No, these have a Form Justice, beauty and goodness in you and me and in society will always be shadows. — Benkei

I never read Plato from such a purely subjective standpoint. I thought that he is also referring to a separate universe that some how impinges on ours. Where do you get your interpretation from? I have so far read Guthrie and Cooper and I never saw it as a purely internal dualism at all, more of a final answer to Parmenides if anything.

I think that you are too focused on Justice here. Justice is a Form as is beauty, good etc. Understanding the Forms is vital because Plato can only reconcile metaphysics and morality with dualism, everything else starts from this point. Someone needs to exit the cave and draw a map of how things should be and use it to lead us all out of the shadows.

It is a refutation of Taoism.

There is agent causation it is just very minor. Determinism is the teaspoon dipping in and out of the sugar bowl, distributing it all around. We are very small creatures who can move one grain of sugar at a time if we use all of our will. So we can jump around between different spoons and we can move the occasional grain now and then.

In short, justice is personal morality wrote large. — vulcanlogician

Brilliant explanation and quote.

And what about the Forms?

Some people believe he was right about morals and some think that he was wrong. His metaphysics are unique and incredibly complicated and are based in idealism. As for philosophy he is one of the best, even when he gets it wrong (if truth values can even apply) it is still clear why he is such an important philosopher.

I understand your point but I am not sure that I fully agree with you. The connection between the city i.e society and the individual are obvious but not as one way as you put it. Societies are collections of individuals and so the two are completely inter-related.

In The Republic, Plato presents the final versions of all the arguments Socrates has been alluding to and working up to. Justice is a big part of his moral philosophy and does directly deal with statecraft I believe. The tripartite soul is another one that reaches maturity in the Republic and this is more about the individual and morality, which is also an important part of the society. And the opus idea is in the Forms and his metaphysics of the universe and his promoting of dualism.

So I do agree with your post in general but I think that it is an over simplification of the full ramifications of the play.

So all we can prove here is that in a causally determined universe there are some completely random acts and so we must take into account some randomness as part of determinism. Unless I have missed the thrust of your point I will invoke Hume and say that being influenced by random forces does not support freewill or moral responsibility.

There are no circumstances that justify making a lying promise or not answering truthfully to a definite yes or no question that can claim moral worth, none what so ever.

Mum I hugely appreciate all that you have done for me. Mum I don't know how you managed all of these years. etc are surely possible to say without lying?

You need to think Bill Clinton, 'I did not have sexual relations with that women'.

Morality in individual personal cases is very much up to the person most of the time, you can't attach that much to it, especially in family matters.

I am not declaring Kant as a source of truth just as the source of a particular moral theory that can apply to the question. Utilitarianism would be equally useless in this case in my opinion.

I think you altered the OP a little ( or I’m dumb, happy to accept either ) but interesting post and I agree. I really need to read Kant. — Dan84

Mae culpa :) Wrong context of gift. However there is some Kant in the question what do you say to mother when she asks you about the gift. You must not lie, Kant's perfect duty to others, a mandatory must do without exception for moral worthiness however the guidelines of honesty are a little blurry.

In short white lies can be permissible, such as 'it is a very interesting book' 'I can't wait for an opportunity to wear it' etc so it is morally permissible to fib a bit in order not to hurt someones feelings.

But no it is not morally wrong.

Kant says that we have an imperfect duty to ourselves (a duty that we should do when we can) to develop our gifts and talents as much as possible. It is not mandatory duty but it is something Kant believed to be of moral worth.

I sincerely hope you realize Plato's Republic is not a book on statecraft. — Tzeentch

Not at all or not just? I don't know what you mean by statecraft, I was referring to a society built on the republic modal.

Plato's republic would have not have been a very nice place to live according to our standards today.

Idealism that's not positing non-physical existents? — Terrapin Station

That's a hard question to answer. The non-physical existential claim. Idealism posits a non-material / mind dependency claim. Berkeley does struggle to justify spiritual substance- his equivalent to matter, as well as justifying spirits and God - his version of a substratum. He flip flops towards a position which he support with the same grounds he used to refute Locke's materialist thesis.

In his favour he never denies doing this and even points out hypocrisy just in case you missed it. The grounds he gives however are nowhere near as strong as his argument for refuting matter are.
Because he cannot explain the metaphysics of God any better than Locke can explain the metaphysics of materialism his foundation seems no stronger than Locke's.

I still think that for a true believer in an active God who also seeks scientific explanations for the world then Idealism has a certain appeal. Even for non-believers who are worried about science's unanswered questions it is very interesting.

Is that not free enough for you? Do you insist that true freedom entails being sufficiently free to make a different choice given exactly the same set of deciding factors? That seems absurd - because it implies a freedom to make choices for no reason at all. — Relativist

Which is Hume's argument against the Libertarian definition of freewill. An undetermined will is a random will and if all of our acts are random then how can you be morally responsible?

I'm a physicalist/materialist, but my view isn't a "belief in physics" per se.

Among the big problems for me with the "God" side of things is that in my view the idea of a nonphysical existent can't even be made coherent. — Terrapin Station

Materialism doesn't leave much room for God. Dualism creates a problem of coherence. Idealism however makes sense because it allows you to keep God and be scientific at the same time.

It also takes some guts and balls to commit suicide. — Wallows

People choose suicide as a way out. True it does take something akin to bravery to actually take your own life but that bravery is in a one time act. Staying alive day after day when you are tired of life is the real challenge, that is a different type of bravery. According to Kant it is the only duty to yourself that you must perform.

Like I said I also find it problematic. Can we move back to the original question? Assuming that neither of us can prove or disprove the others theory, which one does the job better? Belief in physics or belief in an ever active God?

Suicide is cowardice. It takes bravery to stay alive.

I don't at all agree with that. What would be the support of it? — Terrapin Station

I meant metaphysically possible. That means possible in at least one possible world. I am not saying that I agree with this or the use of possible worlds for thought experiments. But in philosophy for some thing to be metaphysically necessary it must be so in all possible worlds. Seeing as we can only imagine these other worlds all we have as a tool is our conceptions.

If you can conceive it then it must be possible.

So we're saying, without proof, that maybe it could be otherwise--maybe when A happens, B wouldn't have to happen, right? — Terrapin Station

If there is even the slightest possibility of there being another outcome then the outcome was not necessary.

For causation to be necessary connection then when A happens B must also happen. When your first ball hits the second one, the second one must move and there is no proof of this being the case.

You can invoke Newton's laws of physics all you want but Newton himself said that all he is doing is telling us what is happening, not why it is happening. We can understand what gravity does but we don't know how it works or why.

And knowledge-wise, what prohibits us from knowing necessary connection? A billard ball hits another at a particular velocity, etc., and the struck ball reacts with another particular velocity. The difference between knowing that that is a "regularity" and a "necessary connection" is? — Terrapin Station

Can you give an example of something that is metaphysically necessary? Something that 'must' be the case in all possible worlds? Or something that absolutely could not be the case?

Wait, first, "we don't know anything with certainty" doesn't gel well with "Hume is very certain about causation," does it? — Terrapin Station

He is certain that all we know about causation is regularity. I should have said that he is very clear about causation. Surely you can remember and employ the principle of charity when you are discussing philosophy.

We don't know anything with certainty. As empiricists we accept that all of our knowledge comes from sensory experience. We do not experience necessary connection in which case causation is not necessary connection.

Are you simply focusing on the Humean comments that amount to us not being able to be certain re causation — Terrapin Station

Hume is very certain about causation, it is not necessary connection but it is constant conjunction.The view that all we know about causation is regularity is still today the most widely held opinion among philosophers.

For what purpose? What is a "spiritual" substance? How does a spiritual substance differ from a mental substance? I don't think you're paying attention to what I'm asking. — Harry Hindu

Spiritual substance and mental substance are the same thing.

Of course I can form an idea of you mind. Every time you speak or submit a post, I form an idea of what is in your mind. I try to predict people's behavior and in doing so, I form an idea about the contents of their mind. Having ideas about other people's mind is one of the features that separates us from most other species. — Harry Hindu

You can form an idea of my body or bodies in general but not of minds. Brains yes but minds no. What does a mind look like? How big is it? what colour is it?

That last part there - you lost me. — Harry Hindu

How does a tree cause you to see a tree? The materialist provides an answer based in physics, light waves, atoms etc. Thinking so, you allow that objects have causal powers in themselves. This is far from proven, as Hume showed all we experience in causation is regularity. The immaterialist knows that God is the only cause of objects existing.

What I am asking is if materialism or idealism were the case, then what would the actual difference be in the attributes of the primary substance? There should be some difference in how the primary substance actually is or functions if these two substances (matter and mind) are so different to cause this debate to go on for so long. — Harry Hindu

I would say the major difference being that material objects have no causal powers we can know in which case we do not know what causes them.
Ideas also have no causal substance but we do know that they are caused by spirits with the infinite spirit doing most of the causing.

Berkeley does not deny real objects and sees the real world like everyone else, he just denies that it is material.

Materialism only provides the best explanation of the world without God.

Did Plato envisage the clouds (dirt, hair, mud) have a Form? It was left an open question but my feeling is that the answer tends towards 'no'. — Wayfarer

Difficult question but I think that he probably did. I think that all objects also have Forms with Plato. I can base this on his banishment of artists in the republic. He does so on the grounds that we do not experience true Forms only copies of them, artists are then engaged in making copies of copies. This process just pushes us deeper into the cave. Well that's my interpretation of it and I remember in lectures talk about the ideal Form of a chair or a table, all chairs and tables are imperfect reflections of their perfect Forms out there in the parallel universe. If regular objects have Forms then it is not that much of a leap for their components to also have them.

no not you, Terrapin Station is just ruining the thread and trolling the discussion.

Is there a block / mute / ban option on this site?

So is the idealist saying that the primary substance is mind, not ideas? If so, then the question becomes, "what is the difference betweeen mind and matter?" Ideas would be matter-dependent or mind-dependant. Again, what is the difference? — Harry Hindu

Berkeley replaces Locke's material substrata with a spiritual substances - minds. and material objects with ideas supported by minds.

But we perceive thinking objects just as we perceive non-thinking objects. The difference lies in their behavior, not how they appear - as material objects. Both thinking and non-thinking objects are governed by the laws of physics (cause and effect). — Harry Hindu

How do you perceive a thinking object? My mind is the 'thinking end' and you cannot form an idea of a mind. You can develop a notion of minds and of God, but that's not the same as an idea. Berkeley is on sticky ground at this point. Like I said demolishing materialism is easier than supporting immaterialism.

What do you think matter is?

Not if "no alternative decision could have been made." — Terrapin Station

What situation could you envisage that would offer no alternative courses of action? Unless you have unwillingly and unknowingly been 'possessed' or 'taken over' in some way then there are always alternatives. An unattractive alternative is still an alternative.

Again this is incorrect. We directly perceive matter all the time. — Terrapin Station

We perceive material objects all of the time, we do not perceive matter. The material substratum supporting the mind independent, absolute existence of those material objects is invisible.

You say that the atomic structure of a tree is what the tree is made of, however we only experience the tree not the swirling cloud of atoms that provide solidity and colour etc.

When was the last time you directly perceived an atom? a molecule? a particle? Never, because you can only experience them indirectly through their extensions i.e material objects.

Matter is an idea, but not all ideas are matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

Objects are ideas surely? We have no idea of matter because we cannot directly perceive it.

I wasn't being clear, the lesser problem is empirically detecting them whereas the greater problem is knowing what they do, how they do it etc.