Being convinced that you are right there is nothing you can be shown to make you think you are wrong. — Fooloso4

This is completely untrue. I've changed my mind on these issues more times than I can count. And I leave my mind open to further changes, that's why I'm so willing to return to the text, reread and reference relevant parts when someone presents me with a substantial objection.

I spent years comparing Aristotle and Plato, and thought that I had developed a reasonable understanding. But when I read Augustine I found I had to reread Plato to adjust my understanding to be compatible with his. And when I read Aquinas I found my understanding of Aristotle to be quite inconsistent with his, therefore I had to reread Aristotle.. So even after spending years in comparing Plato and Aristotle on my own, thinking that I had an adequate understanding of Aristotle, I had to go back and completely reread to see how I missed what Aquinas had picked up on.

The fact is that there is so much information in these texts, that many readings are required even for a base understanding. And, I know form my experience never to rule out further advancements to my understanding. However, I also know not to go back, and revisit old ideas which I've had in the past, and have been dissuaded of by other highly regarded philosophers. When an esteemed philosopher like Aquinas has already convinced me to go back and revisit Aristotle and this has readjusted my understanding to a higher level, it is probably pointless for you to request that I go back and reconsider descending to the lower level understanding again. I mean you need to at least produce a reason for me to reconsider.

So it is in your requests to reconsider something that I've already reconsidered, without giving me adequate reason, which produces the appearance that I will not budge. Since I've already been there, you need to show me something to make me realize that possibly I was wrong to leave that place. But simply insisting that I ought to go back to what I believe is a lower level of understanding because you think that it was wrong for me to ascend to what I believe to be a higher level, without showing me any reason for your belief, does nothing for me.

Which is it? Are energeia and dunamis just concepts? Are you claiming that there is a need for a concept which is prior to another concept? In what way does a concept cause the first material form? — Fooloso4

As I said, they are concepts used to describe the world. How accurately they describe the world is judged as truth and falsity. There has been volumes of material produced in an attempt to answer these questions which you ask so I think it's pointless to address them here, now. I suggest you spend a good long time reading Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, and delve into the separation between human ideas, abstractions, conceptions, which are forms in one sense, and the independent Forms, which are forms in another sense. Then you might develop an adequate understanding of the two senses of "form" which Aristotle lays out. It is due to this need for two distinct senses of "form', "actuality", "substance", to adequately understand the nature of reality, that we cannot escape the need for dualism.

You know I’m talking about it’s property of motion, in complete absence of a second thing relative to which that motion (or lack of it) is meaningful. — noAxioms

This is unintelligible to me. Motion is a concept. That is why I could give a definition of motion prior to the principle of relativity being produced, and also a definition of motion derived from the principle of relativity. That these differ indicates that the concept of motion has evolved.

That something is moving, or in motion, is a human judgement. This judgement requires a spatial temporal perspective, Kant's pure a priori intuitions. This means that there is necessarily an observer, and that observer is human, hence a "second thing". Therefore it's completely nonsensical to talk about the motion of a thing in the complete absence of a second thing.

Non-sequitur. The principle (your chosen wording) seems only to say that there’s no way to tell, not that there cannot be an immobile one. — noAxioms

No, it's a valid conclusion from the premises I stated. You are ignoring the other premise I stated. That premise is derived from empirical observation that there is a multitude of things. observed to be moving in different ways. From that empirical, observational premise, and the principle of relativity as the other premise, we can conclude that nothing is at rest.

I'm really surprised that you are arguing this point, because the absence of absolute rest is often cited as the basic epistemological principle which is derived from the principle of relativity, which is an ontological principle. So we take the principle of relativity (that the motion of a body is only determined relative to another body, and either one if the motion is observed as uniform, could equally be the rest frame), as the major premise. And this is an ontological theory. Then we add the observational data that there is always at least one body moving relative to any other, and this produces the conclusion that nothing is at rest. This principle serves as the epistemic base for the arbitrary application of the concept "rest frame". Since it is known by the logic above, that nothing is truly at rest, then the designation of "rest", or "rest frame" is necessarily completely arbitrary, therefore that designation is based in pragmatic principles, rather than an ontological principle. The ontological principle "relativity" renders "rest" as not true.

However, this puts "time" in a very odd situation. Our measurements of the passing of time are based in the ancient concept of motion within which, we as observers are assumed to be at rest. We observe motions relative to ourselves, assuming ourselves to be at rest, and produce temporal durations from these observations. Then we apply these temporal durations in measurement of other motions. Newton assumed that we ought to continue with "time" based in our rest frame. This is said to be an "absolute time". But it isn't really "absolute" time, it's just maintaining the old principle that we are at rest, and that observations of motions relative to us (as a sort of absolute rest) are the best suited for the measurement of time. You can see there is inconsistency because the principle of relativity denies that any perspective is true rest, but the "absolute time" perspective clings to our perspective as the true rest frame for producing temporal measurement. Einstein saw a way beyond this inconsistency by repealing the "absolute time" perspective.

The train example presumes the premises listed. If you deny those premises, then the train example ceases to demonstrate any inconsistencies.
I always took you for somebody in denial of Einstein’s theory precisely because only in one frame (and not an inertial one either) are all the events in ‘the present’ simultaneous with each other. In all other frames, this is not so, so the laws of physics are different between this and that frame, in violation of the principle. This follows from your assertions, ones with which I do not agree. — noAxioms

This is really confused. I haven't the foggiest idea of what you're trying to say. You seem to be employing the "absolute time" perspective to come up with "the present", yet also using "the relativity of simultaneity" to say that events in the present are not necessarily simultaneous. You cannot conflate these two in that way. They are completely different conceptions of time which are incommensurable. If you employ the relativity of simultaneity, you have no basis for a conception of "the present". And if you have the desire to base "the present" in your own observational perspective, or rest frame, as Newtonian "absolute time" does, this would just be an arbitrary designation, providing no true representation of "the present". This is why the principle of relativity puts "time" into an odd place. We can only measure time from our own perspective, yet relativity removes the validity of that perspective. Therefore we have no valid measurements of time.

What you deny is that potentiality and actuality do not exist apart from those things that they are the potentiality and actuality of. If we cannot agree on that then we cannot agree on what follows from it. — Fooloso4

Of course I disagree with that. These are concepts, and concepts do not exist within the things which serve as tokens which display the concept. The concept of red does not exist within a thing which is judged to be the colour red. The thing is judged as being the colour of red, and by that judgement it is said to be red. In no way does the concept of red exist within the thing which is judged to be red.

The Pythagorean idealism discussed by Plato assumed the theory of participation. By the theory of participation the red thing participates in the idea of red. That means the thing is in the concept, not vise versa. But Plato demonstrated problems with the theory of participation, and Aristotle denied this approach with his concept of "primary substance". Check the definition in "Categories"

Substance , in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance the individual man or horse. — Categories Ch 5, 2a, 11-12

Notice, how the theory of participation is denied by the concept of primary substance, because the individual cannot be within the concept. However, the individual may participate in substance in the sense of "secondary substance". But secondary substance is conceptual, in the sense of the species. So the individual man is allowed to participate in the concept "man"..

As long as you think that by potentiality and actuality Aristotle means a representation you will remain hopelessly confused. — Fooloso4

You can think what you will, but you haven't shown me anything to make think that I'm wrong. Potentiality and actuality are terms which Aristotle used when describing the features of reality. Descriptive terms are representative. Therefore potentiality and actuality are representative. Why would you think otherwise?

Things are systems of a very basic or maybe well-understood kind. — Pantagruel

No, each thing is different from every other thing. Therefore if represented as "a system", we need different types of systems according to the different type of things. Nevertheless the "system" as the theoretical representation is completely distinct from the thing represented.

The point was you said an atom had a purely theoretical and not a real existence, which is absurd. — Pantagruel

"Atom" is a theoretical representation, for the reasons I explained, but I did not say that it isn't real. As a theoretical representation, it is real. You have not addressed any of the issues I mentioned, to make an argument otherwise.

Maybe the theoretical concept of an atom doesn't correspond in toto to the actuality, but that is a limitation of perception and representation that doesn't eliminate the underlying correlation of the intentional object and the reality it intends towards. — Pantagruel

Ok, so your argument is that if I intend to represent something in a truthful way, but I fail, and my representation is just fictional, because the thing I thought I was representing (intended to represent) was just an hallucination, there is still a correlation between my representation and the thing I intended to represent. i.e. the product of my hallucination. Fine, I'll go with that.

You can't perceive a "season" but seasons most certainly exist. — Pantagruel

Right, in the same way that my hallucination most certainly exists.

Potentiality and actuality does not exist apart from those things they are the potentiality and actuality of. If the world is eternal there has always been something with potentiality and actuality. No potentiality and actuality prior to the world. — Fooloso4

I don't see your point. Aristotle shows that the world is not eternal, as I explained above. Therefore your conditional proposition "if the world is eternal..." is excluded as irrelevant because the world is not eternal. What is used in his demonstration that the world is not eternal, is the concepts of potentiality and actuality.

And concepts are distinct from the things which are said to share in the concept. That is an important point in Aristotelian ontology, the one which dfpolis ignores when he says "the known form is the form of the known". The true form of the thing consists of accidents, the known form does not. Therefore potentiality and actuality, as concepts, do exist independently of the things which are said to be potential and actual. This is commonly known as the separation between the world and the representation, map and terrain.

So, Aristotle uses these concepts to show that the world is not eternal. Whether or not the premises employed by him are true, and the world can truly be described by these concepts is a different matter. So if you do not accept the conclusion, that the world is not eternal, you need to demonstrate that the concepts are not truly applied in the premises, or that the logic is not valid.

My education must have gaping holes in it. Much more obvious than the facticty of atoms being evident qua properties in the external world which we experience constantly. — Pantagruel

The point though, is as I explained. What we commonly refer to as "an atom" cannot be adequately represented as "a system". Don't lose track of the argument. I was demonstrating to you the deficiencies involved in representing natural things as systems.

So, is this a thread about Aristotle's metaphysics, addressing what he actually wrote, or is this just a thread about our opinions of Aristotle, as a supposed wise man. You can see how we could discuss the latter without any knowledge about what he actually wrote. But what's the point of blind character assassination?

In the Physics he argues that it is. — Fooloso4

Definitely, he does not. As argued in "On The Heavens", anything composed of matter is corruptible and not eternal. I suggest that you reread Aristotle's Physics, to see where you've made the mistake of misinterpretation.

he potentiality and actuality of what? There can be no potentiality and actuality of something that is not. Potentiality and actuality does not exist apart from those things they are the potentiality and actuality of. — Fooloso4

"The world" obviously. You made the claim that the world is eternal and therefore not describable in terms of potential and actual. But the world is changing. Therefore it is describable by Aristotle's terms of physics, matter and form. And matter is potential, while form is actual. Therefore the world is describable in terms of potential and actual, these are matter and form. And, it is necessary to use these terms to account for the fact that the world is changing. As explained in "On the Heavens" anything composed of matter is generated and corrupted. Therefore we can conclude that the world is not eternal.

The former does not preclude the latter. — Fooloso4

The former precludes the latter under the conditions of your conditional proposition: "If the world is eternal then there can be no prior potentiality or actuality or prime mover."

This is Aristotle's argument that the world is not eternal. The world changes therefore by his principles of physics it consists of potentiality (matter) and actuality (form). Anything consisting of matter is necessarily generated and corruptible. The corruptible will in time pass away. Therefore the world is not eternal.

That shouldn't suggest an "extraspatiotemporal" limbo world where tree potentialities exist and evolve until they are actualized as trees in our "spatiotemporal" world. Instead the world we inhabit just is where an acorn develops into a tree. — Andrew M

The problem though, is that with each passing moment the actual acorn, along with the potentialities, changes according to the conditions it is exposed to. Through chemistry we'd understand these changes as changes to the form, or actuality of the physical object, the acorn. But corresponding to these changes to the form, there are changes to the potential which cannot be directly understood simply through an understanding of the chemical changes to the form of the acorn. The potentialities really do evolve along with the changing actuality. We might apply premises from biology, which could state that X physical form is equivalent to Z potential, therefore destruction of X actuality is a destruction of Z potential. However, the theory of evolution, genetics and mutations, shows us that relating actualities to potentials is not so simple in reality. Actualities come and go, potentials change.

Actual forms don't directly correspond with potentials. The physical form is represented as one unity, an entity, or particular. Potential is related to the particular as a multitude of possibilities. Each possibility is itself represented (by us thinking humans) as a particular, to establish a direct relation to the actual, particular form. Thus a multitude of possibilities (possible actualities) is related to one actual form. So "potential" appears as a multitude of possible particulars, each of these particulars having a theoretical rather than a real spacetime representation. The theoretical spacetime representation, which is not a real spacetime representation (analogous to a counterfactual), constitutes what is known as a real possibility by modal logic.

But that is not a real representation of the real existence of "potential", it is only a representation of how potential relates to the actual. We create with our minds, a number of possible actualities which directly relate to the known actuality, and designate these as the real possibilities. But these are representation of actualities which are qualified as "possible", and these are supposed to relate the real potential to the real actual. We have no representation of real potential, only representations of real actualities. So to establish the relationship we represent potential as a multitude of possible actualities. But we also know that what we designate as real possibilities (possible actualities) cannot all be true without defying the laws of spacetime. Therefore we need to conclude that real potential, which is described in terms of incompatible spacetime actualities, is not describable by the laws of spacetime.

The proper analogy would be that jgill observed interference effects until he and his wife met up and she pointed out that she had been standing there all the time. — Andrew M

So we say that @jgill has extremely bad eyes, and all he sees until he's about three metres from his wife is a strange interference pattern? Suppose he's 50 metres away. How would he interpret the interference pattern as probabilities for the actual location of his wife? Consider that if this is a true analogy, the closer that he gets, he ought to be able to observe changes to the interference pattern which would increase his certainty.

But I have calculated the probability and it has come out .7 in favor of her standing there and .3 her not. — jgill

So? How did you interpret that interference pattern, to come up with these numbers? Ultimately, the way that you interpreted the pattern, to come up with accurate probabilities, says something very significant about what the wave interference which you are interpreting, really is.

If the world is eternal then there can be no prior potentiality or actuality or prime mover. — Fooloso4

There is nothing to indicate that the world might be eternal. and everything indicates that there is potentiality and actuality. So that possibility, that the world is eternal and there no potentiality or actuality is easily excluded as unreal. You might take the route of ignore and deny though, as that is a real possibility for you.

Ye are quite mad lad. Bon voyage, enjoy the ride! :) — Pantagruel

You obviously have no education in basic chemistry, so you take the route of dfpolis, deny the facts and ignore the reality.

If a system isn't a real thing then certainly, by your logic, there are no real things. — Pantagruel

I explained in what sense a system is a material, physical thing (i.e. an engineered artificial creation). I also explained in what sense a system is a theoretical thing. Both of these are real. That is the advantage of dualism, it allows us to make this separation between what exists in theory, and what exists materially, providing for both to be real. Both are "real" unless you have a mind which is closed to the truth of reality, and therefore have a desire to restrict the reach of the word "real" to one side or the other.

An atom is a system. — Pantagruel

An "atom" is a theoretical representation. Atoms do not have independent existence in nature, and if given such in a lab, its existence, as a system, is an engineered system. Even the helium atom, which was classically believed to exist as an independent inert atom has been found to really only exist in nature as part of a larger structure. So the idea of "an atom" as a "system" is theory which does not accurately represent the natural existence of the things which it is supposed to represent.

And yes, it is an 'arbitrary' boundary if by that you mean at some point the atom didn't exist and at some point it will cease to exist. Again, if that is your definition of arbitrary, then we live in a Heraclitean world and the only thing that really exists is change. — Pantagruel

No, that's not what I meant. What I meant is as explained above. The arbitrary boundary is drawn between the thing represented by the system, and its environment. So for example, atoms in their natural condition exist as molecules, and the supposed boundary which separates the atoms from each other is an arbitrary boundary because this boundary doesn't really exist in natural things. The boundary exists in theory, and the application of this theory proves to be very useful in understanding things like physical reactions and chemical reactions. However, this theory leaves the electrons in a peculiar position, because they bridge the boundary between one atom (system) and another. This is where the usefulness of the model, or representation, begins to break down and loose its effectiveness. Another model has to be produced to show the interactions of electrons from various atoms because these cannot be properly classed as part of one system (atom) or another.

There is also evidence of a further problem with systems theory which is much more significant. There is an assumed boundary between the system and it's environment, and everything not within the system is "outside" the system. However, systems theory provides no means for a boundary to the "inside" of the system. So all things "not within the system" are modeled as outside the system and there is no means to differentiate which things are beyond the true boundary to the outside from things which are beyond the true boundary to the inside. These need to be two distinct boundaries.

So with your proposed system modeling of the atom for example, we can model the interactions of the electrons as occurring at the outside boundary of the system. Individual electrons may pass in and out side of a given system (atom) in this way. At the center of the system (atom) we have a massive nucleus. Each system (atom) has its own nucleus, and the nucleus of one system (atom) may interact with the nucleus of another system. Therefore we need to be able to represent direct nucleus-to-nucleus interaction of the two systems (atoms). But systems theory only allows one boundary as "outside" the system. Therefore any nucleus-to-nucleus interaction through the inside boundary gets conflated with electron-to-electron interaction through the outside boundary, and the systems theory provides us with no principles to distinguish these two.

Time to change your username to Metaphysician Uncovered or much better suited Theologian Uncovered. — Fooloso4

Let me reveal to you, a discovery which I made for myself. The highest quality metaphysical material is found in theology. This tradition emerges from Plato, through Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas etc.. One cannot truthfully proclaim oneself to be a metaphysician without studying the relevant theology.

Where exactly in Metaphysics does he say that material objects are preceded in time by the potential for their existence? Where does Aristotle say that God acts on potentiality to make it into something actual? — Fooloso4

That would be Bk 9 Metaphysics. You ought to read it. It's very informative, especially in respect to his characterization of the nature of potential, or potency, and its relation to the actual. Here's a sample from chapter 8, but you need to read the whole section to get the complete context with the discussion of potency and possibility.

Obviously, therefore, the substance or form is actuality. According to this argument, then, it is obvious that actuality is prior in substantial being to potency; and as we have said, one actuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover. — Aristotle, Metaphysics Bk9 Ch 8 1050b

The part concerning which I had a lengthy discussion with dfpolis previously, is BK7 Ch6-9. In Ch6 he explains in what sense a thing and its essence are the same, and in what sense they are not the same. Then in Ch7 he discusses the coming to be of things. He separates artificial from natural, and discusses the artificial, relying on examples. Artificial comings to be are called "makings". Thinking precedes the making, and the active principle, the form, proceeds from the soul of the artist. So we say that the artist puts the form into the matter. Then, after a lengthy discussion of the various different ways that natural things come to be, he concludes by the end of Ch9 that things formed by nature come to be in much the same way as things formed by art. This latter point is where dfPolis and I disagree.

A "system" is a whole, and as such it requires a boundary, or principle at least, which validates its supposed existence as a united whole. Such principles are applied with degrees of arbitrariness. This is the point covered in my reply to Wayfarer above, concerning secondary substance. When the substance is a species, or type of thing (secondary substance) as is the case in systems theory, a human judgement is required which designates the individual thing being judged as fulfilling the conditions of the species, the type of system in this case.

In "conceptualizing the nature of reality" we need to have respect for this fact, that the representation of the individual is not the individual. That is the problem which dfpolis demonstrates above, by insisting that "the known form is the form of the known". This is the type of sophistry which Aristotle's conceptual space was designed to battle against. Simply stated, the sophistry manifests as the Parmenidean principle, being and knowing are the same thing.
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Therefore I suggest that you pay attention to the fact that "a system" in systems theory is a theoretical representation of a real "thing", not the thing itself. And, when "system" is used to refer to a real physical thing, in engineering, this type of thing is always a created thing. Therefore there is no way around the fact that "a system" is always artificial, whether "system" is used to refer to a theoretical representation of something natural, or whether it is used to refer to physical, engineered system. In both cases "the system" is a type, not an individual thing.

I was trying to argue that the probability wave is outside of space and time... — Wayfarer

Space and time are conceptual. So "outside of space and time", simply means unable to be apprehended through our current conceptions of space and time. This issue is very much analogous to the discussion above, of numbers which our conception of numbers reveals to us as needed to be accounted for, but they lie outside of our capacity to apprehend them. What I argued above, is that this indicates a fundamental flaw in our conception of numbers, that this conception produces numbers which cannot be apprehended by us.

I actually covered a lot of my views relating thermodynamics and information theory by way of cybernetics in the dialog with ChatGPT I just posted in the Lounge. There is a lot of preamble because I needed to contextualize the discussion to make sure the neural net was weighting things correctly. The history of the conversation appears to change the nature of the response to any given question. — Pantagruel

The problem with something like the ChatGPT is that it tends to represent common, conventional ideas, sort of like Wikipedia, so this is not very useful for representing the peculiarities or idiosyncrasies of the thought of a specific philosopher like Aristotle. For example, in your question of hylomorphism it equates matter with substance. But this is not consistent with Aristotle's definition of substance in his "Categories". He proposes primary substance, and secondary substance. Primary substance is the individual. And the individual is a combination of matter and form, not just matter. Secondary substance is species, and this is conceptual. Therefore your later question to ChatGPT, can there be form without substance, just plays on an unAristotelian meaning of "substance".

I also think that you need to be very careful to watch for equivocation, in using something like ChatGPT.

Do you accpet that a "system" is an artificial thing? So any experiments carried with a system are designed and ordered by the engineers of the system, therefore not necessarily giving a proper representation of what is natural.

This leads to the disastrously oxymoronic conception of 'a thinking substance' which is the single biggest contributor to modern physicalist philosophy. So this, I entirely agree with: — Wayfarer

The problem here is not so much Descartes' use of words, as it is the use of words in modern vernacular. In Descartes' time Aristotelian logic was still taught, and "substance" maintained its definition according to Aristotle's principles of logic, as that which substantiates, or grounds logic. Check my reply to Pantagruel above. At that time, the use of "substance" in chemistry was becoming the prominent use, over the logical definition, and this usage in chemistry was consistent with Aristotle's "primary substance". However, that primary substance (the individual) consists of a combination of matter and form, and that secondary substance consists of forms, was soon forgotten by the monist materialist mindset, so that substance in its common usage became equated with matter.

This is the separation which allows for the conception of "prime matter". When matter is conceived to exist as substance without any form, we designate the fundamental "substance" of reality as unintelligible. This is because "form" provides for intelligibility as that which is intelligible. So the cosmological argument is very significant and important, to demonstrate that substance must be formal, and the conception of prime matter as basic substance is a misdirected adventure into the unintelligible. A properly directed adventure into the aspects of reality which appear to be unintelligible is to assign principles which would bring those apparently unintelligible aspects into the intelligible through the process of understanding, not to assign principles which would designate the unintelligible as impossible to understand, eg prime matter.

So the fault is not in Descartes usage of "thinking substance" which is consistent with secondary substance, the fault is in the unnecessary narrowing of the mind by monist inclinations. We no longer recognize the terms of Aristotelian logic, to see that "substance" is what grounds logic, therefore substance must have a formal aspect.

I also agree with the gist of the 'fundamental abstraction', although again, I differ somewhat in my analysis of it. I trace the 'fundamental abstraction' to early modern science - a consequence of Cartesian dualism, and equally, the division of the world into primary and secondary qualities or attributes, with the primary qualities being the objects of physics and the secondary being assigned to 'mind' and thereby subjectivised and relativised**. I agree that Aristotle's hylomorphic model is vastly superior to the Cartesian, and also note that Aristotelian metaphysics is enjoying a comeback in the biological sciences. — Wayfarer

I believe that the division of primary and secondary qualities was meant to be consistent with Aristotle's primary and secondary substance. Primary substance is the individual, the material object. Secondary substance is the species, the type, which we use to classify the individual, "horse", "man", etc.. Notice that a judgement is required in the case of secondary substance, and that is why it is "subjectivised". So if we take the syllogism "Socrates is a man. All men are mortal. Therefore Socrates is mortal", substance or grounding, is provided by "is a man". We cannot take that actual individual (primary substance) and place that individual into the syllogism. So, we make an initial, primary, or fundamental judgement to classify the individual, and this classification acts as a stand in, or representation of the true properties of the individual; this is secondary substance. What we say of the individual, as a true representation within the syllogism, is secondary substance. You can see that the secondary substance is based in a human judgement in relation to a primary substance, and this less than perfect grounding is how logic loses certainty.

There is no point in continuing to respond to you. — Dfpolis

A very common response from the monist mindset, deny and ignore the complexity of reality. Ignorance is preferable to facing the reality of a complex world.

Maybe I'm just naive, but how is the well-documented physical phenomenon/fact of negentropy not in and of itself sufficient evidence of this? — Pantagruel

Wikipedia tells me "In information theory and statistics, negentropy is used as a measure of distance to normality." Care to state your case?

I’m wondering how this relates to phenomenology, which it seems to me attempts to reduce all forms of causation to a single non-determinist form, thereby dispelling the spiritual woo-hoo without falling into materialist determinisms.

And then there’s Nietzsche’s take on causation: — Joshs

I think non-determinist causation would be considered by most as spiritual woo-hoo. I tend toward agreement with the Nietzsche quote though.

When I piece together what you ascribe to Aristotle, I don't understand it as a thought by itself." — Paine

Of course it's not a thought by itself it's a vast multitude of thoughts. And the problem with any multitude of thoughts is to maintain consistency throughout them all. it appears like you never got to the point of understanding the consistency the way that I do. That's most likely due to my inability to express myself clearly. Metaphysical principles are not easily expressed.

The fact that you find it repugnant to think that order could emerge from disorder, tells us nothing about what occurs in nature or the rational mind. — Fooloso4

The problem with this principle, that order emerges from disorder, is that it is completely unintelligible to think of order without a cause for it. Therefore positing it as a real representative principle is to premise that some aspect of reality is unintelligible. This is self-defeating to philosophy because it kills the philosopher's desire to know by assuming that this is something which cannot be known. That is why the theological principle "God" is much better suited to philosophy, because "God" is in principle the highest form of intelligibility, yet fundamentally unknowable to human beings in their current condition. This inspires human beings to better themselves in the effort to know God.

You can posit a pre-material final cause but in doing so you part ways with Aristotle. The final cause is always the end or telos of some being and does not exist apart from it. — Fooloso4

Yes, that would be God. And Aristotle spoke of God, so I don't see why you think I part ways with Aristotle.

Where does Aristotle demonstrate this? We can distinguish between the final and formal cause but they are always at work together within a being. — Fooloso4

It is what is known as the cosmological argument, where he demonstrates in his "Metaphysics" the need for an actuality which is prior to material objects, as the cause of the first material form. All material objects are preceded in time by the potential for their existence. But a potential requires something actual to actualize it and become an actual material form, because potential cannot actualize itself. If the first actuality coexisted with potential, it would be just another material form, and this would produce infinite regress. So the first actuality (as a final cause, known in theology as God's Will) must be prior to, and distinct from material forms.

First actuality is being operational. Second actuality is operating. — Dfpolis

This is somewhat incorrect, and really shows that you are the one confused, because "being operational" is a capacity, a potential. It is the potential to operate. If we do not maintain this description, that "being operational" is a potential to operate, then we have no difference between "being operational" and "operating". This is the principle whereby Aristotle showed that all the powers of the soul are properly characterized as potencies, rather than actualities. Since they are not operating all the time, they are all potentials which need to be actualized in order to operate. Therefore we cannot say that "being operational" is an actuality. Aristotle described it more like having knowledge, and notice that the actuality of having knowledge is provided by the thing which has the knowledge.

As such, and to maintain consistency with Aristotle's conceptual space, this capacity of "being operational" must be attributed to the matter of the living being, not the form or "soul". And this is why Aquinas attributed to the potential, the properties which we call "habits".

However, as demonstrated in his "Metaphysics", in his discussion of how it is that a material body comes to be the very body which it is, rather than something else, Aristotle describes a need to assume an actuality which is prior to the organized material body, as the cause of it being the organized body which it is. And, as stated in his definition of soul in "On the Soul", this "first actuality", which is necessarily prior to the organized material body as the cause of it being what it is, is what he calls "the soul". This is what has the knowledge.

So, we have your stated potential "being operational", and the actuality of operating. We need to assume a "first actuality" which actualizes the potential to operate (described by you as being operational), causing the actuality of operating. It is impossible that the actuality of operating causes the potential to operate (described as being operational) to actually operate, because actually operating is posterior and the cause needs to be prior. And we cannot, as you claim, say that being operational is itself an actuality because then there would be no difference between "being operational", and "actually operating. So Aristotle separated these as potency and act. Therefore we need a further "act" which is responsible for causing the potency of being operational, to actual operate, and this is "the soul".

I am not arguing against having more than one principle in an organism (not against matter and form) as Aristotle recognized, but against having two things (res cogitans and res extensa) as Descartes thought. I've told you this a number of times before. — Dfpolis

This is your hypocrisy. You tell me you are only rejecting Cartesian dualism, and that you do not reject other dualisms. But in your article it is clearly stated "Seeing dualism as a representational artifact disposes of both ontological and property dualism." And your op here states "The article rejects dualism as a framework...".

You clearly propose a means for rejecting dualism. Then when you are criticized concerning how effective the means would be, you claim that you're not really trying to reject dualism, only one special idiosyncratic type of dualism. That's why I accused you of being disingenuous. Why don't you just take the honest route, and accept that your means for rejecting dualism does not work? Then you might start to embrace dualism as the means toward true understanding.

Aristotle does not say that the human mind creates forms, but that it actualizes the intelligibility belonging to the form of the sensed object. He even says that in doing so, the nous becomes, in some way, the thing it knows. Thus, the known form is the form of the known. — Dfpolis

Again, this is incorrect. There is a very explicit difference between the form of the sensed object, being a particular, complete with accidentals, and the form which is intelligible to the human mind, being a universal, consisting only of the essentials. So it is impossible that the human mind actualizes the form of the sense object, because it actualizes a completely different form, what we call an abstraction. The form of the particular is completely separate from the abstraction and is not the same form at all. If he says that the mind "in some way" becomes the thing which is known, then this is clearly metaphorical.

I have not proposed such a duality. Again, the known form is the form of the known. — Dfpolis

This demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of Aristotle. A material object consists of matter and form, and in having matter the actuality of that material object, which is the form of the material object, has accidents which are unknown to human beings. The known form does not consist of the accidents. This is the purpose of the law of identity, to expose this type of sophistry. A thing is the same as itself. It is not the same as the known form or else there would be more than one of the same thing.

Totally agree with this, but it renders meaningless a statement about a single body in the absence of something relative to which motion can be defined. — noAxioms

A statement about a single body is not completely "meaningless", because we can still state properties of the body itself, and this is meaningful. Predication is actually very meaningful. Now, you should consider the distinction between internal and external properties, a distinction which has been quite meaningful in classical philosophy. It seems like the science of physics has no real principles to distinguish these two, the difference between internal change (difference of properties) and external change (locomotion or change of place), and physics wants to reduce, and treat all change as change of place. Internal change would be change of place of internal parts.

The problem with this perspective arises when we get down to the fundamental parts. As I described above in a prior post, there must be base indivisible parts, or else the universe is fundamentally without substance. That's the principle employed by the ancient Greek atomists. If internal change is described exclusively through change of place to internal parts, then internal change to fundamental indivisible parts is ruled out as impossible. Yet if fundamental parts demonstrate internal change, such change is rendered as unintelligible, unless we allow for further division. Then fundamental parts cannot be found unless they are observed to be unchangeable.

If what is being discussed is one body relative to the other body, your choice of wording leaves the second entity unspecified, merely implied, like there’s some embarrassment about it. So say it. Relative to what is nothing immobile? — noAxioms

Relative to the principle of relativity, nothing is immobile. That is, if we take the principle of relativity as our primary premise, and add the observational premise that there are numerous bodies observed to be moving in different ways, we can conclude that noting is immobile. That is the fundamental conclusion, (assumption), which the principle of relativity give us, there is no such thing as "rest" in any truthful, grounded sense.

And here I thought it was the definition of motion that did that. The principle of relativity seems to still hold even if you discard the relative definition of motion, and Einstein’s theories along with it. — noAxioms

Yes, "motion" as defined by the principle of relativity is what renders the concept of "at rest" as obsolete, but only as defined by the principle of relativity. Prior to Galileo's development of the principle of relativity, "at rest" was a valid concept referring to one's position on earth, and motion was defined relative to any location on earth, the earth being "at rest". And, the locations on earth were supposed to be at rest relative to each other. The principle of relativity makes rest a property derived only from locations which are at rest relative to one another (lack of internal change), but these locations are not at rest in the wider context (external change, or change of place). So when motion is defined as change of place relative to what is external to a designated location (the principle of relativity), there is no such thing as "at rest".

If the PoR makes the concept of ‘at rest’ invalid, why does it (or at least the version of PoR that you prefer) reference it? — noAxioms

The principle of relativity creates an artificial, and arbitrary definition of "rest", as "the rest frame". It is not a real rest, because it is moving relative to its environment (external change). So we can designate a number of points, as locations, and say that they are not moving relative to each other (no internal change), and claim to have a rest frame. But this is not a true or real rest, as they move relative to external things. And, as the principles of Einstein's special relativity (time dilation, length contraction) demonstrate to us, there is not even any true internal rest here. We must overlook certain discrepancies to say that they are at rest relative to each other. The locations actually change relative to each other due to the effects of external change, acceleration. Therefore even the internal "rest", or lack of internal change, which is associated with the rest frame, is not a valid "rest".

My apologies for hanging on this point so much, but you seem to contradict yourself regularly, saying that the concept is invalid, but regularly referencing the invalid concept nonetheless. I personally don’t find the concept invalid at all. It’s just a totally different set of definitions with totally different physics than what Einstein proposes. I don’t prefer these alternate definitions, but I cannot prove them wrong. — noAxioms

If you can show me a valid concept of rest, lack of change, which can be maintained consistently along with the principle of relativity as well, I would appreciate the demonstration. Even if we accept locations to be "at rest" relative to each other in an internal way, and deny Einsteinian relativity, these locations are still not at rest in the wider (external) context. And when we start mapping the points which are supposed to be at rest relative to each other, in comparison with external things, we inevitably find minor inconsistencies which cannot be resolved, as demonstrated by Einstein's train example. So we do not have the evidence to adequately support any claim that any multitude of points of location in the material world are actually at rest relative to each other. The need for "spatial expansion" helps to demonstrate the reality of this point.

Basically the problem was that this particular mod hated my guts and would initiate or join any pile-on concerning myself. — Wayfarer

SLX showed extraordinary will power by completely ignoring me no matter what I posted. Banno is similar, but doesn't demonstrate the same will power, and succumbs from time to time.

It appears to me, that what's coming out in this thread, is that there is a form of scientism within which the practitioners attempt to reduce all forms of causation to a single determinist form. This is the manifestation of an urge to reject dualism for monism, and dispel the spiritual woo-hoo. The common method of procedure is to conflate formal cause with final cause, and represent final cause as a type of formal cause, instead of as a distinct form of causation. Ultimately this renders the whole of material, or physical existence as somewhat unintelligible, because the two are fundamentally incompatible.

That appears to be the modern trend in metaphysics, it's well demonstrated by apokrisis. Ultimately, Aristotle's "prime matter" ends up as the first principle, as prior to any ordered or formed existence. And, instead of recognizing the need for a prior actuality ("final cause"), which is demonstrated by Aristotle's cosmological argument, the actuality of ordered material existence (displaying formal causation) is said to "emerge" from prime matter. Of course this is repugnant to the rational mind, to think that order could emerge from disorder, and that is why we need to maintain a separation between pre-material final cause, and post-material formal cause, in the way that Aristotle demonstrated, so that we can maintain the intelligibility of the physical world .

No, what allows me to avoid Cartesian dualism is Arsitotle's definition of the psyche as the actuality of a potentially living body instead of as res cogitans. — Dfpolis

OK, I did not see in the article, how you moved form that definition of soul to your rejection of dualism. All I saw supporting the rejection was the passage I quoted, where you moved from a rejection of the Fundamental Assumption (a rejection unsupported in principle), to a rejection of both property and substance dualism.

"Soul" is defined as the first grade of actuality of a natural, organized body, having life potentially in it. Within Aristotle's conceptual space, as explained in his "Metaphysics", this type of actuality is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of that body, as cause of its existence as an organized body. Therefore we can conclude that this "form" which is called "the soul" is prior in time to the material existence of the living body, therefore independent from it.

So I ask you, how do you proceed within this conceptual space, to reject dualism? You state in your article, that matter and form are logically separably, but not physically separable. But this claim is useless to this analysis because a physical body is necessarily a combination of both matter and form. To separate matter and form would give us something other than a physical body therefore this is "physically" impossible. To separate the two would require something other than a physical process. So, Aristotle uses logic, a logical process of analysis, to show that form is necessarily prior to matter. therefore separate. And since this separate form is necessarily prior in time to the living human body which performs physical observations, the separate form is not physically observable.

Aristotle is clear that hyle is a kind of physis (an intrinsic principle of change), a "source of power," and that it "desires" the new form in a substantial change. Thus, it is an active tendency, and not passively receptive, in the case of natural changes. In artificial changes, it is passively receptive. — Dfpolis

This is completely unsupported and wrong. Nowhere does Aristotle insist that matter is "active" in any sense. In fact, the whole separation between potential/actual, matter/form, is designed by Aristotle to remove the confusion created by this idea. Assigning "active" power to matter is a mixing of the categories, which renders any conclusions you draw from this procedure as invalid. If he refers to matter as being "inclined toward...", or as having "urges", he is referring to the habits of a material body, in the Platonic way, not to matter itself.

Its form must be determined by a prior potential, viz. its predecessor's hyle. Also, it must be actualized by something that is already operational/actual. That line of actualization can be traced to the Unmoved Mover. Still, the form cannot exist prior to the being, because the form is the being's actuality, and it is not actual before it exists. — Dfpolis

This shows a bit of misunderstanding. The prior potential does not determine any future forms. It is the prior form (formal cause), in conjunction with the active form, acting at the present (as final cause) which determines future forms. Material cause is simply indeterminate possibility. The prior form, as formal cause is deterministic, however, the final cause, acting at the present is teleological. In the sense that the form of the object which will come to be (through the act of the artist), exists already in the mind of the artist, prior to its material existence (Metaph, Bk 7, which we've discussed previously), the form of the thing does exist prior to the natural thing's material existence.

Ultimately, it is. Proximately, it cannot be, because change requires a prior potential to new form. That is why the Unmoved Mover cannot change. — Dfpolis

That analysis shows the necessity of prior potentials in natural processes. — Dfpolis

We need to distinguish between making what was potential actual, and making something with no prior potential (true creation). — Dfpolis

We need to distinguish secondary causality, which is the causality found in nature, from metaphysical actualization, which is what the cosmological argument relies upon. — Dfpolis

Consider the above four quotes. You recognize the necessity of "prior potentials" in natural processes. You also recognize that "ultimately" there must be a "metaphysical actualization", and this is derived from the cosmological argument.

The two types of actualization, are discussed by Aristotle in "On the Soul" when he proposes the definition of "soul" as "the first grade of actuality". Aristotle's dualism is based in the logical need for two distinct types of "form", or order, one created by the human mind as formulae, and the other being the type of actuality which is prior to the material existence of material objects as the cause of them being what they are.

I suggest that it is somewhat disingenuous of you to recognize that Aristotle's conceptual space necessitates this duality of actuality (form), yet you assert that this conceptual space provides the means for rejecting dualism.

It is interesting to me that the language in De Anima is more directed to recognizing different kinds of agency than coming to terms with a chain of causality. — Paine

This is precisely the reason why Aristotle's "conceptual space" cannot be used to reject dualism. What he exposes is distinct types of agency. The two principal types of agency, or "form", cannot be reduced, one to the other. In fact the further we analyze them, in an attempt to reconcile them, the further apart they get, and the more obvious it becomes, that dualism cannot be avoided. This is why Aristotle's philosophy is central to the development of the concept of free will, and this is decisively dualist.

I disagree if you are denying that the Aristotelian approach disposes of Cartesian dualism, which was my actual claim. Identifying — Dfpolis

Actually your claim was that Aristotelian conceptual space provides a means for rejecting dualism. You say it in the op, "The article rejects dualism as a framework...", and you claim it in the opening page of the article, "Aristotle’s conceptual space is unburdened by dualism". I'm sure that if you meant that Aristotle's conceptual space provides the means for replacing a simple Cartesian dualism with a more complex dualism, you would have said so.

I'm being hard on you on this point, because I believe that you ought to leave your intentions as open and revealed as possible. If your intent is to reproduce and understand Aristotle's conceptual space for the purpose of applying it to some of the problems of modern science, that's one thing. But if your intent is to find principles for a rejection of dualism, which induces you to cherry pick Aristotle's writing and pretend to reproduce his conceptual space, that is a completely different objective.

The reason I'm so critical on this point, is that in our prior discussions you and I had disagreement as to what Aristotle says about where the form of the object comes from, when a natural object comes to have material existence. I told you that Aristotle seems quite clear to me, to compare the coming into being of a natural article to that of an artificial object. In this case, the form comes from an external source, the mind of the artist, and it is put into the matter. You insisted that Aristotle allowed that the form inhered within the matter itself, in a natural object. But of course Aristotle's analogy of comparing a natural object to an artificial object does not really allow for that interpretation.

It is an important difference, because by saying that the form of an object inheres within the matter, you interpret "form" as necessarily the property of matter. This allows you to deny dualism, and cling to emergence. However, to claim that Aristotle supports this position is simply wrong, because it completely neglects Aristotle's "Metaphysics", especially his cosmological argument where actuality is shown to be prior to potentiality. Therefore form must be prior to matter, and come from a source other than matter.

While it is peripheral to my article, I think you are looking in the wrong direction for the source of the concept of potency (dynamis). As I note in my hyle article, (https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=POLANR&u=https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FPOLANR.DOC), the source of the concept is medical, referring to the hidden healing power of medicinals. A. then applied it to the argument against the reality of change in order to go between the horns of being and non-being. Thus, the origin and original application of the concept are physical, not mental. — Dfpolis

Aristotle's principal demonstration of the concept of "potential" is provided in his biology, "On the Soul", and he uses this concept to describe the powers of the soul, self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, and intellection. The secondary explanation of "potential" is in his "Metaphysics" where he works extensively to establish the relationship between potential and matter. As such, he reality of "potential" which Aristotle argued for, is derived from introspection. It is subjective, mental. That the concept of "matter" is used as leverage against sophists who argued that change is not real, indicates exactly the opposite of what you claim. The concept is pulled from the subjective self, as the principle of continuity and identity, and applied to the physical, to validate the intuitive notion that a changing thing can maintain its identity as the same thing, despite changing. The sophists who would deny the reality of change would insist that at each moment the changing thing is a new thing, instead of allowing that the thing remains as the same thing, while its properties change.

quote="Dfpolis;784638"]The conclusion you cite is not based on the type-token distinction. That is only used to justify the use of introspection. The conclusion is based on the Hard Problem being an artifact of a dualistic (in the Cartesian sense) representation or conceptual space.[/quote]

You very clearly use the type-token distinction as the basis of your rejection of dualism. It is actually the only real argument against dualism which you provide in the article.

[quote=Denis F. Polis, The Hard Problem of Consciousness
& the Fundamental Abstraction]What is at stake is replicability. Since science seeks universal knowledge, data must, with few exceptions, be replicable by competent observers. Replicability is a type, rather than a token, property. We can never replicate a token observation, only the same type of observation. It is as absurd to reject replicable introspection because its token is private, as to reject Galileo’s observations because he made them in solitude.

Thus, the consciousness impasse is a representational, not an ontological, issue. Since humans
are psychophysical organisms who perceive to know and conceptualize to act, physicality and intentionality are dynamically integrated. Ignoring this seamless unity, post-Cartesian thought
conceives them separately – creating representational problems. The Hard Problem and the
mind-body problem both arose in the post-Cartesian era, and precisely because of conceptual
dualism. To resolve them, we need only drop the Fundamental Abstraction in studying mind.

Seeing dualism as a representational artifact disposes of both ontological and property dualism.
Properties depend not only on an object’s nature, but also on how we conceptualize it. For
example, we can justifiably think of an apple as red, or as having a certain spectral response.
While the intentional and physical theaters of operation seem disjoint, our abilities to know
material objects and to will physical acts spans them. Thus, a conceptual rather than an
ontological partitioning of human nature underlies both the Hard and mind-body problems.[/quote]

The statement that each instance of observation is particular, unique, and cannot be replicated is an ontological principle. That the truth and reality of this ontological principle produces a representational problem is another issue. It does not make the ontological issue into a representational issue, it just shows a representational issue which manifests from the ontological issue. To reject the FA, and deny the ontological separation between the representation and the thing represented, as the means for rejecting both ontological and property dualism, is just an imaginary fiction. It is not based in reality at all, therefore it serves no purpose toward a philosopher's seeking of truth.

I am not sure what you are saying here. We are able to know from experience, and so a posteriori, that all knowing involves a known object and a knowing subject. Whether we focus on one (as the FA does) or attend to both, is a matter of methodological choice. If attend to both, we are not employing the FA.

Further, I see no reason to think we know anything in a truly a priori way. — Dfpolis

To demonstrate my point, let's assume, as you say, that all knowing involves a known object and a knowing subject. There are certain necessary conditions, essential aspects of what constitutes a "knowing subject". One of these necessary conditions is the FA, (that there is a distinction between known and knower) as an a priori principle. The something known is not simply the knower, or else there is just a supposed knower, and no knowledge. Therefore we cannot know anything about knowing without reference to the FA. This is Descartes' principle. The thinking is logically prior to the being, and the point is that we cannot get access to the being without the thinking. Therefore we must address the thinking first, of which the FA is a basic part, there is something separate from the thinking, which is thought about. To proceed without the FA is to put the being before the thinking, but this renders the FA, which is very real as an intuition and a priori principle, as unintelligible. As a result the whole act of thinking and consequently knowing, also become unintelligible.

Evidence of this unintelligibility is your statement "I see no reason to think we know anything in a truly a priori way". Your method of placing being as prior to thinking has rendered the a priori as unintelligible to you, so your response is that the truly a priori cannot be apprehended by you.

The agent intellect does not create content. It actualizes (makes known) prior intelligibility, which is the source of known content. — Dfpolis

I believe this statement is derived from your faulty interpretation of Aristotle. What you call "prior intelligibility" is characterized by Aristotle as potential. Prior to being "discovered" by the geometer, (brought into actuality by the geometer's mind), the principles of geometry existed as potential. Within Aristotle's conceptual space this is an act of creation, just like the actions of an artist described above, creating a material object. The artist works to put form into the creation, and the form is not within the matter (potential) prior to the creation. So in the case of "discovering" ideas, the form, which is the essence of the idea, comes from the mind of the geometer in an act of creation, and this is an act of creation by the agent intellect. The need for the "agent" intellect is to account for the real causal activity of the intellect, creativity.

If the intelligible object had actual existence in some mode independent of the mind which "discovers" it, then it would have to be the passive intellect which receives it into the mind. The passive intellect is posited as a receptor, because it is necessary to have something which can receive the forms of sensible objects through sensation. So if these intelligible objects exist independently they would have to exist as potential if it is the agent intellect which acts on them. However, the cosmological argument demonstrates that it is impossible for potential to exist independently of form, therefore the reality of such independent potential is denied. Therefore the Christian theologians posited independent Forms, as prior to material existence, to account for the forms of natural objects.

That is the standard Scholastic view. My view is more complex, and is given in my hyle article. Briefly, hyle plays a passive role in cases where there is an intelligent agent informing a result, but not in natural substantial change, where it is a "source of power." — Dfpolis

But don't you see this as an inconsistency? You are assigning to matter special powers to act which are inconsistent with the concept in Aristotle's conceptual space. This is the problem which the Neo-Platonists ran into, assuming The One, to be absolute infinite potential. It has no actuality, therefore no act, and the becoming of material objects cannot be accounted for because there is no act as causation. That matter cannot have such special power is the reason why the cosmological argument is so powerful. So we need to release this idea, which gives matter special power, creating inconsistency in Aristotelian conceptual space, and respect the force of the cosmological argument. Potential (matter) on its own could have no power to act. Therefore we need to assume some source of actuality, a Form, which is independent from matter, and prior to the existence of material objects, which produces an actual material form.

The seed of this idea is found in Aristotle's biology, the definition of soul which you cited, the first actuality of a body having life potentially in it. When we look at living things, we see that organization is within the body even at the most fundamental level. The body is organized as soon as it is a body, it comes into being as an organized, living body. Further, there must be an actuality which causes the existence of the organized body. As cause of the organized body, this first actuality must be prior to the body itself.

This is the principle which is drawn out further in his Metaphysics, to apply to all natural things. A material object consists of matter and form. And, by the law of identity the object must be what it is, it cannot be something other than it is. Therefore when the object comes into existence as an orderly thing, its form must be prior to its material existence, to account for it being what it is rather than something else. As in the case of the artist, the form comes from somewhere other than the matter. And, absolutely speaking, there must be a Form which is prior to all material existence, so this reinforces the conclusion that the form comes from somewhere other than the matter.

ou know... light passes through the pupil, etc. — L'éléphant

Wow, light passes through the pupil. Where does it go, into the brain? It's very black in there.

The pupil is a black hole.... — Wikipedia: Pupil

Can you present an actual example of such a cause? — Janus

Sure, when I pick up my tea cup to have a drink, that's an actual example. You might say it was my brain that caused this action, but what caused my brain to do this? That such acts do not have a physical cause is understood by the concept of free will, elementary philosophy.

Hi D.f., I just finished reading your article. I thought it was quite good, well written, and easy to read. I think you did a very good job of exposing the problems of the SM of neuroscience, and covered the difficulties from many different angles. However, I disagree with your conclusion which you draw from your proposed solution. Specifically, I disagree with your claims of bridging the dualist gap.

The article rejects dualism as a framework, qualia as essential to consciousness, actual information in computers, and the reduction of biology to physics. It also clarifies the concept of emergence. — Dfpolis

The Aristotelian duality of matter/form, potential/actual, does not provide the basis for a rejection of dualism as you claim, it only reinforces the need for dualism. I will attempt to briefly explain the issues in the following.

First, in the general sense, the separation between potential and actual is proposed by Aristotle as a sort of dichotomy. This means that your attempt to reduce, and resolve them into one, rejecting dualism, is a basic misunderstanding of these principles, in the first place. Consider the difference between potential and actual as analogous to the difference between future and past, in time. The difference between future and past is very real, and only a fool would deny this because, that it is real, is an idea which is fundamental to all human decision making in relation to action taking. It is only in a purely theoretical setting, imaginary I might say, that the difference between past and future might be denied. Now, as you describe, there is always an intermediary between the two, which relates them, and this is "the present" in time.

The intermediary can be apprehended in two different ways, as relational (as unifying the two), or as divisional (as a boundary separating the two). Regardless the two are distinct. Your example, the relativity of simultaneity does not demonstrate that the boundary does not exist, or is not real, it shows that the boundary is vague in our understanding, not well understood, allowing that constructive (conceptual) relations between the two distinct parts may be created in different ways, from different perspectives (frames of reference).

So I think your basic premise, that dualism can be rejected through an appeal to Aristotle's hylomorphic dichotomy, is fundamentally misguided. What Aristotle showed was that the classic dualism of mind/body needed to be expanded to include all of physical reality. The broadening of this dualism under the categories of matter/form, potential/actual, would allow us to properly position the duality found within the living being, discovered through subjective introspection, in relation to a wider duality which encompasses all of reality. Therefore he proposed a duality of matter/form for physics, which would accommodate the duality of potential/actual derived from subjective introspection.

The second point is that when you describe the Fundamental Abstraction (notice "the present" above is a fundamental abstraction) you improperly conclude that dualism can be rejected by excluding the need for a fundamental abstraction. Yes, it may be the case that if we could exclude the need for the Fundamental Abstraction, we could reject dualism, but we cannot realistically exclude the Fundamental Abstraction.

The "Fundamental Abstraction" can be apprehended as the a priori, and since the a priori is very real, and supported by real introspective analysis, we cannot simply reject it just because we desire to absolve ourselves from dualism. So, you refer to a type/token distinction, which is an ontological distinction, then you draw the invalid conclusion: " Thus, the consciousness impasse is a representational, not an ontological, issue". Only one side of the distinction is representational, the type side. The token side is not representational, therefore any understanding of what a token is, in itself, is not representationally based, but ontologically based. So the type/token distinction cannot be understood through representation alone because the token cannot be grasped. We need to apply some ontological principles. Therefore, we cannot avoid the need for the Fundamental Abstraction, as a basic ontological principle which separates the type from the token, rendering such a distinction as a valid distinction. And this necessitates a metaphysical dualism. To derive the Fundamental Abstraction we turn to our most primitive and basic intuitions such as the difference between past and future, mentioned above. And your claim that the type/token distinction is representational rather than ontological, is nothing but a fundamental abstraction itself..

The final point I'd like to make concerns your focus on the agent intellect, and neglect of the passive intellect. The difficulty that the Scholastics, like Aquinas had, was to explain the reality of the passive intellect. The agent intellect, as the creative source of imagination and conception, "the agent", was somewhat taken for granted, as actual, formal, therefore consistent with the classical notion of an immaterial intellect. The problem they had was with how to understand the passive intellect. Aristotle demonstrated the need to assume a passive aspect which could receive impressions from the senses. To be a receptor requires passivity. And under Aristotle's conceptual structure, passivity, and potential, are the defining features of matter. So one could interpret Aristotle as demonstrating that the human intellect depends on the material brain for its capacity to receive sense impressions. And Aristotle states that this is a requirement for all intellectual activity.

So Aquinas was perplexed by the problem of assuming an immaterial intellect, as agent, active and immaterial, directly united with the immaterial soul, yet still having a passive aspect, i.e having some features of potential. I believe that what Aquinas suggested is that this passive or potential aspect of the intellect ought to be understood in terms other than "matter". This is consistent with your rejection of the term "matter". What Aquinas suggested is that this potential, or passive aspect ought to be understood in relation to time rather than to matter.

I wouldn't count causality as metaphysical because I see causality as intimately tied with, indispensable to, the understanding of the physical, and I don't think we have any idea of causes which are not physical. I mean we can think the possibility of non-physical causes, but we have no grasp on what they would "look" like. — Janus

What a non-physical cause "looks" like is a freely willed act of intention (final cause as javra explains). We have lots of experience with such non-physical acts of causation, and all you have to do is look into yourself, in introspection, to "see" them. The problem is that the attitude of scientism has induced some people to enter into a condition of self-denial, refusing to recognize the basis of one's own existence as a self-moving being.

I would not count someone as having learned the history of ideas unless they understood the ideas. — Janus

Well I guess no one has learned the history of metaphysical ideas then, because no one truly understand them all yet. That's even more reason why metaphysics ought to remain in the curriculum. We need more people working on those problems.

Previously I put this down to contrariness. I now wonder if it might be vacillation or trepidation. Or simple failure to commit? — Banno

It's neither contrariness nor trepidation, it simply demonstrates the pervasiveness of the attitude of Janus, displayed above. There's no need to teach metaphysics, we ought to just let people grope in the dark when it comes to metaphysical issues. And if you add in the fact that "non-skeptical realism" is essential equivalent to "no metaphysics" you can see that the attitude of 'no need to teach metaphysics' is extremely pervasive.

If you are interested in metaphysics then learning about the history of metaphysical ideas would be a good idea. — Janus

Learning the history of ideals is a lot different than actually learning the ideas. The former is like memorizing a list of named ideas, in chronological order, the latter requires actually understanding the ideas.

However it's arguable that most people don't give a flying fuck about metaphysics, so it's not likely to be on the school curriculum any time soon. — Janus

This all depends on what school you go to. If you have an honest interest in the ideas of metaphysics, you will choose a school with a curriculum suited to your desire, as is the case in any field of study. That there is a smaller percentage of the population who are interested in metaphysics than in some other studies, and so there are less schools offering a good curriculum, is really not relevant. The trends as to what the majority of people are interested in, change with the shifting sands. But there is never a time when a good metaphysical curriculum is not available to those who want it.

The whole idea of being educated in metaphysics is absurd, because there is no settled metaphysics and never has been. — Janus

This statement is what is absurd. If there is a multitude of distinct attitudes toward metaphysics, then education in metaphysics is even more important in order that we get exposed to all the different possibilities.

Causation

Cause – an agent of change that transforms the state of being of its object

Effect – a transformation of the state of being of the object of a causal power — ucarr

Right, according to these definitions, things are as I said. The agent of change (cause) is gravity. The effect is the falling of the person.

In Example B we see that before and after retain their meanings in the absence of a causal relationship that connects them (with respect to lung cell metabolism). — ucarr

Of course, the designation of before and after is not sufficient for a judgement of causation, it is only one of a number of necessary factors. Do you understand that if X is a necessary condition for Y, the occurrence of X still does not necessitate Y?

Did you not read the reference I put up, the Bradford Hill criteria for causation? There's a list of nine criteria for causation, which he proposed, one of them is a temporal relation: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bradford_Hill_criteria
I'm not saying that this is the only, or best, list of criteria. I posted it because you did not believe that temporality was an accepted criteria for causation. Now I'm referring to it to show you that temporality is not the only criterion for causation, there are other conditions which need to be met as well. The argument which I posted is concerned with the temporal aspect of causation.

Maybe he’ll come back in the past. ;-) — Wayfarer

I think I should revisit some old posts, and see if anything has mysteriously changed. If so, I'd be seriously spooked.

Perhaps space and time are not "actually quantized in real discrete units". — jgill

This is a respectable proposition, but the problems involved in applying mathematics (Zeno's to begin with) demonstrates otherwise. Let me explain, starting with some fundamental principles:

First principle, divisibility is very real, we can physically divide things, therefore division of space or time must be real.
Second principle, if space or time is divisible, and there is nothing real which restricts or limits the divisibility, then it is infinitely divisible.
Third principle, if there is something real which restricts or limits the divisibility of space or time, then these restrictions provide the basic premise for real quantized discrete units.

What has been evident ever since the time of Zeno (and probably even before this formalization, from Pythagoras), is that the second principle (stated above) is problematic. Representing our capacity to divide things with mathematics that provide for infinite divisibility creates various irrational ratios (Pythagoras), and paradoxes (Zeno). The mathematical axioms assume a continuity which is infinitely divisible. However, it can be demonstrated in theory (Pythagoras and Zeno), that these axioms will inevitably lead to problems in application. The conclusion we can draw, or which I would say we ought to draw, is that this idea, of infinite divisibility, is just an ideal which does not truly represent the nature of reality. And this is very intuitive too, because space and time are our fundamental representations for how the world really is, and if you think about it, it doesn't make sense to think that we could keep on dividing the real world, in the very same way, into smaller and smaller bits, forever. It's just not realistic, because this would imply no real substance to the world.

This is why the ancient Greeks proposed a fundamental indivisible base, "atoms", or "matter", to provide substance for our principles of divisibility. So this brings us to the third principle, "substance" is the real thing which limits and restricts our capacity for making divisions in the real world. The conclusion therefore is that we need to understand how "substance" limits and restricts our capacity for division, and formulate our axioms of mathematics to properly represent these restrictions. Then the numbering system which we employ will properly represent the world's real capacity for division.

For example, look at the principles for dividing the octave in music, the basic principles of "scale". Distinct tones, as specific frequencies, are supposed as the substance around which the divisions are made, and the scale is produced. But no tone is absolutely clean, crisp and clear, so there are complexities, overtones, timbre, etc.. Also, the scale of tones must be created so as to be useful in combination for the production of harmony, so "the scale" is intended to relate a multitude of octaves.

Now in dividing the octave into specific tones, to produce a scale, we must also consider what happens when we multiply, because this is how harmony is created, and that is just as important to the scale as the division into tones. Therefore proper, or true division, is not a straight forward act of dividing in any way that the physical world will allow, good proper division practises must be conditioned by the reality of what may be produced through the re-combination of the parts which are divided for. We could say that this is the role of "the good" in the practise of division, or analysis, that the things produced in division are a true representation of the actual parts which went into the production of the whole, rather than a random division. Like for example, cutting with a knife slices through the cells, providing a glimpse inside, but not providing a good principle of division.

So we divide the octave into parts, and produce a scale of individual tones or frequencies. But there is a possibility for random division here, and this would not produce a good scale. So we must keep in mind what will be created from those parts, harmonies, and we must create the scale accordingly. Basing "the scale" in good principles of harmony is what produces consistency in the production of a conceptual multi-leveled spatiotemporal reality. That is the need to represent how the various parts create a harmonic whole, as the reality of substance. In other words, "substance" in its real existence, is a multi-layered harmony through the micro/macro range, so that any production of a base scale must be consistent with intermediate scales, and upper scales, in the way of harmony, so that "substance" is properly formulated.

Let’s begin with a thought-experiment: Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed — Charles Pinter

A better formulation of this thought experiment is to imagine that there never was any life in the universe, ever. It is better because imagining that all life vanishes is already providing a spatial-temporal perspective, the moment when, and place where, all life vanishes. So then we have an image, of the universe now, as we perceive it from our spatial-temporal perspective, and then the universe from that same perspective, with no life anymore.

If, instead, we assume a universe without any life ever, we assume absolutely no temporal or spatial perspective from which that universe is being observed. Therefore we have the entirety of time and space, with nothing to differentiate one billion years from another billon years, nothing to distinguish here from there, no individuation of anything at all, and it becomes very easy to grasp that it's completely nonsensical to talk about any sort of existence without implying a perspective from which that existence is observed.

Incidentally, this point can be derived very easily from relativity theory. Regardless of the supposed fact that observations from one frame of reference will always be compatible with observations from another, and that the same laws will be applicable from every frame of reference, relativity theory implies that a frame of reference is required in order for the idea of any activity in the world to make any sense at all. So first there is a frame of reference (a perspective), then there is a world according to this frame. Further, we might add worlds according to other frames. Notice "a world" is just a product of the perspective. So the perspective is logically prior to "a world". That the different "worlds" produced from the different perspectives, can be resolved into "one world" through the presupposition that they all obey the same laws is unverifiable, and highly doubtful, even though it is commonly assumed as "a law" itself. This is the law which states that the laws are universally applicable, even though we haven't the capacity to test that law. It really just a metaphysical presupposition.

The first statement means the person is causing the falling. — ucarr

No it does not. Anytime something is caused to do something by a separate force, the thing doing whatever it is caused to do is not the cause of the action. A rock is doing the falling but not causing the falling. A cannon ball, or baseball flying through the air is doing the flying, but not causing the flying. Etc..

The rest of your discussion of "doing" is therefore not relevant to how I was using "doing".

that my argument depends upon taking before and after out of their default temporal_sequential context and placing them in the ordinal context, and that doing so strips away temporal antecedence? — ucarr

Of course, but to rob a word of it's meaning is a meaningless exercise.

Sixth and eighth have different ranks, but there's no temporal relationship in ordinality, as there is in cardinality. By analogy, before and after denote different times, but as with all ordinals, there's no temporal relationship between beforth and aftereth. — ucarr

When different times are denoted one is always before the other. Otherwise they would not be different times. That is unavoidable by the nature of what "time" signifies. You are not making any sense to me at all in your latest post ucarr.

Do you not agree your attempted analogy equating red and green fails because contextualizing before and after as beforth and aftereth does not equalize them. Instead, it de-temporalizes them? Do you not see, more generally: contextualizing ≠ equalizing? — ucarr

Again, you are not making any sense. "Before" and "after" are temporally defined. Your proposal to de-temporalize them is a meaningless, useless exercise.

Okay. So, beforth and aftereth can constitute an ordinality either temporal or non-temporal. This true because ordinal specifies order by position; it says nothing about temporal order. Since non-temporal is included and temporal is not excluded, both types are valid. — ucarr

Nonsense, before and after specify temporal order which is a type of "order by position". It is not distinct from "order by position". This is the third time I've told you that now, yet you refuse to accept it and keep repeating nonsense, as if you can remove the temporal order by insisting that before and after is an order by position rather than by time. Yes, before and after is an order by position, temporal position. Give up on the meaningless nonsense, it's pointless.

Due you suppose the pursuit of usefulness always leads to truth? — ucarr

No, but truth can only come from useful concepts, those which are useful toward truth. Usefulness is necessary for truth, but does not necessarily lead to truth. Uselessness cannot lead to truth because it denies the required "useful toward truth".

Since coincidence parallels co-functionality, coincidence can sometimes example causation.

Do you agree with this? — ucarr

Definitely not, for the reasons I've already explained.

As if such a fable were more acceptable than the independent existence of trees, tables and cups of our everyday experience. — Banno

Way more acceptable!

Enough time spent with the guitar could lead to a resolution of the Fourier uncertainty.

I only mean that as n increases so does the function, with no upper bound. I don't mean it ultimately ends up at a magical point at infinity. — jgill

The problem as I understand it is if you posit the lower limit of zero, to a duration of time, this model negates as impossible, the possibility of a real quantum of time. Furthermore, in analyzing any change (force), relative to what is uniform (inertial), as we narrow down the duration of time, toward any supposed point in time, where the change begins, the magnitude of force required to produce the change approaches infinite. Time is inversely proportional to energy, so as the temporal duration assumed for the force becomes close to zero, the quantity of energy becomes close to infinite. Therefore placing a limit to time at the speed of light, inserts the infinite into calculations which relate mass to energy.

This problem was first expressed by Zeno, and though some mathematicians might claim that calculus resolved the problem with the use of limits, it just provided a practical work-around which was suitable for the practises of the time. In modern times engineers employ extremely short periods of time, so the problem naturally reappears despite the efforts of calculus. Another proposal by philosophers and mathematicians, has been to use infinitesimals. Infinitesimals allow that the apparent infinite change occurs within a non-zero duration of time (infinitesimal), but the actual change within that infinitesimal duration cannot be represented. In other words, each infinitesimal quantum of time may contain an unrepresentable change.

The problem though, is pretty much how Zeno represented it. The ideal (theoretical) representation of time and space is as continuous. However, our descriptions of how things move in real practise represent discrete units of space and time. So there is a fundamental incompatibility between how we describe our observations of things in practise, and how we explain or interpret our observations through mathematical theory. There has been some attempts to make the mathematical theory of continuity consistent with the observations of discrete units (quanta), but the proposals employed for mathematizing quanta are completely ideal, not based in any empirical principles of real discrete quanta of space or time. Until we take notice of the reality of how space and time are actually quantized in real discrete units, these attempts, such as limits and infinitesimals, will remain ideals of theory which do not adequately represent the quanta of reality.

For an analogy, consider how the ancient people modeled the orbits of the planets as eternal circular motions (perfect circles which by that perfection are eternal) which are described by Aristotle. This was the ideal which was employed, but it did not adequately represent reality. Within the practise of modeling the orbits, exceptions (retrogrades etc.) were incorporated to account for the fact that the reality was not as the ideal represented it. Until it is fully acknowledged, and recognized, that reality is not as the ideal (as indicated by the need for exceptions), people just do not get motivated to determine the real representation.

He was a Q-physicist who left the profession to play his guitar, as he explained to me. — jgill

So, why not do both? And participate here in his spare time.

Thanks Andrew, I especially like this part:

The assumption that something truly infinite exists in nature underlies every physics course I’ve ever taught at MIT — Infinity Is a Beautiful Concept – And It’s Ruining Physics - Max Tegmark

This is completely opposed to what Aristotle presumed himself to have demonstrated, that it is impossible that anything actual is infinite. The closest he gets to an actual infinite, is "eternal", and he even proposes principles which demonstrate that anything eternal must be actual. This is interesting because it places "eternal" (actual) into a different category from "infinite" (potential). The result is that the conception of "eternal" which is derived from Aristotle's principles means roughly "outside of time", because the eternal thing cannot be infinite, being actual rather than potential. However, a commonly used meaning of "eternal" is "infinite time". This is incoherent by Aristotle's principles.

Do you deny that gravity holding a person down to earth in one situation and accelerating the descent of a person in free fall in another situation exemplifies gravity doing two different things in two different situations? — ucarr

Yes I deny that, and I'm very surprised that you do not understand. It is the person who is doing two different things, walking on the earth in one case, and falling in the other, gravity is doing the same thing in both cases.

ince, when we look at integers 6 and 8 and understand there is no temporal relationship connecting them, as per the definition of ordinality, and that therefore, if we replace 6 and 8 with before and after, and if we maintain our understanding of the context to be ordinal, then claiming before and after have a temporal relationship amounts to conflating two distinct categories (contexts). — ucarr

I'm afraid not ucarr, you are being ridiculous again. Before and after have completely different meaning from six and eight. By analogy, would you say let's switch green and red, in the context of colour, and see that green is the same thing as red. Come on.

Do you deny this? — ucarr

Yes I deny that, for the reasons already given. Causation is one type of ordinality, ordinal numbers is another type. "Ordinal" is not restricted to numbers. It can mean a position in any type of series, or concerning any order. So contrary to what you say, the temporal order of cause and effect is an ordinality.

Do you acknowledge that your above affirmation raises the possibility that humans, in making the effort to understand phenomena causally, might be projecting a rational conceptualization of the mind onto the world?

Do you acknowledge such a possibility suggests the existence of evidence supporting David Hume's attack on rationality_causality? — ucarr

Yes, that's generally how conceptualization works, and why human knowledge is fallible. I respect Hume's attack on causality and recognize the fallibility of human knowledge. As I said, you can define "causation" however you want. But obviously some ways are more useful than others, and if you deny temporality from the definition I think you end up with a useless form of "causality".

Might this be a motivation for projecting artificial temporal antecedence onto observed phenomena? — ucarr

The motivation is usefulness. And, since assigning temporal antecedence to the cause proves to be a very useful principle, and denying temporal antecedence would produce a useless conception, the choice is an obvious one.

In our examination of this bacterial infection, it should be noted no symptoms appear before the bacterial content is high-volume. This time lag, known as the incubation period, holds standard to medical diagnosis and treatment of sickness.

Since they don't appear during the incubation period, can we claim bacterial infection before high-volume is an antecedent cause of symptoms? — ucarr

Sorry, I don't follow the question. I think your example is too complex, too many factors involved which need to be considered, which are not stated in the example.

Do you think there is any thing in the account you quote at length that is at odds with the account of realism I just gave? — Banno

Try this:

Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves, and the objects of our perception, to exist, is in reality dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness many of which are below the threshhold of conscious awareness.

as opposed to this:

It holds first off that there are things in the world, and secondly that these things have at least some properties that are not dependent on us. — Banno

Notice in Wayfarer's passage "dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness", and your quote "not dependent on us". That is an ontological difference in how we understand "things".

but this is not idealism in its strictest sense, insofar as external material reality is tacitly granted as a necessary condition. — Mww

Idealism, even in its strict sense grants external reality, or else it would be reducible to solipsism. What a strict idealist (like Berkeley) would deny is that external reality is properly characterized as "material", insisting that it would be better characterized as "formal", or "ideal". This is why Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason proposes an idealism, by assigning to the proposed independent noumena the classification of "intelligible objects" rather than matter.

What happens to the various idealisms, how people get lost within, and cannot find their way because idealisms begin to look incoherent, is that it is necessary to posit something as a medium which separates the ideas of one mind from the ideas of another, or the intelligible objects of my mind from the intelligible objects of the external world. The simple solution is to posit something like matter as the medium of separation. But this results in dualism. It is this complexity of dualism, which idealism necessitates as a result of the separation between my ideas and other ideas, which deters people from idealism. Reality is just too difficult, complex, so they do not go down that road where idealism leads to dualism.

Yes, that's right. Here's the paper for anyone else interested. — Andrew M

There was a member here, active a couple years ago, I can't remember the name, but a self-proclaimed physicist who was big on this time reversal stuff. I think the fact that processes at the quantum level might be understood as reversible is simply a reflection of a fundamental misrepresentation of mass.

Cantor's proof (by contradiction) shows that the set of real numbers is uncountable and thus can't be enumerated. Since the set of real numbers can't be enumerated, the diagonalized number therefore can't be computed. A similar point is made by Carl Mummert (a professor of computing and mathematics) on Mathematics Stack Exchange. — Andrew M

What do you think this means, to assume numbers which cannot be counted nor computed? To me it's a form of unintelligibility, to say that there are numbers which cannot be accessed by us, or used in any way. Supposing that such a conclusion would be a logical consequence of the axioms assumed, then why would we assume axioms which produce the conclusion that there are numbers which cannot be accessed by us? As real numbers, being implied by our mathematical axioms, this would indicate that there are aspects of reality which we cannot access, grasp. apprehend, or understand in any way, which correspond with these numbers which cannot be accessed.

Since axioms are produced by mathematicians who practise pure mathematics, and those people who apply mathematics have a choice as to which axioms are used, it would appear like we ought not use axioms like these, which necessitate that aspects of reality will be unintelligible to us. Instead, we ought to look for axioms which would render all of reality as intelligible.

Do you see a difference between being held to the ground by gravity and accelerating-due-to-gravity to the ground while free-falling through space? — ucarr

With respect to what the gravity is doing in the two scenarios, there is no difference. In other words, the cause is the same in the two, but the effect is different due to the same type of cause acting in different situations.

Okay. So, you think cause and effect -- even when contextualized by ordinality instead of by temporal antecedence -- only has coherence when cause is prior in time to effect? — ucarr

I don't see how you are understanding your categories. Cause/effect is a type of ordinality, but this does not mean that all ordinalities are causal. Cause and effect are contextualized by ordinality, but the ordinality in this case is defined as a temporal ordinality. That eight is a greater quantity than six is a different type of ordinality, which does not imply temporality. But causation is a different type of ordinality from quantity because the terms of that specific form of ordinality are defined by temporality, before and after, rather than by quantity.

Okay. So, you think cause and effect – even when manifesting simultaneously – must always be understood in terms of temporal antecedence in order to have coherence? — ucarr

Yes. if cause and effect manifested simultaneously we would not be able to distinguish which is the cause, and which is the effect because the temporal relationship of cause/effect, by which we would determine one is the cause, and the other the effect would not exist.

So in your example of bacterial infection.. The symptoms are the body's (immune system's) reaction to a high volume of bacteria. The high volume of bacteria is observed to be temporally prior to the reaction (symptoms) therefore affirmed to be the cause. If the two suddenly occurred in a truly simultaneous way, we could not say that one caused the other, the occurrences would be said to be coincidental. And if we try to assign cause and effect to two coincidental occurrences we have no way of knowing which is the cause and which is the effect.

I think of a blue cube in my mind, even if this comes from sense impressions earlier, what does it mean to be "in my mind"? — schopenhauer1

Right, what does it mean for something to be in the mind? It makes sense to say it, and everyone understands when it is said, but no one really seems to know what it means.

I think truth is elusive to humans and generally avoid people who think they possess it. — Tom Storm

You'd better avoid me then, because I, as the antagonist of Socrates, happen to know everything.

Not at all. I know many rich socialists. It's a thing - we even have the expression Bollinger Socialism.

What matters is what people do not the theories they claim to believe. Don't you think? — Tom Storm

That's what I said early, there's a lot of hypocrisy involved when people classify themselves. It's better to judge by a person's actions rather than what they claim to be. So I said, despite no one confessing to be idealist, I've seen a lot of closet idealism in this forum. That is generally attributable to the fact that idealist premises produce the best arguments but idealism is associated with religion, which is frowned upon. So people tend to argue from idealist world views, and idealist premises, all the while insisting that they are not idealist. I think perhaps we can blame Wittgenstein for setting this example.