Once again I can’t make sense of what you’re saying. — praxis

I wasn't trying to be confrontational or obscure but I can admit that the post you quoted was unclear. So, let me just start by saying that, no, the problem is not the translation. Other scholars used different English words for the Pali word 'dukkha' but that's not the point. Indeed, however, the quote you gave is of pivotal importance. As Nyanaponika Thera wrote in the same essay I already quoted:

Statements in the form of negative terms include such
definitions of Nibbāna as “the destruction of greed, hate and delusion” and as “cessation of
existence” (bhava-nirodha).
...
Negative ways of expression have another important advantage. Statements like those
defining Nibbāna as “the destruction of greed, hatred and delusion” indicate the direction to
be taken, and the work to be done to actually reach Nibbāna — Nyanaponika Thera, Anatta and Nibbana, p.14-5

Clearly, the 'cessation of suffering' is a 'negative description' of Nirvana. What Nyanaponika wrote above seems cogent. It is hard to understand the 'origination and cessation' of 'suffering' if we do not know what 'suffering' is. And, perhaps, we should understand what 'suffering' is in order to reach the 'cessation of suffering'.

Remarkably, the Pali sutta themselves had a rich understanding of the word 'dukkha' that included 'things' that aren't so evident to be 'suffering' for me. I'll quote a few examples:

Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of suffering: birth is suffering, aging is suffering, illness is suffering, death is suffering; union with what is displeasing is suffering; separation from what is pleasing is suffering; not to get what one wants is suffering; in brief, the five aggregates subject to clinging are suffering. — SN 56.11, Bhikkhu Bodhi translation, emphasis mine

While arguably the other things that are named are easily seen as suffering except for the 'five aggregates subject to clinging' that clearly is a technical expression, the declaration that 'birth is suffering' can sound strange. How we should understand it?

Another example:

“Bhikkhus, there are these three kinds of suffering. What three? Suffering due to pain, suffering due to formations, suffering due to change. These are the three kinds of suffering. The Noble Eightfold Path is to be developed for direct knowledge of these three kinds of suffering, for the full understanding of them, for their utter destruction, for their abandoning.” — SN 45.165, Bhikkhu Bodhi translation

Now, "suffering due to pain" seems clear. But what about the other two? What does even mean "suffering due to formations"?

And even another example, where the Buddha is reported as saying:

Good, good, bhikkhu! These three feelings have been spoken of by me: pleasant feeling, painful feeling, neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. These three feelings have been spoken of by me. And I have also said: ‘Whatever is felt is included in suffering.’ That has been stated by me with reference to the impermanence of formations. — SN 36.11, Bhikkhu Bodhi translation, my emphasis

It is not obvious to me that "whatever is felt" should be included under the heading of 'suffering'.

The translator, Bhikku Bodhi, wrote an essay about 'dukkha'. However, it should be noted that there are different interpretation even of what 'dukkha' is among Buddhists. For instance: do arhats and Buddhas suffer while alive? Does the "whatever is felt is included in suffering" apply to those who are without attachments? If you seek online, you find different answers (I have no time right now to point to sources, but I think it is easy to find them).

So, clearly, just appealing to the fact that "suffering" is said to be the problem and "cessation of suffering" the goal doesn't really help to understand "what the Buddha meant". One should be open to the possibility that, perhaps, one might have a different notion of "what is included in suffering" than, say, the Buddha had.

And, if we come back to the problem of 'rebirth'. Is it totally unrelated to what the Buddha (or a specific Buddhist tradition) mean by 'suffering'? Perhaps, yes. But maybe no.

And, I should add that curiously I never found an instance of a pre-20th century Buddhist who denied rebirth. No 'early Buddhist school' (either inside the Mahayana or the 'non-Mahayana') I am aware of denied it. Conversely, you find many discourses attributed to the Buddha in which he explicitly refers to it and even discourses (as the 15th collection of the Samyutta Nikaya I qouted in my earlier posts) in which the Buddha seems pretty clear in using the belief in samsara as a motivator for practice.

Does the above necessarily mean that one can't, for instance, 'become an arhat' without believing in rebirth and samsara? Of course, not. However, one can't help but notice that before the 20th century the belief in rebirth was never (to my knowledge - happy to be proven wrong) a matter of dispute among Buddhists (and some Indian thinkers did deny rebirth even at the time of the Buddha, see the 'Carvaka/Lokiya' school)?

You can find, of course, many examples of disputes among Buddhists. They disagreed on, say, the status of the Mahayana sutras. They disagreed on the interpretation of Nirvana. They disagreed on the nature of the Buddha. They disagreed even on the interpretation of "what is felt is included in suffering". They even disagreed on how to interpret the doctrine of 'not-self' that arguably distinguishes more than anything else Buddhism from other religions. They disagreed on what 'emptiness' means and what are the true 'implication of dependent origination' (just to make an example not all agreed with verse 18 of Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning of Nagarjuna and among Nagarjuna's supporters the precise understanding of such a statement is disputed). The Kathavatthu, a commentarial book included in the Pali Canon (I quoted a brief excerpt of one of its sections before) is a good example of intra-Buddhist controversies and debates.

And despite all of these disagreements among Buddhists, I am not aware of any single pre-20th century disagreement among Buddhists about the belief in samsara.

So what? Does this mean that rebirth happens? Of course, not. Those Buddhist might be wrong. However, it is hard to deny that if something like 'arhatship' or 'Buddhahood' exist those who 'reached' such states endorsed the belief in rebirth. Of course, they might be wrong. But one can wonder if, indeed, to reach such states (even if, say, the Sautrantika were right in their 'negativistic' view of NIrvana that is attributed to them - i.e. Nirvana is just a mere absence) is necessary to believe in those things.

I hope I clarified what I meant and I also hope that I clarified that I am not writing these posts just for the sake of being a 'contrarian' or being obscure for the sake of being obscure or whatever.

I would add that perhaps we have different understanding of what physics allows us to know about 'physical reality'. Honestly, I oscillate between an 'anti-realist' view (i.e. that physical theories are predictive models) and a more 'realist' view that says that physical theories allows us to know the intelligible structure of the physical world. Note, however, that in both cases it doesn't revel what we might call the 'intrinsic nature' of physical systems. Physics allows us to describe the behaviour of matter but doesn't tell us 'what matter is'. In this sense, even in this more 'realist' view physics alone can't decide among metaphysical theories.

To me this is also the reason why the 'hard problem' can't be resolved by physics. Even if we could be able to describe perfectly the 'behaviour' of human bodies in all their movements such an 'externalist' description would leave out 'subjective experience', 'what if feels like to be...'.

For Lao Tzu it is naming--something human consciousness does--that brings the world into existence. — T Clark

Also @Wayfarer

This is very similar to Ven Nagarjuna's views (however, Nagarjuna would perhaps disagree that what remains after 'erasing' objectiification is the 'Tao'*):

10

When the perfect gnosis sees

That things come from ignorance as condition,

Nothing will then be objectified,

Either in terms of arising or destruction.

...

12

And even with respect to most subtle things

One imputes originations,

Such an utterly unskilled person does not see

The meaning of conditioned origination.

...

21

Since there is nothing that arises,

There is nothing that disintegrates;

Yet the paths of arising and disintegration

Were taught [by the Buddha] for a purpose.

22

By understanding arising, disintegration is understood;

By understanding disintegration, impermanence is understood;

By understanding how to engage with impermanence,

The sublime dharma is understood as well. — Ven Nagarjuna, Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning

Oddly, enough, as a (panen)theist, I actually agree that 'things' arise thanks to a rational mind that is able to distinguish, classify 'things' etc. However 'we' are not responsible for that differentiation.
Also, if 'our' minds are responsible for differentiation, how could we arise as distinct beings from an undifferentiated (?) world?

This is something that non-dualist views IMO do not explain (whether Buddhist, Taoist, Hindu etc).

*At one point the Tao te Ching says that the Tao precedes the 'One', so perhaps the Tao Te Ching is even more similar to Madhyamaka Buddhistm than what it appears (i.e. reality is at the ultimate level 'neither one nor many' etc)

I agree with that - especially that there is a truth in there. Philosophy pushes into binary yes/no responses. But, for example, it is true that we can't get out from our own perspective. What idealists tend not to notice is that our perspective throws up problems that it cannot deal with. So we are forced to reconsider and develop a new perspective. The disruption is the world talking back to us. — Ludwig V

:up: We might have a distorted, imperfect knowledge but we are not ignorant. "We see through a glass, darkly" to borrow a Biblical phrase but we are not blind. Knowledge comes into degrees.

If it has no reason to be intelligible, it has no reason not to be. But this misunderstands what intelligibility is, in two respects. Intelligibility is always partial, never finished. What we understand generates new questions and hence new understandings. But also, the category of the chaotic is, curiously enough, a matter of perspective. A disordered pile of books is only chaotic because it is not ordered in a way that is interesting to us. There are in fact, endless ways in which they could be ordered. Our problem is only to pick which order we impose on them. Radical chaos is different. In such a world, we would be unable to identify any object, process or event; there could be no constituents to be ordered or chaotic. — Ludwig V

Good point. But still, if it is intelligible it seems 'natural' to ask ourselves if there is a 'reason' of that intelligibility.

I'm really not qualified to speculate with you, I'm afraid. — Ludwig V

Of course, you are free to avoid such speculations. But I find them very interesting, fascinating and so on.

But what if the way the world really is is best described by a phenomenological analysis of the structure of self-reflexivity itself? And this analysis is conducted not from an objective distance but from within this reflexivity? — Joshs

I don't see how this does address my points. What is the source of intelligibility of the empirical world? These 'transcendental' idealist/phenomenologist approaches, as I understand them, say that it is the faculties of the rational or sentient beings. Fair enough. However, it seems to me that the question that follows up is: considering that the existence of these beings seems to be contingent (and, indeed, the analysis of the empirical world suggests that), how did they come into be?

Indeed, and as I said, I wonder whether philosophy is the right mode to give that explanation. We can't know for sure, but it has the feel to me of a question that, several hundred years from now, people will be amused was considered philosophical and not scientific. — J

Perhaps. But notice that IMO it is also because it seems that knowledge itself is seen in 'all or nothing' terms. IMO it is better to think that knowledge also comes into degrees (with the extreme being something like 'perfect knowledge' and 'absolute ignorance').

To borrow a Biblical expression, "we see like through a glass, darkly". So we have a distorted perspective but we are not 'blind'.

The OP is primarily questioning the idea that the apparent linearity or successiveness of time would be evidence against mind as constitutive of reality, since mind appeared at some point in time. — J

Yes, I agree with the OP that the time objection doesn't refute the view expressed by it. However, the view leads to more questions than answers IMO (not that it is a bad thing necessarily).

The problem is that, insofar as understanding cannot work with a mere idea, re: the existential contingency of sentient beings in general, there can be no empirical resolution possible from judgements made relative to those ideas, that isn’t either thetic or antithetic, meaning in dogmatic conflict with each other relative to the idea. — Mww

Not sure of what you mean. To me the antinomy suggests that the 'Kantian' view that we can't make ontological theories about what is 'beyond the empirical' is probably false. Indeed, if one hand I have to say that science strongly suggests that rational beings in this world had a beginning and that, however, we can't make judgments about the empirical world without referencing to our perspective, it seems to me that we might have no 'certainty' about what is beyonf the empirical but we can still speculate about that.

In other words, the problematic claims are about having certainty.

But as said, I have no reason to contest evolutionary theory or geological history. I’m not providing an alternative account of the evolutionary origins of our species. I suppose you could say that what is being questioned is the support that evolutionary theory provides for philosophical naturalism. Naturalism says, after all, that the mind is of a piece with all the other elements and attributes of humans and other species, and can be treated within the same explanatory matrix. That is what is being called into question here. Which is why I'm not contesting the empirical accounts. — Wayfarer

Yes, I don't deny that. What I am saying is that, however, leaves the issue on how sentient or rational beings (depending on which model of 'transcendental idealism' one supports) came into existence. If they are the source of intelligibility of the empirical world.

In other words, I agree with you that the 'time objection' isn't fatal to this kind of views but they still seem incomplete for other reasons.

Unexpectedly, we seem to be in complete agreement that the cessation of suffering is not the point of Buddhism. — praxis

I would say I agree if 'suffering' is interpreted as 'suffering as we mean it in our culture' or something like that. Clearly, cessation of 'dukkha' is the aim of Buddhist practice. This is true whether Nirvana is merely the end of dukkha or 'something more'.

If the wave function is real and quantum states really are in a superposition until something collapses them then that doesn't entail the binary choice between either a) only consciousness can collapse the wave function or b) only something other than consciousness can collapse the wave function. — Michael

If you believe that wavefunctions are real, you have to somehow explain how physical systems can be in mutually contradictory states simultaneously. To me that is even a worse problem than saying that consciousness 'magically' (so to speak) is the only agent that 'collapses' wavefunctions.

MWI-supporters try to resolve the above problem by suggesting that the 'mutually contradictory states' are different 'branches' of the wavefunction. To me it is rather evident that either the wavefunction is an incomplete description of physical reality (e.g. hidden variable theories) or is an epistemic tool to calculate knowledge and degrees of beliefs (epistemic interpretations).

There's also c) consciousness and other things can collapse the wave function. — Michael

Ironically, the interpretations that explicitly take the view that collapse is an objective 'physical event' generally violate the predictions of quantum mechanics (GRW theories; Penrose's model etc). Anyway, even if one suggests, like Wheeler did, that other systems like, say, a computer can collapse a wavefunction, you still need to explain how a computer came into being in the first place, how to interpret scenarios like the Wigner's friend problem with wahatever things that are able to collapse the wavefunciton and so on.

To avoid these problems, MWI tells you that the universal wavefunction branches into different worlds once decoherence happens (which alone can't solve the 'measurement problem'), RQM says to you that any interaction collapses the wavefunction but sacrifices the view that there is a perspective-independent world.

Epistemic theories give consciousness the 'special' role because they view wavefunctions as something like bookkeeping devices.

But it would be appropriate for this thread, if somebody else wanted to defend his model of brain as receiver of consciousness. :smile: — Gnomon

My own view is that mind and the body are more like two 'sides of the same coin' rather than two separate things. But, again, there is so much unknown...
I'm not a fan of the 'software/hardware' analogy because it risks to lead us to either anthropomorphize machines or to think that we are 'like machines'.

Do you think I should refrain from speculation on The Philosophy Forum? — Gnomon

No, but philosophy also aims to clarity. This also means that we should be aware "what is said or implied by physics" and what is speculative (which, again, I don't think it is wrong but should be discussed without bringing up science).

I'll let you argue with Faggin --- inventor of microprocessors --- about the "role" of consciousness in quantum physics. I find his "speculation" hard to believe, but I can't deny that his detailed reasoning points in the direction that the OP found hard to accept : that Consciousness is not generated by the brain, but received from an external source. — Gnomon

As I said, I am not saying that all physicists are against the "consciousness causes collapse" view. Wigner for a while endorsed it. Von Neumann probably held it. Stapp also suggested it. Others like Andrei Linde sometimes sound like they are saying that consciousness has a causal effect on matter but I believe that they are actually endorsing an epistemic interpretation.

Honestly, I don't find Faggin's metaphysical theory unconvincing because it is too vague. There is also little evidence for that, except perhaps some controversial interpretation of NDEs. I much prefer a view that takes mind and body in a less dualistic way. Indeed, I am partial to considering the 'soul' as the 'form' of the body, i.e. mind and matter aren't two distinct substances but the different aspects of the same 'reality'. But, again, I wouldn't try to convince others by discussing scientific evidence of that.

Later, Richard Feynman, who denigrated philosophy, advised his students to "shut up and calculate" — Gnomon

And yet he himself in a lecture IIRC said that this kind of instrumentalism doesn't give us an account of scientific understanding. Personally, I believe that once you try to make sense of science you actually end up to philosophy. And, indeed, some scientific discoveries put limits also on permissible metaphysical views about reality.

For instance, Bell's theorem rejects any 'local realistic' theories under reasonable assumptions. Special and General Relativity strongly suggest that there isn't an 'universal time'. Anyway, it seems to me that generally science is useful to reject some metaphysical views rather than suggesting that others are true.

Thanks @J for the acknowledgment. However, my objection is more 'subtle' as it doesn't rely on a particular scientific theory but a more general principle, I would say. If one accepts that the existence of rational beings in this world is contingent (for whatever reason), it seems that there should be an explanation for their existence (especially if one insists that their existence had a starting point, as indeed the evolutionary theory suggests).

In other words: it seems to me that the view expressed by @Wayfarer in the OP doesn't give us an explanation of their (and our) existence. I guess that it isn't necessary to seek such an explanation and remain content with the 'antinomy'. However, the fact that the sentient/rational being's existence is contingent to me 'cries' for an explanation. And, indeed, one might even say that the 'antinomy' is a call for a resolution/explanation rather than a statement that such a resolution is impossible.

Quantum mechanics is an attempt to describe the behaviour of all matter and energy in the universe — Michael

As I said, 'energy' is a property of physical systems. So, it is better to say 'behaviour of matter'.

If consciousness exists and is a physical phenomenon then quantum mechanics can, in principle, explain the origin and behaviour of consciousness. And consciousness, like every other physical phenomenon in the universe, interacts with and affects the behaviour of its environment. So just as the physical phenomenon of electricity can "move" any surrounding matter — both at the quantum scale and the macro scale — so too can the physical phenomenon of consciousness. — Michael

This is IMO unrelated to the point I was making. I was criticizing the view that consciousness plays a causal role in the processes described by quantum mechanics. It is true that some physicists (IIRC people like Wigner, Henry Stapp probably von Neumann) supported the idea that during measurements the observation done by a conscious observer 'modifies' the quantum system. But this view assumes that (1) the wavefunction is a real thing and (2) that consciousness is what is needed to cause the wavefunction collapse. Nowadays most proponents of Copenaghen, QBism etc say that the 'collapse' is a mere update of an observer's knowledge/degree of belief and they are emphatic that the wavefunction isn't something 'real'. This BTW means that QM isn't seen as a 'description' of physical reality but a predictive tool.

We should be clear about what physical theories actually say and when 'interpretations' and 'speculations' begin.
Even in classical physics there has been some controversy about how to interpret 'forces'. Are they 'real'? Are they conceptual tools useful for us? Is a 'literal' interpretation of classical mechanics the only tenable one? And so on. But note that we are going outside 'physics' here. 'Classical mechanics' itself is silent on how we should think about the ontology of forces, physical quantities like 'energy' and so on.

And BTW, perhaps 'consciousness' can't be described by quantum mechanics even it is seen as emergent from physical processes. You have to assume a reductionistic kind of emergence to think that.
Furthermore, I have no idea how can consciousness be defined in physical terms.

It seems to me that to deny that consciousness plays a role in the behaviour of other physical phenomena is to either deny that consciousness exists or to deny that consciousness is physical (and so is some other kind of phenomena that is affected by but cannot in return affect physical phenomena). — Michael

At best here one denies that QM really can describe every process in the natural world. But in any case, it is not relevant to my point.

*3. Materialism is fundamentally a philosophy, but it strongly influences (and is often confused with) science, acting as a foundational assumption for much of natural science by asserting only matter and physical laws are real, though critics argue this stance is limiting and doesn't fully explain consciousness or subjective experience, pointing to an "explanatory gap" between matter and feeling. While materialism (the belief that only matter exists) underpins much scientific inquiry by defining what's investigable, it's a metaphysical stance, not a testable scientific theory itself, and some argue science can progress better with broader philosophical perspective — Gnomon

Wanted to add that, ironically, while you're right that 'metaphysical naturalism' isn't implied by scientific knowledge alone but it is speculative, a similar argument can be raised against those who believe that scientific knowledge 'proves' other metaphysical positions or that other metaphysical positions should 'guide' scientific activity.
This is why, incidentally, I am stressing the importance of clarify what exactly physical theories say and what is speculation.

Good OP!

The main reason why, however, I'm not convinced by this kind of argument is that the existence of individual sentient (or perhaps 'rational') beings is contingent. Given that their existence is contingent and, apparently, had a starting point (even if it isn't proper to talk about a 'before' outside their interpretative framework), it seems to me that this position gives no explanation of their existence and their coming into being.

Of course, I can't provide any scientific study that show that belief in samsara/rebirth is necessary to achieve the same mental states of those which have been reached, according to the traditions, by arhats, bodhisattvas and so on.

It should be noted that even early Buddhists debated about the nature of Nirvana, the exact meaning of 'not-self' and so on. However this is no textual evidence that I am aware of that any Buddhist school (prior to 'secular Buddhism' of the 20th century) that rejected rebirth. This tells IMO something of how 'central' the belief in samsara/rebirth was to Buddhist from ancient times to nowadays.

To me this is evidence that Buddhists in history regarded belief in the 'supernatural' as somehow essential to their faith.

In this general case I am not out to prove anything to the world, it is simply finding what will be satisfactory for my own journey. Isn't that generally how it works? — unimportant

Fine. But it seemed to me that you claimed that these kinds of beliefs are irrelevant. According to the bulk of tradition, it seems that Buddhist themselves disagreed on this.

Even the Buddha himself went around all different disciplines until he rejected them all and found his own way. — unimportant

And IIRC, it is also often taught to test Buddhist teachings as one tests the purity of gold, i.e. critically. However, IMHO it is quite interesting that despite the disagreements you find about other topics (e.g. the correct interpretation of 'not-self', Nirvana, how to conceive the reality of 'aggregates' and so on), it seems that the various schools agreed on samsara and rebirth. This doesn't necessarily mean that they are right but I believe that one should reflect on this agreement without trying to accept easy answers like "they simply wanted to impose a belief on others to get power" or something.

There is a Mahāyāna sutra that explicitly rejects that idea. — Wayfarer

Yeah.

Such an idea is also rejected in the traditional Theravada. In one of my earlier posts, I referenced to the paper "Anatta and Nibbana" by Nyanaponika Thera which quotes post-canonical sources that explicitly rejected the idea. Here some escerpts from the commentary to the Visuddhimagga:

Now, in the ultimate sense the existingness of the Nibbāna-element has been demonstrated by the Fully Enlightened One, compassionate for the whole world, by many sutta passages, such as “Dhammas without condition,” “Unformed dhammas” (see Dhammasaṅgaṇī, Abhidhamma Piṭaka); “Bhikkhus, there is that sphere (āyatana) where neither earth•” (Udāna 71); “This state is very hard to see, that is to say, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all substance of becoming” (DN 14; MN 26); “Bhikkhus, I shall teach you the unformed and the way leading to the unformed” (SN 43:12) and so on; and in this sutta, “Bhikkhus, there, is an unborn • “ (Udāna 73) •

...
If Nibbāna were mere non-existence, it could not be described by terms such as “profound,” etc.; [5] or as “the unformed, etc; or as “kammically neutral, without condition, unincluded,” — commentary to the Visuddhimagga, Dhammapala, translated by Ven Nyanamoli and Nyanaponika

It is significant that these authoratitive post-canonical texts took the pain to reject the "Nirvana as mere non-existence/absence" idea.

Also, even in the Theravada canonical Abhidhamma there is one text that describes the 'permanence' of Nirvana in the same way as the permanence of the 'self' of non-Buddhists.

If you assert that the material-aggregate retains its materiality, you must admit that the material-aggregate is permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to change. You know that the opposite is true; hence it should not be said that materiality is retained.

Nibbāna does not abandon its state as Nibbāna—by this we mean Nibbāna is permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to change. And you ought to mean this, too, in the case of material-aggregate, if you say that the latter does not abandon its materiality. — Kathavatthu 1.6, Shwe Zan Aung, C.A.F. Rhys Davids translation

(The context of this excerpt is a debate between the precursor school of the modern Theravada and the 'Sarvastivada' school, a school that endorsed the idea that in some sense the 'psycho-physical' aggregates existed in all times and they are said to be impermanent because their activity is transitory. Note that the Theravada rejects such kind of view of the permanence of the 'aggregates' but at the same time accepts the idea that Nibbbana/Nirvana is indeed 'permanent, eternal' erc.)

It is difficult, in my opinion, to read the above description of Nirvana as a 'mere absence'.

But anyway, the OP here is convinced that one's own views about reality do not matter for achievements. So, these points are irrelevant to them like those about rebirth.

In a technical "scientistic" context, computer software does not work like the human mind. But in a philosophical (metaphorical) context, the human mind's relation to the brain is analogous to the software of a computer. Can you accept that notion, for the sake of philosophical reasoning? :chin: — Gnomon

Yes and No. Yes, because in some sense the 'hardware-software' two different 'aspects' of a computer. However, 'no' because it suggests that human minds and computer softwares are more similar than what they are. It doesn't seem the case that computers have qualitative experiences and deliberation.

For example, Einstein was a theoretical scientist — Gnomon

Nobody disputes that. But like other theoretical physicists, Einstein introduced theories that were able to predict the results of past and future experiments.

When you say, "Many physicists would deny that the 'mind' has some kind of special role."*2, you are ignoring the many scientists (Kristof Koch, et al) who affirm that the human mind is unique in nature. Hence, the "hard problem" of science — Gnomon

Here's the problem of 'mixing' concepts of different contexts. Yes, the 'hard problem' is very relevant. But there is no compelling evidence that 'consciousness' has a special role in quantum mechanics. And even those who does give consciousness some kind of 'role' in quantum mechanics generally say that consciousness doesn't 'do' anything to physical reality. Rather, QM is a tool that is used to predict how the knowledge/beliefs of observers evolve in time.

It is good to be aware of that before taking speculation as 'scientific evidence'.

Rebirth has to do with the supposed structure or metaphysics of suffering. I don't understand why that would be motivational. If nirvana is the carrot, suffering itself is the stick. — praxis

Ok, yes, a famous 'definition' of Nirvana is the 'cessation of suffering'. An early Buddhist school, the Sautrantika, apparently believed that it was just that, nothing 'more'. Assuming that they were right and that 'Nirvana without remaineder' de facto coincides with oblivion, there is no 'transcendent' goal there.

So, if the above conception of Nirvana is right (and this is a big 'if'), you need to show that one achieve the same results of 'traditional Buddhists' with "escaping the suffering of this present life" as a sufficient motivator. Given the textual evidence that apparently no Buddhist tradition (with the exception perhaps of 'secular Buddhism' started in the 20th century) endorsed such an idea, it is indeed a big claim.

So, how can we test such a hypothesis. The OP apparently thinks that "scientific evidence" + "some comparative religion studies" showed once for all that it is indeed possible to achieve the same states of 'enlightenment' of the Buddhist traditions without agreeing with their belief. Fine. However, are we sure about that?

You are ignoring again that evidence I have highlighted that many other religious disciplines reach similar levels of transcendence of the physical world yet don't believe in rebirth. — unimportant

I didn't ignore those evidence.I simply do not see them as convincing evidence that those experience are the same, not just similar.

Anyway, it seems that you have already made up your mind about these things. So, fair enough, I guess.

I thought you might be. Perhaps my response was clumsy. I must confess I didn't give a thought to your possible religious beliefs. If I offended you, I apologize. — Ludwig V

As I said, I was joking. So no offence. No need to worry or apologize. However, unfortunately, it is easy to get misunderstanding in written medias.

Thanks. This is very helpful. Mind you, I'm not entirely sure that we are lucky to be alive. Some people think that life is a bit of a curse. — Ludwig V

I get that. But I was referring to being lucky about the fact that our strategies for survival, scientific models 'work'. But I think you understood.

I'm finding it very hard to envisage the possibility that there may be no intelligible structure in the world. It seems to me that the fact that we survive and find our way about seems to me to demonstrate that there is. So, for me, there is no "if there is an intelligible structure...", only "Given that there is an intelligible structure..." — Ludwig V

Yes, I agree. But note that generally 'metaphysics' is, so to speak, 'chastised' for that. To make a few examples, 'epistemic idealists', 'transcendental idealists', some phenomenologists etc claim that we have no possibility to know "how the world is" because all we know is a representation ordered by our own cognitive apparatus or even deny that the the world has an intelligible structure. How the world 'is' independent from that is unanswerable because we can't get out from our own perspective. I believe that there is a truth in there but at the same time, they overreach. We might have no 'certain knowledge' but I believe we can make 'reasonable speculations'.
Indeed, the fact that our strategies 'work' suggest that we have some knowledge of the 'world independent from us'.

Is there such a thing as an unintelligible structure? If there's a structure, it will be intelligible. If it's not intelligible, it won't be a structure. — Ludwig V

:up: and if there's no structure, how could sentient beings with cognitive apparatuses come into being?

Why do you think a mindless world might not be intelligible? — Ludwig V

Because, it has no reason (I am using this word without any reference to 'purpose' here) to be intelligible, otherwise. It might be intelligible, yes, but I don't think there is any need for that. And yet, it seems that it is. It could be a complete 'chaos' and yet it is ordered. My question is: why is it so?
My own speculative answer is that even what we call 'mindless', 'inanimate' matter has a structure because it derives from a 'Principle' of both 'being' and 'intelligibility' (and this IMO is an 'argument' - speculative argument, not a 'proof' - of the existence of a 'Divine Mind').

Your description of "mindless" and "blind" hints that you think there is some impossibility or unlikelihood of that happening by itself, as it were. Am I right? Why do you think that? — Ludwig V

The fact that the arising of life and our species (i.e. a specie that can use reason) isn't impossible is for me something that is cause of wonder.

For me, "practice" is too broad a brush to be meaningful here. Religious practice has many facets/goals – I think more than most people realize. For instance, it may be fair to say that people have a desire for meaning in their lives and religious practice may help fulfill that need. Religious practice can help attain that state of fulfillment. They achieve that goal regardless of their state of *enlightenment*... and regardless of their ability to endure pain with composure. — praxis

This might be true but the original question was something like "is it possible to attain the same 'achievements' even if I do not believe in what Buddhists have always believed?".

IMO there are good arguments that the answer is 'no'. It is possible that the 'worldview' we have conditions our motivations while we 'practice' and perhaps even the idea we have about the goal we seek conditions the way we 'practice'. Do these factors have no importance when we seek to attain some kind of goals? Is the motivation behind our own practice irrelevant for our ability to reach the goal?

For instance, consider this Pali sutta:

“Venerable sir, if one’s clothes or head were ablaze, to extinguish one’s blazing clothes or head one should arouse extraordinary desire, make an extraordinary effort, stir up zeal and enthusiasm, be unremitting, and exercise mindfulness and clear comprehension.”

“Bhikkhus, one might look on equanimously at one’s blazing clothes or head, paying no attention to them, but so long as one has not made the breakthrough to the Four Noble Truths as they really are, in order to make the breakthrough one should arouse extraordinary desire, make an extraordinary effort, stir up zeal and enthusiasm, be unremitting, and exercise mindfulness and clear comprehension. What four? The noble truth of suffering … the noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of suffering. — SN 56.34, Bhikkhu Bodhi translation

If one doesn't believe in rebirth, can one reach the same level of motivation? Or is the above sutta wrong and such motivation isn't necessary?

The 'traditionalist' answer would be 'no' to both questions. Clearly, one is free to try to reach the same level of, say, 'equanimity' that is generally abscribed to arhats or 'enlightened bodhisattvas'. So, either one has convincing arguments to show that the traditional answer is wrong or, indeed, one has to see for oneself.

Why I would say that you are afraid of crossing that line in the sand? It's because you repeatedly warn me to be "careful". But I don't accept that arbitrary division of Philosophy into Nature and Supernature. For me, it's all Science and all Philosophy, and Nature includes both Mind and Matter, both flesh and emotions. The human Mind (consciousness, "soul", software) seems to be a product of eons of material evolution. So the study of the intangible, immaterial aspects of Nature should not be taboo for Science or Philosophy*1. — Gnomon

My 'suggestions' do not come from a 'scientistic' perspective or anything like that. Rather, they come from a desire to clarify the use of concepts in their own context. To make another example, the 'software' of a computer isn't like our mind, in my opinion. For instance, arguably, a very complex 'mechanical calculator' could perform the tasks 'electronic computers' do. They are both algorithmic. I do not think that there is sufficient evidence to say that our minds are also algorithmic (in fact, our experience of 'deliberation' makes quite difficult to believe they are IMO).

Physics may try to limit its subject matter to Matter only. But Quantum Physics made that policy of apartheid very difficult*2. So, I don't accept that, no longer valid, distinction between Matter Science and Mind Science. Which is why I label my personal philosophy as BothAnd*3. :smile: — Gnomon

Again, I believe it is useful to clarify where the 'science' stops and where 'philosophy' begins. Many physicists would deny that the 'mind' has some kind of special role. And those who do assign a role to the 'observer' generally believe that the role is purely epistemic, i.e. quantum mechanics is more like a recipe to compute how the knowledge or beliefs of an observer about a physical system evolve rather than how the physical system evolves. Other interpretations like 'many worlds', 'de Broglie-Bohm', 'relational interpretation', even some strands of 'Copenaghen' and so on do not treat 'conscious observers' as 'special'. The problem with all these interpretations is that there is no reliable experimental way to falsify one or another. So, at the purely scientific level they are equivalent. In any case, it is clear that QM doesn't force a special, 'causal' role of the 'mind' on 'matter'. Indeed, that seems an unwarranted speculation. However, epistemic interpretations IMO have their merit but, being epistemic, they do not claim to give us a 'picture' of "how the world is in itself".

They, however, all agree that QM is a very useful recipe to predict the results of past and future measurements and its usefulness for applications. This might be the 'scientific consensus'. I believe that it is best to be clear about this before claiming that 'QM' is 'evidence beyond doubt' for or against any particular metaphysical view.

This part makes sense. :up: — praxis

:up:

This is IMO central. If it isn't just an intellectual understanding, motivations behind why one practices become relevant. Indeed, the goal we set to ourselves when we do something conditions the way we do a determinate action.

While I believe that nothing prevents a practitioner to practice even if they don't believe in rebirth, Nirvana and so on, it is still relevant that you have an immense amount of witnesses in the Buddhist traditions that tells you, instead, that believing in rebirth is something central. So, perhaps, they are right. Maybe don't, but you should have good arguments to show that someone that doesn't have the same motivations can get to the same state.

I'm not disappointed at all. Many people have beliefs of this kind that I do not share. You, in your turn, may be disappointed to learn that I have never been able to sign up to any doctrine of this kind - mostly because I find it too hard to make sense of them. For purposes of classification, I call myself an agnostic. I think we can co-exist. — Ludwig V

I was joking but it seemed to me that your use of adverbs like 'clearly' meant that it was impossible for you that I could be a panentheist :smile:

I don't understand what you are asking for. — Ludwig V

Consider this analogy. Alice every time that plays a lottery, wins. Let's say that this reapeats for 10 times.

Our instinct is: it can't be "just a coincidence". We want an explanation of "what is really going on". Perhaps, we discover that the lottery system is rigged in her favour, with or without her knowledge. And then we discover how it is rigged and we can make an explanation of why she is winning.
However, someone else might just say: "well, it is unlikely but it isn't impossible. The game works as it should, Alice is just very, very, very lucky.".

So, here's the point. If, for instance, the mathematical structure of our physica models doesn't 'reflect' an intelligible structure of the "physical world as it is", our success becomes difficult to explain. We might just be lucky: there is no intelligible structure but somehow we manage to make models that work. Or there is an intelligible structure which is 'reflected' (albeit imperfectly) into our models that allows us to make successful predictions.

"The physical world seems intelligible" means, to me, that we can understand the physical world. You use the word "seems" which suggests that you think that might not be the case. I agree that we do not understand it completely. Is that what you mean? I can't see what it might mean to say that our partial understanding is an complete illusion, as opposed to partly wrong. — Ludwig V

I agree with you here. However, notice that we have no 'guarantee', i.e. no 'absolute certainty', that we understand the world, even imperfectly.

However, if you agree with me and there is an intelligible structure in the physical world, things get interesting.

Conscious beings evolved in the physical world, and evolved the means for understanding that world. If those means had failed to understand the physical world, our species would likely have died out long ago. No? — Ludwig V

Yes, but why should a 'mindless world' be intelligible at all? If conscious beings - and even more rational beings - are completely accidental product of 'blind' processes of a 'mindless world', why would such a world have a structure that can be truly (even if imperfectly) understood by them?

Again, you seem to be afraid of crossing the Enlightenment line between Science and Religion. But Philosophy is similar to Religion only in its focus on the non-physical (mental, spiritual) aspects of the world. Philosophy has no Bible and no Pope. So each thinker can be a rogue priest. My childhood religion was antithetical to Catholicism, in that it downplayed rituals & miracles, and focused on reasonable verifiable beliefs. I still retain some of that skeptical rational attitude, even though I no longer congregate with those of "like precious faith". In fact, Faith is a four-letter word for me. — Gnomon

Not sure why you would say this. I am neither against religion nor philosophy. What I want to point out is to be careful to 'mix' them with science.

ut if I "go beyond" the bounds of materialistic Physics, my direction is influenced mainly by astro-physicists (cosmologist), such as Paul Davies, and Quantum physicists, such as Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schrödinger, and Max Planck. — Gnomon

Sure none of them seemed to hold a 'materialist' view of things. However, someone like Schrödinger who was very explicit in his endorsement of a quasi-Advaita Vedanta metaphysics, never said that quantum mechanics suggested that. Rather, he interpreted all physical theories as statistical theories.
One can think that modern physics doesn't support necessarily 'non-physicalist' views and still have reason to support them.

Regarding quantum mechanics, in particular, there are many interpretations. So using it as 'proof' of any kind of metaphysical view is IMO problematic. At least, one should aknowledge that it is one's own interpretation and not what the 'theory' says.

Of course, the primitive philosophers 1500 years ago, did not have the detailed scientific knowledge of the 21st century. So, their concepts were more general & visionary than our modern technical details. — Gnomon

Or perhaps they are still right because they didn't refer to what we now refer when we speak about of 'energy' or 'momentum'.

Speaking of "physical" can you define Dynamics, Energy, and Potential in material terms --- without using abstract philosophical notions such as "capacity", "ability", "causal" & "essence"? What is Energy made of? Where can I find Potential in the real world? :wink: — Gnomon

Yes, you can. For instance, classical mechanics can be done without saying that 'forces' are real. Lagrangian and Hamiltonian approaches are a way to do that. In other words, it might sound strange but it is actually common since the 19th century to treat physical quantities as 'useful fictions', so to speak, rather than properties of the 'world out there'.

Another example is QM itself. If you take literally the basic theory of QM and interpret the wavefunction as a physical entity, you end up endorsing a lot of bizzarre claim. In fact, most supporters of a 'Copenaghen' interpretation nowadays think that the wavefunction is simply a way to encode the information we have about a physical system. Its 'collapse' is an update of knowledge. This avoids being forced to say that a particle is in two mutually contradictory states.

Again, you seem "careful" to draw a hard line between Physics and Philosophy. But, especially since the quantum revolution, Physics was forced, by the Uncertainty Principle and the indeterminacy of quantum phenomena, to resort to philosophical reasoning for descriptions & interpretations of the real world's ideal foundation*4. Physics is no longer purely mechanical, nor purely philosophical, but a complex adaptive system of both. :cool: — Gnomon

I sort of agree with that. I would, however, say that the 'revolutions' in 20th century physics made us more aware that we should be careful to be 'literalist' about our scientific theories.

To make an example, classical Newtonian mechanics has been 'proven wrong' only if it is interpreted as an ontological description of the world. If you interpret it as a predictive model it is in fact pretty good.

It's a bit contorted argument, so I'll try. Basically, the point is that while a person might intellectually accept the idea that "the self is an illusion", if such a person also believes that this is the only life, at a deeper level they IMO have more difficulty to develop non-attachment to this life. If this life is unique it seems to me that it is more likely that one might regard it as 'special' and if it is regarded as 'special' it is clear to me that this involves a concept of 'mine'. So, at a deeper level, the person still engages with the world with a convinction that there is a self and the the experience is 'theirs'. — boundless

I wanted to add this. Contrast the above situation to the scenario that is true if rebirth happens.

If one's 'succession of lives' spans so many different 'states of being' and one truly believes that, it is easier to think that one becomes less attached to the contingent circumstances he or she finds themselves in. There is nothing 'special' about any of them and it becomes easier to lose attachment to them. However, if one is convinced that there is only 'this life', then 'this life' becomes much, much more important. It isn't just an instance of an incredibly long succession of successive lives none of which is more 'important' than the other because, in samsara, none of those state is blissful and unending and none of them defines your identity more than any other. Rather it is the only life one thinks he or she has. Being the only life one has such a lifetime tends to be regarded very important for the person and much more apt to define one's identity.

In summary, it seems to me that it is much easier to let go of attachment to one's life if one is convinced that it is just an instance of a very, very long of succession of lives, none of which is of particular importance. Instead, if this lifetime is unique, it is clearly more likely to see it as 'special' and 'importan' and develop attachment to it.

Have you ever looked at the concept of Energy from a philosophical perspective? You ought to try it sometimes. It might broaden your understanding of Philosophy itself. — Gnomon

Yes, but I'm still convinced that you're reading too much into the concept. Note however, that this doesn't mean that your metaphysical outlook is 'off' or anything.

But modern Physics*2 imagined Energy as some intangible eternal property/quality of inert temporal matter that could be quantized (a quart of vacuum) for practical applications. — Gnomon

Nothing in here and in the reference you quoted go beyond the 'realist' interpretation that is admissible in physics. But despite the appearances it isn't like a 'potential' in the metaphysical sense.

Also, it isn't the only interpretation is admissible in physics. You can also think as a purely conceptual tool that is useful to predictions etc.

Ancient Greeks began to formulate primitive ideas about Causation & Change that would later influence modern physics. For example, Plato talked about dunamis (dynamics) and energeia (power). Even pragmatic Aristotle*3 characterized what we now call Energy, as un-actualized Potential seeking to become real in a process-of-becoming called Telos (purpose or goal). — Gnomon

I dispute the fact that these philosophers had what we label as 'energy' in mind when they talked about 'dynamis', 'energeia' and 'potentiality'. These concepts might have inspired later physicists to develop the concept of 'energy' but they aren't necessarily referring to the same thing.
Also, this doesn't mean that these ancient concepts are wrong.

Modern Physics uses the same old terms, but avoids any teleological or philosophical implications. — Gnomon

Yes, hence the confusion. Actually, I believe that physicists themselves should be more careful in how to explain the concepts they use.

For instance, one might try to say that a 'seed' has the 'potentiality' to become a 'plant'. However, in this potentiality the concept of 'energy' as it is used by modern physics has no role. Rather the Aristotelian concept is more similar to a controversial concept that has been advanced by David Bohm and Basil Hiley, which you might find congenial as it is more similar to how you think about 'energy': Active Information.

I say 'controversial' because it is unclear if such a concept is amenable of scientific research or if it still purely philosophical.

I'm sorry. I didn't mean to imply that consciousness isn't fundamental in some sense. I was just asking in what sense you think it is fundamental. Obviously, you don't mean in the sense that it is the causal origin of the world. — Ludwig V

You might be disappointed by what I say now: I am a panentheist, so obviously, I regard the (Divine) Consciousness as ontologically fundamental (incidentally, I believe that 'classical theism' is a form of panentheism but honestly I'm unclear if my views are truly compatible with 'classical theism'). However, I do not believe that 'consciousness' is fundamental if by 'consciousness' we mean the consciousness of (finite) sentient beings.

Why do I accept the view that there is such an 'ontologically fundamental Consciousness'? There are various reasons but IMO the most pertinent here are the following:

• Laws of reasons and mathematical truths seems to be (1) conceptual and (2) timeless and not contingent. If they are conceptual, they cannot exist outside a 'mind'. If, however, we accept also (2), this leads to accept that there must be a timeless, non-contingent Mind.
• The physical world seems intelligible, which seems totally ungaranteed if the 'physical' was totally independent from consciousness. Also, such an intelligibility, IMO makes sense only in reference to an Intellect, at least at a potential way (i.e. intelligibility means that it can be understood). To me this is a clue that such an Intellect exists and is the reason why the physical world is intelligible. I find the 'Kantian' views lacking here. To me they seem that they can't give an account of why the 'mind' can 'order' experience if there is no intelligible structure in the 'outside world'.

So you accept that they do work. But if they work, they provide an explanation - that's what conceptual structures do, isn't it? — Ludwig V

No, merely stating and observing they work isn't an explanation. They could for instance work by pure 'luck'. Think for instance, about the problem of induction.

I don't understand the first alternative. If the world has an intelligible structure, then there is an explanation why things are the way they are. — Ludwig V

If intelligibility is a fundamental property of being, we might ask ourselves if there is a reason why it must be so. Again, merely stating that "intelligibility is a fundamental property of being" is an assertion but not an explanation.

As to the second, it happens all the time that we think we have an account of the world and it turns out to be wrong. We just set to work to devise another, better, one. — Ludwig V

What gives you a guarantee that the 'better' account isn't also illusory if there is no intelligibility?

This doesn’t make any sense to me. Can you explain? — praxis

It's a bit contorted argument, so I'll try. Basically, the point is that while a person might intellectually accept the idea that "the self is an illusion", if such a person also believes that this is the only life, at a deeper level they IMO have more difficulty to develop non-attachment to this life. If this life is unique it seems to me that it is more likely that one might regard it as 'special' and if it is regarded as 'special' it is clear to me that this involves a concept of 'mine'. So, at a deeper level, the person still engages with the world with a convinction that there is a self and the the experience is 'theirs'.

At the end of the day, it must be something more than a mere intellectual convinction. If it was just that, then, all people who believe that the "self is an illusion" would have some kind of 'enlightenment' in the Buddhist sense. It should be noted, also, that apparently the Buddha didn't go around and tell everyone that "there is no self" because such an assertion was at danger of being misunderstood by beginners (SN 44.10) and it seems that the Buddha when speaking from an ethical point of view didn't have any problem to speak about the 'self'.

Interestingly, there was an early Buddhist school, who at one time was quite popular, the Pudgalavada who affirmed the existence of a 'person' ('pudgala') while denying it to be like the 'self' (atman) rejected by the Buddha, perhaps because they saw the 'person' as something 'indeterminate' (and perhaps influenced some strands of the Mahayana - not all).

You believe that there are no unique entities? — praxis

I wasn't presenting my views. I'm not a Buddhist and I reject the 'non-self' doctrine, precisely because IMO it seems to me that there are individual entities. However, I am still fascinated by Buddhist traditions and I admire it.

Why does becoming a mendicant have to have anything to do with rebirth? — unimportant

You seem to have some familiarity with Buddhist texts. A great number of them speak about why Buddhists historically saw 'liberation from samsara' as their goal.

Of course, one can become a 'mendicant' without believing in rebirth. For instance, there are Hindu, Christian, Jain etc ascetics who clearly believed that such a life had a different purpose than Buddhists. You can find perhaps many analogies, but one can't overlook the differences.

So, you should ask yourself: why should I become a monk/mendincant or whatever? What is the purpose of such a choice?
For instance, one needs a very strong motivator and a very strong convinction to make a radical choice and remain committed to it. And, for instance, becoming a Buddhist monk is clearly a radical choice.

To be honest, I can't see why a secular materialist would make such a choice. Something like Epicureanism (as 180 says) seems more apt for a secular materialist. You are of course free to incorporate other practices but honestly I do not get why one would want to devote oneself to the life of a Buddhist ascetic without being a Buddhist.

Anyway...

The bikkhu gives insight for the lay person when the latter asks for guidance and the lay person gives the bikkhu food to survive. Nothing of that has to have anyhthing to do with supernatural explanations. — unimportant

Guidance for what?Only for the 'here and now'? Also it should be noted that most Buddhist traditions have believed that Nirvana isn't just a 'mere absence' of negative mental factors and/or experience (like the ancient Sautrantika school apparently believed and appararenly as various modern Buddhist teachers believe). Just to make an example, for a 'traditional' Theravadin perspective on this ('traditional' because it quotes ancient commentaries that are highly regarded in the Theravada tradition), read: Anatta and Nibbana by Ven Nyanaponika. Clearly, if one thinks that Nirvana isn't a 'mere absence' then the goal itself becomes incompatible with a materialist worldview. This is a problem of course. If the goal isn't something that is conceivable in materialistic terms, then a 'secularized Buddhist practice' becomes incoherent (it would be like practising Christianity without believing in God).

As to the 'no selfness' being contingent upon rebirth I again don't think it is necessary. Lots of neuroscience, and this is a point Sam Harris makes when discussing the topic, has confirmed there is no 'I' to be found and it is just a social or cultural construct. So it can easily be explained from an empirical standpoint. To actually have some huge insight just from that data is another matter. — unimportant

While I disagree that Neuroscience gave us a definite answer on the existence of a self, even if it did, the bolded part is crucial. If I believe that 'there is only this life' there is a high risk to never be able to shake off the deep-rooted convinction that we are an unique, distinct entity with defining characteristics. On the other hand, if I believed in rebirth the 'features' of this life would seem much less 'central' to me.
So, again, while you might be right that 'non-self' might be compatible with materialism, the belief that there are no future and past life actually increases the 'impression' that this life is lived by a 'real' self.
If 'Bob' can become a snake, a celestial being and then 'Alice' none of the things that defined these 'states' seem essential to 'the person'. It is quite easier if one believes in rebirth to become less attached to one's current identity, relationships and so on.

This then means that all the talk of reincarnation is not necessary to have such spiritual awakenings as the Christian mystics managed just the same and do not hold those same beliefs.

What should be done is to read through the different mystical experiences from each culture and religion and look for the common threads. — unimportant

Why you think that they reached the same experiences. What makes you so certain that the experience were literally the same (and not, say, 'similar')? Is comparing brain activity really enough to estabish that they are exactly the same?

Can the same states still be achieved if one only takes them as allegories rather than realities? — unimportant

This is an interesting question. Interestingly, while, for instance, in Christian history it is easier to find examples of 'allegorical/non-literal interpretatons' even in ancient times, I do not know anything like that in Buddhist history. In fact, 'literalism' about the content of the suttas/sutras seems quite important to Buddhists in antiquity. Again, I may be wrong about this, but I do not recall of any 'allegorical method' of interpreting Buddhist scriptures in historical Buddhist traditions.

Anyway, to answer your question, I don't know. The only way of knowing that, perhaps, is to personally 'walk through the path' and see where it leads.

It depends what you mean by "fundamental". Clearly, consciousness is not the origin of the physical world and does not exist independently of some physical substrate. That suggests that it is the physical world that is fundamental. So what do you mean by "fundamental". — Ludwig V

I disagree about the 'clearly'. Theists, panentheists, idealists etc would have a word about it. Even someone like Spinoza would disagree. For him the 'physical' and the 'mental' are two attributes of the one Substance - so to him neither of them is foundational to the other.

The fact that scientific evidence suggests that all individual sentient beings can't exist without a physical basis doesn't exclude all metaphysical models that posit consciousness as fundamental. One might think that scientific knowledge doesn't give us a complete knowledge about the physical world.

The physical world seems to have an intelligible structure. If consciousness isn't fundamental in some sense, how can we explain that?

You are right to think that our not knowing all about everything does not mean that we know nothing about anything. However, the reason why our predictive models work is that we test their predictive power. If they fail, we revise the model or abandon it. What more do you want? — Ludwig V

An explanation that explains why our conceptual models work that isn't reduced to a mere "they work because experience tells us they work". This kind of answer means either that:
(1) "it just happens that the physical world has an intelligible structure", i.e. there is no explanation, it's just so.
(2) "intelligbility is illusory". It appears that there the physical world has an intelligible structure but this isn't true.

What I am asking is whether the none religious person can go as far along the path as the religious 'believer' when they do not accept a large part of the 'canon', seeing it as fallacious dogma. — unimportant

Ok, I see. Consider the points I raised here:

You'd have to 'explain away' all these texts that used the belief in a potentially endless cycle of rebirths as a motivator to induce 'samvega' (a sort of healthy anguish) in the practicioner. For instance, all the discourses in the 15th collection of the Samyutta Nikaya. Note that this kind of 'contemplation' inspired renunciation. And renunciation of the world is indeed a BIG component of Buddhism. If one doesn't believe in rebirth, it is indeed strange to convince oneself, for instance, that it is 'good' to abandon one's social roots to live off alms and committ oneself to a hard practice.
You'd have to confront text like this according to which believing that there is no afterlife actually tends to favour a more relaxed approach or even bad behaviour and the clear affirmation that, according to the Buddha, there is an afterlife.
Also, I never encountered any Buddhist tradition that doubted the existence of the cycle of rebirths by appealing to cardinal Buddhist doctrines of impermanence ('anitya') and non-self ('anatman'). In fact, they rather held the opposite. It is precisely the lack of a 'static self' that allows such a capacity for change and rebirth. — boundless

The question becomes this: can one attain the same meditative status if one doesn't believe in rebirth? The traditional answer seems like 'no' for the following reasons:

• Believing in rebirth seems to have been traditionally considered a BIG motivator for renunciation and non-attachment.
• Believing in rebirth seems to have been traditionally considered a BIG motivator for also having compassion towards all sentient beings. For instance consider the Mata Sutta in which it is said that it is difficult to find a being which has not been your mother, your father etc in a previous life. Clearly, this kind of contemplation motivates you to be more compassionate to other sentient beings.
• If you believe that you only live once, can you really believe in the doctrine of 'non-self'? I mean, if you believe that you live only once, you perhaps tend to think that you are an 'unique' entity. So, I'm not sure that you can be convinced (not just intellectually but in a deeper level) of that doctrine if you do not believe in rebirth.

Can one practice in such a way to achieve the same attainments that are reportedly attained by traditional Buddhist practitioners without believing in the 'supernatural' beliefs of the religion?
I'm not sure that it is possible for the reasons I said above. The convinctions we have before engaging in a serious practice might condition the achievements we can reach.

Quite right. However, in order to diagnose the purported performative incoherence, Bitbol must presuppose universally binding normative standards of judgment (correctness, error, and order) that he then withholds from metaphysical inquiry. If the standards are universally binding, then reason has authority beyond any particular stance, and it becomes unclear why that authority should suddenly stop at metaphysics. If they are not universally binding, then Bitbol’s charge of incoherence loses its force because the diagnosis is only valid from within the (non-universal) scope of the framework from which it is made. — Esse Quam Videri

Good point. I would add that this also distinguish Bitbol from Nagarjuna. The latter only accepts the binding normative standards to show that, according to him, the metaphysical positions of his opponents are incoherent. However, he doesn't accept them as true for himself.

See this book by a Buddhist monk of German origin, which reviews both the traditional beliefs on re-birth and also current research. — Wayfarer

Thanks!

As I said - the background culture and beliefs of Buddhism are vastly different to Semitic (Middle Eastern) religious culture. — Wayfarer

Yes, I know. I wanted to just make an additional remark on the possible theological reasons of the condemnation of the belief in reincarnation in Christianity.

In any case, I believe that such a point is important. If rebirth is true, it weakens the 'reality' of personhood and it is a BIG reason to weak one's attachments in this life. On this point, Buddhists are completely right IMO.

Your comment seems to be implying that we should express units of Energy in physical Joules, instead of metaphysical meanings. However, I'm not a physicist, so in my philosophical thesis, I look at Energy from a different perspective*2. I take an abstract concept, which is invisible & immaterial --- known only by its effects on matter --- and represent it in concrete metaphors & analogies. That's the opposite of reification*3. Therefore, I am not denying that Energy has physical effects in the Real world*4. I'm merely noting the metaphysical*5 implications of that causal power in the mental meanings of human conception. On this forum, I do have to be very "careful" when I discuss distinctions between Physics and Meta-Physics. :smile: — Gnomon

You're free to use the word 'energy' in a way that is different from the way it is used in Physics. However, you might encounter a problem when you try to equate the two concepts or say that they are equivalent in some sense. I was just pointing to this.

Ironically, I actually believe that a 'non-realist' view of physical quantities actually is a problem for some forms of 'metaphysical physicalism'.

First, belief in reincarnation was declared anathema (forbidden) by the Second Council of Constantinople in 553 C.E. (in relation to Origen's idea that souls pre-existed in a spiritual realm before being born.) — Wayfarer

As an aside, in Christianity there are also theological/philosophical reasons to reject rebirth. First, if there was a 'pre-existence' of souls then our life in this world becomes a sort of punishment for sins we allegedly did before our coming into this life. However, there is no trace of that belief in earliest Christian scriptures and, indeed, the dogma of Incarnation tells you that Christ became associated with 'human nature' when he became human in this world. Second, belief in personhood is very strong in Christianity and the Christian life, arguably, is founded upon the idea of a personal relation between one and God. Clearly, if one believe that 'Alice' or 'Bob' can become 'Joseph' or 'Mary' or even non-human animals in a future life, it seems that such a belief would weaken the importance of the personal relation between 'Alice' and 'Bob' with God.

The second reason is that it is incompatible with the scientific understanding which doesn't encompass any medium for the transmission of traits, behaviours etc between different lives. (There has been published research, however, on children who appear to recall past lives.) — Wayfarer

Note that, however, even if one believes in those evidence, they still can't be considered evidence for the traditional Buddhist model of rebirth. By this I mean that according to the traditional Buddhist model one can be reborn into the animal, 'hellish', 'celestial' etc realms. I also read people claiming that NDEs 'prove' rebirth. Again, however, if one takes literally the content of NDEs - reported say in the book After by Dr. Greyson - one in fact finds that there is very little support for the afterlife belief of any religion. So, while I try to keep an open mind on these things, I wouldn't use them as 'evidence' for a particular religion (This is not a criticism of your points or your views on these issues. I'm just saying that one should be 'wary' to mix, say, 'Buddhism' or 'Christianity' or whatever with modern research on these matters).

Speaking of divide, have a read of Facing the Great Divide, Bhikkhu Bodhi. He is a Buddhist monk of American origin and a scholar and translator of the Pali Buddhist texts. Another is Buddhism Is a Religion, David Brazier. Finally Beyond scientific materialism and religious belief, Weber, published on Bachelor's website. (A lot of reading, I know, but they're big questions!) — Wayfarer

:up:

Is it still Buddhism without the extra natural elements? — unimportant

Why not try to have a 'secular approach inspired by Buddhist elements'?

You'll have a lot of difficulty to make sense of 'Buddhism' if you abandon the belief in Samsara. I'll just name a few problems you might encounter:

• You'd have to 'explain away' all these texts that used the belief in a potentially endless cycle of rebirths as a motivator to induce 'samvega' (a sort of healthy anguish) in the practicioner. For instance, all the discourses in the 15th collection of the Samyutta Nikaya. Note that this kind of 'contemplation' inspired renunciation. And renunciation of the world is indeed a BIG component of Buddhism. If one doesn't believe in rebirth, it is indeed strange to convince oneself, for instance, that it is 'good' to abandon one's social roots to live off alms and committ oneself to a hard practice.
• You'd have to confront text like this according to which believing that there is no afterlife actually tends to favour a more relaxed approach or even bad behaviour and the clear affirmation that, according to the Buddha, there is an afterlife.
• Also, I never encountered any Buddhist tradition that doubted the existence of the cycle of rebirths by appealing to cardinal Buddhist doctrines of impermanence ('anitya') and non-self ('anatman'). In fact, they rather held the opposite. It is precisely the lack of a 'static self' that allows such a capacity for change and rebirth.

So, there is no need to try to turn Buddhism into a 'secularized' worldview. It is better, in my opinion, if one doesn't belief in rebirth, to do Buddhist practice for the benefits that one feels it has. For instance, if you find that Buddhist meditation actually helps you to be more serene, content, at peace and so on, I don't believe that you're doing nothing wrong. However, the moment you start to say that belief in 'rebirth' - as well as other 'supernatural' beliefs - was a 'later addition', you need to confront the overwhelming evidence on the contrary. Then, again, I don't think that you can't associate to Buddhists and practice with them if you don't believe in the 'supernatural' ideas as Wayfarer said. You might put it aside for now and see later if it makes more sense for you.

:up:

Instead of talking about this ongoing intelligibility in terms of a mirroring , copying or representing of an external world of ‘things in themselves’ by a subject-in-itself, we can think of intelligibility in terms of the ordered, assimilative way the knower makes changes in themselves. — Joshs

But note that even within your own model intelligibility doesn't pertain to the subject alone but also to the 'world'. So, it would seem that the 'world' in which the subject exists also has a structure, an order that is somehow related to the changes the knower makes in themselves.

In other words, unless you admit that such changes are done arbitrarily, you need to say that 'what is outside the subject' has a structure, an order. And I'm not sure how this doesn't imply that the 'world external to the subject' is intelligible (at least, in principle).

Thanks for the thoughtful reply. — Esse Quam Videri

Thanks also to you for the interesting exchange.

Where I still want to push back is on the claim that, absent such an Intellect, intelligibility must be either brute or a matter of coincidence. From an Aristotelian standpoint, intelligibility is neither a coincidence nor an unexplained remainder, rather it is grounded in the very structure of being itself as intelligible relations (form, order, lawfulness) that do not depend on being understood in order to be what they are. — Esse Quam Videri

Intelligibility, however, implies the potential to be understood. At least at the level of potentiality, intelligibility does refer to such an Intellect. This doesn't automatically mean that such an Intellect exists, but it is a 'clue', as it were, that that Intellect does exist. Not a proof, but a clue.

Note that Aristotle himself, however, endorsed the idea that a Divine Mind exists. I know that one can make an Aristotelian model without reference to such an Intellect, but it nevertheless is interesting that apparently Aristotle himself thought that the two ideas are connected.

This is a philosophy forum, not a physics seminar. So why not reify that which is invisible & intangible? Energy is non-thing concept, it's a knowable-but-not-seeable relationship between things. Energy is unreal & unbound Potential or Probablity that temporarily takes on actual bound forms (matter), causes change of shape or position, and then returns to its unreal immaterial state as latent possibility. Matter dissolves as energy dissipates, but only the Energy is conserved, in its formless form. — Gnomon

It isn't a 'physics seminar', yes, but if one uses the concepts of physics, it is seems to me correct to point out if they aren't used well.
In the case of energy, I believe you're reading too much in that physical quantity.

Even if you interpret it in a realist way, i.e. if you interpret 'energy' as a real property of something in the physical world 'out there', you can't neglect the fact that energy is defined as a property of something. That is, energy is always defined in reference to a physical system. So, it doesn't seem the case that 'energy' somehow is more ontologically fundamental than physical systems. Being a property, it is difficult to understand in which sense energy could 'exist' without any physical system.

However, one can also interpret energy in a non-realist way, i.e. as an useful concept that we use to make predictions, just like we now do with classical forces.

Note that this isn't a direct criticism on your own metaphysical position. It is just an observation on how careful I think we should be in interpreting physical quantities in a metaphysical way.

Can you imagine the number 5 without reifying it as something concrete? — Gnomon

To be fair, I don't think that mathematical entities should be treated like physical quantities. For one, I believe that while mathematical truths are timeless and non-contingent, physical theories are, in part, human inventions. This doesn't mean that they do not give us genuine knowledge but we should be careful to not confuse the 'map' (the conceptual apparatus of a physical theory) with the 'territory' (physical reality).