Says you. That is precisely the point at issue! — Wayfarer

I backed it up with logic. It was suggested that there was a fallacy involved in the logic, the fallacy of appeal to consequences. But referral to a description of that fallacy indicated that it is only a fallacy if the logic claims to deal with truth and not a fallacy if the logic deals with good and bad, "ought". So the logic shows why we ought not accept such an assumption. Here, I'll reprint it:

Ontological randomness may be logically possible but it's philosophically repugnant. The problem being that if something is deemed as random, it is in that sense unintelligible. So if something is deemed as ontologically random, and it is considered to be unintelligible, then there is no will to attempt at figuring it out.

Now the problem is that if something appears to be random there is no way of knowing whether it is epistemologically random, or ontologically random, because of the unintelligibility of it. So we won't know which until we figure it out, therefore we must assume it to be epistemologically random. And even if it is ontologically random, we will still never know that this is the case, so we will always have to assume that it is epistemologically random, and try to figure it out. The category of "ontological randomness" is absolutely useless. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you think he means? I'm sure he doesn't mean that the indeterminate nature of quantum phenomena is simply due to gaps in our knowledge. — Wayfarer

On the contrary, I think that's exactly what he means, except he's not talking about simple "gaps" in our knowledge, he's talking about a huge chasm, hence the word "shocked". What the baffling nature of quantum phenomena reveals to us, is that the reality of the world is very far outside of our current ability to understand it. "Indeterminate" means beyond our capacities to determine, and why he thinks that we ought to be "shocked by quantum physics" is that these "indeterminate" aspects are so significant, and have been shown to be so far outside our capacity to understand, that it reveals how shockingly minimal our current capacity to understand the reality of spatial temporal existence actually is.

So what we currently know about physical reality is just like the proverbial tip of the iceberg, and the vast majority lies hidden from us. Meanwhile, the commonly held idea in the conceit of humanity, is that we're on the verge of knowing everything there is to know, and all of reality which is intelligible, is very close to being within our grasp. That's why he thinks that if we're not shocked, we don't understand, because what is revealed through an understanding of quantum reality annihilates that commonly held self-idolatry idea. It does this by revealing to us that we really only have a very slight grasp of a very small portion of the complete intelligible reality.

This is the reason for Aquinas positing God as fundamentally intelligible, and the most highly intelligible, despite the fact that the human intellect in its current condition of being united with matter, has not the capacity to understand God. We allow that the highest principles of reality are intelligible, yet the deficiencies of the human intellect are what make them appears as unintelligible to us. Aquinas' representation here, of God as a Form, makes God most highly intelligible, despite the fact that we cannot understand Him in our current condition. And this is how Christian theology put an end to the dead end direction which was Neo-Platonism, and Plotinus' representation of the highest principle, "One" as outside the realm of intelligibility.

Therefore, it is not simply "my opinion" which I am expressing. I have the support of some of the best metaphysicians and theologians who have lived, in my judgement as to which assumptions we ought to accept and ought to reject.

Call it anything you like, but not logic! Logic means something else. That term is already taken. You are using extra-logic. Morality, right or wrong, productive/nonproductive. All well and good, but not logic. If logic is to mean anything, it has to mean something. — fishfry

Slow down, you are not taking the time to understand what I said. In the application of logic, there is two aspects to soundness, the truth or falsity of the premises, and the validity of the logical process. The term "logic" refers to the validity of logical process, it does not apply to the premises. All applications of logic utilize premises as providing the content. The logical process is the form. A valid logical process may utilize faulty premises, and this will result in faulty conclusions even though the logic is valid, and in this case we say that the conclusions are valid, and logical, yet they are unsound.

Accordingly, what I've presented is logic! Moral philosophy uses logic, and it is rightfully called "logic", and it is valid. The issue is that it uses a different sort of premise. Instead of judging the premises as true or false, and the soundness of valid logic being decided according to such a judgement of the premises, the premise are judge according to principle of good and bad. If there was such a thing as what is "truly good", then the premises of moral logic could be judged as true and "sound" in the sense of true. But due to the is/ought incompatibility, there is really no such thing as the truth about "the good".

Therefore, we must respect the fact that moral arguments can proceed with valid logic, from premises which receive their "soundness" from moral judgements of good and bad. You might argue that all moral arguments are unsound, because soundness requires true premises, but to argue it's "not logic!" is an untenable principle. It is logic, using the very same formal systems for validity, only it employs different criteria for soundness, because it uses a different type of premise, as required by a different type of content.

If I'm choosing good versus bad I'm not using logic... — fishfry

The issue is that in most applications of logic, we do not use logic to judge the premises. And, in all applications premises are required. If it was always required that the premises are judged by logic, we'd have an infinite regress, these premises are justified by logic based in those premise, which are justified by premises based in a further set of premises, ad infinitum. So, we use principles with lesser degrees of certainty to support the premises, inductive reasoning (which is sometimes called logic), abductive reasoning, and most often principles which are just accepted by convention. These premises which are accepted because they are the convention are the social standard, or norm, so they are accepted as truth without doubt. The conventional principles, which account for very many premises in logical arguments are no different from a judgement of good and bad.

So, choosing good versus bad, is not a matter of using logic, just like you say. But neither is most instances of judging premises for truth or falsity. And even if premises are judged using logic, the premises of that logical process must be judged, so at some point the premises of all logic must be judged by something other than logic. Since much of this judgement is based in nothing other than what is the social norm for truth, it is fundamentally the very same type of judgement as choosing good versus bad. The difference is that "truth" deals with "what is" and this is justified by past experience, whereas "ought" deals with what should be, and this is justified by what we want for the future.

Yes but the contrary proposition of determinism is even more repugnant, as I've noted. Shouldn't we (logically!) choose the lesser of two repugnancies? — fishfry

As I explain, there is another option other than "determinism".

And you have not shown randomness philosophically repugnant. By the time I thought about it a little, I realized that randomness is our only hope for salvation. It's the only way we're not automatons. Clockwork oranges. So you haven't made your point here. I am a proud randomite. — fishfry

I suggest that the reason you are like this, is that you do not respect the fallibility of scientific knowledge. There are specific axioms, or fundamental laws of physics, such as Newton's first law, which create the illusion of determinism. The illusion is the assumption that all will continue to be as it has been in the past, unless "caused" by a force, to change. The force here is generally understood to be the energy of something else which has continued to be as it has been in the past. The result is causal determinism. However, when we allow that free will "causes" change in a way which is not determined by the past, we break this illusion. However, this requires accepting that there is a fundamental incompleteness of Newton's laws, which implies that physical reality is really not the way that it is represented by the laws of physics.

This is way past the lamp. The lamp is not a physical thing. These puzzles have no bearing on physical reality. That's a cognitive error everyone makes about them. — fishfry

The "bearing on physical reality" is always the way in which it is applied. This is no different from mathematics in general. Mathematics has no bearing on physical reality other than its application. This is why it is so important to distinguish between the logical process itself, and the axioms or premises, which determine the applicability. The relationship between the logic and physical reality, is a matter of the application, or practise, and this is the way that we take content from our beliefs about the way that the physical world is, and our beliefs about what is good and what ought to be, and apply the logical process to these beliefs. In philosophy it is assumed that the basic axioms ought (notice recognition of the overall supremacy of ought here) to be self-evident truths. But in mathematics, the basic axioms are simply whatever is desired for the purpose of the individual mathematician who is designing the applicability of the logical system. (So desire is veiled under the hidden intention of the mathematician rather than recognized as the overarching principle.

You say randomness and determinism are compatible, and your justification is to use an alternate and unrelated meaning of the word determined? — fishfry

I did not say that randomness and determinism are compatible. You offered the dichotomy, randomness or determinism, with no other option. I offered another option, free will, as a type of determining which is not consistent with determinism, nor is it consistent with randomness. Determinism is based in a highly restrictive sense of "determine" which limits any form of determining to a meaning of having itself been determined by prior causation. This sense of "determine" employed by determinism excludes the possibility of a free will act. It also excludes the possibility of a first act, which is demonstrably problematic. So the problem with your proposed dichotomy is that by restricting the definition of "determine" to that employed by determinism, which is a demonstrably faulty restriction, it does not give us realistic options.

But you talk about a "real physical boundary." Here you imagine that the staircase is physical. It's not. The conditions of the problem violate known laws of physics. — fishfry

I really don't see how there could be a staircase which is not physical. That really makes not sense. However, just like in the case of the word "determine", we need to allow for two senses of "physical". You seem to be saying that to be physical requires that the thing referred to must obey the laws of physics. But the classic definition of "physical" is "of the body". And when a body moves itself, as in the case of a freely willed action, that body violates Newton's first law. Therefore we have to allow for a sense of "physical" which refers to things which are known to violate the laws of physics, like human beings with freely willed actions.

What is implied here is that the laws of physics are in some way deficient in their capacity for understanding what is "physical" in the sense of "of the body". That's why people commonly accept that there is a distinction between the laws of physics and the laws of nature. The laws of physics are a human creation, intended to represent the laws of nature, that is the goal, as what is attempted. And, so far as the representation is true and accurate, physical things will be observed to obey the laws of physics, but wherever the laws are false or inaccurate, things will be observed as violating the laws of physics. Evidently there are a lot of violations occurring, with anomalies such as dark energy, dark matter, etc., so that we must conclude that the attempt, or goal at representation has not been successful.

It's only a conceptual thought experiment. And why shouldn't math apply to that? — fishfry

Sure, it's a conceptual thought experiment, but the interpretation must follow the description. A staircase is a staircase, which is a described physical thing, just like in Michaels example of the counter, such a counter is a physical object, and in the case of quantum experiments, a photon detector is a physical object. And of course we apply math to such things, but there are limits to what we can do with math when we apply it, depending on the axioms used. The staircase, as a conceptual thought experiment is designed to expose these limits.

But anyway, it's an upper bound. If it's a least upper bound, it's a limit. — fishfry

OK sure, but that's a limit created by the axioms of the mathematics. So it serves as a limit to the applicability of the mathematics. The least upper bound is just what I described as "the lowest total amount of time which the process can never surpass". Notice that the supposed sequence which would constitute the set with the bound, has already summed the total. This is not part of the described staircase, which only divides time into smaller increments. It is this further process, turning around, and summing it, which is used to produce the limit. The limit is in the summation, not the division.

It is very clear therefore, that the bound is part of the measurement system, a feature of the mathematical axioms employed, the completeness axiom, not a feature of the process described by the staircase descent. The described staircase has no such bound, because the total time passed during the process of descending the stairs is not a feature of that description. This allows that the process continues infinitely, consuming a larger and larger quantity of tiny bits of time, without any limit, regardless of how one may sum up the total amount of time. Therefore completeness axioms are not truly consistent with the described staircase.

However, since our empirical observations never produce a scenario like the staircase, that inconsistency appears to be irrelevant to the application of the mathematics, with those limitations inherent within the axioms. The limitations are there though, and they are inconsistent with what the staircase example demonstrates as logically possible, continuation without limitation. Therefore we can conclude that this type of axiom, completeness axioms, are illogical, incoherent. The real problem is that as much as we can say that the staircase scenario will never occur in our empirical observations, we cannot conclude from this that the incoherency is completely irrelevant. We have not at this point addressed other scenarios where the completeness axioms might mislead us. Therefore the incoherency may be causing problems already, in other places of application.

'I cannot believe that God plays dice', said Einstein, in response to the discovery of the so-called 'quantum leap'. (Bohr used to say 'stop trying to tell God how to manage the Universe'.) But it is a known fact, as is the stochastic nature of radioactive decay. That doesn't mean that maggots spring fully formed from damp cloth, of course, but that there is an inherent element of unpredictability at the most basic strata of nature. — Wayfarer

As already argued in this thread, above, the so-called "stochastic nature" of radioactive decay, is best understood as a feature of the means employed to understand it, rather than as a feature of the named activity itself. In other words, it is better to assume that the appearance of randomness is due to the deficiencies of the theories and methods used to understand the object, rather than to assume that the randomness inheres within the object.

I can agree with your reasoning that one "ought" not to accept it, but the reason is extra-logical. That is, if we are going by pure logic, you have not argued against it. It's like solipsism. Can't refute but pointless to believe it. — fishfry

There is no such thing as "going by pure logic", toward understanding the nature of reality. "Pure logic" would be form with no content, symbols which do not represent anything. All logic must proceed from premises, and the premises provide the content. And premises are often judged for truth or falsity. But as explained in the passage which referenced, in the case of an "appeal to consequences", there is no fallacy if the premises are judged as good or bad, instead of true or false. That's why I said that this type of logic is very commonly employed in moral philosophy, religion, and metaphysical judgements of means, methods, and pragmatics in general. So for example, one can make a logically valid argument, with an appeal to consequences, which concludes that the scientific method is good. No fallacy there, just valid logic and good premises.

Therefore it is not the case that the reasoning is "extra-logical", it employs logic just like any other reasoning. What is the case is that the premises are a different sort of premises, instead of looking for truth and falsity in the premises we look for good and bad. So this type of judgement, the judgement of good or bad, produces the content which the logic gets applied to.

But consider: If the world is not random, then it's determined. And is that not equally repugnant? Nothing matters because we have no choice. — fishfry

No, that is not the case, because there are two very distinct senses of "determined". One is the sense employed by determinism, to say that all the future is determined by the past. The other is the the sense in which a person determines something, through a free will choice. In this second sense, a choice may determine the future in a way which is not determined by the past. And, since it is a choice it cannot be said to be random. Therefore it is not true that if the world is not random then it's determined (in the sense of determinism), because we still have to account for freely willed acts which are neither determined in the sense of determinism, nor random.

God transcends logic, fair enough. But again, that's not a logical argument. — fishfry

As I said above, it is not a matter of transcending logic, the conclusions are logical, but the premises are judged as to good or bad rather than true or false. So from premises of what is judged as good (rejecting repugnant principles), God may follow as a logical conclusion.

Here you are arguing that just because an idea is repugnant is no logical reason to reject it! So you should apply the same reasoning to randomness. — fishfry

No I was not arguing that. In that case I was arguing that the idea ought not be accepted (ought to be rejected) unless it is justified. In the case of being repugnant, that in itself is, as I explained, justification for rejection. You appear unwilling to recognize what wonderer1's article said about the fallacy called "appeal to consequences". It is only a fallacy if we are looking for truth and falsity. If we are talking principles of "ought", it is valid logic. Therefore the argument that the assumption of randomness ought to be rejected because it is philosophically repugnant, cannot be said to be invalid by this fallacy, and so it may be considered as valid justification.

I agree with you there. I agree with most of what you wrote. Still I do want to understand why you see that Michael is wrong to say that supertasks are logically impossible, when they are merely repugnant; yet you seem to reject that same reasoning when applied to randomness. — fishfry

But Michael did not show that supertasks are philosophically repugnant. He showed that they are inconsistent with empirical science, and his prejudice for what is known as "physical reality" (reality as understood by the empirical study of physics) influenced him to assert that supertasks are impossible. As I explained in the other thread, in philosophy we learn that the senses are apt to mislead us, so all empirical science must be subjected to the skeptic's doubt. So it is actually repugnant to accept the representation of physical reality given to us by the empirical sciences, over the reasoned reality which demonstrates the supertask. And this is why that type of paradox is philosophically significant. It inspires us to seek the true reasons for the incompatibility between what reason shows us, and what empirical evidence shows us. We ought not simply take for granted that empirical science delivers truth.

Also, don't you think determinism is at least as repugnant as randomness? — fishfry

As explained above, I am not taking a standpoint of determinism. There are two very distinct senses of "determine", one consistent with determinism, one opposed to determinism (as the person who has a very strong will is said to be determined). I allow for the reality of both.

"The process carries on, unlimited, even though there's a limit." I haven't the keystrokes to untangle the myriad conceptual difficulties with that statement, and the beliefs and mindset behind it; even if I had the inclination. I hope you'll forgive me, and understand. — fishfry

I can explain it very easily. There is two different senses of "limit" being used here. One is a logical "limit" as employed in mathematics, to describe the point where the sequence "converges". And "unlimited" is being used to refer to a real physical boundary which would be place on the process, preventing it from proceeding any further. There is no such "limit" to a process such as that described by the op. The appearance of paradox is the result of equivocation.

So it seems that we are locked into two incompatible ways of thinking about infinity. One as if it were a sequence which stretches away for ever. The other as a succession of operations which can be continued for ever. (Two metaphors - one of space, one of time.) I'm not suggesting it needs to be resolved, just that we are subject to confusion and need to think carefully, but also recognize that our normal ways of thinking here will need to be adapted and changed. — Ludwig V

The problem, as displayed in my reply to fishfry above, is that each of the two incompatible ways will use the same terms. The same terms will then have incompatible meanings as you demonstrate with "ad infinitum", and the natural tendency for human beings not to take the time required to detect such differences, leads to equivocation and the appearance of paradox.

Yes, quite so. But it follows that applying the calculus to Achilles doesn't demonstrate that Achilles will overtake the tortoise. I think that only ordinary arithmetic can do that. — Ludwig V

That's right, and the issue with Achilles and the tortoise has extra complexities which are often overlooked. Achilles and the tortoise are both moving. At any point in time, t1, Achilles is at a location and the tortoise is at a location. At t2, Achilles reaches the location where the tortoise was at t1. But the tortoise has moved to a new location. At t3 Achilles reaches the location where the tortoise was at t2, the tortoise has moved to a new location. And so on. In this case, therefore, it is not only impossible for Achilles to overtake the tortoise, it is also impossible for Achilles to catch up to the tortoise, so it appears like the tortoise will necessarily beat Achilles to the finish line.

We cannot describe the tortoise's position as a simple limit to Achilles' position, because the tortoise is already moving at a constant velocity, and no matter how fast Achilles accelerates he cannot catch up to the tortoise. This is the problem of acceleration, which demonstrates the fundamental incompatibility between distinct rest frames. Einstein attempted to bridge this incompatibility by stipulating the speed of light as the limit, (therefore absolute rest frame) in his special theory of relativity.

Read carefully. I didn't say that. — noAxioms

That's why I was asking, "are you saying...". You seemed to be saying what I asked about, but I was not sure. Now you are making it clear that you were saying something else. So I now understand that you were attacking a straw man effigy of me, and that's why I couldn't understand you.

2), that you [cannot / choose not to] understand what others mean when they presume what Michael conveyed better than I could: — noAxioms

If I don't understand, then I don't understand. I believe that I said that I don't understand why someone would make an assumption which to me is so clearly false. So to explain why someone would make such an assumption, would require an explanation as to how this obviously false assumption makes some sense to the person. The quoted passage, in which you say Michael makes sense of his perspective, makes no sense to me, because it is a straw man representation of what I am arguing. I told Michael that I didn't understand how this was relevant, and he needed to explain its relevance. I now fully understand that it was a straw man, and that's why I couldn't apprehend the relevance. Michael did not understand what I was arguing, therefore produced a straw man representation of me, and I could not understand what Michael was accusing me of, because he did not understand me and tried to defend against a straw man of me.

You (M-U) seem to either not be able to separate "X" and Y, or you refuse to communicate with those that do. — noAxioms

I have no problem distinguishing between the sign and what is signified. The problem here is that Michael refused to recognize the distinction between when the thing signified is a real physical object, and when the thing signified is a mental fabrication, a fiction, or an ideal. So Michael was talking about ideals, principles of measurement, like a day, and a second, as if these mental fabrications have some sort of existence independent from human minds, in some Platonic realm or something like that.

My personal beliefs in this matter are irrelevant. I simply know what somebody means when they treat Y as something independent of "X". — noAxioms

I'll repeat, just so that you'll quit with this utterly ridiculous straw man accusation you are hitting me with. I have no problem whatsoever with the separation between the symbol and the thing represented by the symbol. That is not at all what is at issue here, so you are simply making a straw man representation of what I am arguing.

The problem here is with the nature of the thing represented. Do you understand that sometimes what is represented by a symbol is a real physical object, and sometimes what is represented by a symbol is an ideal, such as a mathematical object? And do you understand that these two types of objects are completely different, and need to be understood in completely different ways. My claim is that it is highly doubtful that an ideal such as "a second" has any existence independent from the human minds which I believe fabricate them, and propagate them through educational processes.

Michael has been arguing that "a second" has some sort of real independent existence, just like a physical object which we can point to, instead of being an ideal which is propagated by human minds, as I claim. So, I've asked him to show me such a thing as "a second". All he has provided is a definition referring to some ideal state (ground state) of a cesium atom. Since the definition refers to an ideal state (ground state), rather than any real existing physical object, it seems very clear that "a second" is an ideal, not an independent physical thing.

That this period of time is named "60 seconds" depends on us. That 60 seconds pass does not depend on us.

You don't seem to understand how reference works. — Michael

This is not a simple issue of reference, it is an issue of the type of thing which is referred to. In the example here "seconds" is an ideal, just like any other principle of measurement, metre, foot, degree Celsius, circle, triangle, and number in general. They are all ideal, and are therefore dependent on the human minds which employ them, unless you assume some sort of Platonic realm for the independent existence of such ideals.

So, we say "time is passing", just like we say "the earth is spinning around the sun", and we refer to real independent things with those phrases, "time", "the earth", "the sun". However, when we go to measure those things, we employ principles, which are ideals, and have no such independent existence. So, when we say "60 seconds has passed", "60 seconds" refers to an ideal which has been applied to measure the independent passing of time. The 60 units of seconds do not pass, time passes, and "60 seconds" refers to the ideal which is employed.

For example, we could say "the earth circles the sun". In this case, "circles" refers to the ideal which is employed in measuring the earth's motions. We know that a circle is an ideal figure, and that true circles do not have any real existence independently from human minds, because pi, which is the essential feature of a circle, is an indefinite, irrational number. So the motion of the earth isn't really a circle, that's just the ideal which is referred to in that statement. Likewise, in the statement "60 seconds" has passed, "seconds" is just the ideal which is referred to, as the principle employed in the act of measurement. And we find these ideals in all forms of measurements, metres, degrees of temperature, frequencies, etc..

Surely a lot of these problems go away if you concede that nature contains an element of spontaneity, as well as patterns which we characterise as "laws". — Wayfarer

It is not useful to assume spontaneity, just like it is not useful to assume randomness. Are you familiar with the theory of "spontaneous generation"? It used to be the accepted "scientific" theory for how tiny organisms like maggots come into existence. They just kind of pop out from inanimate matter. Of course the theory has been disproven, I think by Louis Pasteur. However, old habits die hard, and now we have the very similar "scientific" theory of abiogenesis and other things like spontaneous symmetry breaking. In general spontaneity does not serve as a good explanatory principle.

If I am understanding you: You say that if we have a sequence; that if that sequence happens to have a limit, then the limit is not inherent to the sequence, but is rather imposed by the observer. — fishfry

That's not quite what I'm saying. The process described by the op has no limit. That should be clear to you. It starts with a first step which takes a duration of time to complete. Then the process carries on with further steps, each step taking half as much time as the prior. The continuity of time is assumed to be infinitely divisible, so the stepping process can continue indefinitely without a limit. Clearly there is no limit to that described process

I think what's confusing you into thinking that there is a limit, is that if the first increment of time is known, then mathematicians can apply a formula to determine the lowest total amount of time which the process can never surpass. Notice that this so-called "limit" does not actually limit the process in any way. The process carries on, unlimited, despite the fact that the mathematician can determine that lowest total amount of time which it is impossible for the process to surpass.

Clearly, the supposed "limit" is something determined by, and imposed by, the mathematician. To understand this, imagine the very same process, with an unspecified duration of time for the first step. The first step takes an amount of time, and each following step takes half as much time as before. In this case, can you see that the mathematician cannot determine "the limit"? All we can say is that the total cannot be more than double the first duration. But that's not a limit to the process at all. It's just a descriptive statement about the process. It is a fact which is implied by an interpretation of the described process. As an implied fact, it is a logical conclusion made by the interpreter, it is "not inherent to the sequence", but implied by it.

That it is not inherent, but implied, can be understood from the fact that principles other than those stated in the description of the process, must be applied to determine the so-called "limit".

Exactly so.
Your disagreement with views that suggest this is a subject for a different topic. Your displayed lack of comprehension of what the person means when he says things like that is either in total ignorance of the alternatives or a deliberate choice. Being the cynic I am, I always suspect the latter. It's my job as a moderator elsewhere.

I do thank you for verifying my earlier assessment. — noAxioms

Are you saying that you believe that there would still be an April 29, even if there never was any human beings with their time measuring techniques, and dating practises? And do you believe that there would still be "seconds" of time without those human beings who individuate those temporal units in the act of measurement? I don't understand how you can believe that I should accept this as a reasonable alternative. Care to explain?

So they don't want a better government, better economic policies, or better anything. What they want, is to bring down the whole system, because they don't accept the principles on which it was founded. — Wayfarer

They don't know what they're voting for in terms of politics, they aren't educated enough or they are so within their own bubble that they don't have any access to anything but the notion of "us and them". — Christoffer

Anarchists, who are not well educated in politics, or moral and social philosophy in general, are the modern day libertarians.

Your whole argument for less ambiguity is based on an impractical desire for words to be absolutely concrete and defined. — Benj96

No, it's not based on such a desire at all. I recognize that to be impossible. My desire is that the writer of the material which I am reading, would have a good understanding of what they are saying, so that they can express themselves with clarity, instead of using ambiguous words to coverup the fact they know very little about the subject that they pretend to be knowledgeable of.

Notice, in your referred article, that when the argument's conclusion concerns good and bad, rather than true or false, it is not considered to be a fallacy.

I use the term "information" myself because I think it is useful and has its own flavour of characteristics outside of just energy transfer or material arrangements. — Benj96

That "flavour of characteristics" is what I call ambiguity. Your use of this word conflicts with the idea you expressed above, about using well defined words with less baggage.

Perhaps it's better to ask someone to clarify how they use a seemingly ambiguous term- because the ambiguity rarely comes from the user of the word. They usually know exactly how they're using it. Therefore ambiguity is more based on the interpreter which may not be sure what thr details of their definition are. — Benj96

I flatly disagree with this. In a place such as this, TPF, the use of ambiguous words is more often than not an indication that the person does not know what they are talking about. It's like a child, just learning to talk, who uses big words to sound proficient, but really doesn't say anything with those words.

Logic is: reasoning conducted or assessed according to strict principles of validity. — Barkon

Empirical does not mean absolute, it means more probably. — Barkon

Deductive logic proceeds from premises which are often produced from inductive reasoning and empirical evidence. As you noticed, empirical evidence does not provide absolute certainty, so inductive principles are based n probability. So when we judge empirical premises as true or false, these are judgements of probability. If I say "Premise A is true", I really mean it is probably true, and this is because I don't "understand everything there is to know", and something may be overlooked, as you mention in the op.

Logic is: reasoning conducted or assessed according to strict principles of validity. — Barkon

This statement is applicable to deductive logic, but inductive reasoning (logic) does not proceed according to strict principles. This is why induction cannot be relied on to provide certainty.

You are falling into the trap of thinking a limit "approaches" but does not "reach" its limit. It does reach its limit via the limiting process, in the same sense that 1/2, 3/4, 7/8, ... has the limit 1, and 1 is a perfectly good real number, and we all have had literally billions of experiences of one second of time passing. — fishfry

There is no limiting process in the premises of the op, nor in what is described by . The "limiting process" is a separate process which a person will utilize to determine the limit which the described activity approaches. Therefore it is the person calculating the limit who reaches the limit (determines it through the calculation), not the described activity which reaches the limited.

Striking that he used the same word you used, repugnant. But repugnance is not a logically argument, and what's repugnant in 1733 may turn out to be exactly what's needed to model general relativity in 1915. You never know. — fishfry

"Repugnant", is a commonly used word in philosophy. The argument I gave is logical, but what is concluded is that the assumption, "there is ontological randomness" is philosophically repugnant, because it would be counter-productive to the desire to know. Therefore it's more like a moral argument. The desire to know is good. The assumption of ontological randomness hinders the desire to know. Therefore that assumption is bad and one ought not accept it.

Since the argument concerns an attitude, the philosophical attitude, or desire to know, you're right to say that it is an argument concerning "feelings". But that's what morality consists of, and having the right attitude toward knowledge of the universe is a very important aspect of morality. This is where "God" enters the context, "God" is assumed to account for the intelligibility of things which appear to us to be unintelligible, thereby encouraging us to maintain faith in the universe's ability to be understood. Notice how faith is not certainty, and the assumption that the universe is intelligible is believed as probable, through faith

In this sense you are putting the idea of a random universe in the same category of solipsism. You can't prove it's false, but it's pointless to believe it because it leads nowhere. Therefore we should reject it on that basis. They're both essentially nihilistic ideas. — fishfry

Not only is it pointless to believe it, but I would say it is actually negative. Choosing the direction that leads nowhere is actually bad when there are good places to be going to.

In any event, I conclude that it's still logically possible that the true nature of the universe, if there even is such a thing, is random. And then we can still wonder ... how does all this apparent order arise from underlying randomness? So the philosophers would still have something useful to do, even in a fully random world. — fishfry

I agree that it is very important to leave as undecided, anything which is logically possible, until it is demonstrated as impossible. Notice what I argue against is the assumption of real randomness, that is completely different from the possibility of real randomness. That we ought to leave logical possibilities undecided was the point I argued Michael on the infinite staircase thread. Michael argued that sort of supertask is impossible, but I told him the impossibility needed to be demonstrated, and his assumption of impossibility was based in prejudice.

I believe that paradoxes such as Zeno's demonstrate an incompatibility between empirical knowledge, and what is logically possible. Most people will accept the conventions of empirical knowledge, and argue that the logically possible which is inconsistent with empirical knowledge is really impossible, based on that prejudice. But I've learned through philosophy to be skeptical of what the senses show us, therefore empirical knowledge in general, and to put more faith and trust in reason. So, to deal with the logical possibility presented in that thread, we must develop a greater intellectual understanding of the fundamental principles, space and time, rather than appeal to empirical knowledge. Likewise, here, to show that the logical possibility of ontological randomness is really impossible, requires a greater understanding of the universe in general.

60 seconds can pass without anyone measuring it. — Michael

That's like saying today would be April 29 even if there was never any human beings to determine this. If you can't understand how this is wrong, I don't know what else to say.

Yes there are. A second is "the duration of 9,192,631,770 periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the caesium-133 atom". This occurs even if we don't measure it. — Michael

Nice try Michael, but "ground state" is an ideal which does not occur in nature. It's like a "blackbody" and things like that, ideals used for theory, which do not ever truly exist. Like "60 seconds" in the OP it is approached as a limit, but never truly achieved.

Besides, what you've provided does nothing to resolve the problem I explained. It's just the same as your example of "a year". The activity is what occurs, time passes. What you gave is the definition of "a second", that means that a second is the duration of time which is equivalent to that activity. A second is not that activity itself. So the activity occurs, and there are no seconds unless someone determines the duration of time required for the specified number of oscillations. That's why beginning and end points are required which constitute a measurement, just like I explained to you in the case of "a year".

Yet again you can't seem to get beyond our use of labels to understand that our labels refer to things that exist and do things even when we're not around. — Michael

I have no problem accepting that things exist even when we're not around, and I gave you examples of such things, dogs and cats. However, what you are not getting, is that some labels refer to things created by human beings, these are called "ideals". So, we have two categories of labeled things, natural things which exist even when we're not around, and things created by minds, such as ideals, which are dependent on minds. And, you refuse to distinguish between the natural things, and the artificial ideals. So you insist that because it is a labeled thing, it must exist even when were not around. That's the folly of Platonism. Do you not understand that "the second" is a mathematic object of ideal time, just like "the circle" is a mathematical object of ideal space?

Your reading comprehension skills are also off. I never suggested converting you to some opinion other than the one which you hold. I simply suggests that you seem incapable of understanding alternatives, to the point where you don't understand people who presume one of these alternatives. — noAxioms

I think you misunderstand. I understand the alternatives very well, so well in fact that I can comprehend the contradictions which inhere within some of these alternatives. So I see the need to reject them. The people who assert, and insist on some of these alternatives do so without proper understanding themselves. They accept and assert by the force of convention, which is simple prejudice, and they refuse to acknowledge the contradictions within, assuming that convention cannot be faulty.

If we take the term “1 year” as an example, the Earth orbiting the Sun does not depend on us measuring it. It just orbits it, independently of us. — Michael

OK, the earth goes around the sun indefinitely, even if there were no humans on earth. But there is no "years", nor is there any individual "orbits" separated out without someone, or a device to make the judgement of beginning and end.

That is the problem with your example. Time passes, we agree on that, but there are no seconds unless measured out. Now, both the counter doing the supertask, and the ordinary stopwatch are designed to measure the passage of time. The counter, with it's supertask has one way of counting out time, by dividing seconds into shorter and shorter increments, while the stopwatch is designed to measure an endless procession of seconds. The two are incompatible.

A white box turns red when the Earth completes a half-orbit, turns blue when it completes another quarter-orbit, turns back to white when it completes another eighth-orbit, and so on.

What colour is the box when the Earth completes its orbit around the Sun? — Michael

Same problem, the device is not designed to reach the end of an orbit. It will keep on changing colours faster and faster without ever getting to the end of an orbit. I assume it would probably burn up though, from going too fast.

The previous attempts were at the urging of spouse, or because of the usual arguments about what's good for you. — Vera Mont

So these attempts were a matter of caring about something else (your spouse, your health), more than smoking. And this is what actually failed for you, the method which involved caring about something else more than smoking.

You will give up smoking if you care more about stopping than you do about smoking. — Janus

OK, so do you agree, that this is pure will power? Attempting to quit smoking because one cares more about not smoking than smoking, and having success this way, is a matter of the will deciding to change, for no other reason than to change, and this is successful. That is purely, and absolutely a matter of determining "sui generis what is significant for us, what we care about". And that contradicts what you said earlier: "The point is that we do not determine sui generis what is significant for us, what we care about".

My point has only been that we care about what we care about, and we can't just magically decide to care more about something we previously cared less about—we need incentives to shift our concerns. — Janus

Yes, people often do "magically decide to care more about something we previously cared less about", this is known as changing one's priorities. That is what deciding to quit smoking because one cares more about not smoking than smoking, is representative of. Its actually very common, and it is what gives the person incentive to shift one's concerns. You have the causal order reversed. You seem to think that some random event must happen in the universe, a change in the star signs or something which pulls at the superstitions, and this provides incentive for change to a person. In reality what is required is simply a decision by the person, change my concerns, along with the will power, and that is what creates the incentive, the decision itself, and the capacity to adhere to the judgement made.

Attempting to discuss anything with you is usually an endless battle against strawmen. — Janus

Such statements are an indication of denial. You reveal to me, through what you say, your own ideas, and when I interpret what you've said, you claim it to be a strawman. This is because what you say, and reveal about your own beliefs, is not consistent with the metaphysical principles which you hold. Instead of recognizing that your beliefs are inconsistent with your principles, and acknowledging that the principles you hold are not consist with your own experience, so that you ought to change those principles, you simply deny my interpretation of what you've already told me, as a strawman. In reality, as demonstrated above, when pressed, you contradict yourself because the metaphysical principles you profess are inconsistent with your beliefs.

Once again, M-U cannot comprehend a view outside his own idealistic assumptions. — noAxioms

If someone would explain to me, in a way which makes sense, a better perspective, then I'd happily switch. Simple assertions like "It must", and "no it's not" just do not suffice for helping a poor lost soul such as myself, comprehend another view.

but it is a fact that 60 seconds of time can pass without anyone looking at a clock or a stopwatch. — Michael

Simple assertions do not help me to understand what you are trying to say. "60 seconds" is the reading we get of the clock. It's just a generic symbol, like "dog" or "cat". But I can show you many things which would be called "a dog", and things called "a cat". Now, if you think that there are some things called "60 seconds", other than the reading taken from a measuring device, then show them to me.

Consider Wittgenstein's example of "the standard metre in Paris". "One metre" is a measurement, and there are many items which can be measured to be a metre. The standard metre is the paradigm, the official example of that convention. But there are no objects in the world which "one metre" refers to, not even the standard metre, as this is the paradigm, it is not "one metre" itself. Likewise, we can measured a multitude of different times as "60 seconds", and there is a paradigm, or standard which is the oscilation of the cesium atom, but there is nothing in the world which is referred to by "60 seconds"

the second, defined as about 9 billion oscillations of the caesium atom. — Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_of_time#:~:text=The%20base%20unit%20of%20time,oscillations%20of%20the%20caesium%20atom.

Billions of years passed before humanity evolved, and this isn't some retroactive fact that only obtained when humanity started studying the past. — Michael

A ''year" is nothing but a human convention, a standard of measurement, just like "a metre". Therefore there was no years prior to humanity. What you talk about here is a projective measurement backward in time. There was something occurring prior to humanity, which we commonly call "the passing of time", but what is referred to as the passing of time did not consist of years, as "years" is the product of the measurement, just like "metres" is the product of the measurement. To claim that standards of measurement existed prior to humanity, which actually invented them, is Pythagorean idealism, Platonism. Then these standards become eternal principles, such that God was measuring the passage of time prior to humanity, to determine the passage of "years". But this Platonism is demonstrably wrong, because it excludes the possibility of error.

That the passing of time is something completely different than a succession of years is very evident from the fact that it can be measured as a succession of a vast multitude of different increments, years, days, minutes, seconds, picoseconds, nanoseconds. Each of these increments serves as a measurement standard, (just like metre, centimetre, kilometre, foot, inch, mile), but not one of them is the thing which is measured. And, the little inconsistencies between them which show up in conversions, where we have to adjust the clock so that they keep up with each other, shows that none of them is actually real or true. Notice the wiki quote, a second is "about nine billion oscillations".

I don't know whether you're arguing for some kind of antirealism or if you're failing to understand a use-mention distinction. — Michael

Perhaps if you took the time to explain to me how you understand this use-mention distinction, and how it is applicable in this context, that might be helpful to me understanding your position, which at the time seems completely ridiculous. I really do not understand how you can believe that the product of a measurement "one second" can exist without the act which produces it. Again, the best course of action for you to help me understand, would be to show me these things, called "a second", or explain to me how I might find one without performing the act of measuring which is what, I believe, actually creates them.

Regardless, the arguments I am making here are directed towards the realist who believes that supertasks are possible. — Michael

As I explained yesterday, we must consider that any such task (supertasks) are possible until proven otherwise. This is because they are logically possible, and the only thing which makes them appear to be impossible is that they are inconsistent (in contradiction with) the conventional way of doing things. But the conventional way is not necessarily the best way, it is only the way which is supported by empirical evidence, which has been proven to be unreliable and misleading. Therefore we cannot dismiss the supertasks as impossible until we have sound logic which disproves them. Simply asserting that supertasks are impossible just displays an empiricist prejudice. Then you support your prejudice with Platonism.

It's an open question, but ontological randomness is at least logically possible, as far as we know. — fishfry

Ontological randomness may be logically possible but it's philosophically repugnant. The problem being that if something is deemed as random, it is in that sense unintelligible. So if something is deemed as ontologically random, and it is considered to be unintelligible, then there is no will to attempt at figuring it out.

Now the problem is that if something appears to be random there is no way of knowing whether it is epistemologically random, or ontologically random, because of the unintelligibility of it. So we won't know which until we figure it out, therefore we must assume it to be epistemologically random. And even if it is ontologically random, we will still never know that this is the case, so we will always have to assume that it is epistemologically random, and try to figure it out. The category of "ontological randomness" is absolutely useless.

Notice your reference to "previous occasions". That's what I described, the will to get past the failed attempts, until you find the strategy which is appropriate for yourself. The overarching desire was to quit smoking, and it took you a few attempts to find the method suited to you. Then you found success. But you need to remember that the method suited to you is not necessarily the method suited to everyone else. So we can say that what works is to have a method which will bring you to the end goal. The end goal is to quit, but the successful method varies depending on the person. Therefore we cannot say that this or that method is the best method, only that it is necessary to have that one specific end goal, to quit.

No they mustn’t. — Michael

That's fundamentally incorrect. If you truly believe that an increment of time exists without being measured, tell me how I can find a naturally existing, already individuated increment of time.

You simply come to care about something more than the addiction, and are thus able to let it go, or you do not come to care about something more than the addiction and are thus unable to let it go. — Janus

It's pretty obvious that the exact thing which you need to care about more than smoking, to stop smoking, is not-smoking. If you look into the scientific research on the subject, as my brother did when he quit smoking, you'll find that what has been proven as the best way to quit smoking is to have a strategy, a method, or procedure, and to adhere to it. Having the will to following the prescribed method is not a matter of having something else which you care about more than smoking, unless you name that something else as "not-smoking".

The issue here is the possibility of failure, which is very strong with addictions. If a person proceeds toward quitting by caring about something, or someone, more than smoking, then the smoker depends on this other thing, or other person, to support one's own will power, as a sort of crutch. And of course this can, and often does work. However, if the other thing which the smoker cares about more than smoking fails in its capacity to support the quitter, then the support will be lost and the person will resume smoking without the will to quit. On the other hand, if the smoker approaches quitting with the pure goal of not-smoking, quitting, then the person may move ahead from one failed attempt to another attempt, with the will and determination to keep trying. In this way the appropriate strategy which is suitable to the particular person will inevitably be found. Failed attempts are very common with addictions, and the only thing which bridges the gap from one attempt to quit to the next is the will to stop the addiction.

If you accept that smoking is detrimental to your health, and you care more about maintaining good health than you do about gratifying your desire to smoke then you will give it up. if you care more about gratifying the urge to smoke you won't. The point is that you cannot simply decide by fiat what will be more important to you. — Janus

This is wrong in multiple ways Janus. First, addictions do not work like that. To break an addiction is not a matter of deciding that there is something you care about more than the addiction. It's actually the opposite of this, one must make the addiction, and breaking it, the top priority itself. Second, deciding by fiat is exactly what is done. It is decided that the addiction must be broken.

An ordinary stopwatch is started.

After 30 seconds a white box turns red, after a further 15 seconds it turns blue, after a further 7.5 seconds it turns back to white, and so on.

When the stopwatch reaches 60 seconds, what colour is the box? — Michael

You have not avoided the contradiction, only obscured it. Increments of time must be measured, the are the product of a measuring device. The measuring device in this example is an ordinary stopwatch. What is implied by "and so on" is increments of time which the stopwatch cannot measure. There lies your contradiction. The stop watch is the designated device which measures time, but you talk about increments of time which cannot be measured by it, therefore contradiction.

In your other example, the counter was the device that measured the passage of time, and it was designed to measure all those increments (do the supertask). But that measuring device denied the possibility of 60 seconds of time passing, making the measurement of a separate timepiece which would measure 60 seconds, contradictory.

Therefore we can conclude that the contradiction lies between the two very distinct descriptions of how time is measured. One way is the supertask of the counter. This is obviously a theoretical way of measuring time. The other way is a description of how time is actually measured in practise. There is contradiction between these two ways of describing the measurement of time. As you yourself indicate, the practical way gets the nod, as the real way, because it is supported by empirical evidence, and the supertask way, since it contradicts the practical way, is designated as impossible. As philosophers though, we are trained to be skeptical of sense evidence, having been educated in the ways that the senses commonly deceive us. So the philosopher knows that there is more to this problem than what meets the eye. It's not simply a matter of dismissing the supertask, and accepting the conventional way of measuring time, as the true way to measure time.

As I said before, the supertask way needs to be proven to be wrong, rather than simply dismissed because it contradicts the way of current practise. The empirical evidence of the stop watch is nothing other than current practise, convention, so it is in fact manufactured evidence. If we always accepted the current practise as the best, or true way, then we'd never improve ourselves. This is why I say simply accepting it and dismissing the supertask, is prejudice, and nothing else. The fact that we have not devised a supertask machine, and so we use other ways to measure time, does not mean that it is impossible that the supertask way is the real "true" way to measure time, and our current practise is actually giving us a false measurement. Therefore the supertask must be proven to be impossible.

Here's an example of an attempt at a similar type of proof. In ancient Greece, there was a principle accepted by many, that the orbits of the sun, planets, etc., were eternal circular motions, as a sort of divine activity. Being a prescribed activity which continues for an infinite duration of time, the eternal circular motion is a supertask. Now, Aristotle in his "On the Heavens" (De Caelo) showed how eternal circular motion is a logically valid and consistent principle, a real logical possibility, just like the supertask counter is. However, he then went on to explain how anything which moves in such a spatial pattern must be a material body. He then described "matter" as the principle of generation and corruption, and determined that a material body must have been generated in the past, and will be destroyed in the future. In this way he provided the principles required, to prove logically, that (the supertask) eternal circular motion is actually logically impossible. This proved that the heavenly bodies were not eternal, and not divine. Then the principle which he employed, "matter", became the keystone for understanding the nature of the physical reality because it provided the principle for associating change and becoming on the earth, with change and becoming in the heavens.

I believe that is the essence of freedom of choice. Possibility is general, it is then divided by the mind, individuated into a multitude of specific possibilities. Then what is chosen is a particular. What puts the final nail in the coffin of determinism is the reality of the decision not to choose. Out of all the possibilities, not one is chosen. This is the case in your example of the person fasting. The person is hungry, and has an abundance of possible foods to choose from, yet decides to choose none. Plato used a similar example, of a thirsty man who has an abundance of water in front of him, yet he does not drink because he knows the water is not suitable.

No it doesn't. — Michael

The contradiction is very obvious. I'm surprised you persist in denial. The supertask will necessarily carry on forever, as the sum of the time increments approaches 60 seconds, without 60 seconds ever passing. Clearly this contradicts "60 seconds will pass".

You seem to take issue with that first paragraph, but your reasoning against it doesn't make any sense. Unless the universe ceases to exist then 60 seconds is going to pass. The passage of time does not depend on the counter. — Michael

In logic we must follow the premises regardless of truth or falsity. Your example makes premises which describe a machine doing what has been called a "supertask". We have no premises to say that a supertask is impossible, only the premises which describe an instance of doing it, therefore demonstrating the logical possibility of a supertask.

Now, you introduce another premise, "Unless the universe ceases to exist then 60 seconds is going to pass". This premise contradicts what is implied by the others which describe the supertask.

So, what we have is a contradiction, without the information required to resolve the contradiction. In your reply to fishfry, you simply choose "60 seconds is going to pass", and conclude "supertasks are not possible". But this choice is made without the required argument, it simply reveals your prejudice.

You do not seem to

Oh, you are trying to make that kind of sophistical argument...if the desire is merely for "something" to eat how is that different from the general desire for food? — Janus

I was clarifying what is meant by "hunger". And, rather than being sophistical, I was exposing your sophistry. When we say that someone has "the desire to eat", we recognize the generality of the supposed "object" by showing that what is actually desired is a particular type of activity, "to eat". There is no actual object, until the person forms a specific desire to eat a particular food item. That particular item is "the object" of the person's desire. When you insist that the very general concept "food" is the object of the hungry person's desire, instead of identifying the activity, you are employing ambiguity to obscure the reality of the situation, in a sophistical way.

n any case the argument is not over whether our desires are general or specific, but over whether we are able to determine by fiat what we desire, and/or are able to determine by fiat whether we desire one thing more than another. — Janus

It appears like you paid no attention whatsoever to my argument. Allow me to rephrase in a very simple way. First, you need to distinguish between the very indefinite feeling of want, or need, from the very specific desire for a particular object. The feeling, which gives rise to the desire, allows for many possible sources to serve as the means for satisfaction. The specific desire for a particular object is the result of a choice from one of the apprehended possibilities. The feeling of hunger for example, allows for a vast multitude of possible food items to serve as the means for satisfaction. The hungry person will choose from the multitude of possibilities and form a desire for one, or a number (perhaps a hierarchy in order of preference) of particular food items. Very clearly, the person determines "by fiat", the particular objects which are desired, and any hierarchical order of preference.

Your last paragraph is merely hand-waving. We are what we are and want what we want, and think what we think, and we cannot change any of that simply by fiat. Of course, people do change, but they only do so insofar as they have the capacity for change, and they cannot simply conjure up such a capacity if they don't already possess it. — Janus

OK, so you believe that a person is what a person is, and what that person is, is "the capacity for change". Since you insist that the person has no capacity to choose, "by fiat", in relation to that capacity to change, I assume you are a hard determinist.

For example, if you are addicted to tobacco, you won't be able to give it up unless you care about something else that contra-indicates smoking more than you care about smoking. You will either be able to do that, or you will not—we do not create ourselves from scratch. — Janus

You clearly understand nothing about will power and determination. The way to quit smoking is to have the will power to quit smoking, and this allows the person to choose a method which is suited for that particular person. It may require numerous attempts of trial and error, as some methods may fail. It is not necessary that the person substitutes the desire for a smoke with the desire for another object, though this may work for some people. The only thing which "contra-indicates smoking" to the extent required to guarantee that the person gives it up, is the will for non-smoking. Therefore, if to give up smoking, it is required that one cares about something else more than the person cares about smoking, this "something else" must necessarily be "not-smoking".

Because 60 seconds will pass. I don't understand the problem you're having. The passage of time does not depend on what the counter is doing. — Michael

You just reaffirmed the same contradictory statements. It's impossible, by way of contradiction, that the counter can do the assigned task, and 60 seconds can pass. I see the contradiction as very clear and obvious, so I do not understand why you can't see it as contradictory.

The counter, by the prescribed specifications, is designed so that 60 seconds cannot pass until the counter counts every logically possible fraction of a second. Since logical possibility is defined by convention, and the convention allows for an infinite number of possible divisions, the counter, by the prescribed specifications, cannot finish the task. Therefore 60 seconds cannot pass. Your insistence that it can is blatant contradiction.

We can determine whether or not something entails a contradiction. If time is infinitely divisible then supertasks are possible. Supertasks entail a contradiction. Therefore, time being infinitely divisible entails a contradiction.

You can argue that reality allows for the possibility of contradictions if you want, but most of us would say that it is reasonable to assert that it doesn't. — Michael

Why the double standard? When speaking to fishfry you readily acknowledge the contradiction. When speaking to me, you insist that the counter can perform the supertask and 60 seconds of time can also pass, as if there is no contradiction involved.

ince you'd translating from it in your head, and you don't seem to know. — Lionino

Are you saying that people do not use "life" in that way, in languages other than English?

when we say "life" we know exactly what each other mean. — Lionino

So if I were to ask you (in some language other than English), if you believe that there is "life" in some places of the universe other than on earth, would you be able to tell me exactly what I mean by "life" in this context?

Maybe in English you don't. In other languages we have no trouble using the word that comes out of Google translate when you write "life". — Lionino

Then why did you say there is no agreement between you and some biologists on the question of whether or not viruses are alive? Isn't this an instance of "trouble"?

Step 1 occurs after 30 seconds, step 2 occurs after a further 15 seconds, step 3 occurs after a further 7.5 seconds, and so on. — Michael

I see that 30 and 15 and 7.5 sums up to 52.5 seconds. I also see that as it progresses the sum approaches 60. But I do not see how it could ever get to 60. Show me how you believe that "and so on" could indicate a sum of 60 is achieved please.

Then your argument should be that supertasks are impossible, not that 60 seconds cannot elapse. — keystone

No, clearly I made the appropriate choice in deciding what to argue. The described "supertask" is incompatible with 60 seconds elapsing. We seem to agree on that now. The supertask is derived from the premises of your example, therefore the supertask is the valid conclusion to your premises. You have provided no propositions or premises whatsoever, to conclude that 60 seconds may actually elapse. This is derived from your prejudice about the the nature of time, and the conventions of measuring the passage of time. To base my argument on unstated premises, and prejudices, is to produce an invalid argument. Therefore I have no principles to validly argue that 60 seconds can pass, and no principles to argue logically that the described supertask is impossible. Your assertion that 60 seconds may pass is inconsistent with your stated premises, and is not supported by any premises.
It is derived merely from your prejudice.

The example is simply: after 30 seconds a single-digit counter increments to 1, after a further 15 seconds it increments to 2, after a further 7.5 seconds it increments to 3, and so on for 60 seconds, resetting to 0 at every tenth increment. — Michael

Clearly, what is implied by "and so on", contradicts "for 60 seconds". The two are inconsistent, incompatible. Therefore your example is self-contradicting and incoherent. To me, it is analogous to saying "the big blue computer is designed to produce the complete numerical expression of pi, and when it is finished we'll throw a big party. Do you see how "when it is finished" (analogous with "after 60 seconds") contradicts the described supertask "produce the complete numerical expression of pi" ( analogous with what is meant by "and son on")?

I don't agree with them, but that is just a personal preference of mine. — Lionino

All this, I take as evidence that we do not know what "life" is. We seem to believe that there is something called "life", (and it's sort of odd that we name it as a thing, harkening back to "the soul"), but we really do not understand what it means to be alive.

Kant agreed that all our knowledge begins with experience, but he disagreed with Hume's conclusion that it therefore arises solely from experience. Kant introduced a critical distinction between the forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories of understanding (including but not limited to causation), which are necessary for us to interpret sensory information.

According to Kant, these categories are not derived from experience but rather are the preconditions that make experience intelligible in the first place. They are the innate structures of the mind that organize sensory data into coherent perceptions ('percepts'). For example, when we perceive one event following another, our understanding interprets this as causation, allowing us to see one event as causing the other, rather than just as two events occurring sequentially. Thus, Kant argued that Hume's reduction of knowledge to mere sensations and perceptions overlooks the active role of the mind's inherent structures, which underpin experience. — Wayfarer

I would think that since having these categories is actually having a form of knowledge, then we cannot truthfully say "Kant agreed that all our knowledge begins with experience". There is a bit of inconsistency here, whereby it is necessary to either break knowledge into two types, a priori and a posteriori (such as innate and learned), or else we need to provide different principles for understanding the a priori as something other than knowledge.

The latter, which appears to be the direction you've taken, is a very strenuous task. This course of explanation drives toward the resolution of Plato's "knowledge is recollection" problem. Without a proper separation between the potential for a specific form of knowledge, and actually holding that knowledge, the two become one and the same, with something separating them. So as Plato demonstrates, learning is nothing other than recollection. That produces the problem of infinite regress, and the conclusion that all knowledge has eternal existence.

Aristotle offered a resolution by portraying this as two distinct layers of potentiality. Kant's a priori can be understood as the capacity, or potential for learning. This potentiality underlies all a posteriori, or empirical knowledge, which is describe by Aristotle as the capacity, or potential to act. Notice the two distinct levels of potentialities. Knowledge proper, is the potential to act in a specific way. But in order to act in a specific way, we must first learn how to act in that way. Below this though, supporting it as a foundation, is the capacity, or potential to learn, which is a necessary requirement to learning. This, the lower level capacity to learn, appears to have all the characteristics of being a form of knowledge itself. Learning is a type of acting, so the capacity to learn is itself a capacity to act.

What separates these two forms of potential (two types of knowledge) is a form of activity. That type of activity is described by Aquinas as the creation of habits. This is how the one type of potential, the capacity to learn, becomes the other type of potential, as the capacity to act in a specific learned way. The former "capacity to learn" is the more general, and the latter is to focus the general potential in a more specific way. The importance of habits in the shaping and forming of living beings through evolution is what Lamarck focused on in his evolutionary speculations.

The first point is that what is significant to you, what is important to you, conditions your desires. We all have first order desires for pleasure, satisfaction, gratification, stimulation and so on. But in case those desires lead to habits that are unhealthy, they may be countermanded by stronger concerns like personal health, social harmony, or even simply by introjected moral prescriptions and proscriptions. — Janus

This seems to support my claim rather than yours. Since you name a multitude of types of desires, and the human being must prioritize one over the other in many situations, this seems to support what I said, that we can choose what we want. Please note, that having a general inclination in some way, is not the same as having a want. The want is for something specific an "object". So for example, I may have an emptiness in my stomach producing a general uneasy anxious feeling called "hunger", but this is completely different from the "want" of "I want a hamburger".

The second point is that what you desire in the first order sense; food, warmth, shelter, sex, and so on simply is what it is. — Janus

Notice, that all these so-called "desires" manifest simply as general uncomfortable, or even painful feelings. You only call them "desires" because you assume that there is an object involved. A desire is for something specific, this is the end, or object. The objects of all your mentioned desires, "food, warmth, shelter, sex," are very general. These generalities do not serve as objects at all, in reality. You just mention them as if they do, because it makes your argument. In reality, the desire is for a specific object, and since the person has the choice between many different objects, you can use the general terms, ""food, warmth, shelter, sex,".

Suppose for example, that you have the general feeling which we know as "hunger". This you seem to describe as "the desire for food". Hunger is clearly not the desire for food. It is a feeling within your body having an effect on your mind. The effect is not the general "desire for food", it is the desire to eat something. Then that desire to eat something is turned more specific by the conscious mind, toward the desire to eat a specific thing. The saying, "the desire for food" is simply a feature of the mode of description. Since we observe that the desire to eat something may be satisfied by many different food substances, we can simply call it "the desire for food". However, when hunger, the desire to eat something, actually manifests in the particular circumstances that it does, there is the opportunity for the hungry person to choose from many different food items, so that the feeling of hunger transforms to the want for a specific item, without ever actually being "the desire for food". That generalization is just the way that we describe the reality that the hungry person, the person with that feeling, has the freedom of choice to choose whatever object that one wants, to eat.

The third point is that each person's capacities just are that person's capacities—some are more capable than others at overcoming their compulsions or addictions. Some people simply don't and cannot, feel empathy, for example—they cannot force themselves to care for others, although is they are smart, they may at least be able to bring themselves to act as though they do. — Janus

This is simply a copout, the position of a determinist, fatalist, defeatist. As described in my reply to wayfarer above, a person's capacities are multilayered. And, through habit forming we are very able to shape and direct our capacities. This is because they are based in the most general, yet are actualized in the most particular, as in my description of hunger above. Because there are layers, and the opportunity of choice at each layer, and what is formed at the higher level is a further capacity, we very clearly have the ability to shape and form our own capacities. This for example is what we do when we grow up from childhood to being an adult, we shape our capacities in the directions that we choose, and eventually take on a career. And this ability to shape our capacities continues through our lives.

The example is simply: after 30 seconds a single-digit counter increments to 1, after a further 15 seconds it increments to 2, after a further 7.5 seconds it increments to 3, and so on for 60 seconds, resetting to 0 at every tenth increment. — Michael

I guess I misunderstood your example. It is obviously not consistent with the OP. That little part where you say "and so on for 60 seconds" is unclear. The OP lays out the conditions in steps, but your "and so on" tells me very little.

The obvious point is that we can describe a scenario which is logically possible, but physically impossible. When working with this scenario, we need to bare in mind, the fact that it is physically impossible, and adhere rigidly to the logic of the scenario, only. If one's mind gets influenced by other principles, such as what is physically possible in the universe, and what is going on in the physical universe, this will surely create confusion.

60 seconds will pass in the universe. The counter is just one thing that exists in the universe and it changes according to the prescribed rules.

So given the prescribed rules, when the universe is 60 seconds older, what digit will the counter show? — Michael

Yes, that is the point. Your expressed conceptualization "60 seconds will pass in the universe" is not consistent with the conceptualization prescribed by the OP. But this conceptualization "60 seconds will pass in the universe" is not part of the example. So your introduction of it is not valid. We could call it an equivocation fallacy. We have "time passing" as prescribed in the example, and "time passing" in the universe. The two are not consistent. To introduce the latter into the example, is to equivocate.

Sorry Lionino, I am not a biologist, and spoke hastily without understanding what I was saying. Google has told me that viruses are not alive, so I apologize for the misleading comment.