This led him to argue that evolution has developed sensory systems in organisms that have high fitness but don't offer a correct perception of reality. — Wikipedia

Organism and environment coevolve. So what increases the organism's fitness the most is arguably the ability to sense things as they are, not only the parts that happens to increase one's fitness relative to one's current environment. Hence perception of reality evolves towards being correct.

It's not even a philosophical issue; it's a scientific issue. — Michael

Yeah right :roll:

Your explanation of what causes variations in colour perception is not relevant to the claim I am making. — Michael

The relevant philosophical issue is whether percepts exist, and if there are more plausible explanations of colour. Hence my explanation, yet you show little interest in the philosophy when you repeatedly assert that colour terms refer to percepts. My reference to the SEP article (that you also ignored) is at least descriptive while the article that you refer to unsurprisingly assumes percepts. :roll:

See the dress. ...
See also variations in colour perception.
. — Michael

Now you ignore my reply and explanation of those variations, how rude :sad:

So questions about perception are best first addressed in ecological terms. What is a “mind” even for?

If there is anything “philosophical” left unaddressed after that, at least the discussion will be usefully focused. And not another re-run of idealism vs realism. — apokrisis

Did for example JJ Gibson's research get rid of the metaphysical, epistemological and semantic issues? It seems fairly clear, I think, that these issues are inextricably connected. Hence the reruns of idealism vs realism etc.

We look at the same distal object (the pixels on the screen), our eyes react to the same proximal stimulus (the light), and yet we see different colours. — Michael

No, you fail to distinguish the pixels of the image and the conditions of observation such as the pixels of different screens on which the image is displayed. Two observers looking at the same photo but on different screens see different colours (that's why screens need to be calibrated).

Also when different observers in the same room see the photo on the same screen they may discover that they identify different colours depending on whether their eyes have been exposed to the same light conditions prior seeing the photo. It can take around 20 minutes for an aircraft pilot to adjust his or her vision from bright cabin light to the weak light conditions in a cockpit during night flight.

Since it takes time for the eyes to adjust, different observers can mistake one colour for another, especially bleached, or blended colours under weak light conditions, st dusk or dawn etc that can make it difficult to identify the colour of a pigment or light source.

Notice that regardless of the colours of the dress in the famous photo, they are kind of bleached or unsaturated, hence particularity susceptible to being influenced by the various conditions under which the photo is observed. It is disingenuous to exploit these selective or manipulated conditions of observation as "arguments" for subjectivism.

n the case of colour there is no such thing as veridical. — Michael

That's plainly false. Red paint really reflects wavelengths of 700 nm, and to experience it as red is to have a veridical experience of it (unlike experiencing 700 nm as gray (if colorblind) or as any colour, sound, smell etc. (if hallucinating).

We can use colour terms however we like, but when we ordinarily use them we are referring to colour percepts, not an object’s disposition to reflect a certain wavelength of light. — Michael

That's also false, because the use of language is conventional, and evidently we refer to different things: you to an alleged "percept" inside the head, and I to the disposition of pigments and light. Most speakers use colour terms pragmatically or ostensively without commitment to philosophical subjectivism or dispositionalism etc.

..I look at the photo of the dress and describe its colours as white and gold.... ..someone else looks at that same photo and describes its colours as black and blue... — Michael

The colours in the photograph are susceptible to blend and interfere with changing light conditions on different screens and environments where the photo is displayed. Basically we don't just see the colours of the dress, but a blend of its colours with the colours from different environments or screens, and that's why different observers tend to see different colours.

But this isn’t colour. — Michael

I didn't say that. I said that the pigment and the light have the disposition to systematically cause the experience of colour. This means that the colour experience arises when an animal that has the ability sees the pigment or light, while the colour is a property of the pigment or light in the form of a disposition.

See the SEP-article on color, in particular on color-dispostionalism.

If you don't distinguish between experience (i.e. event in your brain) and colour (i.e. object of the experience), then you can't distinguish between veridical experiences and hallucinations. How could any animal have survived on this planet if they were only hallucinating and never saw objects and states of affairs? Arguments from illusion or hallucination suck.

Or, are they just allowing us to see the colors the fruit had all the time.
— Richard B

This makes no sense. Colours aren't mind-independent properties. — Michael

It makes sense: a colour is the disposition of a pigment or light to systematically cause the experience of the colour.

The experience exists in the mind, but the colour that you experience exists regardless of being experienced.

Hence the world is coloured even when no-one is there to experience it.

So not like dawn or dusk? — apokrisis

Sorry for late reply, I'm travelling.

At dawn or dusk, a red coin may appear unsaturated, perhaps blended with other colours from the sky etc. That's what its red colour looks like under weak, blended light conditions. Moreover, its circular shape appears oval, or rectangular even, depending on the angle of view.

From these variations it doesn't follow that the red and the circular are figments of the mind, neurological processes, or conventions of language.

From a neuroscience view, the point of colour vision is not because the world is coloured. — apokrisis

Colours might seem insignificant in neuroscience, or conventions in fashion, but that's not a failure to be real in biology.

Colour vision is an adaption to way the physical world is.

How does an animal know that it is seeing a colour? — javi2541997

By seeing it or knowing its conditions of satisfaction.

That game demonstrates how colour is arbitrary. — javi2541997

No, it demonstrates colour vision under selective conditions of observation. Not the same under ordinary conditions in which colour vision evolved.

Are you referring to the light that reflects those colours right? — javi2541997

I'm referring to the biological evolution of colour vision.

because the amount of cone cells in the electromagnetic spectrum and the colour wheel differs. — javi2541997

Huh?

The "natural sign" is the light not the colours. — javi2541997

Why would you want to get rid of the colours?

Objects and materials reflect, scatter, or absorb light in different ways depending on their physical and chemical properties. Several hundred million years ago organisms adapted and began to use the behaviour of light for seeing objects, materials, nutrients etc.

What matters for an animal is what it sees, e.g. a flower, not the light nor the mechanism that together enable the seeing.

Our eyes are tricky. — javi2541997

The eyes of a mantis shrimp are way trickier.

Let's play the following classic illusion game: — javi2541997

Why? Arguments from illusion suck.

Colour vision and the use of colours evolved millions of years before dogs, humans, and socially biased conventions. Colours are used as natural signs for fresh food, nutrients, fertility, health, camouflage etc.

the mind could be trained to use ideas or visions from past memories or brain activity patterns? — Kizzy

Our ability to remember and imagine and dream is astonishing. It's fairly easy to imagine what a red pen might look like, or a floroucent pen that glows red in the dark etc. Past memories might help, but with basic language skills one can compose infinitely many descriptions of what a red pen looks like, or might look like, in real or fictional worlds etc.

However, I don't know how to imagine what it might be like to see something invisible, or a pen that is red yet green in the same respect. It's easy to write or say, but not so easy to imagine.

What if we watch the brain activity looking at a painting of a red pen? The painting itself is not a real pen, but it still conveys the idea of “redness” and “pen” to anyone who views it. — Kizzy

Empathy is the ability to experience what someone else is experiencing. Since someone elses experience is not open to view, we must access it indirectly via languages, verbal, pictorial, interpretation of gestures etc

That's basically how a painting conveys experiences. In the late 1800s and early 1900s empathy theory was used for explaining works of art and architecture.

I am speaking solely on the subjective experience of “redness.” — Mp202020

Any experience is subjective in the sense that it exists only for the one who is having it. But there is ambiguity in talk of 'subjective' and 'experience of redness'.

First, the experience cannot solely be an experience of redness unless it is the seeing of something red, say a patch of red paint. Or else it would be an hallucination.

The quality of the paint and the conditions under which it is seen fix its visible appearance..That's what there is to see for any observer, and to see its redness, hue, saturation etc. is an epistemically objective experience. The redness of the paint is measurable even with a colour meter.

So, although the experience of redness is ontologically subjective (as it exists only for the one who is having it) it is also epistemically objective as the redness of the paint is open to view!

Observers may have different abilities, habits, interests, backgrounds etc. that influence their experiences of the paint. These are epistemically subjective features of experience that might result in disagreements. Yet there is seldom disagreement about what there is to see when it's open to see and investigate, e.g. whether the paint is red, whether one patch is darker or lighter or more saturated than another etc.

what if the concept of a “red pen” exists within the realm of every subjective mind’s ideas? — Kizzy

Is a red pen not enough?

That supposedly private object of a colour perception doesn't exist (disregarding hallucinations and manipulation of the perceptual apparatus).

Pigments and light, however, exist, and they are disposed to cause colour perceptions systematically enough to warrant the public labels that they have.

One might add that what exists subjectively (i.e. only for the one who sees the colour) is the seeing, but the object that one sees is the pigment or the reflected bundle of light rays.The seeing is private but the object that is seen is public.

How do we know that mantis shrimp see ultraviolet when it's beyond our own visible spectrum? By hypothetical deduction, photography etc.

You remove the perceiver yet ask how does he know that his perception exists? :roll:

Or do you mean that you remove all perceivers so that the biological phenomenon no longer exists, yet ask how does one know that it exists? Your question makes no sense.

For example, a colour blind person who doesn't see red can still know that there exists such a phenomenon by studying those who can see red, study colour tables, spectrometers etc and find out which of them one is unable to perceive. Being colour blind does not mean that there is a problem in colour science.

If you can be assured there is radiation, why can't you be sure there's red? — Hanover

I'm sure there's red. Do you know of a good reason to doubt colour realism?

Colours are biological phenomena that arise when we and many other organisms interact with our visible environment. When you ask whether a red colour exists outside our view, as something unseen, the question obviously doesn't refer to the colour perception but to conditions in the environment from which it can emerge. There's little reason to doubt the existence of a spectrum of electromagnetic radiation that we by convention label 'red' .

By nature men are alike. Through practice they have become far apart. — Confucius

Men are alike as men, but different by nature. Through practice men become far apart in some respects, but also alike as we have shared interests, cooperate, trade etc. That's how conventions and languages arise. Hence men are alike as men. But also conventions differ and cultures arise that maintain some of the differences.

how under an “in re” realism metaphysic a seemingly new idea (or concept) could come into existence. — Mark Sparks

Realism is the assumption that some things exist independent of us. For example, molecules exist regardless of our discoveries or ways of organizing things.

It does not exclude things whose existence depend on us. For example, money is just as real as molecules but exists only as long as we agree to believe that it exists.

Real things can have different modes of existing, e.g. natural, social, phenomenal. Conscious states, e.g. perceptions and beliefs, are real biological phenomena, and unlike molecules and money they exist only for the ones who have them.

Many ideas exist as conscious states. They come into existence as we use our abilities to think, imagine, perceive etc.

Abstract ideas, e.g. mathematical or logical, seem to have an independent mode of existing as they are discovered and rediscovered by different minds. How do such ideas come into existence? Some things are brute facts, or tautologies, that do not require further explanations.

Is the real world fair and just? — Gnomon

Partly, because the real world includes varying life conditions. We discover what's fair and what isn't, and respond accordingly, e.g. suffer, enjoy, form judgements and complain or praise the particular conditions in which we live. It takes discipline to remain indifferent to the reality of fairness.

I agree. Constituent parts and functions, such as biochemical events, a nerve system etc. are necessary for conscious experience.

The tardigrade goes into a state of cryptobiosis in which its metabolic and other systems shut down. So, after all, it's probably not so reasonable to call it dead.

Entail.[/quote]

I recall seeing a documentary where biologist dehydrates all the cells of a tardigrade, including its metabolic organ, nerve system etc.. Since it becomes a completely dry thing without functioning parts it seems fairly reasonable to call it dead. Later, however, when it is rehydrated, the cells, organs, nerve system etc. start functioning again.

If tardigrades have experiences, then near death experiences are possible. :cool:

How can I know that the experience that I'm having (or remember having) is a near death experience?
— jkop

If you had an NDE it wouldn't be something that easily forgotten. Moreover, you would know based on what others have reported and comparing your experience with theirs.

Just listen to this NDE, it may answer your questions.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ZfaPCwjguk
— Sam26

It's reasonable to believe that her report is sincere. Most reports of NDEs probably are. Nevertheless, there is ambiguity in how perceptual verbs such as 'experience' are used

In one sense 'experience' means the conscious state that arises from brain activity. In another sense it means the objects and states of affairs that the conscious state is about.

By using these two senses ambiguously you can produce intriguingly absurd results. For example, experiences without brain activity, or a world where all objects and states of affairs are made of brain activity. Fallacies of ambiguity.

How can I know that the experience that I'm having (or remember having) is a near death experience?

Is it derived after the experience, e.g. from a doctor telling me that I was dead for a few minutes, plus from remembering having had an experience and deriving that I must have had it near or during those minutes?

Or is it inferred from recognizing or interpreting the experience as a typical near death experience because one has seen alleged near death experiences depicted or described?

I don't know if I've ever had experiences near death, only near unconscious states, such as when falling asleep or experiencing accidents. Extraordinary situations, disorientation, pain etc tend to evoke extraordinary experiences.

I don’t think the badness of something is necessarily dependent on a conscious mind being aware of it or experiencing it in some way. — Captain Homicide

I agree, but some animals such as the octopus die soon after it has become a parent so that its offspring can eat the remains of its body and thus increase their chance of survival. Seems like death is good in some situations.

You assert that there exists some difference between hallucination and reality that can be analysed to show the difference between the two.

I don't see why this difference must exist. I can see that it might exist. But as an a priori for a philosophical position I am deeply sceptical. — Treatid

Well, the most important difference is that the hallucinatory experience is not caused by the things that you experience (e.g. snakes). Instead, the experience is caused by malfunctioning brain processes (possibly evoking memories or imagined snakes) under the influence of drugs or disease or other extraordinary conditions.

The veridical experience, however, is caused by the presence of actual objects and states of affairs (e.g. real snakes). For example, they reflect light into your eyes' photoreceptor cells, which under ordinary conditions causes your brain to produce the visual experience (of the snakes).

Unlike the hallucination, the veridical experience has a continuous and non-detachable interplay with the object that you experience (the real snakes). So when you're looking closer at them, they appear closer in your experience. When you want to look closer at hallucinated snakes, you are not looking closer at anything, and the experience might suddenly disappear as in dreams.

I believe uninteresting phenomena are those that lack primary qualities such as bulk, figure, texture, motion, and so on. — javi2541997

Ideas and abstract objects lack "primary" qualities a la Locke, but can nevertheless be interesting. Many "secondary" qualities are interesting too, e.g. the qualities in music, coloured shapes, food etc.

(Isn't something like that exactly the conundrum that was thrown up by the observer problem in quantum physics?) — Wayfarer

The physics is way over my head, but if there is backwards causation in a block universe and such, then our current understanding of causation might require some additions.

However, scientific realism always pertains to the objective domain, that which can be made an object of analysis, measurement and observation. And the subject who performs that measurement is outside that scope. — Wayfarer

There's scientific knowledge about the subjective domain as well. For example, pains, itches, stress, feelings and thoughts are real phenomena whose mode of existing is subjective, and are therefore studied indirectly via language, analysis of reports, behavior, statistics, shared experiences etc. They are not outside the scope of objective knowledge in medicine, psychology, social sciences, linguistics, philosophy etc. From being ontologically subjective it does not follow that it is also epistemically subjective and outside the scope of objective knowledge.

Humans can name, make an object or thing out of, anything. — T Clark

Only Chuck Norris can do that. :cool: For example, make a fire out of ice, or make wood by rubbing two fires against each other.

There's a good definition - a thing is a phenomenon that holds interest for people. — T Clark

What then is an uninteresting phenomena?

I contest this. — noAxioms

A molecule is a compound of atoms bound by physical fields of force. The relations and structures that these words refer to exist regardless of the words or the social habits of natural scientists.

Money, however, is a social construct that exists only as long as we believe in and comply to conventions of an economic system. Without the conventions money doesn't exist.


A forest is a recognizable object that consists of trees. Neither is a random swarm of unrecognizable gunk from which we construct recognizable objects.

what constitutes an 'object' is entirely a matter of language/convention. There's no physical basis for it. I can talk about the blue gutter and that, by convention, identifies an object distinct from the red gutter despite them both being parts of a greater (not separated) pipe. — noAxioms

Some objects are socially constructed and exist only by conventions, other objects are physical and exist regardless of conventions. Talk of a gutter is conventional, but what it refers to consists of physical parts bound by fields of force into a recognizable whole.

Searle is arguing that two indistinguishable perceptions are distinct becuase... he says so?} — Treatid

No, when you see a tree or hallucinate a tree, some of the same brain processes are employed. Hence their possible indistinguishability as perceptions. You can, however, analyse the conditions under which they occur, which are different. Hence their possible distinguishability by analysis.

However, exceptionally attractive people are much less likely than average to have high goodness, specifically because in their life experience they've been able to skate by on their looks and develop a privileged and self centered personality that most define as very low on the goodness scale. — LuckyR

Hm, I must disagree here. Among the good looking people, some skate by on their looks while others get bullied for having good looks. For example, in our society there is still jocular contempt for blondes or pretty women in general. Being pretty at a work place means that it is easy for the envious or competitive to cast suspicion on your merits and position, because of the widely spread but false assumption that having good looks is almost always a privilege.

Noone observes solipsism, there's no available sensory data of solipsism to encounter, because a solipsist doesn't publish.

The assumption that we never experience objects and states of affairs, only our own sensory data, is based on a long tradition of bad philosophy of perception refuted by more recent philosophers, e.g. Searle.

How do we ensure those who need the medical or psychological treatments get them? — Truth Seeker

For example, by paying our taxes, voting, building and maintaining institutions for public health care and education.

How do we distribute resources evenly amid so much inequality? — Truth Seeker

Which resources? Many resources are unevenly distributed by nature, such as oil, gas, water, crops, knowledge, etc but we redistribute them more evenly by pipelines, vehicles, trade, education/research, adaptation, diversification etc.

How do we replace injustice with justice? — Truth Seeker

Justice doesn't replace injustice, it counteracts and reduces it. One easy way to reduce injustice is by not taking part in it, e.g. don't support bullies, unethical organizations etc

How do we get people to live healthy and peaceful lives? — Truth Seeker

By good examples, shared knowledge and opportunities.

How can we reduce suffering, inequality, injustice, and death? — Truth Seeker

I do not think it’s possible to minimise suffering on global or personal level. — kindred

Suffering is evidently reduced by medicine or psychology, inequality by distribution, injustice by justice, and death is reduced by healthy, peaceful living.

Do you agree that the philosopher must uphold, almost, a fiduciary duty towards the public, in terms of living a certain life? — Shawn

The kids who always talk about being fair and sharing," I recall him saying, "mostly just want you to be fair to them and share with them. — Davy

Help me understand why it is SPECIFICALLY Wittgenstein where I see this?? — schopenhauer1

I recently read an article that has the following quote (translated):

Nothing seems less likely than that a scientist or mathematician reading me could be seriously influenced in his way of working. At best, I can hope to stimulate that a significant amount of crap will be written, and that this in turn might contribute to something good coming into being. — Wittgenstein, 1947