Science would know nothing about laws without the ability to reason, and 'the ability to reason' is neither a product of, nor is expicable with reference to, the laws of physics. — Wayfarer

And it would be a mistake to refer to "cause" in your reasoning if there is none. There is none.

To paraphrase, even though the principle of causality can't be demonstrated empirically, the operations of thought are predicated on its reality. In other words, reason cannot proceed without it, and insofar as we know things by way of reason, then we must presume causal relationships, in the absence of which, scientific analysis would not be able to proceed. — Wayfarer

But the point is the laws of physics say otherwise, and somehow scientists are able to discover them and reason about them and use them. The laws of physics agree with Hume and Russell.

If there is no cause, then how can there be a first cause, absent religion?

I see, it's philosophy and physics vs your religious prejudices.

Why could neither Hume nor Russell could find causality anywhere in Reality? What did they miss?

I'd argue that patterns indicate causes, and vice versa. — Heister Eggcart

You mean like night follows day follows night? Which one is the cause of the other?

But even if a machine becomes conscious one day, how would we ever know? A computer might insist all day long that it is a "real live boy", but that could simply be the result of clever programming, so who will believe it? And this is the point of the OP - we judge other minds to exist, extrapolating from our own, but we don't really know. — Real Gone Cat

It is simply not possible to program consciousness prior to understanding it. It will be known that an algorithm is conscious because the principles it instantiates will be known and understood.

The notion of the p-zombie is simply incoherent. The idea of a being who acts just like us but exhibits no consciousness simply does not hold up to scrutiny. The p-zombie is an oxymoron - perhaps with poetic value, but not philosophical. — Real Gone Cat

I agree. I think a p-zombie would be easy to spot. A p-zombie may look like a human, but its behaviour would be quite different.

When coupled with a hand to calculate the symbols, why isn't it? — Marchesk

Pencil and paper coupled to a hand?

So pencil and paper implementing that software would also have the same experience — Marchesk

It's not the hardware, it's the software, and all computationally universal hardware is equivalent - i.e. irrelevant.

Pencil and paper is not computationally universal.

Why would any physical system or process be accompanied with experience? Why is my active brain/body having experiences? — Marchesk

It's not the brain, it's the software running on the brain that has the experience.

I don't think physicalism entails functionalism or the computational theory of mind, although they're compatible. — jamalrob

What else could it be?

Does any of them give an account of what exists, how it behaves and why?

My point is that this really is no difference at all. The only difference here is whetheryou personally attribute consciousness to the person or not. This has nothing to do with actual, transcendentally existing conscious experiences which are somehow in relationship to this person before you. All it is is you basically going "that person over there is conscious, and therefore isn't a p-zombie", and nothing else. — dukkha

I think I could spot a p-zombie. Every creature has to follow an algorithm of some sort, and if the algorithm did not include consciousness, then I suspect some behaviours and capacities would be absent.

For a start, I don't think p-zombies can create knowledge.

Physicalism can't explain why some physical systems have experience and others don't. You might ask so what, but physicalism is supposed to present a comprehensive ontology. It can't leave anything out and be true. — Marchesk

Which metaphysical view explains subjectivity? Actually, which other metaphysical view offers an explanation for anything?

According to physicalism, subjectivity must be a software feature.

I agree, and that was Jaron Lanier's point to the functionalists who think that the mind can be computed, which is why he came up with a bizarre scenario of using a meteor shower instead of a billion Chinese to implement a digital simulation of a person. For functionalists, the substrate is immaterial, as long as it provides the functionality. — Marchesk

Is a meteor shower computationally universal?

They think consciousness is explainable in term of abstractions that supervene on the physical, such as neuroscience. So if neuroscience can fully explain color experience (at some point in the future), then it's physical. — Marchesk

I doubt that the science which will deal with the abstractions that are conscious will be neuroscience. When the philosophical breakthrough is achieved, the natural place for the science to be placed is within psychology. The theory will be at the appropriate level of abstraction.

More broadly, it's about whether an objective account can be given for subjectivity. Tying this back to the OP, if there is such an objective account, then it might be computable, and if so, then there should be some algorithm for computing an experience of seeing blue. And if that's the case, then why wouldn't a pencil and paper computation of the algorithm result in that experience? — Marchesk

Is there an objective account of life? Can a "pencil and paper" be alive?

I'm under the impression that modern philosophers don't appeal to the soul when defending versions of consciousness which aren't explainable in physical terms. Rather, they come to the conclusion that physicalism is false. — Marchesk

Do physicalists think consciousness is "explainable" in physical terms? Life isn't even explained in physical terms, but rather in terms of abstractions that supervene on the physical.

I'm not aware that physics requires universal computation to be the case, only that some have asserted that all physical processes can be computed. Sounds like an ontological claim to me, but maybe there is a mathematical proof for this? — Marchesk

There exists a proof.

Even if so, the big challenge would be to show that everything about the living brain is reducible to physics. — Marchesk

No! What is required is to demonstrate that any finite physical system can be simulated to arbitrary accuracy by finite means on a universal computer.

You think the brain has some non-physical aspect to it?

Humans were computers before electronic computers existed. Is there a reason why enough humans given enough time can't compute any algorithm? How is that different from a turing machine with infinite tape? — Marchesk

There are a great many practical difficulties in encouraging 1 billion people to cooperate in cranking out an algorithm. What makes you think 1 billion is enough?

Much easier to use a laptop, surely!

Does anyone have any idea what sort of algorithm that would be? The point is to ask what it is about algorithms which could lead to experience. — Marchesk

No. It is a pressing philosophical problem.

You can take this as a criticism either against the computational theory of mind, or a criticism against universal computation (the substrate doesn't matter). — Marchesk

Denial of known physics is always an option, particularly when there are no consequences that matter.

Because racism. Only a Chinese substrate will realize a true Turing machine. God is Chinese, and Searles messed up by having the room output Chinese, otherwise he had a solid argument. Silly Searle. — Marchesk

Or it could be because of a very famous thought-experiment.

I'll agree with the point there may be something unconsidered which will prevent a jar of all colors, however that also applies to the assumption they will be evenly disturbed. — Jeremiah

The only assumption is that the marbles are well-mixed.

Something that happens outside the third standard deviation. — Jeremiah

I gave a formula earlier for the density of occurrences of jars of a single colour. By definition, when this happens, it is well outside many standard deviations for moderate sized jars.

The normal distribution does not end at 3 standard deviations.

And where did you establish that only slight variations can occur over an infinite number of jars? If we say something can happen outside normal distribution then we are saying an occurrence that is not a slight variation can occur. I already went over this. — Jeremiah

What would constitute something happening "outside the normal distribution"?

All universal computers are equivalent. What you need to argue is that a billion Chinese human computers, cranking out an algorithm, constitutes a computationally universal system which is realisable.

Why not just program qualia on your laptop?

Why group animals with robots and computer programs? Animals have nervous systems, and they have their own goals independent of us (often enough at odds with us). Computer programs and robots just do what we design or program them to do. As such, attributing intentionality to them could just be a case of anthropomorphism. Seeing intentionality in things that lack it because they have a behavior or look familiar to us. It's like seeing shapes in clouds or thinking the volcano god is angry. — Marchesk

Because animals are exquisitely engineered robots! Animals must have certain brain-abilities in order to function as they do, and one of those seems to be intentionality. It seems impossible to explain their behaviour without recourse to intentionality.

Obviously current robots don't have the complexity of behaviours associated with even relatively rudimentary animals, but then, they've not had 3.5 billion years of nature selecting these behaviours! Even so, is it really possible to explain the behaviour of a robot without recourse to "computational" states that refer to other things? I'm not so sure. I think a tiny amount of intentionality is still intentionality.

We know that robots don't possess qualia, and there is no reason (anthropomorphic fallacy aside) to suspect animals do. Thus neither has the quale of intentionality.

You have to believe that you have accounted for everything when you say “sure... you can end up with a gallon size jar filled with only white marbles if you have infinite tries” even though the average person (who knows nothing about the language of math) knows this to be and untrue statement. — Ergo

Perhaps you could extend some sympathy to those poor souls, lacking your deep statistical intuition, who are condemned to think abstractly about such situations? A simplified example might be useful:

Say your jars could only hold 3 marbles. How often could you expect to find a jar with only one colour in it, and why?

Yeah this is where I accept the arguments/merits of physicalism, as it can give reasonable explanations up until the 'quale of intentionality' which is where I struggle to see how it's overcome. — Rawrren

Yes, we want physicalism to provide an explanation of qualia, but why don't we demand explanations from the other metaphysical positions?

But wouldn't one here re-enforce the notion of privileged access? I agree that e.g. we can figure out what a dog might be dreaming about, but for the most part we have no idea what it's actually thinking of and no amount of inspection from neuroscience could ever reveal the intentional content - only the intentional state? Likewise a computer surely does not have intentional content since it cannot make use of intentional states (think/hope/believe) - it only runs based on input & outputs like functionalists say. — Rawrren

According to physics, a computer can do everything a human can - i.e. it can have identical intentional or other mental states. We simply don't know how to program them yet!

Do you think animals possess qualia? How about intentionality?

In this case I am referring to the term 'intentionality' in this philosophical sense:

"the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs" — Rawrren

To get anywhere, you've got to decide whether "intentionality" is a property of a mind, or whether "intentionality" can be exhibited by mindless objects.

I think intentionality can be exhibited by mindless objects: robots, computer programs, animals. This in a way solves the problem of intentionality at a stroke. The big problem remains however - that of the quale of intentionality.

"the about-ness of something/the answer to the question 'what are you thinking of/about'?"

As opposed to, what I think you're trying to infer, the intention/aim/plan to do X, Y, Z — Rawrren

And you could ask that question of a program or a dog. With enough technical ability, you could interrogate the hardware of each. With dogs, you can even get a rough idea what they are dreaming about simply by watching them.

Do you think the human genome is "about" anything?

You're conflating intentionality and intention. — Michael

Really, how?

I know that is the approach of the eliminative materialist (deny), but what would other physicalists theorists/theories say about intentional content + more importantly is there a better response from the eliminativist? I genuinely cannot figure out how physicalism overcomes this problem since intentional content is one of the things most apparent to us and it is clearly not physical. — Rawrren

Might you be conflating "intention" with the quale of having intention? There are robots on mars that have been programmed to behave in a certain way, which seems to suggest that they possess intention. They don't however possess qualia!

But does the maths say this?
Your trying to play off two mathematical claims against each other, but if you flesh it out more there is not conflict at all.
1. If there is a the possibility of a jar filling up with a certain color then infinite jars will almost certainly have at least one in which there is only one color. — shmik

The issue here is modelling a deterministic physical system as a stochastic process. If we agree that randomness is an appropriate model, then the probability of finding a jar filled with a single colour would be something like 1 in 4^(n-1) where n is the number of marbles in the jar.

So, if n=101, then you should get a jar full of a single colour every ~1.6x10^60 jars, by which time you will have used up the matter in the universe and created a super-massive black hole.

For any specific set of causes, if there can be an infinite set of events that follow (as there's no reason to limit things to just 2 possible choices), how do you conclude causation and not spontaneity? My point being that an inherent condition of causation is determinism, and any indeterminate system is necessarily non-causative and therefore spontaneous. — Hanover

That's not quite true. Under super-determinism (which just means determinism+entanglement), you will observe reality exactly as quantum mechanics predicts i.e. the result of measurement is one member of the spectrum of the observable, but the value you obtain is completely determined.

Another view is that measurement results in a superposition of the entire spectrum of the observable and through decoherence, you find yourself entangled with one of them, or rather you become entangled with each of them, but are unaware of your counterparts.

There are other interpretations of QM, but these are not compatible with the Free Will Theorem, which is precisely the result that A leads to B or C and no information exists in the universe to predict which. The argument is that particles are genuinely free.

I reject super-determinism, but that still leaves us with a deterministic (with unpredictable outcomes) theory and a "spontaneity" theory, which are empirically indistinguishable for the foreseeable future.*

One interesting point I find, is that BOTH the deterministic and the spontaneous theory deny causation.

*Because deterministic theories are time-reversible, certain exotic experiments have been proposed that could distinguish a time-reversible theory from a spontaneity theory.

I think uncomfortable numbers can still be said to exist in the sense that there is a formal abstraction that defines them.
I see your point though and it is interesting. — m-theory

Did not mean to cause any discomfort, but we know the non-computable numbers and the non-computable functions exist because they are indispensable in our explanation of why certain numbers and functions are computable.

Our connection with concrete reality is via our theories and tests. Our connection with abstract reality is via proof.

As you don't point out, but I keep asking you, what's an example of something that a computer does or has that's an abstraction? — Terrapin Station

Here's a rather striking example of the literally trillions of possible examples that could be chosen:

http://www.nature.com/news/two-hundred-terabyte-maths-proof-is-largest-ever-1.19990

Now I've got a couple of questions for you:

1. What is the special physics that exists only in the human brain that makes it the only place abstractions can be instantiated?

2. How do computers work - perform proofs, play games, simulate reality, if they don't instantiate the abstractions upon which they are operating?

Before the invention of computers computation was only an abstraction.
If that abstraction did not actually apply to reality then computers would not exist and would not even be possible. — m-theory

Yes, and not only can a Turing machine be instantiated in Reality, but that Turing machine can instantiate another Turing machine abstractly. But then that's what Turing machines do - they abstract!

And, as you point out, if Reality did not have this ability to instantiate abstractions, computers could not exist. But taking your argument a little further, computation (as performed by humans) would not be possible, the same goes for language and thought.

Again either abstractions are a real possibility and thus exist, or abstractions are not a real possibility and do not exist. — m-theory

Some entities are purely abstract, and I see no reason to describe them as "possibilities". Take the set of non-computable numbers. How could they be described as "possible" when they are explicitly not.

If you agree that abstractions exist then in some sense you are acknowledging that abstractions are real.
It is really that simple. — m-theory

It may be that simple, but it does get interesting.

But this is all for a different thread called "What is an abstract object?" — Mongrel

Maybe you should read the OP.

I don't see why A → B ∨ C entails spontaneity but A → B doesn't. In the predetermined world, B happens because of A. In the random world, either B happens because of A or C happens because of A. There's no spontaneity. Whatever happens is caused by something prior. — Michael

If you run the physical causal law in reverse, does B ∨ C → A make any sense?

Electrical signals are being directed around silicon chips, mechanically influencing the pixels on the display. Presumably nothing's going on that can't in principle be seen with a sufficiently powerful magnifying glass. — Michael

You mean like the electrical signals in your brain, mechanically influencing your fingers?

For me it's better to look at the concepts without ontological considerations. If you subsequently want to say there is no such thing as an abstract object.. fine. Ontology does not provide leverage for redefining terms. — Mongrel

Still, it is tempting to think that, when a team of mathematicians have finished programming a computer to perform a proof, and finally, after months of toil, run the program, that there is indeed a mathematical proof being performed by the computer.

If no mathematical proof was performed by the computer, if abstract entities were not instantiated and operated upon, then it is quite difficult to explain just what is going on.

What is Hilbert space, and what makes it any more real than probability waves? And I don't mean what is the math, I mean what does the math represent? — Marchesk

Would it surprise you to learn that classical mechanics can also be formulated in terms of wavefunctions on Hilbert space?

No one thinks there are probability waves flying around in classical physics. What exists are rocks, chairs, planets ... and they aren't in Hilbert space either.

This is where I get confused about the Copenhagen interpretation. Is it anti-realist, or is it saying that reality is this non-classical stuff of possibilities that behave like a wave? That seems to be two different interpretations. — Marchesk

The Copenhagen is anti-realist; it is a purely epistemic theory. The "Standard" interpretation, taught at most (American) universities calls itself Copenhagen, but it's not. It is based on the famous book by von Neumann "The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics". That interpretation definitely has a realist feel to it. In British universities, the treatment tends to be closer to Dirac, which again feels realist.

Quantum mechanics is quite hard, and is made more so by obfuscators like Binney. You aren't going to be asked for an essay on ontology or epistemology in your final exam, but you are going to need to shut up and calculate.

In terms of the double slit experiment, we don't know why it results in an interference pattern when there isn't a detector on one of the slits. — Marchesk

Yes we do!