.

To state that God is the greatest being imaginable is to state up front that God is imaginary. Surely an existing god would be greater than the limits of our imagination.

I don't think you got the argument right. I don't think it was built around imagination like that. Try to restate it.

When we hear that a certain experiment 'proves relativity' we get the impression that scientists are one step closer to establishing relativity as absolute reality. — FreeEmotion

What do you mean by 'proves reality' and which scientific finding lays this claim?
It sounds like a philosophical assertion, and you're hearing one person's asserted interpretation of some particular finding, and not what the experiment actually demonstrates.

So in the above example, it is possible to synchronize clocks, and it is possible to measure the one way speed of light? — FreeEmotion

Given an arbitrary choice of frame, yes, this measurement can be done.
Given a different frame choice, the chock synchronization would be different and therefore the time between the same two events E1 and E2 would be different, but the spatial distance between them would be different as well, so the measurement of light speed would still come out the same each time.

I'm curious what percentage accuracy? — FreeEmotion

Within 10% error

If we have the spatial separation between events E1 and E2, and know the times at E1 and E2, we can calculate the light speed. (not measure?). Why assume it a constant when we are trying to measure it in the first place? — FreeEmotion

This can be done, but the synchronization of the two clocks is frame dependent. For that matter, so is the distance measurement since E1 and E2 are not simultaneous.

Now I know that the clocks need to be synchronized, or the other option is slowly moved apart.

If we are able to have control over how fast the clocks are moved apart, we can establish the error bounds due to non-synchronization and take this into account.

Slowly moving apart doesn't necessarily work. You start at a midpoint and move the two clocks symmetrically in opposite directions. That defines a frame, but the two clocks stay synchronized despite the speed at which this might be done. Now you can measure your light speed. Painful way to do it, but valid.

Why "compute" and not "measure"? — FreeEmotion

If you use synchronized clocks, it is a measurement. If I know light speed, I can compute the time and don't need the clocks. But synchronization is frame dependent.

All the thought experiments you reference assume as a postulate that light speed is constant. None of the thought experiments involve the measurement of it. I have performed a light-speed measurement in a lab exercise using the length of a hallway and only an RPM meter as my clock. We got about one digit of accuracy with that setup.