Thanks
@Janus, for your wonderful summaries.
:cool: :sparkle: I wanted to write something similar about the concept of 'aufhebung'. Being Dutch we have the same word, "opheffing" and indeed it has these dual connotations of 'to lift up' and to 'negate' or maybe 'dispel'. I will just refer to your summary though.
@180 Proof :smile: Thanks!
@180 Proof @Jackson@Moliere@Janus and at every other reader interested...
On the notion of ideas being complimentary or in conflict and on there being one idea containing inner tensions, I always read it as follows: I tend to use the term negation over complementarity. The reason is that Hegel uses negation himself. He also approvingly cites Spinoza: "Omnes determinatio est negatio". He also quite some conflict laden language and emphasizes conflict. The idea seems at a higher stage to be able to accommodate this conflict, and is even enriched by it, but nonetheless the conflict is real. I think it is important because when the ideas are applied for instance in Marx, you see the emphasis on conflict as well. I think it is also one of his most insightful contribution and opened the 'avenue of thought' into conflict theory. The idea of a body politic not as a homogenous 'one' (Leviathan) but as a unity within which fault lines criss cross each other has been very fruitful. When he applies his thought himself and makes the turn from consciousness perceiving the world by itself to consciousness dealing with others, he comes to the master / slave dialectic, also a conflict ridden approach.
edit: Maybe in my enthusiasm I gloss over the notion of complimentarity too soon. Clearly, the idea, broken within itself, also needs that break. The master slave ddialectic for instance cannot arise without the notion of master and slave and these notions are not only in conflict. The relationship between master and slave is one of subjugation and conflict but at the same time they are complimentary, because to be master the master needs to slave. This instability in the institution of slavery could only be (temporarily) resolved with the notion of law and contract, transforming (sublating) subjugation in reciprocity (temporarily!).
As far as the movement itself goes, I also shun the idea of thesis antithesis synthesis, as it gives the feeling of there being two ideas, the second idea arising out of nowhere, or just 'called upon' in some sense. I do think Hegel sticks to the image of there being one idea that is internally strained, but that strain only comes to the forefront when the idea is being absolutized and presented as a final answer. For instance being is not opposed by nothingness because of some sort of intervention somewhere, it arises because one considers being. When being is considered, the question arises from this consideration, what about nothing. Hegel in this regard speaks of 'the movement of the concept', not concepts being opposed to each other. So here I would side with Jackson.
I do not know whether Jackson and Janus are far off though, because here Janus gives this great example:
But this idea contains the seeds of its negation(s): anti-realism, idealism, indirect realism, which arise by taking what is observed to be the case about the human perceptual organs and their processes as simply true; i.e. that they "filter" or "distort" the "real" objects we encounter so that we "see through a glass darkly". — Janus
The seeds of the negation can be found in the original naive realism. If naive realism is considered a final answer, questions arise about the distortions our perceptual organs cause, leading to a 'break' or dualism in our view, between thins as they are perceived and things in themselves. The duality then is resolved in some higher idea, but not totally resolved the break is still there, just not efficacious anymore, it does not 'work' anymore. It is no longer 'wirklich' as they say in German. Wirklich has the connotation of being both 'real' (Wirklichkeit means reality) and active, working.
I do not like the word synthesis much either because it gives the impression of a state in which all conflicts and internal breaks are resolved. Rather we get a conceptual framework that is itself inherently unstable, only held up by this continuous movement. The movement from 'negation' to 'negation of the negation' keeps it from breaking down in my view. (This is all my view by the way and I have been criticized for having a too ironic and de-absolutist reading). I think that is why Hegel calls himself a Heracleitian, movement is the only thing remaining. It ends there, that is the absolute insight Hegel offers, but nothing more... It is akin to Wittgenstein's ladder, when you are through with it, you think 'what now'? Well now history is just beginning... it is not the end of history
;)