Dr. Jordan B. Peterson, known for his critique of political correctness and offense-sensitivity in the context of higher education, has presented a formidable defence of his position in a recent interview with Cathy Newman.

In response to Ms Newman’s question why his right to freedom of speech should trump a person’s right not to be offended, Peterson said: “Because in order to be able to think, you have to risk being offensive. (...) You’re certainly willing to risk offending me in the pursuit of truth.” (Daily Wire) To Ms Newman’s credit she did not attempt to push the point, what was a wise thing to do as she would be committing what Jürgen Habermas called a ‘performative contradiction’. Peterson’s argument is almost a textbook reference to Discourse Ethics, a transcendental-pragmatic position developed by Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel (see On What is Right: The Problem of Grounding in Ethics).

According to Apel (Selected Essays: Ethics and the Theory of Rationality. Humanities Press International, 1996), “Humanity is in essence linguistic, and therefore depends always already for its thinking on consensual communication.”(p211) “The logical justification for our thought” therefore commits us to “understand arguments critically” and to “mutually recognize each other as participants with equal rights in the discussion.”(p29) The claim of ‘right not to be offended’ is incompatible with these conditions, as it either monopolises the discussion (makes a subjective demand of another to limit expression) or precludes understanding (if both parties claim offence). In any case, subjective judgement about what is offensive cannot even hypothetically be the basis of a normative principle (Setiya, Kieran. Explaining Action. The Philosophical Review, 2003). Setiya shows that subjective judgement provides only explanation of our reasons, not their objective justification.

There is a deeper logical consequence to Apel’s premise that all meaning, and therefore all thinking, is a product of public deliberation. If we were limited only to discussing things we already agreed on then no new meaning could ever emerge, no evolution of rationality, language or consciousness would be possible, because the process of transition from meaninglessness to meaningfulness would be barred. Deliberation is possible only if there is a mutual capacity to tolerate disagreement, but its application transcends disagreement even if explicit resolution cannot be achieved. It makes us who we are for ourselves and for one another, being the basis of our existence as thinking, conscious agents: a necessary condition of everything we believe in and of everything we value.

If disagreement can be used as a justification of personal offence than this is not an indictment on the subject-matter, the truth-claims or the value-commitments we disagree about, but an indictment on the possibility of rational justification of being offended. By imposing limits on what can be publicly discussed, on what claims can be defended, on what words can or must be used, deliberation is shut down, and little by little our meaning and therefore our identity fade away... in the ‘safe space’ of non-contention. The ‘right not to be offended’ entails that we value our existence, or our identity, but it also entails active nihilism, a pursuit of non-existence and non-identity, therefore a contradiction. If we do value our existence then we are rationally committed to accept the necessary condition of our existence - tolerance of disagreement - even if we don’t like how disagreement sometimes makes us feel.

(this is an abridged version of my article originally published on CulturalAnalysis.Net)