That's the exact problem
I think that this can be criticized in the same way willow criticized the notion of "supernatural explanation". The same way the supernatural explanation is, in fact, always a natural explanation, albeit a different (weird, irregular, less common) one, the same way the content of your experience was not beyond human conception or unrelated to your senses. It could be a form of synesthesia or something like that. At any rate, I agree that such experiences can be utterly transformative.
comeuppance
Postmodernism alert!
So, it seems to me that it's not only that religious experiences are not epistemically on the same level as other regular experiences, but there's also a gradation of testability among the religious experiences themselves
But the OP is asking about whether someone is alive, brain states are besides the point. The point is in reference to the state of being alive. I agree that a person does not have an identical brain state as one they had in the past(although in an infinite universe, it is inevitable that it would happen somewhere else). But they do have life, they are alive as they were in the past. So the OP is asking about either being alive, or not being alive, brain states are irrelevant to this.As a nominalist, I don't believe that an identical brain state in someone else, or in the same person at a different time, is possible.
I do largely agree, but it occurs to me that I tend to think of our world as an artificial construct (including spacetime, matter etc) and reality is on another level, like a world of the soul, perhaps in an eternity, or a manifest world, more real than this world.But I have spent a fair amount of time considering time as discontinuous. It appears to me that the consequences are that All arises from nothing and returns to nothing. Why exactly the whole thing appears to repeat over and over... I don't know. Maybe it's just how our consciousness is wired.
Miracles and magic are entirely possible, but they are always only "nature": the world acting how it does. What logically follows is that if a "naturalistic"explanation is not accurate (e.g. it's a hallucination), then a different "naturalistic" explanation will be (e.g. an experience which is an ad hoc reduction of the world to a concept of "God," an entity of God speaking to someone, etc., etc.).
I know it's difficult to articulate with the language we have. But I think we all know instinctively what you are thinking about and I have puzzled over it for a long time too.So the OP isn't really talking about whether he as the same person will exist, but, rather, whether he'll emerge into existence again - whether he'll get 'caught back up in' existence. Even as something different. The focus on pronouns misses the problem entirely - it's a problem that is difficult to pose due to the limitations of grammar.
The only way we will be able to know if we will never be able to upload our consciousness into computers or robots is to try it by experiment. I see no reason to dismiss the idea of a gradual introduction of synthetic processors into the brain, if there is a continuation of consciousness. Although it does occur to me that there would be some psychological issues, or a alteration on personality developing into a "different" person. But the critical issue is that the continuous living experience of me would be maintained. I would still be here, although feeling different. Rather than having entirely ceased to exist, when my apparatus stop working.So, no need to worry about it. If something wakes up and thinks it is you, it won't be you. It also leads to the fact that we will never be able to "upload" our consciousness into computers or robots or inhabit other bodies
I'd say more than that. It goes deeper. Rather than just a empirical approach, it is a metaphysical one: materialism. When it is recognised anything may be known, transcendent philosophy collapses. It no longer has any wisdom to offer. There is nothing "mysterious" or "inexplicable" anymore. Such notions merely become our reactions to thing we do not expect, rather than a hidden realm of power or truth.
I am talking around the subject of pragmatism because I am still familiarising myself with metaphysical debate. If for example you were to ask me how I make pragmatic selection in my contemplation, I would probably not be able to express it in commonly used metaphysical terms. I would have to rely on using common parlance in creative ways and would probably not be tolerated, cause confusion and misunderstanding, or fail to convey it.Sorry. which of those questions is about pragmatism rather than being an expression of pragmatism?
and explains the degree to which it could then matter
This is your perception perhaps.Fine. But you are not showing that they have a demonstrable advantage - except as a way to block open minded, publicly conducted, ontological inquiry.
You forget that I am arguing the pragmatist view and so Occam's razor applies. You can pretend to worry about invisible powers that rule existence in ways that make no difference all you like. You are welcome to your scepticism and all its inconsistencies. But as I say, if whatever secret machinery you posit makes no difference, then who could care?
↪Punshhh Where did we see that?
Sorry. Gods that exist in ways that don't make a difference don't exist according to my definition of existence. So all you are doing is trotting out the modern theistic formula which seeks to avoid the cold hard facts of science by pretending cold hard facts can be both true and yet not really matter.
Which is why the only consistent position I could hold is that if God does in fact exist in ways that don't make a difference, then my metaphysics is holed below the waterline. No lame excuses.
If I don't accept lame excuses from theists, I can hardly accept them from myself.
impossibility for her to know this aspect of her world and the extent to which it is subtly controlling and manipulating her life and circumstances. She is securely veiled from participating in my intellectual world
