Speaking Wheeler, it's always fun to remember his unequivocal stance for all those who like to misinterpret him on this point, that: "Consciousness' has nothing whatsoever to do with the quantum process" (Wheeler, “Law Without Law”). — StreetlightX

Thanks for the quote! That's interesting :smile:

Well, I actually one who apparently misinterpreted him (and I am very sorry for that if he never embraced that idea)...

But what about the idea of the 'Participatory Anthropic Principle'? Maybe he just changed his mind during his life? :chin:

Actually such an idea is also attributed to him by his critics. So, it seems strange that he never endorsed it. For instance, in 'Why information can't be the basis of reality', John Horgan writes:

We live in a "participatory universe," Wheeler suggested, which emerges from the interplay of consciousness and physical reality, the subjective and objective realms.
...
The idea that mind is as fundamental as matter—which Wheeler's "participatory universe" notion implies--also flies in the face of everyday experience. Matter can clearly exist without mind, but where do we see mind existing without matter? Shoot a man through the heart, and his mind vanishes while his matter persists. As far as we know, information—embodied in things like poetry, hiphop music and cell-phone images from Libya--only exists here on Earth and nowhere else in the universe. Did the big bang bang if there was no one there to hear it? Well, here we are, so I guess it did (and saying that God was listening is cheating).

Part of me would love to believe that consciousness is not an accidental by-product of the physical realm but is in some sense the primary purpose of reality. Without us to ponder it, the universe makes no sense; worse, it's boring. But the hard-headed part of me sees ideas like the "it from bit" as the kind of fuzzy-headed, narcissistic mysticism that science is supposed to help us overcome.

and also in 'Do Our Questions create the World' :

Wheeler was one of the first prominent physicists to propose that reality might not be wholly physical; in some sense, our cosmos must be a “participatory” phenomenon requiring the act of observation--and thus consciousness itself. Wheeler also drew attention to intriguing links between physics and information theory, which was invented in 1948 by mathematician Claude Shannon. Just as physics builds on an elementary entity, the quantum, defined by the act of observation, so does information theory. Its “quantum” is the binary unit, or bit, which is a message representing one of two choices: heads or tails, yes or no, zero or one.
...
But Wheeler himself has suggested that there is nothing but smoke. “I do take 100 percent seriously the idea that the world is a figment of the imagination,” he remarked to physicist/science writer Jeremy Bernstein in 1985. Wheeler must know that this view defies common sense: Where was mind when the universe was born? And what sustained the universe for the billions of years before we came to be

Had also John Horgan misattributed such a view to Wheeler?

Yes, the relationship between empirical exteriority and transcendental interiority is exactly what this kind of argument challenges. — fdrake

Yeah, I should have specify that :smile:

Ionic bonds happened before the advent of humans, yes or no? Ionic bonding would have occurred even if humans never existed, yes or no? — fdrake

I am not Wayfarer, but I try to give an answer from a 'Kantian' or 'quasi-Kantian' viewpoint.

A 'moderate correlationist' (i.e. neither 'weak' nor 'strong') might say 'a la Kant' that while humans (or more generally sentient beings) do not 'create' reality, the 'world as it appears' to us is just our representation. In other words, it is given by the sum of the 'noumenon' (which is unkowable) and our mind. So, to your questions he might answer: for the first 'yes' in the sense that 'things in themselves'* exist independently and 'no' for the second in the sense that 'Ionic bondings' are 'empirical things in themselves' (and hence part of the 'representation'): see the fifth note here https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/notes.html (these are the notes to the SEP article on Kant's transcendental idealism).

*Note that Kant used the plural and hence he allowed the possibility that the 'noumenon' could be made of a plurality of things (and hence, this would put him quite close to the 'transcendental realist' camp). Schopenhauer denied that plurality could be a feature of the 'thing in itself' (hence, he used the singular), claiming that it is a category of our intellect.

A 'strong correlationist' might say that it appears that ionic bonding would exist before the advent of sentient beings. I believe that Schopenhauer is a 'stronger correlationist' than Kant, because he says explicitly that you cannot even think about the universe where no sentient being exist and the previous story of the universe is actually related to the opening of the 'first eye' (i.e. the appearance of the first conscious being) and he also believed that the 'thing in itself' was singular.

BTW, similar remarks have been made by e.g. John Wheeler with his idea of 'Participatory Anthropic Principle' (check the 'Variants' section in the article on Wiki about the anthropic principle, which also mention Schopenhauer) and this interview with Andrei Linde (especially after minute 6). So, it seems that some physicist do embrace this sort of idea (there is also the 'Many-minds interpretation', a version of the MWI where minds have a special role).

In any case, what is common in Kantian-like philosophies is a sort of paradoxical situation of 'external objects'. Since they are regarded the cause of our sensorial experience, they must exist independently by us as the 'empirical things in themselves' (hence 'empirical realism'). At the same time, however, they are still 'inside' the representation. Check also how Kelley L. Ross deals with this issue of 'empirical realism': http://www.friesian.com/kant.htm#idealism.

Sounds like if H is also factorizable into H3 and H4 instead of just H1 and H2, H3 and H4 'exist' as much as the other two, and yet cannot exist in different worlds from H1 and H2, only in different worlds from each other. I think I got the gist of your explanation in your post, but it seems that RQM might suffer from some similar issues. — noAxioms

I'll answer to this now. I try to answer to the rest of your post ASAP.

Anyway, as I said also to AndrewM I think that the problem is even deeper. Consider now that you want to identify H1 as the Hilbert space of physical system that is measured and H2 as the Hilbert space of the 'environment' (that is 'the Universe minus the system').

In MWI, you just have H. The theory itself does not tell give you any way to decompose H a-priori. Of course, we observe that something happens and, therefore, we need a factorization/decomposition (but note that the basic ontology of MWI is simply H, which is a-priori without any structure). But here we have two problems:

1) if we factorize, we note that the factorization is completely arbitrary. And in some factorizations you get into a 'situation' where nothing happens. No measurement, no interactions etc. So it just appears that the measurement is due to a sort of illusion due to a bad choice of 'decomposing' the universe.
2) even if you accept the above, then you have to accept that all factorizations/decompositions are actual. So you end up in the situation you mentioned: a Many-Many world situation where all decompositions and all histories related to each of them 'exist' like the one you are living.

As I (tentatively) said to AndrewM:

Now, I do not know if a version of this problem might appear in RQM (which AFAIK does not even use decoherence). The reason is that in MWI you regard the entire universe as the single 'real system' and you need to add an 'additional structure' in order to decompose the universe into subsystems. In RQM, the subsystems are the 'primary' because they are given by experience (in MWI, instead you try to derive experience from the universal wavefunction).
In other words, factorization is something that you do not need to justify simply because it is so to speak given by experience. (Also the comparison between RQM and Everett's theory in the SEP article about RQM might be interesting here...) — boundless

Check also this discussion on physicsforums: https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/why-does-nothing-happen-in-mwi.822848/

Thanks boundless - they're excellent videos and well worth watching for anyone with an interest in the philosophical aspects of QM. Fun quote from Rovelli at 36 mins: "When I told Max (Tegmark) that he was a relationist, he told me that he is going to convince me that I'm, without knowing, a Many World believer. — Andrew M

Yeah they are very good and the quote is very funny :wink:

1. Is this just a semantic difference with Many Worlds? (That is, there are nonetheless many physical branches, but there are only deemed to be facts relative to an observer's branch.) — Andrew M

I believe that Rovelli himself treats the wave-function as not descriptive. So, he would not say that there are 'many physical branches'. I am inclined to agree with this but I understand that it is somewhat problematic. As I said elsewhere, honestly I am a bit averse to the idea behind 'Many Worlds' (i.e. that "whatever can happen, does happen"). But that's subjective.

Anyway, even if one accepts the 'existence' of 'many physical branches' there is still a crucial difference IMO between MWI and RQM - and this is a more 'technical' objection if you will. In MWI, the 'only real thing' is the quantum state of the universe. This leads to some problems as I mentioned to NoAxioms. Check for instance this paper by JM Schwindt: https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8447.

Here Schwindt says that even if one accepts that decoherence solves the 'preferred basis problem' once a factorization of the Hilbert space is done that allows for instance to 'decompose' the universe into the measured physical system and its environment (BTW, as I understand it, decoherence solves this 'for all practical purposes' in fact but let's assume we are content with it). But as you might have noticed, decoherence is based on the assumption that a factorization is already made. The point is that Hilbert space by itself is structureless and this raises a lot of problems. Firstly, why we would make a factorization in the first place? This is a need that, of course, we have but it is an a-posteriori requirement based on our experience that a propri is not needed in the theory. Secondly, assuming that we do not regard that a problem, we need to factorize. What happens, however, is that factorization is arbitrary and in some factorizations 'nothing happens' (no interaction etc). Hence, even if we do the factorization the theory itself does not justify that we experience change and so on. So, to avoid this, it seems that we need to accept all possible factorizations: MWI becomes a Many-Many World Interpretation where all histories of all factorizations 'exist' (like the one we are 'experiencing').

Now, I do not know if a version of this problem might appear in RQM (which AFAIK does not even use decoherence). The reason is that in MWI you regard the entire universe as the single 'real system' and you need to add an 'additional structure' in order to decompose the universe into subsystems. In RQM, the subsystems are the 'primary' because they are given by experience (in MWI, instead you try to derive experience from the universal wavefunction).
In other words, factorization is something that you do not need to justify simply because it is so to speak given by experience. (Also the comparison between RQM and Everett's theory in the SEP article about RQM might be interesting here...)

Check also this discussion on physicsforums: https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/why-does-nothing-happen-in-mwi.822848/

Honestly, I do not know if MWI-supporters have found a solution to this problem.

2. If not, then what is the substantial physical difference and what explains physical interference effects? (Many Worlds would explain it as physical interference between branches.) — Andrew M

Well, yeah I honestly do not know how you can explain that if you assume that the wave-function is not 'real'. So, I unfortunately cannot give you a response.

If the wave-function is taken as 'real', then the situation is still different from MWI IMO (as I explained above, hoping that it made some sense LOL...). Mauro Dorato apparently tried to explain RQM in terms of dispositions, check: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1309.0132.pdf

Regarding the fact that cosmology is not a 'theory of everything', I suggest this nice talk about Carlo Rovelli: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TzmykSv6OBY (especially around minute 7 - it is a hour-long talk).

Also the response to the first question in the Q&A section of that talk is interesting since it gives the idea of how much 'perspectival' is RQM, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TiXzq4G10mk (the first question ends around 2:30). Anyway, the whole video is very good.

Maybe also @Andrew M and @noAxioms might find the above linked videos interesting.

Thank you for emphasizing that!

The relevant question about our networks of inferential knowledge is whether they are vindicated solely by virtue of being intersubjectively validated or whether a knowledge claim's intersubjective validation tracks how nature behaves. Scientists don't produce theory or experiment, usually, for the purpose[ of intersubjective validation, they validate claims about the world using shared methodologies. Even repeating an experiment is done to assess whether a claim is true, consistent with the available evidence, or neither of these things. — fdrake

I agree with you here. And IMO the 'weak correlationist' does not have a problem with it.

Even when all properties are relational, we can still be in the state where Alice agrees that Bob sees X, Bob agrees that Alice sees not-X, or that one was in a superposition or whatever. The general logic here is about as banal as Banno portrayed it outside of the QM context and @Andrew M portrayed it within the context of the paper in the OP. Collapse is observer dependent, great, we have established something about nature. — fdrake

Well, I agree again :wink: I mean, 'perspectival knowledge' about something is still knowledge about that. BTW, I agree that objective reality is redefined...when you specify the 'perspective', that is when you give the appropriate context then the statement becomes true for all.

[On the other hand, there might be the problem of how can we talk about objects that do not have any intrinsic property. It seems that a defining (i.e. 'essential') property of an object (i.e. the property that makes an object that object) is intrinsic, not relational...but maybe this is off-topic...]

I would remind any reader that a view from somewhere is a view of something. The context dependence of the production of a theory; through whatever intersubjective validation mechanisms you like; does nothing to diminish the truth of well established claims using methods consistent with the theory (or theoretical context). — fdrake

Agreed!

Yes, the calculation of the age of the universe is done with respect to a reference frame in which its expansion is isotropic. But:

You can still make ancestral statements within the frame — fdrake

Yeah! And I agree with you that such a knowledge does tell you something about the object of knowledge. Still, however, you cannot completely remove the fact that it is 'perspectival'. In fact, I cannot think that it is really possible to deny it.

BTW, cosmology is also not the study about 'the universe' in the sense of 'everything'. In fact, in cosmology you neglect small-scale perturbations.

What this argument reveals is that the conditions of possibility for the sense of ancestral statements require us to be able to think of a world indifferent to any given; any conditioning sensibility or emergent system of intersubjective validation. The meaningfulness of ancestral statements requires us to adjust our sophisticated intuitions about the a-priori nature of the correlation between thought and being to include the ability to interpret, since we inhabit, a world radically indifferent to any conceptual distinction. Nature becomes a curmudgeonly gainsayer who can refuse to yield to any determination of theory or sensibility; it will shout "NO!" whenever it bloody well likes and may not speak our language. — fdrake

Again, I think I, in fact, agree with you. And I believe that the 'weak correlationist' does not deny the validity of ancestral statements. Rather, as you said before he only says that ancestral statements are made within a frame. Of course, this does not make them invalid!
I really do not think that 'weak correlationism' is more (or much more) than this.

[Also, I believe that the distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' that I made in my previous post knowledge is apt. This should not be taken to mean that knowledge of e.g. what is observed in other perspective is devalued (unless one wants to become an epistemic solipsist of sorts) but only that it is indirect...]

In summary, I agree with the 'correlationist' is right in believing that all our knowledge being with our 'situated' lived experience (which is changing and conditioned by the 'external world'). I agree also with him that we cannot neglect completely the 'contribution' of our mind. So, 'direct knowledge', i.e. immediate non-inferential knowledge, occurs within this aforementioned perspective.
But I disagree with him if he denies that we absolutely cannot know anything except the world as it appears to us. In fact, I believe that we can be reasonably sure that we can have a (partial) indirect, inferential knowledge of what is 'outside' our situated experience.

But, interestingly, it seems that a 'perspectival' reasoning (somewhat analogous) to the one of the correlationist can be applied to science. And one wonders if there is a link :chin:

Thank you for giving this excellent counter-argument! :wink:

I am too reticent to accept completely what people like Bitbol, d'Espagnat etc are positing (and in some sense even Rovelli). In fact, I share your concerns. But IMO correlationism says something really 'deep' about our knowledge, so to speak. Meilassaux's argument is very strong but IMO it does not really refute the 'correlationist' argument. I am not trying to be difficult (I am sorry if I am giving this impression) but IMO Meilassaux's argument refutes the strongest form of 'correlationism', that is: there is no mind-independent reality.

IMO, a weaker form of 'correlationism' is, in fact, right. Let me explain this briefly. First, let's define 'direct knowledge' as a form of knowledge that is not based on inference but it is immediate. I believe that for this form of knowledge the 'correlationist' is right. We cannot 'neglect' its 'perspectival nature'. On the other hand, there is another type of knowledge, based on inference that is necessary for science. For instance, if we accept the reasonable assumption that we can know by inference, it seems hard to deny. We can say that we cannot be 'absolutely certain' about it, but it is difficult to think that all our inferences about something independent from our own perspective cannot give us knowledge.

Now, let me give a longer answer (I hope that isn't too unclear)...

Let me begin again from Rovelli's Relational interpretation (it is a somewhat long answer, sorry!). According to Rovelli, there is no truly 'absolute' perspective. But here whatever physical system has its own 'perspective'. So there are no 'observer-dependent' states. A 'perspective from no-where' or 'God's eye view' is impossible. Rovelli writes in his pre-print 'Relational Quantum Mechanics' (p. 1 and p.15):

The notion rejected here is the notion of absolute, or observer-independent, state of a system; equivalently, the notion of observer-independent values of physical quantities. The thesis of the present work is that by abandoning such a notion (in favor of the weaker notion of state –and values of physical quantities– relative to something), quantum mechanics makes much more sense.
...
Let me summarize the path covered. I started from the distinction between observer and observed-system. I assumed (hypothesis 1) that all systems are equivalent, so that any observer can be described by the same physics as any other system. In particular, I assumed that an observer that measures a system can be described by quantum mechanics. I have analyzed a fixed physical sequence of events E, from two different points of observations, the one of the observer and the one of a third system, external to the measurement. I have concluded that two observers give different accounts of the same physical set of events (main observation).
Rather than backtracking in front of this observation, and giving up the commitment to the belief that all systems are equivalent, I have decided to take this experimental fact at its face value, and consider it as a starting point for understanding the world. If different observers give different descriptions of the state of the same system, this means that the notion of state is observer dependent. I have taken this deduction seriously, and have considered a conceptual scheme in which the notion of absolute observer-independent state of a system is replaced by the notion of information about a system that a physical system may possess.

If the above is true then we simply cannot have a 'perspective'-independent knowledge. Rather all knowledge is 'perspectival' by necessity. Does this mean that there are only 'perspective' and nothing else? That is: can we still speak about 'absolute' properties of things? For instance, can we speak of an intrinsic property of an object O? Or all properties of O are relational, i.e. defined only in relation to other objects?
I believe that if Rovelli is right, then we simply cannot know intrinsic properties of objects (or maybe even that there are no intrinsic properties...). I honestly do not know if this 'makes sense', so to speak. But in my opinion this is quite interesting*.

Given the above, how can we make sense of the sentence: 'the universe is 13.8 billions years old'? If we accept Rovelli's interpretation, IMO we cannot even speak of 'the universe as a whole'. Why? Because, there is nothing outside that can be used to define a relation (this is very reminiscent of Kant's antinomies about the universe). So, fine! But as you say cosmology is very effective so it is hard to think that even such statement is perspectival. On the other hand, we should not forget that even that statement is made according to a 'perspective', the reference frame where the Cosmic Wave Background is isotropic, that is the 'co-moving reference frame' (check: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Age_of_the_universehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmic_time ). So, strictly speaking it is still 'perspectival'.

Even Relativity itself seems to suggest this, if we want to avoid the 'block world'. In the 'insight' article 'Block universe, refuting a common argument' on physicsforums, the 'block world hypothesis' is criticized because the assumption that the 'present' of each 'observers' is 'fixed' (in fact, the 'block universe' would follow if you accept relativity of simultaneity and this assumption). The reason why such an assumption is rejected is because of the velocity of light speed limit: no information is available outside the light cone, so only events in the past light cone are really 'fixed'.

So, ok, let us now accept all of this reasoning. Does all of this suggest an absurd form of relativism? The point is that although there are perspectives, one can still speak of 'shared truths'. 'The universe is 13.8 billions of years old in the 'co-moving' reference frame' is true for everyone, because it specifies the appropriate context. Also, from the reference frame of the Earth we can know the age of the universe in that reference frame. So, we actually can know other 'perspectives'. Hence, despite the fact that we cannot have a 'view from no-where' we still are able to make statements valid in the various 'perspectives'.

OK. Now let us bring our consciousness inside all of this. We have accepted that we cannot speak of 'perspective-independent' states. Our consciousness arguably gives us another perspective. So, we actually see everything from this 'perspective'. If the above is right, we can know by inference what is true according to other 'perspectives'.

But Kant reasoned that 'the world that appears to us' is (in part) conditioned by our a-priori forms, categories etc and, therefore, we cannot neglect the contribution of these a-priori forms. Hence, So, even if the 'correlationist' position seems absurd it cannot be really rejected. Statements about other perspectives become 'hypotheses'. How all of this escapes the charge of being 'epistemic solipsism' is unclear to me - it is IMO an 'aporia'. (It is epistemic because Kant accepts that we do not create the world but at the same time we cannot know it independently by our own a-priori forms, categories and so on)

We might try to say that our perspective is itself conditioned by the 'external world'. I'd agree. But still IMO does not actually overcome all of these difficulties. Rather, we have a changing perspective rather than an unchanging one. But still I cannot see a real refutation of the 'correlationist' view.

It might be said, however, that taking very seriously 'correlationism' is due to a sort of 'excessive skepticism'. That is, while it is true that we cannot completely neglect our 'situatedness' we can still say that statements about the world independently by our minds are reasonably true (after all, your concerns are well-justified IMO). But again, I do not see a true 'refutation' here so to speak.

What is fascinating however is that it seems that all this reasoning is suggesting that we should take into account a perspectival thinking. That is, it seems to suggest that all 'true statements' we make are context-dependent, so to speak even if we do not accept the 'correlationist' position. We are always 'forced' to specify the context in which a statement is true. (And also we should not neglect too easily our own perspective!)

As I said, maybe, however, we can accept a weaker form of the correlationist position by distinguishing something like 'direct knowledge' and 'knowledge based on inference'. The correlationist position is applicable to 'direct knowledge'. But he is wrong if he is too skeptical about 'knowledge based on inference' (which enables us to say, for instance, what happened during the evolution of the universe...).

[*As an aside, I find fascinating that David Bohm already by 1957 - only five years after the publication of his 'deterministic' interpretation of QM - arrived at a similar conclusion with the concept of 'qualitative infinity of nature'. According to him, all our knowledge is valid only in a specific context. For instance, classical mechanics is not 'wrong'. Rather, it has a limited validity. And according to Bohm [i]all[/i] physical theories must be of limited validity. The difference with Rovelli's view might be that Bohm assumes that there is a perspective-independent reality but it is unknowable. Rovelli does not. But I am not an expert on both. So, I won't digress any longer...]

Information and probability are dual notions; wherever you have a probability distribution you have an entropy. The connection between the two is particularly intimate for discrete random variables - like when there is a given probability of being in one of countably many eigenstates of an operator. Quantum entropy measures the degree of mixing in a state; how close it is to behaving in a singular eigenstate (unless I'm misinterpreting, I am both rusty and mostly uneducated here). Information measures are derivable from probability distributions, but the process of mapping a distribution to an entropy value is not invertible - so the two notions can't be taken as inter-definable. As in, if you have an entropy, you have a single number, which could be generated from lots of different quantum states and probability distributions.

I'm sure there are problems, but I think there are good reasons to believe that information is just as much a part of nature as wave functions. — fdrake

Well, yeah this more or less what Rovelli says. In his pre-print 'Relational interpretation of Quantum Mechanics' (see here: https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9609002.pdf), he writes (p.3):

Also, I use information theory in its information-theory meaning (Shannon): information is a measure of the number of states in which a system can be – or in which several systems whose states are physically constrained (correlated) can be. Thus, a pen on my table has information because it points in this or that direction. We do not need a human being, a cat, or a computer, to make use of this notion of information.

This certainly avoids the problem of introducing a 'special' role of consciousness. In fact, the 'observer' in RQM is not really different from a 'reference frame' in classical or relativistic physics, i.e. any possible physical system.

But, interestingly, for all practical purposes Rovelli's position is not very different from Bitbol's proposal, in the sense that Bitbol does not think that consciousness has an 'ontological role'. It does not 'change' reality (as IMO actually say the 'consciousness collapse interpretation' held by Von Neumann, Wigner, Wheeler etc). Rather, it just says all our knowledge is 'situated', in the sense that it comes from a certain perspective and we cannot neglect this. So what I observe is the universe 'seen by me' and from that perspective I am indeed sort of special: not in the sense that I am the 'creator' of what I observe but simply because 'I' am the 'point of view'. So, at least for what is observed in the 'perspectives' of human beings the two models are indistinguishable.

Note, that, however Bitbol's view goes a bit ahead than Rovelli's (note that Bitbol is strongly influenced by Kant and phenomenology). According to Bitbol, knowledge starts from conscious experience. This means that consciousness itself defines automatically a perspective. Hence, each of us 'observers' reality from a precise viewpoint. Note that, in this case, the 'perspective' is easily identified. We do not know how 'reality' is 'seen' from the viewpoint of 'a pen on my table' (in fact, we cannot even know what if such a perspective makes sense).
As I said, however, Bitbol does not claim that we 'create' reality. Rather the situation here is much like in Kant. We cannot know how reality is independently from our perspective. We just cannot 'neglect' it completely. Why? Because, conscious experience is the starting point of all inquiry.

To summarize, for Bitbol and Rovelli, QM tells us that knowledge is perspectival. But Bitbol sees a link between this and Kantian philosophy and phenomenology which (in a different context) also say that 'perspective', which, in this case, is conscious experience. So, according to Bitbol this is also true for QM: we cannot know the 'world as it is', but only from our 'situated' experience.

I do not know if Bitbol is right here but IMO he raises very interesting point. Also, Bernard d'Espagnat has a similar view, see: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1101.4545.pdf



Yeah, I agree. Bell's theorem then implies that one between predictions of QM, counterfactual definiteness and locality must be abandoned. Most physicists believe that it is counterfactual definiteness that is to be abandoned. Hence, the 'claim' of this experiment is not really different from the implication of Bell's theorem.

The wiki table on interpretations lists Copenhagen as a non-local interpretation, and I don't understand that. My knowledge of a system doesn't change due to an event that happens elsewhere. But I suppose that my knowledge of a distant system (like the distant half of an entangled pair) changes immediately upon my measurement of its local sibling, so maybe that's why they list it as a non-local interpretation. — noAxioms

Well, I think that probably different 'Copenaghists' would give different responses (after all, there is no agreement among them about the right interpretation of the wave-function). But, I suspect that this problem might be avoided using the same argument that (IMO) is used by RQM, that is, reasoning with 'perspectives'. After I make a measurement, I am sure about the outcome of the other measurement. But until I actually receive the confirmation of it, such an event (the measurement) is outside my perspective.
I do not know however if this argument is really enough to avoid non-locality.
(Note that, more or less, this is the reasoning that is employed to avoid the 'block universe' interpretation of Relativity. In that case, the point is that each 'observer' can define 'its' own plane of simultaneity, i.e. its own present. But if we believe that all these events are 'actually real', then it is not too hard to show that it would imply that we are in 'block world': https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rietdijk–Putnam_argument).

As an aside, a note in that table says that the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation is compatible with relativity. This is IMO wrong. The point is maybe that we cannot observe any violation of relativity via the transmission of faster than light signals. But this does not mean that dBB is actually compatible with it (BTW, non-locality is not the only reason (or even the main) that dBB is not my own favorite interpretation. But I would digress too much here).

I actually don't know the terminology that well, in particular 'factorization'. — noAxioms

Ok! I'll try to give an explanation.

In MWI, there is only a quantum system, the universe itself. Its quantum state is a vector in a Hilbert space.

Now, consider a complex quantum system, that is a quantum system like, say, a pair of particles. Let us call them P1 and P2. To each particle is associated a Hilbert space, say, respectively, H1 and H2. To the total system we associate the Hilbert space, H, which is the tensor product of H1 and H2. So, the quantum state of the total system is a ray in the Hilbert space H, which is 'factorizable' into H1 and H2, the Hilbert spaces related to each particle. Here, the factorization is well-defined by the two particles themselves.

In the case of MWI, however, the only real system is the universe itself. Without additional structure, you can't speak about subsystems. So, you need a factorization, i.e. a decomposition of the Hilbert space related to the universe (which, however, we can argue that is needed a-posteriori because we observe subsystems. A-priori, there is no reason to even do a factorization). But even if we make a factorization we see that such a factorization is arbitrary and in some factorizations literally nothing happens (I suggest to read Scwindt's pre-print. I do not claim to have understood it completely, but IMO it explains well the point...). Since, however, in principle, the factorization is arbitrary, we can choose such factorizations where nothing happens.

The point is that people claim that MWI is more elegant than other interpretations because there is only one real thing, the wave-function of the universe, which never collapses. On the other hand, this is a moot point because in order to explain the multiplicity we observe you need to factorize/decompose the Hilbert space associated with the quantum state of the universe in a given way. MWI by itself however simply cannot do that (as I said, I do not know if MWI supporters have offered a counter-argument).

The only way 'out' seems to introduce an additional structure in the Hilbert space of the universe. But, at this point, how is MWI really 'simpler' than, for instance, the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation (which is an example of 'way out' offered in the paper)? In the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, you still have the universal wave-function but you also have the particles that define the factorization/decomposition (that is, the theory itself offers you the actual subsystems). The other 'way out' that offers the paper is the Copenaghen interpretation. Of course, there are others but the paper offer these two.

To summarize, MWI claims that the only real thing is the 'universal wavefunction'. But without introducing additional structure it seems that there is no way to explain the 'multiplicity' we observe - to do that we need actual subsystems that introduce a factorization/decomposition.

I'm an RQM guy myself, and yes, nothing is just 'real', things are only real in relation to something else, so how can the universal wave be real when there is nothing to which it is real in relation? The view would be self inconsistent if it were to be otherwise. — noAxioms

Yeah! Speaking of myself, I lean towards either RQM or (some versions of) Copenaghen.

So, according to the article, the notion of objective reality has not been unequivocally undermined, as your headline asserts. It might be the notion of freedom of choice or the idea of locality which have been undermined; the article only claims that it must be that one of the three is wrong. — Janus

Well, here 'freedom of choice' does not refer to 'free will'. Rather, it is a denial of Superdeterminism (the link is to Wikipedia article), that is the idea that choices were pre-determined at the beginning of the universe. It is actually stronger than 'simple' determinism (like the one that de Broglie-Bohm interpretation (dBB) accepts), because the 'history' of events in the universe is 'already written' at the beginning of the universe. Superdeterminism is a known 'loophole' of Bell's theorem.

According to Bell's theorem, one cannot accept the predictions of QM, counterfactual definiteness (the view that we can speak meaningfully of experiments that have not been performed) and locality (assuming that superdeterminism is not true). dBB does not accept locality.

Note, however, that even if one does not accept counterfactual definiteness, one can still accept an 'objective reality', hence the article is mistaken in that claim. For instance, MWI accepts an 'objective reality', which is the quantum state of the entire universe but does not accept counterfactual definiteness. Objective collapse theories accept an 'objective reality' but do not accept counterfactual definiteness because results of experiments are seen as random (according to these theories, wave-functions are real, physical objects that 'collapse' at the measurement).

Agree. MWI says there is an objective reality, but it is entirely in superposition, and measurement just entangles the measurer with the measured thing. It does not collapse any wave function. Hence there is no defined state of anything (like dead cat), and hence no counterfactual (or even factual) definiteness. — noAxioms

Yeah! BTW, I believe that other than the very problematic concept of 'many worlds', MWI has a serious problem, check: https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8447. The usual claim that the 'preferred basis problem' is solved by decoherence. But it is not correct. Decoherence solves the 'preferred basis problem' (in fact, 'for all practical purposes' in my feeble understanding) only if you already assume that there is a well-defined factorization in the Hilbert space (which is the only 'reality' in MWI, AFAIK). Without well defined subsystems, the factorization is completely arbitrary (also, it should be added that, in fact, one has no, a priori, reasons to do a factorization in the first place).
I do not know how MWI-supporters handles this in a non-circular way.

I also add that MWI and RQM are close. The difference being that RQM does not accept the reality of the 'universal wavefunction' because, in RQM, wave-functions are well-defined in relation to a specific physical system (the 'observer' in this interpretation).



Very interesting quote by Bohr, thanks for sharing! At that time, he seems to have held a view similar to Carlo Rovelli (who believes that you can define a 'perspective' for every physical system).

Nonetheless, the main problem with this view is that if the wave-function is considered to be information or a 'mathematical tool' (as in my understanding Rovelli does), then it is difficult to understand how we can speak of 'information' related to a non-conscious observer. This is, in fact, Michel Bitbol's point.

Apparently, however, Bohr changed his views over time. Check, for instance, this paper by Bitbol that I linked before:

http://www.bourbaphy.fr/bitbol.pdf — boundless

In other words, according to Bitbol, Bohr's views are similar to Kant's philosophy. While RQM is right in saying that QM is about 'perspectives', according to Bitbol these perspectives are well-defined only for conscious observers.

However the point of the article is the claim that what was previously only a thought experiment has now been experimentally realised. — Wayfarer

Right! And this, if confirmed, would a wonderful thing :wink:

However, since all interpretations of QM give (almost) the same predictions, we cannot use that experiment to falsify or verify one in particular.

I have been reading those papers from Bitbol, and this is the interpretation that makes the most sense to me also. A point that Bitbol makes is that there is an ineliminably subjective aspect to knowledge, generally - measurements are always made from a point of view or perspective. But scientific philosophy doesn’t want to acknowledge that, it wants to believe that it’s seeing reality as it is in itself, as Boundless notes. This the conceit that is being exposed by these conundrums. — Wayfarer

Correct. The point of Bitbol is that in the case of Wigner's friend experiment, Wigner's friend sees a definite experimental outcome, whereas according to Wigner there is a superposition (which includes his friend, too).
But the point is that you cannot really make this comparison until Wigner asks to his friend to tell the precise outcome he has seen. The two perspective are different and they are both 'right'.

Each observer has her own perspective. When they communicate the two perspectives are not separate anymore. At this point, we can make a reasonable comparison.

Rovelli's view is similar, but according to him we can define a perspective with all physical systems. In Rovelli's view, communication is replaced by a physical interaction.

In fact, in both cases before the communication (in Bitbol's version of CI) or the physical interaction (in Rovelli's RQM), a comparison is impossible.

Hi all,



iI my opinion, as others have said, this experiment, by itself, does not disprove the existence of an 'objective reality' anymore than QM does. After all, Wigner's friend is a well-known feature of QM, so it is not really prove anything new.
For instance, an interpretation like the de Broglie-Bohm theory can explain that experiment.



I agree that QBism, Copenaghen interpretation (CI), RQM in their own ways reject 'realism'. But how about MWI. In MWI, the only 'truly real thing' is the universal wave-function (UW). The UW never collapses in MWI. It rejects counterfactual definiteness. But the UW is still objective.
Also, the 'objective collapse' theories like the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber model or Penrose's interpretation claim that the wave-function is real IMO. But during measurements, the wave-function localizes to a definite position. AFAIK, these theories all predict that this 'localization' occurs at some length scale (even if they differ in the precise way that occurs) spontaneously - another name for these models is 'spontaneous collapse' theories. Hence, I would not say that 'counterfactual definiteness'='objective reality', strictly speaking.

There are different 'flavors' of CI. For instance, see these papers by Michel Bitbol: http://www.bourbaphy.fr/bitbol.pdf and https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/148348264.pdf. In brief, in my own understanding, Bitbol thinks that the wave-function is not a 'description' of reality, but it is a tool of the experimenter that enables her to make probabilistic predictions. In other words, QM, according to Bitbol is perspectival: it makes predictions of what the experimenter herself will observe. This does not mean that the observer creates reality but, rather, that the measurement is made by a peculiar perspective, namely that of the observer's. According to Bitbol this was also the position of Bohr himself. Note, however, that this interpretation does not take an ontological position on the 'objective reality'. In some sense, CI, in this 'flavor', is a statement on the limitations of science. Science cannot give us knowledge of 'reality as it is', but in its relation to the observations (in the first paper Bitbol compares Bohr's views on QM with Kant's philosophy).
This is rather similar to Rovelli's RQM. The difference is that according Rovelli each physical object has its own 'perspective'.

Interesting anedocte :up:



I think I mostly agree with you on this point.
Removal of hatred, violent tendencies and so on from our minds is indeed a good thing. Yet, sometimes, even non-violence seems excessive!

Only the utterly resolute can attempt absolute pacifism (this is different than conscientious objection to war). Those who are not so resolute will have to define what is necessary violence and what is not. One might decide that violence in defense of one's self, one's spouse, and one's children (maybe pets?) is legitimate. But then, "How much violence is necessary?" Where between a slap on the hand and death does one draw the line? — Bitter Crank

Well, I think this is the point. Rigorous pacifists would answer that violence is never necessary. But, frankly, I find such a position quite extreme.

After all, if by doing nothing we know that others might get harmed, are we "in the right" if we abstain from action when by acting we know that we can save them?

Violence should, I think, be used when all other possible solutions are ineffective and even if violence is employed, it should be done without the intention of killing (but rather for saving) and without cruelty. If possible, violence should have the purpose to change the mind of the aggressor. But, of course, I am speaking of the "ideal".

If one is willing to defend one's self, spouse, and children, perhaps one should extend one's protective circle to the neighbors' children... You can see where this ends. One is prepared to defend one's interests, which is a much broader permission to be violent than merely defending one's self and one's spouse or children. — Bitter Crank

I think that I partly agree. On the other hand, however, I think that one should try to extende as much as one can good-will, compassion etc (by wanting to do too much, one risks to cause more trouble than anything else).

I did at one time, but I I can not now defend pacifism. I am not willing to accept any degree of abuse without defending myself IF I CAN. If I am unable to defend myself, then I will have to accept whatever happens. "Accepting whatever happens" is not "loving one's enemies". And calling in the categorial imperative, if I claim my own right to defense, I can't deny someone else defending themselves. — Bitter Crank

I am quite conflicted on this point, actually. As I said, one should try to defend oneself and others by non-violent means. If that does not work, one can try to use some coercion trying to stop the aggressor trying to cause less harm as possible.
In the "real world", however, this is really hard to do.
If we consider "harming" as bad and "saving" as good, then, IMO, we can see that harming for self-defence (or to save others) is a very particular "kind" of violence. If we look at intentions involved, for example, we are very likely to find an intention to "save" simultaneous to an intention to "harm". So, even to a pacifist, it might be regarded as a "neutral" (or rather, so to speak, "mixed") action.

(P.S. As an aside, the Biblical quotes you provided are from the first letter of John. Yet Paul himself says something similar "14 Bless those who persecute you; bless and do not curse" and "17 Do not repay anyone evil for evil. Be careful to do what is right in the eyes of everyone. 18 If it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone." found at Chapter 12 of the Epistle to Romans, link)

It would entail abstaining from all violence so long as we assume that love can never be expressed through violence. Because remember, to love one is different than to do what they would want you to do. — Agustino

I might agree with that, if we make a clarification (well, I am not sure of what you mean here).

I highly doubt that having the intention of harming or killing are expression of love. Rather, I can see "violence" motivated by compassion when one tries to save others or oneself by violent actions. At the best, there is the case when you want to stop them with the intention of "saving" them (and hoping that they later ). But, for example, I doubt that you can "express" your "love" to your aggressor by killing him or her. So, a bit of coercion might express love (like in the example of cocaine), but I cannot easily see how one can express love to another by seriously harming (intentionally) or even klling (intentionally) him/her. At best, such actions can be done for benefit for others (or oneself), certainly not for the one seriously harmed or killed (except, maybe, the case where one seriously harms another to avoid that he/she will be killed).

Anyway, I am not really sure that the Gospels allow violence as an expression of love. I mean, in the same discourses where love to enemies is mentioned, it is said to who do evil, to turn the other cheek, to not resist to an evil person etc (the same is said more or less by Paul "14 Bless those who persecute you; bless and do not curse" and "17 Do not repay anyone evil for evil. Be careful to do what is right in the eyes of everyone. 18 If it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone." Chapter 12 of Epistles to Romans, link). Personally, the "pacifistic" reading is strongly supported by these passages.

Actually, a pacifist might say that it is not possible to "resist evil" and "express love" at the same time. But, at the same time it is true that doing nothing can, for example, cause a massacre in certain situations. The issue is extremely controversial and I think that many Christian thinkers struggled on this point and allowed violence only in some cases. Yet, I cannot see how a literal reading of such passages can be reconciled with violence.

Also, another problem here. Even if it could be possible to do violence with a loving disposition, this is not the case for everybody. Some might not be able to do that. In this case, if one seeks to always act lovingly, then s/he will abstain completely from violence.

EDIT:

"Preferential love" is another way of saying that there is a hierarchy in love. In this case, Abraham's love for God is prefered relative to Abraham's love for his son. A man's love for his wife is preferred over his love for his neighbour. And so on so forth. So when one comes in conflict with the other, the preferred one is chosen. But it's important to note at this point that preferential love is always built on top of non-preferential love. — Agustino

Thanks for the explanation. Maybe next week I will be able to ask to that my friend about the interpretation of this biblical passage. In that case, I will let you know his interpretation of the passage!


P.S
I inform you that I will not be able to answer until Tuesday, I think.

Yeah, sorry that remark was not adressed to you :-)You are right, there are indeed affinities (and thank you for the suggestioni)! I had other people in mind who take the similarities to imply that Buddhism suspends judgement on everything.

This isn't meant to suggest that God doesn't love all men, but rather that God loves all men as individuals, one-to-one. So God's Love is both preferential and non-preferential at the same time. In front of God, each human being is the chosen one. And at the same time, this does not stop God from loving all men, even though he prefers each one as individual. — Agustino

Good point!

I would say so - every man has a preferential relationship with God. — Agustino

Well, another good point.

But there are cases where sacrifices are required, since we cannot please everyone as human beings. We are not God - we are finite creatures, and as such we cannot love the way God does. So it's true, that we should love all men. But what do we do when the love of all men, comes in conflict with the love of our wife, or our child, etc.? — Agustino

Sure, I agree that we must love all men. At the same time, it is evident that our preferential love will sometimes come into conflict with our non-preferential love. My position is that, in such cases, one should choose their preferential love. This is similar to Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac when commanded by God. — Agustino

Well, I think that here there is some controversy, both in Buddhism and in Christianity. Taken literally, the passages quoted above about "love your enemies" imply that Christians should abstain from all violence. Yet, it seems that violence is sometimes even necessary. A Gandhian approach might be effective with some enemies but if the enemies are the nazies, then a Gandhian approach would be equal to an assured massacre. In Buddhism there are differing views on this point, too. The first precept is to abstain from killing. And, you find passages like:

Monks, as low-down thieves might carve one limb from limb with a double-handled saw, yet even then whoever sets his mind at enmity, he, for this reason, is not a doer of my teaching.

(MN 21 I.B. Horner translation)

which are extremely similar to the "turn the other cheek" in the Gospels. But what about the case a loved one, say a son/daughter is in peril? Is it "right" to not act? Or in order to save others one should act? (maybe as an act of compassion). Personally, I agree with you. Sometimes, sadly, violence seems impossible to avoid. Yet, maybe most Buddhists might disagree. For example, among the Theravadins, check the view of Bhikkhu Bodhi (which, however was criticized by other Buddhist figures like Thanissaro bhikkhu).

On the other hand, I cannot understand the example you give of Abraham. In my understanding, it seems the exact opposite, i.e. that Abraham was seen as "righteous" by being faithful to God even to the point of sacrificing his son. Yet, last year a catholic priest made a point that this was not the correct reading of the episode. Unfortunately, I cannot remember his reasoning in saying this. So, why do you think that this episode is an example of the importance of preferential love?

Okay, yes I see. I see your point, and I agree. However - potentially - we could have "right intentions" forever if we are awakened. So given two lovers who both become enlightened, what will happen to their love? Their love cannot fail to be eternal - that seems the only plausible answer. It is true that in Buddhism, because of ignorance, we cannot act rightly 100% of the time. But what happens if we dispel the ignorance? — Agustino

Good questions! In "non-Mahayana" schools (i.e. Theravada and other "early" Buddhist schools) I think that their love cannot continue forever, simply due to the fact that Nirvana without remainder also implies the cessation of "good qualities". On the other hand, in the Mahayana the situation is much more complicated. If the mindstreams are really endless, they continue forever even when purified by ignorance and other "defilements". Providing that this is the case, however, I think that the love is "non-preferential".

But still, you have that the arhat Sariputra went to save his mother just before his death. So, I am not even sure that preferential love is absent in awakened ones.

I agree with this difference. We start out in life in the unenligthened state, where we mostly react, instead of respond, to what is happening around us. We are the slaves of our instincts, and so on. But, as we approach enlightenment, we cease reacting, and start responding more and more. When we finally become enlightened, we no longer react, we are no longer part of the stream so to speak. Everything we do becomes a response, that is freely chosen, and not compelled. — Agustino

I mostly agree with this. However, you need a qualitative and irreversible change, meaning that in order to achieve that state you need to get awakened/enlightened.

Well, is it really the case, or not? Does the metaphor bit suggest that this is a "relative" truth? — Agustino

Yes, I meant that. And I think that in order to understand what it means, we should fully know the relation between the relative and the ultimate truth. Which in turn means that we should be awakened :lol:

Thanks, I will look into it! — Agustino

I found it very interesting. Most comparative studies are devoted to Mahayana, and many of them rely only on Meister Eckhart writings. I find it extremely interesting because it is a comparison between the work of a saint, St. Theresa of Avila, with the "traditional" Theravada commentary by Buddhaghosa. I never found anything similar to that.

I would say it depends on the means one has at one's disposal. I would say that it's fine to use a degree of coercion in order to prevent a greater evil in this case. What coercion would consist in, depends on the circumstances. It could be some form of financial pressure, not giving your son something else he desires, etc. — Agustino

Well, I agree with all this!

Hmmm... but in a love relationship wouldn't what is good for the other, also be good for you? — Agustino

Yes :wink:

(That is why, by way of a footnote, that Madhyamika is sometimes compared to Pyrrhonian scepticism, to which it is sometimes compared, as it amounts to a 'suspension of judgement' or radical un-knowing. See Sunyata and Epoche, Jay Garfield, and Pyrrho and the East, Edward Flintoff. However in our cultural context, it is very difficult to understand such religiously-oriented scepticism, as we're inclined to equate scepticism with [scientific] realism.) — Wayfarer

Another point to be stressed here is that this "un-knowing" limits itself only at the "ultimate" level. In the relative level, I would be VERY hesitant to call Madhyamaka a "Pyrhonism". As an obvious example, there is the belief in rebirth, karma, that dependent origination is the best relative truth and so on.


As an example of the "reverence" idea among Theravadins, check this writing of Buddhadasa bhikkhu, ABC of Buddhism. Also, I forgot to mention the comparative religion article about that I linked to Agustino yesterday, i.e. http://www.academia.edu/4364149/The_stages_of_Christian_mysticism_and_Buddhist_purification.

I forgot to anwer to these questions, sorry!

Okay, but how far should one go to stop their son from consuming cocaine? — Agustino

Well, independently of Buddhism or Christianity, I cannot give you a precise answer on this. To be honest, I tried to give you a response here, but I failed. So, please do not take it as due to a lack of effort.

Well, just for curiosity, how would you answer to your question?

What do you mean for "good will"? — Agustino

IMO "good-will" means willing to do what is good for the other. Being faithful is doing what is good here.

But, if, as you say, everyone could be mother, father, etc. then your current mother and father are, relatively speaking, devalued, aren't they? In other words, it is no longer a preferential kind of love, is it? If you expand the object of preference to include almost anybody, then you cannot claim to have a preference anymore - it defeats the purpose. — Agustino

I believe that here we should consider the duality between the "relative" and "ultimate" truth. At the "ultimate", love is non-preferential. But, at the relative level, we have special relationiships :smile:
I think that Buddhism suggests us to love everybody, have "metta", "karuna" etc for everybody. Yet, I do not think that it devalues special relationships. Maybe it points to the fact that we should not neglect who are "outside" our preferences. We should also be "good" with our enemies.

But the Gospel passage quoted is Jesus's answer. The message is that God's love is not preferential - or rather, that God's love is more than merely preferential. To further unpack this, God's love for each person is of the same intensity as the preferential love a father has for a child, but this does not, in any regard, diminish God's love for others. — Agustino

Now, let me ask you, in turn this question: is "preferential love" present in Heaven?

43 “You have heard that it was said, ‘Love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ 44 But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, 45 that you may be children of your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous. 46 If you love those who love you, what reward will you get? Are not even the tax collectors doing that? 47 And if you greet only your own people, what are you doing more than others? Do not even pagans do that? 48 Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect.

(Matthew 5:43-48, source)

35 But love your enemies, and do good, and lend expecting back nothing, and your reward will be great, and you will be sons of the Most High, because he is kind to the ungrateful and wicked. 36 Be merciful, just as your Father is merciful!

(Luke 6: 35-36, source)

I see a parallel between the "divine love" and "boundless heart" (see the "Metta Sutta") related to the "ultimate" in Buddhism. You are right that Christianity praises preferential love more than what Buddhism does, yet, I believe that Christianity too aspires to arrive at both and encourages people to strive to "imitate" God. What do you think about this?

I find this notion very strange and unclear. Do we have free will? If we have free will, then presumably, we are able to control some things, such as who we love. So if love is such a choice that we make, it doesn't require our selves to be unchanging, but rather merely our choice to remain unchanging. It becomes, once again, a matter of the will, doesn't it? — Agustino

I think that we have free will. And choices are a matter of will. And, maybe, Buddhists might agree on this point. Yet, I have reservations that our choices are unchanging (see below).

It's also not clear to me what an "unchanging self" would even be. Buddhists reject the Hindu notion of atman. But what exactly is rejected still remains mysterious. I mean, phenomenologically speaking, what is the difference between an unchanging self, and a changing one? We live life, and sometimes our preferences change. Does that mean our self has changed? If the phenomena are anatta (empty of self), then there can be no question of our self changing when phenomena (thoughts, desires, etc.) change. — Agustino

BINGO! Well, we know that Buddha denied that any of the five aggregates (consciousness included) could be taken as "me, mine, my self (atman)". He also denied that "Nirvana" could be the "atman".

Personally, I think that he even denied an "impermanent" self. There were "ascetics and brahmins" that thought that "the body is the self". The body, of course, is impermanent, subject to illness, uncontrolled changes and so on. Therefore the Buddha, IMO, denied a "changing" self, too.
I think that he denied all possible "objectification" of the self, i.e. he denied that we could say that "my self is this", or even "my self is indescribable" (the position of the Pudgalavadins, apparently). At MN 2 (Ven. Thanissaro translation) we find:

“This is how he attends inappropriately: ‘Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?’ Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the immediate present: ‘Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where is it bound?’

“As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self … or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self … or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self … or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine—the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions—is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will endure as long as eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.

Hence, all "definitions" and descriptions are to be "transcended". Note the paradoxical language of this sutta. I think that Buddhism points even beyond the position that "there is no self". In fact, it stops completely identification. I read somewhere that "shunyata" is nowadays translated as "openness", meaning that "anatman/anatta" points to have no "self", i.e. having no reference point.

What would you say is the relationship between anatta and will? — Agustino

Difficult question! Personally I believe that there is free will (I never saw a convincing argument for the view that moral responsibility is meaningful without free will). If anatta is true, I believe that it is a sort of "undeterminate question". In fact, I think that it is very puzzling (tha author of the blog post you linked here, indeed, has a point!).

I disagree. The events could lead to the two lovers becoming separate, for example. But this cannot affect their will, all by itself. Love is anchored in their will. Is their will not under their control? — Agustino

Maybe not. In fact, I think that this is one of the important points of the anatman teaching, i.e. that, if unawakened, we cannot even have the "right intentions" forever (if that was possible a perpetual succession of blissful rebirths would be possible). It is IMO an important point. Our "fallen" nature (see also the quote provided by Wayfarer in his latest post) prevents us to control forever our will. Isn't it reminiscent to the Christian tenet that we need God's Grace to save ourselves from sinning? Of course, in Buddhism, one "gets free" from this fallen nature by "awakening" rather than Grace. But, here, I think we have a similarity.

Can you detail what you mean? — Agustino

I would have put it differently, being a wild speculation of mine (of course everything I write is a wild speculation, but that was especially the case). Anyway, what I meant is that if mindstreams continue forever AND if such mindstreams are full of "positive qualities", for example the "loving" quality, then mindstreams will radiate love forever, so to speak. So, in some sense, mindstreams of awakened beings will always love. The "metaphor" part was meant to include in what I tried to say, the Buddhist tenet of anatman. I hope that it is clearer now. But, I admit that it might be not XD

So you do have a nature (or a self)? — Agustino

Yes! Maybe it is not as "real" as I take it to be :yikes:

I agree. — Agustino

Excellent!

You might like "The stages of Christian mysticism and Buddhist purification" by Lance Cousins, a very rare comparative study between Christianity and Theravada Buddhism.

As an aside, on the "everything is impermanent" view, check Ven. Yuttadhammo's answer to this question on Buddhism stackexchange (also, I found useful his youtube videos on meditation).

Thanks for the reply and further details! Good point about the “family resemblance” between mystical experiences. They do seem to cut across traditions and epochs. To me, there is a unmistakable similarity (not identical of course but similar) between Sufis, Christian mystics, Taoist sages, and even animist Aboriginal tribal shamans. They are not reducible to each other nor interchangeable. But there seems to me to be a thread that connects them all. It is probably the whole exoteric vs esoteric topic.

And thanks for the Tricycle link. Will check it out. — 0 thru 9

Well, in those traditions you mention the idea of "union with the Absolute" is central (well, I am not very familar with Sufism and I do not know anything about Aboriginal spirituality but I trust you!). The "unity motif", so to speak, is very widespread around the world. Buddhists are generally cautious in speaking of "unity" or "oneness", but the idea is IMO far from being absent, especially in East Asian (Mahayana) Buddhism. For example, there is a school, the Hua-yan (known as "Hwaeom" in Korea and as "Kegon" in Japan) that teaches that all phenomena "interpenetrate" (I think that I already linked in this thread the IEP article on Fazang, the third patriarch of this school). But it is also present in the Tiantai (in Japanese Tendai) school as you can see in the SEP article about that school. But I think that the teaching of interpenetration is present also in Chan/Zen Buddhism (the modern teacher Ven. Thich Nhat Hanh speaks of "interbeing" which is related to interpenetration and interdependence). Maybe this "flavor" of Buddhism may be very interesting for you.

Another family resemblance is that of the "ephemeral" vs "permanent" (both in the sense of everlastingness and timeless). Again, many Buddhists are reticent to speak of the "permanent", but I think that this "ephemeral"/"permanent" thing is also present in early Buddhism. Check, for example, the Dhamma-niyama sutta which seems to suggest that the "Dharma" is a "truth" that stands all times, yet no every Buddhist agrees on this (also there are some texts of the Theravada schools that seldom refer to "Nirvana" as "permanent" but you find some controversy here. Even in the article about Tiantai that I linked before you find that, according to the author, Early Buddhism says that everything is impermanent. But IMO it is only the interpretation of the author [see, for example, the link to the answer of Ven. Yuttadhammo that I provided at the end to my answer to Agustino in this very post]).

Then, we have the "experience" of a "relationship", i.e. being loved. Again, it is pretty widespread, especially in religions that believe in a Personal Deity.

Thanks for the reply. I will answer back tomorrow.

Also, thank you for the links. Very interesting site, indeed.

BTW, there is a scholar, prof Alexander Wynne that makes similar criticism on the "orthodox" "no self" doctrine. See e.g. these two articles (maybe also @Wayfarer is interested in reading them):

The atman and its negation. A conceptual and chronological analysis of early Buddhist thought and Early evidence for the "no self" doctrine? A note on the second anatman teaching of the Second Sermon

Well, personally I do not believe that the "anatman" teaching was misunderstood in the last two thousand years. But, both the link you provided and these articles are very interesting.
My view about "anatman", however, is that in some sense it is true that it means that there is no "self" (and also that in some extent Buddhism can be said to be reductionistic). However, I think it is a teaching that can be easily misunderstood as implying that there is no free will, that we do not exist at all, that the private experience is illusory, no "real" moral responsibility etc (I think that the teachers quoted in the articles when they denied the "self" they did not imply that we do not exist at all). Anyway, maybe there is too much emphasis on the "no self" thing (after all, as these links and Wayfarer noted previously, "anatta" is mostly used as an adjective. This makes sense, considering that "anatta" is a property that is to be investigated in analytical and meditative experience).

Why do you say that in a certain sense, "love" is eternal in Mahayana? Love has different aspects - largely, we have two kinds of love: non-preferential love, and preferential love. Preferential love is the love you feel towards mother, father, children, wife/husband (and even here, love breaks down into multiple categories). Non-preferential love is the love of neighbour, the love of God, etc. Above we were talking about the kind of preferential love mentioned - I'm not sure if Buddhism talks positively about this love. For example, Buddhism often emphasises allowing the loved one to be free, but, for example, is allowing one's child to be free equivalent to allowing them to snort cocaine? Or is allowing one's wife/husband to be free the equivalent of allowing them to be unfaithful? How are we to draw the boundary? How does Buddhism propose to manage such cases, where the stock answer "compassion, letting go, etc." isn't a clear cut answer? — Agustino

You are right, to some extent. Buddhism emphasizes much more the "non-preferential" kind of love. At the same time, however, I do not think that it speaks negatively about the "preferential" one. In fact, in the paper I mentioned, if I recall correctly, the contemplation that "it is not easy to find a being that was not a mother, a father etc" leads to both non-attachment but also to the devolepment of compassion etc for all sentient beings because they might have been our father, mother etc in the long time of samsara. It sounds, actually reminiscent of this passage of the Gospel:

48 He replied to him, “Who is my mother, and who are my brothers?” 49 Pointing to his disciples, he said, “Here are my mother and my brothers. 50 For whoever does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother and sister and mother.”

(Matthew 12:48-50 source: https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew+12%3A46-50&version=NIV)


The problem is that the “love” you describe requires essential selves: “I will love you forever”, taken literally, sense implies that there is an unchanging “I” that will love “forever” an unchanging “you”. This is true if and only if there are “permanent selves” in the two lovers or if there is a Higher Power that is able to render them permanent. In both cases, according to Buddhism we have an “eternalistic view” (a “partial eternalism” in the second case). So, I think that the “eternal” romantic love you have in mind is incompatible with Buddhist notion of anatman also because it requires an ability to control forever the events, whereas anatman denies that. I think that in some Mahayana schools the mindstreams never cease and so in a “metaphorical” sense the promise might be justified.



Regarding the real-life examples you are providing, I think that, in order to be compassionate, one should try to stop his son for consuming cocaine and for “good-will” a wife/husband should try to be faithful!

Do you think that not everyone can have faith? Faith, is really the will to believe. It's not a matter of intellect. You will not gain faith by more study, and more reasoning. The faithful know exactly the same as the unfaithful. But the faithful focus on the glimmer of light, whereas the unfaithful focus on the larger darkness.

Faith is fundamentally a movement of the will. It's the will that must be changed, the will that must want to have faith, to cling onto God. — Agustino

I agree that faith is a matter of will. One chooses to believe. Problem is, however, that people are Christians (or Buddhists, or whatever) for various reasons. Some, like Saint Paul converted because of a mystical experience, some remain attached to their tradition, some convert to the religion of his/her lover and so on. It is a matter of will. Personally, I am trying to see which religion looks to me more reasonable, so to speak, since I chose to “question everything”, to be skeptical, problematic, and so on. But this choice actually reflects my nature (or at least I think and hope). Hence, probably in my case for both “natural” and voluntary reasons I have more diffiulty to “have faith” in whatever religion. Maybe it is only egoism on my part for refusing to choose a tradition, but I think that it I am following my “nature”. Again, I choose to see it in this way. So, the answer for your question is “no”, everyone can have faith. Yet, at the practical level, for some having faith and believing is much more simple than for others (in my case, of course, it might be simply egoism).

Do you think Love extends beyond Samsara? — Agustino

I think that for Mahayana Buddhism the answer may be “yes”. Buddhas are already “outside” (in the sense of being “trascending and immanent”) and yet they are full of compassion etc. The "mindstreams" of the awakened beings are always present to help countless sentient beings in countless eons. If samsara will be completely emptied, I think that there are at least some schools of Mahayana that do not accept an end of the "mindstreams". Since, the mindstreams of awakened beings are full of "positive qualities", then you can argue that some kind of relational love is endless.

Since I am agnostic (but actively seeking to "find out the truth") about "Samsara", I can only say that I recognize that our world is "fallen" and some kind of "Love" (which I have no problems to call "divine") transcends the this world.

Of course, becoming a Buddha means that one "transcends" the human condition. On the other hand, in Christianity there is no need to do that (in fact, and I agree with it, Christianity teaches that there are serious risks for those interested in "transcending" the human condition. After all, it is very easy to get conceited in the process)

Thanks for your reply, as well as your other contributions to this thread. — 0 thru 9

Thanks! I am happy that you have appreciated. Anyway, thank you for yours! :wink:

I completely agree with your statement about mystical experiences and the interconnectedness of the body and mind. And I would say that likewise the faculties of the mind are intertwined. Lately, I’ve been wondering what the difference and relationship between one’s intellect and one’s awareness is. A mystical experience seems like it would be pure expanded awareness mostly (for lack of a better term). Some call it non-dual consciousness. Any intellectual sorting and naming would come later. Which is to be expected; no problem there. The intellect is an indispensable part of us. — 0 thru 9

I do not think that all mystical experiences are the same, but I think that there is some affinity between them. To borrow an analogy used by Wittgenstein, I think that there is a "family resemblance" between them. However, a very common element, IMO, even more common than "non-duality" is that of "something higher", that inspires respect and reverence. Non-duality too is widespread that there are many traditions where it is absent, or at least not very emphasized.
Regarding the distinction between intellect and awareness, well, I agree. Immediate awareness is nonconceptual, one simply is "cognizant". Concepts arrive later, but conceptual knowledge is mediated, not immediate. I think that immediate awareness comes into degrees. Maybe, "mystical experience" are at the "high-end" of the scale, so to speak.

You might like this article on "Trycicle". It is about the Tibetan Buddhist position that "cognizance" and "emptiness" are fundamental qualities of the mind.

If I may go out even further on this limb... One could compare a mystical experience to unexpectedly seeing a herd of wild horses up close. They seem to come out of nowhere into your area. And they exude a strong life force that is hypnotic. In this example, this mostly would fall into the category of “awareness”. Where the intellect (and mostly the ego) might enter the picture is if the person then decided to capture all of the horses, either to keep or sell. Not judging the morality of such an action, but there is a clear difference between the experience and decision to possibly capture the horses. — 0 thru 9

I agree, at least for some mystical experiences.

So I guess what I’m saying here is that awareness can be expanded. You would certainly agree with that, I imagine. There seem to be many practices in collective Buddhism that do so. And do so while perhaps temporarily “putting the brakes” on the intellect, the emotions, the ego, etc. Just giving the awareness a chance to grow by tending to it like a garden, watering it and pulling some weeds. The intellect and all the other mental powers we have are valuable. And any cautious approaches to such would be with the intention to make them even more valuable and useful to us. Like you said...

I like the apophatic approach because gives me a sense of awe and reverence. It is also true that, unfortunately, I have a somewhat compulsive need to philosophize about the "ultimate". Anyway, I think that is very useful to find peace. — boundless


Completely agree. I think that as long as the “need to philosophize about the ultimate” is counterbalanced by awareness and the sense of awe you mentioned, one can proceed both cautiously and confidently. There is a verse from the Tao Te Ching that might be related:

You can do what you like with material things. But only if you hold to the Mother of things will you do it for long. Live long by looking long. Have deep roots and a strong trunk. — 0 thru 9

I completely agree (as it happens, I really like the early Taoist writings! They really give inspiration, awe and a sense of freedom rarely found elsewhere. I say "early", simply because I am not very familar (not even by readins secondary literature) with more recent writings than the Liezi).

And do you mean to say that it is not possible to communicate this discovery to others? — Agustino

Well, I think that it cannot be fully communicated. Of course, as @Wayfarer says, it is partially communicable. However, "insight" is a transformative experience and therefore one must see "it" for onself (that's why there is so much emphasis on practice).
For example, in the "Dhamma-niyama sutta (AN 3.137)" the "Dhamma" is described as a sort of "Law of phenomena" that is valid whether or not there is the arising of Tathagathas. The Tathagathas are said to "awaken" to it. IMO, it is implicit that the "Dhamma" goes beyond what can be said verbally. See also the [url]http://"Garava sutta SN 6.2"[/url], where it is said that all Buddhas dwell "revering" the "Dhamma". I think it is another implicit reference to the fact that the Awakening is an experience of something that is "bigger", so to speak.

To be complete, the sutra that Wayfarer quoted is not included in the Theravada Canon. It is a Mahayana sutra included among the "Tathagathagarba" sutras.

The apophatic approach mentioned by boundless seems to be most helpful here. A useful device to have in the mental toolbox. At least to me, it is like the eraser for the blackboard or the brakes on a car. Going back to the uncarved block... at least once in a while. — 0 thru 9

I like the apophatic approach because gives me a sense of awe and reverence. It is also true that, unfortunately, I have a somewhat compulsive need to philosophize about the "ultimate". Anyway, I think that is very useful to find peace.

We as humans may get glimpses of “unfiltered reality” or pure gnosis or the like. I think the (arguably) widespread view of mystics or maybe theologians is that we can’t handle it for very long. Which is completely and totally OK. — 0 thru 9

Well, I think there is some truth in this view (even if I do not think that it is universal, despite being widespread) because, after all, our minds are accustomed with ordinary reality. On the other hand, "mystical experiences" can be very extra-ordinary, so I imagine that they can affect even our physical health somehow since I do not see mind and body as completely "separate".

I think the purpose of belief is to snap you out of an habitual mode of understanding and awaken you to a totally different relationship with your fellows and with the world. But the point is, for that to happen, you really do have to commit to it; it can't be just a hypothetical question. You need to have a commitment, 'skin in the game', so to speak. And obviously the Christian faith can provide that - if you take it seriously, if it really means something to you. — Wayfarer

Agreed!

Another quote, I think from Joseph Campbell (could have been quoting someone else): Life will grind you, there’s really no escape from that. But depending on the angle we choose to take, life can either grind us down, or make us sharper. — 0 thru 9

I think that, for example, Christianity here has a good point. Suffering is very hard to bear if you consider it meaningless. But, in Christianity you can live suffering in a meaningful way, i.e. by loving in a way where your "suffering" can even become a sort of "gift" you give to yourself and to others. For example, Jesus felt abandoned at the Cross (Luke 22.42), he did not "endure" suffering in an equanimous way. However, through suffering Jesus was able to give us the "gift" of Love. In this sense, as @Agustino says, Christianity can be life-affirming and even give meaning to suffering itself: one can follow Jesus' teachings even without following a rigorous and ascetic spiritual practice (like the case, for example, of Buddhism, especially Theravada).

Why not? How is "original sin" different from the beginningless Avidya (or Samsara) in Buddhism? The presence of evil in the world makes it most clear that the world is fallen - something is not right. — Agustino

I agree in a sense! I think that our condition is "fallen", but I do not know what this "fall" is!

Now there are multiple interpretations of Original Sin. The Eastern Orthodox view is that while we're not "guilty" of the sin of Adam and Eve, we are born in a corrupt world. So while we are a clean mirror at birth (free of sin), it's very easy for dirt to get stuck on us, since we're born in the mud so to speak. So there is always a very strong tendency towards sin.

https://oca.org/questions/teaching/original-sin — Agustino

Thank you a lot for this! I did not know that Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodox held such different views about original sin. When I said that "I cannot accept" the original sin dogma I had in mind the Roman Catholic version, i.e. that we are born "guilty". The Eastern Orthodox version is much better!

Bingo. That's the point, Osho raised the same point too. But the point only resonates with one who does have such memories. The fact that nature wipes away the memories makes Samsara bearable, so to speak. One does not feel any urgency to escape. — Agustino

Well, yes, I feel more or less the same. I am fascinated by Buddhism but I do not feel a strong urgency to "escape" from Samsara. So, I am trying to use Buddhists teachings to have a better understanding of my experience, to live a more "ethical" life (sadly, I am not very good in this) and also I think that Buddhism, both Theravada and Mahayana, has at least some understanding of the "ultimate". That's why I like it.

I agree with you. There is another important point of difference with regards to love I think. In the Christian approach to romantic love (between a husband and a wife) and the Buddhist one. Kierkegaard writes very well with regards to the Christian POV in his Works of Love (an amazing book). — Agustino

Never read it. But it seems indeed a very interesting work (I add it on my list!)

Namely, the love between a man and his wife opens up an area of Being that is otherwise closed. It brings up some unique problems that one cannot use the same stock answers against. For example, ever lover, as Kierkegaard states, needs to proclaim that their love for the beloved is eternal. Now the question is, how can such a proclamation be made in good faith? Because if it can't, then the lover is doomed from the very beginning. And Kierkegaard answers from the Christian side that this proclamation and vow is made in good faith when the two lovers swear their love not by themselves, but by the third, God. It is only when their love is anchored in the eternal, that it can take on the character of the eternal. — Agustino

Indeed a very good point. Indeed, in Christianity this is possible, because it is emphasized that "love is eternal" (e.g. the famous "Hymn of love" of 1 Cor 13). If love, as Kierkegaard, is anchored in the eternal, then, as you say, the proclamation can be done in good faith. Again, it shows the importance of Faith!

Also, in Mahayana, in a sense, "love" is eternal. But, again "anatta" makes that proclamation impossible.

This is one issue. Another issue is how Buddhism and Christianity would deal with things like "becoming one flesh". It is clear that in a romantic relationship, two people form a spiritual bond - indeed, in some regards, they become one, where the distinction/boundary between the one and the other starts to vanish. Christianity would claim that each one has authority and ownership over the other.

The wife does not have authority over her own body, but the husband. Likewise the husband does not have authority over his own body, but the wife. — 1 Corinthians 7:4 — Agustino

I see. Same as above. On this point, however, I would like to note that a somewhat similar idea is found in Buddhism. I think that in a sutta it is said that a husband and a wife, in order to live again in a future life, should both behave virtously, be faithful to each other and so on. So, the idea of the "bond" is IMO present, in a more limited sense, in Buddhism.

And yet, Buddhism I think would be unable to negotiate this kind of relationship to achieve this level of intimacy or merging of the two together. The common answer, it seems, is that because of anatta, any such merger is a form of attachment, that will surely bring about great sadness. To me though, this seems something that again would block some important, life-affirming possibilities. What's your take? — Agustino

You indeed have raised very good points and I agree with them. And also, I think that you showed also that these "life-affirming" possibilities depend on being "anchored" in the Eternal, and hence they depend on "faith". If there they are not anchored, such proclamations and vows of an eternal "bond" risk to be tainted by bad faith. Unfortunately, not everyone has faith :sad:

I think that regarding the importance of Love, Christianity and Mahayana Buddhism share many similarities. The greatest difference is due to the different views about Samsara and the self.

So what is left after the extinction of ego? — Agustino

The Mystery, Unknown etc :wink:

It really depends on what you mean by "self". Do you think the "self" is always something negative? I mean, as far as I see it, lots of things in life require a STRONG self. Going on the example below, romantic love, for example, requires a sense of self who is relating with another. Without a sense of self, how can you even relate to another? Who is relating to who? — Agustino

I think that this is another interesting point, isn't it? In a Mahayana context, for example, how I can reconcile compassion (e.g. work for the benefit of all sentient beings) with the idea of anatman? I think that this is another "mystery" in Buddhism. In the Mahayana, I think that in a sense "bonds" are very real. You might find this article interesting. I think that in Buddhism, it is important to note that there are two truths, not one. Probably only an "awakened" one can really know the answers of your questions. But, I think that from a buddhist point of view they are very useful answer in order to avoid to fall in a nihilistic trap.

Also, there is the idea that one need to cultivate a strong self in order to "let go" ("take yourself as your refuge")!

So in summary, I agree, if there is no Resurrection, then there can be no Christian religion (faith in one sense). But the Resurrection is itself a matter of faith (different sense here), and it cannot be any other way. — Agustino

Ok! I think it is more clear now, thanks :smile:

I will certainly read with interest your more detailed explanation!

But then, in the negativistic interpretation, Nirvana becomes the real suicide. Shooting yourself in the head is not a real suicide, because you will reincarnate, and in a much worse state than before, it will take you much longer until you can get to the human stage again, from where you can commit the real suicide (Nirvana). I see this interpretation as the essence of the life-denying, impotent, impulse. — Agustino

Yeah, that's why I think the negativistic interpretation is wrong. Seeking Nirvana, in this negativistic view, is seeking solely the ending of suffering (which, in turn, leads to the "end of life"). Personally, despite the fact that in modern times many think that "oblivion=Nirvana", I think that there is enough evidence to say that in ancient times it was a minority interpretation and, therefore, it is more a modern phenomenon. Of course, this does not mean that it wrong by default.
Nowadays, you can read claims (both by critics and by Buddhist themselves) that it is the "orthodox" Theravadin view. I think that they are wrong: the negativistic view was rejected explicitily by Buddhagosa (who, apparently, built the (real) "orthodox" view of the school). Anyway, there are in the commentarial part rare "positive" descriptions of Nirvana, like in that part of the Kathavattu I linked the other day. You can find a translation of a nearly identical "positive" description here at the end of this article: Timeless (Jayarava Raves' blog) (like the other passage, Nirvana is said to be "eternal" here - AFAIK Jayarava is a "modernist" of sorts who does not believe in all supernatural elements). So, unless these descriptions are later interpolations, you actually find somewhat "positive" characterizations of Nirvana. And in the suttas, Nirvana is said to be "beyond reasoning" (in the passage of the Itivuttaka hat I linked earlier) and, frankly, oblivion is not "beyond reasoning" IMO.

BTW, I approached Buddhism because of the "apophatic" approach on Nirvana. I really liked the "negative" language used. Reading the suttas, I was really fascinated by this approach.It gave me a sense of awe and mystery. Theravada Buddhism struck me as the most "rigorous" apophatic approach. Then, when I read that many Buddhists actually interpret the very same passages as suggesting that Nirvana is oblivion, I was somewhat dismayed. Now, I am still a student of Buddhism and I began last year to practice vipassana. I do not consider myself a Buddhist, though.

But... if that cycle had a purpose, then it would have an end. And an end means precisely a death. There can be no end without death, for how can life, whose very nature is change, suddenly come to a halt without ceasing to be life? — Agustino

I see! Let me ask a question, however: do you see Christian Heaven as "timeless"? If so, you can see an "end" as something that is blissful. But, also, note that I was thinking to the "end" of a particular mode of existence, samsara. If samsara ends and, after that, a different (and more blissful) existence starts, then we do not end with a death, but with a "life" with less misery! (of course, I am speculating! No religions that I know have this view).

So I don't think that the perspective of an endless Samsara, which contains both pain and pleasure is necessarily distressing and frustrating. It is like an adventure - you never know what you will find the next time around. It is sort of exciting - once you get to see the big picture, and you stop anchoring yourself merely in your present condition as if this was all that there will ever be. In a way, an eternal Samsara is a good thing - it means that all pain (and pleasure alike) will ultimately come to an end. So if you are suffering now... fret not, it too will end. — Agustino

Well, at times I have similar musings about samsara (well, it is the "lightness" given by impermanence)! After all, now I do not remeber my past lives (assuming that samsara is real). Hence, even if I will suffer in the future, then I will forget it and, maybe, I will be reborn temporarily in a blissful abode. Then, again, I will fall from it. But, with time I will forget it again. So, without memory it seems an adventure. On the other hand, if I had memories of such a long time, then maybe I will get somewhat bored and annoyed from the cycle. I think that the 15th chapter of the Samyutta Nikaya explains it very well. Unfortunately, you will continue to suffer and cause others suffering. Hence, an escape from such a state will be desired. And if I remembered all my crimes, all the enormous amounts of suffering that I caused to myself and to others and so on, I would like to stop it, if there is no way to "control" the whole thing. Again, in such a situation, if we accept that Nirvana has a positive reality, Buddhism is not "nihilistic". In this case, "Nirvana" might be seen as a satisfying end to our "beginingless" stories. Things change, however, if the "negativistic" view is held.

On the other hand, Christianity posits a sure end for all Creation. We do not have to seek a "satisfying end". It will surely end. What we have to do is to "use rightly" the time we have in this lifetime. I think that the view about time and "history" conditiones all others teachings.



Edit: regarding Christianity there are some dogmas that I (for now) cannot accept. For example, the idea of an original/ancestral sin really disturbs me and seems to me very implausible.

Finally, I am here:

To me, this means that you must love God more than anyone or anything else, and relative to your love of God, you hate brother, mother, sister, etc.

In other words, I don't see this "let go" stuff to be the emphasis of the New Testament. The emphasis is rather "be attached to what matters most - God". — Agustino

Yes, here you are right :up: I wanted to stress that "renunciation" is present in both traditions. But, of course, in Christianity renunciation is "used" to avert the mind to "what matters most - God". In Buddhism, renunciation is a value in itself, so to speak.

On the other hand, in Buddhism one should be attached to the Dharma (as well as the Buddha and the Sangha...): one should not get rid of the raft before ending the crossing. So, I think that in a way, there is still a possible (partial) similarity here: in Buddhism before achieving Nirvana, one should desire Nirvana, just like one, in Christianity one should desire God until one "enters" in communion with God. A very important difference is that, in Buddhism the Goal is achieved during life, in Christianity after death. But, you are right here. There is an undeniable difference!

Also, in Mahayana there is the idea that the desire to help others will be fulfilled even after Awakening for "countless eons".

Depends. It's not just being unable to "let go" that causes the pain. There are other beliefs associated with it that are responsible for causing pain. For example, if someone isn't able to "let go" of their desires, then the end of life can be painful and cause distress SO LONG AS the person in question does not see a possibility to fulfil the said desires AFTER death. In this case, a Christian would believe that God will "wipe away every tear", and so they may not feel such pain and distress when death comes, even though they cannot let go of their desires. — Agustino

Agreed! And here we have another important difference between Christianity and Buddhism. If desires will be fulfilled, then one should not fear death. In fact, I think that some biographies of Christian figures show people that are not afraid of death because they have faith. On the other hand, Buddhists Arahants do not fear death because they are "unattached".

Yet, according to Buddhism, to "escape" from samsara one must reduce attachments. On the other hand, in Christianity, Salvation is not "gained" by reducing attachments but by accepting God's Grace. Hence, in Christianity it is love is much more emphasized. — boundless

See, it's only when one sees the endless cylce of rebirths and redeaths as something negative that being unable to let go makes it painful. — Agustino

But... that cycle is endless. Above all, it is endless in the sense that it is aimless. There is no purpose. I think that such a perspective is very distressing and frustrating. If it had an end (in both senses), I could accept to be reborn, to suffer and so on. But it is aimless and there is the idea that we are not in full control, and therefore, we will not be able to get reborn in intended conditions forever. So, even with the best intentions, the idea is that we will sometimes commit serious crimes. So, such a perspective is IMO extremely distressing. On the other hand, if it had at least a temporal end, one could try to remain in Samsara to help others.
Of course, there is also the Mahayana that teaches that Bodhisattvas will be always help sentient beings. But, in Mahayana Bodhisattvas are awakened.

I largely agree with this here - it's also what happens when you stop wishing that things were different than they are. But even that is not a great way to put it. Because it implies that you don't have any wants or preferences (such as preferring that there is no pain). But those wants and preferences, at least for me, still existed in that state. Just that I wasn't "troubled" by the pain. It's difficult to explain. — Agustino

I think that I agree here.

But the resurrection is itself a matter of faith. Afterall, even if you saw the risen Christ, you always have at your disposal alternative explanations. So if you lack faith, if you lack the will to believe, and are instead cursed by unbelief (it's a problem of the will), then regardless of what you see, you will not believe.

So St. Paul is right - if there is no resurrection, our faith (I read this as religion) is in vain. — Agustino

Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.

So the resurrection is something that is, by default, not seen. It is rather hoped for. — Agustino

Exactly! But I am still confused by what you said earlier, i.e.:

The interesting thing on this point, is that I don't think there has to be a God. It is sufficient to have faith in Him. Faith transcends the rational, but is not thereby irrational. Having faith will still transform THIS LIFE. — Agustino

If there is no God, resurrection is not possible. So, Paul says that faith is vain if there is no resurrection. Hence, as I see it, Paul says that if there is no God, faith is vain.
So, how can you say that faith is not vain if there is no God and, at the same time, be in agreement with Paul?

Right, so then attachment can be the opposite of aversion, and Buddha's way being the Middle Way would strive to neither attachment to the positive (pleasure, let's say), nor aversion for the negative (pain). — Agustino

I think that they are opposites in the sense that they are two sides of the same coin. If one is attached to a particular pleasant experience, then when it ends and arises an unpleasant one, he/she experiences aversion. So, I see them as very connected. When attachment is absent, aversion too disappears.

See, this I see as a problem. Love does not require positive feelings. I can be very upset at someone I love, or I can be disappointed with them, or even, why not, angry with them. All these feelings do not suggest in the least that I don't love them. Love is rather the choice, or better said, the will to like them REGARDLESS of how I feel. The will not to give up on them.

So in the case of my enemies, I may still feel anger towards them, but only because they are doing wrong and destroying their own souls for example. Or in the case of my son, I may feel upset because he is harming himself. Or just like the Japanese Samurai, I can feel great compassion while slashing my enemies in half. All these actions do not necessitate the absence of love. Sometimes, it may be the loving thing to do to be angry at someone you love. — Agustino

OK! Let me explain better myself. I think that if you love them, then "at the bottom of your heart" you still desire, for them, the good. So, you might get angry but, at the same time, you want the best for them. When I wrote "positive feelings", I meant this. Sorry for the confusion.

So, I mostly agreee with you. I think that only a "negative ethical" approach (i.e. do not do this, do not do that...) in our actions is not sufficient. We also need to develop compassion, love and so on. And, in order to express love we might also get angry.

Regarding the example of the Japanese Samurai, well, that is a somewhat controverted point for me. I am not sure that in this particular example you are right. But I need some time to reflect upon this.

Anyway, as you say, love is, in the highest sense of the word, a disposition where you always want the best for others (which IMO coincides with the full expression of metta (good-will), mudita (sympathetic joy), karuna (compassion)). Sometimes, sadly, I feel that Buddhism, especially Theravada, is presented in a way in which the importance of metta, karuna and mudita is neglected. For example, in the absence of hate we can develop better compassion. But a presentation of Theravada that emphasizes ONLY the "absence of hate", without also give importance to compassion is very wanting. The "negative" and the "positive" sides are both needed. After all, the Dhammapada has the following verse (source: https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/dhp/dhp.14.budd.html):

183. To avoid all evil, to cultivate good, and to cleanse one's mind — this is the teaching of the Buddhas.

I think that the same "unbalance" in giving ONLY importance to the "negative"/"absence" side is at the basis of the position that Nirvana is ONLY the absence of greed, hatred and delusion.

But, of course, differences with Christianity remain also on this point.

Why should being saved from Samsara be this important? — Agustino

Because it is aimless and endless. And, if Nirvana has a "positive reality" of sorts, also to experience the "highest bliss".
In the "negativistic" interpretation of "Nirvana", the ONLY reason to leave Samsara is to avoid endless and (ultimately) aimless.
In the Mahayana one also wishes to escape "samsara", also to be better help sentient beings.

Anyway, I am happpy to see that we agree in many points!

Hi,
thanks for raising again interesting points:-)!

I am very sorry for the delay. Hopefully, I will answer later today!

'Non-attachment' is also a basic theme of the New Testament:

'For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it'. Matt 16.

'If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me' Mark 10

'Sell that ye have, and give alms; provide yourselves bags which wax not old, a treasure in the heavens that fail not, where no thief approaches, neither moth corrupts. For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.' Luke 12

'Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you, Nay; but rather division: For from henceforth there shall be five in one house divided, three against two, and two against three. The father shall be divided against the son, and the son against the father; the mother against the daughter, and the daughter against the mother; the mother in law against her daughter in law, and the daughter in law against her mother in law.' Luke 12

All of these sayings are perfectly in accord with the spirit of the Buddhist nikayas. — Wayfarer

Agreed, the spirit is somewhat similar (especially if one considers Mahayana Buddhism)!

I want also to add that many "hard" expressions were typical in that cultural contexts. So, for example, the quote of the Gospel according to St. Luke provided by Janus:

"If anyone comes to me and does not hate father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters--yes, even their own life--such a person cannot be my disciple." (Luke 14:26)

probably meant that, in order to follow the "vocation", one should be able to "let go" even of her/his family attachments. Problem is, IMO, that translations cannot capture the intended meaning nowadays. We need also commentaries and interpretations.

I think that it's because 'emotional indifference' is not at all the same as 'non-attachment'. In both religions, there is an understanding that the peace that arises from God's love (for Christians) or realisation of Nirvāṇa (for Buddhists) is such that even the witnessing of terrible tragedies doesn't undermine it. But it doesn't undermine empathy - far from it, in fact. — Wayfarer

Agreed!

When I was young, I had a casual job as wardsman in the casualty ward of a Catholic teaching hospital (called Mater Misercordiae, 'mother of mercy'). The nursing sisters exemplified this quality of 'un-attached compassion'. Several times I witnessed the senior nurse comforting people in terrible states of distress, whose loved ones had just died. I was deeply moved by her ability of 'suffering with' in these cases. Yet she had to then go back to her duties in a very busy suburban casualty ward straight away afterwards. I think that kind of compassion really does require tapping into a spiritual source. Of course, this is what the Catholic symbolism of 'the sacred heart' refers to. You actually find iconographic representations of the same idea in Chinese Buddhism. — Wayfarer

Yes, I think that the "ideal" might be similar. Probably we have a difference in emphasis. This difference in emphasis is IMO linked to the fact that Buddhism accepts samsara and Christianity does not, and, also that Christianity accepts God's Grace and Buddhism (for the most part*) does not. It is very difficult to reduce attachments. Yet, according to Buddhism, to "escape" from samsara one must reduce attachments. On the other hand, in Christianity, Salvation is not "gained" by reducing attachments but by accepting God's Grace. Hence, in Christianity it is love is much more emphasized. While not everyone are able to reduce attachments, everybody, in principle, can love. So, we can understand why in Christianity love is much more emphasized than non-attachment.

BTW, as usual, thank you for the interesting parallelism!

As far as the Buddha is concerned, have a read of the monk with dysentery — Wayfarer

Great find! Thank you :up:


*the only exceptions, that I am aware of, are some schools of Pure Land Buddhism.

It's okay! No problem!

I will be slower in the coming days. So, take all the time you need :smile:

Thank you in advance!

I want to add another similarity between Buddhism and Christianity.

Buddhism places a lot of importance on intention. In fact, intentional actions have karmic consequence (e.g. https://www.accesstoinsight.org/ptf/dhamma/sacca/sacca4/samma-ditthi/kamma.html - note that "kamma" is the Pali word for the sanskrit karma). Hence we read in the Vinaya Pitaka (the collection of canonical Buddhist scriptures of the Theravada school that deals mostly with rules of monks and nuns):

On one occasion a monk, feeling compassion, released a pig trapped in a snare. He became remorseful … “What was your intention, monk?”

“I was motivated by compassion, Master.”

“There’s no offense for one who is motivated by compassion.”

("Master" here refers to the Buddha. Source: Suttacentral - (emphasis mine))

Hence, if one is motivated by compassion he can "break" the "not stealing" precept. If otherwise the intention was stealing:

On one occasion a monk released a pig trapped in a snare, intending to steal it before the owners saw it. He became remorseful … “You have committed an offense entailing expulsion.”

(same source as above (Suttacentral) - emphasis mine)

So, we see also an interesting parallel with Christianity, IMO. First, also Christianity seems to suggest that intention plays a central role. Consider for example this passage:

16 “Are you still so dull?” Jesus asked them. 17 “Don’t you see that whatever enters the mouth goes into the stomach and then out of the body? 18 But the things that come out of a person’s mouth come from the heart, and these defile them. 19 For out of the heart come evil thoughts—murder, adultery, sexual immorality, theft, false testimony, slander. 20 These are what defile a person; but eating with unwashed hands does not defile them.”

(source: Matthew 15, 16-20 NIV )

Both religions are against legalistic thinking and excessive attachment to rituals.

IMO, Christianity is dying also because people do not see in it these things in it. In general, people do not see wisdom in religion.

And also, some forms of secular Buddhism by "neglecting" the central aspect of "sila" (morality).

Regarding the OP question, I think that Christianity is not dead.

Problem is that our society, as it has been said also by others, is VERY different from the society where Christianity originated and, therefore, many rituals, symbols etc sound very anachronistic and difficult to understand.

The image of Jesus Christ as the "Lamb of the world" becomes much more meaningful if we consider that in nomadic society of that very ancient times, a lamb was sacrificed in order to protect the community and the herd by the attacks of wolves. The reason behind sacrifices was survival. The danger was real. Hence, sacrifice was done for protection. In the same way, the sacrifice of Jesus aimed to salvation from sin, evil and so on.

Nowadays, we do not (normally) have to struggle for our survival. And we do not protect ourselves, our herd etc by making a sacrifice. So, it is more difficult for us to appreciate that symbolism.

The same, I think is true for many others symbols, rituals, linguistic expressions etc. In fact, when I discussed with two Catholic theologians about these matters, they explained to me these things very well and I began to appreciate their meanings. Besides the cultural background, I think that nowadays there is a communication problem. In those times the meaning was clearer and there was less need to explain things. But nowadays we need also people that are good to explain them.

So, IMO, the crisis of Christianity is in part due to a difficulty in communication.

why we should avoid attachment in love? For example, I love my son and I am attached to him, if he dies, I will be devastated. But I am not afraid of being devastated in that case... I would not want NOT to be devastated. The devastation is the expression of my love, I want to let it happen, why would I want to stop it? — Agustino

Just to clarify what I said yesterday... I think that Buddhists have no problems, strictly speaking with this. I think that they do not find nothing "wrong" in it. However, we should consider also their belief in a "potentially endless cycle of rebirths and redeaths" - in that case they might say that, unfortunately, that if we do not learn to "let go", then we will be trapped in samsara. The ideal is to be both loving and "non-attached" (as I said yesterday, what does that mean I do not really know! BUT IMO in Buddhism "true" non-attachment is accompained by compassion, amity and so on). Anyway, I do not think that a man that is not devasted by the death of a loved one is not loving, necessarily. Of course, being devasted is a sure sign of loving. But not being devasted is not IMO a sign of not loving.

I think that in this respect Christianity is more open to give value to suffering and to all various forms. In fact, if we look to the Gospels we find that Jesus appreciated equally different kinds of love. I think that that Christianity and Buddhism here differ and that maybe the difference is due to the fact that Christianity does not have the dogma of Samsara. Also, in Christianity there is the idea that we are saved by God's Grace and not from our efforts (we have, of course be able to accept it). In many forms of Buddhism there is no "Higher Power" that can "save" us. For example, according to Theravada the Buddha only indicated the Path and we have to walk through it. Of course, the Buddha is seen as an exceptional teacher and it is said that hearing his teachings directly is much more effective than hearing from anyone else. But this is not, of course, the same as Grace. In Mahayana, the situation is different. But I think that Grace becomes very important only in Pure Land, but I do not know that school very well.

As I said, I find this aspect of Buddhism hard to accept. It is quite disturbing, because I find nothing wrong in expressing love by being devasted. I hope to be in that state, too, if such a situation occurs. This because I think that my expression of genuine love would be being devasted. But I am open to other expression of equally genuine love (do you agree with this?). But, I think it is also important to say that if one is not devasted, he or she can be still be loving. (Also, we try to console someone, if is devasted...).

A separate question might be: is it possible to feel genuine love without also suffer? Honestly, I don't know. I am open to an affirmative answer. But, I think that for most people love entails suffering and also I think that in order to "attain" the state where one feels love and does not suffer one needs to learn to love and suffer. If one does not learn that, I do not think that he or she will be able to reach that "state" (if it is possible, of course). Anyway, I think that this idea is present in Buddhist texts. For example, the partially awakened Ananda loves and suffers (and is consoled by his fellow Buddhist disciples and by the Buddha). Does this make sense to you?

Also in some form of Buddhism self-sacrifice can even take the form of self-immolation. This is true especailly for (some traditions at least of) Mahayana Buddhism. But also some Jataka tales (included in the Theravada canon) apparently speak about it, as it can be seen here.

But, even Christianity promotes non-attachment to some extent, I think. In fact, consider this quote of Gospel according to Saint Luke provided by Janus:

"If anyone comes to me and does not hate father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters--yes, even their own life--such a person cannot be my disciple." Luke 14:26 — Janus

So, one must "renounce" to some extent (I think this is the meaning of "hate") even to family. In fact, I find somewhat disurbing this quote, too. I mean, not everyone is prepared to do that. I think this also applies to many Christians!

Thank you a lot for you answers!

That is the point I would like to address. In Christianity, the emphasis is on forming a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. You feel this as a living presence in your life, which naturally results in the development of qualities such as charity, self-restraint, and so on. However - not always. Even Christians who say they have been 'born again' will confess that their inherent negative tendencies (to put it in modern terms) still have a grip on them. Actually Paul laments this Romans 7:14. And I'm sure many a spiritual seeker will have gone through that - I know I do on a daily basis.

In Buddhist practice, the 'agency of change' relies on a different 'energy source'. It comes from clearly seeing and understanding the source of dukkha. Now when that is written out, it's easy to say 'well that's just a dogma'. And it would be, if you only wrote it out, or talked about it. But the point of Buddhist training is to really see how the process of clinging, attachment and craving is giving rise to unhappiness, moment to moment. And part of that, is also the realisation of the true nature, which is the aspect of the being that understands and responds to the teaching (known in Mahayana Buddhism as the Buddha Nature, Tathāgatagarbha). I guess it sounds complicated when you try and explain it, but the crux of it is similar to the Biblical teaching 'you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free'. But that 'knowing' is 'jnana', or direct insight into the cause of sorrow. That is a skill that can be learned and applied.

So developing positive qualities means, the pursuit of the 'three legs of the tripod', which are wisdom (prajna), morality (sila) and meditation (samadhi). Then the 'true nature' begins to manifest. Really a lot of the skill of meditation is learning how to get out of the way of that happening. — Wayfarer

Very good answer. Thank you :up:

I think that the "advantage" that Buddhist has, in this respect, is that one can also do spiritual practice without "believing" in Buddhist "dogmas" or believing that the Buddha was really "fully awakened" (the same goes for other Eastern religions, like some sects of Hinduism and Taoism for example. But Buddhist practice IMO has the least amount of "belief" required to work). On the other hand, I hardly see how most forms of prayer can be useful for non Christians. Of course, there are some exceptions, but generally Christian practices work much better for Christians IMO.

I agree also regarding what Paul describes. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to not fall under the traps of that negative tendencies you mention. And it is quite distressing.

And also, I believe you are right in saying that Buddhism is much more about the "immediate experience" (that's why it appeals to a secular and "skeptic" mindset). Of course, a certain amount to "openness" to "higher truths" is necessary for deepening spiritual practice.

There's some truth in what Agustino is saying, because there's a lot of trendy fashionable Western Buddhism that is indeed platitudes and emotional palliatives. Zizek picked up on the same trend. But, as Rumi said - there would be no fools' gold, if there were no gold. — Wayfarer

True! In fact, I think that Buddhism without rebirth and karma is a palliative of sorts. Or at best, it can become a sort of Epicureanism. But, yes no "true" Buddhism. Theravada (or, IMO better, "Shravakyana") and Mahayana Buddhism are religions of renunciation. The same goes IMO also for Vajrayana even if its practices are more "adaptable" to non-monastic life (I am not fully sure about it, but I think this is true AFAIK). But, IMO, all three have "world-denying" aspects that secular Buddhists do not want to see, so to speak.

There is a lot of truth in that. A large part of the issue is that the tropes and imagery of the Bible hark back to an early agrarian, pre-industrial culture - sheep, fields and religious sacrifices. It is remote from the life and experience of the 21st century. But that is why interpretation is needed. There are still universal truths in the tradition, but they need to be constantly re-interpreted in light of changing circumstances. Obviously 'biblical literalism' is an impediment to that - that leads to fundamentalism and many other conflicts.

Karen Armstrong is a good commentator on this subject, not least because she has the perspective of comparative religion rather than Christian apologetics. I frequently cite of her OP's from a few years ago, titled Should we believe in belief? And it's a very good question. — Wayfarer

:up: very interesting thanks. As you say, too many people simply cannot understand the significance that symbols had in that social contexts. In order to understand we need to contextualize. Otherwise, we cannot understand fully.

Agreed :wink:

But what do you think, in particular, about the points raised by Agustino in this post and at the end of this one? I think I have partly answered to them. But there are some points that indeed are very difficult to answer.

Thank you in advance!

@Agustino, thanks for the insights!

Like Christianity? :P — Agustino

:up: :wink: (thanks for the link! anyway, as you might imagine I meant something like "absorption" as in pantheistic religions. But, I think that Christian "communion"/union with God somewhat resembles it even if the "separation" between God and the creatures remain. I have no idea about what that resemblance might be, however.)

Well, I don't think death necessarily causes suffering, pain and distress, at least for the one dying. But old age, illness, etc. obviously do. — Agustino

maybe death does not cause pain, suffering etc in some cases. But for whoever is unable to "let go", thinking about the end of life is certainly painful and causes distress (meaning if one fears death, then death is certainly linked to suffering).

Also, Buddhists believe in rebirth and, for them, "death" is either Nirvana without remainder or leads to another life marked by old age, illness and so on (which, except for the case of a partially awakened one, means the continuation of a potentially endless cycle of rebirths and redeaths).

At the same time, I think it is possible to, psychologically so to speak, not mind your own suffering. In other words, the suffering is still there, the pain, for example, is still there, but you don't mind it. It's hard to describe this state, I've sometimes experienced it. So I think it is possible to accept life, and see the pains as inseparable from the joys, and say yes to the whole ride, without "extinguishing" yourself as per Buddhism. — Agustino

Well, sometimes I think that "Arahants" dealt with suffering in that way. If you are familiar with the two darts analogy (see: SN 36.6 "The dart" ), where awakened beings are said to not experience mental suffering (and so, I think that you can consider that "total acceptance"). But, the total eradication of all forms of unsatisfactoriness and suffering according to the traditional Theravadin view happens at "Nirvana without remainder" (=death of a Arhat or a Buddha).

Personally, I would like to experience the state that you describe. But, IMO, this also means a reduction of "self concern" or more precisely a reduction of our tendency to strive to control things ("anatta", in a more experiential level, means "lack of control", see Anatta-lakkhana sutta (regarded to be the second discourse of the Buddha)). I think that the effect of "letting go" is roughly the state you describe.

I mostly agree on all these points. — Agustino

Perfect! :smile:

Yeah, I sort of agree, but this point is disputable. Suppose you have a son who is addicted to hard drugs - stuff like cocaine. In one sense, you do want to control him (so that he no longer takes the drugs). I think this desire to control him is, in this case, natural and justified. But the desire to control him will not be JUST for your own good, but also for his (your good is also related to his good, the two are, to some extent, mutually dependent). So in what sense do you say you should be unattached to saving your son? — Agustino

I would say that if you act in that way, you simply act out of compassion, which is very good (with or without "attachment"). In fact, you can act in that way also without thinking about your own good, but only for his (more on later...).

Okay, I agree! How do we go about developing positive qualities? — Agustino

Probably, by trying to do actions that involve them (which means trying to cultivate that qualities actively). Spiritual practice might help to "develop" mindstates that are conductive for that actions.

The interesting thing on this point, is that I don't think there has to be a God. It is sufficient to have faith in Him. Faith transcends the rational, but is not thereby irrational. Having faith will still transform THIS LIFE. — Agustino

Very interesting perspective :wink: ! Not sure that I can understand what you are saying here, but I think that I can even agree with it.

I do not understand, however, how it can be reconciled with the "traditional" position that if there is no resurrection, faith is vain (of course, I am not saying that you have to agree with that perspective but I wonder how you "deal" with this) (see e.g. 1 Cor 15:32 link "If the dead do not rise, “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die!”"). In fact, there are a lot of Christian dogmas that I can find very hard to accept and, sadly, no one was able to give me a satisfactory answer to my doubts.

I see, I agree. — Agustino

Good!

Can you clarify what attachment means, and also why we should avoid attachment in love? For example, I love my son and I am attached to him, if he dies, I will be devastated. But I am not afraid of being devastated in that case... I would not want NOT to be devastated. The devastation is the expression of my love, I want to let it happen, why would I want to stop it? — Agustino

Thank you very much for raising this issue. It is a very deep problem. I admit that I have not, in my mind, a clear understanding of what a "love without attachment" might be. Also, I admit that I have not a definitive answer. But let me separate the problem in two parts.

1) I think that "attachment" means clinging to positive experience in our life, in such a way that we cannot accept negative situations (which in my mind means we feel aversion). So, an unattached love might mean that I can accept that, for example, my son chooses a way of life that I would not like for him and I can still love him. Or, that I can be able to have positive feelings even to my "enemies" (i.e.desiring for them happiness and so on...). Note that I do not think that it is completely "right" to say that Buddhas are completely without desire. After all, they are seen as the embodiment of compassion (other than wisdom) and compassion (karuna) is of course a desire. There is also "metta" (loving-kindness). Linked to metta, mudita (sympathetic joy) and karuna, there is the prayer "may all beings be happy and secure", which is after all a desire! But again, what means experientially to love and to be without attachment at the same time? I don't really know! Love and acceptance are somewhat difficult to reconcile.

2) you said that "I would not want NOT to be devastated. The devastation is the expression of my love, I want to let it happen, why would I want to stop it?". This is an excellent question. I think that I cannot find a reason to stop you, because I think that I agree with you. Maybe a possible Buddhist answer is that, there is nothing wrong in it but unfortunately that (alone) will not save you from samsara (honestly, I find this answer as disturbing but unfortunately it has some truth in it...) and in order to "achieve" release from samsara you should accept to "let go" even loved ones without, of course, stopping to love them. But again, stream-enterers* might be extremely sad and therefore I am not even sure of what a real answer might be.
Anyway, I refuse to think that there is something "wrong" in your reaction and you should change it and in fact it is one of my qualms about Buddhism. A strong point of Christianity is that "love" is the highest virtue and there are various way for expressing it. Christianity has the strong point to be able to give meaning and value to suffering. Also, in Christianity we are not expected to change our condition and become somewhat "super-human", but we can give meaning and value to our experiences, actions and so on: something that everybody can do (in a way or an another depending on their possibilities...).

*see how Ananda is described here. I like him in particular, because unlike other famous disciples looks very "human" and I can relate to him much more than the others more "awakened" ones! :smile:

P.S. Note that English is not my mother tongue. Also, some ideas expressed here are not even clear in my mind. So, sorry if I am not clear, enough or if I have made mistakes!

Why are death and decay so bad? — Agustino

They cause suffering, pain, distress and so on. And I think that compassion also means to limit our suffering. If someone is suffering, we should try to help him/her. They are bad in the same way an illness is bad (and therefore we seek to cure it).

I think you mean without personal preferences, but then I see that as dehumanising. How can you be human, if you don't have any preferences? We are human precisely because we can choose, and we choose based on our will, meaning based on our preferences. — Agustino

I agree to that to an extent. I think that "preferences" in a sense are still there, even in "liberated individuals". For example, the last thing Sariputta (the "wisest disciple" in the suttas) did was to "liberate" his mother. If he had no preference, why did he went to free his mother and not an unkwnown person? On the other hand, however, I think he is depicted as "unattached" to his preferences. And non-attachment does not mean "indifference".

But note that in Theravada, the total freedom from craving is gained at Arhant level (full liberation). Stream-enterers (who are partially liberated) can also enjoy "wordly" pleasures, live an "ordinary" life etc. They, however, have abandoned all "self-views". Again, I think that in this radical "transcendence" of the human condition is due again to the belief in Samsara. For Indians it is "normal" that humans can become even more "worthy" than the devas. So, in such a cultural landscape I am not too surprised to see somewhat disturbing ideas.

Sure, it's even called "eternal bliss". But those conceptions are never developed, nor is it clear what "eternal bliss" means, when Nirvana literarily translates as a "blowing out". When you combine this with the doctrine of anatta - no abiding self whatsoever - then it seems to me that things go quite far towards nihilism. Buddhism speaks very clearly against eternalism, and actually also condemns nihilism, but the two condemnations are made because both eternalism and nihilism assume that there is an abiding self to begin with. — Agustino

Yes, anatta seems to point towards that. But, as far as I know, only an ancient school of Buddhism apparently interpreted Nirvana in that way! So, I think that it is not simply "oblivion". Also in the discourses themselves the Tathagatha is said to be "deep, boundless..." (see e.g. the sutta MN 72). Of course we have the "extinction of the fire" analogy, but we have also a "hint" to some "ineffability". Also, there are some hints in discourses like: Udana 8.1 and Iti 43. But, indeed you are correct in saying that both eternalism and annihilationism were criticized for poisiting an "abiding self". So, sadly, the nihilist view has its textual support (and, in fact, you find a lot of people who say that). I do not deny that!

Regarding what is that "eternal bliss", if not "mere absence", I agree that it is not developed. This is meaningful in the "Buddhist soteriological context", because if one "conceives things" about Nirvana, one begins to grasp his concept of Nirvana and therefore can miss Nirvana itself. Personally, I think that "mere absence" can be considered as a "worthwile goal" only if one thinks that anatta means that we do not exist at all.

Anyway, I think that even in Christianity we do not know what the promised "eternal bliss" is! After all, I have no clear idea of "what is like" to be in Communion with God? Or, take for example religions that aspire at "union with God". What does that mean, experientially? So, IMO, the fact that Buddhism does not want to describe Nirvana is due to a strict "apophatic" approach (and yes, I think it is sometimes misunderstood as "oblivion").

I don't see why the "positive" qualities would follow from the mere removal of lust, and the like. To me, it's more like those positive qualities have to be cultivated for themselves. Love, after all, isn't merely the absence of evil. — Agustino

Agreed! Sorry, for the lack of clarity, I did not want to imply that! What I meant is that we can develop positive qualities easier if we remove "negative ones". In fact, Buddhism without the cultivation of positive qualities can become an ego trip IMO.

I want to challenge this. The personality is an integral aspect of loving someone. It is because of one's preferences, in other words, one's humanity, one's fraility, that love is at all possible. It is because I prefer this, over that, that I can be said to like the one. How is it possible to "love others for what they are" when I have no preferences whatsoever? To love them means that I must will to like them... I must will to want them, to prefer them, to choose them. — Agustino

Again, I agree with this. And I think that Buddhism does agree with it. In fact, there is also e.g. "mudita", i.e. "symphatetic joy". As I said before, maybe the problem is not preference or personality but our tendency to "grasp" and not be able to "let go". But, you are right. Even compassion itself is a preference: you want others to feel good and so on. I think that the problem is egoism here, i.e. wanting to control others for selfish reasons.

Anyway, I still like Christianity for the reason you mention here. We are not told to behave in a "god-like" way, so to speak. We can still be "human", with our weaknesses. We do not need to "renounce" the world to achieve Salvation. Hence, we can try to do our best as humans to make the world a better place, to love others and so on. In Christianity one does not have to think in terms of multiple life and, therefore, should try to value this life. So Christianity, as you say, is more life-affirming. Also, Christianity is, in a way, more flexible than Buddhism: a person that has a greater tendency to enjoy worldy pleasures is not "disadvantaged" in the pursuit of Salvation.

On the other hand, if there is no God and we are in a Samsara the situation is different...

Not so much here. I don't think ethics requires meditation and the like. Meditation just helps to clarify perception, but does nothing apart from that. It does not change one's will, it does not bring about a change in one's being or one's character. — Agustino

Again, I agree that meditation per se does not lead to love others. But, maybe it can help to become more effective in our actions. Also, by "ethical teachings" I also meant something like:

"Whenever you want to do a bodily action, you should reflect on it: 'This bodily action I want to do — would it lead to self-affliction, to the affliction of others, or to both? Would it be an unskillful bodily action, with painful consequences, painful results?' If, on reflection, you know that it would lead to self-affliction, to the affliction of others, or to both; it would be an unskillful bodily action with painful consequences, painful results, then any bodily action of that sort is absolutely unfit for you to do. But if on reflection you know that it would not cause affliction... it would be a skillful bodily action with pleasant consequences, pleasant results, then any bodily action of that sort is fit for you to do.

(MN 61, Instructions to Rahula)

Sorry for the edit!

I think that anatta can be interpreted in a nihilistic way, sadly. However, in Buddhism there is also the "compassion" side of things that should be emphasized. Maybe also @Wayfarer might share his thoughts. In fact, I am very disturbed by the nihilistic readings of "anatta"!
The same goes for "emptiness".

Hi all,



Personally, I am a "seeker" of sorts and have an interest for both Christianity, Platonism and Buddhism and you actually pointed out my own reservations about, especially, Theravada Buddhism. I think that, however, it is worth mentioning that the worldview of Buddhism and Christianity is radically different, and on this particular issue I think that the influence of the concept of "samsara" is relevant (that's why I think secular Buddhism is not "real" Buddhism).

Basically, all beings in Buddhism are seen as subject to a potentially endless cycle of rebirths. All these realms, however blissful, are impermanent and therefore they are ultimately "dukkha" because they are not free from decay and death. As the story goes, the Buddha sought a solution to this problem, i.e. freedom from old age, illness and death. He abandoned his family to seek a solution to this problem and he found it. An "unawakened" life cannot give a solution to the problem of (repeated) decay and death, and therefore Buddhists would say that he actually gave to his family, after awakening, something that is unvaluable, something that surpasses every joy that can give the "world". As a king he could never give even to his family the freedom of Nirvana.

As the story goes, the Buddha awakened to the "Dhamma" and expounded the four Noble Truths. The first is that there is suffering, given by decay, death, association with the "unbeloved" etc. The second is craving. Note that craving is seen as the cause of the "transmigration". The third Nobel Truth is Nirvana, the end of suffering. The fourth is the Path to achieve Nirvana. According to the "suttas" Nirvana is achieved by being unattached and also without aversion. So, the training leads to see reality with personal preferences, which are said to be rooted in ignorance (avijja), the cause of craving (and ultimately the cause of samsara).

Anyway, it is difficult IMO to render justice to Buddhism in all its various forms. Theravada and Mahayana are very different and in each of them there are a lot of school of thoughts.

I think that there are two main reason why people call Buddhism as "nihilistic". One is that according to them (and also for some Buddhists!) Nirvana is simply the mere absence of conditioned phenomena. The other is its tendency of world-denial.

As I said, some interpret Nirvana as "mere absence". But, I think that it is mostly a modern innovation and not a good one (except for, probably, the ancient Buddhist Sautrantika school). For example, even in the Canonical commentaries (i.e. included in the Pali Canon) there are a few "positive" description of Nirvana as being "permanent" (or even "eternal" albeit "not-self and not pertaining to a self", see e.g. this section of the Kathavatthu, a part of the Theravada canonical Abhidhamma). So even saying that for "Buddhism" everything is impermanent and unsatisfactory, is an over-simplification. Then you have the Mahayana idea that there is the "non-abiding Nirvana", where the liberated being (in this case a Bodhisattva or a Buddha) abides in neither Samsara nor in Nirvana, and therefore s/he "renounces" the bliss of Nirvana for the benefit of all sentient beings.

Anyway, look closer. Anatta means also that phenomena are not under one's control and therefore, egoism leads to suffering. Hence, by removing the concern to oneself, in both Theravada and Mahayana the idea is that one reduces egoism. And in fact, the reduction of lust, attachments, aversions etc are accompained by an increasing of "positive" qualities like loving-kindness and compassion. Detachment also means that one does not see the world with the lens of one's preferences and therefore he might also be more able to love others for what they are (and not under the lens of one's expectations, for example). The Mahayana emphasizes the "compassion" part as well the "wisdom" part, hence "taking care of others" is very important in a Mahayana context. But if there is no "potentially endless samsara" the Theravada's "world-denying tendency" and the Mahayana vows to help all sentient beings lose, in my opinion, their meaning. Anyway, if that belief is not true, Buddhism, howwever, can be very useful to be mindful, patient and so on. Buddhist teachings about ethics are in my opinion very useful to non-Buddhists (for example to do vipassana, samatha and metta meditation I do not think that "belief" is required, except an amount of "trust"...).

Also, Buddhism is not anti-natalist. In fact, the human birth is regarded as "precious" and as an opportunity to aspire to the "Highest" or at least for better future rebirths. Again, it is also important to remember, IMO, that AFAIK most forms of Buddhism regard salvation as due to personal commitment (i.e. Buddhist teachers might teach you the Path, you are free to follow it or not. And also you have to walk the Path if you wish).

Regarding what Buddhists say, well, I think that all religions are subject to very different interpretations. For example, some Christians of them believe that "faith" in the sense of "mere belief" is what lead to Salvation, to "Heaven". And, in fact, according to some Christians all "unbelievers" go to Hell. So, I imagine that even in Buddhism there are a lot of views. For example see theEdicts of Ashoka:, e.g:

Everywhere[2] within Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi's domain, and among the people beyond the borders, the Cholas, the Pandyas, the Satiyaputras, the Keralaputras, as far as Tamraparni and where the Greek king Antiochos rules, and among the kings who are neighbors of Antiochos,[3] everywhere has Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, made provision for two types of medical treatment: medical treatment for humans and medical treatment for animals. Wherever medical herbs suitable for humans or animals are not available, I have had them imported and grown. Wherever medical roots or fruits are not available I have had them imported and grown. Along roads I have had wells dug and trees planted for the benefit of humans and animals.
...

is this "world-denying"?

Also, also many forms of Hinduism and Jainism are as "world-denying" as Buddhism. IMO, the belief in Samsara is the reason behind this "world-denying" tendency in India. But, on the other hand, the same belief can also inspire compassion, non-violence and so on.

Personally, I am interested in Buddhism. But I am highly skeptical of many of its doctrines. And, therefore I have reservations, for example, about the "total letting go of all attachements".

In my view, "anatta" points to the non-objectification of "what is the self" (the "identification" process).
Anyway, I think that "interpentration" is quite widespread in East Asian Buddhist teaching, especially in the Huayan school (see e.g.: this article on Fazang, the third patriarch of the Huayan school. on the IEP), which is based on the Avatamsaka sutra.

:up: thank you for the detailed and insightful response.

If we will resume the discussion in the future, maybe I will be more learned in Aristotle's metaphysics. Now, I think it is too underrated in our time.




Good point! Unfortunately, I am sorry but I have to take a break from the Forum, now.

Anyway, thank you for the interesting discussion!

The issue with "potential" gets more complicated with Aristotle's cosmological argument. The argument is that no potential can be eternal, therefore there must be an actuality which is prior to all potential. This is how Aristotle denies the reality of "prime matter", potentiality without any actuality (what is sometimes called the eternal flux of the infinite apeiron). A boundless potential denies any actuality, and therefore could not actualize itself. If such an infinite potential ever existed, it would always exist, and therefore there could not ever be anything actually existing. But this is contrary to what we observe, which is the actual existence of forms. So we must deny the reality of infinite potential, assuming that there is always actuality which is prior to and therefore limits any potential. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interestingly, both "idealist" and "materialist" philosophies tend to say that the "first cause" (or "first principle") is something that is "simple", has infinite potentialities etc. While I do respect these philosophies (well, after all my username is "boundless", apeiron in Greek), I saw no convincing explanation on how the "world" could arise from this "primordial potentiality". As I said, I know almost nothing about Aristotle, but interestingly here he criticizes exaclty this point.

Anyway, Aristotle's argument is sound. If it is true, then a "double-aspect" is heavily implied.

Understanding this cosmological argument can have a great influence over the way that one understands time. Suppose that the passage of time is understood by us through the analysis of changing forms. The passage of time, in conception, is tied to and bound by the changes in actually existing forms. But we also learn from our understanding of free will and such things that the potential for any actual form precedes its actual existence. This is how ethical determinism is denied, we allow that a form of actual existence comes from the potential for that existence. So any actual state of existence, at a particular point in time, doesn't necessitate the next state, there is the potential for a multiplicity of next states. — Metaphysician Undercover

This could solve the problem that Janus posited, before. From a purely "naturalistic" (in our langauge if we consider only the "changng forms") reasoning free-will is literally impossible. If we accept the view that we are completely "natural" phenomena then free-will is simply illusory (or it is taken as an emergent phenomenon, in a way that is not very convincing).

In this theory, free-will seems well explained.

If we apply this to our understanding of time, we see that this understanding is incomplete because the conception of time is produced from the changing forms, but we have determined the logical necessity for a "potential" which is "prior to" the changing forms. Our concept of time cannot grasp this potential, because it is prior to the changing forms, upon which the concept of time is based. The idea of something prior to time is irrational and contradictory. Now we bring in the cosmological argument which states that this "potential" cannot refer to anything real and therefore cannot account for the real existence of the changing forms, unless it is soundly based in something actual. So we must find the means to give actual existence to the potential, in order to bring it into the realm of intelligibility (potential, as it is, defies the fundamental principles of logic). — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I agree that in this "dual-aspects" (potentialities and actualities) model, our concept of time needs redefinition. If we think about measurements, clearly we measure "time" in relation to the changing form. Hence we need a redefinition.

In your view the universe had a beginning? I agree that speaking about something "before time" is illogical ("before" is a temporal relation and outside time speaking of "before" or "after" is meaningless), but at the same time, to me it seems that this model requires that time had no "beginning" due to the fact that potentialities and actualities cannot be separated.

Right, the two different spaces account for the two distinct actualities. Without distinguishing between them they are conflated and produce the appearance of infinite possibility, or potential. There is nothing actual which "the passing of time" refers to, so it appears as infinite potential. What the cosmological argument teaches us is that "infinite potential" is an unintelligible concept which renders metaphysics and ontology as incomprehensible. Idealists and materialists alike get drawn into the trap of infinite potential as Aristotle demonstrated. The cosmological argument refutes Pythagorean (Platonic) Idealism, in which human ideas are said to be eternal, by showing the true nature of these ideas as having the characteristic of potential, and it also refutes Anaximander's materialism which refers to an eternal chaos, or "aperion", which is matter, or potential. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that their system have an inconsistency (or at least a "non-sequitur"). Ideas are not separable from changing forms and also changing forms are not enough to explain reality. The undeniable merit of this metaphysics is that it accepts both levels. It might be very difficult (or even impossible...) to make a scientific theory from it (although there are some attempts as you remarked earlier) but philosophically has a very good point: the two "aspects" of reality need each other. This explains nicely the difficulties of both "materialism" and "idealism".

Just for curiosity: do you know online sources that explain well the cosmological argument of Aristotle? I am very curious to learn about his philosophy after this discussion :grin:

Unfortunately I will probably be very busy in the following days, so I will likely have a hard time in keeping up with the conversation. Even this answer is somewhat lacking and I am quite sorry for this :sad:

Anyway, thank you very much for the interesting discussion we had so far :blush: ... and thanks in advance for the reply!