Very nice video, indeed!

Anyway, while I see the 'machinery' of it. I also see that all those 'mechanical operations' are done in virtue of a 'larger goal' of the whole organism, so to speak. I am not sure there is no 'finality' here, as I would expect in a machine.

Also, even if all of this is machine-like, their 'programming' seem spontaneous. Why such a programming is there in the first place?

Yep. Once you are stuck with the Cartesian metaphysical division into a mind stuff vs a world stuff, then this kind of wooly Panpsychism is where you must logically end up. It is built into the premises. You can’t think your way beyond the casual trap you have prepared for yourself. — apokrisis

I sort of agree about panpsychism but I do not see as a necessary implication.

A first person vs third person contrast is what must arise for the modeling of the world to even function. This is the enactive or embodied argument. This is the trick that is generic to any notion of sentience or intelligent in an organism. Does it subtract its own actions in a way that makes “objective” the state of the world as it is sensed beyond. This is the basic semiotic algorithm that defines an organism with some kind of mind, some level of mentality. — apokrisis

I see. As the complexity of an organism rises, the more that organism can differentiate itself from its environment. In this view of things, self-awareness is so to speak, the pinnacle of this complexity. A cell has a very rudimentary 'notion' of a distinction between itself and its environment.

I think that in the simplest living organisms we can also see a sort of 'finalism' in their actions. After all, even a cell operates toward the goal of preservation of itself and, above all, of the species (with reproduction). Of course, it is not conscious but nevertheless there is a sort of 'finalism' in biological organisms that is not found in 'non-living' natural things. Same goes for a 'basic awareness' (for a lack of a better word) of being 'something distinct' from its environment.

I personally am not sure that there is only a 'quantitative' distinction between us and the simplest living organisms. There is IMO a qualitative difference... but let's not digress here.

However as I argued, biosemiosis now clears up the life and mind side of the equation, leaving the dissipative structure and topological order side much more plainly seen. The new holistic view of fundamental physics. The cosmological view that has to be fundamental as after all, it is all about dissipative structure if reality is that trajectory from a Big Bang to a Heat Death. — apokrisis

I think that 'holism' was actually present even in Newtonian mechanics. For instance, one can 'derive' the conservation of momentum of an isolated system from newtonian laws of dynamics. But such a derivation is best seen IMO as pragmatic. On the other hand, if one sees the 'conservation law' as a property of the whole isolated system the newtonian laws make much more sense. So it's not surprising to see that, gradually, holism becomes even more important in contemporary physics (I mean Noether's theorem, spontaneous symmetry breaking etc are holistic concepts after all). IMO, contemporary physics seems to suggest that the 'building blocks of the universe' are not ontologically primitive. On the other hand, imo it suggests more the reverse (albeit not in a conclusive way).

Friston’s Bayesian Brain now takes this to the point where the predictive world modelling is expressed in dissipative structure terms and as the differential equations of a new Bayesian mechanics. The semiotic approach has become mathematically formalised as a theory both in terms of life/mind and also - in the de Sitter holographic view - in cosmology. — apokrisis

Ok, thanks for the reference. I'll look.

Anyway, I wanted to ask you some questions, if you do not mind.

• The way I see it, as I said, living organisms, even the most basic ones, seem 'aware' of that they are distinct to their environment, that they are a 'whole', so to speak. Is there a 'global law' (spontaneous symmetry breaking) that describes the emergence of these 'individuals'?
• Do you think that our mind is algorithmic? If not, how 'machine-like' entities can 'give rise' to a non-algorithmic mind shall have an explanation. I think that our mind are not algorithmic but I don't think that I can make a rationally compelling argument of this point.
• Do you think that a 'proto-proto-awareness' of sorts is there in anything else besides living organisms and biomolecules?

. Are you familiar with that book, or the concept of Holism? — Gnomon

No, I never heard of Jan Smuts and I am not familar with his work. But I am familiar with the concept of holism, though. Not sure if Spinoza's philosophy can be said to be 'holistic'. After all, the modes are not the Substance's parts (the Substance is IMO partless in his philosophy...if it had parts, after all, it would be ontologically dependent from them).

In my previous post, I asked you "I'm not a Spinoza expert, but regarding unbounded space-time, he seemed to assume that the material world, and his Nature God, was Eternal & Infinite*1. So how would he deal with modern Cosmology, which says that the universe had a sudden & inexplicable beginning of Space-Time-Matter-Energy? Where or when was boundless Natura Naturans before the Bang?" Do you have an opinion about Spinoza's opinion on that vexing modern question? — Gnomon

Lol, sorry for my short attention span :sweat: I missed your question

Anyway, IMO Spinoza's philosophy is unaffected by the beginning of our universe. In fact, maybe Spinoza would said that our 'universe' is merely a mode and therefore it can have a beginning.

But that sounds too close to traditional god-concepts for some of us. :smile: — Gnomon

Some interpreters seem to think that Spinoza was a modern 'scientific pantheism' who identified 'God' with our physical world. I am not saying that they cannot be defended somehow, but IMO they are implausible because Spinoza did not see himself as an 'innovator' and used in a different ways the concepts of 'classical philosophy' (derived mainly from Plato and Arisotle). Also, Spinoza's substance had infinite attributes. Only one of them was extension (the analogue of our 'phyicality' at this time) and another attribute of the Substance was actually mind. Also, he endorsed the view of psychophyical parallelism*, so mind could not be generated by matter (in his terms 'extension') in any way.

So, yeah, while not a Personal God like the one present in classical Theism, Spinoza's God was quite incompatible with a merely 'physical wholeness'.

PS___ For all practical purposes, I am in a space-time box. But, for philosophical purposes, I try to think outside the box. — Gnomon

Yeah, I think that the same goes for me

:up:

Personally, I think that this kind of 'search for the eternal' is probably what differentiates a 'spiritual' than a 'secular' search. Of course, what the 'eternal' is, is something that is debated among traditions, even within them (is it a metaphysical Absolute that is the source of all things? some other kind of transcendence of transiency and suffering?). As your quote says, pursuing 'perishable' things worsens the situation (the dependency IMO might be rooted in a fear of losing them...maybe this is in turn based in a sub-conscious intuition of their transiency).

Anyway, despite some claims that I have read about 'early Theravada Buddhism' where some argued that Nibbana is never said to be 'permanent' or 'eternal', in the Kathavatthu, a book inclueded in the Abhidhamma in the Pali Canon (so quite early), one can found this quote:

Nibbāna does not abandon its state as Nibbāna—by this we mean Nibbāna is permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to change. And you ought to mean this, too, in the case of material-aggregate, if you say that the latter does not abandon its materiality.

(source: https://suttacentral.net/kv1.6/en/aung-rhysdavids?lang=en&reference=none&highlight=false)
curiously, the string of adjectives 'permanent...eternal...' is the same as that used by the 'eternalists' views criticized in the Buddhist scriptures

Of course, I am not proposing a 'perennialist' view here and I am not saying that the authors of the passage were 'eternalists'. But I would say that such a 'search for the eternal' is IMO compatible even with Theravada Buddhism, a tradition which is quite adamant in deny the existence of a 'true self'.

Wow, thank you very much for the response, again. I am sorry if I do not answer in a comprehensive way which is also because admidettly I don't know enough or reflected enough* in the past about various topics you addressed . I think that your view may have many merits and I think it points to the 'right direction': I think that it might be right explanation of the emergence of life but I am not sure about consciousness as such - by this I mean a consistent 'first-person perspective' (I think that the 'first' and 'third' person perspecive are complementary and one cannot be reduced to the other...but I treat this as a working hypothesis, so to speak)

Sort of the same. Everyone is feeling the same elephant once they get fed up enough with reductionism. — apokrisis

:up:

Anyway, I cited Bohm because he noted that his own interpretation of QM, depsite being realist or even physicalist, treated the (universal) wave-function/quantum pontential as a unique field that has no source and its 'influence' mathematically does not depend on the magnitude of the field but rather on its form. This, especially in the 80's, lead him to think that this 'field' is actually a 'pool of information' available to everything. So, according to him, even the most simple physical objects have a 'mental aspect' so to speak, a very very rudimental ability to 'read' information and meaning, so to speak. Note that the 'very very rudimental ability' in Bohm's is present even in the most basic level of physical reality, so no concept of 'emergence' is needed! Based on what I understood of your position, it seems that you agree with him.
While I am not sure that it can explain consciousness, I do think that it can explain the emergence of life. On the other hand, conventional physicalism is reductionistic, matter is seen as inert.

I sort of agree but I would put it in a different way.

The 'box' refers to the condition of everyone that is not saved/liberated from death, pain, illnesses, cruelty etc - let's call all the negatives as 'evil'. This does not mean that the 'box' is wholly evil - at least not necessarily. In our natural world, for instance, there are pleasant states of course. But evil is an undeniable aspect of it.

Now, I think we could say that according to most religions we not only are in a 'box' but that we do not know its extension, its 'depth', so to speak. For instance, Buddhism teaches the doctrine of rebirth and all realms of rebirth are subject to at least death, even the most lofty ones (whereas the 'lower realms' are seen as pervaded by an evil greater or much, much greater than the 'human realm').

Clearly, the conception that one has of the 'box' clearly influences the conception of the 'outside the box' and the way of escaping the box. To continue with Buddhism*, not only one must escape of the 'human box', so to speak, but to be 'fully liberated' one must escape from the incredibly larger 'box' of the 'whole samsara', so to speak (but since human are seen as potentially being trapped in samsara forever, if not liberated at some point, the 'human condition/predicament' in Buddhism refers to the whole samsara).

On the other hand, Epicurean philosophy and its related practice was clearly influenced by the belief that death is an annihilation for all and while it can be said that annihilation is a negative for all, one at least does not have to be preoccupied with 'what might happen after death', in the Epicurean view. And not just that, but Epicurus clearly saw IMO pain as the 'box', so to speak, to which one might want to escape. So, coherently with his view of the 'human condition', he tried to find a way to minimize the pain, the 'evil'. I might say that this 'minimization' is actually an evidence that his solution is not really a 'true escape' from the 'evil'.
As I said, what I found interesting is that even ancient 'secular' perspectives on the human conditions actually had a way of 'dealing with' the human condition ('the box') that had spiritual overtones, so to speak. And despite being seen as a 'symbol' of hedonism, Epicirus was quite 'moderate' in it and in fact compared to many 'hedonists' today he was certainly not one.

Anyway, I think that the religious/spiritual search of liberation/salvation is actually one of the most impressive forms of human creativity ('thinking outside the box') and the more 'radical' the 'search' is the more 'creative' the searcher is, so to speak (this doesn't mean he/she is necessarily right, of course). That's why to all 'conventional purposes', say, the Buddha's choice of 'becoming homeless' was seen as a 'foolish choice'. Consider the buddhist Epic 'Buddhacarita':

[the Buddha/prince:] "Promise me that my life will not end in death, that sickness will not impair my health, that age will not follow my youth, that misfortune will not destroy my prosperity."

"You are asking too much," replied the king. "Give up this idea. It is not well to act on a foolish impulse."

Solemn as Meru mountain, the prince said to his father:

"If you can not promise me these four things, do not hold me back, O father. When some one is trying to escape from a burning house, we should not hinder him. The day comes, inevitably, when we must leave this world, but what merits is there in a forced separation? A voluntary separation is far better. Death would carry me out of the world before I had reached my goal, before I had satisfied my ardor. The world is a prison: would that I could free those beings who are prisoners of desire! The world is a deep pit wherein wander the ignorant and the blind: would that I could light the lamp of knowledge, would that I could remove the film that hides the light of wisdom! The world has raised the wrong banner, it has raised the banner of pride: would that I could pull it down, would that I could tear to pieces the banner of pride! The world is troubled, the world is in a turmoil, the world is a wheel of fire: would that I could, with the true law, bring peace to all men!"

(source: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Life_of_Buddha/Part_One/11._Siddhartha_is_Eager_to_Know_the_Great_Truths)

I would say that a strong amount of 'creative impulse' is present here.

Note that I used Buddhism as an example. I would say that an analogous 'argument' could be said in relation to other spiritual/religious schools (and subschools).

To return back to what I said earlier, the perception of the 'unfairness/imperfection' is the perception of being trapped in the 'box', which IMO also is itself a creative type of thinking.

*I personally think that 'Buddhism without rebirth' is nonsense. If nothing happens after death, I do not see why a person would actually have to choose Buddhism, why seeking the 'liberation from suffering' would be of paramount importance and so on. Of course one can make argument for Buddhist practice being still relevant, but IMO it would be completely arbitrary.

As I interpret Spinoza, there are two ways of 'seeing' the 'world'. First, there is the usual perspective, 'sub specie temporis' which does not contemplate 'Reality' as a whole. This perspective, for Spinoza, has the unfortunate 'side effect' that it suggests that the 'modes' are actually distinct entities, substances.

However, when the world is seen rigthly, Reality is seen as an 'undivided Whole', the only One Substance, God, in a way that is actually reminiscent of Parmenides IMO or indian advaita Vedanta. He says that the human mind is eternal, but only when seen as a mode, not a substance. It's a bit like saying that a particular ocean wave belongs to the whole history of the ocean, which is seen as a single undivided entity.

Of course, we can guess, assume a belief, we can even speak of knowledge in some sense, but it's not certainty. Empirical knowledge doesn't seem to be able to give us certainty. Yet, logical necessity seems to demand it. — boundless

I want to stress that what I am saying is more like a skeptical position. I am suspending my belief on what the ground, if any, of logic (and mathematics) is. Why? Because I think we can't be certain of any view about this.

Many thanks for the informative and very interesting response. To be fair, I am not really familar with biosemiosis and Peirce's philosophy. So, I am sorry if some of my questions are 'trivial'.

Thus there is a ground. But it is neither something of the world or even of our minds. It is a propositional attitude that arose from a semiotic modelling relation with the world. It is neither a pure realism or a pure idealism. It is something that cognitively worked. A tool using hominid could structure its world with a hierarchical order. A grammatical sapiens could impose a further level of still more consciously-distancing narrative structure, — apokrisis

Let's take a broad definition of 'ontological idealism' and a somewhat restricted one of 'ontological realism', here (I think that you are using here). Let's say that 'ontological idealism' means that fundamental reality is mental and every other kind of 'realities' are dependent on that ultimate reality. On the other hand, 'ontological realism' as the view that there is an ultimate reality, which is of a non-mental kind and minds ontologically depend on it.

Now, I think that it can be argued, like I think you do, that all living organisms (and maybe even some of their components and non-living things like viruses) do have a 'semiotic modelling' of the world, as you say. But it this is true, then at least some aspect of their 'being' can be rightly said to be 'mental' (a very, very primitive kind of 'mentality', not a truly sentient one...).

In your view, is 'mentality' there in all 'levels' of 'physical reality' or does it emerge at some point? Or are you endorsing a form of 'panpsychism', where mentality is 'there' at the fundamental level of 'reality' (as one aspect of it)?
I ask you this because, unless your view is a sort of 'panpsychism' it should be called 'realism' as defined above. Of course, this is not a problem 'in itself', so to speak, but it is a problem if this kind of 'realism' assumes intelligibility. If intelligibility is assumed, then such an assumption remains an arbitrary feature of the 'world-view' because the 'emergent minds' are not in a position to know if their claim of intelligibility is sound or is mistaken. On the other end, if your view is 'panpsychist', then this problem does not really arise because intelligibility is an intrinsic feature of the world so to speak.

We hazard a guess, take the risk of assuming a belief, and then discover the pragmatic consequences of doing that. We systematically doubt what we have assumed until we reach a point that further doubt has become useless. Moot. A difference that no longer could make a difference in practice. — apokrisis

At which point does a belief, though, acquire the status of 'knowledge'?

For instance, we both agreeded in the other thread that newtonian mechanics is best understood as an useful 'fictional model' that give us the possibility to make predicitions, applications and so on. We know e.g. that a 'realistic' interpretation of 'newtonian force' as a physical entity is inappropriate.
But for a long time, an ontological interpretation of newtonian physics seemed to be supported by experiments.

Of course, we can guess, assume a belief, we can even speak of knowledge in some sense, but it's not certainty. Empirical knowledge doesn't seem to be able to give us certainty. Yet, logical necessity seems to demand it.

I am not saying that your view is wrong but IMO grounding logic in an uncertain knowledge doesn't seem a real 'grounding'. Logic reamains 'groundless' or at best 'grounded' as are empirical sciences. This isn't necessarily a bad thing but seems to IMO contrast the 'necessity' of logic. But maybe it's not an important point. IMO it is but I can understand why you do not think it is.

Neither I believe that, say, platonism grounds logic. It proposes a ground, tries to give a justification of logic. But that's not enough.

If the semiotic modelling relation has been working for life and mind since its biological beginning, and a semiosis founded in number is merely the latest instantiation of this natural story, then that would be a pretty grounded tale I would have thought. — apokrisis

If 'semiotic modelling' - I am wrong to call it 'mentation'? - has only been working since a certain point of this universe history, doesn't it lead us to an emergentist view?

BTW, are you familiar to the late Bohm views on 'active information'. I think that you would find them akin to yours.

(i.e. void, anicca, dao, sunyata) — 180 Proof

Since you mentioned these concepts, in Indian/Far eastern philosophy, many religious traditions developed a version of a 'two truths doctrine', the 'conventional truth' (what we might call 'consensual reality') and the 'ultimate truth' (only known by the 'liberated'). Of course, they differ in their conception of what these two truths are, even among the same religion there are many versions (it would be simply to long to view them...).

The difference between the two truths is epistemic, i.e. the 'conventional truth' arises from a distorted perspective we have on 'what is real', whereas the 'ultimate truth' is seen by those who transcended this deceptive - even if useful in most contests - perspective. So an 'epistemic transcendence' is needed to overcome suffering/pain (and in some versions this leads to an 'ontological transcendence', but I digress...)

But IMO even if what is required to overcome 'pain/suffering' is a radical 'epistemic transcendence' I think that, maybe initially, what motivates this kind of search is actually that anguished awareness that I mentioned before.

Spinoza's 'sub specie temporis' seems the perspective of 'conventional truth', whereas his 'sub specie aeternitatis' is the perspective that 'reveals' the ultimate.

But even among the greeks, we actually find some versions of the two truths (IMO among the presocratics, the Eleatics are the best example...)

What I find fascinating is that in Ancient Greece even those who actually held a more 'materialistic' view employed something similar. Democritus for instance seems to have developed a philosophy which is structurally similar: on the one hand, composite objects which are seen as a whole because our understanding is incomplete and on the other hand, atoms and the void which can be seen as the 'ultimate truth'.

But this is not surprising if philosophy was, in the ancient times was combined with a practice as Pierre Hadot said.

@Wayfarer

Well, fwiw, I see no other way but to interpret Spinoza as both an immanentist and acosmist sub specie aeternitatis (though sub specie durationis also as a pandeist, which (for me) ontically relates him to that other great immanentist Epicurus). — 180 Proof

As an aside, now that I think about it, I realize that reading your posts (I think in the old forum?) convinced me that Spinoza was a kind of acosmist (I think it was you who compared Spinoza to Advaita Vedanta and used the wave/ocean analogy). So, kudos for that :up: and also for considering him a pandesit sub specie temporis (here he markedly differs I believe from Advaita Vedanta, where in the 'lower level' of truth, Advaita is theist I think...)!

I can see why you can call Spinoza an 'immanentist'. But at the same time it is a peculiar form of immanentism where the 'true reality' has an element of transcendence. Not in the sense that 'Natura Naturans' is something 'separate' from the modes but 'sub specie aeternitatis' only God is real (at this level the modes in some sense 'disappear', are transcended).

What else leaves us satisfied but that something works. It achieves some goal. It is consistent with our aims. — apokrisis

I think I understand what you mean, but IMO logic is prior than understanding that. In fact, some kind of intuition of logical principles might be innate. Maybe even animals.

Of course I am speculating here. But I think no matter one tries to define logic with respect to something else, one encounters difficulties, circularities and so on.

We routinely apply this constraint to physics. What makes it impossible in logics? Especially given as we do it routinely. To the point that we think we know what has practical bite and what is verging on abstract nonsense. — apokrisis

In a sense, I think I agree. After all, if logic was useless nobody would employ it. But, on the other hand, even understanding the concept of 'usefulness' relies on understanding logic. What do you think?

Physics might not be that physical, just as logic ain’t that unphysical when you get down to it. It is a bit of a social construction to claim that logic is some free choice abstract from reality, or indeed an inhabitant of Platonia. — apokrisis

Not sure what you are getting at here. I don't think that saying that logic is 'primitive', 'a groundless ground' so to speak, requires a platonic view (although, maybe, it can be used as an argument in favor for such a view... but again, I don't think that if one accept that logic is not grounded in anything, then one is forced to accept a platonic view).

Ironically, what I am saying is IMO consistent with a pragmatical view of logic, given that there is no compelling evidence for a view or another of the 'ontology' of logic. Keeping it groundless, primitive, allows us to use it without relying on a theory of a supposed ontological 'ground' of logic.

↪boundless Perhaps a sharper way to put it. If logic is meant to structure our thoughts and causality to structure the world, why should they not correspond in this way. Why not the pragmatic constraint that optimises the value of both? — apokrisis

Let's say that, indeed, logical principles are a 'reflection' of an intelligible structure of the world. How could one 'prove' this view?

If one cannot prove this view, is this view really more pragmatically significant than other philosophical positions about the 'ontology' of logic (or the position that building an ontology of logic is impossible)?

Let's say one is a platonist. Does platonism limit the activity of logic more than other views?

The definition of pragmatic is found in the limit of inquiry. When further refinement is agreed to be pointless. A difference that would make no difference. — apokrisis

Yeah, I think I agree.

Every hates effective theory. But what if that is just the nature of both physics and logic? As we discover in our own good time. — apokrisis

Ok. But in order to accept a view or another, it might be needed to be shown that such a view is better than others (or a skeptical approach on the issue).

I use the 'might' here because, after all, it may not be the only criterion to choose a view over another.

↪boundless On the contrary, with all due respect, perhaps the world (naively) seems "imperfect" to us only because each one of us is "imperfect" ... Philosophy can be a practice – "spiritual exercise" (Hadot) – for learning (again) to see the world as perfect and thereby, like Sisyphus, always striving to perfect our communities and ourselves (e.g. ethics-as-tikkun olam). — 180 Proof

Yeah, I might have worded it badly...

For example, Spinoza himself distingueshed two ways of contemplating reality: sub specie temporis and sub specie aeternitatis. To 'transcend' pain and suffering, one must contemplate reality sub specie aeternitatis.

So, I guess that, yeah, I might erred in implying that the 'world is unfair' (after all, 'unfair' cannot be something that is applied to something insentient and that has no moral agency) in my previous post. I was, in fact, trying to verbalize the 'instinctual' reaction to the pre-reflexive or reflexive awareness (unfortunate? delusional? maybe 'enlightenly delusional'*?) of the paradoxical predicament in which we are.

So, yeah, the 'feeling' that the world is imperfect or unfair might well be understood, in some ways as a delusion. But is IMO still the starting point of even an immanentist 'solution' of this problem a la Spinoza, at least in some interpretations (although, I actually interpret Spinoza as a sort of 'acosmist', so not sure I would call him an immanentist in the literal sense of the term). But IMO it can be also the starting point of diverse philosophers like Epicurus and Pyrrho, who seeked and thought they found a solution of the human predicament. So I don't think that this anguished reaction is actually found only in religious/spiritual thinkers but it is a reaction, a 'splinter' that motivates one to actually find some kind of solution. Yes, I think that it is most explicit in religious concepts of 'liberation/salvation' but not entirely absent in skeptic or even 'fully secular' thinkers. After all, I think it is something that be vivdly felt by anyone.

*By 'enlightenly delusional' I mean an intuition that is wrong but it is the starting point for a 'more enlightned perspective', so to speak. To borrow a famous metaphor from Wittgenstein and a certain (inappropriate) liberty to decontestualize it, it is like a 'ladder' that is to be taken seriously IMO.

The fact that the world is 'imperfect' is actually a good motivator for spiritual practice, I think. — boundless

Just wanted to expand on this point. We instinctively want to be in a positive state and be from pain/suffering/unease. Also, we have a natural instinct of survival. And yet, our own nature contradicts those innate insticts. That, I believe, leads to a perception of 'unfairness' in this world, which can itself bring pain (and we, by instict, seek distractions from it...). So, I think that the awareness of the 'unfairness or imperfection of the world' doesn't come from reflexion but it is pre-reflexive*. We feel this unfairness, so to speak because our fragility and our being liable to death contrast our instinct.
I think that the religious 'seeking' of an escape/liberation/salvation is therefore ingrained in us.

So, yeah, I would say that the 'world as unfair' is a pre-reflexive awarenss which is rooted in our most central instincts. That's why, I think, the 'need of salvation/liberation' that is found in religions has been universal in all cultures. It can be elaborated upon in a religious doctrine or even seen as a paradoxical, delusional feeling that is maybe best to try to ignore in all possible ways. But it is IMO undeniably there and even if it is denied it remains in the background.
In fact, I believe that this feeling or this pre-reflexive awareness of the tragicality of our predicament is the main motivator for any kind of spiritual practice.

*I think that some 'spiritual' experiences are, indeed, experiences where there is a stronger-than-usual awareness of this paradox and this kind of experiences can IMO be the strong motivators for a 'drastic change' in both views and actions. I think that I had an experience of this sort in the summer of 2016 where I felt an anguished awareness of this paradoxical condition of living beings and I really felt it as something that indeed is of my concern. In my case, this experience caused a shift in views but not in actions.

Why not ground logic in its practical consequences? Like science. — apokrisis

Because, e.g. in order to establish if something is useful you need to have criteria to establish that it is useful, i.e. coherent with the concept of 'useful'.

Also, practical consequences are empirical facts.

That way entailment and causality might start to look like they have something in common. — apokrisis

I think that they do have something in common. In order to formulate the concept of 'causality', I think you need entailment as a prerequisite.

Thanks!

I'd like to address this again given that my previous response was just conjecture. What I want to point out is the ability for a system to change. This change is dictated by causality. To understand causality we have to regard nature as a unitary system evolving through time. So, with this said, what do you think "possibility" might mean? — Shawn

Well, I admit that I have some difficulties to answer to your question. First of all, I wasn't assuming that change is necessarily due to causality. Second, I was merely saying that we simply do not know if 'laws of nature' are contingent or not.

Anyway, I might define 'possibility' as a 'one state' in a collection of other possible state that 'something' might have.
So, a 'contingent entity' might be taken to mean that such an 'entity' can be either 'exist' or 'do not exist'.

The concept is so vaguely understandable only based on the way we perceive change itself. I don't really have an answer as to these deep "why" questions about what makes change possible. — Shawn

Well, I think that if we want to 'ground' logic then such answers must in some ways be answered.
I was trying to point out that 'grounding' logic on something else only seems to lead to some assumptions which are themselves 'ungrounded' and that, in fact, I think even stating those assumptions requires logic.

Modal logic is supposedly grounded by processism. I think that's the best answer I can give. — Shawn

Ok. Maybe you are right, but I think that even modal logic doesn't need such a 'grounding'

I was merely trying to point out that the concept on an 'unknown knower' doesn't necessarily entail a form of ontological idealism but it is, in my opinion, fully compatibile with some forms of epistemological idealism and some kind of phenomenology that does not make ontological commitments about the 'knower'. If I misunderstood you, I apologize for that.

And I wasn't trying to imply that you thought that the 'mind', 'subject' do not exist.

But anyway if you think that my questions were inappropriate I'll leave at that.

P.S. I do not consider myself an 'antirealist'. I do not deny the existence of a mind-independent reality (and actually I think that some kind of epistemic idealism or phenomenology are actually comptabile with realism). Not sure why you assumed that I'am an antirealist...

I'd like to point out that I view the very notion of having possibility within a system can only mean in terms of modal logic the necessity of determined states which are truth apt regarding causality. — Shawn

What do you thank that is the 'ground' of modal logic?

IMO: logic has no ground at all.

I hope this thread can go in such a direction. It seems plausible that the logic of causality can only be defined materially and temporarily. — Shawn

Let's concede that is indeed the case.

It seems to me that, according to you, we should infer logical principles by observing physical phenomena, which we assume that have regularities which can be 'translated faithfully' in a conceptual map.
Let's assume that it is indeed possible, in principle, to infer logical principles in this way.
But what does gaurantee us that, indeed, our inference is correct? On what grounds can we be sure that our inference is correct?

We cannot say 'further observations' because, after all, the problem remains the same.

So we now have two assumptions: (1) physical phenomena have regularities that can be 'faithfully translated' to conceptual maps/schemes and (2) we can know logical principles because we can have valid inferences based on observations made on the said physical phenomena

These two assumptions might be considered reasonable but... we have introduced the concept of 'inference', which is a type of logical operation which we actually want to ground in physical observations. This suggests to me that it is best to assume that logic is primitive.

I'd like to address this again given that my previous response was just conjecture. What I want to point out is the ability for a system to change. This change is dictated by causality. To understand causality we have to regard nature as a unitary system evolving through time. So, with this said, what do you think "possibility" might mean? — Shawn

I'll respond to this later!

Yeah, after all an 'experience' is something mental. So, in a sense, I can agree what is said.

But let's consider the structure of our experience. Experiences of course have contents, which might be called the 'objects of experiences'. But they all share a quality, a 'privateness', a 'sense' (for a lack of a better word) that they are experienced by 'me'.

Let's start by this: what is this 'me' according to you? does it ever appear as a particular content/object of experience? If so, when?

This "knower" (i.e. perceiver) Bishop Berkeley calls "God" which, not by coincidence I'm sure, is functionally indistinguishable from Gnomon's "Enformer". An infinite regress-of-the-gaps. :sparkle: :eyes: — 180 Proof

I disagree. It depends on how you interpret the 'subject of experience'. It might just be a formal property of experience. The subject never appears as an object of experience but this does not mean that it is non-existence or a substance that is independent from experience.

Thank you once again. I will bring it to bear on the topic of the OP. The basic point of my argument is that we do not really see 'what is'. We're unaware of our own sub- and unconcious machinations and as a result we project them onto 'the world', an inevitable consequence of our ego-centred individualist culture. That is the point of 'awareness training' and philosophy as a spiritual discipline, is the attainment of self knowledge. Much of what goes under the heading of philosophy nowadays comprises methods to rationalise the human condition, although what philosophy really should be doing is critiquing it. That is the context in which the question of the fairness or otherwise of 'the world' should be assessed. — Wayfarer

While I largely agree with you here, I think that we can still make correct judgement about the 'unfairness' of the world that actually help us to better our awareness of our 'sub- and unconscious machinations'.
For instance, if we consider, say, the 'unfairness' of diseases, the fact that this world actually does not match many of our idealisations - 'how we wish we it should be' - we arrive at a more disillusioned and mature view of both ourselves and the world itself.
The fact that the world is 'imperfect' is actually a good motivator for spiritual practice, I think.

I don't think we can have the cake and eat it too here. The way things seem is that the very notion of possibility within a system of physical laws gives rise to a logic that is modal. Modality might be a better term than contingent... — Shawn

I disagree. By 'contingent' I mean something that might to cease to exist/be valid. If physical laws are something contingent and they at some point change, the criteria by which we consider an explanation 'coherent' change, if we take them as the foundation of logic. I don't think that is acceptable.

It would be interesting to approach your question from the perspective of a counterfactual. What would a physics look like that could not be apprehended by any form of inferential or abductive reasoning? I don't think such questions are coherent, and there seems to be plenty of evidence attesting that everything in physics can be modeled. If it is indeed true that human logic can apprehend physics in a model or what have you (I think the right term, nowadays, is a "simulation"), then the circularity dissipates. — Shawn

Maybe physical theories, models etc cannot give us a picture of the 'physical world' but only useful tools to make predictions. If that is the case, it might be said that they work 'as if' they are a correct 'description'.

Consider, for instance, these two phrases:
"The sun moves from east to west and I predict that it reaches its maximum height at noon"
"When the bat hits the ball, (edit: it produces a force that) will cause an acceleration on the ball"

The first phrase is coherent, in many situations we can use it 'as if' it's correct, but it is nevertheless wrong if we take it literally: we know that the sun's movement is merely apparent. But for most practical situations I can certainly live 'as if' it's correct. I can take it seriously but not literally.
The second one is also coherent, for most practical purposes valid and yet we know that it cannot be taken as literally true.

You seem to assume that physical reality can be literally 'mapped' in a conceptual model, i.e. it has a structure that can be literally 'translated' in a conceptual framework. I guess that if we assume that this is true then maybe we might think that logic has a 'physical basis' (although then one might ask why this is so... but this is another story for another time).

On the other hand, physical theories might be able to work even if they cannot give a faithful picture of physical reality. But if this is true, then logic isn't really grounded in physics: the conceptual map is imputed by us and is not 'forced' by physical reality.

If a simulation were so accurate that it would be impossible to distinguish it from 'reality', it could be still possible that such a simulation would be correct for all practical purposes and not a literal picture of reality.

In brief, I think that your reasoning is based on a hidden assumption, i.e. that it is possible to build a conceptual 'map' of reality that is a literal picture of it.

I am sorry but I really don't understand what are you getting at.

To me logic is a discipline that aims at understanding the criteria according to which an explanation, argumentation, theory etc is coherent.
Physical theories, conjectures, protocols, predictions, explanations etc should be coherent.
Even, say, a false explanation must be coherent in order to be considered 'false'. In fact, in order to be a true 'explanation' must be coherent.
And I believe that the criteria according to which an explanation is deemed 'coherent' cannot be based on something that is or might be contingent.

To another poster you said earlier:

If physics is to be descriptive of logic, then, a "cause" would be defined by how the system of laws governing physics works, and from there to deduce what logic would be required to explain those laws in terms of decidability in logical space. — Shawn

This might be a starting point, I think, on which we can work.

IMO, the problem I see here is that when you try to describe the laws you might infer from your observations, you already use logic and mathematics (to make them coherent and give quantitative predictions). So, I guess I can say that in order to 'ground' logic in physics, you are already assuming that logic is fundamental.

What do you think about this last paragraph? Do you think I am wrong in detecting a circuarity here? If so, why?

Sure, I would like to highlight your uncertainty as stemming from not knowing how logical space can exist. Is it true in how I'm framing the ambiguity? — Shawn

No, as I said I don't understand why it is relevant to the debate about physics and logic, i.e. I see the two issues as separate, but I might be wrong.

there anything standing in the way of a direct relationship between logic and physics? — Shawn

IMO, all explanations relie on logical principles. But even, say, the basic concept of 'prediction' is based on logical reasoning:

"If [some kind of theoretical statements are valid] then [ I should observe such and such in a lab]"

So, I cannot see how physics can be considered as foundational to logic (or math) when the former cannot exist, in my opinion, without the latter. Note that even if all our physical theories, explanations etc were wrong their structure has logic as a prerequisite. Explanations and predictions are based on logic.

Also, logical argumentation cannot be based on physical phenomena and their regularities. Why? Because, there is no guarantee that physical phenomena and their regularities are not contingent and if they were contingent, then logical argumentation would not be compelling.

Unless one shows that regularities in phenomena are not contingent physics cannot be foundational for logic and mathematics IMO.

Yes, well may I ask whether there are things that cannot be modeled in a computer? — Shawn

Well, I don't know. I think that, say, some discoveries in physics could not be made by a computer (say e.g. Newton's discovery of gravitation)
But I am not sure why you think that it would show that if that is the case then physics would have a precedence over logic. After all, computer operations too follow logical principles.

I'm also trying to understand your argument about logic being transcendental. Do you mean to say logic is foundational to every state of change within a system, as logic seems necessary to produce change or "cause and effect" between objects that may have a relation as defined by physical laws through logic or the transcendental logic you mention. — Shawn

By saying 'x is transcendental for y' I mean that 'x' is a necessary prerequiste for 'y'. It's roughly like saying that a 'functioning visual system' (x) is 'transcendental' to 'seeing colors' ( y).

Anyway, what I meant is that logic is employed in any activity in physics, both theoretical and experimental.
Using your example, any causal explanation of physical phenomena must be formulated in a way that employs logical principles (this seems true even if Hume was actually right in his skepticism about causation. Causal explanation relie on logic, even those that are not valid).

I cannot conceive doing physics without employing logic. Not even experimental physics: after all, experimental protocols seem to be based in a procedure that follows logical laws.

On the other hand, I can study/do/discuss logic without any reference to physics. Same goes for mathematics, actually.

Is this chicken or egg? Physics came first in a non-anthropological manner. QED? — Shawn

You can study/employ/use logic without physics. But the viceversa is not true. You can't do physics without logic. That's why I said that logic is transcendental with respect to physics: it is a necessary precondition for physics. And same, I think, is true for science in general.

Ok I see :lol:

↪boundless Linde says it changes our perception of what appears to be ‘the past’. — Wayfarer

I think that it is a good way to put it :up: That's would be an 'epistemic' claim, consistent with epistemic interpretations. So, I don't think that is a controversial statement.

What's odd is that this is a thread about justice and fairness, yet it contains page after page of speculative quantum physics. — Banno

Lol, yeah, I see your point. Is it possible to 'split' the thread?

Indeed, physics has its merits. I don't think anybody denies that. I was just pointing out what some of its problems are, and how these problems relate to mathematical logic. — Tarskian

Ok, I see. Thanks for the clarification.

↪Wayfarer Again, there is the bit where you give and the bit where you take back. You want consciousness to be the special thing that collapse wave functions, but you don't want it to be different to the other stuff of the universe. — Banno

Actually QBism is a form of 'consciousness causes collapse' interpretation as I understand it. But given that in such an interpretation the wave-function is merely a tool that allows one to calculate probabilities to have some kind of experiences, I do not see how it can be problematic or how can it give a 'special' role to consciousness. It certainly does not mean that when a conscious agent makes an observation something in the 'fabric of the universe', so to speak, changes. The only thing that happens is an update of knowledge (in QBism this is expressed as an upddate of a probability, which in turn is interpreted as a quantification of a degree of belief).

I do not think that QBism or similar views are in contrast with your own view.

On the other hand, Rovelli's RQM holds that all physical objects can be considered as 'observers'. To be fair, I prefer QBism or similar views because, after all, what a 'physical object is' is extremely vague. Is a table a physical object? Are its legs physical objects? Does each atom of a table have its 'perspective'? Do all its atoms and the whole table have their own perspective? How they are related?
My problem with such a view is its vagueness.

↪boundless That’s pretty right - I do hold to a form of epistemic idealism. But I also claim that what we can claim is real is inextricably connected to what we can know, which I think is a consequence of my training in Buddhist philosophy. — Wayfarer

Ok :up: Note, however, that if one thinks that the delayed choice experiment shows that a measurement can change the past (rather than our knowledge of it), then one enters in some serious difficulties. That's why I don't like the expression 'partecipatory realism' even if respected physicists use it.

I do not doubt their credentials. I am merely saying that an ontological reading of certain ideas can be misleading. Of course it also depends on how 'ontology' is defined.

Yes, for instance QBism does require that 'observers' can 'experience', i.e. are conscious. But this does not imply that consciousness 'affects' the 'external reality' when a measurement, observation or anything like that is made.

If 'consciousness causes collapse' is taken as meaning that 'an experiment updates the knowledge/degree of beliefs' of a conscious agent, I do not see anything 'weird'. On the other hand, if it is taken as implying that an observation of a conscious agent changes the 'fabric of reality' or that 'consciousness causes a drastic change in external reality' and so on, then yes it becomes a problem IMO.

Thanks for the link, btw, I'll read it. Anyway, I do think that your own idealism is actually a form of epistemic idealism, rather than ontological (based on what I read in the past). Ontological idealism treats consciousness as the sole substance.

So like gauge invariance vs Poincaré invariance? Constrain spacetime to a manifold of points and it still has degrees of freedom in that the points may spin rather than sit still. They may be vector and chiral rather than scalar. Quantum spin arises as an intrinsic property and the rest of particle physics follows. — apokrisis

Well, maybe 'symmetries' are the only intrinsic properties that can be discovered by physics.

But even quantum spin after all is a quantity that describes how an object responds to an interaction. So I am not sure that it can be said that it is an intrinsic property of a particle (I admit that this does not 'conclusively' shows that it isn't lol...).

(IIRC there was a paper by philosopher Michel Bitbol that discussed this kind of things. If I find it I'll link or quote the relevant parts)

Yeah, that bit. The principles of physics are to be formulated so that the frame of reference being used does not change those principles. Any frame will do. This was intended to head off the common notion that science seeks a "view from nowhere" - perhaps the view you described and disagreed with as "independent from any reference frame". Rather, science seeks a view from anywhere. A pont worth making in a philosophy forum. — Banno

Completely in agreement with this :100:

That seems to be making 'an ontological claim'. Or wait - is it an 'epistemological claim?' — Wayfarer

It depends on the interpretation of this type of things. In epistemic interpretations like, say, QBism or some form of Copenaghen-ish interpretations, such an experiment results in an update of the knowledge of the agent/observer, not in the 'coming to be' of some kind of reality.
At best, it is an 'ontological claim' in the sense that 'the world' that the agent 'observed' is not 'the world in itself', but the 'world observed'.

These kind of theories do not make ontological commitments, i.e. do not attempt in describing 'how the world is in itself' (from a 'view form nowhere', if you like).

Unfortunately, concepts like 'participatory realism' IMO kind of muddy the waters. They seem to imply that 'the observer changes reality'. This in QBism, as I understand it, actually means 'the observer gets a new experience'. Other similar interpretations say that 'the observer knowledge its updated' and so on.

I guess that 'participatory realism' was developed in other to defend QBism and similar views from the charge of solipsism. But I do not really see the point of that. It only complicates the issue.

So, physicists want a "grand unified" pattern instead. Physicists seem to view this effort as essential. — Tarskian

My point was simply that I think 'Physics' as a discipline has still a 'raison d'etre' if 'a theory of everything' is impossible to achieve. I myself worked briefly in condensed matter physics, a branch of physics that is quite independent to the search of a 'theory of everything'. To some physicists might be essential, maybe even famous ones, but this does not mean that physics becomes vain if a 'theory of everything' is impossible. There still much to be discovered about physical phenomena that can be 'modeled' with current theories.

Hi Banno, apokrisis,

The Principle of Relativity asks us to set out the laws of physics in such a way that they apply to all frames of reference. — Banno

Correct. But this only says that physical laws are the same in all reference frames. Invariant properties in all reference frames are not necessarily property of a 'physical world independent of all reference frames'

Hence this suggests to me that any true description of the physical world can be made from any perspective/frame of reference. — Banno

I disagree, if the 'phyisical world' here is meant the 'physical world as it is independent from any reference frame'. On the other hand, yes, I agree if this is taken to mean that any reference frame can be used to discover/find some truth that is valid for all other reference frames.

But we can have a theory of reference frames can’t we? We continue on as we see with holography, de Sitter metrics, or twistor space. We can have general arguments that pick out 3-space as special as the only dimensionality that has the same number of rotational degrees of freedom as translational ones. — apokrisis

Yeah, I guess that we can but I am not sure how this is an objection to what I said earlier, if you meant that way. I am perfectly fine, for instance, with what you say about 3-space. But this can be IMO understood as a pointer to a property in common to all reference frames. Regardin holography, de Sitter ant twistors, well as I said, they all seem all quite far as the 'physical world as it appears to us', so to speak. As I said:

'How the world is' independently from any perspective seems to get weirder and weirder as we get to more 'advanced' theories. — boundless

I see it as a sort of 'evidence' for this kind of tendency.

There may always be questions but they also can be new ones. — apokrisis

Agreed.

Anyway, to put in another way what I am saying, I think that a distinction can be made between 'intrinsic' and 'relational' properties. Relational properties are not properties of 'a thing in itself' so to speak, but is a property that arises in a relation. As an example, the apparent height of a tower seen from a distance is a relational property, not an intrinsic one (it cannot be assigned to the tower, without taking into consideration something else). If we do not know intrinsic properties of objects we do not know them 'in themselves', but only in relation.

According to, say, Galileo all 'primary' qualities were intrinsic to physical objects. But his own 'principle of relativity' actually showed that velocity is a relational property. In special relativity, for instance, even distances and temporal durations are not intrinsic properties*. In QM this 'relationality' is even more explicit.

*Yeah, the speed of light is the same in all inertial frames in special relativity. But it does not follow that it is an intrinsic property: after all, velocity is a concept that makes sense only when a particular reference frame is considered. I think that the same can be said even for rest mass. Rest mass is a quantity that tells us how an object 'responds' to some interactions. BTW, after all the operational definition of all physical quantities is in fact relational. So, maybe it might not be surprising if it turns out that they are not intrinsic.

It is actually the ultimate goal of science: — Tarskian

I disagree. Science can exist even if such a theory is impossible. It isn't essential to science IMO, so it cannot be its 'ultimate' goal.

One of those possibly pseudo-questions which may be sophistry; but, in your opinion do you think physics describes logic? — Shawn

No. In fact, one might say that the opposite is true. As Hume said, there is no 'proof' of, say, physical causality, we cannot be certain of it. On the other hand, it seems that any physical theory must be logically consistent. Logic is, I think, transcendental (i.e. a necessary precondition to any explanation) as the early Wittgenstein said.

Also, there is no conclusive evidence that physical laws are not contingent.

Doesn’t the same problem crop up in a relativistic context such as the simultaneity issue? No absolute reference frame and yet that can still be approached in the limit. — apokrisis

I agree with that. In fact, I believe that relativity has similar interpretative difficulties. On one hand, a 'literal' interpretation of relativity leads one to an 'eternalist block view', i.e. change and the 'now' are merely illusions. On the other hand, as Einstein himself said the 'now' is a great problem for relativity. After all, the experience of the 'now' is undeniable and so 'immediate' experience seems to contradict a literal interpretation of relativity. So what?

In relativity the 'branching' of space-time into space and time is associated to the choice of a particular reference frame, i.e. perspective. This is similar to what happens in QM with 'observers' (whatever one takes them to be): only at measurement/observation/interaction etc physical quantities assume a definite value. But hey, even in classical mechanics velocities etc have undefined value until a reference frame is chosen.

Like QM and like what I said about newtonian mechanics, this suggests to me that any description of the world must be made from a particular perspective/frame of reference. 'How the world is' independently from any perspective seems to get weirder and weirder as we get to more 'advanced' theories.

In a sense, I get that it can be seen as a disappointing view but, on the other hand, it is at the same time in a sense 'liberating' and 'awe insipring' (reality seems much more mysterious than it appears to be...).

I think that my view is close to the view presented by Bernard d'Espagnat in his 'On Physics and Philosophy' or of the late David Bohm (who wasn't an 'instrumentalist'). For the latter see e.g. this interview*: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mst3fOl5vH0 (yeah, I know that the late Bohm is controversial but still...also his concept of 'active information' might be congenial to biophysics)

Yes. It is perfectly acceptable to me to go full Copenhagen and say all we can know is the numbers we read off dials. If a proper ontic interpretation isn’t available, quantum physics still works as instrumentalism. Copenhagen remains the sensible backstop epistemic position. — apokrisis

Same as all theories. It does not matter that the literal interpretation of newtonian physics is right for its applications.

IMO Physics seems to assume that there are regularities in phenomena (but any ontological commitment of the theory is unneeded)

Yeah. Heard quite a bit from him on Physics Forum some years back. But I can’t remember whether I was agreeing or disagreeing with him at the time. I will have to check that reference. :up: — apokrisis

Lol, I 'knew' him there too years back. Seems to be a very thoughtful researcher. Unfortunately I found many of his works very complicated and well above my level. I do not know if his interpretation is actually accepted as a 'canonical' one as say de Broglie-Bohm, MWI, Copenaghen etc

*I do not think that he is completely correct in that interview, but I agree with his main message.

Classicality comes to be in the limit. So reality never arrives at that ideal conception we have of it, but through decoherence, it approaches a classical state for all practical purposes. We can apply that brand of physics and logic to it. — apokrisis

Ok, I see. But IMO, while decoherence - for all practical purposes - explains why we see definite outcomes in experiments, it doesn't explain why experiments have a unique outcome. In other words, as far as I can tell, this is why decoherence is not taken as a complete solution of the measurement paradox. Decoherence gives the definiteness of the observed outcome but is not enough to explain the uniqueness of the outcome.

But the cat is a hot body in a warm place. It went into the box decohered and not coherent. It wasn't converted to a Bose condensate. It remained always in a "thermalised to classicality state". — apokrisis

OK, you are right.

MWI is the kind of nonsense to be avoided. Spontaneous collapse fails if you demand that reality actually be classical rather than just decohered towards its concrete limit. Zeilinger's information principle captures some aspects nicely. — apokrisis

Ok, sorry for the misunderstanding then. I fully agree with you about MWI. I referred to spontaneuous collapse theories because they provide a consistent 'ontologically interpretable' (or 'realist') explanation for the uniqueness of the outcomes.

But, anyway, I concede that, in a sense, one can say that decoherence is 'enough': after all, it is enough to explain, for all practical purposes, why we get definite outcomes. As far as observations, applications, and practical concerns are concerned, yeah, you don't need other assumptions. Still, from a theoretical point of view, I think that uniqueness of the outcomes is a crucial assumption in physics and I do not see how decoherence can explain that.

To be honest, I set the interpretation aside these last few years to let the dust settle. Youngsters like Emily Adlam are coming along and making more sense. — apokrisis

Ok, I see! I don't know Adlam, thanks for the reference.

In a sense I think I agree with you. IMO, I see QM as a practical recipe, useful for predictions and applications. I favor epistemic interpretations like QBism. I think that it is impossible to make a literal interpretation of the 'orthodox' quantum formalism that makes 'fully' sense, so to speak.

But as I say, biophysics puts it all in a new light. Something has been missing. It seems obvious to me that this is it. — apokrisis

Ok, I see, thank you.

Personally, I think that QM strongly suggest that we cannot describe physical reality as it is independently from a particular perspective and that physical theories are, in general, useful tools and 'fictions' (but as I said in my previous post, I think that this insight is actually present even in newtonian physics, albeit less explicitly). But this certainly does not mean that, in the future, it won't be replaced by something better.

P.S. I have a hunch that you might find interesting the Thermal interpretation by Arnold Neumaier. It is an 'ontologically interpretable' interpretation which apparently solves the measurement problem and other issues of other 'realist' interpretations (btw, it is also holistic: it sees entangled particles as a single extended objects, not reducible to its parts that have nonlocal properties...so some 'quantum weirdness' remain). Unfortunately, his papers are too difficult for me