Very much so. Presumably that is why we are here, to educate us in our spiritual growth? — Punshhh

Yes, I hope and tend to think this is the case.

Interestingly, I believe that it is a somewhat classical teaching in Christianity that the 'spiritual life' is a process of growth and the state of the 'blessed' in Heaven is the ultimate realization of human nature. IIRC, Gregory of Nyssa in his book 'On the Making of Man' distinguishes three types of aspects of the 'soul': vegetative, animal (perceptive) and rational and saw the process of physical growth both in the womb and in the physical growth process as a gradual fulfillment of the first two aspects. The third is cultivated through virtue. However, this process is completed in the afterlife.

Also, in Christianity, in a similar way to Buddhism and Hinduism, you find reference that the fulfillment of spiritual life entails some kind of 'death' (even in the New Testament passages like: John 12:24, Galatians 2:20, Ephesians 4:22-24; also the metaphor of the 'sown seed' is used to describe the relation between the earthly body and the 'spiritual' body in 1 Corinthians 15:42-44). This to me makes sense even from a purely 'religious neutral' point of view: when we, say, grow from childhood to adolescense and then adulthood we might conceptualize the process of growth as a succession of metaphorical 'deaths' and 'rebirths' and resisting to these 'deaths' is actually detrimental to our spiritual health even if they can be quite scary. I'm not surprised therefore that 'dying to oneself' or similar expressions are used as a positive sign for spiritual development.

This is where my thinking differs from Buddhist theology and I move back to the Hindu tradition. I find the dissolution of the individual upon death as incoherent in the way it is generally presented. I am aware of the explanation for it, but see it as part of an apology for the wholesale rejection of atman and a presence of the divine world in our world. — Punshhh

Buddhists would argue that the termination of a particular lifetime is just a more evident instance of change that also happens during a lifetime. They would argue that if there is an atman, change would be impossible. I can see why they say that but IMO their rejection of atman assumes that their opponents think that selves like concepts are changeless. I don't know how one can 'remain the same' while also 'changing' but to be honest it's not that the rejecton of atman isn't free of conceptual difficulties like that of moral responsability.

I am unsure about the identity of the Bodhisattvas and enlightened beings. Also there does seem to be some equivocation around this point. There is a universal consciousness, but each individual is one drop of water in an ocean of water drops. There is a denial of a permanent self, or identity, but a permanent self, a universal self is smuggled in and plays the same role. — Punshhh

I believe that generally Buddhists would assert that all the enlightened minds share the same nature of mind but not the same mind. Just like, say, all fires are instance of 'fire' doesn't imply that all fires are manifestation of a cosmic fire.

Hinduism is saying the same thing, but in atman the individual retains some individuation ( not the Jungian definition) while similarly being a drop of atman in the sea of atman. — Punshhh

Or even something like a wave (a mode of existence) in the sea. I don't think the part-whole language should be taken too literally.

There seems to be equivocation around Karma too, that it shapes one’s next life, while denying that the individual remains after death. And how can the karmic debt be repaid, when the agent who took out the karmic debt does not any more exist. Again, I understand there is a explanation given, but it comes across as apologetics again. — Punshhh

Perhaps a traditional Buddhist answer would frame the problem in the distinction between the 'provisional/conventional' and the 'ultimate' truth. In the ultimate truth, there is no karmic continuity even in the same lifetime. In the provosional truth, individuals persist from life to life. However the provisional is ultimately illusory. So, again, the problem perhaps even worsens: not only there is a problem to explain how karma works from life to life. But there is a problem of how to explain it even within a lifetime once one questions the existence of the atman.
So, to be honest, I was never convinced of Buddhist defenses that I read.

Interestingly there was an ancient Buddhist school (the Pudgalavada) that affirmed the existence of 'indeterminate selves' perhaps to explain karma and compassion.

In Hinduism, the divine world is here with us, walking alongside, interacting with us and the theology delineates it’s presence. — Punshhh

:up: Also, if 'understranding' collapses to 'pragmatic success', then we would have no reason to trust our most successful models. Why our conceptual models, theories etc work? If you don't assume intelligiblity, there is no answer to this question. If there is no answer to this question, you have no rational reason to trust models and theories no matter how useful they are.

The Buddhist teaching on rebirth does not say that you — understood as a persisting personal subject, ego, or bearer of identity — will be reborn. — Wayfarer

I have never been able to make sense of how one can build a coherent moral philosophy about this (Disclaimer: I'm not saying that one cannot live a virtuous life!).
I mean, any concept of 'moral responsibility' that I find coherent assumes that the agent of an action and the bearer of moral responsibility of that action is the same person. If, for instance, a man is caught because he stole something, if there is no 'real moral agent' that is the same as the agent that did the theft, it would simply be unjust to punish the thief.

Right, but it seems undeniable that each entity is unique and that there will never be another the same. In our thinking about the one, I think we should not dis-value or deny the reality of the many. — Janus

I personally agree with this. At the end of the day, even Buddhists would say, for instance, that Buddha and Ananda were, in some sense, different individuals and when the Buddha reached enlightenment it was an event that had an effect on him and not on others. Simply saying that their individuality is merely a product of different 'causes and conditions' seems too reductive to me. If selves are ultimately illusory, why are all the 'fruits' of practice experienced 'individually'?

The very fact that we can distinguish between individuals IMO implies that, as you say, each being is unique and this points to an underlying essence that is, ultimately, what distinguishes that being from other beings.

(I stop posting for today...)

The reason why I objected to your use of the physical concept of 'energy' in this discussion is because I believe that, by doing so, there is a danger of equivocation. While it might be true that scientists in the modern era developed the concept while inspired by something like the Aristotelian concept of 'potency', the way it is actually used in physics is different.

I'm not really sure why many scientists* see in 'energy' something more than a concept that is useful to make predictions, applications and so on. However, if one wants to go with a 'realist' interpretation of 'energy', you end up with considering it as a quantifiable property of physical objects or systems the value of which varies or stays the same according to precise 'regularities'.

Perhaps, the recent insistence on seeing 'energy' as a sort of metaphysical 'entity' that somehow is foundational of 'reality' is due to what, in my opinion, is a misinterpretation of Einstein's mass-equivalence that rests on a further misinterpretation of what 'mass' is.

Of course, 'mass' is often introduced as 'the quantity of matter'. But even in high school physics, such a definition is gradually replaced by subtler defintions like 'inertial mass', i.e. the resistance of an object to change its state of motion, and 'gravitational mass', i.e. the 'degree' of how much an object interacts gravitationally (i.e. it has an analogous role of the electric charge in electromagnetic interaction).

It would be very odd to me to attribute such a foundational role to something like the above descriptions of mass or something like energy one form of which is 'kinetic energy' which depends on the speed of an object (and the speed depends on the reference frame).

*At least when they seem to present energy as the 'stuff' that in some sense 'makes up the universe'.

Yes, the birth of independent, or transcendent agency*. Quite a responsibility, hence the requirement for us to act responsibly. Indeed religions might well have sprung up as a way to corral our new found agency. To head off our new found powers inevitably being used destructively. — Punshhh

I think the best way to see 'moral teachings' of religions is to try to see them as a way to cultivate our own nature. While a 'legalistic' way of seeing them has perhaps its purpose, the deepest way to see them is IMO to see them as aiming to our education and assist our (spiritual) growth.

:up: I would add that if intelligibility is merely 'pragmatic', then our beleif in our capacity to understand reality would be an illusion. It would seem as if we can understand (in part) but we would be wrong to believe we do.

I don't see how that helps the case unless universal liberation were achieved at the end of the life of each universe. By the way, do you have a citation from the scriptures to support that cosmological view? — Janus

When my mind had become immersed in samādhi like this—purified, bright, flawless, rid of corruptions, pliable, workable, steady, and imperturbable—I extended it toward recollection of past lives. I recollected many kinds of past lives. That is: one, two, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, a hundred, a thousand, a hundred thousand rebirths; many eons of the world contracting, many eons of the world expanding, many eons of the world contracting and expanding. I remembered: ‘There, I was named this, my clan was that, I looked like this, and that was my food. This was how I felt pleasure and pain, and that was how my life ended. When I passed away from that place I was reborn somewhere else. There, too, I was named this, my clan was that, I looked like this, and that was my food. This was how I felt pleasure and pain, and that was how my life ended. When I passed away from that place I was reborn here.’ And so I recollected my many kinds of past lives, with features and details — MN 4, bhikkhu Sujato translation

If there is little (nothing?) in John Smith that can be considered to be an underlying essence, then the idea of him becoming a future female ant seems unintelligible. I've heard the "candle flame" analogy, but it seems simplistically linear and naive in the context of a vastly interconnected world. — Janus

I see your point. I think that a more 'modern' analogy would be something like a movie. There is 'nothing' that passes from a snapshot to another but there is continuity.
Of course, you can still say that snapshot have a material frame and follow a plot that characterizes the movie. But IMO you can say that nothing is truly 'going to' the following snapshot.

At the same time, however, I believe that when we try to describe it conceptually we inevitably posit an essence. That's why 'enlightenment' is not seen as merely intellectual.

Notice, however, that an 'essence' limits the changeability of something (edit: because an essence would imply a defining characteristic that cannot be changed without annihilating the entity that bears the essence).

But with a caveat. The concept of Buddha nature can be taken to mean that all one needs to do is get to some primeval, pure state, and that's that. But we have this: — baker

To be clear, I wasn't saying that 'essential goodness' is an initial state and spiritual practice aims to 'go back to that' but rather to an intrinsic potential present and that the aim of spiritual practice is the fulfillment of one's nature.

I was simply saying that in both (groups of) traditions:

(1) 'evil' (either framed as sin, defilments etc) is seen as an extraneous addition to the mind, i.e. something that is parasitic to it.
(2) given the former point, one can reasonably interpret that the aim of spiritual practice is, in fact, to fulfill one's nature and this fulfillment entails the purification from these extranous 'additions'.

Notice that while in Christianity there is, of course, much emphasis to a return to a state of original purity, there is also the idea that the 'blessed' in Heaven will reach a state that admits no further fall. So, it isn't like the state of humans before the fall (however interpreted) but a better state in which human nature is perfectly fulfilled. I'm not saying that you find the same idea in Buddhist traditions but I see a similarity here.

He's right of course, if we've always—literally alway and for all time—been ignorant then it can't be our fault that we're ignorant. Original sin? That similarity is the sort of thing I mean when I say Buddhism is fundamentally the same as other religions. — praxis

Yeah, I agree. Despite their vast doctrinal differences, most forms of Christianity and most forms of Buddhism agree on two points:

(1) The 'ordinary' state of human beings* is a state in which our nature is, in some sense, 'wounded', we are born in a condition of weakness, tendency to do what is actually harmful to us and so on (we might use the expression 'original sin' for this feature).
(2) This 'wounded state', however, isn't an essential state for human beings. Both religions, indeed, proclaim the possibility that we can reach a state of 'being healed' by these wounds (we might call this feature 'essential goodness').

Note that, in both cases, ontologically the 'essential goodness' is more fundamental than the 'original sin'. If it wasn't, liberation would be impossible for both religions.


*after the 'original fall' in Christianity.

Not sure why you did raise this objection. Let's say that, as you say, 'enlightenment' can be reached outside the dispensation of Buddhist traditions. Even if it is true, in order to get 'enlightened', you need to live in a time and place that allows the possibility of you becoming aware of these 'paths' and practise them. Even then, in order to become 'enlightened', you'd need to practice personally 'well enough' the teachings of one of these 'paths'.

So, merely saying that the cycle of rebirth is beginningless gives us no guarantee that one has already practised 'well enough'.

Personally, one of the reasons I'm not convinced by the traditonalist Buddhist account of a beginningless cycle of samsara is because Buddhist doctrine says that ignorance, the root cause of rebirth, isn't an essential property of the mind. At the same time, however, we are told that, despite this, our minds (or 'mind-streams') have always be tainted by 'ignorance' and other 'defilements'.
However, no explanation is given on why the mind-streams of sentient beings have been always 'defiled' when, in fact, according to the same Buddhist traditions, the mind can be freed from one's defilments shows that they aren't an essential feature of the mind (i.e. minds can exist without defilments).

Yes, so my intuition is actually an acceptance (or realisation) of a deeper understanding underlying these religions. That they are playing a role in a process of purification of the self. That the self is not required, to go anywhere, to do anything, achieve anything in reconciling (becoming liberated from) their incarnation. But rather to relinquish, to lay down the trappings of our incarnate selves. — Punshhh

Yes, I think I can more or less agree.

If 'evil' is a corruption of the good, we are at the deepest level good. Hence, the 'spiritual life' doesn't 'transform' us in something that is 'alien to us' but, rather, it aims at the ultimate fulfillment of our nature.

'Saṃsāra has no beginning, but it has an end. Nirvāṇa has a beginning, but it has no end' ~ Buddhist Aphorism (quoted on Dharmawheel.) — Wayfarer

That's a good way to summarize things, altough I believe that if one really wants to be 'pedantic', one would say: "Samsara has no beginning but it can end. Nirvana is unconditioned, but conventionally has a beginning" or something like that.

But we’re not looking forward, we’re looking infinitely backwards, and in the past ignorance has necessarily never been removed because we are here in ignorance. — praxis

I understood that. But, again, my point is that the mere infinite succession of lifetimes doesn't guarantee that either of us has already practise seriously the Dharma. Indeed, as I said, it is generally emphasized that being born as a human is a rare event and being born a human and live in a time when it is possible to practise the Dharma is even rarer. But even in the best conditions, at the end of the day one has still to choose to practice.
So even if samsara is beginningless, it doesn't follow that you have already practised the Dhamma in a serious way.

This isn't necessarily the case. Traditional buddhists would reply that the ultimate cause of the cycle is ignorance. If ignorance is removed, samsara stops. If ignorance is never removed, the cycle will go on forever.

BTW, this problem was one of the reason why I ultimately ceased to try to become a Buddhist. If the cycle is beginningless, then the very existence of the 'cycle' is unintelligible. As youb remarked, each instance of rebirth is intelligible in principle, it is a regulate phenomenon. It would be weird if the very existence of the cycle is an unintelligible 'brute fact'.

If, however, the cycle began, this means that if other traditional Buddhist claims are true it must end:

“Whatever is subject to origination is all subject to cessation.” — SN 56.11, bhikkhu Bodhi translation

However the traditional Buddhist view is that it doesn't necessarily end. Rather it ends if ignorance is removed.

Hart’s point, as I read him, isn’t that natural processes couldn’t in principle produce intentional states, but that any attempt to explain reason, truth, or meaning already presupposes intelligibility and normativity. Scientific explanation itself depends on distinctions between true and false, valid and invalid, better and worse reasons. Those norms aren’t themselves causal properties, and so can’t coherently be treated as merely derivative features of otherwise non-intelligible processes. — Esse Quam Videri

Excellently put! I would also add another implicit conclusion: if intelligibility is real, then necessarily it follows that there must be at least the potential of an intellect that can understand it.
So, if one tries to derive reason from an intelligible world one is already assuming reason in two ways: the way you're describe here and the potential existence of a reason that can understand the intelligibility.

In a naturalist framework, however, reason should be explained in terms of natural processes. In order to avoid circularity, naturalist view have to deny intelligibility. If however we deny intelligibility we deny the possibility to make explanations.

I already stated that I'm not a Buddhist and I don't believe in the Buddhist teaching of rebirth. I am very interested in Buddhism, however.

s there an idea like this in Buddhism? as it’s an important idea for me. — Punshhh

As @baker remarked, the idea is quite explicit in some strands of Mahayana with the concept of 'Buddha nature'. However, it can be said that it is implied by the fact that the Buddhist practice is seen as a way to purify the mind, i.e. removing all the 'impurities'. So, rather than a transformation into something 'alien', the Buddhist path actually seems to have been presented as a way to bring the mind-stream to its 'purity'.
This idea is IMO recurrent in ancient religious and philosophical traditions. You can find analogous idea in Christianity, for instance, when sins are depicted as an impurity or an illness that 'stain' the purity (yes, there is original sin but as you probably know the interpretation of that concept wasn't the same among all Christian traditions... and, anyway, there is the idea that all God's creations are originally good and, therefore, evil is a corruption that came about later).

I mean, if we're going to delve into the supernatural and metaphysical (the otherwise traditionally non-logical), it's theoretically possible it wasn't that way at first but later became that way through some way or means. If I'm not mistaken that's essentially a major tenet of Christianity. — Outlander

I believe that most Buddhist traditions accept the idea of a beginningless samsara. I recall to have read that some Tibetan schools allowed the belief of a beginning of samsara but I can't recall where I read it.

Interestingly, I believe that some scholars have noted that the Pali texts actually do not explicitly say that samsara is beginningless. Consider this excerpt of an already quoted sutta:

“Mendicants, this transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving. What do you think? Which is more: the flow of tears you’ve shed while roaming and transmigrating for such a very long time—weeping and wailing from being coupled with the unloved and separated from the loved—or the water in the four oceans?” — SN 15.3, bhikkhu Sujato translation

Also, speculating about the question of the world being eternal or not was discouraged:

Thus have I heard: at one time the Lord was staying near Sāvatthī in the Jeta Grove in Anāthapiṇḍika's monastery. Then a reasoning of mind arose to the venerable Māluṅkyāputta as he was meditating in solitary seclusion, thus: “Those (speculative) views that are not explained, set aside and ignored by the Lord: the world is eternal, the world is not eternal, the world is an ending thing, the world is not an ending thing; the life-principle is the same as the body, the life-principle is one thing, the body another; the ITathāgata is after dying, the Tathāgata is not after dying, the Tathāgata both is and is not after dying, the Tathāgata neither is nor is not after dying; the Lord does not explain these to me. That the Lord does not explain these to me does not please me, does not satisfy me, so I, having approached the Lord, will question him on the matter. — MN 63, I.B. Horner translation

I don't know how the traditionalists explain this.

Opapātika means only not born through parents or biological reproduction. It is still rebirth and causally conditioned. — praxis

Yes, it is still a form of rebirth and, as you say, it is still causally conditioned. Rebirth is a process that follows precise 'rules'.

I'm thinking that this, if nothing else, is the reason rebirth is not claimed to be a motivator for practice. We've have literally been practicing forever without end. — praxis

Even if samsara is beginningless, it doesn't follow that you have practised since beginningless times and you have already practised with diligence infinite times and you somehow always failed.
Indeed, in Buddhist traditions you find a lot of emphasis on how rare a human birth is and how rare is a human birth in which you are exposed to the teaching of the Dhamma and can practice it. There are many, many more activities you can do in your 'journey'. You can't even exclude the chance that you never encountered the Dhamma previously.

On the other hand, if you believe in the Buddhist traditional account of rebirth, you can get a lot of motivation by contemplating the vastness of the sufferings of the 'lower realms' (purgatories (naraka), hungry shades and animal) as well as the fact that no 'realm' is without suffering and death. And, again, if you believed in the traditional account you also would believe that you shed more tears than the waters of the ocean for the losses of your loved ones like it is written in the sutta I quoted above. As the quoted sutta says, all of this is 'enough' to become disillusioned and actively try to 'go out'.

Ok, thanks. I think I can agree with that.
In many religions/philosophies there is the idea that we have an innermost desire/implicit knowledge of the 'highest good'.

Well isn't it going to be a case of gradual divergence like most things, which change and morph over time? At some point they would have been one, when closer to the Buddha's original teachings temporally, then over time, and maybe distance, with less communication, they would split away from each other. — unimportant

I agree... of course each school claims to teach the 'true version' of Buddhism and see others as detective or corruptions. Over time, differences have been more and more remarked. As you say, this seems a common phenomenon in religious traditions and not only in religions.

That does beg the question which is 'right' if any to try and bring it back to some semblance of my OP which seems to have long been abandoned in the debate in the last few pages. Lol. — unimportant

I can see that. But to be fair, these 'deviations' can help to understand what might count as 'supernatural' elements in Buddhism and see if the belief in them is relevant or not in order to reach the state of enlightenment as promised by Buddhist traditions.

The fact that there are differences in the doctrinal contents among schools might suggest that 'what one believes' might be important to reach the goal. For instance, before stopping the participation in this thread I argued that:

1) the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth was regarded as an important motivator for practice. Can one achieve the same goal without this motivator? How?
2) the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth perhaps influnced the understanding of what counts as suffering (e.g. 'birth is suffering') and what is the cessation of suffering. Notice that Buddhist believed that insight in the nature of suffering and its cause was a condition for enlightenment. So, how can we be certain to achieve the same goal if our understanding of suffering differ?
3) the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth coheres pretty well with anatman. Can one really achieve an insight in 'not self' if one holds the view of 'one life only as this or that person'?

Note that all these questions make sense even if the traditional Buddhist doctrine of rebirth is false. I was wondering about what role might the belief in it might have in practicing and achieving the goal. They are IMO legitimate questions one can ask if one claims that belief in rebirth (or any other 'supernatural' doctrine) isn't needed to achieve the goal.

I think we do know the answer to my question, but just can’t put it down on paper, it always misses the mark. — Punshhh

Well, I don't :sweat: indeed, given the variety of opinions Buddhists seem to have hold about the 'ontology' of Nirvana, it is difficult to say that they had the same 'state' in mind.

But perhaps you meant something different.

Note that in Buddhist thought rebirth is sustained by desire of either continued existence or annihilation. So, in order to avoid that, one shouldn't have any attachment or aversion to existence (that's why incidentally, I think that both negativistic that consider Nirvana as mere cessation or positivistic views that consider Nirvana in terms too similar to a blissful 'personal' state are inconsistent with the broader context of Buddhist thought).

Also, rebirth is quite consistent with anatman. If the male human John Smith can become in the future a female ant, then there is little in John Smith that can be considered an underlying essence.

In the Mahayana, there is an aspiration to liberate all sentient beings without, however, the guarantee that it will happen.

In the Theravada, there is the idea that while Buddhas and arhats stop helping when they reach Nirvana without reminder, but also the idea that cyclically the Dharma will be rediscovered and taught and there will be more occasions of liberation.

Interestingly, there is a sutta in the Pali Canon in which the Buddha is asked on how many will be liberated and the Buddha replied that one shouldn't ask about that, basically. He just put the question aside.

So, imo generally in both traditions you'll find the idea to act for the benefit of all (within one's limit) but there is no guarantee that such an 'universalist' ending will come to fruition. Perhaps you cam say that the Mahayana is more hopeful but even there you generally find emphasized of how rare is reaching liberation.

BTW, last post for today, here in my timezone is quite late!

ok, so you seem closer to 'Theravadin' reading.

BTW, you find both views espoused by supporters of both traditions. So perhaps calling Theravadin and Mahayanist is incorrect.

Yes, that's a possible way to interpret the three forms of suffering and, indeed, this seems to have been the interpretation that is taken up by the Mahayana: perfect insight itself extinguishes (Nirvana literally mean extinguishment) suffering at the very moment it occurs.

The Theravadin commentary I quoted however says that the true end of suffering happens when all conditioned phenomena cease. So, perfect insight itself doesn't extinguish suffering the moment it occurs but it leads to the eventual end of arising conditioned phenomena.

IMO you can find support of both views in the suttas.

Edit: "The Theravadin commentary I quoted however says that the true end of suffering happens when all conditioned phenomena cease" - of course not literally all the conditioned phenomena. I meant all conditioned phenomena of the series relative to an individual. Of course, Theravadins do not claim that when one arhat 'reaches' Nirvana without remainder, conditioned phenomena stop for everyone

:up:

Also: intelligibility is the property of being understandable, at least in principle, by an intellect. So, arguably, anything in order to be 'intelligible' should require the possibility of the existence of an intellect.

So if physical reality is intelligible, the potential existence of an intellect is requied from an essential feature of physical reality. This would be indeed an odd thing to say in naturalistic views.

I believe it is also about the problem of explaining reason from purely naturalistic terms. How can, for instance, logic necessity be explained in terms of physical causation, laws etc?

Then there is the issue of "skillful means". Again, doing things that are ordinarily considered immoral or wrong, but when done for some "higher purpose" and/or by a "spiritually advanced person", considered perfectly right.

So in the light of this, I'm wondering whether the Crusades and the Holy Inquisition (with the stake burnings and all that) were actually examples of such "spiritual advancement" that we ordinary folks simply cannot even begin to comprehend. — baker

I see. Sorry for the misinterpretation. However, this presupposes a very strong 'discontinuity' between the 'perfected state' and the 'imperfect state' that is IMO indeed a problem.

For instance, if a 'perfectly good person' can make clearly bad acts from an 'imperfect' perspective, then arguably 'good' loses its meaning. In many ancient philosophies and traditions, the 'perfected realization of virtue' is the ultimate realization of something that is 'already present' in those are still in an imperfect state and everytime that vritue is exercised, it is a manifestation of such a 'potential to perfection'.

All of this to say that if 'love of your neighbour' for 'ordinary folks' means that one should care for the other, treat him or her with respect and so on, it is reasonable to expect that if one is 'perfect in virtue' then he or she would treat the 'neighbour' in an analogous way but better than the 'ordinary folks'.

If, however, one accepts that there is strong discontinuity between the 'perfected' and the 'imperfect' states, then yeah I can see how one might end up justifying what is unjutifiable, calling 'an expression of goodness' what would generally regarded as the opposite and so on. The problem with these kinds of views is that the language they use can't be trusted.

Yes, I think I’m getting the feeling for it now. My first thought is a reference to a transfiguration of the aspect of the self which is constituted of/in the aggregate. Also if there is a reference to ultimate meaning (paramattha), the self and not-self may lose their distinction, while in a sense remain, reconciled. — Punshhh

It's hard to know what that text meant for 'paramattha'. In the developed abhidharmic/abhidhammic thought, 'paramattha sacca' was the 'ultimate truth' as opposed to the 'conventional truth', i.e. 'how reality truly is' vs 'what is provisionally true but ultimately illusory'. I know that various scholars have suggested that this distinction wasn't made at the time of the earliest commentary but of course traditionalist Theravadins I would say that think there is a continuity between 'early' and 'later' commentaries.

Anyways, the developed Theravadin tradition suggested that there are 'ultimately real dhammas' ('cognizable objects'): 81 types of conditioned (both mental and 'material') and only 1 unconditioned dhamma (i.e. Nibbana). All these 'objects' are irriducible, have no components. Indeed, all 'composite objects', like tables, chairs, trees and so on were seen as ultimately illusory, but conventionally/provosionally real. This was also the case for the 'selves'. Other 'abhidharmic' systems developed their lists of conditioned and unconditioned dhammas but the idea was essentially the same (the Sautrantika denied the 'reality' of unconditioned dhammas, including Nibbana, and believed that they are just absence of conditioned dhammas).
So, indeed, in these systems the 'self' was simply a wrong (albeit useful) idea. No ultimate reconciliation.

Interestingly, in the Madhyamaka thought, if I understand it correctly, this 'ultimate/provisional' distinction collapses in the sense that there are no 'ultimate dhammas'. All 'dhammas' are provisional and, therefore, not more real than the 'selves'. So, in a sense, here you find a 'reconciliation': at the end of the day, while the 'abhidharmic views' were reductionistic ('ultimate irreducible objects' are real, 'composites' aren't), Madhyamaka doesn't posit an 'ultimate' set of 'real dhammas'.

Not sure if this helps (also, don't trust what I'm saying too much).

Whom is experiencing the exalted state? — Punshhh

For most Buddhist traditions is regarded as wrong-posited. Consider this excerpt:

“Venerable sir, who feels?”

“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One feels.’ If I should say, ‘One feels,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who feels?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does feeling come to be?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With contact as condition, feeling comes to be; with feeling as condition, craving.’” — SN 12.12, Ven Bodhi translation

Indeed, ultimately, both the 'enligthened' and 'unenlightened' experience is self-less. It would be interesting to see how the ancient 'personalist' (Pudgalavada) Buddhist school, which posited a sort of 'indeterminate self', would read that passage but unfortunately, their literature is lost (and the same goes for many other ancient Buddhist schools).

I know this might sound like a simplistic question, but there is a deeper issue in it. Or rather if there is total annihilation, such that all is left is a state of non-existence, whom, is, present, in it? Who, or what remains? — Punshhh

I believe that the 'commentarial Theravada' would answer, 'the Nibbana element' remains. Given that it isn't understood as anything material or mental, I have no idea of what would mean. But no, based on the quotes I found it isn't simply 'non-existence' or an 'absence'.
I think that the Madhyamaka instead would answer you that even asking this question is premised on wrong presuppositions about reality.

Note that even the Sautrantika wouldn't say that 'Nibbana without remainder' is annihilation because they would tell you that since there is no self, there is nothing to annihilate. But, yeah, their view of 'Nibbana without remainder' is well 'non-existence' IIRC (I think that some scholars questioned that this was true for all Sautrantikas but I can't recall their arguments).

I’m not expecting an answer to it, particularly. Just expressing the question that immediately occurred to me on learning the Buddhist conception of nirvana. — Punshhh

Me too. I gradually found the 'abhidharmic' (the Sautrantika included) views less and less convincing over time. However, interestingly, I would say that the Madhyamaka perhaps would be right if there is no metaphysical Absolute that 'grounds' the reality of the conditioned - if there is no 'Absolute', then neither the conditioned nor the unconditioned are ultimately real.

Honestly, I'm not sure. I compiled that list in 2018 but even at the time I wasn't sure about that. Notice that Harvey mentions that in some instances Nirvana is described as the opposte of the aggregate even with the respect of 'not-self'.

My hypothesis is that the text means that you can know Nirvana only when you have an insight on not-self. Indeed, in one sutta the Buddha is reporter to have said that notions of self can only arise when the aggregate of feeling is present:

Ānanda, the one who says ‘Feeling is not my self, but my self is not without experience of feeling. My self feels; for my self is subject to feeling’—he should be asked: ‘Friend, if feeling were to cease absolutely and utterly without remainder, then, in the complete absence of feeling, with the cessation of feeling, could (the idea) “I am this” occur there?’.”

“Certainly not, venerable sir.” — DN 15, Ven Bodhi translation

So since in Nirvana without remainder all aggregates stop, Nirvana can't be regarded as a 'self' in any meaningful terms.

In that list I also forgot to mention in the post that there is a post-canonical text that explicitly refutes the idea that Nirvana is some form of consciousness while commenting a sutta that seems to say the opposite. So, Nirvana is not just a 'mere absence', it is an unconditioned ultimate (i.e. non illusory) 'entity' (for a lack of a better word) but neither a form of consciousness according to the 'commentarialTheravada'. Certainly a peculiar view.

The Theravadins traditionally rejected this 'negativistic' view but nevertheless maintained that there is no consciousness in Nirvana — boundless

For those interested on this peculiar view of Nirvana, I compiled some textual evidence on this post: https://ancientafterlifebelifs.blogspot.com/2026/02/on-nature-of-nibbana-nirvana-in.html

I believe that one of the late-canonical commentarial books in the Pali Canon clearly say that even arhats and Buddhas experience dukkha while alive in the forms of physical pain and this third 'mysterious' type.
...
The Theravadins would generally reply that this is wrong and the final cessation of suffering is 'Nirvana without remainder' — boundless

Ok, I found the source:

"Dukkha is [the world's] greatest fear."
(Ajita Sutta, Sn. 1033)

"Dukkha is [the world's] greatest fear" is the Blessed One's reply to [Ajita's question] "and what will be its greatest fear?"

Dukkha is of two kinds: bodily and mental. The bodily kind is pain, while the mental kind is grief. All beings are sensitive to dukkha. Since there is no fear that is even equal to dukkha, how could there be one that is greater?

There are three kinds of unsatisfactoriness (dukkhatā): unsatisfactoriness consisting in [bodily] pain (dukkha-dukkhatā), unsatisfactoriness consisting in change (vipariṇāma-dukkhatā), and the unsatisfactoriness of formations (saṅkhāra-dukkhatā).

Herein, the world enjoys limited freedom from unsatisfactoriness consisting in [bodily] pain, and likewise from unsatisfactoriness consisting in change. Why is that? Because there are those in the world who have little sickness and are long-lived.

However, in the case of the unsatisfactoriness of formations, the world is freed only by the Nibbāna element without remainder (anupādisesa nibbānadhātu).

That is why "Dukkha is [the world's] greatest fear", taking it that the unsatisfactoriness of formations is the world's inherent liability to dukkha.

(Nettipakaraṇa 12; bolded mine, source: https://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?p=6539#p6539 )

It seems obvious to me―it means suffering due to negative thought complexes or patterns. — Janus

And yet, you find different interpretations of it. The third type of dukkha is most often interpreted as a form of suffering/unsatisfactoriness/ill-being that permeates all conditioned states. I believe that one of the late-canonical commentarial books in the Pali Canon clearly say that even arhats and Buddhas experience dukkha while alive in the forms of physical pain and this third 'mysterious' type.

The Mahayana schools would generally agree with that but they have a different 'twist'. For instance, in the Madhyamaka school, given that all conditioned (and unconditioned) phenomena are unestablished, that is illusion-like, dukkha is too illusion-like. Hence the doctrine of 'emptiness' is central to the idea that Buddhas can take rebirth 'out of compassion' while being enlghtened and having transcended suffering. The Theravadins would generally reply that this is wrong and the final cessation of suffering is 'Nirvana without remainder' (with endless discussions about what this state entails. Another non-Mahayana school, the ancient Sautrantika even claimed that 'Nirvana without remainder' is basically eternal oblivions, a mere absence (this view is IMO increasingly popular among the Theravadins today). The Theravadins traditionally rejected this 'negativistic' view but nevertheless maintained that there is no consciousness in Nirvana).

(Sorry if I'm going with memory, I am pretty confident that what I said above is right and I said above I have already mentioned various things I have said in this thread with links...)

This notion of transmigration could be consistent with the idea that Atman is Brahman. That it is Brahman who is endlessly transmigrating and suffering in many different forms, without retaining the idea that Atman (in the sense of a personal soul or even karmic accumulations) is in any kind of (even illusory) personal sense reincarnating. — Janus

It is also consistent with the 'self is an illusion' position you find in most forms of Buddhism and the 'indeterminate self' of the Pudgalavadins. After all, if you keep having rebirth no quality associated with any of these 'lives' defines 'what you really are'. So, indeed, rebirth actually, when you think about it, weakens the sense of personal self and attachment.

Why should belief in rebirth be motivating in a context that denies personal rebirth? Or even in the Vedantic context where reincarnation of the personal soul (which however is seen as ultimately an illusion) and where it is in any case exceedingly uncommon to remember past lives, and hence establish any continuity of self? Why would attaining peace of mind, acceptance of death and the ability to die a good death not be more motivating? — Janus

The first thing you have to note is that they asserted that the very same 'continuity' you have between 'you as an infant' and 'you as an adult' is the same as when you consider 'you as John Smith' and 'you as a Deva'.

Secondly, traditionalists would tell you that while you aren't enlightened you exprerience this 'succession of lives' as truly 'something you yourself are experiencing'. It's like, say, when in the same night you continue to have nightmares and you can't control them or awake from them. You might have the suspicion that they are dreams but you still experience a lot of anguish. In order to cease anguish, you have to 'wake up'. But until you do, you have to take seriously your nightmares.

Of course I agree that one cannot rationalise their way to enlightenment but still, just like there are routines they follow in Buddhism to act as breadcrumbs to get there, I would just be looking at how one would do it as a secularist. — unimportant

Perhaps the best way to do you in your case it to take seriously those teachings you find 'unbelievable' at least as good allegories that say something true about the human condition (as @Punshhh suggests). Also, in order to sustain the practice you can still contemplate the numerous forms of suffering that are present in this world and one can see without any spiritual attainment (illnesses, wars, loss of loved ones, the fact that our life is uncertain and death can happen anytime and so on)* and see other humans and other sentient beings as 'being in the same boat', so to speak, to develop compassion.
Nowadays, I am no longer a 'Buddhist' in any good sense of the word but I see the above approach to it as a good way to give it value. As much as I would like to have the compassionate, calm, patient etc mind that Buddhists promise, I find it exceedingly hard to sustain a serious practice however. It would certainly help if I could believe also what I find 'unbelievable' in it. Nonetheless, as a 'sympathetic outsider' of (both Mahayana and Theravada) Buddhism, I still find their doctrine and practice useful.

*Incidentally, I believe that if one truly believes that there is no afterlife and still gives so much relevance to 'suffering' as Buddhists do, the only coherent conclusion one would get is to become an antinatalist. I mean: given how much suffering can happen during anyone's life and that no matter what we all die and we do not even know when and how, if there is no afterlife would it be worth the risk to bring other human beings in this world?
Interestingly, Buddhism and other Indian religions see the human realm as positive and 'being born as a human' as a very good thing precisely because it is the one that give you the highest chance to escape samsara.

Were the Inquisition and the Crusades an abuse of power, or a mere use of power? What if the popes in the past did what they did because they were "further along than you"? — baker

Sorry, but I don't understand your point here. Are you claiming that if a behaviour that is blatantly in contradiction with a religion's 'code of conduct' is done by a large number of those who hold a authority position in that religion it is evidence that the religion in question is false (or it is at least a reason to be skeptical of it)?

Surely Wayfarer will answer for himself. But this was about a pretty standard theme: According to Theravada, one person cannot save another, ever, one person cannot do the work for another, ever. And this goes back to intention being kamma, and kamma being what matters; and one person cannot intend for another, instead of another. — baker

It is pretty standard but it should be noted that there are differences in how Mahayanists see the Theravadins. Indeed, it seems that the earliest times, the ancestors of modern Mahayanists and Theravadins were less polemical than in later times.

Anyway, sectarianism has always been a problem both in Buddhism and other religions.

Interestingly, I think that the Mahayana notion that Buddhas can in some way still 'help' explains better why Buddhas are said to arise cyclically. In the Theravada, it is never explained why Buddhas keep re-occurring. That said, the Pali suttas can't be read as asserting that past Buddhas can actively help. So, of course, Mahayana and Theravada are indeed different religions.

Not disqualify, but certainly demotivate. From what I've seen, people who believe this one lifetime is all there is just don't explore much Buddhism; they just don't. Apparently they're so put off by any mention of rebirth that they lose their ability to pay attention or something. — baker

Yes, I agree. Buddhist practice in Buddhist monasteries is indeed taxing. It demands a degree of renunciation, 'spiritual struggle' and so on that many outsiders might underestimate (incidentally, I think the same is true for other religions).

I've seen some Buddhists who hold a view that rebirth applies on a moment-to-moment basis (and not to multiple, serial births); and the proponents of the "momentariness" view have put in considerable effort to interpret all teachings in line with that (recasting some of those that don't seem to fit as "metaphorical", others as "later additions", and yet others as "corruptions"). — baker

I find odd that a surprising number of people would think that rebirth is a later addition when it is the less disputed belief among Buddhist schools. As I said, you find disagreements on how to interpret Nirvana, anatman etc but I never found historical evidence of historical Buddhists that questioned rebirth. Indeed, you even find in quite early texts like the Kathavatthu, a debate about the reality of the wardens of the terryfing Buddhist 'purgatories' (naraka) , which is an insanely precise detail to debate on that would surprise people who think that rebirth is marginal (incidentally, the 'orthodox Theravada' view is that the guard are real; the idea that they are projection was later adopted by the Yogacara school...).

Nevertheless, I believe that one can doubt rebirth and yet believe that 'enlightenment' is possible (altough, I believe that the Buddhist descriptions of enlightenment are only coherent with a belief in literal rebirth).

IIRC, momentariness, moment-to moment rebirth and literal rebirth are all affirmed in the 'Theravada commentaries' (I'm going with memory however).

Exactly, as I've been trying to tell the OP. — baker

:up:

Of course. There are also those who just stick around, go through the motions with the "practice", and who don't seem to be all that concerned about the doctrinal stuff one way or another. — baker

Yes.

Or else, one may realize that motivation is not enough and that one also needs the right external conditions. In my case, I realized there was a limit as to what I can attain, spiritually/religiously, given my current physical, social, and economic status, and that persisting longer and trying to push further would just be a case of diminishing returns. — baker

That's also true, unfortunately. When I was considering joining Buddhist traditions, I certainly had to confront certain 'ordinary life' circumastances that discouraged it. And one should take these circumstances seriously.

Mahayanis and their fans keep saying that. It's not true, though. It's that Theravada doesn't believe that one can save another, and this goes back to the workings of kamma. Not some kind of "selfishness" or "small-mindedness" or some such as Mahayana likes to accuse Theravada of. — baker

I believe that @Wayfarer meant that the end goal for Theravada is a state in which the 'enlightened' can't help other sentient beings. Buddhas and arhats can help sentient beings while alive but they can't keep help after 'Nirvana without reminder'.

Personally, I consider Mahayana and Theravada separate religions. They of course share a lot in common but they have radically different beliefs.

Or just read Thanissaro Bhikkhu's The Truth of Rebirth And Why It Matters for Buddhist Practice. — baker

Yes, that's a good source. However, I don't see how a disagreement about rebirth would disqualify one to try and see for himself or herself.

Personally, I think that if rebirth isn't real, then also the Buddhist (of all schools) conceptions of Nibbana/Nirvana, anatta/anatman and so on become incoherent. In my previous posts in this thread I explained why I think so and why I can't make sense of these doctrines (in all their 'variations' among historical Buddhist schools I know of) without the belief in traditional rebirth.

However, I can understand why someone who can't accept the traditional belief of rebirth might still want to achieve 'the mind at peace' that Buddhist traditions promise (a mind that is freed from all hatred, anxiety etc is certainly a desirable goal not just for Buddhist). At the end of the day, despite what I have said before, I do believe that the 'only way to know' is actually try to practice and see for oneself. Philosophical and exegetical arguments can get us up to a point.

1. People believe nibbana (a complete cessation of suffering) is impossible.
2. People believe nibbana is a matter of luck.
3. People believe nibbana requires very little work and can be attained easily.
4. People believe they are already enlightened.
5. People believe they will certainly become enlightened, at the very least at the moment of death. — baker

Yes, I tend to agree with you that without the belief in rebirth long-term practice is difficult to maintain and one might become convinced of one or all these things. However, since we are in a philosophical forum, I would point out that this outcome is not logically necessary. It is arguable that without a strong motivator, one can't sustain the practice (such was my case, just to make an example) but that doesn't imply it is the necessary outcome.

Have a read of the suttas contained in SN 15. Belief in literal rebirth was indeed seen as a motivator. — boundless

You haven’t read the chapters and can’t point out where it says that? — praxis

Ok, I'll quote some of those suttas. I leave the judgment for the reader. It seems to me evident that these suttas treat the belief of literal rebirth in samsara as a strong motivator for practice but I'll let the reader to judge for himself/herself (again, in order to avoid misunderstanding, I don't think that this proves that rebirth is logically necessary to get enlightnened).

“Good, good, mendicants! It’s good that you understand my teaching like this. The flow of tears you’ve shed while roaming and transmigrating is indeed more than the water in the four oceans. For a long time you’ve undergone the death of a mother … father … brother … sister … son … daughter … loss of relatives … loss of wealth … or loss through illness. From being coupled with the unloved and separated from the loved, the flow of tears you’ve shed while roaming and transmigrating is indeed more than the water in the four oceans.

Why is that? This transmigration has no known beginning. … This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions.” — SN 15.3, bhikkhu Sujato translation

At one time the Buddha was staying near Sāvatthī.

“Mendicants, this transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving. When you see someone in a sorry state, in distress, you should conclude: ‘In all this long time, we too have undergone the same thing.’ Why is that? This transmigration has no known beginning. … This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions.” — SN 15.11, bhikkhu Sujato translation

The Buddha said this:

“Mendicants, this transmigration has no known beginning. No first point is found of sentient beings roaming and transmigrating, shrouded by ignorance and fettered by craving.

What do you think? Which is more: the flow of blood you’ve shed when your head was chopped off while roaming and transmigrating for such a very long time, or the water in the four oceans?”

“As we understand the Buddha’s teaching, the flow of blood we’ve shed when our head was chopped off while roaming and transmigrating is more than the water in the four oceans.”

“Good, good, mendicants! It’s good that you understand my teaching like this. The flow of blood you’ve shed when your head was chopped off while roaming and transmigrating is indeed more than the water in the four oceans. For a long time you’ve been cows, and the flow of blood you’ve shed when your head was chopped off as a cow is more than the water in the four oceans. For a long time you’ve been buffalo … sheep … goats … deer … chickens … pigs … For a long time you’ve been bandits, arrested for raiding villages, highway robbery, or adultery. And the flow of blood you’ve shed when your head was chopped off as a bandit is more than the water in the four oceans.

Why is that? This transmigration has no known beginning. … This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions.”

That is what the Buddha said. Satisfied, the mendicants approved what the Buddha said. And while this discourse was being spoken, the minds of the thirty mendicants from Pāvā were freed from defilements by not grasping. — SN 15.13, bhikkhu Sujato translation

At Sāvatthī.

“Mendicants, this transmigration has no known beginning. … It’s not easy to find a sentient being who in all this long time has not previously been your mother.

Why is that? This transmigration has no known beginning. … This is quite enough for you to become disillusioned, dispassionate, and freed regarding all conditions.” — SN 15.14, bhikkhu Sujato translation

That said, all of this doesn't disqualify bhikkhu Analayo's quote in this post:

Lol, ok looking at my own thread title I see the focus on Buddhism is largely my own fault, but my thoughts developed as a product of the discussion so far. It would probably be better to revise the question to: Can enlightenment be achieved without appeal to any supernatural elements? — unimportant

Given your clarification, I think I might return to this thread. To be honest, I don't think you'll find a satisfying answer to your question here. Unless somebody is actually 'enlightened', how could one answer with certainty to your answer?

In my posts where I presented evidence of the presence of the belief rebirth in Buddhism and the apparent universal acceptance of that belief in Buddhist traditions, my point was to make an argument that a traditionalist Buddhist would make to answer your question in the negative.

So, certainly my point wasn't to tell you this:

This is exactly what the 'you must completely adhere to the teachings or you are going to get nowhere' folks in the thread, and the usual mindset I see when I have asked similar questions elsewhere in the past, are like imo. Fundamental uncritical faith or you are not practising at all. — unimportant

It was just the traditionalists apparently believed that the belief of rebirth was a strong motivator for practising and that it was taught by people who they deemed to be enlightened.

However, I believe that it is impossible to give a philosophical argument to answer either in the positive or in the negative to your question:

Can enlightenment be achieved without appeal to any supernatural elements? — unimportant

The only possible way is, as you yourself say:

I just realised this is actually really ironic and the opposite of what the Buddha himself suggested. In his sutras he would talk about how you should not believe him, but practice and see for yourself through experience. — unimportant

i.e. try and see if it is indeed possible for yourself. Apologies if I came across as asserting this kind of view:

This is exactly what the 'you must completely adhere to the teachings or you are going to get nowhere' folks in the thread, and the usual mindset I see when I have asked similar questions elsewhere in the past, are like imo. Fundamental uncritical faith or you are not practising at all. — unimportant

It certainly wasn't my intention.

Yeah, it was an interesting typo lol. I'll fix it now.

Hope all goes well, I too will be taking a few days out. — Wayfarer

Thank you very much!

Kant never refers to the transcendental subject or transcendental ego. That comes with later philosophers. But also, notice that in singling out the subject as an individual being, you're already treating this as an object of thought. That is what I mean by taking an "outside view". — Wayfarer

I am merely stating an hypothetical: "if I am a transcendental subject and my existence is contingent, there must be an explanation of my own existence. Being contingent, my existence is explainable, in principle, in terms of something other than me."
If the above phrase is coherent - as it seems to me - this implies that the 'perspective' assumes that there is something beyond it, which is also necessary to explain the existence of the 'perspective' itself. I can't make sense of saying that 'we can't say that there is anything beyond' if it is accepted that the subject's existence is contingent, unless it is said that the subject is also an 'useful map', i.e. that the subject is ultimately an useful abstraction rather than a real entity (which would then leave us to a non-dualism of some form).

his is, precisely something like 'the Cartesian anxiety' — Wayfarer

Perhaps, yes. But the point of my argument is that these transcendental models seem to be naturally incomplete. Good as starting points and good to avoid dogmatisms but they can't structurally be 'the last word'. They seem to point to some conclusion and just stop before asserting it. In other words, these approaches seem to point beyond themselves naturally.

And perhaps, now, the 'useful map' analogy is a good one. In presenting this OP, I didn't set out to offer a 'theory of everything'. Really the point is to call out the naturalistic tendency to treat the human as just another object — a phenomenon among phenomena — fully explicable in scientific terms. This looses sight of the way that the mind grounds the scientific perspective, and then forgets or denies that it has (which is the 'blind spot of science' in a nutshell). — Wayfarer

Ok. I was just stating, however, that it is reasonable to go beyond it.

The point is not to replace scientific realism with something else, but to recall that the very intelligibility of scientific realism already presupposes what it cannot itself objectify: the standpoint of the embodied mind. So I'm not presenting it as 'the answer' but as a kind of open-ness or aporia. — Wayfarer

Ok, I see.

BTW, I'll probably stop posting for a while. I'll have surgery the day after tomorrow (a low-risk operation). Anyway, thanks for the discussion to all.