However, it would seem to be a non sequitur to move from these experimental results to inferring that there are no such things as mental states. — Arkady

That wasn't my intention, I do not deny that mental states exist. My problem is that 'mental sates' are largely mysterious, at least as much as deterministic forces and causality.

Each words means what it refers to. What is the actual difference between ideas and matter? — Harry Hindu

If you had read the Dialogues you would know that Berkeley already addresses this question as well as all of the other objections that have been raised so far in this thread.

The difference between ideas and matter is that ideas are mind dependent and matter supposedly is not. Berkeley is very good at demolishing the foundations of material substance but not so good at supporting his own foundation for spiritual substance.

At the end of the Dialogues he allows that the only real difference between the two is the materialists insistence that non-thinking objects or what you call material objects can exist without a mind that perceives them.

Again this is not an attempt to defend Berkeley, I want to compare his theory with Locke's. You are perfectly correct in questioning whether first person introspection is the proper place to begin our scientific inquiries, however that is exactly what Locke does for his materialist thesis.

Berkeley and Locke take this from Descartes. Berkeley recognizes the weakness in his argument and defends against the objections. Introspection provides us with notions of ourselves and things like us, spirits in other words. Again it gets very Cartesian at this point and cannot work without God.

Here the question is whether he is a scientist, a christian, a scientific christian, is he trying to prove science or God or one through the other.

Yes indeed. Newton asserted the absolute independent existence of matter, force, space and time upon which our science is based. Berkeley shows that we cannot know material without a material object, force without something being forced, space without something occupying it and time without some agent passing through it.

You appear to be right on this, I was oversimplifying it. Berkeley is into Contra direct realist materialism. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/

I have a huge problem writing about idealism. I swear before each exam never to answer questions on Idealism but the subject fascinates me so much and I spend too much of my time studying it out of pure interest.

I need to reread my Berkeley but he definitely does make allowances for the dreaming / hallucination argument he also covers himself against solipsism. I will go through it again and try to find the relevant examples.

A professor once told me that we can't do philosophy only by definitions.

Speculation is not my primary buisiness. — Heiko

Every time you take for granted that objects exist independent of perception you are actually speculating.

One of us seems to be a bit mixed up here. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_and_indirect_realism

Ok but how can you prove that these things exist independently of our perceptions of them?

How do you experience mass? Can you see it directly?

but surely direct realism the perception of the object as it is. We cannot see matter only material objects, according to Locke and so their true nature is beyond our experience and our understanding. We cannot have true knowledge of the object.

With Berkeley the object is as we perceive it, no annoying atoms or bothering quarks or other particles, just the pure idea in itself. Berkeley was a great scholar of Plato and I am sure that the theory of Forms is being exploited here by him.

Objects are real for Berkeley too, they just are not material.

Matter occupies space and - in common day life - has a weight. Anything that has these properties is made of matter. That's the definition. — Heiko

You oversimplify it with your partial definition.

mat·ter
/ˈmadər
noun
1.
physical substance in general, as distinct from mind and spirit; (in physics) that which occupies space and possesses rest mass, especially as distinct from energy.
"the structure and properties of matter"

Newton asserts the absolute existence of matter, force, time and space. Berkeley undermines their absolute / independent existence by offering an alternative cause in God.

Actually not naive realism, but Berkeley is categorised as an empiricist. His argument could be paraphrased as depending on the observation that we cannot go beyond the content of experience, and that experience requires a perceiving subject. — Wayfarer

He is an empiricist, no doubt. Why do you say he theory is not direct realism? By refuting abstract ideas and the primary / secondary quality distinction the veil of perception disappears. We are left with direct access to the object itself (even if it is only an idea in our head) hence I called it naive / direct realism.

James K is actually just repeating what Berkeley argued, not that it is true. Folks are just trying to be charitable to Berkeley. — Nils Loc

Thanks but look again at the title of the thread and the questions asked. I clearly state that I want to compare between the two theories and see whether Berkeley''s argument is as sound as it seems. I am not being charitable to Berkeley, I am just defending him (along his own lines as you pointed out) against the ungrounded attacks, I can argue against him as well but everyone else seems to be doing that just fine.

I thought that we would have some proper philosophical discussions here but some people are more into trolling.

You observe their mind-independent existence.

Aside from that, mind is material too. — Terrapin Station

Firstly observation and perception are mind dependent. A mind must be present in order to do these things. Mind independent perception is a contradiction in terms.

Secondly, you say that mind is matter by which I can only assume that you mean the brain is matter. For Berkeley,as with Descartes minds and spirits and souls are synonymous, we have little enough empirical evidence of 'minds' and none what so ever about spirits or souls so your claim that minds are material is highly problematic.

You are positing their mind independent existence. You posit their existence when they are not being perceived. So they exist as part of a material substratum which you cannot perceive.

All that exist are minds and ideas. The metaphysics of our minds and of God are beyond our understanding but Berkeley doesn't seem to imply that our minds are 'parts' of Gods mind. Unfortunately because we can only know ideas, and minds are not ideas, we cannot really know anything about minds. We cannot form an idea of either our own minds or of God's.

Like I say Berkeley doesn't really explain how God does it or even why he does it but shows us where it is happening, which is everywhere.

Materialism also relies on a belief in the causal powers of objects, it is the objects existence that causes us to perceive it. Hume undermined this belief and showed all we know is constant conjunction, Berkeley anticipates Hume's refutal of causal power in objects. All causation is from God.

Yeah, positing a magic genie makes the view a lot more reasonable. — Terrapin Station

Finally we are getting somewhere. The question is does positing a magic genie provide a better explanation than positing a material substratum that has equally mysterious properties as the genie.

Locke says that material objects are supported by a material substratum. Until today science is dealing with the mysterious nature of this substratum and we still remain on the wrong side of the veil of perception and so only have indirect knowledge of any true nature beyond our limited sensory perception.

Berkeley says 'ballix to material substratum, God is the support for all objects in the world. By accepting Gods role we can be sure that we directly perceive objects as they are. There is no veil of perception, we can be naive realists once again after Descartes pulled out the rug.

The point is that the metaphysics of the quantum physics are as equally mysterious as the metaphysics of God so what reason do we have for choosing one over the other?

You miss the point. God acts as the guarantor of all ideas. Objects exist independent of YOUR mind because they are always held in Gods mind.Again, intelligent beings do exist as minds / spirits and are mind independent.

Excuse me, I'm not just an idea of yours. How rude. :D — jorndoe

No you are not an idea, you are a mind / spirit. Thinking beings are different to unthinking objects. I still haven't worked out which category Terrapin Station belongs in.

Are you going to engage in a constructive argument or are you happy with just trolling?

As you should expect, given that I'm a naive realist. Another theory of perception would have to be well-supported, have good reasons for belief, be plausible etc. for me to change my view. I won't be holding my breath. — Terrapin Station

You do realize that Berkeley is proposing a form of naive realism? He is actually giving you theory to justify your belief and refute Locke's veil of perception.

On what grounds do you dismiss him so flippantly?

Ok so I will take a definitive position and disagree with your argument. No the world would not necessarily be a better place if killing and jealousy were wiped out.

Of course, keep in mind that I'm of the view that compatibilism can't be made coherent in the first place. — Terrapin Station

Which is quite an extreme view really when you think that incompatibilism has been largely abandoned.

Where Berkeley fails, in my opinion, is due to his nominalism. Because of it, he can’t accommodate the fact that certain classes of ideas, such as logical and mathematical proofs, have universal application. This is the subject of C. S. Peirce’s criticism of Berkeley, which I intend to study. — Wayfarer

Which is an interesting point when you consider the nominalist argument Berkeley uses to attack abstract ideas, Locke is also a nominalist btw apparently not as much as Berkeley. It is interesting if his failure to accommodate logical and mathematics proofs is the biggest weakness in his theory because not everyone is convinced by math, Russell felt it was largely based upon fallacies.

You have the argumentative skills of child which is why I am not answering you.Do you even know what a rational argument looks like when stated philosophically? I ask because I have not seen anything from you that isn't just your own unsupported opinion.

My question doesn't ask if Berkeley is right or not. My question is does his theory properly undermine Locke? Also does he undermine Locke fairly, meaning doesn't then himself rely on what he doesn't allow Locke to.

Could we not also bias deterministic influences as well? Using freewill to make uniform types of determined choices (not all choices are black or white) on a constant basis could also influence the chains of influence that influence us. In other words we can take some part in causality, even if it is a small one. Shifting towards our preferred spectrum of gray.

If we think that mental states might not exist, then what the heck are we even talking about in the "before you think you have decided to do it" part? — Terrapin Station

We still cannot accurately prove which brain processes relate to which mental states so even if we accept mental states we don't really understand them either biologically or psychologically.

Let's accept that they exist, that still doesn't really tell us anything about what they do. That was the point of my example. No one is saying that our thoughts do not cause us to act, the question is what caused our minds to cause an act?
There seem to be only two choices, one, that it was determined and the other that it was random or spontaneous. Can you think of any other options? I can't.

We don't need to defend compatibilism against hard determinism such as Strawson's. The libertarian argument needs to justify why freewill makes us morally responsible and why not having it should free us from any responsibility. Why is there a necessary connection between the two?

If anyone wishes to demonstrate that "mental phenomena have physical effects," one needn't appeal to such arcana as experiments purporting to demonstrate telekinesis: anyone who has had a desire for some peanuts and gotten up to kitchen to get some has ably demonstrated that mental states can have physical effects. — Arkady

One problem with your theory is proving that mental states exist at all. Most recent research shows that on average our sub-conscious sends the message the body to get up and get peanuts about half a second before you think you have decided to do it.

The mental state to get the peanuts has been caused by something else, hunger, boredom, habit etc. As has is your choice for peanuts rather than something less salty. The fact you have where to sit and a kitchen to go to that has peanuts in it is also dependent on many things that have affected your life until then and will continue to after.

There is a difference between causation and explanation. I believe that we can choose between different deterministic influences and that possibly the crux of virtue ethics.

Nice essay but I see an immediate problem with your original scenario. Parental example is not the only causal influence that the child is under. There are many other factors that influence the way that we behave as adults apart from parental ones.Also your example cites consequences from accidents which is unrepresentative. Car accidents happen for many reasons in which case anyone who drives imperfectly is just as responsible and we can't trace bad driving back to parental influence.

The intoxication argument is an interesting one in general. You decide to get intoxicated, although sometimes it happens by accident, you never intended to have more than a safe amount to drive home on. Your consequent decision to drive after having a skin full because it was a mates birthday at the pub and you'd forgotten was actually made under the influence of alcohol. So there is a question of causal influence, alcohol influence which makes it even more complicated..

We cannot have a philosophical discussion without fully qualifying what you mean by your argument.

I already gave you my opinion that your argument is not as complete as you say it is and that I do not agree with it so your claim that I am dodging the question is unfounded. When you say that following these rules would lead to a better world, you need to define exactly what you mean by better. Better for who? Better in what way etc If you cannot clarify these matters in depth then you are merely stating your own opinion.

You made a premise and I showed you where there are exceptions and contradictions in it. You need to clarify your point to make me understand what you are trying to prove.

If there are exceptions to your universal law that killing is evil then it is not a universal law.
Would it have been evil to kill Hitler in 1938? How about Osama Bin Laden in 1999? How about terminally ill people suffering terrible pain that want to die? Why should a pesron not be allowed to take their own life? Are you only talking about the killing of other humans? Is it evil to kill fish? etc etc.

I am trying to show you the danger of your argument and how all arguments following such sweeping statements that cannot be backed up will lead you into trouble.

In short I DO NOT AGREE WITH YOUR PREMISES.

The thesis was that responsibility is explained by us being social animals. If this were true, then a responsibility relation would be a feature of all social animal groups. — Dfpolis

Humans are social animals
Humans have developed the concept of morality and responsibility
Therefore all social animals will develop the same concept.

All humans are social animals
If humans develop morality because they are social animals then
All social animals would do the same.

How do your premises lead to that conclusion? Your argument is neither sound nor valid.

"Thou shalt not kill (except for when it is an unintended side-effect of self-defense)" So it is ok to accidentally kill in self defense? What about accidentally in general?

I was not claiming that killing can be good, only that it is not always evil. I thought that your point was that it is always evil.

With self defense, the person would be dead either way if you intended to kill them or if it was by accident so the loss is the same. What about accidental killing in general? The only way to judge the morality of the agent that kills is by judging his response to it. If he feels remorse or not.

Someone who takes the life of another with no remorse is probably what we could class as 'evil'.