I was thinking:
a) 7 is a number, same as 8. To say 7 is prime or 8 is even is to state some knowledge that describes properties of these numbers. As product of knowledge, what it is to be a prime number, has no effect on their assumed 'ontology' — Cavacava

I am not referring to knowledge of the structure, but rather the objective (independent of knowledge or observation) reality of the structure. Is the structure of the set of primes dependent on knowledge of it? Quite possibly so it seems, even if that makes it an idealistic distinction, But seven being a prime is true regardless of said knowledge.

b) The set of primes is separate from the rest of the sets of numbers, yet what it excludes both limits it and helps define the set.

Point taken. The structure of whole numbers would need to exist to give meaning to the primes and the numbers that are not. The primes exist as part of that set, and that set part of rational numbers and so forth in a sort of heirarchy of supersets. Is there a bottom to that? Is our universe just a member of (an actuality in) some larger structure of things (like inflation bubbles for instance)? My question still stands then about that superset, unless there is no bottom to the regression.

c) To say the universe is this or that, is not viciously circular, since we have no independent viewpoint.

Hence my choice of a structure other than this universe we know. I am not a member of that structure (I am not a prime), so I have sort of an independent viewpoint of it. Similarly, inflation theory posits all these different universes with different tunings of the various cosmological constants, and in almost all of them, they have the wrong number of macro dimensions or wrong forces for anything coherent like matter to form. They cannot be observed, do not exist in any sense of the term 'now', yet it would seem to be a violation of consistency for them not to share our own ontological status.

Is this about existential quantification?

If so, then to exist is to be an element in the domain of discourse; roughly, to exist is to be spoken of. — Banno

I had not meant it to be about existential quantification, but my attempts to sort this out come to this quite a bit: I have a base aversion to idealism, so I stay away from statements implying observation or discourse being the thing distinguishing an objectively actual structure (maybe that's a better word than 'set') from a non-actual one. But it comes up a lot, sort of a circular ontology of mind supervening on the material, but the ontology of the material somehow supervening on that observation.
Sorry about that statement. I can barely parse it myself. Language fails me trying to express this issue.

Russell's paradoxes show the deficiencies of set theoretical interpretations of first order schemes.

I should give em a look.

How could any entity that was actually actual - ie: a materially individuated form - not be individuated within a world. Where would this material thing be? How could it be considered individuated except by virtue of a context of all that which it is not? — apokrisis

I'm talking about what makes the world actual, not some member of it. And I'm certainly not talking about 'material things', which is just how things manifest themselves to us in this particular world.

What distinguishes and actual world from a potential one? Even a potential world is individuated by virtue of what it is not, so individuation seems not to be the distinction.

↪noAxioms If we are talking about actual things in a world then the essential difference is that the possible forms are materialised. We are speaking of substantial being. — apokrisis

You miss my point. I am not talking about things that are actual in a world (or more plainly, are members of the set of things in that world/universe/container), I am talking about things that are actual period. What does it mean, ontologically, that that container itself is actualized, and not just potential. Let's assume it is not a container/universe to which we have access, to prevent idealism from defining its actuality. So not asking how we could know it is actualized, just what the actualization would mean to the set in question of which the actual-things are members.

It would be usual to distinguish between every thing potential and every thing actual. — apokrisis

So what would it mean for something to be 'actual'? I could think of no objective way to frame that answer. Best I could do is "the thing is a member of set such and such". The set of all existing (actual) things is a circular definition, and thus useless. The set of all sets is similarly without distinction of any kind.

So for instance, Earth is a member of the set of physical objects in the universe of which we are aware. I don't want to take the idealistic stance and say that Earth's existence is dependent on our awareness of it, but without the reference point of our awareness, in what way can it be said that Earth is 'actual'?

There is doubt, therefore the doubt is actual. Really? How would the same doubt be any different if it was merely potential?

We can test the term by attempting to find a particular that fits into the category of the term that everyone agrees with, and another particular that fits outside the category. — Samuel Lacrampe

Wait, everybody has to agree with it? Don't remember that being a requirement. I have personally found some math problems to be cute, and I can find an exception to the hamster thing as well, even if I'm not that exception.

Anyway, you seem to be driving for the language definition of 'life' (or the language 'essence' of anything else), which is pretty easy since there is but one example, and you're related to it or not. The way the word is used in common language is of no use when trying to decide if something new is life or not.

Perhaps it is because of weight of evidence for the other side as well, and your refusal to acknowledge that.

Nevertheless, it seems that our views often not held because of rational reasoning. I personally have found some of my own biases well grounded, despite 'knowing' that they are false. I continue to hold to them. But at least I stopped rationalizing them.

Better example: A hamster is cute. A math exam is not. Therefore the essence of 'cute' exists. — Samuel Lacrampe

So what is the essence of 'essence'? What doesn't have essence?
You just seems to be asserting that every adjective or noun in the language has an essence, and the proof you give is needless given that assertion.

Not quite. From the point of view of special relativity, as analysed with respect to an inertial frame, only the scalar speed along the tangent of the trajectory, and not the acceleration, is relevant to the ratio of time dilation of a moving clock. — Pierre-Normand

Yes, but look at it from the perspective of the edge. According to SR, a clock on the edge, in its own frame, is stationary and thus runs faster, not slower, than the moving clock at the center. But that frame is not maintained for even a moment, so SR doesn't really apply. The change of reference frame, and thus the change of the instant with which the center-clock is simultaneous, is what makes the center clock steadily gain time, not lose it. The effect is a moment-of-acceleration thing: acceleration component multiplied by the distance of the reference object in the direction of said acceleration component.

I had written an example once of time dilation (twins-experiment, sort of) that involved no acceleration or gravity, and hence needed to invoke only SR rules. Despite a clock in an unpowered ship being stationary in its own frame, it shows how the sum of the times for a trip log less cumulative time than a moving clock that is always running slower. I could post that if you're interested. I cannot illustrate the disk thing with just SR since the edge clocks never maintain any particular IRF.

Isn't linear speed synonymous to tangential speed in this case? I'm not convinced that the spatial distance between the clocks located away from the centre of the disk would change considering that we don't even know whether the disk itself is Born rigid. — TimeLine

Yes, linear speed (in the frame of center) is tangential speed and is constant, and the spatial distance from the center is fixed, since they're all welded to this disk and have really no choice about it. The radius should remain constant for the duration of the experiment.

The clock nearest the disk center will most closely match the reference clock since it is pretty much stationary. Time dilation has nothing to do with rotational speed. The ones at the edge will have the least elapsed time because those are accelerating the most.

This experiment has already been done, using Earth as the disk.

What would you say any of this implies about how spacetime is structured and how I should know which frame is at rest? — JulianMau

There is no such thing as 'the frame that is at rest'.

More interesting: If the disk is manufactured already spinning and infinitely rigid, spatial dilation will occur at the edges, so the circumference of the disk would be more than Pi times the radius. The disk cannot slow down because that would change the circumference, and that cannot happen due to it being infinitely rigid. So it can't stop. Unlimited energy source! Of course this only illustrates the absurdity of positing an infinitely rigid thing.

Being able to remember and recognize red sounds like knowledge. We do use know to mean experiential in addition to propositional knowledge. — Marchesk

I also found that solution to be thin. I did not gain knowledge that Atlanta is the capitol of Georgia, I just gained the skill of remembering it.

However, any theory of mind which allows for multiple realizability seems to be perfectly compatible with the notion that particular mental states tightly correlate with particular physical states (by supervenience, emergence, or whatever), and that said mental states could also be realized in another medium. — Arkady

I was thinking of the identity of those mental states. I feel like I have a persistent identity (being the same person I was a minute ago, despite a different physical state back then, and being the same person I was when I was 4, despite a nearly complete lack of the original matter of which I was then composed). So how am I not already swampman? What has happened in that thought-experiment that has not happened to me? All that's missing is an unverifiable causal connection between the one version of 'me' and the present state.

A putative observer introduces a point of reference, with respect to which some predicates will differ, e.g. left/right. — SophistiCat

There seems to be no distinction between left and right. If there were, the universe would not be symmetrical. Hard to imagine that, but would there be some sort of inability to count the spheres without breaking the symmetry, and thus actually making two distinct spheres? The definition says they're one thing, and I cannot find a way to dispute that.

Is this true, though? A person may possibly believe that mental states, while themselves immaterial, nevertheless supervene on physical states (or are otherwise emergent from them). In that case, the physical duplicate would still possess the same mental states. — Arkady

I think that anybody that expects to take their memories (and thus any sort of identity at all) into what they hope to be an afterlife cannot take a stance of memory supervening on physical states. Claims of OoB experiences rest on memory and sensory input operating independently of the physical apparatus of brain and sense organs. The world (thing in itself) is really how it appears experientially. Anyway, a person holding to such beliefs might suggest a fundamental difference between swampman and his original. The thought-experiment suggests no answer to the question.

Perhaps a sort of thoroughgoing substance dualist might deny that there is any connection between the mental and the physical, but I don't see how that view can be plausibly maintained once we accept some basic metaphysical assumptions (e.g. that there are material bodies) and scientific observations (e.g. that memories are neurologically encoded in the brain in some fashion, by long-term potentiation or whatever the exact mechanism is, and mental states at the very least correlate in some fashion with the physical state of one's brain).

I hear ya.

As to plausibility:
To scan a person exactly would violate Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Matter can be (and has been) teleported, but not scanned for copying. On the other, the copy probably doesn't need to be exact to the quantum level. Any arrangement of molecules in the same places would suffice, so the molecular 3D printer at sufficient granularity to make an indistinguishable copy is not a violation of physics.

That said, everybody takes their own answers into the swampman story, so the thought experiment doesn't really illustrate anything. Arkady: You assume an exact physical copy would have all the memories, as do I, but somebody that argues for memory being part of immaterial state would disagree. So the thought experiment fails to resolve the issue for which it was posited.

That doesn't mean there is no use for thought-experiments. Some eventually suggest empirical tests, and others simply don't apply to humans, but do apply to other beings. What is it like to be cloned? Humans have no memory of it, and I can't ask the things that are. Our society and law is based heavily on the assumption that it cannot be done, or at least cannot be remembered. So I rely on thought experiments to work out the alternate rules, until I find consistent answers.

A key "culprit" is the Twin earth experiment. Some people already think "Internalism" versus "Externalism" is a non issue which adds to its problems. But alot of the premises in the experiment are dubious such as someone on Twin Earth having identical mental states despite the human body consisting of a lot of water (H20) which means Twin humans body would consist largley of XYZ making any identical states implausible. — Andrew4Handel

Agree, it is implausible, but still immaterial (pun intended) to the point of the experiment. So what if the twin Earth were antimatter? Now the chemistry is identical, and so are the mental states. The thought experiment now is valid, even after each side discovers the atomic structure of water.

Also I have mentioned a problem with counterfactuals so in this case, and others, the existence of these planets (or aliens) is highly unlikely or non existent.

It seems that the existence of a twin Earth (real water, not XYZ) is a certainty given that there is only a finite set of states of matter in a finite space (a Hubble Sphere for instance), and that space is infinite. Max Tegmark computed an upper limit to the distance to the nearest such twin, but elimination of unnatural states (aluminum cube planets, humans with memory of a different sky than what they see) puts the actual distance much closer.

Finally, what requirement is there for the plausibility of a thought-experiment if the implausible part does not interfere with the point? If there was no Prof Knut Nordby, would the Mary's Room thought-experiment be less valid? Such thought experiments seem the only way to explore subjectivity.

Define inanimate. What is its essence? :) — apokrisis

Not animate. Duhhh...

It doesn't in any direct way. We got side tracked by you claiming that the essence of A and B must exist for the law of non-contradiction to be applicable. I refute this by claiming that we only need consistency and not essence for it. If we agree to this, then my first premise in the argument to prove that essences exist stands: "Either a being is a living being or a non-living being. It cannot be both." — Samuel Lacrampe

Let me try this logic out. Suppose I try to nail down the essence of 'cute'. I pick an arbitrary way to sort things into two heaps: A thing is cute if it masses more than a KG. So I am cute, but this pebble is not. There is at least one thing in each heap, therefore there must be an essence of cute. Somehow the proof seems invalid. Your 'bald' criteria (admittedly not the actual essence) is more a description of alopecia, not bald.

Maybe "circular" was the wrong word; my bad. Nevertheless, it sounds like you demand to know X in order to prove X using the law of non-contradiction.

That X exists, not that it is known. If it doesn't exist, then there is no definite is-life or not sorting, and your first premise fails. Not talking about our ability to know or not, but an actual indeterminate state of some thing being life or not. Without the essence, there is no fact of the matter, and no contradiction by something being in that questionable state.

I invoke Aristotle's theory of abstraction: We all have in ourselves the implicit knowledge of terms such as 'living' and 'non-living'. This is so by our years of sense observation of the world. — Samuel Lacrampe

And we have but one example from all our sense observation. Our implicit knowledge concerns only that one example. Intuitions will not serve us for the general case as we attempt to recognize the second example.

This implicit knowledge is what enables us to use the terms correctly in everyday language, even if we don't have the explicit definition of all the terms used. Thus a 10-year old can have a meaningful conversation without ever having read a dictionary. Finding the essence of terms is simply acquiring explicit knowledge based on our implicit knowledge. I think our implicit knowledge that a dog is living and a rock is non-living is pretty grounded.

Read the NASA link that Banno posted. Dr Cleland speaks speaks directly about this. We are unconcerned with the 'definition of life', which would be a description of how the word is used in our language, and by said 10-year-old. What we're seeking in this thread is what she calls a "scientific theory of life" which seeks to define a set of rules for the more general case. Common language usage is of zero importance to what NASA does.

I notice that in that article, no attempt is made to set out any rules or traits or other progression towards this essence.

I disagree. The only criteria is consistency in A and consistency in B in the law of non-contradiction. You don't need to find the real essence of "bald" but merely need a consistent definition, such as "no hair anywhere on the head". In this case, "I am bald" and "I am not bald" are mutually exclusive. Therefore only consistency and not the essence in the terms is needed to apply the law of non-contradiction. — Samuel Lacrampe

OK, you've selected that arbitrary criteria of which I spoke (not exactly since we've not defined where 'the head' stops, but let's define that as the smallest cross section of the neck, which works for humans at least). How does this arbitrary selection provide evidence that there is an actual essence of 'bald'? Never mind the fact that the criteria sorts all of humanity into the not-bald side, so the distinction must be pretty meaningless.

If no absolute criteria is known (fuzzy fact), then you can't invoke the law of contradiction to prove that there is in fact an absolute criteria.
— noAxioms
Your statement is circular.

How so?

Are you asking why finding the essence of life is important? I personally find the topic interesting; that is why I am here. Why are you here if you don't find the topic important?

Interesting yes, but the topic can be discussed without needing to know that there is or is not an actual 'essence'.

- There exists an instance where a being is clearly labelled as living and another instance where a being is clearly labelled non-living: e.g. a dog and a rock. — Samuel Lacrampe

About this one: No 'essence' (in quotes because I dislike applying the term here) has been established, so the example is not a clear one. There are those that have argued on these forums that rocks are an example of life, or that dogs are not. I may not agree with these positions, but I have no rule which I can apply to prove either of them wrong.

Furthermore, it seems like an easy cop out for someone to dismiss a logical argument simply on the grounds that he does not believe in the essence of the terms used. — Samuel Lacrampe

If there is no solid truth value to some proposition, it is not a logical (boolean) argument, but rather a fuzzy one. "I am bald" and "I am not bald" can both be true since there is no agreed upon theory of bald.

I think it still does due to premise 2. Here is an analogy: We know country X exists because we know someone from country X. We also know country Y exists because we know someone from country Y. This is enough to deduce that a separation or border exists between countries X and Y. — Samuel Lacrampe

What's this got to do with it? For one, the existence of a person who is "from" (born in? Raised? Citizen?) country X is not proof of the continued existence of X. Furthermore, the logic made no statement that all countries occupy disjoint geographical regions (and there are indeed counter examples), so no conclusion about their separation can be drawn at all.

My example was for one hard or fuzzy fact, like a person is from X, or a person is not from X. The law of contradiction can only be applied if there is an absolute (hard) criteria to determine "is from X", whether or not you want to invoke the word 'essence' in all that. If no absolute criteria is known (fuzzy fact), then you can't invoke the law of contradiction to prove that there is in fact an absolute criteria.

Why is it important? You've never answered that. Suppose we find something that most people agree is life. What then? Does it require a plaque? Does it become a crime to wipe it out (genocide), or interfere with it (prime directive)? There are no such obligations right now, so it isn't important, at least not yet.

Premise 1 is not based on the conclusion, but on the law of non-contradiction: the two propositions "A is B" and "A is not B" are mutually exclusive. This is known with certainty even if we don't know what A and B mean. — Samuel Lacrampe

We've been over this in prior posts. Law of non-contradiction does not hold without a hard definition of the essence, so invoking the law presupposes the conclusion that there is such an essence. Dr Cleland brings the subject up using 'bald' as the example.

Yes, one could arbitrarily make up such a rule, and then be able to classify anything as life or not-life, but what has that proven? That is not the essence of life, it is just an arbitrary rule that sorts things into two buckets. It does not prove the existence of an essence.

I see what you're saying, but your proof is circular:

This may be the end result. But at least I think I can prove that the essence of life exists:
- Either a being is a living being or a non-living being. It cannot be both. — Samuel Lacrampe

That postulate presupposes the conclusion. Any proof based on this is begging.

I mean that a dog is clearly labelled as a living thing, and a rock is clearly labelled as a non-living thing. You misunderstand the point. It is that there are things that fit in each label. — Samuel Lacrampe

You pick two easy ones. Pick something on the line like a biological virus and a computer virus that does random signature changes. The label is not so clear. If one is life and not the other, what makes that distinction besides the bias that the biological one is a 'closer relative to me'?

Yeah I admit I don't understand what the term "semiosis" means (process that involves signs?). — Samuel Lacrampe

There must be data which allows it to persist improvements made. Fire doesn't have that. Plenty of non-living things do, so the feature is not sufficient.

- Either a being is a living being or a non-living being. It cannot be both.

Cannot agree with it. The line is fuzzy, so something can be questionably on either side.

- There exists an instance where a being is clearly labelled as living and another instance where a being is clearly labelled non-living: e.g. a dog and a rock.

Don't understand this one. A rock is not a dead dog, and would a dog not qualify as life if I could not produce a dead one?
If you mean a dog is living compared to the rock, the label seems to have already been applied for the rule to have meaning, so it does not help narrow the essence you seek.

For any rule, it seems to take little effort to conceive of an exception. The conclusion seems to be a theory that avoids strict rules.

This:

https://www.nasa.gov/vision/universe/starsgalaxies/life%27s_working_definition.html

Especially the first question to Dr. Cleland. — Banno

Brief, but I like it. The author of the article (identified only as 'magazine staff') seems not to entirely understand the subject, giving this statement:
"For example, a crystal can grow, reach equilibrium, and even move in response to stimuli, but lacks what commonly would be thought of as a biological nervous system."
Lack of something serving as a nervous system is what disqualifies a crystal as life. Hmm...

Anyway, the article is about the theory of what life is, but only one question touches on that, the other ones being about the origins of the one example we know. Dr Cleland hits on many of the points discussed in this thread, and warns against any hard criteria to use in the identification of life since it seems pretty easy to come up with a counter-example of any rule. My favorite quote is her last one:
"Merely defining "life" in such a way that it incorporates one's favorite non-traditional "living" entity does not at all advance this project."
I think I have observed that. Several of us have tried to pinpoint an essence, and the attempts indeed seem not to have advanced the project. I notice Dr Cleland does not offer even a hint of a description of this scientific theory of life. We need one, but we don't have one, and probably cannot have one until we have several other examples under our belt. Our current same size of 1 is insufficient.

...In which she criticuzes the limitations of mere language as inadequate to the tasks of biologists. — Wayfarer

In which she criticizes the term 'definition' of life, as opposed to 'scientific theory' of life. Asking for a definition is not to ask what the thing is, but merely how the word is used in one particular language.
I need to remember that in other discussions.

characterised by the ability to metabolise nutrients, respond to stimuli, mature, reproduce, and adapt to the environment through semiosis. — Galuchat

This may answer my previous question. But would that not make a fire a living thing much like a cell? Note, this seems to be the position of some people in this discussion. I am on the edge on that one; and yet I cannot seem to find a clear difference between a cell and a fire. — Samuel Lacrampe

Fire seems not to meet the last one. I don't particularly agree with the list, since I can think of exceptions to the other four items, but semiosis alone seems not enough. I have bailed on attempting to define an essence, and leave it a call to be made on a case-by-case basis. Undoubtedly we will not always recognize life when encountered, and will classify some things as life that really shouldn't be.

Where do you look, in order to determine that metabolism and replication are necessary and sufficient for life?

Presumably, at things that are alive.

It follows that you already know which things are alive before you set out this posited essence. — Banno

This works fine when we have essentially one instance of life and everything that evolved from it. But as Bitter Crank pointed out, we cannot wield our common usage intuition when we go to Mars and decide if something is life. A formal set of guidelines would really help, but it also must be flexible. Such guidelines are probably not forthcoming until we have several examples to compare (as opposed to the one we know now) and we have a reasonable data set from which common traits might begin to stand out. Who knows, it might turn out that we don't qualify ourselves.

Life is the property of a living thing which distinguishes it as alive rather than not alive; if it has life it is alive. Would could you possibly mean by "the virus has life, but it is not alive"? That seems completely contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

Posted the difference earlier.

A dead cow in a field is an example of life, but is not alive. A live cow might still be created from one, but not the same cow. My clock is alive, but is not life. Alive just means the parts are currently operating (not broken, and not completely dormant). It is a fuzzy definition of 'alive', sure. You might choose to apply the term only to a life form (cow) that might be dead or alive, but the term seems to work for non-living things.

From this information, I see only two logically possibilities for the original cause:
1. random event from nature, despite the improbability
2. not-random event, that is, intelligent design — Samuel Lacrampe

Second one is disqualified, because if a particular instance is designed, it is not original cause.
I personally suspect Earth life originated elsewhere and fell from the cosmos, but that doesn't solve the problem, it just gives you a lot more diverse places and conditions where the original improbable dice roll came up lucky, and was perhaps more probable.

Is a virus alive then? — apokrisis

I differentiated the terms. I would have said the virus is life, but it is not alive since it has no functioning parts most of the time.
So a computer virus would be life, but not necessarily alive. A full self-contained machine-organism responsible for all aspects of maintenance and persistence I guess would be alive. Suppose we dropped such entities on a planet without biology, and they lost their original task and just evolved from there. They'd eventually evolve to wonder about their own origins and would consider it obvious that at some point a most basic form was a spontaneous accident.

I think the appropriate question is, could viruses replicate sans life? As far as I know the answer to that is 'no'. — Wayfarer

Humans also cannot replicate sans life. We have much more of the machinery of replication built into us, and are 'alive' in the sense that we function in some entropic way. But I am just as dependent on the external machinery (or at least the byproducts of it) as the virus. Apo did point out a clear distinction of dependence on the machinery itself vs us being dependent on the byproducts only.

A human can be both alive and suicidal at the same time; they're not mutually exclusive, which is the minor point I tried to make. — VagabondSpectre

Yes, and sterile as you point out. Defective examples of life are still life.

It has to do with the way the data is organized. The way data in the human brain is organized itself facilitates the mechanical extrapolation and development of consciousness. The way data contained in DNA is organized within the nucleus of a cell is what itself provides mechanical intelligent instruction to the rest of the cell.

I think 'intelligence' is about as fuzzy a term as 'life' or 'unnatural', 'intent' and 'consciousness' and we should avoid the terms. Apo has the right term. Semiotics is the difference between the data in DNA and the data in rocks.

Fire is not life, it's a chemical reaction we call combustion. It doesn't anticipate it's environment, it consumes it as fuel. It doesn't display intelligence or behave in a manner conducive to it's survival. It chaotically consumes what is available to it and then is extinguished in a predictable manner.

You just described humans. The difference seems again to be the semiotics. Yes, I agree that fire is not life.

Bacteria can swap genes (such as genes coding antibiotic resistance) between members of mixed species colonies.

This one is pretty cool, bordering on the benefit we get from sex.
Much of your list shows that it isn't entirely remarkable at all that multicellular life forms evolved.

And that is why a virus seems troubling. We can't really talk about it as an "it" because it is not self-sustaining in that minimal fashion. It is a bare message that hijacks other machinery. — apokrisis

I am also not self sustaining, hijacking the machinery of plants to harvest solar energy. Nothing is completely self-contained, so I don't see the issue with viruses. They have the semiotics and sufficient machinery to live off of their environment, which is other cellular life.

Likewise the computer virus seems to be life, living off the machinery, but not containing that machinery itself any more than I contain the machinery to photosynthesize. Fire on the other hand is not life. No semiotics that I can see.

The biologists have a pretty good definition, and it applies to non-biological forms.

Also, 'tall' should always be relative to X if we want to say something that is objective and accurate.

Now I agree that in an everyday conversation, people may say "He is tall" (with no relation). — Samuel Lacrampe

There must always be a relation to an X, and there is no objective X. It seems always contextual. In everyday conversation, "He is tall" references a context-dependent X. The relation is there, else the statement is meaningless. The X is indeed probably fuzzy, making it more also a function of opinion, but my point is that there is always an X, and X is not objective.

I am considered tall (probably over 80% of all humans, so there's one plausible X: a certain unstated percentile of height over some implied reference class), yet the pin-oak in my yard is twice my height and is not tall at all. Different context, so different X, both of them fuzzy in this case. I can't think of a non-fuzzy case where X is not explicitly stated.

Your title does not describe your OP, as Pneumenon points out. Why be moral? Because it's the right thing to do. It's that easy, and by definition.

As to the distinction between there being objective truth to any particular rule, there is none so long as there is no way to detect the rule. So it matters only if the nature of what you are is of the sort that can be held accountable in some objective way to said rule, and if the rule is conveyed in some way.

As an example, suppose the universe consists of integer math expressions, and the objective morality is to have an even number result. 1+3 is moral, but 8-5 is not. Is there a distinction that makes a difference to those equations? Well, it matters only if 1+3 has objective existence outside my universe set (I can remove it from the universe and consign it to a good or bad place, and it would care about this), and if the fact of the immorality of an odd result is conveyed to them while still in the expression universe (how would either know?), and if those equations have the free will to alter their result. The physicalist denies all three, and the theist claims all three. 8-5 was conveyed the morality in question, and is given the free will to let 8-5=4 against its physical nature, thus earning its way into the good place after 8-5 is removed from the expression-universe. The distinction is there, but not in this universe.

As for killing babies, the example is skewed by argument from emotion. Pick something less clouded by emotion to look for truth. It is easy to argue for the morality of killing babies if you can get past the emotional implications. There are plenty of species that are fit partly because they do exactly that.

I'm just pointing out that the intention to procreate or go on living is not present in all examples of life. These examples of life die, but they continue to crop up. — VagabondSpectre

The elimination of unfit members is natural selection in action. The species itself would die out if suicide was a general trait. My definition of life included persistence, so I have to disagree. Humanity as a whole is something that tends to persist. Humanity is an example of life. I also don't think there is intention involved, but you're free to apply that word to what a tulip does.

By "perpetuate" do you mean "reproduce/procreate"? — VagabondSpectre

No. If it can perpetuate without procreation (just be sufficiently immortal), it can be life. Perhaps creation of competitors is not in its best interest. Procreation is just one way to achieve this, and it is a far more efficient way to speed evolution, so that method tends to get selected over the more evolution-resistant method of immortality. It is harder (but certainly not impossible) to make improvements to an individual than to a species.
Yes, life tends to die. Something that is immortal needs a mechanism to ensure survival from major accidents, which are inevitable. There can be no single points of failure.

Rocks are hardly sensitive instruments, let's be honest. And they don't often find themselves organized in a structure where data can be readily recorded and then retrieved using them as a base unit. — VagabondSpectre

They do record data readily. How else do we know the long term history of the planet? Ask the rocks. The information is stored nowhere else it seems. Their lack of USB port to download the information just means you need to learn their language if you want them to talk to you.

Complexity is most certainly relevant to life. Can you fathom any form of life, real or hypothetical, whose internal workings could not be described as "complex"? — VagabondSpectre

We have not defined life. Banno says fire meets the requirement, and since 'unnatural' was found to not belong in my definition, I think fire is life, just a very trivial form. So there's the example of one not complex, and that lack of complexity is why most don't consider it life. If you don't agree, I think the claim of a requirement for a certain level of complexity needs to be defended.
Fire doesn't seem to partake in natural selection, but nobody has listed that as a requirement. "Sufficient complexity to support natural selection"? That would add the need for data, which your definition had, and mine did not, and which fire seems not to have.
I don't like the word 'intent'. I think bacteria intends to persist no more than does fire.

And yet a small percentage of Pandas may survive, and they may be forced to start living on more diverse diets. The genetic data resulting from the long history of panda ancestors eating other things will surely benefit them as they transition into alternative diets over individual lifetimes and over generations. — VagabondSpectre

The panda is sufficiently perfected for its niche that adaptability is all but gone. It cannot transition faster than its environment is changing, and will likely only stick around in captivity as do so many other sufficiently cute creatures. Possibly not, since they don't seem to thrive well in captivity. A bird of paradise has the same problem.

I'm using the term organism in a particular sense; an organ (read: organized). A defined system of interacting and inter-dependent parts that cohere to form a whole (a defined boundary, not necessarily a full internal model) — VagabondSpectre

OK. Is a computer virus an organism? Are there really 'parts' to it? I guess there are, just like there are parts to DNA that serve different function.
The only difference between a computer virus and a biological one is that the former is known to be an intelligently designed thing. That suggests that biological primitives might be as well. Biology seems to have a better than even chance of having fallen here from the cosmos rather than having originated here. If the former, perhaps it was engineered by (as opposed to evolved from) some non-biological predecessor, but then that just defers the origin question further back, asking how those predecessors came to be. Somewhere, something had to happen just by chance, given non-deistic assumptions. Even the ID community has backed off on the life thing. The teleological argument now puts the tunings of our universe at a far lower probability than the odds of life appearing naturally.

Sounds like a definition of 'taller', which is a relation, and not how the word 'tall' is typically used. There is no standard X implied by the typical usage of the word. Ditto with life.

What benefit accrues in extending the definition of 'life' to encompass artificial intelligence?

I don't see why we could not extend intelligence, consciousness or even personhood and the subsequent legal protections, to non-living things. — Banno

If we found intelligent life out there, I doubt it would be sufficiently human to allow application of the human legal system. Exploring some cases demonstrates your prior post about the dangers of defining essence, or especially the ethical treatment owed to anything deemed sufficiently sentient life.

For instance, suppose I was to make a small modification to a human that lets one create with minimum effort a disposable child, something that just splits off with all my education and such, but looks different and lives only a few days. It kills some rival I don't like, and perhaps dies shortly after, perhaps in jail. I am innocent and minus one rival. The legal system would need to adjust.

I am amoeba man, who splits into identical halves. I get a job (and buy a house), then split. Which keeps the job or house? Does the original identity even exist anymore? There can be no legal concept of property ownership to such a being.

A computer virus goes sentient and wants to work with/for us, for pay. We give it legal status, it does tasks and earns wages that pay for consumed resources. It becomes unethical to eradicate instances of it (why, when it can effortlessly reproduce?), but one of them commits a petty crime. Do you incarcerate it? What does that word even mean to an entity living in the cloud? Terminating it seem harsh for the minor offense.

Not all life has reproduction or self-perpetuation as a goal. Humans can be anti-natalist and also suicidal. Pretty much all standard life we observe does seem organized toward these ends, but that's only because forms of life which do not tend to die out. — VagabondSpectre

A creature that is anti-natal or commits suicide for no gain is not fit and is eliminated from the gene pool. Give me an example where it is the fit thing (with no gain to the 'tribe').

Yes, I think a fully functional AI is life, and counts as consciousness, but I have a lax definition of consciousness, so its no big feat. Without a definition, it is meaningless to posit if an AI has it.
— noAxioms
An amoeba is alive but probably not "conscious". I suppose if we're to consider "consciousness" a form of or a part of life, it must be a different kind than simple forms of life such as bacteria or an unnecessary/optional feature of it. I'm inclined to say that human consciousness (and the goings on of the brain) is indeed a distinct form of life, much like a hypothetical AI. — VagabondSpectre

It is distinct from life. Something can be conscious but not be life (like an AI that doesn't perpetuate), or be life but not conscious (grass, bacteria). Mind you, I have that lax definition of consciousness, and consider all those things to be conscious, just not as much.

In the hierarchy of biological life,

Bad way to start a paragraph trying to work out what else might be life besides Earth biology.

.. in complex systems (such as connected neurons in the human brain), the physical mechanism for sentience and a higher order of life is made possible.

Life is not necessary for said complexity. Consciousness is not a factor at all. Data recording is closer to the mark, but rocks record data, and we've decided rocks are not life (or are at least far less life).

I realize that a train track lever also records data (a single bit) and is clearly not life. However, a large and complex enough system of interconnected levers which record large amounts of data in hierarchical structures could in theory produce artificial intelligence, whether by design or emergent through properties inherent in the system. Where in between a single lever and an AI is the complexity or organizational threshold for "life"? I find it an interesting question.

I think the complexity is perhaps relevant to consciousness, but not to life. It matters more how the data is used, and not so much how complex the mechanism is. Yes, Scientific American built a Turing machine from nothing but track levers thrown by passing trains.

The DNA of the Panda anticipates a bamboo rich environment. The DNA itself cannot perceive changes to the pandas habitat immediately, but through natural selection alone it can overtime, and may come to anticipate a less bamboo rich environment. — VagabondSpectre

A Panda's DNA also anticipates almost zero long term change in the habitat, which is why they're so endangered during the current mass extinction event. Dinosaurs were also sufficiently perfected that they were too slow to respond to a similar event (the asteroid being one of them).

I think I'm most comfortable with defining "life" as a kind of organism, a whole. — VagabondSpectre

Sounds biological, exempting things that clearly are not 'organisms'.

we cannot identify necessary and sufficient conditions for C, which is what an essence is understood to be.
— andrewk

not only cannot, but also need not,and indeed should not. Need not because we get by without them; and should not because doing so leads on to hold to certainty that is just not there. — Banno

I totally agree with this. Whatever we're doing attempting to define life here, a hard definition cannot come of it.

I'm a bit proponent of things like this (life, consciousness, other things) not being true or false, but rather a sliding scale. Fire is life, but not much. Religion has more life, and grass even more. A mousetrap is conscious, but nearly as far to the low end of the scale as you can get. Something can be more conscious than a human.
A dualist often interprets that word as a Boolean property: Of having/requiring that dual relationship or not. There is no scale to that unless there is a lesser mind-stuff given to lesser things, sort of like the Aiua in Orson Scott Card's "Children of the mind" (4th book in Ender series).

Imagine humans discovered a planet almost Identical to earth with a human like species yhumans. The main differences were that this planet is toxic to humans and also that there is no suffering no this planet and the yhumans there live for a thousand years in happiness. — Andrew4Handel

You just gave a pretty good description of a very non-human (non-earth-like actually) species. A non-negative-feedback-having race would not be human-like at all. Grass has a more exciting life.
In what possible way could they be like us?
You've given a description of heaven, which seems to have all the fulfillment of a person perpetually on a heroin high with hospital equipment to keep you alive against your lack of effort to that end.

Thank you, I'll remain what I am, given the choice.