This is nonsense though, for author's like Foucault are hardly that obscure. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Authors like Foucault ain't that clear either. The context of my previous post was that obscurity of expression might be sufficient reason to skip reading a writer, such as Heidegger or the postmodern writers mentioned by McDoodle.

Reading Foucault, it's not hard to understand, for example, that he's not just reducing knowledge to discourse or power. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I never said that he would just reduce knowledge to discourse.

Yeah I guess. :)

Which 'postmodernists' do you think wouldn't accept the result of a DNA test? — csalisbury

Social constructionists might want to challenge the test as anachronistic if the birth in question occurred before the 1980s when testable DNA had yet to be "socially constructed".

Allegedly Bruno Latour has claimed that the ancient pharaoh Ramses II couldn't have died of tuberculosis since it was yet to be socially constructed as a single identifiable disease in the 19th century.

Not only are they against postmodernism, they do indeed have some sort of disdain even to read the people they believe they will disagree with profoundly. More than one told me it was sufficient reason not to read Heidegger that he was a Nazi, for instance, — mcdoodle

Heidegger's obscurity makes him more of a guru than a philosopher, which might be sufficient reason for students or teachers of philosophy to skip some of his work. Being a Nazi is also part of his obscurity.

Obscurity might intrigue us, but we shouldn't take for granted that something with an assumed meaning has a meaning. Meanings can be absent, and obscure jargon can make trivial meanings appear more significant than they are. To skip obfuscatory literature does not mean that we lack curiosity, an open mind, nor ability to comprehend the language. Bullshit wastes lives.

Furthermore, a writer and a reader share a responsibility to maximise comprehensibility. To simply expect one to "qualify as a reader of Foucault" puts all responsibility on the reader, whereby the writer (or his fan) becomes a self-appointed authority on how to interpret the assumed meanings; anything else can be dismissed as a "misreading". But we don't get constructive debates without a shared responsibility or respect for the truth of words.

I think his method is tremendously powerful and is firmly in the philosophical tradition. He reaches back to Plato and Aristotle — mcdoodle

I get that Foucault was a true intellectual, but I think the premise of his method is effectively anti-intellectual, It is arguably related to today's "alternative truths".

I get how the assumption of powers beneath consciousness and beyond logic can have such a deplorable influence on people's respect for argument and the quality of thought.

If uncritical acceptance of his doctrines qualifies a reader of Foucault, then I'm happy to decline. But I was never applying to be "a reader of Foucault", Instead I am criticising claims ascribed to Foucault, his method, and the deplorable influence they have on the quality of thought (for example, in our universities).

Furthermore, your claim is false that I would be opposing argument with power. It is open to read:

The explanatory power of the argument is thus made less significant, or irrelevant even, compared to, say, bribery, good looks, or whatever powers there could be lurking beneath consciousness. — jkop

It is neither equivocation nor misreading to infer that he is, in effect, replacing argument with discourse.

He does so by introducing alleged powers beyond argument, which may compromise the argument even. The explanatory power of the argument is thus made less significant, or irrelevant even, compared to, say, bribery, good looks, or whatever powers there could be lurking beneath consciousness. Hence Foucault sneaks in his own version of "argument": discourse.

Does my use of the word "replace" matter a lot? Foucault's prose is notoriously dense, so let me quote what is written on the subject in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

The premise of the archaeological method is that systems of thought and knowledge (epistemes or discursive formations, in Foucault's terminology) are governed by rules, beyond those of grammar and logic, that operate beneath the consciousness of individual subjects and define a system of conceptual possibilities that determines the boundaries of thought in a given domain and period. — SEP

As I understand it, what governs the outcome of an argument is, then, not the truth of its premises but some force beyond it and beneath our consciousness. That sounds like a rejection of argument to me, and without argument there are just thoughts and discursive formations (e.g. formed by the act of discourse).

Neither did he equate discourse with rhetoric (and indeed spent alot of time and effort trying to disentangle the two). — StreetlightX

I'm sure he did, but did he succeed, or just try, and thus failed to disentangle discourse from rhetoric? Sorry for being so vulgar not being a fan of his.

Not if one is arguing for the benefit of the audience — andrewk

Foucault replaced argument with discourse, recall, so, you don't get to argue at all. Instead there is discourse, and whatever rhetoric you can muster e.g. by word play, charm, bribery, populism... anything but words that refer to facts. Explain the benefit of that.

But my earlier point is, people are often saying this sort of thing, but not citing the apparent purveyors of it. Who are these postmodern 'thinkers'? What is the detail of their claims? How do they get to be so influential? Why is it so hard to name or quote them? It would be good to get to grips with them. — mcdoodle

If one that I dislike has actual social implications, I will argue against it on a political level. But that's arguing against the idea, not against a nebulous 'ism'. — andrewk

What you guys want seems unreasonable. Foucault, for instance, replaced the very idea of argument with discourse, and truth with power (Archaeology of Knowledge). Under such premises it is futile to argue against anyone's detailed ideas.

this is more of a historical period — Moliere

According to Chomsky it was around the 1970s when a group of Parisian intellectuals and maoists (e.g. Julia Kristeva & Co.) could no longer deny the atrocities in Asia for which other maoists had been responsible. So, did they reconsider? No, instead they became outspoken post-structuralists who rejected the self-sufficiency of right, wrong, true, false, good, bad and so on. As I understand it they exploited problems of philosophy as a means to get away with a dubious past.

Not all Parisian intellectuals were maoists, of course. But most of them had (or still have) an obfuscatory style of writing which has the illegitimate benefits of making themselves (or their interpreters) the sole intellectual authorities of their claims, and thereby also immune to criticism. If one does not blindly accept their claims one runs the risk of being intimidated and accused for being ignorant.

I think postmodernism has little to do with philosophy, although demarcation seems to be a recurring theme. Kristeva, Derrida, Baudrillard, Foucault, Deleuze etc. became intellectual rock-stars by making all kinds of outrageous claims embedded in impenetrable jargon which attracted the intellectually curious as well as those with a grudge against established knowledge, skills, or habits.

It is not over yet, though. Currently many professors at our universities are old fans of these rockstars. Most graduates from my school of architecture know very little about how to build, because many of their teachers think it is naive to believe that there would be right or wrong ways to build. As if an absence of right and wrong would make us creative. But the way we build will therefore be determined by power instead of knowledge or rightness. I don't think that's so creative.

Not when the claim is supported by good reasons. But to say that no reason is better than another would be dogmatic, because without the possibility to distinguish the quality of a reason from another one would merely think what is good or true (or whatever some threat or power makes one think) without the support of good reason.

Great! (Y)

Postmodern "thought" is among the most pernicious anti-intellectual movements in modern times. In philosophy it matters little (most of it is sophistry) but in practice it matters quite a lot when teachers and intellectuals obfuscate right and wrong, true and false, good and bad. When large parts of the population no longer know or care about what is right or wrong, they are more susceptible to irrational decisions, unethical management at work, unethical research, or whatever power tells them to think or buy. Only might makes right in a postmodern society.

By distinguishing one's personal experience as a fact from one's personal belief about its meaning or interpretation.

For example, I taste a sip of coffee, and the experience lets me know, directly, what it tastes like. Now I may form a belief about it, predict what the next sip might taste like, under other conditions etc.. My belief can be right, or wrong, because it represents a probable taste of the coffee. The experience, however, doesn't; it gives me direct access to what the coffee is like, its taste is not represented but presented in my conscious awareness. There is no ultimate coffee-taste "in-itself" which each sip would somehow represent more or less successfully (not to be confused with an intended taste that a barista, for instance, might want to achieve as s/he prepares the coffee).

The idea that experiences would be representational is utter nonsense, yet persistent in thought about perception where it is fueled by bad arguments, such as the argument from illusion.

What exactly could be in doubt when you're having a personal experience?

In order to be fallible and something to doubt the experience would have to represent something. There is no point to treat the experience as fallible except under the assumption that it would be a representation, like a description, picture, or a model of what you experience. But I think this assumption is false; experiences are not representations.

An experience is what it is: the conscious awareness of some object or state of affairs under such and such conditions of experiencing it. Then it is neither right nor wrong, just how the object or state of affairs is experienced under such and such conditions, as a matter of fact. Nothing is then represented in a right or wrong way, but presented in your experience.

England, actually (if you're referring to the hosting company). — Michael

No, in PayPal one is asked to choose the currency, and at the forum's subscription page it says $, hence I assumed that this is managed in the USA, or at least that donations should be made in $.

I assume that the site is managed in the USA, so I sent some US $ (via PayPal).

Another thing which can help keep the site going is a secure connection for the login page, as explained here:
https://support.mozilla.org/t5/Protect-your-privacy/Insecure-password-warning-in-Firefox/ta-p/27861
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Insecure_passwords

What philosophical question gets under your skin? — csalisbury

What sometimes gets under my skin is not a particular philosophical question, but the misuse of philosophical questions. For example, when the problem of demarcation in the philosophy of science is used as a means to get away with pseudo-science, fake news, mysticism, or other shady businesses that thrive on a mistrust of the intellect.

A pigeon or human who is deprived from knowledge of how the food is delivered can only speculate, or test whether the delivery of food might have something to do with their behaviour. Is that superstitious belief? No, it's abductive reasoning.

Superstition does not arise from a lack of knowledge alone but from an indifference to knowledge. Superstition satisfies a will to power over matters of fact.

Like radical relativism, superstition provides us with an implied promise that nothing here on earth is absolute, e.g. we don't have to accept mortality, poverty, inequality etc. as absolute determined facts as long as we can mistrust our intellect, or believe in supernatural intervention. Hence the popularity of superstition (as well as relativism).

A democratic military with the capability of separating and fighting our government if need be. — MonfortS26

Who would appoint your "democratic" military if not the citizens or their representatives, i.e. the federal government?

Moreover, without a shared commander of the military you'd have different independent commanders, and the mightiest of them would get to rule what is "right", like a puppet master of the government and the citizens. That's a dictatorship.

They are no longer called proofs. — Frederick KOH

That's because they are not proofs. A proof is sufficient evidence, or sufficient argument, for the truth of a proposition. But the "proofs" you refer to are not sufficient arguments. They are just arguments, hence called arguments.

What makes an argument sufficient for the truth of a proposition is that the argument is valid and sound. Valid means that the truth of the premises entails the truth of the conclusion, and sound means that the argument is valid and all of its premises are true.

Many arguments for the existence of God are valid. But none of them are sound. You don't get to prove anything with an argument that is valid but contains a premise which is false, nonsensical or unknown whether it is true or false.

If the purpose of the military is to protect its citizens, ... — MonfortS26

:-} The military is also used for attack, conquest, or invasion, recall, which has little to do with protection. The US-led invasion of Iraq, for instance, served special interests far more than it protected citizens against alleged "weapons of mass destruction". The idea of protection was misused to mislead the citizens.

By leaving our military under the ultimate control of the federal government aren't we putting ourselves in the likely position of losing our freedoms? Shouldn't military power be divided? — MonfortS26

A federal government is, by definition, a mixed or compound mode of government, and that's how power should be divided in a democracy.

A democracy without government merely amounts to "might makes right", in which case all citizens lose their freedoms because (like what Bitter Crank says about "eternal vigilance") they end up being on guard against each other all the time and everywhere.

One might add that the meaning of 'red' is causally constrained by speakers' interaction with things that emit or reflect em-radiation at 620–740 nm.

There are many more creator-candidates beside god, such as in various pagan myths (nordic, aztec etc.), or the flying spaghetti monster, or some natural phenomenon which caused itself from nothing and became the big bang, and so on. One might also add varieties of non-created universes, such as eternal without beginning, or eternally recurring etc.. Is the probability for god still 50/50? I don't think so.

..they are more interested in creating a problem of meaningless than what is being argued about consciousness. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I agree. It is as if consciousness would have to remain beyond explanation and current scientific principles, no matter what. No reconception, clarification, nor scientific discovery under currently accepted principles would be enough. But who are they to know?

I get criticized a lot for 'obsessing' about Dennett, but it's because he the most prominent advocate of philosophical materialism in modern culture. — Wayfarer

He does not advocate, say, Searle's materialism.

He is, in Aristotle’s words, “maintaining a thesis at all costs.” — Thomas Nagel

Likewise, Nagel seems to maintain the question as unanswerable (or as if it would take some future science).

Therapeutic is not so passive. To do philosophy is a form of training, like physical training in sports. It can make you more fit and qualified to change the world.

... ..is the complex and subtle love experienced by intelligent humans, in some way a real expression of something universal in nature, or of divinity? — Punshhh

Qualities are universal, including qualities we may love. But love is an experience, not a quality, an experience doesn't express anything, rather it makes us express it.

Some of our expressions of love might have universal qualities, as described in love songs, poems, plays and so on. But divine? Why would you muddle the philosophical question with religion?

It became relatively easy to find others to validate shared views already in the 19th century, when a lot of people moved into the cities. Now, would the way contemporary social media propagates opinions have a greater impact, and somehow reduce people's respect for truth? I don't think so. Most people respect truth, especially when they depend on it, e.g. at the doctor's, when buying groceries, or when they agree to do work for a certain salary, and so on.

???

I am not speaking of idealism — Calimero

I don't think this issue has anything to do with idealism.

On the contrary, meaning is completely 'in the head'. — Calimero

Ah. That old subjectivist dogma was decisively refuted in 1976, 1982 etc. by Putnam.

Nobody says there would be a universal cat. The cat is whatever it is that we interact with and thereby refer to as 'cat', a 'feline animal' etc. (the words are arbitrary, not their meaning).

Trump began to fall for that melancholia disguised as Christian mysticism so typical of Slavs. — Mongrel

Really? Trump does not seem melancholic, just hilarious.

Is this not a world where powerful reign? — Calimero

No, because in ordinary speech a word such as 'cat' truly means the feline animal, regardless of your power. If some mad military who happens to hate cats would, by force, manage to change all speakers' use of the word's meaning, there would still be other words that mean the same feline animal. The meaning ain't in the word, nor in people's heads, nor in what they're told to think about, but in what they actually interact with: the feline animal.

Meaning is truly unique and perspectival. — Calimero

Truly? :-}

In a world where nobody believes in shared truths only the powerful reign, and the wise with uncomfortable truths are easily dismissed as having inferior perspectives. Perspectivism has become an ideology in favour of the powerful, ignorant, and careless; their actions would never be wrong, their statements never false, at least not in any way that would make them change their actions or statements.

People now use words to describe whatever they decide they mean, accepting no authority over their own opinion. It has got so bad, it is impossible to communicate any more, ... — ernestm

Those people are not describing anything, they're prescribing or pushing their own arbitrary meanings, typically whenever it suits them. For example, when a redefinition of a word saves them from having to admit a lie, or from changing their opinion or ideology.

Throughout history ideologues or liars have relied on the possibility to define or redefine the meanings of words as it suits them.

So, this phenomenon that some call "post-truth" is probably as old as our language, or older even considering the fact that also some animals who don't speak a language can act deceptively as a means to benefit from it.

What's this talk about inevitable misunderstandings?

Both author and interpreter are obliged to comply to the rules and vocabulary of the language that they use.

An interpretation is proper or acceptable when it complies to what is actually there to read, regardless of whether it deviates from the author's alleged intent.

An interpretation is improper or unacceptable when it does not comply to what is there to read, and regardless of whether it would comply to the author's alleged intent.

Likewise, the author's published text can be either proper or improper, acceptable or unacceptable, depending on whether it complies to the rules and vocabulary of the language s/he is using.

Misunderstandings happen, of course, because of mistakes, insufficient language skills, or egocentrics, relativists, or ideologues who might attempt to redefine our language as it suits them.