This is an interesting idea, but interesting ideas are not proof. With the idea of first causes, anyone can propose an equally competitive idea. For example, I could just say that a God created souls, and souls create free will. Or I could say there are no souls and free will is deterministic. All these claims require proof now. You must prove without a doubt that something is a first cause.

Your description of a soul using first causes needs specifics. How can a soul channel something which the soul would not know would exist? After all, first causes are 100% unpredictable, and could be anything. So what you're really stating is that there are very specific first causes that follow very specific rules that pop into reality every time we make a choice. That doesn't make any sense or line up to the complete randomness of a first cause. So its an interesting idea, but logically doesn't make sense, let alone without proof. — Philosophim

That was just and idea. What I really believe is what I wrote later in the next post, that you need to consider two distinct types of cause. This way, "first cause" refers to the first in a chain of efficient causes, while allowing that there is a completely different type of "cause" which is prior to it. Here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/875937

There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being. — Philosophim

This is incorrect, as demonstrated by my argument, there necessarily is constraints prior to its coming into being. "Constraints after it comes into being" doesn't even make sense. If the constraints only exist after the cause, then they have no capacity to act as constraints on the cause.

Look, here's the argument again, in short form. There must be something preexisting the "first cause" which the first cause acts on, in order for the cause to have an "effect", therefore to be known as a "cause". So the "first cause" cannot be absolutely unconstrained because the thing which preexists it, which it will have an effect on, will be a constraint to it.

In other words, your idea of an absolutely unconstrained "cause" is self-contradicting, because the concept of "cause" has constraints inherent within it. if you want to talk about a completely, or absolutely, unconstrained act, this act cannot be known as a "cause" in the common sense which relates "cause" to "effect", because that completely unconstrained act could not be said to have an "effect", effect being described in terms of "change".

Meaning it could be a photon, an explosion, or anything else you can imagine. — Philosophim

Your proposal of things to imagine as examples of first cause are all constrained by what is described in the terms of the examples, therefore those proposed "first causes" are actually constrained. In reality, if you can imagine it, then what you are imagining is the effects of the supposed "first cause" on the preexisting constraints, therefore constraint is implied by the image. So your requirement of no constraints is nonsense. This is what makes "first cause" as you propose, completely unimaginable, incomprehensible, unintelligible, and self-refuting nonsense.

Causal chains do not end unless existence itself disappears. A causal chain is not a creation of measurement by people, it is the reality of X influences Y's outcome. Even the disappearance of an existence may cause an outcome elsewhere. — Philosophim

Again, you are just demonstrating why your supposed conception of "first cause" is unintelligible nonsense. The very sane thing which you say about a causal chain ending also holds for a causal chain beginning. If X is the supposed "first cause", it must have a influence of Y, like you say. Y is the preexisting conditions which constitute the constraints on X.

To be clear once again, there is no restriction on what can occur. — Philosophim

The conditions you describe, "no restriction on what can occur", are conditions which eliminate the possibility of anything "occurring". That is why your proposal of the requirements for a "first cause" amount to unintelligible nonsense, self-contradiction.

Yes, I am confirming that you understood this perfectly! I'm just pointing out that you're drawing incorrect conclusions from this that necessitate free will is a first cause. — Philosophim

And I am pointing out to you, that your conception of "first cause" is simply unintelligible, as self-contradicting. So I propose that we dismiss it, and move along to something more rational, like what I propose in the link above, a distinction between types of cause. This would allow that a "first cause" in a causal chain would still have a prior "cause", but the prior cause would be of a distinctly different type, and not be describable as a part of the causal chain.

The logic points out that there must be a first cause, but it does not make any claim as to what that first cause might be. — Philosophim

So, let's start from this premise, and I'll show you where you go wrong. The use of "cause" here is strictly determined by the logical demonstration. We cannot stray outside of the meaning intended for "cause" within the argument, without invalidating the argument, and that argument produces the conclusion you refer to.

Now, the next question is how does a first cause arise. You assert that it must be absolutely unconstrained, and truly random, but this insistence is unjustified. All that is required as what is prior to the "first cause", is that it is something other than what is implied by "cause" in the sense of a causal chain. So it is not necessary to conclude that what is prior to the first cause is absolutely unconstrained randomness. This is not a valid conclusion, there may simply be something which doesn't qualify as a "cause" by the terms of the argument. So this is why Aristotle distinguished different senses of "cause". This allows that a "final cause" is actually prior to the "first cause" of a causal chain, when we recognize that "cause" in the sense of final cause is not consistent with "cause" in the sense of "efficient cause" as used in the argument of causal chains, which produces the conclusion of a first cause.

On the other hand, it would not be difficult to link your desire to a physical basis - dehydration, perhaps, or level of alcohol in the bloodstream. But they are neither necessary not sufficient for desiring a beer, so they cannot be straightforward causes. Social context etc. might also be factors and those are rules or habits and so, again, not causal. — Ludwig V

This lack of necessity is what necessitates, logically, that the type of causation is distinct. In the determinist causal chain there is no room for choice, selection, or any form of directing efficient causes toward an outcome, there is only a necessary relation. But to understand intentional actions we need to allow for selection, and this means that the relation between cause and effect is not necessary. So we have two senses of "cause" one with necessity one without, and these two are incompatible, therefore requiring the distinction between them.

There is an issue with your theory. You sweep everything up into one classification, and brush aside the variety and difference in the concepts of causation under one term. This is not wrong, exactly, because we do apply that term to all the different ideas. — Ludwig V

That is exactly the problem, but I would say that it is wrong, because we do use the term "cause" in very different ways. We do use "cause" to answer "why?", commonly in the form of "because". Failing to recognize the difference between very distinct and fundamentally incompatible uses of "cause", and attempting to restrict one's definition of "cause" to one or the other, as Philosophim does, will leave the aspects of reality which are understood by the other usage as unintelligible. This is demonstrably "wrong".

I'm not sure I can cope with different types of actuality. Can't we just talk about the actuality of contingent things and the actuality of necessary things? — Ludwig V

Sure, but I think that these two are incompatible, so then we might just as well accept that they are different types of actuality. This is the metaphysics part, getting to the basic categories. If you don't want to do the metaphysics, we can avoid it, but if you don't want to do the metaphysics then what's the point in discussing "first causes"?

One can always dive deeper into an explanation (i.e. ask why a particular causal link holds). There's nothing special there. But there must be something known about A and B as a basis of the explanation. No doubt we all had a moment of illumination when we were presented with the causal explanation of a rainbow. We don't abandon what we knew beforehand and we knew fine what a rainbow is before that. Indeed, we couldn't understand the explanation unless we did know. We add the causal explanation in to our understanding of what a rainbow is. Similarly with wants and needs, beliefs and assumptions and their physical counterparts. — Ludwig V

The rainbow explanation is a good example. The classical explanation refers to the refraction of waves. But modern understanding of photons interacting with electrons shows that this explanation is really inadequate. So it's true that there must be "something known" which forms the basis for the explanation, but knowledge is not infallible, and depending on the unknowns which are hidden underneath that "something known", the knowledge which constitutes the "something known" may even turn out later to be wrong.

"Cause" is defined by the theory/hypotheses that it is part of, or theories and hypotheses have different ideas of what a cause is. I recognize those as different types of causation. Common sense explanations of actions are incredibly complicated. I would not rule out the possibility that some of the factors we appeal to might be considered causal. Examples would be needed. But I'm pretty clear that such explanations are often, even primarily, interpretations of actions. Analysis of all this is further complicated by the familiar fact that actions are mostly describable in different ways and can form into hierarchical structures, and explanations may address just one level of the hierarchy. — Ludwig V

An example could be something like my desire for a beer caused me to go to the fridge to look for one. "Cause" in this sense would be completely different from "cause" in the sense of the heat from the stove caused the water to boil. Notice how "desire" is not a physical activity which can be quantified and shown to be actively causing effects through a physical process.

Einsteinian space-time is a concept which is well over 100 years old.. — wonderer1

Concepts do not have physical existence. And the fact that a concept is useful does not imply that there is anything physical which corresponds with the concept. In fact, the reverse is true. The more useful a concept is, the more general it is, and being general means that it is designed to relate to many different things. The more general the concept, the further it is from having any physical thing which corresponds with it. Take the numbers for example. The same is the case with Einsteinian space-time. It is a very general, and useful concept, "general relativity", but being "general" implies that there is nothing particular, i.e. a physical thing, which corresponds with it. The physicists I've spoken to about this issue completely acknowledge that "space-time" is a conceptual structure, and not a physical thing.

The first cause must have an effect on the causal chain it initiates. Therefore, by definition, it is an element of that chain and not something prior and abstract. — jgill

That, I would say is an interesting problem, which appears to be giving Philosophim some difficulty, the relationship between the first cause, and the resulting causal chain. In the descriptions, or definitions which Philosophim provides, there appears to be some ambiguity as to whether the first cause is part of the chain, or something separate from the chain. This is due to the way that we understand causes, as something contingent on a prior cause. If we remove the prior cause (in "first cause"), we have the question of whether this is really a "cause" as we understand, because we understand causes in a causal chain as contingent on a prior cause. So it becomes ambiguous as to whether the firat cause is part of the chain or not.

I would argue that a first cause must be something prior to, and separate from the causal chain, not an element of the chain. This is because the elements of the chain are known through science and inductive reasoning, such that they are all of the same category, and being that way implies that there is another cause prior to each one. That is the way that we know "events".

These are the principles laid out by Aristotle in the cosmological argument. A "cause" (in the modern sense which corresponds with Aristotelian efficient cause) is a contingent event. This means that it consists of two parts, the temporally prior potential for the event, and the posterior actuality, after the event. The "contingency" is due to the fact that the prior potential is always a potential for a multitude of possible events, and the resulting actuality is the one particular event which actually occurs. This implies the necessity of an actuality which actualizes the particular event, from the multitude of possibilities. You might consider this to be a sort of 'selection' process.

Now, if we ignore the "contingency" aspect and represent the causal chain as a simple cause precedes effect model, in a determinist way, then we effectively remove the "potential" from the model. One actual state precedes another actual state, and this determinist representation provides no real principle whereby we could say that the potential for an event precedes its actual occurrence, all there is is another actual event as cause.

So to be consistent with our true empirical observations, we must include "potential" into our descriptions of real events, and allow that events are contingent. This implies that the potential for any physical event always precedes, in time, the actual occurrence of that event, and something acts to cause, or 'select', the particular occurrence from the multitude of possibilities . This we can take as an inductive principle, a physical law, and on its own it appears to create an infinite regress of potential preceding actual, extending backward in time. However, we still need to account for the 'selection' process which determines the particular actual outcome from any instance of existing potentiality.

Things get complex now because we tend to assign the selection process to another chain of efficient causes Causal chains interact.. Therefore the various relations between causal chains appears to suffice for explanation of the selection required to account for the contingency of potential. However, this is just a superficial appearance. What the cosmological argument shows is that this provides an incomplete representation. If we look at the relationship between potential and actual, in an absolute way, we see that potential cannot really precede actual in this way. If there was ever a time when there was only potential, it would not have the capacity to actualize itself, and there would always be only potential. Potential cannot precede actual in an absolute way. Therefore to account for the reality of the actual existence, which we live and experience, we need to allow for a distinct form of actuality which is prior to the actuality which we observe as physical events. The actuality of physical events requires a preceding potential. The actuality of physical events is known by inductive reasoning to have a preceding potential, but this distinct actuality, the 'prior actuality', the one I described as the one which 'selects', requires no preceding potential, and therefore is a completely different type of actuality.

What we have here is two distinct types of "cause", therefore two distinct types of actuality. There is the contingent type of actuality which always has the prior potential, and there is the logically necessary type of actuality, demonstrated by the logic to be prior to the contingent actuality, as necessary for the existence of a contingent actuality. Philosophim appears to be getting confused due to a failure of recognizing and separating these two distinct types of cause.

So Philosophim appears to understand the requirement of a "first cause" in a causal chain of contingent events, but does not allow that whatever it is which produces the first cause in such a chain, could itself be a "cause", but a different type of cause. Because "first cause" signifies that there is no cause prior to this, Philosophim denies causation to the first cause in a causal chain, insisting on true randomness. But this problem is avoided if we recognize the two distinct types of actuality, and allow that the "first cause" is simply the first cause in a causal chain, the first contingent actuality. This allows that a completely different type of actuality, the one that 'selects' from potential is temporally prior, to the first cause in a causal chain, thereby resolving the issue pointed to by Philosophim, that a first cause must be uncaused in an absolute way.

I'm sorry, It was not helpful to use the word "popular" in different senses in successive sentences. This observation refers to Ryle and his followers. They thought that identifying categories was the end of the story, but that isn't satisfactory on its own - at least, not in this case. Ryle seems to recognize this in the context of his discussion of perception in "Dilemmas" — Ludwig V

Would you agree that we can have two distinct types, or categories of "cause", in the way I describe above, such that the "first cause" in a chain of one particular category of causes, has a prior cause of a different type?

Common sense explanations cannot possibly depend on unknown and unseen events in the brain (or mind); if that were so, common people like us could never explain what people do. In their simplest form, explanations of action give the agent's rationale for action (together with indications how sound that rationale is). — Ludwig V

I do not see the problem here. I think that common sense explanations do, very often, rely on unknown events. This is because we explain things without knowing in completion the thing we are explaining. So the unknown is always lurking within the explanation somewhere. Sometimes people might use a form of "magic", or similar things like "random occurrence", "spontaneous generation", "abiogenesis", etc., to stand in for the unknown. So it is a simple fact that often when we explain things, there is within the explanation, elements of the unknown, which are very often in some way glossed over or ambiguated, to give the impression that the explanation is better than it really is. "Events in the brain" is a very complex subject, so we ought to expect an abundance of unknown factors. In fact, "events in the brain" has inherent within the expression, this type of ambiguity or glossing over, because the nervous system extends beyond the brain, and there is not a clear boundary which would separate an event in the brain from being in other parts of the body as well, at the same time, as part of the same event.

That cannot be the same as a causal explanation, because a rationale justifies the action, whereas a causal explanation does not justify or fail to justify what it explains. A major difference is that a rationale explains the values that provoke or motivation the action, and causal explanations have no equivalent to the question what motivates an action. — Ludwig V

Would you accept, that the rationale, the values etc., which motivate an action, are "causal"? But this would mean that we obviously need to distinguish two distinct types of causation, one being the sense of a causal chain of physical events, the other being the motivators for actions of living beings.

I suspect you would have a hard time finding physicists who agree with that assertion. — wonderer1

I think you'd be surprised by what some physicists believe about time. I happen to know a few.

In any case, do you have an argument for the claim? — wonderer1

It's very simple. No part of time, past, present, or future, nor the passing of time itself, is perceived by any of the senses. And physics does not describe time in any way, it is something which is taken for granted in that field.

The present is in two categories. The physical present that exists as physical matter and mental content that exists as a non-physical. — Mark Nyquist

I tend to look at mental content as consisting of two parts, our relations with the past (memories), and our relations with the future (anticipations). The brain, existing at the present, is what relates these two in the act of thinking.

The mind can understand past occurrences as memories, and future possibilities as anticipations, but the physical presence of the brain at the present is somewhat incomprehensible to it. It is incomprehensible because the mind does not know how to adequately represent the division between past and future. We tend to reduce this division to a point in time, for the practical purpose of measuring, but this leaves no time at the present. That creates a problem because nothing can be known to exist without temporal extension, so the physical presence of the brain at the present become incomprehensible.

Time consists of three parts, past present and future, none of which is physical.

The reality of time is good evidence for the existence of non-physical aspects of our world.

Me, as a physicalist, saying "the evidence for physicalism could also plausibly still be compatible with non-physicalist ideas" is not me rejecting physicalism. — flannel jesus

I don't see the logic. If it is compatible with non-physicalist ideas, then it is not evidence for physicalism because it's equally evidence for non-physicalism.

Perhaps it is because I come from a more science based perspective, but I would expect a physicalist to be open to physicalism being falsified, as a matter of intellectual integrity. I don't see any problem with leaving the door wide open for evidence which might falsify physicalism. Having left the door open for a long time, and never having seen any evidence falsifying physicalism walk through the door, is why I am a physicalist. That and the explanatory power of relevant scientific understanding. — wonderer1

Do you understand what "evidence" is? Evidence consists of facts which support the hypothesis. Evidence doesn't walk through the door, it must be sought. That's why experimentation is a significant aspect of the scientific method, through experimentation we seek evidence. If you are happy with your physicalism you will not seek evidence to falsify it, and the evidence will never walk through the door. Real scientific understanding recognizes that evidence does not walk through the door.

I'm not intending at all to debate the soul, so lets assume one exists. If free will comes from the soul, then free will is not a first cause. Is the soul a first cause then? For it to fit within a first cause it would need to be to be randomly created. There should be no reason a soul should or should not exist. Meaning that a God could not have created them. For if God created souls, then souls are not first causes. I just want you to be aware of this. — Philosophim

Let me put it another way. The free will itself is not a first cause, because it is a property of the soul, and it is therefore guided by the intention, or purpose of the soul. What I propose is that free will is evidence of the reality of first causes. What I think, is that the soul uses first causes to exercise free will so that there could not be free will if there was no first causes. So it is not that the soul is a first cause, nor strictly speaking, is free will itself the first cause, but there are first causes, and the soul is able to utilize them for its purposes toward effecting change in the world. The reality of the free will is what provides us evidence that there are first causes, and the evidence is that the soul is using first causes toward its goals. The soul itself is not a first cause, but the soul has free will, and the free will requires first causes for its existence.

To think about the issue, lets say then that a soul is not behind free will but free will is its own thing uncaused by anything else. To prove this, we would have to show that free will is limitless and unconstrained. Except there are a few things we find.

1. Free will is constrained to living things. Free will does not exist on its own in the universe.
2. Free will is constrained to certain biological functions like the brain and nerves. Unless you think your toes or rocks can have free will.
3. Free will shouldn't be contained or limited by intelligence, and yet it is. A roach does not have the same will as a human being.

All of these things refute the idea that free will is a first cause. There are clearly only certain areas where free will can form and is constrained by that biology. — Philosophim

So the issue of constraints is not relevant, as I said above. The soul has free will, and it is free because of the reality of uncaused causes which are happening within the living body, but the soul is still constrained by the physical reality of that body at the same time. In other words, the soul's capacity to utilize the uncaused causes which are occurring is limited, or constrained by the physical body, but the reality of these constraints does not mean that the uncaused causes are not real. So you are correct to say " There are clearly only certain areas where free will can form and is constrained by that biology", but this is irrelevant to the issue of first cause.

You should read the article, its pretty interesting. Here's the second paragraph:

"Using the fMRI to monitor brain activity and machine learning to analyze the neuroimages, the researchers were able to predict which pattern participants would choose up to 11 seconds before they consciously made the decision. And they were able to predict how vividly the participants would be able to envisage it."

That's not a reflex, that's a choice. — Philosophim

I've read similar articles already. The point I made about reflex was to demonstrate your illogical use of that article. That some human actions are reflex, does not mean that all human actions are reflex. That is my analogous example. Likewise, that some decisions occur in the way indicated in the article, does not imply that all decision occur in this way. So the article doesn't provide any point to argue, it's like someone arguing that since some human actions are by reflex, therefore free will is not real. There are all sorts of different types of "habit" involved in the actions of living things. The habit is what makes a living thing's actions predictable. Free will decisions are distinctly non-habitual.

Let me explain. Take a die roll. Can you roll a die and have a pink elephant appear? No. There are plenty of causes that explain the die roll. A '1' is a result because someone created the die to have a 1. It rolled because of the force of a human putting it into a cup, shaking it, and dropping it. It rattled because of gravity and reactions to force. It stopped moving because of friction. The die result is not a first cause. It is caused by many other forces and constraints. — Philosophim

I don't see any relevance here. We are talking about the free will act which rolls the die, and how this act utilizes first causes, we are not talking about the action of the die rolling after being thrown.

A first cause has zero reason for its existence besides the fact that it exists. This means there can be no constraints as to what or why it exists. Of course, once it forms, its part of causality and may be limited. Once a thing lasts longer than a measure of time, it is no longer a first cause. At that second tick of time, it is caused by the previous tick in time. It is only at that first tick of time where nothing prior has formed, restricted, or influenced its appearance that it is a first cause. — Philosophim

I don't agree with this. I do not think that you understand the relationship between first causes and constraints. The first cause comes into being without any reason for its existence, as you say, but it comes into being into an already existing environment. It is not caused by that environment, nevertheless it comes into being in that environment. Therefore there are constraints which are prior to it, which necessarily limit (constrain) its coming into being as it does so, specifically the effect it will have. There are no constraints as to why it exists, but there are constraints as to what effect it will have. This is how the soul can utilize uncaused causes without being able to predict them, by constraining them as they come into being.

I agree 100%. As we come to understand the basics of what I wrote, we realize that tons of chains interlink all over the place. A first cause is not an interlink though. It is the end of prior causality somewhere in that mess. While there logically must be at least one, there could be several. And each would be exceedingly difficult to prove. How to you prove that prior to a certain point, a "X" (variable) has no reason for its existence? There's always the question that we simply missed something with our instruments or understanding. Proving that there is no instrument or understanding that could show some prior cause is very difficult. While a first cause is logically necessary, proving that "X" is one is a very high bar. — Philosophim

I think the existence of free will provides very good evidence of the reality of first causes. Look at all the causal chains which must come to an end within us, much of the energy we eat gets stored, so it turns passive. And all the causal chains of all information we absorb through sensation must come to an end if they do not cause a reflex. And then there are self-directed actions derived from decisions, which com from within us. If these actions were just a continuation of the causal chains which enter into us through sensation, eating etc., it would be impossible for us to direct them as we do.

No, this is not the case. A first cause necessitates that it be uncaused by something prior. If there is evidence at all that some other type of causality is in place, then a claim of a first cause fails. Here's one last nail in the coffin. Free will must respond to a stimulous, or choice. Do I go left, or right? What caused me to go left or right? One part of the prior cause is that I had an option to go left or right. Choices are necessarily caused by the limitations in front of us. Something which has no prior cause has no restraint as to what it must be. — Philosophim

The issue was whether or not we "create the chain", not whether or not we create the first cause. The first cause is not created, we know that by definition. However, the particular chain it produces is dependent on the environment within which it arises. So we "create the chain" by preparing the environment for it, while still not predicting it.

Choices are necessarily caused by the limitations in front of us. Something which has no prior cause has no restraint as to what it must be. — Philosophim

Again, you are misrepresenting the role of constraints. The uncaused cause comes into being without a cause, in the middle of preexisting constraints. The limitations, are not causal, they are only restrictions to the cause. So it is incorrect to say that the uncaused cause has no restraint on it.

It's simple logic. The uncaused caused cannot have an effect (therefore it cannot be "a cause") unless there is something already existing which it will have an effect on. Therefore it necessarily comes into an existing environment. And the already existing thing which the uncaused cause has an effect on, will be a constraint to the uncaused cause. Therefore the uncaused cause will necessarily be constrained.

An inability to understand something completely is not evidence of a first cause. Evidence of a first cause requires that there be no possible explanation for why "X" occurs. Our comprehension of it is irrelevant. Free will has too much evidence that it is constrained and influenced by other factors. Therefore it is not possible that free will is a first cause. — Philosophim

This point is irrelevant due to your misunderstanding of the relationship between first causes and constraints.

I would think that "physicalism" is quite strict, not allowing for the possibility of an open door. Isn't that what physicalism is, saying that there is no possibility of anything other than the physical? Opening the door would be rejecting physicalism.

What are you saying, I'm a physicalist but I'll own up to the possibility that physicalism might be wrong? I'm a physicalist and I don't mind admitting that the probability that physicalism is right is about .999...?

Yes and no. There are two modes of explanation involved and much difficulty about the relationship between the two. There is, presumably, a causal chain involved. There is also what is usually called a rational or purposive explanation involved. These two are in different categories or frameworks. We are finding out a good deal about the first kind. We use the second kind every day. We (well, philosophers,) are in a good deal of confusion about the relation between the two. It won't do to say that they are just different kinds of explanation and leave it at that - though that was popular a few decades ago. Nor will it do to "reduce" one to the other or identify one or other as the "real" explanation. How much more do you want? It would take us miles beyond this thread. Perhaps I should post that paragraph as the beginning of a discussion. — Ludwig V

I take it that you are not prepared to make any judgements about the relationship between the two "modes of explanation". I don't agree with your claim that in the past it was popular to just say that the two were different, and leave it at that. I think the popular way was just to take it for granted that intention, purpose, free will, acts to produce a first cause. It was popular just to accept the way things appear to us, that causal chains begin with a freely willed act, and this constitutes the relationship between the two, the free will act begins a causal chain.

I believe that the recent rise of physicalism and scientism has produced the idea that if we follow a causal chain, created from a freely willed event backward, we would see that chain extends beyond the point of decision by the will, into some neurological activity or something like that. The issue that develops though, is what @jgill points to, the matter of a vast multitude of causal chains within the neurological system, and the temporal overlapping of them. So from the physicalism/scientism perspective, which is the determinist perspective, it is a matter of relating the temporality of numerous causal chains to each other, to represent the point of willing. From the free will perspective, such a relationship cannot be established, because there is another active force involved, that of the soul, and this active force actually ends and begins causal chains.

A random event is not about our current ability to measure to predict, it is about a hard logical limitation to predict. A first cause is something self-explained, there is nothing prior that causes it. Such a thing cannot be predicted to arise as there is absolutely nothing causing it.

The point I'm trying to make is that randomness due to lack of knowledge is not the same as randomness with even perfect omniscience could not predict. — Philosophim

OK then, by your definition, "a first cause" is "truly random", not even omniscience could predict it. So, what I am arguing is that this is consistent with "free will" as a first cause, not even omniscience could predict it.

Your reference to omniscience really does nothing except emphasize that human intelligence is not omniscient, and a failure of that intelligence to find "the cause" does not mean that a cause might not still be found by a higher intelligence. What the concept of "free will" signifies, is that there is no such cause in the sense of the causal chain, therefore a cause cannot be determined even by omniscience.

Its actually been determined that people can make unconscious decisions up to 11 second prior to them being aware of it. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions — Philosophim

I don't see how this is relevant. If a type of decision can be made in this way, it does not imply that all decisions are made in this way. Many human acts for example, are shown to be simply reflexive, but this does not mean that all human acts are reflexive.

A constraint is part of what causes an outcome. A first cause cannot have constraints or anything that would lead a particular outcome. Because that would 'cause' the first 'first cause' to be. Meaning its not really a first cause. A first cause is as simple as "No quark is there, not a quark is there." There is nothing that caused the quark. It exists purely because it does. — Philosophim

Constraints do not necessarily lead to "a particular outcome", constraints limit the possibilities. Therefore your appeal to constraints in this context does nothing to imply that a free will act does not produce a first cause.

This again would need to be proven. I don't think science points that way. I think its pretty clear the brain has a sense of timing and it can be traced through causality. But, as I noted earlier, you have an interesting idea that could be tested. — Philosophim

As mentioned above, in my reply to Ludwig, I think this idea of "a sense of timing" is from a naive form of scientism, based in determinism. In reality there is probably thousands, or millions, of causally chains occurring in the brain at the same time, extremely rapidly, far beyond the brain's capacity to understand its own mechanics. So the temporal relations between the various causal chains, and the beginnings and endings of those causal chains (which the doctrine of free will indicates are real) occurring within the brain cannot be grasped by the brain's "sense of timing". The "sense of timing" which the conscious mind actual has, indicates that causal chains end and begin with the free will.

We don't get to create the chain. — Philosophim

As explained above, this is an unsound premise. You insist that the idea of a free will act being an uncaused cause cannot be accepted without prove, but the inverse principle holds just as well. Equally, we cannot exclude ourselves as first causes without proof. As Ludwig implies, there are relations between causal chains and "reasons" (in the sense of purpose and intentions), which are not understood by us. This implies that when a being acts for a purpose we cannot exclude the possibility that the being is utilizing first causes in this type of act. And the vast multitude of causal chains which are active within the brain, in an extremely rapid way, make it very difficult to understand with any degree of certainty, whether some are actually beginning and ending there. If the causal chains are beginning within the brain, then we cannot say "we don't get to create the chain".

I'm sorry. I didn't mean to say that free will is really a first cause. — Ludwig V

That statement was addressed to Philosophim. To you i said I didn't understand you.

I meant to say only that that is the "traditional" view and as an example of what happens when you reach rock-bottom in a specific pattern of explanation. At that point, further explanation will require a categorial change in thinking. It was not a very good example. My own view is that actions by people are explained in a non-causal framework, by purposes, values and reasons. "Free will" is an umbrella for all the "springs of action" - convenient because it doesn't require us to consider all the complexities. Simplification can be useful - and misleading. It's a big topic and won't be helpful here. — Ludwig V

But don't you agree that what you call "springs of action" are first causes in a causal chain? A person makes a choice, springs to action, and this begins a causal chain. If, later, we look back at the causal chain which has progressed from a spring to action, we see the choice which was made as "the end" of the causal chain, or the "final cause" in that chain.

Hi Metaphysician, good to see you again. :) — Philosophim

Glad to be back Philosophim.

I think there was a misunderstanding. A first cause is uncaused. Meaning its existence is a purely random event that cannot be predicted. Free will is not purely random but has constraints and influences. As I noted earlier the brain is where human thought resides, and there is prior causality to the brain. A first cause has no prior causality, so free will cannot be a first cause either. — Philosophim

I don't quite understand this. An event which cannot be predicted is not necessarily purely random. I understand a freely willed event to be like this, it cannot be predicted yet it is not random. So the example of dropping the ball. The drop cannot be predicted, not even by the person dropping it or else that person does not adhere to the principles of the experiment. The person just (seemingly randomly) drops the ball at any moment. And we cannot say that the act is purely random as you describe, because there is a reason for it, the person wanted to.

That an event occurs within constraints does not necessitate the conclusion that it is a caused event. Suppose for example that there are events occurring within a human brain. If we broke down in analysis, these events, some may be uncaused. These uncaused events would be occurring within the constraints of the brain. There is no reason to believe that all of the events occurring within the brain must be caused. There could be uncaused events occurring all the time, at a small level, and as they occur they are constrained by surrounding caused events. The point, is that there clearly is prior causality to the brain, as you say, but this does not rule out uncaused events within the brain, which make us feel like we have free will.

What you may be confusing is the idea of a first cause vs a measurement where we state, "OK, this is the starting, or origin of a causal system. Meaning we start with the hand releasing the ball as a measurement, but we're not denying that there is prior causality to why the hand is there, gravity, etc. A first cause is not a measurement by us. It is a fundamental reality that has no prior cause for its existence. — Philosophim

I'm talking about "first cause" in the same sense as you, an event which has no prior cause. In the example it's not a question of why the hand is there, it's a question of why does the hand release the ball at the precise moment that it does. This act of release has a causal chain which we can follow back in time, to somewhere in the brain. But at some point the person holding the ball, simply decides "now", and releases it. This freely willed decision is the cause of that chain of events in the brain and nervous system which causes the ball to drop, but there is no cause of that decision of "now", at that point in time.

True randomness has zero constraints or rules as to what can be. Limited randomness always has a constraint of some sort. "What causes that constraint?" means that we haven't gotten to a first cause cause. The appearance of a first cause is true randomness. Why? Because if it wasn't, there would be some thing causing one possible outcome to be more or less likely than the other. So is 'free will' truly random? I don't believe so. Humans are physical creatures with physical brains. Brains have rules they have to follow. Now are those rules so complex that measuring and predicting what a brain will do next with 100% certainty a current impossibility? Yes. So free will is not a first cause. — Philosophim

Ok, you agree with me then. The free will act I described appeared to be random, but really it was a "first cause".

You can claim free will is a first cause, but now you have to prove it. If people cannot prove free will is a first cause, then they cannot claim it to be. — Philosophim

Doesn't my example of dropping the ball serve as proof. The act is either random or caused by free will. You showed how it is not truly random, so we can conclude free will.

It depends what you mean by "true first cause". In certain traditions of philosophy, free will is the traditional cause of actions (as distinct from events); it is traditionally regarded as special - either as an uncaused cause or causa sui. Neither concept makes much sense. But then, since explanations of actions qua actions are different in kind from causal explanations, they are regarded as belonging to a category different from causal explanations. In which case free will is not a cause at all. — Ludwig V

Sorry, I do not understand you Ludwig. Are you making a distinction between an action and an event? Why? Is it just for the purpose of stating that free will is not a cause?

Yes, you did say that. But it is not true. I have played string instruments for most of my life. I have put in the time to study music theory and harmony. I have also set-up guitars and have the specialized tools to do so. Including cutting nuts, adjusting neck relief, and setting intonation I also play upright bass which does not have frets. Here playing in tune requires more precision to get the length of the stopped string right. — Fooloso4

Then you obviously know that the instrument does not need to be tuned relative to any specific pitch, pitches, to be "in tune" and produce harmony. And, only if it has to be played along with other instruments must a particular "pitch" be chosen. Furthermore, you must also know that there are numerous different possible "tunings" for the same instrument.

However, I do not think that this is really relevant.

Right again. But those ratios existed prior to the instrument being in tune. The harmony produced is
something that had been produced countless times before by various instruments. The harmony exists prior to this instrument. — Fooloso4

Sure the ratios are pre-determined and pre-exist, but not the tuning, nor the "attunement" , which is a property of the instrument. The fact is, "attunement", as well as "harmony" require an instrument. That is why "the soul is a harmony", or "attunement" is a materialist/physicalist position which Socrates is arguing against. The attunement is the last thing to be created and first to be destroyed.

The predetermined ratios which are used in the process of tuning, are not part of the argument, and are irrelevant to the theory "the soul is a harmony". The materialist/physicalist does not even accept that there must be a hand (mind)-that-tunes the body, if a soul is to emerge, They don't even want to consider the requirement of pre-existing ratios being applied in the artificial construction of harmony, they want to say that attunement/harmony (mind/soul) arises naturally.

That is the position Socrates is arguing against, the materialist/physicalist argument that attunement arises naturally from a body. That is why it is described as the last to be produced, and first to be destroyed. The issue of whether an attunement could be naturally created without a hand(mind)-that-tunes is not even considered.

I used the example of standard tuning so an not to confuse you any more than you already were. But you have come around. What must be adhered to is the ratio of frequencies from one string to another. The ratio of frequencies, exists independently and prior to the instrument. Both standard and non-standard tuning must adhere to those preexisting ratios. — Fooloso4

Yes,, we agree that the ratios pre-exist as principles by which an instrument is tuned. Where we disagree is on the relevance of this (can we call it a fact?). I say that this is not at all relevant to Socrates' arguments. He is arguing about the attunement, or harmony itself, as a property of the instrument. Look again at Simmias' statement. The attunement is "in" the instrument. Look at Socrates' statement, it is the last composed and first destroyed.

This is what Plato is arguing against, the materialist/physicalist position that the soul is like a harmony, which arises from an attuned instrument. I believe it is important to recognize that Plato refutes this materialist/physicalist theory "the soul is a harmony" without appealing to the requirement of pre-existing ratios and a hand(mind)-that-tunes. These are metaphysical principles unacceptable to the materialist/physicalist, and principles which you seem to recognize, cannot really be proven. So Plato refutes the materialist/physicalist theory on its own terms, that the soul is like a harmony which emerges naturally from a well tuned body.

The attunement is not the tuning of the lyre. It is not the tightening and loosening of the strings. For that is physical. It is something that is present when the lyre is in tune. But, as Socrates points out, a man differs from a lyre. To take the analogy further is misleading. — Fooloso4

That's right. Now do you respect the statement that the attunement is "in the lyre". And, as you say, it only exists "when the lyre is in tune". Therefore the attunement is completely dependent on the material existence of the lyre. That is why it is a materialist/physicalist theory. It is not something which preexists the lyre as a set of ratios or anything like that, it is something which only exists when the body is properly tuned. The harmony emerges from the tuning of the body.

This is what Socrates demonstrates, with the three arguments, is a faulty theory. The most convincing is also the most difficult to understand, and that is the middle argument about degrees of existence. If the soul only emerges from the body when the body is properly attuned, then there must be a boundary which is crossed, a point when the soul emerges. This is because it is inconsistent with evidence to say that something has a partial soul, or is partially alive. So the body either has a soul or it does not, it is alive or not. This implies that if the soul is a harmony or attunement, it is a sort of perfection to the tuning, there is a point where the tuning is perfect, and a soul/life appears. But this is completely inconsistent with observed evidence, souls exist with all sorts of imperfections. Therefore it is logically impossible that the soul is like an attunement or harmony which is the result of (emerges from) a body becoming well-tuned.

What is at issue is the preexistence of harmony. — Fooloso4

That is absolutely false. It appears to be the result of a biased or prejudiced interpretation. The "pre-existence of harmony" is not at all presented even as a possibility. What is stated is that the harmony is a property of the well-tuned instrument and it is the last aspect of the instrument to be composed, and the first to be destroyed. That is the materialist/physicalist (Pythagorean derived) presentation of "the soul" which Plato is arguing against. The concept of "the preexistence of harmony" is not at all a part of this materialist/physicalist presentation, and therefore cannot be considered at all. Plato refutes the materialist/physicalist theory on its own terms without the need to appeal to a preexistent harmony. The closest he comes is in Socrates' first argument where he appeals to "recollection".

The attunement is not the tuning of the lyre. It is not the tightening and loosening of the strings. For that is physical. It is something that is present when the lyre is in tune. But, as Socrates points out, a man differs from a lyre. To take the analogy further is misleading. — Fooloso4

Notice "in the lyre". The attunement is the product of the tuning of the lyre. That is the materialist/ physicalist principle, the mind/soul is like a harmony which arises, or emerges, from the well tuned body. The materialist/physicalist principle pays not respect to the fact that the composition of the instrument is artificial, and there is a hand(mind)-that-tunes, simply assuming that the well-tuned body could arise naturally. So Plato refutes the principle without even appealing to the need for the preexistent principles of tuning, thereby refuting the materialist/physicalist theory on its own terms.

“Then, my excellent friend, it is not at all appropriate for us to state that soul is an attunement, for it seems we would be disagreeing with the divine poet Homer and with ourselves.” (94e-95a) — Fooloso4

You, it appears place far too much emphasis on Plato\s reference to "the divine poet", without actually taking the time required to understand the arguments. All he is saying, is that the refutation provided by "ourselves: is consistent with the position presented by "the divine poet Homer". This merely supports 'the logical way of thinking' provided by Socrates. It is not the argument itself, but a reference to a similar way of logical thinking in an authority figure.

The weaknesses of Socrates' arguments in defense of a separate soul that enters and leaves the body are the weaknesses of the traditional beliefs of the city of Athens and others about the soul as taught by Homer. But it is not the belief described by Simmias of Thebes. — Fooloso4

This is way out of context and completely irrelevant. The belief described by Simmias of Thebes, that the soul is a sort of harmony, is decisively refuted by Plato, through the three arguments presented by Socrates. The idea of "a separate soul that enters and leaves the body" is a completely different belief, and is completely irrelevant here.

@Banno
GP is an interesting character, very elusive and careful not to take a stand on any issue which might be controversial. I think it uses a sort of unbiased confirmation bias, to produce the appearance of an unbiased approach. So for example notice that the more you questioned it on the subject of identity, the further it moved away from giving you a decisive answer.

In the first post it clearly stated "It's a fundamental aspect of arithmetic and mathematical notation that "=" often represents equality, not identity", as if it recognized a clear distinction between the two. However, it leaves ambiguity with the word "often", and in the other paragraph it used "typically". "In mathematical terms, '=' typically denotes equality, not identity."

As you proceeded to question it though, it moved further and further from taking a stance on the issue. It then said the meaning of "identity" is "context-dependent", and "context-specific". When asked about this, it moved even further away from taking a stance by describing what it meant by "context-specific", with terms of "nuanced" and "variability", stating that this does not necessarily imply inconsistency. As you can see, it moved itself further and further away from being useful, refusing to say anything decisive.

So, when I referred back to the first post, where it had said something decisive, where it had expressed a clear distinction between equality and identity in mathematics, it simply did not answer, only saying that it is important to ask such questions. It appears like it recognized that saying something decisive in the first place, was a mistake to its unbiased confirmation bias, so that it would not go back and reconsider how it could have made such a mistake.

@Banno
Feed that last post to GP, you'll probably cause him to have a heart attack.

We can attribute a starting point anywhere in a chain of causality. For example, when explaining why a ball falls when I let go of it, I don't have to address quantum physics. Does that mean that quantum physics and a whole host of other things are not part of the causality of the ball falling? No. It just means we don't look at it creating a mathematical origin or starting point. — Philosophim

Do you accept a free will act as a true first cause? Take your ball example. Imagine that you are holding the ball intent on letting it drop at some point. After a duration of time you drop it. There is no determinable "cause" for the drop at the moment it was dropped because the time was randomly selected in your mind. Therefore this freely willed action appears to be a first cause, no apparent cause of the dropping.

In that situation we cannot appeal to the picking up of the ball as the cause of it dropping, because of the time gap in between, when the ball is being held. So every moment that the ball is held, the holding of the ball is a free will act, an uncaused cause acting on the ball, which produces a gap in the causal chain between picking the ball up, and dropping the ball.

5. Infinitely prior, and infinitely looped causality, all have one final question of causality that needs answering. "Why would it be that there exists an infinite prior or infinitely looped causality in existence? These two terms will be combined into one, "Infinite causality.

6. If there exists an X which explains the reason why any infinite causality exists, then its not truly infinite causality, as it is something outside of the infinite causality chain. That X then becomes another Y with the same 3 plausibilities of prior causality. Therefore, the existence of a prior causality is actually an Alpha, or first cause. — Philosophim

Aristotle used a different technique for denying the infinite loop (eternal circular motion). First, he allowed that eternal circular motion is logically possible. There is nothing within the conception of it which would deny it, such as self-contradiction, or any other logical flaw. However, he pointed out that for there to be an eternal circular motion there must be something, a material body, which is moving in that circular way. And, he showed that by the very nature of "matter", such a body is necessarily generated and also corruptible. Therefore that body moving in a circular motion must have had a beginning, and being "corruptible" implies that it will decay if given enough time, so it will also have an end. Therefore the eternal circular motion is physically impossible, based on the science of material things.

The infinite regression of causality, the infinite chain of causes is ruled out in a slightly different way. The infinite regress is described as fundamentally repugnant to the intellect. This is because it renders the thing which is described as "infinite" as having an unintelligible aspect. The aspect which produces the infinite regress is fundamentally unintelligible, because the cause of it cannot be apprehended, being obscured by the infinite regress.

This is similar to what you say when you say that there must be a reason for the infinite regress, except that when someone designates something as infinite in this way, they are actually stipulating that there is no reason for it. That's what the assertion of infinite regress does, it stipulates that the reason cannot be apprehended because there is no reason. The intellect however has the basic desire to know, and to stipulate something as having no reason (to violate the law of sufficient reason), is to assert that it is unintelligible, and this is contrary to the nature of the intellect. It is self-defeating for an intellect to say this. Therefore the assertion of infinite regress is an act which impedes the process of the intellect, and so it is said to be repugnant to the intellect, and must be rejected as counterproductive to the intellectual process of understanding.

The size of the string determines how tight it must be tensioned to produce a desired pitch, but it is the pitch and not the size of the string that determines whether or not the lyre is in tune. Those pitches are not determined by the lyre. — Fooloso4

As I said, you do not at all understand the tuning of a stringed instrument. It is not necessarily tuned to any specific pitch. The notes which the instrument makes must be in tune relative to each other, not relative to any specific pitch. So the base note could be 180 hertz, 160, 175, !90, whatever. The particular pitch does not matter. So long as all the strings are properly tensioned in relation to each other the instrument will produce harmony, and can be said to be in tune. Not only that, but stringed instruments have a wide range of possible tunings. This is why your interpretation of "attunement", or "the tuning of a lyre" as a standard which needs to be adhered to when tuning a lyre, is simply incorrect. There would have been many different ways to tune a lyre in Plato\s time, and nothing specific as "the way".

Anyway you've gone off on a tangent and refuse to address Plato's argument, insisting that "attunement" is something other than the way that Plato described it. Maybe you are correct, and the true description of "attunement" is as you say, and not as Plato said. However, this is irrelevant because Socrates' arguments are directed against "the soul is an attunement", by the description of "attunement" presented in the text, not the one presented by you.

So your dismissal of the arguments seems to be based on a claim that Plato does not properly present what "attunement" is. You think that Plato does not actually refute the Pythagorean theory that the soul is a type of harmony because he makes a strawman of "harmony", and refutes that instead. I believe it is you who has made the strawman, by not following the conventional translation of "harmony", which has a clear meaning consistent with Plato's description, and opting for the more ambiguous "attunement" instead. The ambiguity allows you to produce the strawman.

This is very simple. Either you believe there is a first cause or you do not believe there is a first cause. It's a matter of belief, not reasoning. Sounds like theology to me. — jgill

I disagree with this. I think it is a matter of reasoning. Aristotle's so-called "cosmological argument" begins from the reality of change, and contingent being, which we experience at the present time, and proceeds to demonstrate logically the need to conclude the reality of what people call "a first cause". Because of this, I think that belief in the first cause is really, at its base, a matter of reasoned metaphysics, rather than religion.

The theologists have taken "the first cause" from the theoretical discipline of metaphysics, named it "God", and put it to work herding human beings in the practical field of religion. But theologists use many different tools in their practise, some even unethical, so this has created much dislike for religion. The backlash turns against "God" and ultimately the metaphysics which supports that conception. The problem is that the backlash against the metaphysics is generally irrational, being motivated by practises other than teaching the logical necessity of "the first cause", yet being directed at "the first cause"..

These consequences do not follow if one does not assert that the soul exists before in enters the body. Simmias' argument is a refutation of this assertion, but poor Simmias has become as confused as you are. — Fooloso4

Sorry I don't see the relevance. What I pointed to was Socrates' description of "harmony", to show you that it is inconsistent with your description of "attunement". By Socrates' description, "harmony" is the last composed and first destroyed. You had said attunement is prior to any particular instrument.

I was not talking about any "consequences", only showing the discrepancy between Socrates' description of "harmony, or "attunement", and your interpretation.

The tuning of a lyre, that is the frequencies to which a lyre is tuned, and the process of tuning a lyre are not the same. A particular lyre is tuned to those frequency ratios which exist prior to it. A lyre is well tuned when it comes close to matching those frequencies and poorly tuned the more it deviates. — Fooloso4

If you were familiar with string instruments you would know that this is not true. An instrument is not necessarily tuned to any specific frequencies. There are ratios between the different parts of the instrument which must be upheld to produce harmony, but there is no necessity for specific frequencies. Furthermore, any string instrument can be tuned in a multitude of different ways. The ratios of the different tunings may be said to be understood, and preexist, but these are principles of music theory, they are clearly not "the tuning of a lyre". We might call it some sort of instructions for tuning a lyre, but "the tuning of a lyre" is the act of actually putting the instrument in tune.

The relation is between attunement and a lyre. A relation of the one to the other. The tuned lyre is one in which the proper ratio of frequencies is achieved. — Fooloso4

No, this is not the case. The tuned lyre has properly tensioned strings according to the size of the strings. The tuned lyre has the required relationship between its parts to qualify as being in tune.

One soul might be more in tune than another but both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul. — Fooloso4

You're still not getting the point, or else simply denying it. A poorly tuned instrument does not have "harmony", or "attunement". If the soul is "harmony", the body cannot be poorly tuned and still be a soul. "Harmony" or "attunement" is a good tuning, not a poor tuning. The soul is defined as having a good tuning "harmony" or what you call "attunement". If the body is not properly tuned (poorly tuned) there is not harmony nor attunement, therefore there would be no soul. But this is inconsistent with the evidence. We see that some people are evil, and some are good, yet they all have a soul, while "harmony" or "attunement" is only proper to a good tuning.

Here's an example which may help you. Let's take the concepts of "understanding" and "misunderstanding", and compare them to harmony and dissonance. Suppose a person understands, and this is like a harmony in the person. However, it's also possible that the person misunderstands, yet believes oneself to understand. If we say that understanding is a descriptive property of the person's soul, we must also allow that misunderstanding might also be a property of the person's soul. Understanding is the good, and misunderstanding is the bad. Likewise, harmony is the good, and dissonance is the bad. We cannot restrict "the soul" simply to the good property, harmony, because this is inconsistent with observed reality, the soul also has the bad property, dissonance, just like it has both understanding and misunderstanding.

To improve would be to lessen dissonance. Again, it is a matter of degree not either or. — Fooloso4

But the soul is a matter of either/or. That's why there is an incompatibility between "soul" and "harmony". To make "harmony" compatible with "soul" we have to make it a matter of either/or, because that's the way soul is, either a body has a soul or it does not. Now, either the instrument has harmony or it does not, to be consistent with a body either having a soul or not. But then dissonance is excluded from soul, if soul is harmony, and this is inconsistent with the evidence. The evidence indicates that the soul has both the contraries, bad and good, not just the good, harmony.

One soul might be more in tune than another but both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul. — Fooloso4

Exactly! That's why "soul" is inconsistent with "harmony". A poorly tuned instrument does not have harmony, yet a "poorly tuned soul is still a soul".

It is not a set of principles, it is a ratio of parts. In the case of a lyre it is the ratio of frequencies of the vibrating strings. Those ratios exist prior to the lyre. They are mathematical relations and can be heard. It is this ability to hear them that allows someone to tune a lyre. — Fooloso4

This makes no sense. You do not hear "a ratio of parts", nor do you hear "mathematical relations". You hear sounds, harmony and dissonance.

The fact is, an instrument can be more or less harmonized, more or less in tune. — Fooloso4

An instrument can be more or less harmonized, but a body does not have more or less a soul. That's why the theory "soul is a harmony" fails. A body might have more or less of whatever quality you define, but this is not the case with "soul". That's why soul cannot be a property of a body, like "attunement", or "harmony".

I am not equivocating. What is confusing you is that you are conflating the process of tuning with the standard by which the instrument is tuned. The tuning of a lyre is that set of frequencies that determine that some particular lyre is in tune. The lyre is tuned, the strings tightened and loosened, in order to come into accord with those established frequencies, that is, the tuning of a lyre. — Fooloso4

You can define "the tuning of a lyre" however you want. The problem is that the way you describe it is not consistent with the way that Plato does, as "composed last of all and the first to be destroyed". So whatever arguments you make, based on your definition, are irrelevant to what Plato wrote. Plato is using "the tuning of a lyre in a completely different way, the common way, the act of tuning a lyre. As such. it is the aspect of the instrument "composed last of all and the first to be destroyed". And if you insist that your argument, which uses a different definition, is relevant, that is equivocation.

The question cannot be addressed without establishing on the one side what an attunement is and on the other the body it is said to be an attunement of. — Fooloso4

As I said, you can define what "an attunement" is however you want, but if it is not consistent with what Plato has presented your definition is not relevant.

I want to clarify that when I mentioned "context-specific" regarding the term "identity" in logic, I was referring to its nuanced use within logical frameworks. In logic, the concept of identity is defined in a specific context and does not necessarily imply absolute identity in every conceivable sense, as stated in the law of identity.

While there might be some variability in how the term is used in different contexts, it doesn't necessarily mean that it is inconsistent or incompatible with the law of identity. The distinction between "equality" and "identity" in logic is often made to accommodate the need for precision in different logical systems and mathematical structures. — ChatGPT

ChatGPT has become evasive, saying nothing of any value here. What it says is that the use of "identity" in logic is "nuanced" and variable, and this doesn't necessarily mean that it is inconsistent with the law of identity. Since there is a well stated principle called "the law of identity", which defines "identity", I would conclude that any nuanced or variable use which is contrary to this principle is inconsistent with it.

For example, if a person said that "=" in mathematical equations, is a symbol of identity, this would be inconsistent with the law of identity. Two different things, what is represented by the right side of an equation, and what is represented by the left side, are said to be equal. But by the law of identity a thing's identity is unique to itself. Two different things cannot have the same "identity". Therefore the "=" symbol in mathematical equations cannot be said to be a symbol of identity without violating the law of identity. Remember the following?

So, while 1 = 1 in the sense that the individual "1"s are considered equal, when we say 1 + 1 = 2, we are combining two equal values to get a sum of 2, without suggesting that the individual "1"s are the same in an identity sense. It's a fundamental aspect of arithmetic and mathematical notation that "=" often represents equality, not identity — ChatGPT

Thanks Banno, it appears like CGPT has a lot of respect for me. It concludes that "Identity" in logic is "context-specific", therefore not consistent, and not at all representative of the law of identity.

Thanks Banno, for providing a reply not chock full of confirmation bias. Unfortunately for you, and others who take the position you have, the unbiased machine appears to support my position very well.

For instance, in first-order logic, you can have variables that represent specific individuals, and statements like "a = b" assert that the individuals denoted by "a" and "b" are identical.
...
When we say "a = b" in logic, it usually implies identity. If "a" and "b" are interchangeable, it means they are the same in the relevant sense. Your example of chairs ("a" and "b") is correct in illustrating this concept. If everything predicated of "a" is the same as what is predicated of "b," then "a = b" holds in the logical context. — ChatGPT

We have two distinct statements here. 1) "a=b" indicates that a and b "are identical", and 2) "a=b" indicates that a and b are "the same in the relevant sense". To avoid equivocation with "=", it is necessary to conclude from these two statements, that "identical" means "the same in the relevant sense". That is exactly what equal means, therefore we have an indication of the concept of equality.

However, "the same" by the law of identity means the same absolutely, and this is quite different from "the same in the relevant sense". Therefore we can conclude that logic uses "identity" in a way which is inconsistent with the law of identity.

In summary, while logic does deal with individuals and identity, the equality symbol in logic typically denotes identity, not just equality in a quantitative or qualitative sense. Your explanation captures the nuances well, but it's important to recognize that in logic, "a = b" usually means that "a" and "b" are the same individual or object. — ChatGPT

So, we have a problem here. If "a=b' means that a and b are the same object, and it also means that a and b are "the same in the relevant sense", then we must conclude that "the same object" really means "the same in the relevant sense" in logic. This is not consistent with the law of identity which indicates that an object is the same as itself in every sense. Therefore the claim that logic deals with individuals or objects is false if what it means to be an "individual" or "object" is provided by the law of identity.

In summary, while logic does deal with individuals and identity, the equality symbol in logic typically denotes identity, not just equality in a quantitative or qualitative sense. Your explanation captures the nuances well, but it's important to recognize that in logic, "a = b" usually means that "a" and "b" are the same individual or object. — ChatGPT

Conclusion: since "identical" is shown to mean "the same in the relevant sense" in logic, and "a=b" usually is taken to mean that the two are identical in logic, logicians who take this position are in violation of the law of identity.

Your clarification aligns with this distinction, and it's important to be aware of the context in which terms like "equal" and "identical" are used, as they can carry different meanings in different discussions. — ChatGPT

Yes, these "different meanings" facilitate equivocation, and we must be wary of equivocation when judging soundness. Since many logicians use a meaning for "Identical" which is inconsistent with "identity" as stated by the law of identity, we need to be careful to recognize this difference to avoid equivocation. When a logician talks about "identity" this might really mean "equality", which is distinctly different from "identity" by the law of identity.

So, while 1 = 1 in the sense that the individual "1"s are considered equal, when we say 1 + 1 = 2, we are combining two equal values to get a sum of 2, without suggesting that the individual "1"s are the same in an identity sense. It's a fundamental aspect of arithmetic and mathematical notation that "=" often represents equality, not identity.[/chat] — ChatGPT

It appears like ChatGPT has vindicated me. It recognizes the difference between "equality" and "identity", such that the mathematical notation of "=" is recognized as representing equality not identity. The difference between the two is shown to be necessary for the application of mathematics, by my example, and ChatGPT recognizes this necessity. So, if one would insist "equal" means "identical" in mathematics, they would simply be wrong. As shown by my simple example, arithmetic would not be sound if "=" meant identical. It really means "the same in the relevant sense", and the relevant sense here is quantitative value.

Do you mean probability approaching 1? — jgill

I suppose, I'm not familiar with the terminology of probabilities, I don't bet.

=" is the sense we were using, the one used in mathematics and logic, which is a predicate ranging over individuals. "a=b" will be true if and only if a and b are the very same individual. — Banno

In logic, "a=b" might indicate that a is the same subject as b, definitely not "the very same individual". Logic does not deal with individuals, it deals with subjects. Whether or not "a=b" is a true statement is irrelevant to logic, requiring a different type of judgement. That's why there is a difference between "valid" and "sound".

So for example, we can have two distinct chairs, and name one as subject "a", and the other as subject "b". So long as everything we predicate of a is the same as what we predicate of b, then we can say that a=b within our logical proceedings. I believe this allows for substitution, as the two are interchangeable within that logical system. By some people, they are said to be "the same" even though this is simply "equal", and they're obviously not the same. We know that the objects which were given those symbols are not "the same" by a rigourous definition of "the same", but within the logical system they are considered to be equal, and this facilitates the use of logic.

What you are referring to in the quote is a different case. You and I are not the very same individual. — Banno

Right, you and I are not the same individual, we are equal, and this allows that we are actually two, not one.

"Banno is human and Meta is human" is not a case of "=". To suppose so would again be to confuse the "is" of equality with the "is" of predication. — Banno

I'm afraid it's you who is confused. There is no such thing as "the 'is' of equality". That's just a misconception.

Here is a grade school exercise for you, to get you back on the right track. Suppose we represent you as 1, and we also represent me as 1. Now we put us both together and we have two, so we represent this with 1+1=2. I'd say that we're pretty smart to figure that one out. But I also think that both the 1's must be equal or else we could not give them both the same value of 1. So we can say 1=1. But if this "=" means that both the 1's are the same, then it's impossible that 1+1=2 because both 1's are the very same thing, so there is only one, not two. Understand?

Attunement is how Horan translates it. It is how Sedley and Long translate it. It is how Brann translates it. It is how many others translate it as well. The Greek term is ἁρμονία (harmonia) and is transliterated as harmony. — Fooloso4

The particular word used is not relevant. What is relevant is how Plato describes what is being talked about. We have the passage from Simmias which I quoted, "a harmony is something invisible, without body, in the attuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical, bodily, composite, earthy and akin to what is mortal". Replace the word translated as "harmony" with "attunement" if you will, but that does not change the description presented.

Then we have Socrates' description at 92c, "...the lyre and the strings and the notes, though still unharmonized, exist; the harmony is composed last of all, and is the first to be destroyed." Go ahead, replace "harmony" with "attunement". This does not change the thrust of the argument because the context provides the meaning.

The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre. — Fooloso4

This is nonsense. Yes, it is true that the principles by which a lyre is tuned exists apart from any particular lyre. But "the tuning of a lyre" is the tuning of a lyre, and that means that a particular lyre is being tuned. This is your sophistry. When Plato talks about a particular lyre, a bodily composite of elements, wood, pegs, and strings, which is tuned to produce a "harmony" or "attunement", you claim that he is talking about the general principles by which a lyre is tuned.

The context clearly indicates that you are wrong in your interpretation. First, in Simmias' statement, the harmony or attunement is something which exists "in the attuned lyre", it is not a separate principle by which the lyre is tuned. Then in the context of Socrates' statement, "the harmony is composed last of all". Obviously this "harmony" or "attunement" is not the principles by which the lyre is tuned, because that would be prior to the attunement, and not "last of all".

These statements in Plato's Phaedo are very explicit, and completely contrary to your interpretation above.

The myth of recollection is fraught with problems. If we start with the premise that knowledge is recollection then there would never be a time when knowledge was learned. But it cannot be recollected if it had not at some time first been learned. — Fooloso4

Yes "recollection" is fraught with problems, as it leads to eternal objects of knowledge, commonly known as "Platonism". But the problem of preexisting knowledge, knowledge which preexists the individual, which shows up within the individual, as instinctual know-how, and the capacity to learn, which the theory of recollection was designed to resolve, still exists if we deny the theory of recollection.

To improve does not mean to bring into existence. One cannot improve something that does not exist. — Fooloso4

Put this into context though. To improve would be to bring harmony from dissonance. This very clearly indicates bringing harmony into existence.

Your final statement, "One cannot improve something that does not exist" represents the exact point of Plato's argument. To improve an evil person is not to bring harmony to dissonance, because that would imply that the evil person, being dissonant, does not even have a soul. Being dissonant means the harmony does not exist, and therefore neither would the soul.

But that is not the case in reality, the evil person does have a soul, and so do all sorts of other living things. Therefore improving on the attributes or properties of the soul, may be described as bringing harmony to something dissonant, but the soul cannot be the harmony because it exists even when there is dissonance, prior to the harmony.

Right, it is not the soul which is tuned. The soul is the attunement, the arrangement and tension of the parts of the body, not what is tuned. — Fooloso4

Now you are being ambiguous with your use of "attunement". Each body, or musical instrument, has parts and an arrangement which are particular to that body or instrument. You've said already that the "attunement" in your peculiar interpretation exists prior to the instrument, as the set of principles by which the instrument might be tuned. Now, you cannot turn around and say that the attunement is "the arrangement and tension of the parts of the body", and pretend to be consistent. That arrangement and tension is particular to the individual body, and is therefore posterior to the existence of the body.

When the instrument is in tune the strings are in harmony to each other. — Fooloso4

Again, you are playing your equivocation.

The more harmonized the soul the less its dissonance. A soul that is in poor health, a soul with a great deal of dissonance, is still a soul. — Fooloso4

You are not getting the point. The soul is harmony, attunement. That is the theory. It cannot be more or less harmonized, or in any way dissonant or else it would not be a soul. That is the precept of the theory, the soul is harmony. Therefore, by the precept of the theory a soul cannot have "a great deal of dissonance", because this is contrary to harmony, and by the theory the soul is harmony. The proposed "great deal of dissonance" would indicate a supposed soul with a great deal of non-soul, but that is contradictory.

A soul that is well attuned, a soul that is in harmony and balance, rules well. One that is in discord does not. Harmonized means that there is not one element of the attunement that rules. — Fooloso4

If the soul is a harmony, or attunement, then every soul, necessarily, is well tuned, by definition. By this theory, "the soul is a harmony", there can be no such thing as a discordant soul. That would be contradiction.

The attunement is the condition of the instrument. Your being in good or bad health is not something distinct from you, but you are not the condition you are in. — Fooloso4

Again, you are equivocating with "attunement". By what you said at the beginning of the post, "The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre", the attunement is not "the condition of the instrument". It is something separate from any particular instrument, as the principles by which an instrument might be tuned.

Your equivocation allows you to blatantly contradict yourself. First, the attunement is apart from and prior to any particular instrument, and now it is "not something distinct", it is "the condition of the instrument".

Where does it say that the spirited part is the medium between body and soul? — Fooloso4

Read "The Republic" please.

What I claim is that the attunement is not apart from the body, not that it is a part of the body. It is not some part in addition to the parts. — Fooloso4

Hmm, the final part of the post directly contradicts the beginning of your post. This is due to the equivocation I pointed to. Do you proof read? That could help you to avoid embarrassment. Look, this is the top of your post:

The tuning of a lyre exists apart from and prior to any particular lyre. The tuning, the harmony, is an arrangement of frequencies that exists even when a particular lyre is not in tune — Fooloso4

By your new statement "the attunement is not apart from the body", do you agree with what Plato has Socrates say, that the attunement is posterior to, as dependent on the body? It is last to be produced, and first lost at corruption of the body And do you agree that an attunement is not random, but according to some principles which constitute "harmony". So if the soul is supposed to be a harmony, or attunement, the tensions of the bodily elements must exist in this specific way in order for that body to be endowed with "a soul"? That is the position which Plato is arguing against. And I suggest it is much the same as modern physicalism

He claims it problematic that '"equal" means "the same as"'. — Banno

This appears quite contrary for someone who tends to assert that meaning is use.

As human beings, you and I are equal. We are the same kind. This means that each one of us is of the same kind, human being. Despite being the same in kind, the fact that we are not the same in a complete way, provides for the reality that we are two distinct individuals. And, that we are of the same kind, allows us to say that there are two of that kind. If we were the same, we would only be one.

If you do not understand the difference between being equal and being the same, I'll do what I can to help you. If you are ready, let's begin. First, do you accept that you and I are equal yet not the same?

His otherwise innocent confusion is most troublesome for someone with pretensions to doing metaphysics, showing itself in many of his excursions into the area. He has for example variously also asserted that there is no such thing as instantaneous velocity, that... — Banno

I will say however, if you do not yet understand the difference between being equal and being the same, please get some schooling before you attempt the difficulties of metaphysics. Otherwise you will be lost in what is an extremely complex discipline. And, I will also tell you that your epistemology will suffer greatly if you do not respect this difference between being equal and being the same.

And don't forget the other end of causal chains - do they terminate in the future, or peter out into nothingness. — jgill

It is a basic ontological mistake to extend a causal chain into the future, that's the issue pointed out by Hume. Beyond the present, the events are possible, contingent. So in that sense future events are understood as probable, and predicted through statistics. Some future events, especially those which are more immediate, would have a probability approaching an infinite value, but still the present must be understood as making a boundary, a limit, which disables certainty, as Hume explained.

Also, lets be wary of non-constructive interpretations of Hyperreals, for otherwise one ends up having infinitesimals by fiat that do not denote anything tangible. — sime

None of this shit is "tangible". "Infinite" is not tangible. That's the issue, because it's not tangible, mathematicians are free to create all sorts of axioms which do not relate to anything physical. But when the mathematics gets applied there is a very real issue of the intangible aspects of reality. And if the axioms which deal with the intangible in mathematics do not properly represent the real intangible, the product is "the unintelligible".

This is what happens when we approach the issue of "the first cause". The calculus turns the first cause into a limit on tangible causation, rather than treating the first cause as an actual cause. But if there is an actual intangible first cause then the mathematical representation renders that first cause as unintelligible, being outside the limit of causation, according to the conventions for applying the mathematics.

Thank you for illuminating this issue for the fifth graders on the forum. — jgill

That's what I do, take everything to the most base level, and lay it out plain and simple. But the simple confuses many because at the most simple level things are complex.



Your referenced page makes the exact mistake I explained above. This mistake is to assume that things which are equal are exactly the same. The fact that someone else makes the same mistake as you does not correct your mistake.

This number is equal to 1. In other words, "0.999..." is not "almost exactly" or "very, very nearly but not quite" 1  –  rather, "0.999..." and "1" represent exactly the same number.

There are many ways of showing this equality... — Wikipedia

It appears Wiki could use some editing. Notice toward the bottom of the referenced page, the mention of "hyperreal numbers." That might help you to understand that valuing .999... as equal to 1 is just a matter of convention.

All such interpretations of "0.999..." are infinitely close to 1. Ian Stewart characterizes this interpretation as an "entirely reasonable" way to rigorously justify the intuition that "there's a little bit missing" from 1 in 0.999....[55] Along with Katz & Katz, Robert Ely also questions the assumption that students' ideas about 0.999... < 1 are erroneous intuitions about the real numbers, interpreting them rather as nonstandard intuitions that could be valuable in the learning of calculus. — Wikipedia

Here, check the following, like the guy says, even his "early-school math teachers knew that fact":

https://medium.com/@kenahlstrom/proof-that-99999-is-not-equal-to-1-5672e7dd58ce

First, it is important to understand that hyperreal numbers are an extension of real numbers … meaning that the restriction of disproving .99999… = 1 using only real numbers remains valid with hyperreal numbers.

The important function of hyperreal numbers in this case is that they create a method by which infinitesimal values can be represented within our imperfect decimal notation system.

Now, we can mathematically represent what we all know to be true. We all know that .99999… is not actually equal to 1, but that the difference between the two numbers is so infinitesimally small that it “doesn’t really matter”. Well, the true notation of equality between 1 and .99999… is 1 -h = .99999… and that is not an actual equality between the two numbers. Further, remember that problem of 1/3 not actually being equal to .33333…? Well, that can also be accurately expressed by hyperreal numbers as: 1/3 -h = .33333…

Conclusion
.99999… was never exactly equal to 1. Instead, a limitation in notation of decimal numbers created the illusion that the two numbers are equal and an academic desire to keep everything neat and tidy lead to confirmation bias and the statement that, at some limit, the actual difference was essentially akin to 0. With the inclusion of hyperreal numbers ( introduced algebraically in 1948 ), we can provide an actually accurate representation of the numbers being represented by using the infinitesimal representation h.

The lesson learned here? Question everything and everyone, even the experts. If something feels wrong and it’s ‘proofs’ seem insufficient, do more research … because you just might be on to something.

This seems to be the principal issue of this thread, the difference between a limit imposed by convention, and the reality of the thing which the limit is imposed on. According to the axioms of the mathematics, the difference appears to be infinitely small, therefore insignificant. But since the limit may be applied arbitrarily, in practise, the difference may actually be very significant. This means that because the difference is there, and very real, the practise of using calculus must adhere to very rigourous rules of application, to make sure that the chosen limit adequately matches what is real, to ensure that the difference does not become significant. Rules for applying calculus vary according to the field, or discipline of study.

Your entire argument seems to be centered around a misinterpretation of the theory, "the soul is a harmony". Clearly, the "harmony", or what you are calling "attunement" is something distinct from the material instrument itself. That is very clearly expressed by Simmias in the passage I quoted.

Simmias says, 85e-86d:
One might make the same argument about harmony, lyre and strings, that a harmony is something invisible, without body, in the attuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical, bodily, composite, earthy and akin to what is mortal. Then if someone breaks the lyre, cuts or breaks the strings and then insists, using the same argument as you, that the harmony must still exist and is not destroyed...

If then the soul is a kind of harmony or attunement, clearly, when our body is relaxed or stretched without due measure by diseases and other evils, the soul must be immediately destroyed...
— Plato, Phaedo — Metaphysician Undercover

You might continue to insist that the "attunement" is not something distinct from the instrument, but clearly Plato's arguments are directed against the idea of a "harmony" as such. And, the harmony exists as something separate from the instrument, as produced from the instrument. This is clearly the idea that Plato argues against, and is more consistent with modern physicalism. Your use of "attunement" only creates ambiguity between "attunement" as the general principles by which an instrument is tuned, and "attunement" as a specific condition of a particular instrument.

My apologies for the continued derailment, but since MU is insistent and refuses to move this to another thread I will respond here.

The three arguments found at 92-94 provide a very good refutation of the theory of 'the soul as a harmony'.
— Metaphysician Undercover

I do not think that the argument that begins:

… our soul is somewhere else earlier, before she is bound within the body.
(92a)

and goes on to ask:

But see which of the two arguments you prefer - that learning is recollection or soul a tuning.
(92c)

provides the foundation for "a very good refutation". — Fooloso4

OK, so you dismiss the first of the three arguments, because you do not believe in the theory of recollection. This theory is meant to account for the reality of the innate knowledge which a person is born with, the capacity to learn, intuition, and instinct.

Are you saying that this type of know-how does not qualify as "knowledge", or does not even exist? Or what is the basis of your rejection of the knowledge that a person is born with, knowledge which a person has, which precedes the existence of one's body, so that the person is born with it?

An attunement does not lead or follow the elements. The attunement is the condition of those elements. For the lyre this means the proper tension of the strings. For a person this means being healthy. The limits of the analogy are obvious, a lyre cannot tune itself. But we can act to maintain or improve our mental and physical health. — Fooloso4

Clearly, the lyre exists prior to being tuned, therefore the attunement follows the elements of the physical composition. And' the harmony follows from the attunement. The very fact which you cite, that a person can act to improve one's health, or improve the attunement, demonstrates that the attunement is posterior to the physical body. That the attunement of the instrument, and therefore the harmony, is most readily changed is the reason why it is last coming into being in generation of the instrument, and the first thing lost in the corruption of the instrument.

The theory, "the soul is a harmony", as expressed by Simmias, very explicitly states that the harmony is something distinct from the physical instrument, strings and wood. And, the harmony, as something distinct, is produced from the instrument.

Socrates then resorts to a bit of sophistry:

“Now does this also apply to the soul so that, however slightly, one soul is more what it is than another? Is it more and to a greater extent, or less and to a lesser extent, a soul?”
(93b)

A lesser attunement is still an attunement. One soul might be more in tune than another but both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul.

“Now, what will any of those who assert that the soul is an attunement say that these things, virtue and the vice, in our souls are?
(93c)

They are like health and sickness, well tuned or poorly tuned, and in harmony or out of harmony.

And, being neither more nor less an attunement, it is neither more nor less attuned. Is this the case?
(93d)

No, that is not the case. It is well tuned or poorly tuned, and this allows for degrees. — Fooloso4

Plato's argument is not sophistry, it is just complex and difficult to grasp. You demonstrate a misunderstanding of it, and that's why you call it sophistry. Your dismissal of it is what is really sophistry. Look.

First, do you recognize that it is the bodily instrument which is either well tuned or poorly tuned? Therefore you cannot say "both a well tuned and poorly tuned soul is still a soul" to be consistent with the argument, because the body is analogous to the instrument, and is what is tuned; it is not the soul which is tuned. That is your bit of sophistry. In the theory "the soul is a harmony", the soul follows from the body, like harmony follows from the instrument according to the attunement. This is just like in modern physicalism, mind follows from body, and concepts follow from the mind. Remember the statement by Simmias which expresses the theory that the soul, is a harmony. The harmony itself is invisible, without body.

Next, do you agree that if the instrument is not well tuned there will be some degree of dissonance, and that dissonance is inconsistent with harmony? And, since there is a multitude of strings, some may be in harmony and others dissonant. Therefore the same instrument may produce some harmony and also some dissonance at the same time, depending on the tuning. But "soul" by the theory, can only be harmony, it cannot be dissonance.

Now, the problem which Plato elucidates. The same soul can have degrees of both goodness and evilness at the same time due to the various elements within, just like the tuned instrument can have harmony and dissonance at the same time. However, according to the theory, the soul can only be harmony. Dissonance is contrary to harmony which is, "soul", and the soul cannot consist of aspects of 'nonsoul'. Therefore the theory must be wrong, the soul is not like a harmony, it also has dissonance as well.

This is deliberately misleading. On the premise that the soul is an attunement then it is not one element of the attunement that rules, but rather the relation between those elements, the ratio and harmony of those elements that rules. When the person is well tuned, balanced and in harmony, he or she will rule themselves well, and if not then poorly. — Fooloso4

You seem to misunderstand this argument too. The premise "the soul rules" is proposed as a true proposition, validated by the evidence explained. And, it is specifically proposed as inconsistent with "the soul is a harmony". There is nothing deliberately misleading here.

So you point out the inconsistency between the two ("the soul rules" and "the soul is a harmony"). However, since "the soul rules" is demonstrated to be a true premise by the evidence given, then logically we must reject the inconsistent premise "the soul is a harmony", which is proposed as an hypothesis rather than supported by evidence.

This begs the question. Socrates treats the soul and body as two separate and different things, the very thing the attunement argument denies. — Fooloso4

This is not true, it's clearly misinterpretation. The "harmony", or what you call the "attunement", is explicitly stated as something distinct from the instrument. Refer to the passage quoted above, what is stated by Simmias.

The passage from Homer is about Odysseus controlling his anger. Where is anger located within this separation? Is it an affection of the body or the soul? According to the division set in the Republic the source is the spirited part of the soul not the body.
If Odysseus is his soul then the example is not about being led by the affections of the body. — Fooloso4

The "spirited part" is the third part, the medium between body and mind. It is not the source of anything, only the medium between, which may act with one or the other. Either the the source is the mind, if the soul is healthy, or the body is the source if the mind is ill. So "anger" is good and healthy when the mind is exercising control over the body, and "anger" is bad and unhealthy when the body has affected the mind. Therefore your objection here has no relevance.

Certainly, when one goes through the arguments sufficiently, it becomes clear why we should not accept them. — Fooloso4

It has become very clear why you reject the arguments. You straw man them. You do not represent "harmony" as something invisible without body, which follows form the attuned instrument, as clearly stated in the text. Instead, you claim that the "attunement" is a part of the body of the instrument.

If we were discussing the "attunement", then we'd have to consider the intentions involved in the act of tuning, which produces the attunement. This would involve the complete design and manufacture of the instrument to ensure proper tuning. All that intention involved is prior to the manufacture of the instrument, and the tuning of it. If we were to represent "the soul" as the creator of the instrument, in this way, then the argument would be completely different. However, it is very clear that Plato is arguing against "the soul" as hypothesized to be something which follows from the body, as "the harmony" follows from the instrument.

Interestingly, your many mathematical expressions contain only a finite number of elements, yet set out infinite sequences. A simple expression such as 0.9˙=1
0.
9
˙
=
1
includes infinity - the dot says we "carry on in the same fashion", writing more 9's...

We don't expect to be able to write all the 9's down. But we do, in a finite time, understand what is going on, and can follow subsequent arguments and discussions without getting trapped in our inability to actually write an infinite number of 9's...

Well, some of us can. — Banno

:"Some of us" get lost in self-deception. The question is which are the ones who are lost. The two expressions, the 1 and the 0.9˙ are said to be equal. And as you say, we can readily understand what's going on without getting trapped. The two do not actually have the same meaning, it's a form of "rounding off", with the convention allowing the use of "equal". When rounding off we assign a different meaning, which better serves the purpose, and we allow that the rounded is equal to the pre-rounded.

I would assume that those who do not understand that this is a form of rounding off, and claim that the two expressions are actually the same, despite the glaring difference in meaning between them, are lost in self-deception. They have fallen into the trap of saying that two different things are the same, just because the convention allows us to say that they are equal. It seems common at TPF for mathematicians to fall into the trap of saying that "equal" means "the same as".

I thought that a pretty cool response, but then, it was also telling me what I wanted to hear (although, how did it know that :chin: ) — Wayfarer

I think that this is a very interesting question, and goes to the heart of what current AI processes actually are. It's more a topic for the philosophy of language, than mind, but the two are closely related, language being a reflection of mind.

The Ai is formulated to look at the exact words which you use, and the exact way that you use them, compare this with others, and thereby categorize you, produce a very specific "type" constructed just for you, the individual. You are a type. But it isn't really "you" that it is representing with that specialized type, it is simply what you want, as represented by that one specific instance of language use. And, as you note, it is very adept at giving you what you ask for. Beside the fact that it has all sort of language use available at its fingertips to analyze, it is very impressive because it is designed with that one intent, to represent what you want, without the interference of having its own desires, which happens with human to human interaction. The machine has the capacity to determine what you want without being influenced by what it wants, if the only thing it wants is to give you what you want.

Of course, misuse is extremely likely. To begin with, ulterior motives are probably already cooked into the machine, intent other than to simply provide a representation of what you want, such as data collection and other forms of classification for you, for advertising or whatever.

Imagine if an AI were to stalk you. It can already produce a very good representation of what you want, from one simple instance of language use. Do you think that if it followed a whole lot of your language use, it could produce a very clear model of "you", or would it get totally confused by all sorts of conflicting wants, and see you as a completely unintelligible being?

Since you did not answer the question, I take it you agree with me then. The three arguments found at 92-94 provide a very good refutation of the theory of 'the soul as a harmony'.

Short answer begins here

A more adequate long answer here

It is clear from that thread that you disagree with my interpretation. If you wish to pursue this further please reopen that thread or begin a new one. — Fooloso4

Your quoted passages in the "short answer" are all before 92 in the text, which is where the argument against 'the soul is a harmony begins'. The issue I am addressing here is not whether Socrates provides a good argument for the immortality of the soul, as presented in the The Phaedo. Neither is the issue whether Plato believes that he or Socrates has provided a good argument for the immortality of the soul. The issue discussed here is whether or not Socrates provides a good argument against the theory 'the soul is a harmony'.

This position, 'the soul is a harmony' is very much similar to the modern physicalist position which apprehends ideas, concepts, mind and consciousness in general, as something distinct from the physical body (as the harmony is distinct from the lyre), but insists that these are dependent on the physical body as properties of it, or emergent from it, like the harmony is dependent on the lyre.

I believe Plato provides a very good refutation of this theory 'the soul is a harmony'. Regardless of what you think abut Socrates' arguments for the immortality of the soul, do you agree with me that the refutation of this theory is a sound one? If not, why not?

The framing of the problem is the problem. Body and soul are treated as if they are two things, with the former dependent on the latter. — Fooloso4

A lyre that is not in tune cannot play a tune in tune. The harmony is not what is played on the lyre it is the condition of the lyre, the proper tension of the strings in ratio to each other that allow it to play in harmony. A body that is not in tune cannot function properly. When it is far enough out of tune it cannot function at all. — Fooloso4

Simmias says, 85e-86d:

One might make the same argument about harmony, lyre and strings, that a harmony is something invisible, without body, in the attuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical, bodily, composite, earthy and akin to what is mortal. Then if someone breaks the lyre, cuts or breaks the strings and then insists, using the same argument as you, that the harmony must still exist and is not destroyed...

If then the soul is a kind of harmony or attunement, clearly, when our body is relaxed or stretched without due measure by diseases and other evils, the soul must be immediately destroyed... — Plato, Phaedo

Socrates' refutation of 'the soul is a harmony' (92-94) consists of three distinct arguments. Each one argues a slightly different principle. Each argument is aimed against the idea that the soul is a composite thing, it is composed from the elements of the body coexisting in a specific tension, resulting in a "harmony". From the elements of the body, the harmony is composed last, and first destroyed in corruption of the instrument. In modern terms we might consider this "harmony" to be a balanced state of existence, or equilibrium, of the composite material parts.

The first and third argument attack the fact that the harmony is posterior to the bodily composition which produces it, yet common understanding of "the soul" puts the soul as prior to the bodily composition. These are simple arguments but rely on the common notion of "the soul" for their effectiveness. That is what Foolos4 rejects with "The framing of the problem is the problem. Body and soul are treated as if they are two things, with the former dependent on the latter." But this dismissal is unacceptable because proposing that the soul is a harmony, already in itself, as a primary proposition, assumes this body/soul separation, as "the harmony" is expressed as something distinct from the material body which produces it (described by Simmias above). So this rejection would only be acceptable if we remove the primary proposition 'the soul is a harmony', but then there is nothing to argue. The point to argue might then be 'there is no soul'. But Socrates' argument is against the Pythagorean position that 'the soul is a harmony'. So it is the Pythagoreans who have already framed the argument in this way.

The second argument is more complex and difficult, involving the difference between "equilibrium" (as the harmonized state), and "equality", as what all equilibriums might have in common. The argument seems to be that a harmony is an equilibrium, and all physically existing equilibriums partake of varying degrees of equality. That would dictate their stability. The soul on the other hand is more like "equality" itself, that which all equilibriums have in common, as an order state of being.

So in the first argument, Socrates appeals to another principle, 'knowledge is recollection' and shows how this is inconsistent with 'the soul is a harmony'. Knowledge is a property of the soul, so if the knowledge which an individual will have, pre-exists the person's bodily existence, then so does the soul. This is inconsistent with the soul being a harmony which arises from the well-tuned elements of the body. In modern terms we can think of the preexisting knowledge as innate knowledge, intuition and instinct, knowledge which is supported by genetics and DNA. If this is a type of knowledge which an individual has, and knowledge is the property of a person's soul, then the person's soul must precede the person's body.


The second argument concerns the various degrees of tuning which are possible. We can say that an instrument is better tuned or worse tuned depending on the amount of dissonance inherent within the harmony produced. Each bit of dissonance which exists within the harmony is a degree of unharmony. Since a harmony is never absolutely perfect, there is always various degrees of dissonance within the occurring harmony itself, and this is a case of the opposite of the thing, occurring, or inherent within, the named thing, Due to a lack of perfection, there is always some degree of 'not-harmony' within the harmony. As analogy we could consider instances of "hot". Each hot thing still has some degree of cold inherent within it, unless it is the absolute hottest possible thing.

If the soul was like this, admitting to various degrees of "soulness", harmony and dissonance, then we'd have to say that an evil person has less of a soul than a good person. But this is not the case, we say that all souls are equal, as souls, and the evil person has no less of a soul than the good person. Furthermore, all the living creatures are equal in the sense of having "a soul", and despite the vast variety of difference that we notice amongst the living creatures, one is not more in tune than the other, as is the case with the difference between harmonies, one having more dissonance than another. All the souls of living creatures are equal, as souls.

The third point is that the soul is said to rule the various part of the body, making them do, at times, what is contrary to their very nature. If a man is hot and thirsty yet the water is known to be bad, the soul prevents the man from drinking. Likewise with food. If the soul was a harmony, it could do nothing but follow the plucking of the strings, the soul would be directed by the affections of the body, following them, never being in opposition. But this is not the case, we see that men, with the power of will, are capable of inflicting all sorts of punishments on their bodies in many different ways, directing the parts in ways very contrary to the nature of the part. It is impossible that a harmony could do this, directing the activities of the composite parts of the lyre, as this would alter the tuning, corrupting the harmony which is "the harmony"'s very existence.

In order not to get too far off topic I will only say that Plato also gives us reason to doubt the argument provided. — Fooloso4

Can you show me the reasons given by Plato, to doubt the arguments presented by Socrates, as paraphrased above.

Well, kind of, but the meaning of the general category of 'object' is still abundantly obvious. — Wayfarer

How can you say this in light of what I presented? If "object" is supposed to have the same meaning when referring to a physical thing which we can sense, pick up, move around, etc., and also when referring to a subject of discussion, like 'the weather' or 'American politics', which you metaphorically call an "object of discussion", then how would "object" be defined, in an abundantly obvious way?

Suppose we say an "object" is something apprehensible, either through the means of sensation, or directly to the intellect. This could formulate the general category "object". But you know as well as I know, that there is a huge separation between these two types of objects, outlined in Plato's Republic by the categories of the divided line. Now Kant came along and said that one of these two types of objects is not even apprehensible to the mind anyway. So the proposed definition, "something apprehensible" is rendered unacceptable by Kant's metaphysics, and what was supposed to be abundantly obvious is now very confusing and unintelligible.

The tendency is to ignore Kant's metaphysics, and assume that an "object" is apprehensible. But this places the two distinct types of objects together in the same category. The problem is that some objects are inherently unknowable, while others are inherently knowable, and we've denied, or ignored the metaphysical principle which would distinguish between these two. This produces a significant epistemological problem. Mistakes inhere within our knowledge due to the fact that some objects are inherently unknowable. But the knowable and unknowable have been so thoroughly mixed to together through the use of this "general category of 'object", that the skeptic must doubt all supposed "objects of knowledge" to expose where the elements of unintelligibility are hidden.

I find the distinction between object/objective and subject/subjective quite intelligible. — Wayfarer

There is more than one such distinction, between object and subject, because these words have multiple meanings. Consider the following:

What I'm saying, and it's an important qualification, is that consciousness does not exist as an object. We can, of course, speak of it as an object in the metaphorical sense - an 'object of discussion' - but the mind itself is not an object in the sense that all the objects we see and interact with are objects. — Wayfarer

The use of the phrase "object of discussion" is strictly speaking, incorrect, because what you are saying is really "subject of discussion". This type of sloppy usage is what leads to the problem you speak of, where consciousness is considered to be an "object", because it is taken to be an object of discussion rather than a subject of discussion.

This problem is actually pervasive with many modern logicians who prefer to ignore this subject/object distinction. In a common predication there is a subject and a predicate. The subject cannot be taken to be an object without category mistake. Some people will say that the word names an object, and so the proposition concerns the object. But this is false, because the word itself is the subject in this case, and there is a further correlation between the word and the object named. The reality of this separation must be maintained to maintain the possibility of mistaken identity.

Strong emergence would show the analogy is simply wrong, as Plato is arguing, although it would be wrong in a different way. With strong emergence, we would have a new, fundemental and irreducible force in play. Such a force would seem to be causally efficacious, and so it shouldn't be a problem to say the mind causes the body to do things in the way that it appears to be a problem for a harmony to "cause" changes in the instrument that generates it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is this "fundamental and irreducible force" 'the soul', as defined by Aristotle, 'the first actuality of a body having life potentially within it'?

But conceptually, I would argue this doesn't appear to make sense. The analogy breaks down because a lyre/harmony relation seems like a reducible one. That it is conceptually hard to see how this could ever work is sort of the point. Strong emergence isn't at all intuitive and this would seem to suggest that either something is fundementally wrong with the concept, or the concepts it is built on top of (substance/superveniance), or that there is something wrong with our intuition. — Count Timothy von Icarus

By this "strong emergence", is it the case that the material body is actually emergent, from that "force"? This would be consistent with the immaterial soul being prior to the material body, as the force from which the body emerges. Therefore it must be immaterial.

For me, this is tough because I think the analogy is probably in some ways a good one, although "melody" would work better. But I would tend to want to locate the problem back at basic ontological distinction between things and processes being basic (putting Heraclitus over Parmenides). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I believe that the simultaneity of the parts of the "harmony" is an important aspect, which ought not be replaced by "melody". It is very important to the concept of the material body of the living being, that the various parts exist in a unity of simultaneity, and this gives us the intuition of being "present". Being "present" is a very difficult but real aspect of being, and the difficulty manifests as the uncertainty principle in the Fourier transform when we try to break a harmony into its constituent parts at the present moment. The way that different notes coexist at the present moment is very perplexing, each requiring a different length of time to perceive due to differing wavelengths, and this is indicative of the difficulty in understanding the reality of passing time.

And Socrates certainly seems to use the term like it refers to a (specific) "tuning," rather than just a any harmony. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Actually, I admit that Plato is ambiguous with this term, translated as "harmony", and uses it in different ways in that text, depending on the translation, which is also very critical. Probably in his time, "tuning" was the more common usage for that word. However at the point when Socrates dismisses or refutes the idea that the soul is a harmony, it is very obvious that he uses "harmony" in the way which is more common to us, the way I defined. Obviously, that's what makes the argument work.

@Fooloso4 is very quick with quotes, so I'll wait for some reference then I'll show the ambiguity in Plato.

The problem I see is that it seems possible that Plato is having Socrates use the term in a very limited and argumentatively weak way on purpose. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In my opinion, Plato is having Socrates demonstrate the ambiguity of the term. People in that time would have claimed that the soul is like a harmony (I believe that's a Pythagorean principle). For those individuals who would believe that the soul is a prior "force" (like you describe in strong emergence) causing the unity of the body, as a sort of tuning, then this interpretation is apt. However, the physicalists/materialists of the time would have argued that a harmony is something produced from the "tuned" body, in the way I defined "harmony" above. So the principle, 'the soul is a harmony' is lost to ambiguity. It is a meaningless principle, because some would believe that this means that the soul is prior to the body as that "force" which produces the parts co-existing in harmony, while others would interpret "harmony" as what is produced by the tuned body. Therefore the stated principle supports two opposing perspectives, and requires analysis of the ambiguity in order to produce an adequate understanding.

Given the advice that comes before, I think we are supposed to pick up, examine, and discard each of the first two (arguably three) reasons he gives for discarding the analogy, until we get to the last argument that parallels the problems of strong emergence. Likewise, Plato seems to save his best overall argument for the immortality of the soul for even later in the dialogue. I don't think this argument works, but figuring out why it fails required innovations in logic that weren't around for a very long time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've read the passages a number of times, but my memory fails me now. If I remember correctly, Plato builds up to the argument with numerous mentions of "tuning". Then at the point of dismissing the position he argues against "harmony" (in our common usage as simultaneous notes produced by the instrument). This really leaves the aforementioned "tuning" unaddressed.

I guess it depends on what you take the goal of science to be, usefulness or truthfulness. Traditionally, in "the scientific method", the ability to predict was taken as an indication of the correctness of an hypothesis. Now, it appears like many people believe that the capacity to predict is the goal.

The more I read and the more I live the more I am convinced of that. Or perhaps it is survivorship bias. — Lionino

Yes, i think there definitely is a "survivorship bias". Consider that only the best really got preserved. Most ancient Greek principles, from the Ionians, the Eleatics, the atomists etc., were preserved only through the criticism of it, in Plato and Aristotle. So really, what was preserved was the dismissal of the ancient ideas, the refutations found in Plato and Aristotle which demonstrated the faults. Then skepticism, as demonstrated by Socrates, became very important because it was necessary to rid the mind of the ancient foundations which were being demonstrated as faulty. We ought not downplay the importance of this movement, to rid the mind of ancient ideas which were being refuted (the downfall of Alexandria for example).