Ha, ha, very funny.

So I'll go back to a point I made earlier, that even if she is wrong about what Descartes said, she may not be wrong about how the hegemony of the solitary white male has mislead philosophy. — Banno

I take it that no one wants to address the issue of the philosopher's (whether the philosopher is a solitary white man or not) relationship with the divine. It appears to me like the issue is not the hegemony of any particular human being, but that of the divinity which some appear to establish a relationship with.

To exist is one thing, and Berkeley gives me no reason for supposing that existence of anything depends on being perceived or judged to exist. I can make some sense of the idea that anything that exists is capable of being perceived - especially if indirect perception is allowed. — Ludwig V

To "exist" is not well defined, and we tend to use it in whatever way we find suitable for the occasion.

Berkeley is no doubt relying on his argument against abstract objects. It supplies a way of accommodating abstract objects in his system, but is not obviously effective in the absence of his axiom. But his introduction of the notion of "notions" undermines his slogan, since he accepts the existence of my own mind and other minds, and God, even though they are not (directly) perceived. It is clear that he accepts that they are not (directly) perceived, because he introduces notions to get around the problem that my ideas do not themselves include the idea of myself. It's the same objection that was raised against the cogito. — Ludwig V

I agree, it is likely that a thorough analysis would reveal that minds don't actually "exist" if we adhere to Berkeley's principles. That is the problem I referred to earlier, which inclines me to think that we need to bring matter in, through the back door. He provides no principles to provide a separation between one mind and another, or a human mind from God's mind. If we want to conceive of separate minds we need something (like matter) to separate them. Having distinct and separate ideas, in itself, does not suffice because something needs to separate the ideas, one from another.

One of Berkeley's principles is "esse" is "percipi aut percipere", which, on the face of it and in fact, is false. He seems to treat this as a axiom, so I don't know why he believed it. — Ludwig V

I don't understand why you would say this. How can you conclude that the principle is false? To be, or as you state it, "esse", is to be something, and that means to have been judged as having a whatness, or "what it is". This, "what it is", is a judgement based on perception. You cannot dissociate the whatness from the judgement, to give a thing an independent whatness, or "esse", because the whatness. "what it is", is a product of the judgement.

The point was the reality of our communion with the divine. It shows that Midgley's representation ("Philosophers have generally talked for instance as though it were obvious that one consciousness went to one body, as though each person were a closed system") is a strawman. Philosophers, in general, do not represent an individual's consciousness as a closed system.

But the true way to understand that the individual consciousness is not a closed system, is through one's internal communion with the divine (like Socrates' daimon), not to apprehend the connection as an external relationship with other consciousnesses. The external relations, with the misgivings of lies, deception, disappointments, and the general failures of communication with others, only reinforces the feeling of isolation. Yet the internal relation with the divine remains the most true and honest, allowing for one to really "break free" from isolation.

Nature of the Higher Realm: Plato describes a transcendent realm that is "colourless, utterly formless, intangible" and accessible only to true knowledge (epistēmē). This description emphasizes the abstract and non-physical nature of the One beyond being and non-being. In this metaphysical domain, the only faculty capable of perceiving this is reason (nous). Plato often characterises reason as the pilot or charioteer of the soul, guiding it towards true knowledge. This underscores the idea that reason, rather than sensory perception, is what allows the soul to apprehend the true nature of reality. — Wayfarer

The logic of "being and non-being", represents the discrete nature of the reality of "now". At each moment as time passes, there is a true representation of what is and what is not at that precise moment. Since this is a static form, a true "what is" at each precise moment in time, it transcends the sensory realm of what we know as the physical world. Sensory perception gives us a projection of continuous activity, rather than discrete moments of "what is". It is only reason which can lead us beyond the illusion of temporal continuity which our material bodies present our conscious minds with, through the unreliable, and deceptive, sense organs.

This is the way out of Plato's cave. If you study Augustine, you'll see that he takes up this position very strongly. The importance of "the free will", is the strength of will power. The free will allows us to separate ourselves from the temporal world of sensory diversions, to focus on the eternal principles, "being and non-being", and the true nature of reality.

Yes, that's exactly how Berkeley presents his argument - officially - and why he thinks he can maintain that he doesn't deny the existence of anything that exists. (Notice how ambiguous that is - he doesn't deny the existence of anything that exists, but then he doesn't think that matter exists.)
His book was met with widespread ridicule, as the anecdote about Dr. Johnson illustrates. Another illustration of that ridicule is the name given to his doctrine ("immaterialism"). In case you hadn't noticed, it is a pun. His text is full of references to philosophical ideas being laughed at.
I don't know whether he didn't really know what he thought or he was upset by all the ridicule, he equivocates, oscillating between presenting his immaterialism as common sense (especially in the Dialogues and as a technical dispute within philosophy and between presenting his doctrine as a revolution in thought and as requiring no significant changes at all. — Ludwig V

What Berkeley did was ridicule the common notion of "matter", and this invited a reciprocation of the ridicule. The difference is that Bishop Berkeley's ridicule of the common notion of "matter" was well formulated and based in solid principles, whereas the reciprocated ridicule was more like a knee-jerk reaction.

Notice, that "matter" represents the temporal continuity of existence (as you say, what persists through change) and this is presented to us through sense perception. Isaac Newton had represented matter as having the property of inertia, and his first law takes inertia for granted. But Newton had said that this law is really dependent on the Will of God. Bishop Berkeley merely emphasizes this point.

Now, when Hume removes God, and portrays temporal continuity as something produced within human intuition, by representing sense perceptions as distinct instances, discrete impressions, instead of portraying the sense organs as providing us with continuous activity, he makes a false description. So Bishop Berkeley is ridiculed for his appeal to God to support the temporal continuity of existence, but this appeal is derived from sound principles, whereas Hume is able to remove God, but he does so by using false premises.

There was a general realisation that doubt cannot be the whole of philosophical method. — Banno

Does Midgley address the philosopher's appeal to God?

.Philosophers have generally talked for instance as though it were obvious that one consciousness went to one body, as though each person were a closed system... — ENOAH

Through the mystical method, philosophers often claim to have union with a divine source. Unlike Moses and "the burning bush" portrayal, the mystic's communion with the divinity is internal. Consider Socrates and his "daimon" for example. The common form is "prayer".

Yes. But, for me, the unintelligibility of matter is not a conclusion, but a problem. If you were to present this conclusion to Berkeley, he would conclude that matter didn't exist, and I would not be able to explain why he is wrong. — Ludwig V

I can tell you why matter doesn't exist, in a very simple and straight forward way. "Matter" is an Aristotelian concept, and the conceptual structure is arranged so that the form of a thing is what has existence. Matter, as the potential of a thing, simply does not exist, and that's why it's so easy for Berkeley to argue this, and why it seems to make logical sense, what he argues, even though intuitively we would expect otherwise. So it's really not a matter of "why he is wrong", he's not wrong. The real question is why do our intuitions lead us toward believing that he must be wrong. And the answer to this, is that we've grown up being exposed to a common usage of "matter", which propagates a faulty intuition. The faulty intuition is that matter inheres within the independent thing, supporting its unperceived (independent) existence. The intuition if faulty because "matter" is really just a concept, used to account for the apparent persistence or continuity of the object, while the true nature of the supposed persistence and continuity of the object is really an unknown. So "matter" is not something inhering within the object, as our basic education leads us to believe, it is just a concept used to stand in for this unknown aspect of the object.

From this perspective, the unintelligibility of matter is not a problem but rather a solution to a problem. The problem is that the human intellect is not omniscient, it is deficient and lacking in the capacity to understand the complete reality, especially what is commonly represented as the continuous existence of the separate, or independent object. That there is an unintelligible aspect of reality, in itself, is only a problem to the philosophically minded, who have a desire to know the complete reality. But this mindset, this desire to know, pervades through all the sciences as they work to probe the unknown, and attempt to expand the overall body of knowledge. To be integrated into the body of knowledge, the new knowledge must be made consistent with the existing body. The unintelligible lurks as that which cannot be made consistent.

There are two distinct approaches to the unintelligible. The simple approach is to hide the unintelligible within the knowledge, as vagueness, ambiguity, rendering a knowledge which has a level of certainty that is compromised overall. This is the approach of "formalism". It dismisses the importance of content (subject matter, which is the unintelligible), but in doing this it allows the unintelligible content to inhere within the form. This compromises the resulting knowledge because the unintelligible permeates the entirety and there are no principles to distinguish the intelligible aspects from the unintelligible, allowing fallibility into the whole body of knowledge. The solution to this problem is to provide a clear separation of the form (as intelligible) from the content (as unintelligible matter), right from the outset. This leaves an outlined realm of "the unintelligible" as distinct and separate from the body of "the intelligible", as knowledge, allowing for the process of skepticism to analyze "the intelligible", the existing body of knowledge, in a way which would determine why this existing body of knowledge renders specific aspects of reality as incompatible, unintelligible. That is why designating matter as "the unintelligible" is really not a problem but a solution to the problem.

I'm sure you know about the controversy about Hume's atheism. I don't think there is a determinate answer about what he "really" believed. But the Enquiry is perfectly clear. He rejects rational arguments for God's existence and Christianity, but believes in them on faith, which he acknowledges is a miracle. — Ludwig V

Yes, this is the point. Hume does not allow "God" as a principle or premise for any logical proceedings, he would dismiss this as unsound. Therefore he would not be able to accept Berkeley's use of God to support the continued existence of objects when not being perceived by a human being. So, he turns things around (whether intentionally or not is irrelevant), as I tried to explain. The continuous existence of objects is not taken for granted by Hume as it is by Berkeley.

Berkeley portrays perception as the sensation of continuously existing objects, and God supports that continuity when humans aren't looking. So continuity is inherent within perception. But for Hume, perception consists of instances, distinct impressions, which he makes compatible with distinct ideas. This puts continuity as something which happens between distinct perceptual impressions. So continuity becomes a big problem for Hume. How does a perceptual impression at one moment link up, or connect to an impression at another moment? It is not reason which does this associating, because the rational mind works with distinct ideas, and the relating of them, one to another. The relating of sense impressions is a sort of natural, intuitive process which is not an act of reason. This is why he classes all the aspects of temporal continuity, induction and causation, as something other than reason.

What I said earlier though, is that Hume has this wrong, because sense perception really consists of the perception of activity, which in itself is a representation of temporal continuity. So really Berkeley's representation of sensation as continuously existing objects, therefore active and changing objects is a more true representation. Then the real problem, or breakdown, is between the reasoning mind which deals with distinct ideas, and sense perception which gives us continuity. Hume's representation, which makes sensation consist of distinct perceptions, in order to establish consistency between the mind's distinct ideas, and sense perception, is a false premise, designed to bridge this problem, this breakdown between the mind and the senses.

I didn't express myself clearly. There are ordinary uses of "appear" and "real" that are perfectly in order. The stick in water appears to be bent, but isn't "really". — Ludwig V

This is exactly the point. That the stick really isn't bent needs to be supported with principles. Now we are into logic, premises like refraction, etc., and sense perception is relegated to being unreliable. So we have no grounds to accept that what sense perception gives us is in any way "real", it is unreliable. And the skeptic is completely justified.

But when we posit a world of "appearances" (or "experiences") that exist independently of the entities that they are appearances of, we are seriously mistaken. — Ludwig V

Why would you say this? The "appearances" are what sense perception provides to the mind. The mind determines that these appearances are often faulty and misleading, like the bent stick example. If the mind can prove that the appearances are sometimes faulty and misleading, then why not accept the possibility that the appearances are always faulty and misleading? The appearances are a creation of the human body, it creates them with its nervous system, and they are a form of representation. Consider other forms of representation now, like language, signs and symbols. The signs and symbols are created in a completely different context from when they are later applied. So there is no reason not to think that the appearances (like signs and symbols) exist within a realm (the mind) which is independent from the things which it applies them to. Consider dreaming for example, the mind has a whole arsenal of images (appearances) which are independent, and which it can apply.

I'm afraid I'm not quite on board with this. It makes sense on its own terms. I thought matter was posited to account for things persisting through change, and that in any case, for Aristotle, if not others, the object of perception of things is their form (or maybe perceptible form?). But I don't recognize Berkeley here.
For Berkeley, the mind-independent existence of anything is ruled out by "esse" is "percipi". That principle is why he rules out matter as not merely unnecessary but impossible. — Ludwig V

I find this to be a bit scrambled but I'll see what I can do to sort it out with my understanding of Berkeley. First, I do not think that Berkeley could, even if he tried, prove that matter is impossible. The materialist, he explains, assumes" matter" to account for the continued existence of bodies when not being perceived. This is 'the need' for "matter". Berkely avoids this need with the assumption of God. Instead of being material, bodies can exist independently of human minds, as ideas, by being in the mind of God.

I believe that the notion of mind-independence is a bit misleading when interpreting Berkeley. Things not apprehended by my mind, may still exist independently of my mind, if they are apprehended by your mind or someone else's, as you acknowledge. So things not apprehended by any human mind might still be apprehended by God's mind. All things are mind dependent as things, and this makes "matter" in the sense described, completely unnecessary. It doesn't prove that "matter" is impossible, and I can show you how matter must be allowed, in through the back door.

Berkeley allows that separate people have separate minds, and God's mind is separate from human minds. But I do not think that he adequately addresses the issue of what provides for the separation between one mind and another. So we need a concept like "matter" to provide for the separation between minds.

As for Aristotle's concept of matter, it is primarily defined in his physics, as you say, as what persists through change. However, since the form of the thing is what actually changes, then the matter is said to provide the potential for change. That's how matter escapes the law of excluded middle, as potential, what neither is nor is not. And this is why it is the aspect of the world which is unintelligible to us. So the supposed underlying aspect of a thing which persists through change, matter, is completely unintelligible to us.

Not sure who "he" is here. But Berkeley certainly dispenses with matter altogether. It has no place in his world. God supplies all that is needed to explain our sensations of things, and explains change. I'm not sure whether his concept of ideas matches the idea of forms, but it certainly seems possible. — Ludwig V

Yes, I agree Berkeley dispenses with matter, as unnecessary, but not as disproven. And, as I explained above, his way of dispensing of it leaves a hole in our understanding of reality, what separates one mind from another mind, and human minds from God's mind. So he leaves the back door open, for matter to take on a new position in his form of idealism. Therefore dualism is not avoided.

I'm not sure about this at all. I agree that, for Hume, relations between ideas are created (by association) in our minds. I found him curiously silent on Berkeley's issue. I have the impression that the existence of external, mind-independent objects is not explicitly ruled out. My speculation is the Hume did not want to get caught up in Berkeley. — Ludwig V

I believe the principal difference between Hume and Berkeley is that Hume didn't believe in God. This is why he turned things around, as I described. He had to put sensations, sense impressions, as prior to ideas, because the independent things could not be conceived of as existing as ideas. Ideas are derived from sense impressions, so that there is a sort of separation between these two, whereas Berkeley saw no need to make such a distinction.

Well, "reject" is perhaps too strong and too simple. How could I not recognize the difference between appearance and reality? Whether it is consistent with how I experience things is one issue.
But our senses tell us about the world we live in, so long as we are suitably critical of what they seem to be telling us. Somehow they have become a VR headset which is an obstacle to our knowing that the world is "really" like and probably feeding us nothing but lies. It's a fantasy and the granddaddy of conspiracy theories. (OK, that's a caricature. It's only meant to show the direction of travel.) — Ludwig V

This is where we completely differ. How can you possibly distinguish between appearance and reality? Once you accept that there is such a distinction to be made, you plunge yourself into a quagmire because you need to provide principles by which you would distinguish between the two. But anything produced would be a principle, and not something sensed. So being "suitably critical" of what our senses tell us really means nothing more than being skeptical. And I guess you might describe the skeptical position as "the senses are feeding us nothing but lies", but really it's just that they don't show us the way reality truly is. And I believe science has already proven this, so where's the big problem with skepticism?

I'm wondering how Berkeley might distinguish between an idea having a cause "that is not me" and an idea having a cause that is me, but of a sort of causality that Berkley doesn't understand. — wonderer1

This is the issue I refer to above, the separation between one mind and another mind, between human minds and God's mind. Berkeley provides no good principles to account for this separation, and that allows us to bring "matter" in through the back door, as that which separates individual minds, and keeps a distinction between God's mind and human minds.

Perhaps mess and muddle is an inescapable part of human life? And then, the attempt to escape also becomes an inescapable part of human life. Perhaps the best thing to do is to embrace mess and muddle - but then, what would become of philosophy? — Ludwig V

I think philosophy is the embracing of mess and muddle.

Well, the first half of that is a bit unorthodox. — Ludwig V

Notice, that for Berkeley "matter" is presented as a concept which would commonly be used to account for the supposed independent existence of the things (noumena). However, he shows that "matter" is really an unnecessary supposition, it is not actually required to be assumed as part of the independent thing to understand its independent existence. This implies that "matter" is actually a concept use to account for the sense appearance of things (phenomena).

Look at it like this. He shows that if we take "matter" out of the thing, we lose nothing from our conceptions of independent things. That is because our conceptions are formal (in the Aristotelian sense of form). Nevertheless, regardless of what Berkeley shows, we find that "matter" is indispensable to the understanding of our sensations of things. This is because we sense things as active, changing, and Aristotle introduced "matter" as the means for understanding the potential for change.

Incidentally, Hume seems to reverse this perspective in his critique of skepticism. He represents sense perception as consisting of instances of changeless states of being, with activity or change being inferred as what occurs between these describable instances or states of sensation. If this is reality, then the forms of things are what we perceive through sensation, and "matter" is added by the mind to account for what happens to the independent things between these instances of sensation.

In each case, "matter" maintains its Aristotelian base as the potential for change, and the unintelligible aspect of reality. Berkeley, like Kant (with space and time) positions matter as something a priori, created within the human body or mind, as a necessary condition for sense perception, but not necessary for the independent existence of things. Hume turns this around and leaves matter as an a posteriori concept created by the mind in order to understand the independent existence of things which are sensed, rather than as necessary for the sense appearance of things. This he does in his effort to quell skepticism. But Hume misrepresents sensation as consisting of instances, or states of being, rather than consisting of continuous activity. So Hume's attack on skepticism is supported by falsity.

Perhaps so. However, I've always thought that Kant essentially accepts Berkeley, especially his argument that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities doesn't hold up, so that time and space are mind-dependent, as well as colour, etc. Including matter in that argument makes sense. Once you have accepted the distinction between reality and appearance, ideas and things, phenomena and noumena, that conclusion is more or less inevitable. The only way out is to reject, or at least recast, the distinction. — Ludwig V

Why reject it though, when it seems to be completely consistent with how I experience things? Time and space are not the properties of any things, nor are they in any way a part of the form of a thing, they are the basis for the conceptual tools by which we understand the activities of things. And what we sense is these activities, while the mind distinguishes things, as aspects of the sensations which appear to maintain sameness. Whether this sameness, continuity, which appears within our sensations of activity, and is constitutive of being and existence, is real or not is the object of skepticism.

Only in that the visionary was not in charge of making policy during his lifetime and is not in charge of making policy after he's dead. I.e. never. — Vera Mont

The point though, is that another visionary just takes up the idea, and actually takes charge of enacting policy.

Certainly, but I cannot call them benevolent. — Vera Mont

That's just your subjective opinion.

Sorry I can't respect them all equally. — Vera Mont

I know you can't. You make the blanket generalization of assuming that those who have visions, but do not move toward bringing their visions to policy are "good", and those visionaries who move toward enacting the policies are evil. So be it, you've expressed your opinion.

Let me rephrase .. I hope we can have productive discussions elsewhere on TPF! — AmadeusD

From how you've shown yourself in this thread I don't see that as likely. You need to actually address the things which another has said, and show your reasons for disagreement, instead of repeatedly asserting that the other's position is erroneous, absurd, etc., if you really want a productive discussion.

What she may be trying to express, though rather badly, is that philosophers, however transcendent their thought, ought not to disengage from the mess and muddle of ordinary human life. I think that's true and important. — Ludwig V

Yeah, and when philosophers disengage from ordinary human life, that's when their own lives become a real mess and muddle.

So Berkeley was wrong to think that sense observation doesn't imply the existence of matter? — Ludwig V

That's not what I' saying. There is a very fine line to understand here. I believe that Berkeley did not claim that sense observation doesn't imply the existence of matter, he showed that the concept of "matter" is not required to understand the reality of independent things. This puts "matter" in a peculiar position. It is required to understand sense observations, but not required to understand the reality of independent existence. Therefore we can infer that matter is a feature the human system which makes sense observations, just like Kant says space and time are.

I'm sure we'll have more productive exchanges elsewhere on TPF! — AmadeusD

Another example of how you make faulty assertions. It seems like you have a tendency to claim that you are sure about things, when your professed certainty really has no foundation, or support of any kind.

Anybody can 'interpret' it, subsection it, misapply it, misdirect it any way they want. — Vera Mont

I don't see how this significantly differs from when the person is alive. The difference is that when the person is alive one might attempt to interfere and correct the interpreter. But in most cases, they do not bother unless the interpretation is seriously offensive.

Paul ran with an idea Jesus had and made a complete hash of it. Lenin did similarly with Marx. And poor old Rousseau did not fare any better at the hands of Robespierre. The ones who enact are not the visionaries and not usually benevolent and the 'influence' is not reflected very well in the actuality that ensues. — Vera Mont

All those mentioned, Paul, Lenin, and Robespierre, are visionaries in their own right. I don't see how the fact that one visionary makes use of the ideas of another, and may be argued to misinterpret the other, alters the fact that the visionaries are the ones who enact the policies. It just relegates the original to secondary, as i said about Plato. But since the supposed "original" visionary derives ideas from a previous source. the infinite regress you are setting up is just a distraction from the reality of the situation. That reality is, the truth of the matter which you refuse to respect, and that is that visionaries really do enact policies, and where they derive their ideas from is not relevant to this truth. The very thing which you assert that visionaries never do, "make social policy, determine legal, ethical and moral codes", is actually impossible to do, if one is not a visionary. The non-visionaries are simple followers.

In case you wonder way I stray from the op, it's because, based on what I've read here, I totally agree that this is “trivial, irrelevant intrusion of domestic matters into intellectual life". Therefore nothing more needs to be said.

I find the discussion on celibacy to be similar to old school thoughts on celibacy in male athletes. It was commonly thought that male athletes ought to practise celibacy to improve performance. That sort of nonsense has been thoroughly debunked and we could call it a "trivial, irrelevant intrusion of domestic matters into [athletic] life".

Thanks for the overview of Aristotle. It does make sense overall, doesn't it?

Your version makes him seem much closer to Plato than some others that I have seen. — Ludwig V

What I find is that Plato provided a very thorough analysis of Pythagorean idealism. In doing this, he exposed its faults. Aristotle paid close attention to this, and took Plato as rejecting this form of idealism. The Neo-Platonists on the other hand seem to represent Plato as accepting Pythagorean idealism. That forms the principal difference between Aristotle's school and the Neo-Platonist school.

In numerous places, Aristotle criticized those who would represent Forms which were supposed to be incorporeal, with images that could not be conceived of, as other than corporeal. Aristotle insisted that the first principle, which is necessarily immaterial, must be truly immaterial. There's a section in Metaphysics for example, where he criticizes Pythagorean/Neo-Platonist ideas through an analysis of the different senses of "one", or "unity", showing how this conception cannot be derived from anything other than material principles, therefore cannot form a proper immaterial conception.

Ok? — Lionino

The point now, is that for Aristotle, "to subsist", therefore to be substance, is to have form. And, form does not require matter, so this validates the substantial existence of immaterial forms, i.e. the subsistence of immaterial forms. However, the separate, independent, subsistent forms reveal themselves to us, or are evident to us, through sensation, as material things, particulars, or individuals, and so there is the appearance that their substance is material.

But critical analysis of the intellectual experience shows that "matter" is something added by the sensing subject, a condition of the subject, not proper to the thing itself, in a similar way to how Kant describes space and time as added by the sensing subject. This necessitates dualism, because independent forms are real and subsistent, yet matter is also real as inherent within the intellectual, sentient being. This perspective just inverts the common notion of dualism which puts the immaterial as internal and the material as external. It puts the material as internal and the immaterial as external.

A good example here would be the well-known fact that that physics reveals a physical world that is almost completely insubstantial. "Substantial" and "real" have a meaning in the context of physics, but not one that meets the demands of this philosophical wild-goose chase. Berkeley was wrong about many things, but about this, he was right. — Ludwig V

Consider what I wrote in reply to Lionino above. Physics, as science in general, can only know the forms of the world. And, as Berkeley demonstrated, there is no need to assume that there is any material aspect to the supposed independent world. This, it appears, ought to make physics capable of apprehending and comprehending the entirety of the independent world. However, there is a fundamental problem, science understands through sense observation, and sense observation instills "matter" into the phenomena. This produces what @Wayfarer likes to call the blind spot of science.

Not arbitrarily, but to fill in an oversight. I had neglected to point out earlier that people make national policy and religious doctrine while they are alive.
You eventually returned with a list of men who wrote books, that may later have influenced the thinking of men who made policy and revolution. None of the resulting policies and actions, AFAIK, yielded the outcome envisioned by the writers. — Vera Mont

I don't see how whether the ideas are adopted when the person is alive or dead is relevant to what we were talking about. You said: "Do these big-picture individuals attempt to communicate their vision? Of course they do. Do they make social policy, determine legal, ethical and moral codes?
No, never."

Clearly, whether the social policy is enacted before or after the person is dead, is irrelevant to the question of whether these people are the ones who "make" the policies.

Not by contact with human minds. That is incoherent. — AmadeusD

Let me remind you, that it was your words, you, who said the good comes in contact with human minds. You said: "It literally doesn't come into contact with anything but human minds."

I am having great difficulty trying to understand what you are saying. Now you are saying that what you said earlier is incoherent. What are you trying to say?

Good's are literally an invention of human minds. — AmadeusD

The issue is not whether goods are an invention of human minds, it is a question of whether these things, which you insist are created by human minds can transcend those minds.

Suppose for example, we name a concept "X", and we define X as a thing which transcends human minds. Clearly X must transcend human minds or else it is self-contradicting and incoherent, therefore not a concept. Since it is a very real possibility, and not contradictory at all, to propose such a concept, one which transcends human minds, then there is no logical basis for the rejection of such a proposition, the concept "X" which transcends human minds. Therefore regardless of whether the concept X is created by a human mind, it cannot be rejected on any principles of logic, and it must necessarily, by definition, transcend human minds.

It is very clear that what you are asserting is illogical. You claim that the supposed fact that human minds create goods, implies that goods cannot transcend human minds. This would mean that only a human mind could create a good. So here's another way that your position may be refuted. Your mind is not my mind. My mind creates its own goods, and your mind creates its own goods. My goods may transcend your mind, and your goods may transcend my mind. Unless you can prove that only a human mind could create a good, then we must allow that there could be goods which transcend all human minds, perhaps created by a mind which is not human. And clearly we have evidence of such goods. Birds build nests, and other animals make homes for themselves, so all these creatures produce their own goods, with their own minds, and these goods transcend all human minds.

And it simply means in scholastics "something that exists by itself", there is no problem conceiving something immaterial that exists by itself unless you are a close-minded physicalist. — Lionino

From Aristotle, "something that exists by itself", is commonly translated as "subsists", and this is understood as "having subsistence", therefore "exists by itself" is a predicate.

What's going on here is even weirder than that. Latin has a perfectly good equivalent for ousia, "being" in "esse". But somehow that got used for the Aristotle's phrase "en tôi ti esti" - literally "what it is to be". (Obviously, he can't find an actual Greek word for what he has in mind. His Metaphysics is riddled with his coinages.) — Ludwig V

"What it is to be", is the essence, or form of a thing. There's a very complex and difficult section of Aristotle's Metaphysics in which he explains how forms, or essences, must subsist. He does this through reference to "the good". It is impossible that the good itself is other than the form, or essence, of the good. And yet it is necessary that there is such a thing as the good. Therefore the good, must subsist, as a form or essence.

Further, he argues that all things, particulars, or individuals, must subsist, and each one's subsistence must be identical to its form or essence. For anyone who does not understand the concept of "matter" in Aristotle, this appears to leave no place for matter, because a thing itself is nothing other than its form, as indicated by the law of identity. However, matter as the potential for change. is understood as a general principle, and is therefore not properly a part of the thing itself.

They all may well have influenced people, even long after they were dead, but in their lifetime, they changed not one dot or iota of public policy or prevailing morality or general standards of behaviour. — Vera Mont

I think you are wrong, and these people did effect changes within their lifetimes. However that little disagreement is irrelevant because the condition of "in their lifetime" has been arbitrarily added by you anyway

You just ignored my question. You didn't do what was asked. — AmadeusD

I explained to you why your question was ridiculous and unanswerable because it was based on the false premise. You asked me to point to a good, when goods are not the type of things which can be pointed to. You, yourself, even affirmed that the premise of your question was false, later in your post when you, stated that a good doesn't come into contact with anything but a human mind. Therefore it was already clear to you that you were asking me a question which assumed a falsity, and your question was nothing but trickery.

And if you are thinking that because goods come into contact with human minds, they must come into contact with a human mind, to be a good, then this is faulty logic. That would imply that goods are only created through contact with human minds.

Examples of what I mean by things that aren’t immoral but you shouldn’t want to be the kind of person that does them include living your life in a drugged stupor like the lotus eaters of Greek mythology or someone who wants to do nothing in life but cover themselves in filth and watch Salo on repeat. — Captain Homicide

I think that any time you state a general rule such as "you shouldn't want to be the kind of person that does... (X)", this statement represents a moral judgement. Anything represented by (X) here is judged as bad in some way. Therefore it is a moral judgement, because to judge a type of activity as bad, is a moral judgement.

If, on the other hand, you were to state "I would not want to be the kind of person that does...(X)", in full respect that others may want to be the kind of person that does... (X), and there is no problem with that, then you simply state a matter of personal preference. It is when you say "you shouldn't want to...", imposing your personal preference upon others, that you turn the statement into a moral statement.

Could you give some examples of benevolent visionaries who made national policy or church doctrine? — Vera Mont

In ancient times we could begin with Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas. And since these three were greatly influenced by Plato, we could designate him as having a secondary role. In more modern times we might consider philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, and even Marx.

I understand that you are refusing to engage with what you have obviously understood: — AmadeusD

Sorry Amadeus, I have no idea what your talking about. All you have done is made incorrect assertions. First you said that my supposition is erroneous, so I corrected you on that. It is not erroneous, but debatable, as suppositions often are. Now you are simply asserting that my position makes not sense.

Well, of course my position makes no sense to you. You dismiss my supposition as erroneous, without bothering to debate it. So be it, continue to live in your narrow-minded world.

Do they make social policy, determine legal, ethical and moral codes?
No, never. — Vera Mont

Never say "never". You appear to be not well educated in the history of humanity.

'Supposed' is the operative word here. And that supposition is erroneous. Point to the Good, sans human interaction? — AmadeusD

That is correct, "supposed" is the operative word here, and its selection was deliberate. However, whether or not the supposition is erroneous is debatable, that's why I used that term rather than "known" or something like that. Therefore the mistake is yours, to assert that the supposition is erroneous, when the truth or falsity of it is unknown.

You ask a very ridiculous question, point to something without interacting with it. To sense it, thereby point to it, requires interaction, so I dismiss your question as nonsense. The way that we come to know that the supposition of an independent "good" is a requirement, necessary, is a logical process. The independent good is not something sensed, whereby we might point to it, it is determined to be real through logical necessity.

It literally doesn't come into contact with anything but human minds. — AmadeusD

See, you even knew that the good is not something which could be pointed to. Therefore I am justified in dismissing your question as an act of deception, and you, as the fool who thought that they could get away with such an obvious deception.

But there are different kinds of knowing... — Wayfarer

I agree, and this is what makes epistemology so difficult. Epistemologists will try to reduce all knowledge to one category, one description or definition, which could encompass all knowledge. But this creates all sorts of problems because "knowledge" in its widest sense would include all sorts of fringe forms, like the knowledge which other life forms have, and the fundamentals like genetics and DNA. These fringe forms of knowledge present us with a kind of knowledge which we don't understand, "knowledge" which is not known by the common kind of "knowledge" which human beings are observed to have and use with their conscious and intentional interactions with their environment. I'll call this the "unintelligible" knowledge because it seems to escape our capacity to understand it.

So, the epistemologists will attempt to limit their definition of "knowledge" to the kind of knowledge which human beings employ in their interactions with their environment, thereby assuming a sort of boundary or separation between this type of knowledge, and the rest of the realm of "knowledge" which consists of that unintelligible type of knowledge which they cannot properly understand, define or describe. In reality though, the epistemological form of "knowledge" is just a small part of the overall wider form of knowledge. And, since it is a part of that unintelligible type of knowledge, the unintelligible actually inheres within it, as that unintelligibility is a feature of all the vast forms of knowledge. This means that the epistemologist's attempt to describe, or define a form of "knowledge" which is specific to human beings, and does not partake in the unintelligible aspect, is a mistaken venture. That is demonstrated in Plato's Theaetetus.

So, if we take Plato's divided line analogy, we find that common knowledge, what the epistemologists want to define as "knowledge" occurs around the centre, of the line, with two distinct categories on both sides of the centre. The centre division is the what Aristotle described in his Nicomachean Ethics as the division between practical and theoretical knowledge. Knowledge of forms, theory, are on the 'upper' side of the centre divide, and application to the sensible world, practise, is on the 'lower' side. Toward each extreme we head toward the more "pure" types of each, practise and theory, and as Aristotle explained, at each end the guiding principle is intuition.

The problem with the epistemological definition of "knowledge", is that by adhering to the centre portion, it attempts to exclude intuition from "knowledge", as not a valid form of "knowledge". This neglects the fact that intuition provides the foundation at the lower end of practical knowledge, and the guiding principles, 'meta-theory' , for understanding the eternal forms at the higher end. So epistemology tends to exclude these two extremes as not properly "knowledge", being the unintelligible aspect, even though the influence of intuition permeates through all knowledge.

There is, however, a lingering question, which is what is there, then, about animals that make them included in concerns about the Good? — Astrophel

We don't know the reasons for life on earth. The human being, as a species, is just one small part of the overall organisms, just like you and I are just one small part of humanity. We do not give our individual selves special preference amongst the whole of humanity, and we ought not give human beings special preference amongst the whole of life.

That is a loaded statement. If true, then one would have to identify something that is good or bad "outside" of social contexts, but how is this possible since the good and bad are essentially social, conceived only in societies and about social circumstances. Can one "reduce" ethics to something not "social" in its nature? — Astrophel

"Good" is clearly defined by a larger context than the social context. This is evident in principles which relate to respect for other life forms which do not partake in human society, and respect for the planet in general with issues like climate change. "Good" truly transcends the context of human society, because human beings are only a small part of life on earth, and we're all integrated.

There are actions that aren't considered immoral, but I wouldn't be that person. Rudeness is not illegal or immoral, but I wouldn't do that face to face with people. — L'éléphant

I believe that's known as "manners". Which manners are adhered to, differs according to social context, and manners can be classed as good or bad relative to that context. However, the good or bad which is associated with manners, since it varies according to social context, is not considered to be a moral good or bad. The moral good and bad is supposed to transcend all differences of social context.

Oh thanks for the encouragement and tips! I absolutely should start with a smaller dialogue first, can't believe I hadn't thought of it — dani

It's a good idea to get familiar with Plato's style. His overall humour and use of simile in a humorous way, can be very entertaining. Once you become acquainted with it, it may become very enjoyable to you. You'll be wanting to read more and more of it.

I've often read in discussions of Plato on this forum that he never claims that Socrates or anyone has ever seen 'the form of the good'. Yet in this passage, and even though Socrates has said 'God knows whether it happens to be true', he nevertheless says 'anyone who is to act intelligently....must have had sight of this.' That seems an unequivocal confirmation that the form of the Good is something that 'must be seen'. — Wayfarer

I think you ought to respect a difference between "the form of the good" mentioned in the quoted passage, and "the good" itself, discussed earlier in The Republic. The philosopher grasps the form of the good, in seeing that the good is the cause of all things, but does not grasp the good itself.

This can be compared to the way that Aquinas describes how we apprehend God as the cause of all things, through His effects, but we do not apprehend God directly. So, "must have had sight of this" in the quoted passage means to have grasped the logical need for this principle, the good, but it does not mean to have actually understood it in any complete way.

There is a separation between "the form of the good" which the individual philosopher's mind apprehends, and the good itself, which is separate or independent from the human being's mind. This is comparable to Kant's phenomenon/noumenon distinction. Aristotle, and some Christian theologians who follow him, develop this division as the distinction between the apparent good and the real good. When a philosopher apprehends "the form of the good", it is grasped by that philosopher's mind. As such it can only obtain to the level of an apparent good, which is the good grasped by individual minds. The "real good" remains separate and independent.

Notice 'present in the soul of each person'. — Wayfarer

The "good" which is present to the mind of each person is the apparent good. Enlightenment consists of acknowledging that there must be a real good which is separate and independent of oneself, and independent from everybody else. A moral soul will attempt to attune the good within one's self, the apparent good, to the real good, which is independent. The problem for the philosopher, and this is what makes philosophy the most difficult undertaking, is that we only have goods within ourselves, apparent goods, to serve as guidance for directing us toward the real good. We only have effects to serve as guidance to direct us toward the cause.

We can see an analogy toward the end of The Republic. The carpenter follows a 'form of bed' when constructing a bed. This is analogous to "the form of the good". It is a formula which serves as guidance to the carpenter. However, Plato describes how the carpenter must also respect the notion of an Ideal bed, this is the divine form of bed, the best possible bed. The carpenter knows that his personal 'form of bed', the formula which he follows in building a bed, is not the most perfect, ideal bed possible, it is not the divine form of bed. Nevertheless, he uses whatever means he can to make his personal 'form of bed' as close to the divine form of bed as possible, though he does not in any way actual grasp the divine form of bed.

Which is good, I think you're right, there are different enough for that. — flannel jesus

Yes, I described how I believe they differ. The one is intentional, therefore manageable, educational, and helpful in confronting the very real limits to one's freedom. The other consists of the very real limits to one's freedom imposing upon the person in an unwanted, unmanageable way. So the same "emptiness" is approached from two different ways. The one is a peaceful, confident, courageous approach, while the other is an anxious fearful non-approach, as it is instead imposed.

Depressed people think a lot. They think, I'm bored, this sucks, this isn't satisfying, I'm lonely, nothing is fulfilling, etc. The kind of emptiness that depressed people feel isn't a lack of thought - depression would be a lot more bearable for more people if it were. — flannel jesus

The thinking itself is not the emptiness of depression. The emptiness is the feeling associated with the hopelessness of the thought. Yet the thought continues despite the hopelessness created by the feeling of emptiness. The feeling ought to end the thought in hopeless emptiness, but it does not, so the feeling of emptiness is required to increase in order to confront the hopelessness of the thought. So, just like meditation, the emptiness is the end of the thought. But in meditation the end is properly achieved because it is a trained practise, while in depression the end cannot be achieved because the emptiness is the product of hopelessness of the thought.

It's just a feature of the two different ways that the emptiness may be induced, intentionally and unintentionally. The unintentional requires the hopeless thought as catalyst, the intentional produces the emptiness without the catalyst.

He most likely cashed in at the expense of his loser supporters.

Do you think the kind of emptiness in depression is really that comparable to the emptiness of meditation? They feel like entirely different things to me. I'd wager most people suffering from the emptiness of depression WISH they could have the emptiness of meditation. — flannel jesus

Yes I do, and what I pointed to, is that I believe that with practise and effort, one could substitute the emptiness of depression with the emptiness of meditation. So if you suffer depression, and WISH that you could have the emptiness of meditation instead of the emptiness of depression, then with the required will power, determination, and effort, your wish might be granted.
https://www.health.harvard.edu/mind-and-mood/how-meditation-helps-with-depression

This is something meditators, yogis and even some philosophers understand thoroughly, of course. — Wayfarer

That's why I am arguing that the result of meditation, "emptiness" is described in the same way as the result of depression, as "emptiness". It takes one (intentionally in meditation) to the limits of one's freedom. What I think, is that the difference is that unlike depression where the limit to freedom, and consequent emptiness, is forced upon the person unintentionally, and unknowingly, from the other side, as a sort of enclosure, in meditation the limit is approached, and emptiness produced, willingly and knowingly, as a learning experience, therefore it is manageable.

Depression is quite common, yet very disruptive, and sometimes a highly disturbing mental illness. If a person practises the art of managing the condition, "emptiness", this could prove to be very useful in preventing the occurrence of the unintentional form, where the emptiness is forced upon one from the other side.

As often, because there is no direct equivalent for many terms in the Buddhist lexicon, and vice versa. There are no direct translations for karma, dharma, bodhi, Vijñāna and many other terms, nor direct Buddhist equivalents for words like ‘spiritual’. In any case, the article makes it perfectly clear that ‘emptiness’ has nothing whatever to do with depressive states. — Wayfarer

The page on "emptiness" which you referred, seems to confirm what I said. Both forms of emptiness are associated with the relationship between a person's feelings, and one's thoughts, the stories or world-views which are employed to deal with one's feelings. The difference appears to be that the Buddhist sunnata mode is an intentional suppression, while the other is an unintentional depression. Each appears to result in a similar condition, described as "emptiness". But the intentional emptiness is manageable, controlled and conditioned, being consciously intended, and therefore may be utilized toward one's well-being, while the other form of emptiness is not manageable and is therefore most likely detrimental toward one's well-being.

There have been comparisons made between śūnyatā and the epochē of Husserl, and also Pyrrho’s ‘suspension of judgement about what is not evident’ - about not reading things into the raw material of experience but learning to see ‘things as they are’. I thought I noticed a resonance between this and some of the remarks made by Astrophel but perhaps I was mistaken. — Wayfarer

The problem I see, is that experience is always preconditioned by thought, so there is no such thing as "the raw material of experience", which would be the feelings, or sensations, without any associated thought. A large portion of thought is so deep into the subconscious level, being purely habitual, learned at a very young age, that it is not even apparent to the conscious mind. So what the conscious mind takes "the raw material of experience" to be, is something which has already been affected by thought which the conscious mind has simply not taken into account, being composed of very rapid actions and reactions in the borderline area between conscious and subconscious.

In other words, there is no such thing as seeing "things as they are", without reading things into the perceptions, because things are already read into the perceptions by the time the conscious mind attempts disassociate the stories and world-view from the raw material which provides for perception. This is why we hit the bottom, the dead end which you called emptiness. The attempt to find one's "self" is stymied and we must face the reality of the fruitlessness. We, or "I", as a self-conscious living being, or self-conscious living beings, are helpless in any attempt to get down to any lower level of separating the raw material from the conditioning stories or world-views, because it becomes very evident that complete separation is utterly impossible, and the venture is doomed to failure. This leaves us empty, and forces upon us the need to salvage whatever freedom we can, from this dreadful situation which reveals that the freedom we so desire is inescapably hindered, and so we proceed accordingly. In western religions this is recognized as the soul being united to, and hindered by, the body.

And is it not translated as "emptiness" for a reason?

Also entirely mistaken, perhaps you might read the article in full (although I won't argue the point). — Wayfarer

I don't think there is much to mistake with a word like "emptiness". There isn't a whole lot of ambiguity associated with that word. So, I think you're best off not to try to argue the point.

Thanks to this exchange, I am getting to the conclusion that, although I often acted wrongly, and my spirit started to get dirty, I realize I can start to clean it up by proceeding with confession. — javi2541997

Although this might be the part of the process which makes you feel good, confident, courageous, etc., the act of confession might also be said to be the easiest part of the process. The confession helps to isolate and identify the problems of character which inhere within, but now the real effort is to tackle those bad habits. Strategy is required.

I suggest you identify the weaknesses within the bad habits themselves, which might provide you with a place to gain a foothold in the struggle against them. Often, the bad habits are arranged hierarchically so that you might identify a foundation which can be blasted out, dropping the rest like dominoes. This might require a hierarchy of good objectives. The good objectives will inevitably break the foundational bad habit through number, multiplicity. Many small good habits are required to take the time away from the one large bad habit. The foundational bad habit, although it's effectively the worst bad habit because it supports the others, may actually be the easiest one to break, because nothing supports it other than your material composition. That's why medication may be very effective toward curbing many bad habits.

From an article on 'emptiness' in Buddhism:

Emptiness is a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no thought of whether there’s anything lying behind them.

This mode is called emptiness because it’s empty of the presuppositions we usually add to experience to make sense of it: the stories and world-views we fashion to explain who we are and to define the world we live in.
— What is Emptiness? — Wayfarer

It's very interesting that "emptiness" is the descriptive term often associated with depression in psychology. I think that what Buddhism demonstrates to us here, is that this position, what in the west is known as being down, empty, gives us a very unique perspective where there is only one direction, up. The Buddhist perspective explained here describes all these negatives which we associate with being down, or being empty, as artificial, created by the stories and world-views which we use to situate ourselves within 'the world'. To complete the emptiness, or depression, to bring it to its absolute end, requires removing the situation which produced it in the first place.

These are the features which have forced us down, and may hold us down within the emptiness of depression, the stories and world-views which we have used to make sense of the world in the first place. But these can only hold us down if we allow them to, by clinging to them. Once we recognize that they are in fact what has forced us down, and that they only have the capacity to hold us down because we hold onto to them, then we can release them and find true freedom.

So positing an "inversion" of color qualia may not actually establish a difference in phenomenal experience - it may just be describing a difference in linguistic labeling habits. In the end, it may not even make sense to talk about "experiencing the qualia of red" as if there is some objective, mind-independent property that fixes what "red" refers to. Rather, we may just be experiencing the qualia of what is agreed upon or linguistically coded to be "red" within a particular cultural/linguistic framework. The very notion of inverting an experience of "redness" might be incoherent without that shared linguistic coordination.
For example, instead of the color wheel being inverted for Alice, the color wheel labels are. So Alice and Mark both experience the same qualia of "green", but Alice has a different label for it, so when they look at "green", Mark says that's green, Alice says that's blue, and yet they both see the same color and are having the same qualia experience. Anyway, not sure where to go with that, I just wanted to show that our experience of color is inherently intertwined with language and it should somehow be a part of the argument or at least mentioned. — Matripsa

After reading this thread I come to the conclusion that we do the same thing with the words "physical" and "non-physical". Those are just two different ways of talking about experience, reflecting different cultural/linguistic frameworks. Each is itself incoherent if situated within the other's linguistic coordination.

The problem with the op though is the premise you use to make your conclusion. You state that Alice and Mark "both experience the same qualia of 'green'". But this is not a true premise, Alice and Mark are different people, with different bodies, different memories and different experiences. Therefore it is impossible that they could both experience the very same quale. You might say they experience similar qualia, but never do they ever experience the same quale.

I think it is very important to respect this difference when talking about qualia, and recognize that two different people might share the same type of qualia, but they do not share the same qualia. And this is a very significant feature of language to understand. Sometimes we talk about things, and this speech can be described as numerous people talking about the very same thing, and other times we talk about types, and this speech can be described as numerous different things being classified as of the same type.

So if we talk about qualia, as if they are things which people are experiencing, and we say that there is red qualia, and green qualia, these are different types of qualia. But if we want to talk about one particular quale, an individual's experience of green, in a particular spatial-temporal context, we need to respect the fact that no one, not even the person experiencing this particular quale, would ever experience the very same quale, in a different spatial-temporal context.

Google indicates that this is a form of metaphysics which is useful in psychedelic therapy.

I just read it and reread at the difficult parts. The beginning is straight forward, so not requiring a whole lot of rereading, as Plato sort of eases you in to it. It might be a good idea to read a couple shorter dialogues first, to get used to the writing style.

That is Plato's 'idea of the Good' among other examples. We are able to discern it, but it takes certain qualities of character and intellect to be able to do that. — Wayfarer

I think that for Plato the true good is beyond human apprehension, just like the Christians say that God is beyond the capacity of human understanding. Not even the most well-educated philosopher can claim to understand it. So we really are not able to discern the good, and this is why discussion about the good always turns into a matter of subjective opinion. Furthermore, the pragmatic and utilitarian values of scientific materialism, which you refer to, are only allowed to gain supremacy because of this deficiency in the capacity of human beings to actually discern the true nature of "the good".

What I meant was, for those who know, belief is no longer necessary, but that up until then, it has to be taken on faith. — Wayfarer

I think that's a good point. To learn requires faith in others, teachers, and all that surrounds you, in the capacity to educate you. Without that faith, knowledge is impossible. But when the desired knowledge is obtained, that faith is no longer necessary.

But this only demonstrates how epistemology is on shaky ground, as knowledge rests on faith.

I think you are trying to help me to not feel that bad about myself, and I appreciate your support a lot. The exchanges in this thread are more helpful than my sessions with my therapist, indeed. Nonetheless, I disagree with you in that quote above. I personally believe there should not be anything greater than the love for my parents. — javi2541997

Didn't you say that you lied to your mom to tell her that you were going to the library when you were really going to see a woman? So, isn't this an instance of something taking higher priority than love for your parents? As much as you say "there should not be anything greater than the love for my parents" you allow that there actually is something greater, and that affects your behaviour accordingly. This is how divisions within oneself arise, conflicting priorities which divide you.

That is the reason for the anxiety you describe, and the reason why you say your soul is rotten. You do not adhere to your own code. You attempt to enforce a code (nothing higher than your parents) which is contrary to your very nature (you seek a woman). Therefore a chasm opens up between your code and your actions. Now, you must either change your code to reflect more truly your nature, or exercise your will power and determination, to enforce your code, and annihilate parts of your nature determined as consisting of bad habits. Otherwise you will be forever torn between your code and your actions, rife with anxiety concerning what you apprehend as your own sins.

What is it to have a good behavior? — javi2541997

The good behaviour is what comes naturally from the principle of love, as described by BC above. If love is your top priority, you will not act badly. Of course, we are all influenced by a variety of different things though.

What if I have good behavior, but I accidentally lie to my parents once? — javi2541997

If you lied to your parents, then you allowed something to take higher priority than love of your parents. but that's what I mean when I say we are influenced by a variety of different things.

I haven't confessed to a priest in my entire life yet. I think this act would prove that I am contradictory, because if I didn't buy the writings of the Gospels, I should not go to a Church to confess myself. What will the priest do, by the way? He would listen and answer generic answers based on the Bible. This is another reason why I struggle with religious faith. It is unfair that sacred temples - like churches - and their members are the only places to confess the redemption of the spirit. I wish we could do this differently... — javi2541997

I as well, believe that you do not need the Church to redeem yourself. The example of Catholic confession was an example of the type of thing which could be done, but it is obviously not the only route to redemption. If you keep in mind that principle of love, described by BC, or a similar principle, you'll find many different ways to redeem yourself.

I am concerned about abstract problems: lying and its consequences; having sexual desires without limitation; wasting savings on useless stuff when they were there for food or supplies, etc. I don't understand why I shortly act this way sometimes...
What I am aware is that this is bad and it corrupts my soul. — javi2541997

I suggest that you consider these things as habits. Habits, when identified as bad, are difficult to break. The first step, which you've made, is to recognize them as bad. That is the point of confession, you're beyond that now. The next is to move forward with a strategy which will allow your will power to break the bad habit. Different types of people use different types of strategies, and different types of strategies are required for different types of habits. Each bad habit has to be individualized and a plan put in place specifically designed for annihilating it. And make your goals achievable, aiming too high invites failure which is not conducive to mental health. Remember habits are difficult to break, often requiring much time. I like to find many things to do, to occupy my time, (like being here), and this directs my attention away from the influence of the bad habits. In other words, I like to always keep myself busy, because the bad habits never seem to get completely annihilated, they lurk so be aware.

Firstly, yes, I am trying to establish a forced code of ethics. — javi2541997

Why? What I tried to relay to you, is that the forced code of ethics is the wrong way. Notice that a central tenet in The Old Testament is The Ten Commandments, then in The New Testament, this is reduced to one principle 'love thy neighbour as thyself' or "The Golden Rule". This marks a huge advancement in moral principles. Instead of a whole list of things "Thou shalt not...", a code of ethics, there is simply one principle of guidance toward how you ought to behave. What is displayed here is a move away from a system consisting of a code of ethics stipulating what you ought not do, toward a virtue ethics directing you to act toward appropriate ends. The virtue ethics provides guidance to motivate good behaviour, instead of the code of ethics which provides rules to deter bad behaviour.

As I confessed to Metaphysician Undercover, I lied to my parents multiple times. Some would say it is not a big deal because these things usually happen. But I think it is bad anyway, and my soul feels corrupted, or as James Joyce says: engendered by putrefaction. — javi2541997

Confession is a big part Catholicism. It is the first step toward forgiveness, which is the way to bring yourself out from those bad feelings associated with guilt. The first principle, "Love" encourages one to forgive, and forgiving encourages confession. Confession allows one to rid oneself of those bad feelings.

Ethics then is a prerequisite for freedom. The man who can't actualize what he thinks is truly good is limited in some way, as is the man who acts out of ignorance about what is truly good. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sorry Count, but I totally disagree with what you posted. Freedom is clearly prior to ethics, as the reason why ethics is needed. If it was the case, that there was no freedom prior to the existence of ethics, then ethics would never come into existence because there would be no need for ethics, being no freedom to act otherwise, nor even the freedom to create ethics.