Yes, I agree that it is painful. But maybe it is a necessary pain. Think of it as the pain caused by a cure for a terrible disease.

For instance, if I mistreat people I love. When I acknowledge that I made a mistake, I can experience repentance and a desire to be better in the future (in fact, without such a desire it would be something like 'regret'*, maybe, not 'repentance'). Think about it as the pain one suffers because of surgery. Such a pain is necessary for healing.

I believe that healing (both physical and psychological) can be a painful process. But sometimes experiencing that pain is necessary to get better and be better. Even in human relationship, if I, say, treat badly someone I love, acknowledging the mistake can be painful but that pain might be a necessary step for healing and reconciliation.

*I am not anglophone, but I think that 'regret' can mean simply 'wishing to not having done an action', while 'repentance' is, in fact, a sincere acknowledgment of having being wrong coupled with a sincere desire to be a better person and reconcile with whom one has offended, mistreated or whatever.

↪boundless Wouldn't an implication of your view be that everything is ultimately permissible in some sense? Moreover, it would seem to imply that it doesn't matter what we do because even without repentance for sin, there would be salvation. Does that strike you as theologically sound? — NotAristotle

No. One can say that sincere repentance is still needed to escape a state of eternal torment. But there is no 'time limit' after which repentance is just impossible.

A world where the denial of free will is somewhat common is a world where this low anthropology is in the air — Leontiskos

Just to clarify, I don't believe that denying the possibility to be perfectly culpable is denying free will or moral responsability. In fact, assuming that we are enough free in this life to be perfectly culpable is in my opinion an idealized view of human beings. I don't think we enjoy such a degree of freedom or autonomy.

Of course, this does not mean that we cannot deserve very severe punishments. I ma just questioning that we can deserve infinite ones.

Sure, and the claim has never been that the only people who hold Hell to be unjust are universalists of type 1. — Leontiskos

Ok!

You keep assuming that premise, but I see no reason why one would have to hold to the fixity of the will at death in order to believe in Hell. — Leontiskos

I thought that the standard Catholic doctrine is just that: the orientation of the will of the damned is irreversibly fixed at death (otherwise, repentance could be possible after death, and those who do a post-mortem repentace would be still eternally damned, a possibility that the standard Catholic doctrine IIRC rejects).

But anyway, I agree that 'eternal hell' doesn't logically imply the fixity of the will at death. But IMO it is a central issue, isn't it?

I see various possibilities here:

1) Eternal hell is a just punishment that anyone that die in a state of mortal sin (to use Catholic language*) rightfully deserves. Even if the damned repents, it must suffer eternally because it is what justice requires.

2) Eternal hell is a just punishment that anyone that die in a state of mortal sin rightfully deserves. The damned's will is irrevocably fixed at death (or even before?) and they can't repent (because they can't desire it).

3) Eternal hell is a just punishment that anyone that die in a state of mortal sin rightfully deserves. But if one sincerely repents in Hell, then, he or she is mercifully allowed to go out from it (whether this means that the repentant goes to Heaven or not is irrelevant here).

4) The damned can condemn himself or herself forever if he or she persist forever in sin. That is, he or she can at any time repent, but there is the possibility that he or she never does and, in fact, continue forever to remain in sin (this is more or less C.S. Lewis' view).

(1), (2) and (3) require that eternal hell is a just punishment for a mortal sin (or the equivalent term in a different tradition). But note that (3) and (4) are compatible with a type of confident 'hopeful universalism' or at least that in eternity hell might be emptied (a confident hope, not a certainty, of course).

Clearly, if either (1) or (2) is true, then any kind of hope in a empty hell seems to me an irreasonable hope, if mortal sin is something that people can do.

Anyway, only (4) is compatible with the view that eternal hell is not retributive, God forever offers the possibility to everyone to repent and that the damned choose their state (and continue to choose that despite God's attempts to turn their wills).

I do believe, however, that 'infernalism', i.e. the possibility that some will eternally be in hell, in the case of (4) is just incredibly unlikely. I know that C.S. Lewis would say that no one (or very few) among the damned will repent. But IMO this is questionable. In either case, in scenario (4) - and also in scenario (3) - no one is forever beyond hope.

That's why I believe that in order to 'justify' hell, one must believe that eternal hell is a just punishment in a proportional, retributive justice. And to return to the topic of the discussion, I believe that this necessarily implies that human beings must be able to be perefectly/infinitely culpable to deserve that.
IMHO if there are mitigating factors it seems to me that an unending torment can't be a proportional, adequate. There must be no mitigating factors to ensure perfect culpability. I am questioning that it is possible for humans (at least in this life).

I hope that this helps.

This will ultimately run up against objections to Manichaeism if the illness has no proper cause. In Christianity even when sin is conceived as an illness the proper cause of that illness is a volitional act, whether Adam's or Satan's. — Leontiskos

I believe that universalist generally assume that the cause of sin are volitional acts.

Then Hart would seem to be logically committed to a Limbo of some kind, at least theoretically. He thinks God cannot damn the sinner and he also thinks the sinner does not deserve salvation. The deserts of the (existing) sinner are therefore something in between those two options. — Leontiskos

I disagree. I believe that he thinks that no one deserves salvation but God will forever act in order to save all and accomplish (perhaps after an incredible number of ages) that design.

I'm not sure why you say that the sinner is in a limbo.

*One is free to use an equivalent term if one doesn't like the Catholic language used here (in fact, I believe that my thoughts here are pertinent for any 'infernalist' view, not only the 'official/traditional Catholic one...).

It does, thanks. That is very similar to my own story. Raised Catholic, fell away in adolescence, became interested in Buddhism and Eastern traditions, and then reverted back to theism and finally Catholicism in college. — Leontiskos

Interesting, thanks!

It would be hard to quickly introduce you to a very old and deep tradition. Edward Feser has a recent article on the topic, although it is now behind a paywall, "Aquinas on the Fixity of the Will After Death." — Leontiskos

Ok, I think I know something about that (if I am not mistaken, St Thomas bases his arguments on St. John of Damascus' views). I just don't find it pervasive. But IMO it is a digression.

But the quote you take from Aquinas says nothing about death. The claim is that humans can fix their end, which strikes me as uncontroversial. — Leontiskos

I was thinking about what Aquinas says here:

A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever." — Aquinas, ST I-II.87.3

I am simply not buying this, especially if one says also that during life one can repent until the 'last breath'. So, either one says that during life it's possible to fix irrevocably the wil in sin or one should adequately explain why such a thing must happen after death. Consider this passage from Spe Salvi (the encyclical of Pope Benedict XVI quoted before):

With death, our life-choice becomes definitive—our life stands before the judge. Our choice, which in the course of an entire life takes on a certain shape, can have a variety of forms. There can be people who have totally destroyed their desire for truth and readiness to love, people for whom everything has become a lie, people who have lived for hatred and have suppressed all love within themselves. This is a terrifying thought, but alarming profiles of this type can be seen in certain figures of our own history. In such people all would be beyond remedy and the destruction of good would be irrevocable: this is what we mean by the word Hell. On the other hand there can be people who are utterly pure, completely permeated by God, and thus fully open to their neighbours—people for whom communion with God even now gives direction to their entire being and whose journey towards God only brings to fulfilment what they already are.

In the case of the damned, either the 'irrevocable destruction of the good in themselves' can happen during life or not. If it can happen then redemption can be impossible even during life in some cases. If not, then I do not understand how redemption is impossible. If it's impossible, then that very impossibility is a punishment of some sorts (either an active punishment or a definitive abandonment by God). I hope I made my reasoning clearer.

Aquinas doesn't say anything in the text I quoted about the fixity of the will at death, so your points are not properly responding to what he is saying. If you don't think the human will is ever fixed, are you therefore of the opinion that someone can leave Heaven and go down to Hell? — Leontiskos

St Augustine said: "You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it rests in you". If one accepts that the union/communion with God is the highest good, when such a state is reached, one has simply no reason at all to abandon the state of eternal bliss and fulfillment. That's why I think that (if classical theism is true) one can't fall again.

In the state of hell, it's different, after all. One is in a state of torment and frustrated desires.

There is a general—and in my opinion, unfortunate—trend in Catholic theology towards this argument:

1. Humans are not capable of the level of freedom and consent necessary for mortal sin
2. Therefore, no humans commit mortal sins
3. Therefore, no humans go to Hell

It should be simple enough to note that (1) is strongly contrary to Catholicism, and that this argument therefore does not derive from Catholic tradition in any substantial sense. If historical Catholicism believes anything at all, it is that humans are capable of mortal sins. :lol: — Leontiskos

Correct. But of course this is persuasive only if one already believes that one can commit a mortal sin as defined by the official doctrine of the Catholic Catechism and that if one dies without repenting from such an act he is eternally condenmed to hell.
The related section of the Catechism defines mortal sin as:

1857 For a sin to be mortal, three conditions must together be met: "Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent."131

1858 Grave matter is specified by the Ten Commandments, corresponding to the answer of Jesus to the rich young man: "Do not kill, Do not commit adultery, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Do not defraud, Honor your father and your mother."132 The gravity of sins is more or less great: murder is graver than theft. One must also take into account who is wronged: violence against parents is in itself graver than violence against a stranger.

1859 Mortal sin requires full knowledge and complete consent. It presupposes knowledge of the sinful character of the act, of its opposition to God's law. It also implies a consent sufficiently deliberate to be a personal choice. Feigned ignorance and hardness of heart133 do not diminish, but rather increase, the voluntary character of a sin.

The fact that mortal sin requires a certain degree of knowledge and consent is where things get confusing. I doubt you believe that, say, a 5-year old child is capable of a mortal sin (even if you say to him or to her that, say, murdering innocent people qualifies as such and he or she does that). But if one considers the finitiness of our lives, the intricate web of relations and influences between a human being and the cultural, social and even physical context where he or she lives and so on, when we can safely posit the 'cut-off' between 'being able to commit a mortal sin' and 'being unable to commit a mortal sin'? For instance, at which age does one get the ability to commit a mortal sin?

I am just unconvinced by this. Also, what you say later about heaven is different. Eternal beatitude in heaven is a gift of God - not a 'just recompense' but God gives more that what is deserved. And supposedly one in Heaven has his or her innermost desires perfectly fulfilled, has full knowledge to experience the 'best possible state' and is actually experiencing perfect beatitude. It's clear to me why, in these condition, a truly rational agent would have the will fixed to remain in communion with God.

I would say so, because freedom of will is to will in accordance with one’s will. — Bob Ross

That's one sense, yes. Another is having the power of 'contrary choice', i.e. having the real possibility to autonomously choose an option instead of another.

But note that even if one accepts the notion of 'free will' in these two senses, if one assumes that the moral agent is a rational agent, it seems that to be rational and free one should be able to choose what he or she thinks is the 'better choice'. That is behind a true IMHO rational choice would be the one which is in accord with one believes is the 'better' choice.

If I am dying of thirst and I want to live, I am clearly 'free' to refuse to drink water. But if I am sufficiently aware that if I drink water I'll survive and I value my own life, choosing to not drink water seems to me an insane choice, i.e. a choice where some factors are constraining my liberty (or maybe somebody is forcing me to not drink water or whatever).

So if we accept 'free will' as the ability to act deliberately between options, we however must assume that, in order to be considered rational, the ethical agent must choose the 'better'. Otherwise, why should one choose at all?

Hmm, I would say acting rationally is about acting in accordance with reason; which pertains only to the form of thinking and never its content.
... — Bob Ross

I made a clear mistake before by talking about the well-being. Try however to consider 'be able to choose what one considers the better option' as a definition of 'rational freedom'.

Clearly the heroic father chooses to sacrifice his life to save the life of his child because he thinks it's the 'better option' (and I also think that he would think that it is better for him).

Also, a wicked murderer might think that killing innocent people act in that way because he clearly believes it is the 'best thing to do' (assuming that there is no insanity, external cohercion etc here).

I see your point; but it is still an act in accordance with one’s will, so it is free. What do you mean by freedom? — Bob Ross

So let's say that a man truly believes that what killing innocent people 'for fun' leads to a state of unending pain for him while he is also aware that refraining to do that allows him to escape that terrible destiny. Despite this awareness and without any coercion of any kind (of internal and/or external factors) or some moment of insanity, he still does it.

To me the choice would be completely inintelligible due to the profound incoherence. Being totally incoherent, it isn't in my opinion a rational choice. What do you think?

I would argue that they would have the same culpability; for children are given less because we assume they don’t have such knowledge. If we assume that this child does completely understand what they are doing like an adult and have not been swayed by someone else (as children are quite maleable), then why would we not try them as an adult? — Bob Ross

Well, the reason we don't treat them in the same manner is because we assume, reasonably I believe, that children are too immature to qualify as proper moral agents and not because they are 'younger'.

Yeah, that’s fine for conveyance purposes; but, again, the intention is inextricably linked with their knowledge; so the degree of knowledge to me is a part of the act. I am just splitting hairs here though: just ignore me (: — Bob Ross

No, actually I think that your point is valid. It is an useful abstraction. But it can be misleading.

It depends on if the act is indeed of infinite demerit, I would say. For if one knows what they are doing and does it overwhelmingly freely; then how would one not be held fully liable for it? — Bob Ross

Well, I guess that then it would be just to give the appropriate retribution (at least in the case of retributive proportional justice we are assuming now).

But IMHO one should consider also the claim that acting rationally is also acting for the good for oneself. That is, acting rationally is acting in a way that leads truly to one's own well-being.

If a moral agent knows with perfect clarity that an action is actually detrimental for himself or herself and still chooses to do that, is the action done freely?
But even if we assume that such a scenario is possible, it is debatable that in our present life we have enough clarity of mind to be perfectly culpable. It seems to me that our knowledge is imperfect, we are influenced in some ways to external circumstances in a way that in part is outside of our control and so on.

So, I repeat my question: can a human being really have the sufficient knowledge and deliberative power to be deemed as worthy of an infinite/perfect culpability and consequently infinite punishment?

If murder is a sin that carries infinite demerit, the perpetrator knows this, the perpetrator knows that they should not murder, the perpetrator does it for the fun of it (and not of necessity or coercion or what no), then why would they not be held culpable to the highest order? — Bob Ross

As your example shows the murderer seems to value more his or her 'fun' than his or her long-term - in fact - eternal fate. Which, in my opinion, shows that the murderer in this example is not really acting rationally.

If I truly believe that some kind of action brings a fate of eternal torment to me, it seems that doing it would be foolish on my part. Can a foolish action be truly free?

Just like, say, if I am dying of thirst, assuming that I want to live and that I know that drinking water can save my life, my refusal to drink water seems a completely irrational act. Of course, if I have some kind of insanity I might refuse to drink water or if I am coerced by someone or something to not drink I won't drink, but in both cases I am under the influence of some kind of ignorance, coercion or whatever, i.e. situations that I am not really free.

Edit: Can you give me a snapshot of your religious affiliation and background? It will help me respond on point. I myself am a Catholic with an affinity for Orthodoxy. — Leontiskos

Well I try, It's a bit complicated, I guess.

Currently I would say 'none' as I am agnostic. As I said in one of my previous posts, I have a strong sympathy with theistic universalism (both Christian and non-Christian).

I was raised Catholic and for some years I was quite religious. During adolescence I started to have doubts about it and gradually I distanced myself form Christianity. During the last decade, I gradually became more and more interested in Eastern religions, Buddhism especially. During the last years I grew more sympathetic to theistic worldviews and since last year I studied a lot of Christian theology, especially the universalist-leaning authors (both ancient and modern).

I do acknowledge the importance of joining some spiritual tradition since 2018 (when I was at the 'peak' of my 'Buddhist' period, so to speak). But for several reasons, I seem to be incapable or unwilling to do that. Some of these reasons are simply psychological, others are more philosophical (e.g. philosophical doubts about doctrines (such as the traditional position on hell etc), doubts about some ethical norms and so on).

Not sure if this helps.

That's true, but universalism in the first sense I noted and rejection of Hell really do go hand in hand. They are logically distinct positions, but that sense of universalism logically entails the rejection of Hell on the grounds of justice. What threads like this are concerned with is precisely the thesis that Hell is unjust. — Leontiskos

If by 'Hell', you mean the traditional 'eternal Hell', yes, I agree that universalism is also based in considering eternal torment as unjust as a punishment. But also annihilationists raise the same concern. And, if we go outside Christianity, for instance many Indian religions (both theistic and non-theistic) would raise the same concern, without however endorsing a form of universal salvation.

IMHO the greatest problem of infernalism is the claim that the fate is irrevocably fixed at death, which in my opinion implies that eternal hell must be a retributive infinite punishment imposed on the damned (and not, say, the natural result of a choice as some free-will defenders of the traditional view claim). Even if one accepts that eternal torment is logically possible, that is an additional claim.

Universalism is clearly also based on the view that sin is more like an illness, a terrifying illness-like corruption that causes damage to both the sinners and others. Universalists generally think that 'hell' is like a bitter and painful medicine that is seen as necessary to heal the soul to an uncorrupted state (as you probably already know...).

Hart has recently further popularized the thesis that Hell is unjust, and if a Christian views Hell as unjust then salvation is not undeserved. That is, if it is unjust for someone to not be saved, then salvation is not gratuitous. — Leontiskos

To be fair, in his book 'That All Shall be Saved' (p. 51-52) Hart seems to explicitly deny this construal of this thought:

I remain convinced that no one, logically speaking, could merit eternal punishment; but I also accept the obverse claim that no one could merit grace.
...
Our very existence is an unmerited gift, after all

No worries.

Pope Benedict's quote is from his encyclical Spe Salvi.

But as you say, we can understand a universalist conclusion in different senses. It could be necessary according to justice, or it could be gratuitous according to mercy. I think the latter possibility is much more credible than the former qua Christianity. Yet for someone coming from a purely philosophical perspective in the 21st century, the idea that (eternal) Hell is unjust is at least understandable. Indeed, a very quick way to get at the infinitude question is to note that 21st century philosophers generally do not believe in angels, demons, the higher nous, and the eternal stakes that accompany such a paradigm. — Leontiskos

Just a quick note here. I believe that questioning the ethical soundness of 'endless punishment' doesn't necessarily imply believing in universal salvation. That is, one can argue that 'endless punishment' is unjust and still assert that not everyone will be saved. One can certainly say without contradiction that nobody deserves to be eternally punished and that nobody deserves eternal bliss.

Universal salvation of course implies that all punishment will be temporary. But universalism says much more than merely asserting the finite duration of punishments: that all will, ultimately, be saved and experience eternal blessedness. I don't think that universalists claim that eternal bliss is 'just' since nobody actually deserves it. It is seen as a gift of God's grace and mercy.

On the other hand, I believe that it is legitimate to question the doctrine of 'eternal hell' even from a purely retributive (and proportional) account of justice, as I pointed out before. I think we shall keep the issues separate here. Rejecting the infinite duration of punishment doesn't necessarily imply the acceptance of the doctrine of universal salvation.

Yeah, I actually agree. The distinction between the 'objective' and the 'subjective' component is an useful heuristic but, as you note, it can muddle the waters.

Let's say that the child that killed the innocent person actually knows that shooting people can kill them. And, indeed, he intended to kill. Still, I would say that the degree of culpability is far less than that of an adult who commits an analogous act with the same intention. The sin is, as you say, different.

But I believe that the distinction of subjective and objective aspects of a sinful act can be a good heuristic. After all, in the example you propose, an innocent person has been killed by another and the dynamics of the crime is the same. So, of course both acts have that in common. They differ, of course, in the degree of responsibility of the transgressors. We cannot apply the same standards in evaluating the seriousness of the crime of the child and the adult (or, for that matter, an insane adult cannot be regarded as having the same responsibility of an adult with normally functioning mental faculties). So, yes, I agree with you that the sin is different, but the act itself can be regarded as the 'same'.

In the section of the Catholic Catechism I linked to in my first post in the discussion we read, for instance:

1862 One commits venial sin when, in a less serious matter, he does not observe the standard prescribed by the moral law, or when he disobeys the moral law in a grave matter, but without full knowledge or without complete consent.

Note that the Catechism accepts that the same act can correspond to very different sins.

The 'grave matter' is the 'act', i.e. the 'objective' component. In our example: the killing of an innocent person. The degree of knowledge and consent is the 'subjective' component. And the evaluation of the seriousness of the sin should take into account all the aspects of the sin. So my question is: if one takes all aspects into account, can a human being get that degree of culpability that deservers some form of eternal torment as a just, adequate punishment?

So, I agree, the distinction can actually create confusion. But it shows very well a deep problem in the "a sin against God is infinitely bad because God has infinite dignity" perspective.

I'm not a theologist, but I think that eternity should be distinguished from unending procession. Notably, the present can be regarded as 'eternal' in that the meaning of "now" isn't defined in relation to a time series. In this sense, your present emotions, as in the mood you have now, can be regarded as 'eternal' even though your moods are not permanent. Moods can also feel timeless in that those feelings do not involve temporal cognition. Also, the seven deadly sins seem to refer to moods rather than to actions; so I would guess that biblical references to eternal heaven or to eternal punishment should probably be interpreted in the presentist's sense of timelessness, rather than in the sense of unbounded duration. — sime

But, on the other hand, our experience seems to be fundamentally temporal. A process. Not something static. If time stops, can we really speak of beatitude or torment?

As you said, I mostly agree with you. And I also agree on this:

For my part, when I say infernalism has difficulties, this is not to say the other views don't themselves have difficulties — Count Timothy von Icarus

Regarding this:

When David Bentley Hart says that we couldn't be happy with our own ignorance about damned family members or their eternal torment without having been radically changed so as to be "replaced," he might be right. But this seems equally true vis-á-vis the truly wicked. What of the BTK Killer or Ted Bundy, or even a Jeffery Epstein would really remain once selfishness and attraction to finite ends is removed? Not very much it would seem, suggesting a sort of annihilationism within universalism (unless God is simply replacing the wicked). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I see what you mean. An universalist might say that the self of these criminals is extremely corrupted, but not irremediably so (for God). An afterlife purgatorial experience is the process in which such a wicked person is restored to being a proper 'image of God'. Does this lead to a complete replacement of the wicked person with a better version of themselves? Yes, in a sense. The wicked is, in some sense, annihilated in order to recover 'that person should have been'.

Universalism IMHO can use without problems the annihilationist language and up to a point take it literally. Up to a point, of course.

Or, to the infernalists' point, it seems that some might refuse to turn towards God.
...
Moreover, if one has disfigured the Imago Dei enough, are we still talking about a rational nature?

Or perhaps the Augustinian curvatus in se, the curving inward of the self in sin, becomes so extreme that, like a black hole, there is no escape velocity capable of pulling away from its gravitational pull. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The main problem that I have with infernalism (and to a lesser degree, also annihilationism) is that it relies upon an inflexibility of the fate after death. Unless one completely denies any role of free will in our salvation, during this life it is said that we can repent (and also fall) until the last breath. After death, we can't either fall if we are saved or be saved if we are damned. But why? Why should death be this kind of absolute 'cut-off' of our possibilities to spiritual progress?

The main problem with universalism seems to be that it has a kind of determinism in it. Salvation is an ultimately irresistible process. Can we be really free in such a scenario? Of course, in a sense yes. But the possibility of saying 'no' to any kind of loving relationship seems to be necessary for it being meaningful. At the same time, however, the possibility of restoring the loving relationship after the rejection seems to also be a necessary component of a loving relationship. IMHO this would mean that the possibility of salvation remains forever. Hence, I believe that philosophical arguments can lead us to endorse a reasonable hope of universal salvation, in the sense that it will remain always a possibility (if one assumes the existence of a loving God).

The case in Scripture seems more concrete though. ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

While I mostly agree with what you say after this (see below for the exception), it is also true that such texts has been interpreted in a way that precludes universalism, as you also point out. I agree with you, however, that the most natural reading of those passage is universalist.

But the New Testament also include many passage that indicate a division between the saved and the damned. And while one can argue that they can be read in a way that such a division is not truly final, they don't explicitly tell us that the division isn't final.

The Scriptures are therefore ambiguous. I don't believe that any kind of exegesis can fully resolve the matter, no matter how one tries. And honestly I am not sure of what to make of this. Maybe it is a good that the Bible is ambiguous for some reason. Maybe it is simply inconsistent on this point. This is one of the reason why I am an agnostic (although I have a strong sympathy towards theistic universalism in general, and the Christian version in particular).

I think it would be fair to say that the decline in support for infernalism has pernicious causes in a culture whose ethics has become hung up on only the worst sort of offenses, and a general comfort with sin and lack of concern with the spiritual life, etc. But it also has certainly been helped by the widespread expansion of access to critical texts and education in Greek, that make at least some of the efforts to radically re-read what New Testament texts appear to say in a straightforward manner appear to be little more than doctrinal massaging. A good infernalist response to these issues, IMHO, cannot rest on trying to bulldoze through these passages by explaining that "all in all," really means "all in some." — Count Timothy von Icarus

While what you see here makes sense, IMHO part of the reason why the West lost its interest in religion and spirituality actually is the extreme forms of infernalism that have long dominated the scene. The highly legalistic approach to spirituality in the West, the doctrine of the 'massa damnata' according to which even infants who die unbaptized are condemned at least to an eternal separation from God etc have contributed to a mass 'spiritual exhaustion'. Perhaps if the religious doctrines especially in the Dark Ages and in the early Modern age weren't so rigid, extreme etc, people would be less distant from religion in general (I suspect that you actually agree with this, but IMO it was worth to point out).


Edited for clarification

We could say a lot about this, but the most pressing matter is to focus on the term "finite" from premise (1) and as what is meant by it. Aquinas' interlocutor is thinking of a transgression with finite duration or malice. You yourself are thinking of a transgression against a finite being (and this sets up Anselm's argument). But to take an easy and recent example, the Vatican recently released a document claiming that human beings have infinite dignity. Although it was a sloppy document, it is echoing a cultural presupposition (and, ironically, a presupposition that is often wielded against the doctrine of Hell). If we follow that cultural lead and say that humans have infinite dignity, then Anselm's argument in fact holds vis-a-vis humans; and what is sinned against is not therefore finite. — Leontiskos

Even if it were true, this would only true 'objectively' (see this post). One still has to take into account the 'subjective' aspect of sin.

Even in our legal systems, responsibility for crimes is mitigated or even denied by, for instance, 'reason of insanity'. In evaluating the severity of culpability one seemingly has to take into account the capacities of the transgressor. Can a human being reach the level of perfect culpability once the limitations and finiteness of human life are taken into account?

A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever." — Aquinas, ST I-II.87.3

I'm not sure how the argument here is persuasive. It is said that during life it is always possible to repent. During life, then, the will is not invariably fixed in sin.
So, the 'fixation' in sin must come after death. But why?

For the fact that adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes by imprisonment or banishment for life — Aquinas, ST I-II.87.3

I think that one can retort here that all punishment that humans can make are finite, not infinite. Even if death penalty lead to the annihilation of the person, it would probably be still a 'finite' punishment since people are finite beings and the suffering experienced by the person would be finite. If hell lasts forever, however, the amount of suffering of the damned is infinite, even if the punishments were 'mild'.

Furthermore, in human justice one should also take into account the safety of others. So, say, a life sentence does not necessarily entail that society would banish the person 'forever and ever' but simply that the person is considered so dangerous that the best course of action is held to be life imprisonement. Human justice is not perfect. Of course, it can be read the way Thomas reads it, i.e. an endless banishment, but it isn't necesssarily so.

Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished, but sometimes only for others — Aquinas, ST I-II.87.3

In my post, for instance, I never claimed that punishment must be corrective. In fact, I worked within a purely retributive account of justice.

And I argued that even if one accepts Anselm's view that sin deserves an infinite punishment because iti is against God, who has infinite dignity, it can be argued that one should take into account the limitations of human life.

Since death is assumed here as a 'point of no return', consider this simple example.

Two men A and B commit a murder. They are discovered while doing it by police and they initiate a gunfight with the police in order to not get caught. Both murderers are shot in self-defence by police. Murderer A is killed on the spot, while murderer B is hurt, taken into hospital just in time to avoid death and then goes to prison. During his time in prison, for some reason murderer A sincerely repents.

It's clear to me that A and B had unequal opportunities to repent for their crimes. Murderer B was more lucky. He didn't live because he was a 'better person' than murderer A but simply because he wasn't shot in the wrong place and was brought to the hospital in time (and saved by the hospital staff). For all these reasons outside of his control, B got the chance to repent which A didn't simply due to the fact that he was shot in the wrong place and/or died because he didn't arrive at the hospital in time or whatever.

Given that the times and circumstances of death are uncertain and beyond the control of people, death just seems an arbitrary cut-off.

Of course, if one takes into account the fact that human beings are finite in their understanding and capabilities in general, it is even more difficult to understand how a form of 'unending suffering' is a just recompense for sinners.

Not sure how these objections are just 'cultural' and not 'rational'.

The problem with this, by my lights, is that the God was not the one offended. It makes sense to say that, e.g., torturing a rabbit is lesser of an offense than torturing a human (even if it be in the same manners) by appeal to the dignity difference between them relative to their natures respectively; however, it doesn't make sense to me to say that, e.g., torturing the rabbit is a lesser offense if a judge ordered one not to do it prior to doing it than if they had done it without such an order. A third party, who may have the authority to dictate right and wrong action, is not the offended party nor the party that commits the offense; so, to me, the dignity being offended by a finite being when committed on a finite being must be finitely demeritorious: God is a third party, of which is the source of goodness, which was and cannot be the offended nor offender. — Bob Ross

Hi,

I believe here you are neglecting the fact that, in theistic religions, it is assumed that the sinner has a personal relationship with God, who is assumed to actively love the sinner. 'Sin' is seen as any action that weakens or even breaks that relationship, which is assumed to be the Highest Good for every human being. Also, in said religions it is explicitly assumed that in our ethical behavior, the way we engage with others etc, are an expression of how we relate also to God.

To use an analogy, in a family, if one of the child mistreats one of his sibling, he is also affecting his relationship with my parents (who love all siblings). Or another: if I hurt a person, I also affect, in some ways, my relationship with all people who love that person.

One response that I am aware of is the Thomistic response, which essentially claims that the sin is in part evaluated relative to the dignity of the being offended; and since sinning is against God and God is infinitely good, it follows that any sin carries with it infinite demerit. — Bob Ross

I believe that the problem of this kind of argument is that even it is 'objectively' true, one still has to evaluate the 'subjective' component of the sinful act.

By this I mean that it seems reasonable to say that, in order to evaluate the 'degree of culpability', one should take into account both the seriousness of the crime (the 'objective' component) and the degree of awareness and consent that one has in commiting the crime (the 'subjective' component). For instance, one can be found to be "not guilty by reason of insanity" after having commited a crime.

So even if 'objectively' an act against God is 'infinitely bad', it is reasonable to think that there can be mitigating factors in the associated degree of culpability associated with that action - for instance, a lack of maturity, being subject to external influences beyond one's ability to resist, some kind of weakness of will or awareness and so on.

Given that human beings are, of course, finite beings and considering the finiteness of our lives, the ambiguities present in it, the uncertainty of the time of death etc the question becomes: can a human being reach a level of culpability that deserves a punishment of unending pain (of some sort)?
Personally, I lean to answer 'no' to this question even if the 'sin' is 'objectively infinitely bad'.

Note that the current 'official' Catholic teaching is that only unrepented mortal sins deserve an infinite punishment and these sins require, other than the 'grave matter' (the act itself), two other factors: 'full knowledge' and 'deliberate consent' (see the section on the Gravity of sin, in the Catholic Catechism.). I bet that a supporter of this kind of view would say that a human being can have the sufficient degree of knowledge of consent to deserve the infinite punishment. I honestly can't see how that is possible, considering the finitiness and ambiguities in our life, but that's another story*.

Note also that nowadays some theologians seem to say that 'eternal hell' is a choice, that is the damned choose their destiny and God merely allows them to experience what they asked for. A great problem of this kind of view is that it is also claimed that somehow the damned just can't change their minds and repent after death. Such an inflexibility is said to occur only after death, and one is left to ask why it is so. IMO, if we consider that during life one is said to be able to repent until the last moment, it seems that this inflexibility is actually a form of punishment (at least in the form of 'abandonment'). Hence, even in these 'free will models of (eternal) hell', it seems to me that the same question about how can deserve a punishment of unenending suffering, even if such a suffering is due to the perpetual refusal of the damned to repent.

But IMO all 'infernalist' models at the end of the day assume that 'eternal suffering' is an adequate punishment. Hence, all infernalist models IMO are subject to such an objection, even if one grants that, indeed, offences against God, which is assumed to be the Highest Good for us, are infinitely grave.

(Thanks @Count Timothy von Icarus for the mention BTW)

* Edit: This of course doesn't mean that we cannot have a very high degree of responsibility and culpability. But perfect/infinite culpability seems to me out of reach for human beings.

I thought Bohm's idea was just an inelegant and superfluous attempt to retain discrete particles and a purely objective pre or no-collapse reality. But what is the motivation for retaining this idea given what we know now? — Bodhy

Well, the main motivation remains the same, I think, i.e. retaining the idea that physics is about describing the world 'as it is' also when measurements are not made. Not only for de Broglie-Bohm interpretation(s) (dBB) but for all 'realist' ones.

Anyway, I read of one dBB proponent who give an additional reasoning: for him, dBB has the advantage of making QM visualizable. And visualization has been an extremely useful tool for physicists.

As I said, personally I prefer an epistemic approach but I repsect 'realists'. Even if their interpretations are wrong, I still think that they can give us insights.

Isn't it the case we now have significant experimental refutation of hidden variables, such as Bell's Theory, Legget-Garg inequalities, and Kochen-Specker theorem? — Bodhy

dBB gives the same preidictions as 'usual' QM. No result you mentioned here falsify it. There are more technical difficulties when QFT is taken into account but some proponents insist that a dBB version of QFT is acheavable. Others disagree.

IMO, this takes us some way beyond the traditional positions of monism, dualism, reductionism etc. to some sort of metaphysics which needs a new vocabulary, like the kind of constructivist pluralism I've been talking about here. — Bodhy

Well, the fact that 'taken literally' modern physical theories give us 'pictures of realities' which seem getting progressively weird is a good clue that there is a limitation of our ability to arrive at a conceptual and mathematical description of 'how physical reality is in itself'. This also suggests to me that physical theories shouldn't be taken as 'literal portraits' of the 'external, physical world'.

Hence, physical theories use useful conceptual fictions that can be used to make predictions, applications and so on. These conceptualizations are, therefore, very useful for understanding the regularities of phenomena of the empirical reality. We cannot, however, get 'true knowledge' of the 'external world as it is in itself' (see my references about the 'two truths' and skepticism).

On the other hand, I also do not 'forbid' speculations about the ontology of 'external world'. But I don't think that scientific knowledge can enlighten us about which speculative ontology is the 'right' one.

Ok, thanks for the clarification.

I don't think things are so different in the US, although for some time now there has been ongoing effort in the US to communicate that there is an autism "spectrum". — wonderer1

Well, I sort of agree with that: the difference is not so great, but IMO there is. Anyway, I don't think that Italy is 'late' because of some pecularity of my country. Actually, I think that the main problem is linguistic. Scientific research (included the one in 'neurodivergence') is all written in English. There is simply much more information in the 'anglosphere' than in other areas.

Thinking about this prompted me to take a look at the Wikipedia page for Hans Asperger. Not a very flattering picture. I wonder if Hans Asperger's association with Nazism and eugenics impeded the propagation of his insights. — wonderer1

Yeah, agreed!

I'd be very interested in hearing more, if you are comfortable elaborating. — wonderer1

The way I socialize and my sense of humor are just very peculiar. They are generally appreciated and I am considered somewhat 'original'. This originality is both something spontaneous and an ironic result of my attempt to try to 'fit in' and being more like others. Consciously monitoring my behaviors, thinking about 'what I should say' to be friendly/entertain etc has the result of me being seen as 'original', weird in a positive sense, I would guess (note that I do all of that in a somewhat automatic way, I have an instict to do that...). I don't consider it a negative trait, of course it has its 'perks', but is not something that renders social relations really satisfying.

I can have friendships, having a very good time with others but the a nagging sense of 'alienation' is still present, like say if I belonged to somewhere else. There is a difference in how I communicate, what I consider natural/obvious and so on.

Well, if you want I can share something more 'personal' in PM, if you are interested.

One thing I like about TPF is that I feel comfortable here using whatever vocabulary comes to mind, rather than feeling like I need to consider whether the person I am talking to will see me as ostentatious if I am not circumspect in my use of language. — wonderer1

I fully agree with this. How much I would like that 'real life' is like this forum, lol...

I'm still experiencing occasional PTSD 'aftershocks', but I am much better now. I can't think of anything that has come along so 'out of the blue' and triggered a reaction in me the way that self defense thread did. — wonderer1

I see, I am sorry for that, it must be very difficult to handle.

Refusing to "go over the top" or to open fire when instructed, is an act of cowardice. — Tarskian

Not sure how it is relevant in a discussion about Christianity.

Christianity is deemed to have some responsibility for the fact that Germany lost both world wars: — Tarskian

And this at least in the case of WW2, it has been a good thing, I would say.

Anyway... 'self-defence' doesn't make oneself a 'brute', in my view. If one acts violently only when an existential threat is there, I wouldn't consider that an act of 'brutality'. 'Brutality' is when one kills, oppresses etc in other situations where other means could bring the same result. For instance, I would say that killing unarmed war prisoners is an act of brutality (it is considered a war crime after all), whereas killing during a battle isn't. I don't think that all soldiers are 'brutes' because they are willing to kill in battle. I would say that for many of them violence is only a tragic necessity.

But even any 'theological' defence of 'self-defence' in Christianity is IMO questionable, let alone a defence of being a 'brute'. Frankly, I see even self-defence as problematic if one wants to follow the Gospels, Paul etc

But again I am not sure of what your point is.

Thank you very much for the discussion!

Then, there is the second-order one: Regardless of whether you are yourself a coward or a brute, do you prefer to be surrounded by cowards or by brutes? — Tarskian

'Not being a brute' is hardly the same as 'being a coward'. If 'not being a brute' means to be 'non violent', I hardly see how being 'non violent' is being a coward.

BTW, it is for me unsurpassingly strange how some christians chose to be violent etc when their core belief is that God himself chose not 'defend Himself' and die on the cross. And, say, when Saint Paul reccomended to have the 'same mindset' as Jesus (see my posts above with the quotations). I consider it one of the most disconcerting mysteries in human history.

With regard to explanation, you could equally ask why should there not be universality without reason? — Apustimelogist

Well that's a good question. I don't have an answer for that (I do however think that regularities in nature can be taken as 'clues' for some kind of 'transcendent Reason'... but I won't digress)

Regardless of that, I think however that universality is better explained in some kind of 'holistic' picture than a 'bottom-up' one. But YMMV. After all, none of these two pictures can be 'proved'.

The Bohmian formulation is very closely related to the stochastic one. Effectively The stochastic mechanics momentum / velocities are equivalent to the standard quantum ones. Bohmian mechanics includes very similar kinds of momentum /velocity to the stochastic ones abd then essentially adds extra deterministic particle trajectories on top of it. The way I personally see it, the main difference between Bohm and stochastic mechanics is that the latter eschews this last assumption of additional deterministic trajectories. Without that, the natural way to viee trajectories is stochastic and we see this directly in the path integral formulation of standard mechanics because the paths in this formulation that are used to calculate ptobabilities are the same as the stochastic mechanics particle trajectories. Because quantum mechanics is so bizarre though, it is always assumed these paths in the path integral formulation are not real but purely computational tools. Stochastic mechanics just takes them at face value. — Apustimelogist

Thanks for this. So, the trajectories themselves are determined probabilistically, rather than deterministically. Interesting, thanks.

You can either get accused of being a coward or else of being a brute. Feel free to pick your poison. — Tarskian

Well, as Socrates said ""It is better to suffer injustice than to do wrong" (I don't remember where and if the phrase is exactly this, but I do remember this in one platonic dialogue). Also in the Bible it is said, for instance, "For it is better, if it is God’s will, to suffer for doing good than for doing evil." (1 Peter 3:17, NIV translation). So, yeah, I would say that it is better to have a reputation of being a 'coward' than act as a 'brute'. And I would say that specifically for Christians being a 'brute' contradicts these words: "My kingdom is not of this world. If it were, my servants would fight to prevent my arrest by the Jewish leaders. But now my kingdom is from another place." (John 18:36, quoted before)

No, "society" doesn't suffer, individuals with POVs do. I make a distinction between mitigation ethics and preventative ethics. Once born, we are in mitigation ethics mode where indeed, we may have to trade greater harms for lesser harms. Uniquely for the procreational decision, we can be in preventative ethics, where absolutely/purely we can make a decision to prevent ALL harm to a future person whereby no drawback (lesser harm) is had for that person. No ONE is deprived. And ANs generally all agree that (unlike your definition of ethics), positive ethics (other people's projects.. like continuing humanity, wanting to take care of a new person, etc.), should not override individuals' negative ethics (rights not to be harmed, non-consented). — schopenhauer1

I agree that 'society' doesn't suffer but individuals do. And I also agree that we should avoid to cause unnecessary suffering, especially when there is no possibility of consent. 'Not intentionally causing unnecessary harm' seems to be a 'regulative ideal' that we should follow.

And yet, I think that as an ethical duty, if you want, we also have a moral obligation to act for the benefit of others. In fact, I think we should act with the benefit of everyone in sight, although of course we cannot directly benefit to everyone due to our finitude - hence I see this as a 'regulative ideal'. The fact that ethics seems to work only when a community of ethical agents is present seems to me that this second regulative ideal is necessary.

It seems to me that these two 'ideals' give us an ethical dilemma, if we accept both as ethical regulative ideals. Of course, if we give the prominence to the first one, it seems that, unless one holds to some kind of religious/metaphysical beliefs, antinatalism would be right. I'm not convinced, however, that the second 'ideal' is 'lesser' than the first. So, it seems to me that antinatalism isn't the 'best' ethical position for both the 'single individual' and 'all individuals'. I would like to find a way to avoid giving 'prominence' to one ideal over the other. But I admit that at least until now, I never found a solution.

I am very sorry for hear that. I hope that you'll be good soon! :pray:

Imo it would only be 'happy chance' if one of the equivalent descriptions could be the case while the other (e.g. conservation laws) failed, but clearly that isn't the case if one follows from the other formally. — Apustimelogist

Fair enough. Here I disagree but I understand why you can argue for that.

I don't think it is simpler imo; because, if these conservation behaviors are properties of individual interactions, and individual interactions can only propagate locally, then there is no reason for me to attribute this as a holistic property of the whole system. The principle applied to the system would be rendered redundant if it holds for subsystems, subsystems of subsystems... right down to local interactions. It would be explanatorily simpler to say that the conservation property holds for the whole system in virtue of the fact it holds at any interaction propagating in some local part of the system. — Apustimelogist

Ok. But what about uniformity/universality of physical laws?
Why, say, do electromagnetic interaction and gravitation seem to behave the same everywhere?
If there weren't any kind of 'top-down' constraints, how can one explain this universality?

Not sure exactly what you mean but stochastically behaving particles (whether classical or quantum) do not have well-defined velocity / momentum in general so in stochastic mechanics velocity fields are constructed using averages regarding particle motion. — Apustimelogist

I meant that in de Broglie Bohm (dBB), the velocities/momenta that one computes in the 'standard way' are not the same as the actual velocities/momenta that the particle have (and when we measure velocities we find the value predicted by QM without contraction with dBB). IIRC, this kind of pecularity of dBB have lead to the objection that 'Bohmian trajectories' are 'surreal' but oddly enough 'weak measurements' displayed them (I remember that about 10 years ago these experiments were taken by some as an evidence against 'standard QM'. But this isn't true...). This objection is of course not a problem for dBB as far as predictions go but it would be certainly strange that when we measure velocities, the 'real' velocity is something else.

It seems that stochastic interpretations do not share this conceptual pecularity. Interesting.

I agree with that. Ethics is born, or created, in between, or out of, two or more people. — Fire Ologist

Right. Also IMO human beings are, so to speak, essentially social. Ethics, in particular, seems to me based on how an individual relates to other individuals. Making an ethical claim by 'abstracting' oneself or another person from the social context seems to me a contradiction.

BTW, I don't think that we must have kids. But I think that the antinatalist ethical 'prohibition' to have kids is wrong. One can choose to not have kids and making arguments for that choices, sure. But saying that it is always ethically wrong to give birth is a different matter.

The first round of testing, even without a very informative diagnosis, was very beneficial for me. The way I saw it then, is that I had been going through life walking into glass walls that everyone else seemed to walk right through. As a result of the testing I was able to get at least a sense of where the glass walls were, and develop work arounds. So I'm inclined to recommend getting the testing, despite it taking some substantial time, and possibly money. — wonderer1

Thank you very much for sharing and for the advice. I am not american but italian BTW, and here it seems that is generally assumed by the general population that 'autism' is always a very, very serious condition. Even 'Asperger's' is seen as something that must be 'self evident' (at least in hindsight) and 'serious'. Forms of autism that are 'not obvious' seem an impossibility.
Of course, this is different for therapists, neurodiversity movements and so on. I think that here we are '10 years behind' the US, so to speak.

I know what you mean about communities. I tend to fade into the background (aside from the occasional smart ass remark) in real life groups. Internet forums, going back to Usenet newsgroups, have been very valuable to me because I can interact at a pace better suited to me. (Although even in internet forums I can often get involved in more discussions than I can really keep up with.) — wonderer1

Curiously enough, I manage to both 'fade away' in 'real life' and be very talkative, sociable, humorous and so on. But even when I am talkative/sociable/humorous I still feel 'out of synch' and in fact I do not do that in a 'ordinary' way so to speak.
Regarding online discussions, yeah, I find generally easier to speak about my interests and make discussions online and I too risk sometimes to spend too much time in them. This is due to both shyness and, so to speak, a lack of motivation to speak about my interests if I am not sure that the other person shares them.

I was telling a friend very recently how reading the book The Different Drum: Community Making and Peace has played a role in my somewhat unorthodox forum behavior. I call it practicing grumpy zebra style center's mind. :wink: — wonderer1

Thanks!

It's been very nice to meet you. — wonderer1

Thank you very much. The same goes for me.

I would say that because Christianity is unfashionable at the moment, anyone can make terribly fallacious arguments against Christianity or Christians and no one bothers to correct them. The thinking is something like, "Yeah, these arguments are garbage, but we know Christianity is false or unimportant anyway, so who cares?" — Leontiskos

Well, yes, there's also that but not only that. And also it is perfectly understandable if christians do not make a philosophical apology for those arguments.

But this isn't an argument for antinatalism. Antinatalism is the view that is morally wrong to give birth. You are merely saying that in some circustances one might choose to not have children.

It seems to me that whatever is conserved is always implied in the described behavior of the interactions. Obviously you might be able to apply these principles as a blanket description of various systems of different sizes and claim holism in virtue of the fact you could be talking about large spatially separated systems. Thinking about it then; for me, I would accept a holistic explanation if say, the forces and displacements in the above link were non-local. But if they are solely local or mediated locally, then I don't see the need for a holistic description. Sure I may not be able to directly explain why these descriptions apply, but if everything interacts only locally then I don't see the need for holistic descriptions. The blanket description for the system would not be distinct from compatible descriptions applied to all the sub-components of a system. — Apustimelogist

Ok, I think I can get what you are sayinh. However, to be fair, it seems to me even in this kind of 'bottom-up' model, conservation laws, symmetries seem like something that happens due to some kind of 'happy chance'. On the other hand, if one considers that, say, the 'universe' as a single 'system' with some kind of properties and derives the behavior of interactions from them the picture is both simpler and less 'fortuitous'. Again, I get that one can say that even those 'properties of the whole' remain unexplained but IMO the picture is simpler. And simplicity seems important.

Regarding the principle of locality (outside quantum non-locality), I get what you mean but I see it as some kind of 'differentiation' principle, so to speak, that itself derives from some kind of global property. I mean, I don't see it as necessarily as a fatal argument.

Based on the Stanford article, I would say the stochastic interpretation manages to fulfil unicity in the sense of: "a single point represents the exact state of a system at any given time" ehich applies to particles but not the wave-function. — Apustimelogist

Ok, interesting. Just for curiosity, but in this interpretation do the 'real' momenta of particles coincide with the 'observed' ones? In de Broglie-Bohm, while the observed position coincides with the 'real' position, this isn't true for momentum/velocity.

Given I've read relatively few posts from you, I don't suppose that image means much to you. However someone who has put some thought into how information processing occurs in neural networks, might recognize that image as pointing towards some substantial differences in thought for the possessors of those different brains. — wonderer1

Well thanks for the interesting info, actually. Anyway as a personal note, I was strongly suspected to be autistic when I was a young kid but I wasn't formally diagnosed (...it's a long story. I am not really interested to getting diagnosed nowadays, although for a 'self-understanding' it would be cool,but for adults the diangostic process is demanding.). BTW, I actually believe that studying the brain can be insightful to understanding our minds. I do not accept physicalism, though.

Now I'm certainly 'less autistic' than Temple Grandin. I can pass as normal enough, and have even had to deal with skepticism towards the idea that I'm ASD on the part of people who know me well. Still, I know what Grandin means, although the social effects have been less profound for me than for her. — wonderer1

FWIW, I also related very strongly with the 'anthropologist on Mars' analogy. I do feel 'estranged', 'out of synch' with others etc. So, I think I can 'get' the feeling (although this 'alienation' can be caused by other factors). I also do 'appear normal' but I do certiainly live in an 'atypical' way, so to speak. I also notice that I 'socialize' in an atypical way etc.
I did in the past read info about autism, took some tests (and actually got scores compatible with autism).
As I said, however, other reasons can explain that and I am not formally diagnosed...

Are we imagining a situation where social interaction between people plays a prominent role? If so, what reason would there be to not expect autistic people in this afterlife to experience a painful sense of being an outsider? How do you imagine things being different? — wonderer1

Well, actually, I only hope that it will be 'good' (and BTW, I am agnostic about that). But even despite my own social difficulties, I recognize that some of the best moments in my life have been when I interacted with people (either online or IRL) and I do have a deep yearning for be part of a comunity (despite often seeking solitude because, well, company is overwhelming, and what seems natural for me is alien for others and viceversa. This 'disagreement' is actually exhausting and can be painful). So, I believe that discomfort/suffering that one can feel due to social interaction is due to contingent causes.
Hence, I believe that if the afterlife will involve a 'communal life' of some sorts this doens't imply that people who have social difficulties right now will suffer.

Well, not sure of your point. If, say, one has no economical problems, would you still think that 'giving birth' is morally wrong?

Also, generally antinatalists argue that 'giving birth' is wrong becuase it is a choice that affects others (in unknown ways) not becuase it undermines our 'self-preservation'. At best your argument is for a personal choice of not giving birth.

You'd have to qualify "foundation" but there are MANY foundational ethical frameworks for which AN conclusions have been drawn or at least "fit into", such as deontological ones (which I hold). Many fall under a negative utilitarian variety. Others are vaguely consequential (environmental ones, probably ones least like the ones I hold). One can even argue for a virtue theory version, that can correspond with Schopenhauer's notion of compassion being THE only real moral sentiment (because it sees everyone as what they truly are.. fellow-sufferers). In this theory, anti-procreation would be a natural course of a virtuous (i.e. compassionate) person. They see what befalls man, and wants to prevent it. In this sense, AN can also be philosophical pessimistic in its foundation. That is to say, there is something INHERENTLY negative about existence that makes it fundamentally never redeemable through social, personal, or political actions. This goes to a vaguely existential understanding of the situation. — schopenhauer1

Well, I see what you mean, but AN makes the claim that 'giving birth is intrinsically bad'. This is an ethical evaluation and quite clearly is incompatible with a 'subjectivist' view of ethics, for instance. Viirtue ethics is probably the best 'foundation' of ethics in general. We might assume that, say, a good action is both good for the recipient of the action and for the agent himself/herself. So, yes, compassion is a good ground for ethics and I agree with Schopenhauer.
It's also compatible IMO with a 'deontological' view: being compassionate is also a duty to both oneself and to others - one should/must seek the good for oneself and others.

'Giving birth' is tricky here because the 'human being' doesn't exist (unless one believes in some kind of existence before birth*, but let's assume that this is not the case). Let's say that we cannot know the 'final outcome'** of the future person life (i.e. if that individual will be satisfied with life or irreversibily unhappy), in this case, clearly we must admit that, after all, we can't say that 'giving birth' is a good act. In this sense I agree with the antinatalists. However, I am not sure if 'giving birth' qualifies as a 'bad' act, even when one considers the future individual.

So deontology generally puts the locus of ethics at the individual level (not all the time, but most.. things like rights/duties). To me, the outcome doesn't matter. That is to say, we don't have a duty towards the outcome of "preserving humanity". Humanity isn't a subject for ethical concern. Rather, we have ethical considerations of individuals and their suffering, or right thereof not to be unnecessarily and non-consentingly caused the situations/conditions wherewith (ALL!) suffering takes place. That is not your right to confer for someone else. And there is no symmetrical duties/obligations for creating happiness, especially with understanding that there is no one who exists to be deprived of happiness you would not be thus conferring. — schopenhauer1

Probably, 'deontological' was the wrong word. I believe, however, that ethics itself is intrinsically social. Ethical agency doens't seem to me to make sense without a community. In other words, if, say, 'I act in order to bring the good to myself and to others', then I cannot 'ignore' the presently existent human beings and the human community in general. If one accepts that seeking the 'good' is also a social 'enterprise', then trying to preserve society seems, after all, a 'good' act. If one believes that, clearly there is a contrast with AN.


*For instance, Hindu, Jain and Buddhists believers in reincarnation/rebirth see the 'birth as a human' as something good, precisely because it gives the chance to get better rebirths and liberation. So, if this belief were true, then antinatalism would be wrong.
**As in the other thread, if one believes (as say Christian universalists) that in the 'end' 'all will be well', then of course IMO life would be good for everyone (ultimately).

Christianity is just not good at defending itself. Everybody and their little sister can insult the religion and nobody cares. Well, in that case, I don't care either. — Tarskian

What do you mean by 'defending itself'?? How should religious people defend their religion?

IMO the best 'defence' may be to give an 'exemplary' life. I mean probably the best way for christians to defend their religion would be to lead a loving life and a life of service, i.e. 'carrying the cross' or 'having the mindset of Christ Jesus' as said in the quote in the post above.

Certainly, the fact that, say, historically people have used to make 'forced conversions' and has been imposed violenty probably is also a major motive of the modern crisis of the religion.
Also, in the Gospel of John we read (18:36, NIV):

Jesus said, “My kingdom is not of this world. If it were, my servants would fight to prevent my arrest by the Jewish leaders. But now my kingdom is from another place.”

Also, 'consorship', instead of say, trying to make a philosophical defence against oppoents, has been a disastrous way of 'defending themselves'.

As someone on the autism spectrum, the question arises for me of whether in an afterlife I would be autistic.

If not, then it doesn't seem like it would be me in the afterlife.
If so, and for eternity, I expect I'd think the afterlife kind of sucks. — wonderer1

Well assuming that autism is an essential feature of 'who you are', it might be possible that autism is not a cause of suffering in an afterlife, eternal or not. Not sure why you think it is necessarily bad, unless you think that the 'future life' will be very similar to this life (as I said before, I think that an eternal 'earthly life 2.0' would be bad for everyone, not only for some people)

I have two questions for antinatalists.

The strongest argument IMO for antinatalism (AN) seems to be the one from deontological ethics, i.e. that if we are not sure that life will be a good for the future human being, it's ethically questionable to 'take the risk', especially due to the impossibility of any consent from the future human being ('I cannot chose for others'...).

1) My first question is (especially for those who do not beleive in some 'objective ethics'): what is the foundation of ethics for an antinatalist? It seems that in AN there is a very strong ethical component but if 'ethics' is reduced to some kind of social contract or something 'natural', it seems that AN doens't have a strong justification to be 'better' than others.

2) Also, if one accepts that we also have a 'deontological duty' for others, for the whole human community and if one agrees that 'extinction' of humanity is bad for the whole community then it seems that what the 'deontological' argument for AN leads to is not AN itself but an 'ethical dilemma', i.e. we arrive at a situation where we have two contradictory duties, i.e. we shouldn't decide to 'give life' due to the ignorance/lack of certainty of what that will entail (if we assume that life might be bad in some cases) and the impossibility of consent and at the same time we should, among other things, continue to sustain the whole human community. If all of this is true, why antinatalists think that AN is the best choice?

I wouldn't say that its not like the portait cannot possibly in principle be faithful (where it does not have wrong predictions); but that it cannot tell us anything about reality intrinsically beyond tools that are used by us to essentially anticipate what comes next or came before or what could happen in some scenario. — Apustimelogist

Ok, I see. Yeah, even if the portrait is faithful, it is still a portrait, after all. But IMO the 'weirdness' of modern theories suggests to me that they do not even 'portray' reality. But YMMV.

I feel like my point should be interpretation-independent. — Apustimelogist

Agreed. I meant that in a way non-representationalist interpretations might agree with that.

I disagree. They would still be an inherent part of the descriptions of those interactions, it just doesn't have to be anything more than local to that picture. — Apustimelogist

In a sense, yes, they would describe the behavior of the interactions. But whereas the 'bottom-up' perspective says that conservations law are 'contingent consequences' of the behavior of interactions, the 'top-down' picture (i.e. interactions are more fundamental) says the reverse.

Not entirely sure this is the case. Hard to tell. Imo, the 'holism' can be explained away given that the wave-function isn't real and entanglement depends on local entangling interactions ans locally incompatible observables. — Apustimelogist

I don't see how this isn't some kind of 'non-realism', thought. It seems to imply this rejection of 'unicity', as the article on SEP on Consistent histories uses the term:

But it is contrary to a deeply rooted intuition, shared by philosophers, physicists, and the proverbial man in the street, that at any point in time there is one and only one state of the universe which is “true”, and with which every true statement about the world must be consistent: what is here called unicity. In §2.4, it was argued that because of the noncommutation of quantum projectors, classical unicity must be replaced by quantum pluricity.

Abandoning unicity is certainly a radical proposal, which can only be justified if by doing so one obtains a more coherent and internally consistent understanding of the quantum world, together with a resolution of some of its major problems and paradoxes, such as those described above in §8. In this connection it is worth noting that according to CH the use of a quasiclassical quantum framework, §5, allows one to understand why unicity works so well in the macroscopic quantum world, and hence why its failure in the microscopic domain can be so counterintuitive and hard to grasp. To be sure, there may be other ways of dealing with the quantum mysteries, and it is up to future research to determine whether CH runs into serious problems or continues to resolve the quantum paradoxes to which it is applied. It is also not a foregone conclusion that the quantum Hilbert space, though basic nowadays in almost all applications of quantum theory—quantum foundations is the only notable exception—will continue this leading role or be replaced by something else. Should that occur it would, of course, require the revision or abandonment of any quantum interpretation, such as CH, based firmly on Hilbert space mathematics.

BTW, to answer the OP's question (still I don't see it as relevant), I believe that if a Christian were to convince himself/herself that Chrsitianity is false, then he/she would most likely either (1) choose another religion or become a 'secular Christian', i.e. a non-believer that still follows some ethical teachings and sees the techaings as meaningful. Of course, others might reject completely.

I'm so glad you asked me, because not many people know this. He didn't just carry his cross up the hill, when he got to the top, he was nailed there to it and left until dead — unenlightened

To be fair, that's how Saint Paul himself apparently read the story and he believed that one should follow Jesus' example, at least as he seems to say in the letter to the Philippians (source: https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Philippians%202&version=NIV, emphasis mine):

Therefore if you have any encouragement from being united with Christ, if any comfort from his love, if any common sharing in the Spirit, if any tenderness and compassion, 2 then make my joy complete by being like-minded, having the same love, being one in spirit and of one mind. 3 Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit. Rather, in humility value others above yourselves, 4 not looking to your own interests but each of you to the interests of the others.
5 In your relationships with one another, have the same mindset as Christ Jesus:
6 Who, being in very nature God,
did not consider equality with God something to be used to his own advantage;
7 rather, he made himself nothing
by taking the very nature of a servant,
being made in human likeness.
8 And being found in appearance as a man,
he humbled himself
by becoming obedient to death—
even death on a cross!

Thanks. I wouldn't call myself a Christian, but I appreciate the story, and hate it when people wilfully distort the meaning or claim the copyright on interpretation. We are surely all God's people, and none are excluded - that's the story. — unenlightened

This is also correct if one takes literally this passage, for instance (source: https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20Timothy%202&version=NIV):

I urge, then, first of all, that petitions, prayers, intercession and thanksgiving be made for all people— 2 for kings and all those in authority, that we may live peaceful and quiet lives in all godliness and holiness. 3 This is good, and pleases God our Savior, 4 who wants all people to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth. 5 For there is one God and one mediator between God and mankind, the man Christ Jesus, 6 who gave himself as a ransom for all people.

@apokrisis, @schopenhauer1

Also, another reason why I am not an antinatalist is that I am open to the possibility of an afterlife. I am not sure how the possibility of the afterlife would influence the dilemma of antinatalism (I guess that it also depends on how the afterlife is, if there is one).

Remember I have already agreed that one ought to make responsible choices. One can tell if one is really in a position to do a good job of it. — apokrisis

Well, I didn't mean to say that you thought otherwise. I see what you mean, but I don't think you are answering to the objection.

Even if there is a very small chance that life won't be a 'good thing' for my kid, then, given this uncertainty, how can I justify my decision to give birth? If I give birth on the chance that it will be something bad for him or her, then I have to find some other reason to do it - but note that if a person is a good-in-itself, then I cannot really find it acceptable.

Maybe there is something like a 'deontological' duty to preserve the species. But even if it is were true, then, we have the conflict between two 'ethical duties'. On the other hand, we have to preserve humanity. On the other hand, we have to act towards the future human being as a good in himself/herself. If we choose to 'give birth', we follow the first ethical duty and we accept the risk that life might not be something good to the individual that will be born. If we stop reproducing, of course, we choose to ignore the first ethical duty.

I do see it as an ethical dilemma, BTW. The 'best outcome', of course, would be that humanity never goes extinct and every human being sees and will see their own life as something good. Only in this case, the dilemma disappears. If, instead, it is possible that someone doesn't see life as something good, the dilemma arises.

Personally, one of the reason that I am not an antinatalist is that the above - it is true that each individual is a 'good in himself/herself' but I also think that we have a communal duty, i.e. we also have to act in a way that is good for humanity, which seems to imply that as a community we shall seek to avoid extinction (this doesn't imply that everyone must have kids, of course).

Yes, I don't think so either. My desire to just get rid of an inherent conflict between our direct aquaintance of experience and our descriptions of ontologies in physics. I think there is much less conflict by getting rid of this notion of a bottom to the universe with a fixed set of objects just arranged in different ways. Already, the conflict is weakened somewhat imo if it is emphasized the way that physics can be seen as models or tools that describe or trace functional aspects of the universe rather than intrinsic things. — Apustimelogist

I sort of agree. If we let go the position that physical theories give us a complete description of the 'universe', things change. IMO, we can say that there are 'regularities' in physical phenomena but to 'reify' our descriptions and interpreting them as a 'faithful portrait' of reality is wrong. I think that 'non-representationalist' interpretations of QM have the merit to question this assumption - one can see that merit even if disagrees with them

It's unexplained either way imo. I just am not compelled to commit to the idea that its brute nature requires appeal to anything beyond local dynamics. I don't need to appeal to the whole universe (the only isolated system that exists) to observe examples of conserved quantities from interactions, as implied by conservation laws, in local systems. And I imagine you could say the same thing if the local system was further decomposable so one could focus on what is happening at a single component of it. — Apustimelogist

Well, I think I can see what you mean. But IMO the 'reductionistic' picture takes conservation laws as accidental properties of interactions, whereas the 'holistic' one explains why the interactions behave in a certain way via the conservation laws themselves. In both cases there is no 'full explanation', but IMO the second ontological 'picture' is better.

Yes, it especialliy depends if you interpret the wave-function as a physical object I think. — Apustimelogist

Well, I would say that this is true in a more general sense, i.e. if the quantum formalism gives us a 'glimpse' of how physical objects are.

In the thermal interpretation, as I understand it, the wave-function is a pure fiction. As the 'summary' (found here) says:

This richness of physical properties is not compatible with the notion of a system being purely decomposable into its subsystems in all cases. There are many properties such as a correlators that are properties of the total system that don't arise from properties of subsystems.

Since some properties are assigned to the system as a whole, which can be quite extended, they provide the nonlocal beables required by Bell's theorem. This is a combination of points above. Consider an extended two photon system. This has correlator properties like <AB> that are assigned to the whole system, no matter how extended it is and by the above these properties are not merely a property or combination of properties of any of the subsystems.

I still have to find an ontological interpretation of QM that doesn't have some kind of 'holism', BTW.