Were the people who supported the prohibition on slavery "extreme'? Would you have labeled them as 'intolerant' to anyone who still continued to own people as property? — chatterbears

This would depend on the strength of the analogy between humans and other animals, which, as has been shown multiple times on this thread, is far from adamantine. Indeed, it's hard enough to make an analogy between two humans.

I find that Trait Theory provides a pretty good account of the phenomena of why individuals don't behave in entirely predictable and logical ways. Whether or not it's true doesn't alter the fact that there is no reason to suppose (unless you're an economist) that anyone should behave in the same way as you in the same circumstances even if your response appears to you to be the most rational.

Kill a dog? = Psychopath — chatterbears

Where did this come from?

Kill neither? = EXTREMIST ! — chatterbears

No. Kill neither? = Cool, but, Kill neither because you hold that the philosophical bases of veganism to be true? = logical EXTREMIST!

Out of curiosity, which came first in your case; not consuming animal products or being a vegan?

People choose to suffer in all sorts of ways, it's sometimes known as asceticism. What appears to differentiate the individuals in the OP's example is the element of choice. A true ascetic renounces pleasures that they could otherwise have in order to gain a, supposedly, greater good.

However, could it be that impulse to suffer is a psychological trait and there are simply some individuals who are drawn to self-denial? If this is the case, then there is no reason why the distribution of these individuals is limited to socioeconomic groups. In the same way that the middle classes have vegans, the disadvantaged have those who wallow in their condition since they appear to have chosen not to extricate themselves from their suffering despite having the opportunity to do so.

Eating wild, entirely grass-fed, or kitchen-scrap fed meat (which is the only meat I eat), is ethical because there exists intelligent, well-informed studies which conclude that such low impact forms of meat-eating probably cause less harm than farming the equivalent quantity of vegetables for some measures of 'harm'. Therefore a person could entirely reasonably conclude that such forms of meat-eating are ethically sound. — Pseudonym

There seems to be a distinction to be made between 'more ethical than' and 'the most ethical'.

Vegans seek to achieve the most ethical consumption possible (based on their suppositions).

Others, and I include myself, are happy with consuming in a way that is more ethical than, say, factory-farming. The above example appears to fall into this category.

Both positions have ethical merit.

However, what bothers me about vegan 'superlativism' is its intolerance, as shown on this thread, for anyone who doesn't go to the same extremes. And 'extreme' is the correct term here. Indeed, someone from the vegan camp here made the claim that veganism is the logical terminus of ethical consumption, but it's not; you can always go to ever more extremes. Hence the logical terminus of ethical consumption as constructed by vegans is a reductio ad absurdum in which humans consume nothing for fear of acting unethically. This strongly suggests that whilst vegan practices themselves may not be wrong, the ethical reasoning behind them is massively flawed.

Adherents of the 'comparative' or moderate approach to ethical consumption tolerate veganism in a way not reciprocated by vegans. The moderate approach attacks the philosophical fundamentals of veganism whilst respecting vegans' choice to follow their diet of preference. On the other hand, vegans see their own position as the ne plus ultra on a cline of consumption and rip into everyone else with supercilious moral vigour not based on a firm philosophical footing. I mean, are fruitarians equally scornful of vegans? Are wild fruitarians scornful of fruitarians? Are autochthonous wild fruitarians scornful of wild fruitarians?...

Clearly, there is no cline of ethical consumption outside the vegan mind, and so the moderate approach is not a stop on the way to full-blown veganism as vegans here have claimed. Rather, it is a logical terminus in itself insofar as it is position of moderation that places an appropriate value on individual human interests and desires in addition to the interests of animals and the planet.

Could I do more? Yes, but at what point does it become life-denying self-sacrifice. I don't want to be an ascetic so, for me at least, it's pretty clear when to stop.

this is the only post I will ever write on this thread — Uber

What a terrible waste of pomposity.

Sounds like a bad case of determinism.

↪jastopher Well, you turned out to be a disappointment. — darthbarracuda

See, now you're a non 'atheist'. Welcome!

Again, it's not recent... — NKBJ

This is true, but it may just demonstrate that some individuals always gravitate towards asceticism and find it hard to empathise with those who don't.

The fairy at the end of my garden who created the universe has told me that you are the messenger of Satan.

If it were the case that meat were necessary, would you condone its consumption? If yes, what do you consider to be baseline necessity?
— jastopher

"Ought implies can," so, yes.

Baseline necessity would be something that otherwise would seriously impact your health or life. — NKBJ

OK. So if I could show you that, by your own definition, meat consumption satisfies a baseline necessity then you would adapt your position?

When you treat a debate about the existence of God as akin to a debate about the Easter Rabbit, you have forfeited your right to be listened to — darthbarracuda

In terms of evidence, and thus reason to engage in argument regarding the existence of either, there is none for either entity. Debating the existence of God is not philosophical it is engaging in petito principi and shouting tu quoque at whoever disagrees with you. As long as there are atheists willing to be drawn into this quagmire theists will have their own existence guarenteed.

Only by ignoring it will we be able to free ourselves of theism.

meat production itself is not necessary. — NKBJ

If it were the case that meat were necessary, would you condone its consumption? If yes, what do you consider to be baseline necessity?

If we are doing philosophy of religion in the analytic sense and arguing about the existence of God, then there are precisely and only three basic positions to take: theism, atheism and agnosticism. — darthbarracuda

This division is a vestigial contingency derived from the status quo from which it emerged. It is not a necessary division.

BOTH theists and atheists have a burden of proof. If you are an atheist, then you believe God does not exist. — darthbarracuda

An atheist is one who attempts to disprove the existence of God/gods, but there is also a group who have no reason whatsoever to believe in supernatural beings or have no interest in what those who do believe in them have to say on the topic, and consequently don't waste their time in trying to disprove that which there is no reason to believe in in the first place. I suspect that most of those categorised as atheists fall into this group, but calling them atheists seems wrong since one need not be opposed to something that one considers does not exist.

Atheists play into the theists hands by according them respect and a platform. The category to which I refer accords theists about as much attention as the Easter Rabbit.

. What does "equal interests per life time" mean? — SophistiCat

I was going to ask the same thing. Sounds ominously like 'equality'.

Why use the term, 'atheist' at all? There are all sorts of things I don't believe, but I don't require a term for my disbelief in them.

By describing an individual by his or her disbelief in theism suggests that this individual has something prove in defence of his or her position, whereas the onus is entirely on the theists to back up their extraordinary claims.

Theism is 'theory' that theists hold to be true. Atheism is not a competing theory; it requires neither explanation nor defence, and such has no need for a term to describe itself.

How do you explain this 'apparently real' world instead of any other? — Posty McPostface

One explanation is that there is no other.

That is the same as me asking you, "If we could raise humans humanely, but kill them without pain when they turn 20 years old, would you then condone that treatment? — chatterbears

It's not the same because I am an avowed speciesist so I don't have a problem in placing my needs and wants before those of animals.

1. Would you kill a severe mentally handicapped person to save a child?
2. Would you kill an animal to save a child?

Both answers are yes. Therefore I am not engaged into speciesism. — chatterbears

In the first case you engaged in ableism and in the second case you are engaged in speciesism.

If it were possible to eliminate all suffering from the supply chain, would you then condone meat eating?
— jastopher
No, because an animal would still be getting killed, which doesn't allow the animal to live its natural life. — chatterbears

I'm not even going to get into to your use of 'natural', but it's conceivable that euthanising with zero suffering an animal is preferable to all sorts of horrific 'natural' ways of dying.

Eating insects is similar to eating animals. Why do it when it is not needed or necessary? Unless your survival rests on the diet of insects (or meat), there's no reason to do so. — chatterbears

Yet more speciesism.

Look, I have no arguments against vegetarianism, but I still maintain some meat can be reared and consumed ethically.

This was supposed to be an example of the basic premises you mention. Basic premises are presumably ones that aren't supported; just accepted or not. Or did you mean something else? — Michael

For example, I can accept that animals suffer and that we should attempt to minimise suffering whenever possible without needing to recur to ever more convoluted metaphysics. This is not to say that there is no interesting debate to be had over basic premises and axioms, but that if you want to go forward, then going backwards is perverse.

I never condone or support the exploitation of animals. Therefore I am not a speciesist. But if you want to redefine the term 'speciesism' to mean that anyone who holds the position that humans are of higher value than animals, this is not the same term. But as I stated before, even though I do think Humans are more valuable, I do not think they should exploit animals and/or cause needless suffering. — chatterbears

You have already said that, in exceptional circumstances, you do "condone or support the exploitation of animals" so you are speciesist. My point was that the speciesist argument is not helpful since it applies to both carnivores and vegetarians alike.

I do not assign higher value to humans solely on the basis of being a different species. — chatterbears

Does this mean that you assign a higher value to humans partly on the basis of being a different species? Because this is still speciesism. Out of curiosity, what other methods do you employ to assign higher value to humans over other animals?

Flawed moral argumentation. — chatterbears

Indeed, I don't hold with deontology since I value myself over and above many other individuals.

Free-range, organic, grass-fed, cage-free, are all irrelevant to the treatment of the animals. — chatterbears

If it were possible to eliminate all suffering from the supply chain, would you then condone meat eating?

Where do you stand on laboratory grown meat? What about eating insects?

Then what if I don't accept the premise that it is wrong to kill any animal that can feel pain? — Michael

Well, you would either need to attempt to show why this (not difficult) or any other premise is wrong. If you insist on merely saying that you don't accept it, there's no reason to engage with you philosophically since your position will appear to be based on prejudice rather than reason.

So you admit to speciesism?
— jastopher

Not in the way you think I am. — chatterbears

I'll take that as a yes.

So we have established that both carnivores and vegetarians are speciesist albeit to differing degrees.

That leaves utilitarian, deontological and virtue ethics.

Utilitarian: something is right/wrong to the extent that it causes pleasure/suffering. Animals can suffer. Eating animals causes animal suffering, which must be offset against the pleasure obtained by consuming meat. Factory farming comes out badly, but free-range etc. could produce more pleasure than suffering, and hence eating meat is not absolutely wrong.

Deontological, do unto others (animals included) as you would have them do unto you. Makes sense, but as Michael might say, 'Why?'. Why not do what I like, and others do what I like too?

Virtue ethics: We harm ourselves by harming others (including animals) in the sense that it is imperative to develop virtue and harming others is inimical to that aim.

I like utilitarianism since it permits me to continue to eat meat, but requires me to exercise my influence as a consumer in order to minimise animal suffering. The fact that free-range tastes better and that I feel less guilt when I eat only increases aggregate pleasure.

So how does one actually prove that something is right or wrong? — Michael

By accepting some of the basic premises.

I'm just eating a hamburger. If you want to accuse me of behaving unethically then surely the burden is on you to support that accusation? — Michael

In principle, is there anything I could say that would convince you that you were behaving unethically?

I don't eat meat because I don't need to. — Buxtebuddha

How do you move from this to 'humans shouldn't eat meat because they don't need it?'

Also would you accept that if I could establish a 'need', then it would be acceptable to eat meat?

What kind of need would be sufficient?

Is justification needed? — Michael

If you're happy with a war of attrition, you can use the rhetorical strategy of repeatedly demanding that your interlocutor do all the work in the hope that he or she will eventually give up.

If you're genuinely interested in the question, then you may wish to attempt to justify your actions even if it's only to yourself.

I would kill an animal to save a starving child, because I believe the child(human) has more value than an animal. — chatterbears

So you admit to speciesism?

If humans wish to eat other animals and wish to justify their consumption, then they can't just say it's okay to eat animals since humans are animals also. Consequently, they have to find something unique about our species that precludes its consumption and permits the consumption of other species. This something is usually human consciousness since there's not really much else to distinguish us. This can be easily shown to not be a great argument given all the grim orang-utan, baby, mentally disabled consequences that obtain.

Vegetarians, on the other hand, have to do less work, but they do still have to accept some undesirable consequences such as the moral desirability of eating roadkill. The hardest problem though is how a vegetarian responds to the question, "would you kill an animal in order to save a starving child?"

They can either say no, which results in bullet-biting not dissimilar to eating the mentally disabled, or they say yes and admit to the same speciesism as the carnivore. If there are circumstances in which a vegetarian would eat a non human animal, the argument becomes about what circumstances are morally acceptable rather than whether it is or isn't morally acceptable.

So, vegetarians, would you kill an animal in order to save a starving child? What about killing a severely mentally-disabled person to feed a starving child?

There may be a justification for killing and eating the flesh of other animals, and for not killing and eating that of our own species, but it has not been put forward on this thread. However, so far, there isn't an argument for never killing and eating the flesh of other animals either.

My individual demand has no affect on the supply. — Michael

I applaud your dogmatism.

The negligible amount of money I have contributed has no affect on the number of animals killed. — Michael

I'm repeating myself, but, unless I'm missing something, your participation in a market for dead animal products clearly does have an effect on the number of animals killed.

Or are you claiming that there is fixed amount of meat produced, whether or not there is demand (including yours) for it. If this is the case, then I think the burden of proof falls upon your shoulders since it goes against everything we know about how markets function.

You said that I am responsible for the deaths of the 20 chickens I bought. I'm not. I didn't kill them. I didn't even solicit someone else to kill them. I just purchased already dead chickens from the supermarket. — Michael

I did indeed, but I didn't say that you and only you are responsible. You share the responsibility by exercising your autonomy as a consumer in market that responds to consumer demand. Presumably, you know that your demand for chicken stimulates a response in the supply chain. If you buy a dead chicken then the space on the supermarket shelf will necessitate the killing of another chicken. Your purchase of an already killed chicken directly precipitates the killing of another chicken.

Look, I respect your intellectual agility, but I doubt that even you are convinced by your arguments.

How so? I didn't kill them. I didn't pay for them to be killed. They were already dead before I bought them.

You would have to show that those animals were killed because I bought their meat. And that, I think, is wrong. — Michael

This is word-play. Remove 'those' and change 'bought' to 'buy', and I'll happily attempt a rebuttal.

My contribution is so negligible as to have no affect on the number of animals killed.

'Negligible' and 'no effect' are not the same. The sum of many negligible effects is more than negligible whereas the sum of no effects is no effect. You need to clarify.

But even then, let's consider this hypothetical situation: I promise to pay you £100 if you kill a cow for me. You kill the cow. I refuse to pay you £100. Who is responsible for the death of the cow? I say you, not me. And the responsibility remains yours even if I were to change my mind and pay you. At most I can be held responsible for the solicitation of a killing, but certainly not for the killing itself. — Michael

Why not both of us?

Me eating meat doesn't kill or harm animals. Me buying meat doesn't kill or harm animals, either directly or indirectly (given that my individual contribution isn't sufficient enough to have an affect on the amount of harm done or number of animals killed). — Michael

This is clearly incorrect.I have no idea how much meat you eat, but if over the course of a year you ate the equivalent of 1 steer, 2 pigs, and 20 chickens then you are responsible for the death of those animals. That's just the way it is.

We've already established that there's nothing wrong with eating a cow burger. Your issue has been with killing and harming animals. So, presumably, eating a cow that has died naturally is morally acceptable? But then what of eating a human that has died naturally? Many people might say that that would be unacceptable. — Michael

Eating an animal that has died of natural causes may even be the morally correct thing to do if otherwise it were to go to waste or putrefy and cause disease etc. However, there are some pretty good reasons no eat animals that have died of natural causes since natural causes include diseases, infections and so on. Eating a healthy animal that has died accidentally is another matter.

The same argument goes for humans; natural causes, probably not a great idea. Accident; why not? Many cultures and individuals have consumed human flesh. The reason we don't eat victims of accidents is convention and learned disgust. Nevertheless, we have have no problem in using their organs, which, although not eating, is a form of consumption that could, at a stretch, be argued to be cannibalism that bypasses the alimentary canal.

A reason I don't consume human flesh from accidents is the same as why I will not eat a boiled egg; it disgusts me. Nevertheless, this does not imply that it is unethical.

It seems that we justify the eating of vegetables based upon the fact that squash lacks consciousness, — Hanover

Fruit has evolved to be eaten!

It may be intutitive to generate a rule based on proximity to our own species, but I see scant ethical basis for it.

Furthermore, if humans really are at the top of some hierarchy because of their unique qualities, it still doesn't follow that they have dominion over life and death of all below them. And even if it did, why not the same dominion over other humans who sit lower on the scale? Being at the top could just as well imply green custodianship.

There's no human sufficiently like a chicken to justify equal treatment. — Sapientia

Does it follow that the more different an animal is to a human, the worse it can be treated?

Why not, the less human, the better it should be treated?

We seem to be generating an awful lot from the moral gold standard of human to human relationships, but why should evolutionary proximity be proportional to humane treatment once we step out of our species?

If I was being inconsistent within an ethical position, I would change my actions. I am still confused as to how people do not. — chatterbears

Don't be confused. Many individuals are ethically inconsistent, if they weren't there would be no need for ethics.

Re: my position; no doubt I could do more more moral good by giving up animal flesh altogether, but have I done some moral good by modifying my behaviour in order to reduce suffering and environmental damage? Must we be absolutist about this?

Also, would you eat roadkill?

Yes. I bite the bulllet; in other words, I acknowledge the inconsistencies of my actions.

I don't eat much meat, and what I do eat at home is free-range etc., so I suppose I reduce the suffering and damage caused, but I find the philosophical arguments against meat-eating to be compelling.

It's not wrong to eat animals per se. For example, one could argue that it is morally desirable to consume roadkill, since, at least, the accidental death of animal would not be entirely without benefit.

The moral question is whether it's morally acceptable to rear and/or sacrifice animals for food.

It would be nice to think that we could eliminate pain and suffering from the meat supply chain, and that animals destined for consumption could have a 'meaningful' existence whilst alive. However, even if this were possible, it is still moot as to whether the euthanising of animals is morally acceptable.

Personally, I am unconvinced by any of the arguments for the consumption of animals, yet, for the record, I will admit to biting the bullet despite the fact that the green and speciesist arguments are compelling.

This is the conversation held by DM as mentioned earlier:

schopenhauer1
The state of non-existance prior to conception means that by not conceiving one is not alleviating the suffering of an extant being. The affected party in non-conception is the parent and to a diminishing extent the parents' social group, whereas only conception can affect the child. Consequently, the decision to have a child seems to be selfish by definition.

Regarding suffering, the answer to the question, "Is it better to have lived than have never existed?", at least in my case, is a resounding 'yes'. Suffering is part of the human experience, and no doubt I have plenty in store. Maybe I should take Croesus' advice who claimed that one could not evaluate one's life until its end. Nevertheless, I suspect I'm not alone in being fiercely protective of my existence.

Regarding 'antenatalism', It's too nihilistic for my tastes and I don't consider nihilism to be a logical outcome of philosophical enquiry, rather I consider that the purpose of philosophical enquiry to find a way out the clearly paradoxical reductio ad absurdum that is nihilism.

Post McPostface: "I feel as though, there's a dichotomy being drawn between 'rationality' and 'human nature' here. Seems fallacious to me, as if one can speak about 'rationality' while excluding 'human nature' from the discussion."

Reason is supposed to transcend human nature. Conception, like smoking and obesity is usually a result of non-rational impulses. Rationality, in the sense of positive freedom, is the control of these aspects of human nature; my reason is the master of me (or at least I'd like it to be). In this sense, the problem is not succumbing to our human nature, but the reason we have for doing so. Ergo, "Is there a rational basis upon which to bring children into the world (I'm thinking developed countries with some kind of welfare system)?"
— jastopher

Interesting, I'll answer you in the actual forum, but why don't you just continue it onto the suggested thread from Baden? If you want, copy and paste your response there so everyone has a chance to see it:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/3306/are-there-any-non-selfish-reasons-for-having-children

Also, I do see your thread still available in the forum, so not sure why you don't see that either. Maybe it was reopened?
5 days ago
schopenhauer1
The state of non-existance prior to conception means that by not conceiving one is not alleviating the suffering of an extant being. The affected party in non-conception is the parent and to a diminishing extent the parents' social group, whereas only conception can affect the child. Consequently, the decision to have a child seems to be selfish by definition.
— jastopher

No, that is not the position though. You are not starting the suffering for a future person.

egarding suffering, the answer to the question, "Is it better to have lived than have never existed?", at least in my case, is a resounding 'yes'. Suffering is part of the human experience, and no doubt I have plenty in store. Maybe I should take Croesus' advice who claimed that one could not evaluate one's life until its end. Nevertheless, I suspect I'm not alone in being fiercely protective of my existence.

Regarding 'antenatalism', It's too nihilistic for my tastes and I don't consider nihilism to be a logical outcome of philosophical enquiry, rather I consider that the purpose of philosophical enquiry to find a way out the clearly paradoxical reductio ad absurdum that is nihilism.
— jastopher

Nihilism is a rather overused term and means too many things to too many people in my opinion. I am an out-and-out philosophical pessimist, so that term will do just fine with antinatalism :). So, I don't see how the purpose of philosophical inquiry is to find a way around a certain philosophical stance (like nihilism or philosophical pessimism). That might be your particular preference at this point in time as to why you pursue philosophy, but not sure that was or is philosophy's main goal.

As to suffering being a part of human experience, I have laid out some details which were not addressed, so I'll point back to things I said earlier such as starting contingent and structural suffering for other people (and explained what that is), went into detail about causing certain responsibilities for survival, maintenance, and boredom-fleeing, the circularity of our repetitive existence, the deprivation of needs and wants, the emptiness behind facades like technological advancement, the violation of ethical of someone else's ethical principles, using people as an ends for X personal or social reason, etc. etc.
5 days ago
Posty McPostface
Reason is supposed to transcend human nature. Conception, like smoking and obesity is usually a result of non-rational impulses. Rationality, in the sense of positive freedom, is the control of these aspects of human nature; my reason is the master of me (or at least I'd like it to be). In this sense, the problem is not succumbing to our human nature, but the reason we have for doing so. Ergo, "Is there a rational basis upon which to bring children into the world (I'm thinking developed countries with some kind of welfare system)?"
— jastopher

The epistemological argument I am trying to make is that we simply do not know what 'pure reason' looks like. Or if you prefer, then Hume comes to mind of reason being the handmaiden to the passions. That's about it.
5 days ago
jastopher
The epistemological argument I am trying to make is that we simply do not know what 'pure reason' looks like.
— Posty McPostface

We may not have an exact picture, but developmental psychology, neuroscience, studies of feral children and so on give us a pretty good decent photofit. Although I doubt that an entirely non-rational human can exist, there does seems to be a cline of rationality upon which different individuals can be placed. Human nature, on the other hand, must be definition, be present in all members of the species.
4 days ago
jastopher
You are not starting the suffering for a future person.
— schopenhauer1

On your account, surely you are increasing aggregate human suffering by the introduction of another individual? Or have I misunderstood you?

I am an out-and-out philosophical pessimist
— schopenhauer1

Whether nihilism or pessimism, the role of philosophy as an exclusively human activity is to extract us from this kind of logical terminus. I mean, if philosophy is about how to live well and one concludes that everything is meaningless, then somewhere along the line in your enquiry something must have gone wrong. I would maintain, that it must be axiomatic that philosophical pessimism is wrong since were it be to be true philosophical pessimism would be meaningless also. Hence the paradox.

As to suffering being a part of human experience, I have laid out some details which were not addressed
— schopenhauer1

There is a calculus involved here, and we clearly interpret the data differently. I don't deny the existence of suffering, but I sense that it is outweighed by the positive aspects of existence. I'll ask you the question directly,
"Is it better to have lived than have never existed?"
— jastopher

Even if you answer "no", that is only one datum amongst every human that exists, has existed and will exist, and cannot, on its own, be a justification for antinatalism.
4 days ago
schopenhauer1
On your account, surely you are increasing aggregate human suffering by the introduction of another individual? Or have I misunderstood you?
— jastopher

You have misunderstood me. I was using your in the general. To rephrase it, antinatalists think that by not having a child, one is not starting (or is preventing) a future person who will suffer.

Whether nihilism or pessimism, the role of philosophy as an exclusively human activity is to extract us from this kind of logical terminus. I mean, if philosophy is about how to live well and one concludes that everything is meaningless, then somewhere along the line in your enquiry something must have gone wrong. I would maintain, that it must be axiomatic that philosophical pessimism is wrong since were it be to be true philosophical pessimism would be meaningless also. Hence the paradox.
— jastopher

No, SOME people think that the goal of ETHICS (not philosophy in general) is eudaimonia (roughly translates as flourishing) and is mainly linked with Virtue Theory, and not necessarily related with other ethical stances which may have goals such as minimizing suffering, following a categorical imperative, etc. Even if I was to grant you ethics is mainly about achieving eudaimonia, this does not diminish the antinatalist claim that once born, one may strive to achieve eudaimonia, but the best state of affairs was never being born. Philosophical pessimists may even agree that as long as the aesthetic view of existence was acknowledged that life is indeed (or contains much) suffering one can pursue certain courses of action that would achieve eudaimonia.

However, most strong philosophical pessimists would argue that all pursuits are coming from a place of deprivation. The Will is unsatisfied and needs to pursue goals endlessly and all the other things mentioned in my first response. They would also argue that eudaimonia is a false hope. Rather, no one needs to get born to get better at something or to achieve x, y, z goal. In fact that might be using someone as a means to some end (i.e. seeing someone else try to achieve x, y, z is for the parent or some third-party reason, but not the child). Rationally, the best course of action is to not start the life in the first place. Combine with this the idea of contingent suffering- suffering based on particular context (i.e. location, genetics, causal factors), then there more compelling reason not to begin a life that contains suffering in the first place. Pessimists would argue that life is not a "progress" but a circularity of repetitive goal acts such survival, comfort-finding/maintenance, and boredom-fleeing. Though the goods of life are acknowledged (mainly aesthetic/physical pleasure, achievement, flow states, learning, relationships), these are not deemed strong enough to contend with the aesthetic understanding that indeed life has structural and contingent suffering.

Hence the paradox.
— jastopher

No, Schopenhauer might argue that the best ethical stance (besides antinatalism), is to reflect on art/nature (to temporarily stop the insatiable will), do acts of compassion (to temporarily stop one's self-interested will), and most importantly to live an ascetic life with the least amount of willing possible. This not necessarily my stance, but just showing that there can be a pessimist ethics counter to Virtue Theory in general and specifically the claim that the summom bonum is eudaimonia or even more specifically that eudaimonia only looks one certain way.

Even if you answer "no", that is only one datum amongst every human that exists, has existed and will exist, and cannot, on its own, be a justification for antinatalism.
— jastopher

First off, not every human would answer yes to that question. Also, there are many cultural factors that prevent people from acknowledging or publicly admitting pessimistic realities. Finally, appeal to the majority is one of the worst ways to assess ethical import. It is not the sole way (or best) to understand human nature- it is the best way to understand what people are willing to publicly admit to a loaded question.
4 days ago
jastopher
No, SOME people think that the goal of ETHICS
— schopenhauer1

No, some people think that role of Philosophy is ETHICS, all the other questions dealt with by philosophers are thrown up as a result of ethical enquiry.

Finally, appeal to the majority is one of the worst ways to assess ethical import.
— schopenhauer1

No. If anything, this is counter-example not appeal to the majority.
3 days ago
schopenhauer1
No, some people think that role of Philosophy is ETHICS, all the other questions dealt with by philosophers are thrown up as a result of ethical enquiry.
— jastopher

Then I would say that is playing word games. Maybe they think ethics is most important and other things follow. If you really want to go deep, Schopenhauer, for example has Will at the bottom of all things, and so the basis of ethics is a slow-unfolding of a person's character as related to how well they can resist the will's individuated self-interest. So, I guess one can say in this case the metaphysics drives the ethics in such a way, but that is the reverse of what you are saying. Now, the philosopher Levinas did have an idea of "ethics is first philosophy" but that concept is grander then perhaps your meaning (which seems to be that ethics is most important). His idea has a lot of implications, one of being that what you "choose" as your metaphysics can also have ethical implications. I'm not so sure you really mean it in the way Levinas does though.


No. If anything, this is counter-example not appeal to the majority.
— jastopher

Well, you said this earlier:

Even if you answer "no", that is only one datum amongst every human that exists, has existed and will exist, and cannot, on its own, be a justification for antinatalism.
— jastopher

Besides being a false statement, I don't see how this can be interpreted as anything but an appeal to the majority. You are literally appealing to the fact that "every human that exists, has existed, and will exist" does not believe in antinatalism which is by definition an appeal to the majority. A quick definition from Wikipedia states: In argumentation theory, an argumentum ad populum (Latin for "argument to the people") is a fallacious argument that concludes that a proposition must be true because many or most people believe it, often concisely encapsulated as: "If many believe so, it is so."

So, this debate is kind of interesting, but I don't generally use this forum for a personal correspondence. I would like to continue the discussion, but anything further, I would like to respond in the public forum so that others can participate. I use internal messages like this to perhaps further clarify, or have meta-discussions about what is actually going on in the forum discussion itself, but not usually for protracted debates. So, I'll meet you in the forum!
3 days ago — jastopher

I would have thought that the quality of one's friendships is going to influence the way one responds to this question. Human relationships are gradable like many other other things. To me it makes absolute sense to want to manage one's interactions by reducing or eliminating the low grade and maximising quality.

Given Schopenhauer's life experience, it's possible to make the argument for bad case of sour grapes. Indeed, it requires little imagination to interpret his position as an elaborate post hoc rationalisation of his own condition as a social undesirable; especially when we consider his affection for dogs.

It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.

Surely one should be able to discuss almost anything on a forum like this? If some topics are off-limits, it reflects very poorly on the ability of philosophical enquiry to actually do anything useful. If you don't like a topic, show why it's wrong instead of shutting down debate. Alternatively, consider renaming this site as The Dogma Forum.