My objections:

It may not be possible to simulate our world as it is.
If it is possible, we have no way of knowing how likely it is.
There is no evidence we are currently living in a simulation.
We don't know what a super-human AI would do. It seems unlikely to me we can extrapolate from human motivation and behavior.
If we are living in a simulation and if there is no possible way for us to determine that we are, then saying we are in a simulation is meaningless. — T Clark

It is possible to simulate our world according to physics.
If it is possible, it is certain to happen. (if you are a realist)
There is no evidence that we are not in a simulation.
Post-humans may be forced to simulate reality to solve pressing problems.
That we are in a simulation agrees with the Principle of Mediocrity.

I suppose a better term for what people are actually looking for (or should be looking for) is "evidence." Most of science and most of philosophy are just working with evidence which supports or weakens any given argument. Any good scientist or philosopher will admit that "proven" is just shorthand for "there is so much evidence for x that we can reasonably assume it is true." — NKBJ

Science really can't work that way. Progress is made by finding problems with our theories and proposing solutions to these problems, not by certifying theories as true. Right now there is zero evidence that there is a problem with either quantum mechanics or general relativity. No one knows even how to perform an experiment to discover any problems with them, since both LHC and LIGO have failed to find one, but we know there IS a problem, and it has nothing to do with evidence.

Or I'm wrong. There's only two possibilities right? What do you think? — TogetherTurtle

I think that most people when confronted with the idea that animals are not sentient, do not possess qualia, don't even know they exist etc. find that notion repulsive and experience various degrees of emotional outrage.

However, I gave an outline of various hints and arguments that this is indeed the case. There is a computational and epistemological argument that they cannot know anything beyond what they are programmed to know, and they are not programmed to be self-aware or other-aware, because they, lacking appropriate hardware, cannot be.

Another argument comes from the impressive work of the psychologist R. W. Byrne. Animals learn by behaviour parsing, not by understanding.
http://pages.ucsd.edu/~johnson/COGS260/Byrne2003.pdf

For some reason we find the notion that animals don't suffer horrifying, when it is in fact a blessing.

I would say because the criteria of validity are different. — Arne

There are no criteria of validity in science.

But yes, I am always pained when a reasonably argued philosophical proposition is met with a "demand" for empirical "proof." — Arne

Have you got any examples of that?

It is the nature of the proposition that determines whether a demand for empirical "proof" is appropriate. — Arne

You can demand empirical proof as much as you like, you are never going to get it.

And a philosophical proposition is different than a scientific proposition. — Arne

Because the methods of criticism available are different.

So, if I understand this correctly, you're saying that some calls for proof may be less valid in philosophy than they would be in science. — Pseudonym

I can't help but wince a little every time I read something about proof in science in this thread. It's like the Scientific Method never happened.

My argument is that animals are not self aware because they simply aren't aware of themselves. — TogetherTurtle

That's not a particularly convincing argument.

Therefore, yes, we have self awareness, yes, machines can be self aware, and no, animals are not self aware. That was my argument from the beginning and it seems that is the argument I will have at the end as well. — TogetherTurtle

Did you give an argument that animals are not self aware, or did you just assert it?

Are algorithms physical? — apokrisis

I argued in another thread that algorithms are not physical - they are logical. Of course, their instantiation must be physical, but given that this is arbitrary, the instantiation and the algorithm are different things. An identical algorithm may be instantiated on Babbage's analytic engine or on a, yet to be constructed, quantum computer. The instantiations will be subject to quite different physical laws, one effectively classical, the other quantum, but the algorithm itself is not subject to the laws of physics.

In what sense are you using the term physics to mean a scientific model of both hardware and software? — apokrisis

Usually when I use the term "physics" I am referring to that body of knowledge relating to the fundamental structure of reality.

You can start with a Turing machine if you like. — apokrisis

Why would I do that? Turing machines don't exist, they are mathematical abstractions.

In what sense are you saying that all that rather mental stuff is reduced to the same materialistic physics used to imagine the hardware? — apokrisis

Pretty sure I made no such claim.

How does the brain depend on computations? — Anthony

What does that question even mean?

I've thought it, computations, the hammer of mathematicians which treats of everything in existence like its nails. — Anthony

Nails? Computational universality has nothing to do with mathematicians, or nails.

Even though many phenomena can be analyzed mathematically doesn't mean math was required to bring them into existence. — Anthony

You've lost me.

We are not like computers, at all. — Bitter Crank

Our brains cannot be more than computers, according to physics.

It's always rather odd to me people want to focus on computer models (computer as model) as representing intelligence or awareness instead of, say, the integrated processes (mind) of an old growth forest. — Anthony

It has been proved that, according to known physics, a universal computer can emulate any physical system exactly. It's not odd, it's reality.

I am done. I can be no clearer. — Arne

Done? You mean hoist by your own petard.

I am certain I clearly said I had no issue with whether we are unique. We are, after all, the only species that has ever intentionally killed others over a disagreement regarding the transubstantiation of a piece of bread. I suspect it does not get more unique than that. My point was and still is that uniqueness is not a synonym for superiority; — Arne

Null sets, though.

It rests upon the unstated presumption that you have something beasts do not. If all H's (Humans) have A's and only A's and all B's (Beasts) have A's and only A's, then the statement that SA = that which H's have but B's do not produces a null set. — Arne

And even if you could establish some sort of qualitative and/or quantitative difference between the awareness Humans have and the awareness Beasts have, that difference would not necessarily be a difference in a degree of awareness regarding awareness, i.e., self-awareness. — Arne

Humans have something other animals do not - a computationally universal brain, and a self aware mind.

Do you seriously think a Robot has a Conscious Red experience? — SteveKlinko

Do you seriously think I claimed robots are conscious?

The Human Brain processes signals but there is an extra processing stage that a Computer does not have. — SteveKlinko

How many processing stages are required to create qualia? 2, 3, 4? How does the last one create the qualia? Why can't a robot have that "extra processing stage"?

The deeper issue is to behave as if our "uniqueness" justified a normative superiority vis-à-vis other species. — Arne

Other species don't possess qualia, so we are different. Animals don't possess computationally universal brains, so we are different.

We somehow want to claim that the universe is a better place for all because humans and only humans can do X — Arne

That is false and contrary to known physics.

Do you not see the pattern here as well the desperation to perceive an indifferent universe as somehow better off because of our presence? What in the world is that all about? — Arne

There is no pattern except you making assumptions.

Humans are the only objects in the universe known to create explanatory knowledge and possess qualia. You are assuming that I claimed humans were the only objects that could do these things, when I did not. It's a pattern.

I think I understand now. You are saying that there is no such thing as the Conscious Red experience. Do you not See the color Red? If you do then it is real. It exists in what I like to call Conscious Space. It does not exist in Physical Space. — SteveKlinko

I think you might be assuming too much here. When a robot sees red, the seeing-red is definitely occurring in physical space

The Redness of the Red is a Property that only exists in Conscious Space. There is no Redness in Physical Space. Red Physical Light has Wavelength as a Property but does not in fact have Redness as a Property. — SteveKlinko

Again, in a robot, when it sees red, certain physical changes happen in its circuitry that correspond to red. You could point to the circuits and say, "Look, the robot is seeing red!" but there would be no consciousness there.

The Conscious Red Light is a Surrogate for the Physical Red Light. — SteveKlinko

Maybe, but is not the quale of red more in the nature of what-it-is-like to see red, rather than a surrogate for photons of a certain energy?

You seem to assume you are aware of a stone while that stone is not aware of you. — raza

It's not an assumption, it is a consequence of known physics. Stones are not and cannot be self aware, or even aware.

All I'm saying is that consciousness or self-awareness isn't a deserving attribute of humans. We're NOT completely self-aware. — TheMadFool

What does it mean to be "completely self aware" as opposed to just self aware?

Seriously, I share your interest in the subject matter. But I maintain the deeper issue is why some seem so insistent upon reserving to or creating for human (and only human?) some sort of unique normative ontological priority. This apparent need to preserve, reserve, and/or create a significant normative specialness for human is quite fascinating. — Arne

If animals possess qualia - i.e. they can create "what-it-is-like" knowledge, then what is to stop them from creating, as humans do, any kind of knowledge?

Humans are quite unique. We are the only known objects in the universe that create explanatory knowledge. In order to achieve this remarkable feat, there are strong arguments to the effect that we require at least two features: computationally universal hardware, and software that is not genetically determined. There is absolutely no evidence that animals possess either of these.

Animals have been on the planet a lot longer than humans, and you none of them has developed a language, literature, culture or science. You may be fascinated that certain philosophers think this sets humans apart from other animals, but are you also fascinated that we don't ascribe morality to animals and put them on trial for their misdemeanors? Surely we have to prosecute them to escape the charge of "significant normative specialness"?

I regret that the conceptual gap between your understanding and mine is too large to bridge. — Pattern-chaser

You had the opportunity to be true to your word, but you declined. In reality what else could you do?

Anyway, keep erecting fantasy epistemological barriers based on nothing but ignorance and prejudice, if that is all you have.

the conceptual difference between the mind and the brain is just too big for humans to usefully span. — Pattern-chaser

So, you think pretending an arbitrary epistemological barrier exists, constitutes what? An analogy or an argument?

Let's try another analogy, to illustrate the point. I could accurately refer to your car as a collection of quarks. — Pattern-chaser

No you can't.

If you think you can, then be my guest.

I appreciate the links. You seem, as in a lot of your posts, to be confusing "David Deutch says..." with "it is the case that...". All I read in the paper you've provided is Deutch (with far more humility than you're citing him with) saying things like "I present an account of...", and "in this view...". Absolutely no where does he say "This is the way things are and anyone who thinks otherwise is wrong". So no, I don't accept your contention that science is about explanation on the basis of a single paper in which the author himself admits that he is only presenting "an" account not "the" account. — Pseudonym

I see. I show you in the most striking way that science is exclusively about explanation, a fact that you deny, and you chide me because I lack humility? I'll take straight talking over willful misconception any day.

Since the inception of the Scientific Method, explanation has been central to science. Popper even tried to develop a mathematical theory of explanatory depth in his "Logic of Scientific Discovery".

Deutsch a particularly interesting case. He is a practicing Popperian, a world-ranking physicist who has made perhaps the only advance in the philosophy of science since Popper. I make no apologies for citing his discoveries.

I don't think it is. I think most scientists consider themselves in the business of making testable theories. It's in the business of predicting, not explaining. I'm no expert, but my limited understanding of the methods in quantum physics (where currently one has to include an element of chance, so I'm lead to believe), is to simply include that chance mathematically. Scientists are trying to eliminate that chance element, I suppose, in order to make the theory more accurately predictive, but until that point, the 'scientific' theory simply includes probability and everyone's quite happy that they are still doing 'science'. Prediction is far more useful than reasons. — Pseudonym

This recent paper on quantum mechanics should clarify the matter for you. Science is about explanation.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.02048

If anything, the very deterministic nature of science leads even the most causal thinker to conclude that if we keep asking "why?", we must obviously arrive at either an infinite task or the answer "just because". So any scientists who did think that they were one day going to arrive at the ultimate reason why would be deluded indeed. — Pseudonym

The laws of nature are deterministic, and yes, knowledge seeking is an infinite task, and we are always at the beginning of it. Here's a book about that very subject.

https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/the-beginning-of-infinity-explanations-that-transform-the-world-by-david-deutsch-2258470.html

Firstly, a minor correction, it's not chance as cause, chance can't cause something, it's an expression of the lack of determinism. — Pseudonym

You are right, there are no stochastic processes in nature. Here's a video about it.

Software must need hardware right? Anyway I'm questioning the basic premise that humans are self-aware. I think that's not true, at least not to the extent of being x I described in my OP. — TheMadFool

Software and hardware are not the same thing. Your brain is hardware, your mind is software.

1. computers
2. humans
3. being x I described above.

Let's put these on a line that represents the spectrum of self-awareness from completely oblivious (like a stone) and completely aware (like being x).

Would we be closer to the computer or being x? — TheMadFool

What makes you think a computer could ever be aware? Only software can do that.

How is the "now" of our experience change? Why isn't it statically present in one spot forever? It seems to me that consciousness must be propelled forward OR time must "flow" future to present to past. Since the latter option is considered suspect due to the nature of time (block universe theory), it seems the former must be true. — TheGreatOne

You've spotted something very interesting. The various "arrows of time" in physics have been unified under the "thermodynamic arrow of time" or something related to the 2nd Law, and it is just assumed that the "psychological" or "epistemological arrow of time" has been captured by the same unification. You are also assuming this.

However, it was proved in by Bennett (Bennett, C. H. 1973 IBM Jl Res. Dev.17, 525) that the epistemological arrow of time cannot be aligned with the thermodynamic, and that any alleged connection is fallacious. The epistemological arrow of time is in fact reversible.

This leaves us in the precarious state in which the physical and psychological arrows of time are unrelated, which needs to be resolved!

I thought you said that a universal computer could emulate any possible physical system, and that it's impossible that one universal computer could do something that another could not. Are you claiming that you're using a computer that can emulate any physical system? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but it would need more memory and a lot of time.

Please expand upon what you mean by 'The stationary space-time block' — Marcus de Brun

I don't need to "expand", you expressed it well enough.

One does not need QM to prove the absence of free will. Special relatively already achieves this without equivocation. Temporal shifts at high velocity travel have proven special relatively correct. The future already exists and as such free will is precluded. — Marcus de Brun

This is your phrase (not mine), and you have suggested I am happy with it? — Marcus de Brun

It's standard nomenclature for what special relativity (your choice) and its generalisation to include gravity, mandates. I take no credit for it.

Please allow me the courtesy of a definition, prior to the assumption of my contentment with it's philosophical content. — Marcus de Brun

Right.

So a "universal computer" is a fictional thing, defined as a computational device which can simulate the dynamics of any possible physical system? Since it's fictional, how do we even know that such a devise is possible? And if we do not know whether such a device is even possible, of what use is the assumption of such a thing? — Metaphysician Undercover

The whole point is that Universal Computers are real devices, which can exist according to known physics.

We are painfully aware of the classical restriction of the Universal Computer - they are everywhere. Classical and quantum computers have the same computational repertoire, it is just that certain tasks may be performed exponentially quicker on a q-machine than a c-machine. Emulating the human brain is not one of those tasks - the human brain is a c-machine.

It should be noted that massive academic and engineering industries have resulted from the "Deutsch Principle" paper of the 1980s.

Universal computers are real. I am typing on one.

Good video. Gave me new insight into Universal Computing. I thought it was about Computers, but I see a Brain and a piece of writing paper could serve the same purpose but slower. How does any of this solve the Hard Problem and leave a Hard Problem 2.0 to be solved? Now can you tell me what the Hard Problem 2.0 is? — SteveKlinko

Universal Computing is about physics, the way reality is structured, how information flows, and also about computers.

If we accept for the sake of argument, that the brain is a computationally universal physical structure, like Babbage's Analytic Engine, or a PC, then anything the brain can do, so can these other objects. The implication of this is that consciousness cannot be a material property, or be associated with any particular physics.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness refers to the problem of explaining how conscious phenomena, qualia, relate to physical phenomena. Well, the implication from computational universality is that qualia cannot relate to any particular physical structure, and thus the Hard Problem is dismissed.

The Other Hard Problem (Hard Problem 2.0) is how do abstract entities obtain qualia. Qualia are a software feature rather than a hardware emergence.

This mode of discussion, smacks of the new religion of the materialist. One feels as though one is at an inquisition of sorts, questioning the almighty God of modern materialism. The 'which future' rejoinder leads one to a reductio absurdum and cannot be escaped, just as the almightly absurdity of God was medieval ne plus ultra of the dark ages. — Marcus de Brun

But you're happy with a stationary space-time block, because it does not "smack of the new religion of the materialist"?

The statonary space-time block does not make you "feel as though one is at an inquisition of sorts", or that you are "questioning the almighty god of materialism"?

If the stationary space-time block is not religious, or inquisitory, or materialist, then why are a collection of space-time blocks those things?

If the future exists apriori how can our personal future be open.? — Marcus de Brun

It is impossible in principle to know which futures you will inhabit, not even a "god" can do that. Also, it is possible to set the quantum amplitude of certain futures to zero by the application of knowledge.

This multiverrse stuff sounds like a sophisticated version of the god delusion... A nice way of filling in gaps and silencing critics. Other Universes are not relavent to our universe and discussions as to their existence are just another example of atheistic gods. — Marcus de Brun

Sure, you are willing to declare reality is a space-time based on special relativity, but are unwilling to accept what quantum mechanics tells us. Strikes me as glaringly inconsistent.

Bell himself felt the ultimate question is one of determinism, and the only problem with determinism is the fact that people are afraid of it and don't know what to do with it, and cannot reconcile it with thought, or free will. It (determinism) is readily reconcilable with SR and QM, it its less reconcilable with the fear of its intellectual import. — Marcus de Brun

QM is a fully deterministic theory.

One does not need QM to prove the absence of free will. Special relatively already achieves this without equivocation. Temporal shifts at high velocity travel have proven special relatively correct. The future already exists and as such free will is precluded. — Marcus de Brun

But quantum mechanics tells us that we don't inhabit a space-time, rather we inhabit a multiverse, which to a good approximation, is a countably infinite set of parallel space-times. Under this scenario, while the futures already exist, just as in general relativity, our personal future is open.

For myself, I can only positivistically affirm quantum time and quantum energy. — Jonathan AB

How do you do that?

The fact that the Human Mind created the Laptop would indicate that the Human Mind is greater than the Laptop. — SteveKlinko

That's like saying Microsoft Word is greater than your laptop. Comparisons don't work unless you are comparing things of the same type.

First of all a Brain is nothing like a Computer. A Brain has Trillions of simultaneous Neural Firings at any instant of time. — SteveKlinko

It is proved, that under currently known laws of physics, there is no such thing as a physical system that can undergo any dynamics that cannot be exactly emulated on a universal computer. This means that nothing can exist in nature which can out-compute a universal computer in any fundamental way.

So, either the brain is a universal computer, or it is less than one.

This link takes me to David Deutsch's talk which begins at ~2:50:00 into the Dirac Medal Ceremony. Very interesting talk about the discovery of his principle.

What do you mean by Hard Problem 2.0? — SteveKlinko

Let's get computational universality under our belts first.

Equivalent in what way, they are all computational universal devices? — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no such thing as a universal computer that can do something that other universal computers cannot.

There is no such thing as a physical system that can undergo any dynamics that cannot be exactly simulated on a universal computer.

Do you think Turing machines are subjects of experience? — Wayfarer

Ignoring the fact that Turing machines don't exist - they are a mathematical abstraction - and assuming by "subjects of experience" you mean something like ""possess qualia", then the answer, as I explained above, is No. The same argument also applies to real brains.

Ok. So if the Principle itself doesn't say anything about Consciousness how can it tell us that Consciousness is a Software feature? I guess I am missing your point. — SteveKlinko

The Church-Turing-Deutsch Principle tells us (proves based on known physics) that all computationally universal devices are equivalent.

Now, there is no proof that the human brain is computationally universal, but there are extremely strong arguments to support this. The human brain not only instantiates a mind, but is capable of language, knowledge creation etc. Just visit a university library, then formulate an argument that the brain is not universal, that it is restricted somehow. i.e. that it is less than a laptop computer.

Since the brain, and computers are universal, then what one can do, the others also can. This is entirely independent of the particular physics that underlies the design or evolution of the device.

The clear implication of this, is that any abstraction instantiated on a universal computer cannot be a consequence of the particular physics. By extension, features of such abstractions, such as self-awareness, cannot be properties of the physics, they must be properties of the abstraction.

Thus the "Hard Problem" is solved. We now only need to solve the "Hard Problem 2.0".