This isn't elementary school.
I think we can learn quite a lot from these sort of experiences, it’s like a window into hidden parts of our world that we don’t ordinarily see*.Thanks for that description.
Yes, we are, but I would point to the driving force being climate change and to a lesser extent, competition for rapidly depleted resources.Are we truly entering an era of multipolarity? If so, what are the philosophical consequences of a world without a dominant cultural “center”?
They will have no choice.Is the West prepared to coexist with ideological and civilizational alternatives that do not necessarily aspire to Western liberalism?
It will definitely reduce the risk, as easy power block will be struggling to survive and feed it’s population.Does multipolarity inevitably increase the risk of global conflict, or could it usher in a more balanced, mutualist order?
I find it very interesting how different people will remember the very same event in completely different ways. So you might say, something incredulous happened, but someone else in the same area might just notice a mundane occurrence.
Yes, and there are different kinds of knowledge. Something that interests me is knowledge acquired through the witnessing of events. This doesn’t require learning, or understanding, just observation, or presence. I can remember and visualise clearly, in memory, events that happened 30 years ago. In which I witnessed something unexplainable, something which defies credulity and which has broad ranging implications for how I think about the world and reality. And yet at the time, it was just something I noticed, experienced, for a split second. Something that happened so quickly and was over before I could react. I could have just carried on, walked past and not given it another thought. But my enquiring mind and curiosity latched onto it instantly and it is still with me now as though it happened yesterday.This really depends on how you would define "know". Unlike some epistemologists, I don't think that truth is a requirement for "knowledge". Plato, in The Theaetetus, demonstrated that we cannot actually ensure truth, so a determination of truth is not necessary for us to call some information "knowledge". So I'm not saying that we know nothing, I'm saying that truth isn't really part of our knowledge.
Do you realise that you have just said that we know nothing, in particular. Well apart from what we have evolved to deal with.The simplification helps to keep us focused directly on what is important and purposeful to our little corner of being, but it misleads us into thinking that this is representative of "the universe" as a whole. Ontologies like monism are an extension of this misleading trend toward oversimplification.
In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. 2 Now the earth was formless and empty, darkness was over the surface of the deep, and the Spirit of God was hovering over the waters.
The idea that there is a thing which emits the noise, and a thing which receives the noise is very misleading because it does not allow the proper understanding, which requires that the supposed 'things' must be understood as really the activity of something else. The true understanding is that the supposed 'thing' is not a thing at all, but some other activity of something else, which appears to us as if it were a thing
The title of the thread is* (in a nutshell), to tease out a blindness in the view that, supported by science etc. the physical world**is what exists and anything else is mere speculation. A view which is held by the majority of the population. That the overwhelming truth of this orthodoxy cannot in all seriousness be challenged, and that this (orthodoxy) results in a blinkered view.The I have no idea what we have been disagreeing about, because it is true by mere definition that we cannot see the world as it would be absent any observer.
So what?I agree, and for me this means that gravity is a definite part of our experience whereas a universal mind is not―the latter is purely speculative.
Yes, I’ve already realised this. It’s almost like prose.I recommend finishing the whole paragraph for yourself as paragraphs are the basic unit in this writing.
The difference between the action of gravity on our experience and the action of a universal mind, for example, may be that one appears in the external world of appearances where we measure things and the other doesn’t. The latter might have an action in us, which we can’t measure, or isolate as a property.I don't see gravity as a good analogy because its effects are measurable. I believe that the idea of independently existing things makes sense―others see problems with it, but it seems those problems stem form assumptions that I don't share.
Quite, but as I say, it’s presence in our lives might just be inobvious, or orthogonal to our preoccupations.The idea of a shared or collective mind is not logically contradictory, so it makes sense in that sense, but I think the idea is extremely underdetermined by our everyday experience.
Now in this way our understanding acquires a negative expansion, I.e. it is not limited by sensibility(influence of the senses), but rather limits it by calling things in themselves(not considered as appearances) noumena. But it also immediately sets boundaries for itself, not cognising these things through categories, hence merely thinking them under the name of an unknown something.
There are ways around this*, you know how gravity works at a distance, but absent the theory of relativity, there is no known physical mechanism by which the force is exerted. Relativity accounts for it, but is little more than a descriptive, rather hypothetical explanation, a mathematical mapping of the relation between bodies, forces and energy. Perhaps there is the equivalent between minds**. Also there is the idea, which dovetails to an extent with idealism, of all beings/organisms, or more pertinently living entities, as one entity, branched, or budded off into separate organisms in the realm of manifestation/objectification. With the root unseen, or known by us rather like the root of gravity being unseen, or known.Regarding the Ālaya-Vijñāna there is also a Theosophical idea designated the "Akashic Records", which I think bears some resemblance to the Buddhist idea. It seems that idealist thinkers have long recognized the explanatory need for some kind of collective consciousness as a substitute for the independent actuality of physical existents.
If by a noumenon we understand a thing insofar as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, because we abstract from the manner of our intuition of then this is a noumenon in the negative sense. But if we understand by that an object of a non-sensible intuition then we assume a special kind of intuition, namely intellectual intuition, which, however, is not our own, and the possibility of which we cannot understand, and this would be the noumenon in a positive sense. (B307)
Noumena in a positive sense are simply noumena as Kant originally defined that notion in the A edition: objects of an intellectual (non-sensible) intuition. The negative concept of noumena, however, is simply the concept of objects that are not spatiotemporal (not objects of our sensible intuition, namely space and time). But then it follows that things in themselves are noumena in the negative sense, retrospectively clarifying the passage from the A edition quoted immediately above, where Kant seems to draw from the “Transcendental Aesthetic” the conclusion that there are noumena: the concept of appearance requires that something appears, and this must be a negative noumena.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/Another way to appreciate this distinction is to consider the difference in why these notions of object (noumena, transcendental object) are unknowable by us. We cannot cognize things in themselves because cognition requires intuition, and our intuition only ever presents appearances, not things in themselves. We cannot cognize the transcendental object because the transcendental object is a purely schematic, general idea of empirical objectivity. Whenever we cognize a determinate empirical object we are cognitively deploying the transcendental concept of an object in general, but we are not coming to know anything about the object of that concept as such.
This is Kant’s point in “phenomena and noumena” when he writes:
This transcendental object cannot even be separated from the sensible data, for then nothing would remain through which it would be thought. It is therefore no object of cognition in itself, but only the representation of appearances under the concept of an object in general, which is determinable through the manifold of those appearances. (A250–1)
It was a joke, about people looking at the same thing from different perspectives.You’re both looking down different ends of the telescope. That’s why it looks different.
— Punshhh
I thought this comment referred to a conversation we were having in the other 'idealism' thread. I'm not so sure what it refers to in this thread.
I would use the word orientation in that it is a question of perspective, or direction. A viewpoint, or gaze which then sees something already known, or commonly seen in a different light.Nevertheless the basic point that Magee makes stands - that insight into transcendental idealism does require a kind of fundamental shift in perspective, akin to a gestalt shift but in a more general way, and it’s not easy to come by.
A general observation on many of the comments being made in this thread:
the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood, so that these statements appear faulty in ways in which, properly understood, they are not. Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which, on examination, are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. This, of course, is one of the explanations for the almost unfathomably deep counterintuitiveness of transcendental idealism, and also for the general notion of 'depth' with which people associate Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices.
— Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Bryan Magee, p106, 'Subjects and Objects'
Hopefully you get the idea that no matter how long I go on EVERYTHING I can say is noumena negatively ONLY and can NEVER be positively captured.
Agreed, I have been doing the same from a different school for decades along with using it in my practice.I think it is a good place to begin when trying to understand the kind of problems that arise in human experience including how we articulate what consciousness is and how it relates to the physical world as well as our metaphysical concepts about the world -- which are necessarily connected in some fashion.
A little less wordy though, the gist is the same.The closest other thing I can think of that covers this kind of concept is probably Dao/Tao (the 'way'). More poetic than Kant but far less precise. If either works for you then that is probably enough.
A shape with no edges is not a shape at all. If there can exist something 'shape-like' beyond sapce and time it does not 'exist' in any sense we can frame and if not soley separate we can appreciate it. This is the difference between being open to discovery by us and not existing, but 'not existing' is a concept that we appreciate not that we do not.
But it doesn't follow logically that speculative talk about what it might be is meaningless.
— Janus
But it is likely to be dogmatic.
It is not necessary to live a life, so does not come under the purview of necessary beliefs. It is an interest, a leisure, pursuit, an interest.Of course you can say it is necessary for you―but perhaps that is just because you have come to think it is necessary for you, that is you have come to believe it.
No worries, I enjoy what you write.You must understand, I rarely have the gall to interject myself into such established arguments (60 pages and counting!) unless, shall we say, the wine glass has been broken out. :smile:
I was using the phrase to say that I hold as few beliefs as I can get away with. I would rather do away with the word completely, but I accept it is used a lot, with various meanings. So I try to keep it to precise definitions where it is used. Janus was asking about my beliefs, which is why I wrote that post and explained how I arrive at intellectual and other positions without having beliefs about them.One might consider such a sentence to be superfluous considering, surely, there are people alive, perhaps even living quite well, who don't hold the beliefs you do.
I seem to have lived a charmed life and often realise that others have had more complex and, or traumatic, conflicted lives. I realise how fortunate I am in this regard and yet still have all the usual emotional, anxiety, confidence hang ups that most people have. Even after many years of defusing and attending to them.Loyalty, eh. Heh. Sorry. such terms distract me due to the complex history of my own life experience.
Believe is a vague term, so I can’t answer that without a definition. I don’t hold beliefs other than what beliefs are necessary to live a life. However I lead a life informed by what I have discovered or adopted as a practice for a period of time. So this allows guidance in how I live from myself, or other sources. I have tried a variety of practices and understandings from schools and took only what fitted my path and kept the remainder at arms length. So don’t adhere to a belief system.You must believe that it is possible to attain wisdom and that some spiritual teaching or teachings can help you with that.
Know independently, yes.You are assuming this world is an illusion. How could you know that when everything you could possibly know comes form your experience in this world?
Yes, l presupposed that saṃsāra was part of maya forgetting its root. Thanks for putting me right.Actually Māyā is Hindu terminology. The Buddhist term is saṃsāra, ‘cyclical existence’.
But we were always going to hit this wall once straying into Buddhism. In Buddhism this whole world of appearances is nothing but maya. So how can these appearances, or a being enthralled by them, know, or account for the noumena when they themselves are part of the illusion?Unfortunately that is not a sensible, or even meaningful, thing to say―better just to remain silent. If philosophy is about anything it is certainly not about talking nonsense.
Sorry, I meant, is there a good reason not to believe in a demiurge. I’m happy to keep religion and spirituality to one side.
Well, putting religion and spirituality to one side, no. But is there a good reason not to?
— Punshhh
Religion and spirituality are not really discursive endeavors. Is there a good reason not to put religion and spirituality aside when doing philosophy?
Yes, I see now. I was interpreting the word belief in its religious context. Now I see that you were using it in the sense of ‘holding an opinion, or idea’.Cogent means clearly (and thus clearly expressible) and convincing, so I asked whether you had a clearly expressible and convincing reason to believe in a demiurge.
Yes, although it would have more likely have been a higher being(indicating there was a demiurge) But this is besides the point now, as we are putting spirituality to one side.Are you suggesting you have experienced the demiurge?
Agreed.but I don't think the same applies with a demiurge
Agreed, this is what I was getting at with ‘convincing’If we feel an unshakeable conviction regarding what it was an experience of, it will be enough to non-rationally convince us, but it will not be enough to non-rationally convince others unless they have a will to believe as we do.
Well, putting religion and spirituality to one side, no. But is there a good reason not to?Perhaps. Do we have any cogent reason to believe in a demiurge, though, beyond the fact that it's (kind of) an imaginable possibility?
The Ontic structural realism, may be external and pre-existing to the perception of humanity (or any beings on earth), but intrinsic (internal and not pre-existing) to the perception of a greater being of which humanity is a constituent part, such as a demiurge.I want to hear an actual argument for why space, time, differentiation, form, matter and all the rest cannot exist beyond the context of perception. And I should note, I acknowledge that if there is space, time, differentiation, things in general outside the context of perception, we should not expect them to be just as we experience and understand them. That would be naive realism, and I'm not arguing for that. I have in mind something along the lines of Ontic Structural Realism.
So far, out of the things I mention and the way I define those we have seen :
Chaos (lack of distinction, not deterministic)
Simplicity (One thing which is composed of itself)
0 dimensional entity (Distances are not real-Ill get to that in a sec)
the big bang (beggining of Two, or the great split)
The One (lack of distiction, Chaos, infinite, simple and unique)
The universe cannot expand "outward" because, according to physics, there is no external reference point or boundary outside of it. The universe is not expanding into a pre-existing space; rather, space itself is stretching. This means that distances between points within the universe are increasing, but there is no external space into which it expands. Thus space is not made of actual space.
If the universe is stretching the way physics describe(not outwards but "inwards"), space is not composed of space but rather the effect of phenomena on matter.