Yes, I’m not denying that. I was emphasising the importance of mind as body and that different kinds of body have different kinds of experience, unique to them. I agree that rational intelligent minds can observe other kinds of bodies (minds), but it’s always an observation from the perspective of the experience of different kind of body, (third person) when it is done. Also, I think we can (we have the capacity to) as rational intelligent beings break out of our inherent perspective and develop understanding of other experiences.This is what is in question, I think. Nagel, in the passage I quoted in response to @Wayfarer, doesn't think this follows. And I don't see why it must, though no one would deny that we learn more about an experience if we're the ones having it.
But surely it has the experience of being a tree? Yes, I know we never be able to know for certain, but it has a shared presence with us is our physical domain. A domain where there is a common scale, a tree is approximately ten times our height and lives about as long, or a few times longer than us. Senses and reacts to stimuli in that environment which we sense and react to. If there is mind of some kind in the body of the tree as there is in our bodies, surely there are experiences being felt. Albeit so far removed from our kind of experience, that it may be inconceivable to us. For example, it is known that trees in a forest communicate with other trees. They may have a feeling of being in a group, chemical messages are being sent through the group. They may be detecting the presence of destructive fungi at one end of the forest and sending messages about it to other parts of the forest etc.Or at least they may be. Unless we stipulate a certain meaning for "experience" which we're not entitled to ("everything that happens to an entity is an experience"), I don't think we can know whether a tree has them.
This is the nub of the issue, there is an entire perspective, or vista involved in experience which is missing from the objective account. “What it is like to have the subjective experience”, “what it is like”, only hints at it, but is itself conceptual language, talking about concepts to other concepts. In order to understand the experience, one has to be the being experiencing it. And by being, I’m not talking of the mind*, I’m talking of a living creature. Also the use of the word subjective, is confining experience to thought and reflections on thought. Experience doesn’t at first include thought, that comes later, although thought itself is an experience, it is experience of a reflective activity in the brain following experiences.We should note that Nagel qualifies this in an important way. “Something will inevitably be lost,” he says – namely, what it is like to have the subjective experience. “No objective conception of the mental world can include it all.” But do we ask the objective viewpoint to include everything, or only (only!) to understand everything?
And this Reason can tell us that we, or the animals being discussed, don’t and can’t know anything about the world. Other than what is presented to us via our senses. Which necessarily includes experiences. That we can deduce some things about the structure of the world by experimentation. But that is all. And yes we can philosophise about it all to our hearts content, but those philosophical thoughts can’t get past the limits I’ve just pointed out.Reason has no authority beyond consistency, and must remain true to that which supports it, i.e. actual experience, or lose all coherency.
I quite liked the way the thread had become a peaceful, friendly, discussion about the topic. So I went off peste about the idea of a general theory of consciousness, or mind.I've lost track of what we were disagreeing about, or whether we were disagreeing at all.
Those differences don’t preclude what I’m suggesting here. Yes there are many differences even between individuals in a family. But these differences are on the surface, the world of surfaces that we know. I’m implying there is a uniformity beneath the surface. If we look at biology we can start to see the uniformity. If we list the organs in the body we will find that they are present in most animals without exception. This is even more so when we look at internal cellular structure. Cells as we find them now have changed little in their essential structure for over a billion years.I don't think we are one "hive mind" at all―look at the great differences between cultures, and the polarizations within particular cultures.
I’m only suggesting this in viewing the one being (our biosphere as one being), as a whole, this being lives in a solipsistic world in it’s interactions with the neumenon of the world. All individual animals and plants are living in different aspects of that whole experience. It is solipsistic in the sense that it is an isolated arena, that of a planet in space (the sun does exert some influence).and I don't think we are locked in our own little solipsistic worlds.
Quite, but not just unconsciousness, but a common arena of activity. A common landscape, scale, temporal manifold. Take two people sitting in a restaurant eating pasta. They may have different hair clothes sauce on their food. But so much of what is going on is a shared experience and circumstance, one which may well require an underlying unity of being for it to happen.I even think it is possible that we share some kind of collective unconscious, as Jung suggested,
None of this precludes what I am proposing. It is a diversity within an isolated arena of activity.I see Nature as endlessly creative and diverse.
It’s a bit like the idea that a fish in a fish bowl doesn’t know that it’s suspended in water. It doesn’t notice the water, the way that we don’t notice air, unless it’s windy. The fish can’t comprehend what water is, perhaps we can’t comprehend something too.Because part of the problem with experience is that it’s so close to us that we don’t even see it. And it’s only in contemplative practice that you really have to deal with it.
I don’t think this is such a big issue (although it may be a stumbling block empirically), yes it’s true that there is no way of making a direct comparison between minds. But it may be the framing of the question that’s at fault. Rather like what J said.And how all things in that context seem to me may not be how they seem to you―even though there will likely be commonalities due to the fact that we are both human.
This is what I was talking about in the other thread, (Cosmos created mind), I am interested in developing ways to break out of this straight jacket. But I don’t have the philosophical language to ground it in digestible philosophy. It just comes across as fanciful wishful thinking.The problem with trying to model consciousness itself is that it is the thing doing the modeling, and we cannot "get outside of it", so we seem to be stuck with making inferences about what it might be from studying the brain being the best we can do, or going with what our intuitions "from inside" tell us about its nature.
Yes, but the physical constitutions themselves are parts of the structures of the things themselves. Even the mind, via the brain, as used in our day to day thinking is shaped, framed by these structures. Sooner, or later we have to start considering something that isn’t shaped in this way, in consciousness, but is nevertheless shaped by other as yet unrecognised structures. This is usually described as the soul, although I prefer to describe it as the higher mind.*I don't find it plausible that how they present to us is determined by consciousness, but I think it is more reasonable to think that it is determined by the physical constitutions of our sensory organs, nervous system and brain, as well as by the actual structures of the things themselves.
That’s not surprising because I’m in agreement with most of what physicalism says. I was narrowing down what part of existence we know. Existence as a whole and the mechanism of existence is not part of that. So to say;Nothing you've described is inconsistent with physicalism.
Is to conflate that bit which isn’t part of it with the existence we know. The bit of existence which we experience isn’t all of existence and isn’t foundational. This is self evident because we have limited capacities to experience and know things.-that mind is foundational to existence;
Yes, but I’m saying something broader than that. For example in a thought experiment I can say the Earth is a being, Gaia for Gaia the physical world might be like a thin protective layer in her skin, that she is barely aware of and her family is made up of other planets and stars. In conversation what to her is the equivalent of a word spoken in a minute might in our terms be a few million years of seismic events and most of her life is an experience of transcendent realities entirely inconceivable to us. Rather like comparing our lives to that of an individual cell in our bodies. The cell could not comprehend, or understand anything about our lives and yet we share consciousness and there is a germ of being that the cell feels, which we and Gaia also feel in some way.This is a mereological issue. Just because objects are reducible to particles doesn't imply they are not actual, functional entities in the world. By "functional", I mean that they can be analyzed in terms of their interactions with other functional entities.
(I’m not speaking for Wayfarer, rather saying it how I see it.)I can't imagine why you would think physicalists necessarily have to deny the subjectivity associated with being human. But it's irrelevant, because you still have provided no justification for the ontological claims I highlighted:
-that mind is foundational to existence;
- that the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it.
You speak a lot of sense.For me, all we are, all we do, all we know, is derived from our interactivity with the rest of the world. I suspect there's a lot we don't know about the universe, though, and that interaction may include aspects of which we're not yet aware.
What I’m getting at here is that by examining feasible possibilities, one can see the orthodox explanations in a different light. This helps to develop a broader context and develop ways of thinking outside of the orthodox paradigm. Add into the mix the extent of what we don’t know, then one can in a sense break free of the orthodox. This is how mysticism makes use of philosophy.My issue is how one uses possibilities in further reasoning.
But there’s no reason to assume that it isn’t the case either. It’s a possibility, so having an understanding of what we don’t know helps us to not make assumptions, or broad brush conclusions about the world and existence. I’m not accusing you or any (with one or two exceptions maybe) of the posters here of doing this. As philosophers you are open minded about these ideas.But...there's no reason to think this is the case- there's no evidence of it, and it's not entailed by accepted theory.
Epistemic humility.It seems reasonable to believe there's a great deal we don't know. But what use can be made of this fact? Does it lead anywhere?
Yes, but I was treating all minds on Earth as one group. I was asking about minds elsewhere.Regarding other "minds", IMO we can justifiably believe they exist in other humans, and in a diminished sense- in other animals.
You see yourself standing, walking, listening and talking in the world, don’t you? So surely you can also see yourself not knowing much in the world too?I was not talking about the world. I was talking about me, and God. :)
I understand your parameters and approach to this question, which I agree with. However, what we don’t know looms large to me. And yet you are sort of restricting what is natural to what has been deemed to be so by human thought. While we have no metric by which to measure how much of our world we know about and therefore, the extent of our ignorance.I covered that by referencing "anything inferred to exist by analysis of the universe", which means via accepted theory.
I intentionally leave out mere possibilities. My definition is intended to identify what we can justifiably believe. This also applies to:
Do we know there are not artificial things outside the human mind?
and not knowing much about the world you find yourself in.I can see me standing and walking, and hear me talking.
This is a pretty broad generalization when talking about a diverse population. I know indigenous people personally who would disagree with your statement, along with those who would agree.
Yes, I know. I was specifically referring to how they regard the ecosystem they live in, usually a forest.They also tend to engage in murderous cultural norms, sexual assault, xenophobia and plenty of other pretty ridiculous things.
Universes not causally connected, could include infinite universes entirely different to ours. But which is somehow constrained by human thought. If not a gap, a leaky sieve.What hole do you have in mind?
and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that is inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of the universe.
Yes, but we know it includes artificial things, so we will need to separate these out in some way. This is what philosophy is for presumably.That's tricky. Our knowledge of the world is in our heads, and that is (in a sense) made up - even though it corresponds to reality.
Drinking the Kool aid again, I see.American presence there is the only deterrent Europe has ever had, and the only reason NATO stands any chance. The problem is you all have been taking advantage of the United States taxpayer for far too long without developing any way to defend yourselves.
Here’s the rub, it is the fall of man you are describing. When Adam and Eve left the garden of Eden, they were leaving their instinctive behaviours which had been shaped by evolution in their evolutionary niche. They had to develop new drives, motivations, goals to replace them. But what they didn’t realise is that those finely honed instincts and behaviours had been fined tuned for millions of years achieving a balance with their ecosystem and that it couldn’t easily be replaced. From that point on, humanity became destructive (this doesn’t include many indigenous societies who have learned to live in harmony with their ecosystem).Organisms, of which we are one, really, and, by that, I mean naturally, behave by evolved drives and conditioning. But for humans born into history (i.e., not prehistoric humans) our dialectical process--Mind/History--displaces our natures. We are born as a species, our drives are to bond and mate and survive together. Good and evil have no place. Mind displaces that with laws, the manifestation of those processes. And because yet another mechanism of that process is difference, not that but this, good and evil are inevitable; but not as a result of our natures.
The White man is the savage and the Indian is morally superior. The White man has subverted the truth, twisted it around and inflated his ego. While all he’s doing is ruthlessly exploiting and destroying nature for his own selfish ends.Why is the savage the better spiritual human being than the White man who comes with a gun and believes he is morally superior, and he needs to teach the savage about being saved and being moral? Is this justice of a god? Strange.
This might need tidying up a bit. You might have left a big hole there for other things to sneak in.and anything not causally connected (such as alternate universes) that is inferred to exist, to have existed, or that will exist, through analysis of the universe.
Not a lot.If you say something is 'natural', what have you said about it?
Yes, I agree with your premise, but there are tendencies in our natures which appear to be there from birth for certain people to be disrupters, a tendency for psychopathy, sociopathy etc.While I do not dispute your points, I should clarify. As we inevitably have violence in our conditioning, the violence is not in our natures. Killing for food or territory, though evident in nature, is not the same as war, or murder. We cannot say lion's are murderous or evil. We alone have transcended nature
For me, nothing can fill that gap. No one will he able to give a characterization of the intrinsic stuff talked about in the Chalmers' quote of my previous post. And this is just the nature of how descriptions and explanations work in an information processing system like a brain, imo. There are inherent limitations such as described by the munchausen trilemma.
Yes, but we can’t go past “seems” here. This is an example of human thought coming up with what seems to make sense. We might be mistaken, or viewing the issue through some kind of prism (metaphorically).If what it is like to be something can be taken as a directly aquainted example of irreducible ontology, then it seems ontologies strongly emerge macroscopically.
Yes, it suggests that there is more to it, wherein the raw experience and the presence of being in that experience is always the primary objective in animal evolution and behaviour. Just how the body achieves this might be more complicated, or novel, than we might at first imagine.An issue is that if all our conscious behavior can in principle be simulated and reproduced from models of functioning brains, this emergent ontology seems not only epiphenomenal but also disconnected from our own reports about our own experience which would be due to the brains - this seems incoherent.
Yes, but that is admittedly a partial view. We should remember that we only have a partial understanding of our world, how it is produced, sustained and why it is here and why we are here. We are really in the dark on all these questions.For me, the most logical explanation is that any strong emergence is an illusion (and there is no scientific evidence for it anyway) and we actually have no intuitive, coherent sense of the fundamental "intrinsic" ontology of the universe, partly because of limits on how any intelligent system can work.
I would suggest a bit of lateral thinking, as a tonic.When I think about this stuff, it always invokes the imagery of the strange loop and munchausen trilemma that really be escaped from.
Yes, that is interesting and monism is being tossed around a bit in there. I don’t see the appeal in going too deep into these analyses. The people doing it are trying to find out something new and this is how they do it. I do similar things in mystical practice, it’s deep complicated and usually doesn’t produce much in the way of results. But it’s also a way of trying to find out something new.The closest kind of fundamental "intrinsic" ontology I would pick would actually probably be something like informational (e.g. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33286288/), but I don't even actually know what that actually really means; the generality of the concept is appealing, that is all.
We evolved on the African plains, have you watched a nature documentary about what happens there in a natural setting? Everything is competing to eat each other.Are we by nature hostile or evil? I think no, not by Nature. By history.
I think there is a difficulty in depicting the mind in this way. Because the brain is a physical organ. True when it is alive and consciousness it is much more than that, but that organ is present in spacetime.But the living brain is not a physical thing in space and time.
Sounds good, I do think it’s important to bring emotions into this, which involves the endocrine system of hormones and pheromones. So to put it simply, this is a way that the body, as distinct from the brain, is involved in being. Emotions can be triggered in the body ( this can cause a bit confusion because the brain is a physical organ, acting as a gland, independently of the mind), the body informs the being and mind through hormonal activity. Which often works through feelings, urges, emotional states. You only need to look at the oestrogen cycle to see how that occurs.1) illusionism - this means feelings are not directly physical because they exist exclusively in the mind- a mental construction. It depends only on mental causation (which I've defended). It also accounts for the action of pain-relievers, which mask the pain by interfering the brain's construction of the sensation.
To an extent, but I see no reason that it may never be, we just haven’t invented the science yet. I come to this from the opposite end of the stick, I work within a complex ideological system of spirit, soul and mind distinct from the physical world, but which interacts with the physical via beings. Beings that are organisms present in the physical sphere. So bridge the gap between the two. There simply isn’t any science working here, there is very little literature and most of it is embedded in religious traditions. So all there is is some ideas worked out by people like me, Wayfarer and a number of others on the forum, and thinkers, or priests within the religious traditions who work with the ideology therein. A ragtag band, of misfits with no overarching scientific, or philosophical grounding (theology accepted). So I can understand the skepticism of people working with a more formal ideology.2) Feelings are due to some aspect of the world that has not been identified through science, and may never be. This is open-ended; it could be one or more properties or things.
