I would think that a theory such as morphic resonance would require some sort of hierarchy of fields. Massive particles, protons, and neutrons for example, by the law of inertia, have a lot stronger 'staying power', for temporal continuity of existence, than a particle with very little mass like an electron, or a photon with no mass. Therefore the massive particle should have a substantially stronger resonance, with its specific vibration much more deeply ingrained into its own being, as well as into the fiber of the universe. This would be required to support the continued unity of that massive particle in its temporal extension. I believe that in quantum physics what supports the temporal extension of a massive particle is called the strong interactive force. It is an unusual force because it cannot be observed to be limited by distance.

Kripke's proposition that "identity statements are necessary" is true
1) Objects are observed in the sky. By observation, as "Phosphorus" has a diameter of 12,103km, and as "Hesperus" has a diameter of 12,103km, "Phosphorus" is identical in diameter to "Hesperus". Therefore, the identity statement "Phosphorus is identical in diameter to Hesperus" is true. — RussellA

This is a similar issue which I went over with Banno already, concerning Kripke's premise that if the table is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice. That premise is a priori. And in your example, we need a similar a priori principle which states that one measurement of 12,103km is necessarily the same as another measurement of 12,103km. Kripke easily sidesteps this issue by implying that we can simply assume that 12,103km has the same meaning in each instance.

But this is not how meaning is in reality, each particular instance of usage has peculiarities unique to that context of usage. So in your example, the measurements might have been done in different ways for example, under different circumstances. These features, peculiarities which are unique to the particular circumstances, are known as accidentals. Therefore we remove, ignore, or make exceptions for the accidentals, and when two measurements are the same with respect to the apprehended essentials, we might say that the measurements are the same.

Of course two distinct measurements, even of the same object are never truly identical. Each act of measurement is unique, due to the difference in circumstances. Therefore we need to rely on an a priori principle to say that one measurement of 12,103km is the same as another measurement of 12,103km. Consequently, we compromise and say that the two measurements are "equal". And "equal" becomes a compromised sense of "the same", as it ignores the accidentals and applies only to what is determined as essential, depending on the purpose.

That which is willed — bert1

This is "good" as a noun, "the good", the thing desired, or the objective. Taking "good" from being an adjective, or even adverb, and making it a noun, as you've done here, is what makes "good" intelligible.

Scientific American has an article about the resonance theory of consciousness which came up in my search, titled "The Hippies Were Right: It's All about Vibrations, Man!

That objects placed near each other tend to synchronize their vibrations is a well known scientific fact, observed with pendulums for hundreds of years. The following article references a number of relatively recent experiments and describes the discovery of what is called "chimera states":
https://www.quantamagazine.org/physicists-discover-exotic-patterns-of-synchronization-20190404/

Would you agree that how Kripke should have defined "rigid designator" is as the same subject (logical subject) in all possible worlds? So we could say X is a rigid designator, and X is the same subject in all possible worlds.

This puts X into the realm of possibility, and leaves X as possibly referring to an object, and possible not. This is where X needs to be if it is going to be the same in every possible world. That puts the judgement as to whether X corresponds to an actual object, and the important judgement as to which possible world corresponds with a presumed actual world, into a completely different category, i.e. a completely different type of judgement.

Under Kripke's plan, whereby X, as a rigid designator, represents the same object in every possible world, we have no real principles whereby we can separate the correct possible world (the one which best corresponds with the real world), and all the other possible worlds, because the real (actual) object is designated as within the possibility. This is because he does not allow for a separate real object, which we might compare the possible worlds to. The object is always as it is described in its possible world, but at the same time, the same object is in all possible worlds. This leaves no room for the real object, in a real separate world because the real object is designated as being within all possible worlds.

Those premises result in a dichotomy of Platonic realism, and anti-realism. It gives us the choice of those two ontologies. Either the real object is the very same thing as the logical subject (Platonism), having real existence in all possible worlds, or else we deny the reality of Kripke's "object", and say that the rigid designator does not reference a real object, only a possible object, but then we are left with anti-realism.

In other words, Kripke hands us the metaphorical "have you quit beating your wife?". If we affirm his premises, and accept the "object" indicated by the rigid designator, we are plunged necessarily into Platonism. If we deny the premise, saying that this is not a true object, we proceed into anti-realism, because there are no principles provided for any real object, and we are denying the reality Kripke's proposed "object". Therefore the correct response is to reject his premises altogether, as some sort of trickery, or at best, as simply incoherent.

A quick search tells me that one of the recurring themes in the various vibration theories, is that things such as living beings somehow adjust their vibrational field to maintain harmony with their environment.

This field of study (pun intended) is very problematic. Physicists understand the transmission of energy in electromagnetic fields as waves. They also know that a wave is the movement of a substance. This produced the idea that there was an aether, as a medium, within which the electromagnetic waves are active.

The current attitude in the scientific community is to deny the reality of the medium, and produce models, or representations of the wave action which do not include the medium, space-time being a separate somewhat static background. This renders the true nature of the wave action which is involved here impossible to understand. You can see that a true understanding would require that either we stop representing electromagnetic energy as a wave action, or else we include within the representations, the substance (aether) which is active. Of course the former is unrealistic, and that leaves us with the task of trying to determine the true nature of medium which is the substance within which, those waves exist. Denying the reality of this substance, and continuing with the current enterprise of faulty models is not the answer.

I'm interested in any sources for these kinds of ideas — Wayfarer

There is a large volume of speculative information on the web, which begins from the assumption that all physical existence is vibrations of the underlying medium (the medium here being roughly equivalent to what scientists call space-time). That the entire Cosmos is a collection of vibrations is a very ancient idea, extending back through the Pythagoreans and beyond. You'll find it very evident in Plato, The Phaedo for example, where the idea that the soul is a harmony which creates the unity of the material body is discussed. If you start searching through "vibration" theories on the web, it's a very daunting task to separate the tidbits of valuable information from the masses of propaganda, as is the case with much religious material.

Perhaps you might prepare yourself by listening to one of the greatest pop songs ever written: "Good Vibrations"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=apBWI6xrbLY

Temperature is a physical phenomena; in a gas it's directly related to the RMS average velocity of the molecules involved (contra ↪Metaphysician Undercover ). — Banno

Not contra MU, you mean exactly as I said. We "relate numbers to the physical world", and come up with what you say here, "average velocity". Temperature is a measurement, the result of applying a scale, it is not the thing measured.

What I asked is how you support your claim that the value of 100℃ is fixed to something called "the temperature", without invoking Platonism. That we move on, from fixing "100℃" to the boiling point of water, to fixing it to some other physical activity like the average velocity of molecules in some substance, does not support your claim that 100℃ is fixed to "the temperature".

So yes, it is necessarily the case that temperature equates to molecular kinetic energy. — Banno

So you continue with a misrepresentation, in the attempt to reify "temperature". Temperature is the number assigned, based on a scale of measurement, it is not the activity itself, which is more properly called heat. So we cannot say that one is equivalent to the other. That would be a category error, like saying two chairs are equivalent to the number two.

Molecular motion is an example of heat, as is infrared radiation, but neither can be said to be equivalent to temperature, because the temperature scale must be capable of measuring all forms of heat. The temperature of something is a number produced by measurement, the application of a scale. And "temperature" in general may refer to that scale, but it does not refer to the property which is measured, heat and lack of it (cold).

This is a good place for the analogy of the map and the terrain. When we take the temperature of something and say that it has a temperature of 100℃, it might be the activity of molecules which is being measured, but the temperature,100℃, is the measurement. One is the terrain, the other the representation (map). To interpret the representation "100℃" we must refer to some rules, just like we have to refer to the legend when interpreting the map.

Thanks Banno, but that doesn't really solve the problems.

The way I see it, Kripke has no respect for the difference between a logical subject and a physical object. The former can exist in many possible worlds, the latter, by the law of identity cannot. So a rigid designator (designating the same thing in every possible world) could refer to a logical subject, but it cannot refer to a physical object. Treating the logical subject as if it were an object is Platonism. And once Platonist principles are employed, failing to distinguish between the material object and the immaterial object results in ontological confusion, as well as a compromised epistemology.

I think Aristotle says something on this issue in The Physics, after a discussion of the four common senses of "cause". He asks whether chance and luck ought to also be considered causes. I think what he determined was that chance on its own cannot be considered a cause. But when chance occurrences are taken in relation to final cause, the result may be fortune (luck). So in relation to final cause, chance has an effect therefore it must be in some sense causal. For example, a man goes to the market and by chance meets someone who owes him a debt, and he collects the debt. Chance is a cause of his good fortune.

From this we can infer that if we consider "luck" to be something real, then it must have a real cause, and this is "chance".

Well, that made me laugh. — Banno

Maybe it's off topic for this thread, but how would you say that "100℃" refers to a thing called "the temperature" if not by invoking Platonism?

A description may be used to pick out some individual in order to give it a name. But thereafter, the name can be, and Kripke claims, is, used to pick out that individual without using the description. — Banno

In your interpretation of Kripke does the thing referred to with "100℃" qualify as an individual? If not, then how does "100℃" become a rigid designator for you, naming the very same thing in all possible worlds?

The problem obviously, is that "100℃" is a description, and only by Platonist ontology does this descriptive term refer to an object. Likewise, only by Platonist ontology can we say that the descriptive term "2" refers to a thing called a number.

We go past the boiling of the water and fix 100℃ to the temperature. — Banno

This is where Platonic idealism misleads us into nonsense. Temperature scales relate numbers to the physical world. That there are numerous different temperature scales based in different principles for making such a relationship demonstrates that this is the case. The idea that we "fix 100℃ to the temperature" implies that there is something independent from the scale and its relationship to the physical world, an independent "ideal" called "the temperature", which "100℃" actually refers to.

Clearly this is false because there is nothing independent of physical things designated to be 100℃ that we could point at and say this is what "100℃" refers to. So to say that there is a thing called "a temperature" which "100℃" refers to is just a creative fiction, produced to facilitate communication.

This is the reason why Platonic idealism misleads us so easily, because it is so effective at facilitating communication. For example, instead of having to demonstrate what the numeral "2" means in each instance of usage, we assume an independent ideal, "a number" as a named thing which that numeral refers to, and this makes the use of "2" much easier.

The assumption of real ideals, as real objects which exist independently of the context of actual usage of the symbols, presents an ontological problem. This problem truly exposes itself when we try to determine what type of existence these supposedly named things, ideals, actually have. That problem was well demonstrated by Plato.

If we set "100℃" as another term for "the boiling point of water", if they equal the very same thing in the way 2+2 equals 4, then in any possible world, the boiling point of water would be 100℃. And since that's our definition, then Mww would be correct that the boiling point of water is, a priori, that is, from the nature of the very terms used, 100℃. — Banno

So, this issue is not as simple as you make it out to be. As discussed in another thread, the boiling point of water is equally a function of pressure, as it is temperature. Therefore we cannot correctly claim that "in any possible world, the boiling point of water would be 100℃". This mode of speaking is just facilitated by your Platonic idealism, which assumes an independent object called "the temperature". This makes temperature an object rather than a property, which is a category mistake.

Then we still have the further ontological mistake made by Kripke, which is the proposition that an object designated by a "rigid designator" could be the same object in a multitude of possible worlds, despite having different properties. Kripke's work is just riddled with ontological mistakes, one after the other, and it is highly questionable as to what his intent actually was..

It isn't. It is invalid, so it can't be a priori. If it is true, it is true a posteriori, as Kripke uses it. — Banno

It is an a priori principle called "the law of identity". The law of identity implies that a thing is necessarily what it is, and not something else. It is used by Kripke in the first premise "If the table is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice". That is an a priori principle. Whether it is true, false, valid, or invalid, is not what is at issue. What is relevant is that it is an a priori principle necessary for the conclusion produced "It is necessary that the table not be made of ice".

Notice he states "and this conclusion is known a posteriori, since one of the premises on which it is based is a posteriori". That mentioned a posteriori premise is what is derived from empirical investigation. It is stated as "The table is not made of ice". The other required premise, "if the table is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice", is a priori.

Therefore his claim, "this conclusion is known a posteriori" is not justified by his argument.

It seems to me that the use of the word necessary is redundant between objects, in that what does "if two objects have all the same properties, they are in fact necessarily one and the same" add to "if two objects have all the same properties, they are in fact one and the same"

Necessity between an object and its properties - between a lectern and its property wood
As regards the lectern, necessity is being used between an object and its properties, where he writes "So we have to say that though we cannot know a priori whether this table was made of ice or not, given that it is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice. — RussellA

Read my last two posts. That the lectern is made of wood, and not made of ice is given empirically. But the empirical observations do not provide the necessity required to say that it is necessary that the lectern is made of wood and not of ice. The necessity is derived from the a priori law of identity, which implies that it is necessary that a thing is what it is, and not something else.

So, the fact that the lectern is made of wood, and not made of ice, is supported by the empirical observations. But empirical observations do not make it necessary that the lectern is made of wood and not ice. The necessity, (that it is necessary that the lectern is wooden and not made of ice), is derived from the a priori law of identity, which states that a thing cannot be other than it is.

P⊃□PP⊃◻P

is invalid. It is certainly not a priori.

It seems you have not understood the argument, the whole point of which is that P⊃☐P in the case of the lectern is known a posteriori. — Banno

Like I explained, there are two premises stated by Kripke, #1 "given that it is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice", and #2, through "empirical investigation" we know it is not made of ice. From these two premises he makes his conclusion that it is known a posteriori "that it is necessary that the table not be made of ice". Premise #1 is a priori, and premise #2 is "given" through empirical observation, therefore a posterior.

#1 is stated as a premise, not as a conclusion, so whether or not it is valid is not in question. We might investigate its soundness though. It is derived from the law of identity, that a thing is what it is, and cannot not be what it is. It is an a priori principle based in intuition, and it is not meant to be a valid conclusion From this Kripke derives the necessity required for the first premise "given that it is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice".

And from that necessity stated in that first premise, the a priori premise, he derives the necessity of the conclusion ""that it is necessary that the table not be made of ice". His mistake is that he characterizes this as an a posteriori principle, when the necessity stated in the conclusion is derived from the a priori premise, rather than from the a posteriori premise.

It's clear from the examples given that statements of the form x=y can be discovered empirically, and hence at least some are not discovered a priori. — Banno

This is incorrect, and is the result of Kripke's mistaken conclusion that the "necessity" of identity is a posteriori. That's wrong, as described above. The necessity of such statements is derived from the law of identity, that a thing is necessarily the same as itself, and cannot be other than itself, which is a priori, and not discovered empirically. Premise #2 above, that the thing is what it is named to be (wood and not ice), is a posteriori. But there is no necessity in that premise. Therefore the necessity of statements like "x=y" cannot be accounted for by empirical discovery. Empirical discovery does not provide the required necessity, which is only provided by the a priori principle of identity.

That this table is not made of ice is known a posteriori - by examining the table. Yet that this table is not made of ice is a necessary fact about this table - if it were made of ice, it would not be this table.

We cannot know a priori if the table is made of ice or of wood. But given that it is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice. — Banno

The first premise expressed at 180 ("given that it is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice") is a priori. It is directly derived from the law of identity, and a priori principles of "being" as described by Aristotle. When a thing comes into being, it is necessarily the thing which it is, rather than something else, as indicated by the law of identity. This a priori principle, along with the (empirically) given fact that a thing displays an order, is what leads us to conclude that the Form of the object necessarily preexists the material object.

The second premise, which supports the asserted "given", that the table is not made of ice, is a posteriori. The "given" that the table is not made of ice, is provided by empirical observation, therefore a posteriori.

The mistake which Kripke makes is to attribute to the conclusion the character of only one of the premises. One premise is a priori and the other is a posteriori, but he says the conclusion "it is necessary that the table not be made of ice", is a posteriori. Since the conclusion is stated as a necessity ("it is necessary that...") we must enquiry as to what validates this claim of necessity.

Kripke's conclusion is a mistake, because the necessity of the conclusion "it is necessary that..." is derived from the first premise which is a priori, "given that the table is not made of ice it is necessarily not made of ice". It is only the "given" aspect which is a posteriori, and the "given" is not at all necessary, and cannot provide the necessity required for the conclusion.. So it is very clear that the conclusion "it is necessary that..." is a priori, because the "given", or what is taken for granted (which is the a posteriori aspect of the argument), could be replaced with absolutely anything, Any possibility whatsoever, provided by empirical observation could replace "not made of ice", and the necessity of the conclusion would not be altered. We could still conclude "it is necessary that... (with the replacement empirical fact). Kripke simply employs smoke and mirrors sophistry, to make it appear like the conclusion "it is necessary that..." might be a posteriori.

What's an identity statement? — frank

As used in that post, any statement which claims to reference the identity of an object. Our only access to an object's identity is through the object itself, so we reference the object itself, and we might do this with a name. If we claim to reference the object's identity, and then proceed to make statements about the object's identity as if it were something separate from the object, we enter the fantasy world of sophistry. There really is no such thing, so if we insist that there is, it could be absolutely anything, so sophistry runs amuck.

Here's an example of such a sophistic reference intended to create an independent, or separate identity:

The suposition here is that an identity that we discover cannot be a necessary identity, and so there must be something amiss with the derivation (1-4). — Banno

See what happens? At the first attempt to create such an independent identity, immediately it is evident that something is "amiss". That's because the thing itself with its true identity is understood as independent, so it appears like it's identity must be "discovered", but whenever we try to talk about a separate identity, this must be something created by us.

If we allow the "discovered" identity, we allow Platonism, as separate, independent Forms which are discovered. If we allow a created identity, then we reject the true identity within the thing, as inconsistent with the created identity, and we have a type of anti-realism. The only solution is to deny a separate identity altogether, to establish a ground free from such sophistry.

Realizing that the logical proofs for the existence of God fail isn't bigotry. It's just true.

I saw them as a helpful way to learn the basic structure of syllogisms and to locate errors within them during my introductory philosophy classes, but if you walked away from that thinking God had been proven (or disproven) by the sheer force of logic alone, I think you missed something. — Hanover

The real issue is where exactly does the failure lie. Is the failure in the deductive logic, or in the induction? So, the cosmological argument for example, all material things have a cause, a cause is prior in time to the effect, therefore the first material thing has a prior cause which cannot be a material thing, and this we call "God".

The only real failure here is in the inductive premises concerning the causation of material objects. But when inductive premises are seen to be deprived of certainty in this way, it casts doubt on all scientific knowledge.

Solution: place this thread into a blocked category and quickly forget about it.

So it's very clear now, each mathematician lives in one's own private multiverse.

If your identity is a description or definition, then it makes no sense to say you could have become a plumber. — frank

By the law of identity, a thing's identity is the thing itself. To say that a thing's identity is a description, definition, or even a name, is to make the category mistake of saying that the thing's identity is what someone says about the thing, rather than the thing itself. The name of a thing is a representation of the thing's identity, not its identity.

If you allow this category mistake into your thinking, then you allow for all sorts of sophistry to invade your mind, such as the questions about Hesperus and Phosphorus, and the ship of Theseus. Instead, we ought to be content in knowing that we simply cannot make any true identity statements, and that's just a basic feature of human knowledge.

Good advise. So you'll always find me where they want me to be. But the happy thoughts...?

How can an object such as an apple, having a self-identity, have infinite possibilities ? — RussellA

The identity is within the object itself (as the law of identity states, it is the same as itself). The object's identity appears to any one of us as infinite possibilities because I can name it whatever I want.

“For every property F…..” F can be any property, such that if F belongs to x, and if x is identical to y then it is necessary that F belong to y. If F is the property of being round, and if x is round and y is identical to x, then y is round. That’s fine, in that x is, e.g., a round cue ball and y is, e.g., an identically round baseball. Which is also fine, insofar as the conditional is “for any two objects”, satisfied by one cue ball and one baseball.

It remains that a cue ball is not a baseball. But if x is to stand as identical to y, one of every property F is obviously not sufficient to cause x to be identical to y because of F. So keep adding F’s to x, maybe hundreds of F’s, such that when those properties also belong to y, they become closer and closer to both x and y being either a cue ball or a baseball. Still satisfies “for any two objects”, as well as for any property F which belongs to x also belongs to y.

The kicker: “For every property F….”, in order for the cue ball x and the baseball y to be identical, every property F must belong to both equally. It follows that in order for x to be identical to y, a space F belonging to x is the same space F belonging to y, and x and y simultaneously be commonly imbued with every other possible F equally. But two objects sharing the same space F is a contradiction, which negates the case. It must be, then, that they occupy different space F’s but still be commonly imbued with every other F equally. How does that happen, you ask….surely with bated breath. Well…..the space of x in one world, and the space of y in another world. What else????? — Mww

Well, this does little for me. I'd rather stick to the Leibniz principle, and hold the belief that if any true statement made about x is also true about y, they are really one and the same thing. Then it's a mistake to talk about what "x" and what "y" refer to as if it were two different things, because it's really one and the same thing. To say that they each exist in a different space in a different world doesn't do it for me, because that is actually saying something different about each of them.

Hence contingent identity, contingent on the possibility of other worlds. Under the assumption of another merely possible world, however, such world can only have possible space, from which follows only a possible y can have the property of possible space, or, more correctly, only a possible y can occupy a possible space possibly, which reduces to a real x being identical to a possible y, which is not the original argument. In effect, then, in order to assume x = y identity necessarily, mandates a veritable maze of contingent possibilities.

And that’s a category mistake. Dunno if it’s yours or not, but it works, doesn’t it? The article goes on to circumvent these mistakes, re: “let us use necessity weakly”, or actually, to deny them altogether, re: “I will not go into this particular form of subtlety** here because it isn’t relevant”, in order to justify the notions contained further on in it. — Mww

Yes, I'd say that's a good description of the category mistake involved, it annihilates the separation between possible and actual. It's actually a very similar error to one which is common in mathematical axioms, especially ones which deal with infinity. You'll see for instance that a "countable set" is one which can be counted using the natural numbers. But the natural numbers are not actually countable, being infinite. So they take the true defining feature of the natural numbers (impossible to count, by definition of "infinite"), and replace it with a different defining feature (logically possible to count), and come up with "countable".

But still, if a theory starts out illogically, and if the circumventions are not all that valid, wouldn’t it jeopardize the whole? Kripke is just saying, if it was this way, we could say this about it. But if it couldn’t be this way, why still talk as if it could? He goes on to talk about it in a different way, that’s all.
(** existence as a predicate, reflecting on existence in possible worlds) — Mww

That is the weird and wonderful reality of the world we live in. We still go on to talk about it simply because it is possible to talk about it. Ultimately, this ought to become the central point, the reality that It is possible to say things which are completely untrue, and still have people make a very good understanding of what you have said.

So, what are they actually understanding in this situation, we might ask. When someone has a very clear and accurate understanding of something which is false, we can't say it's a misunderstanding, because they actually do understand. What is it that is understood then? What is the subject matter of falsity? Is it "possibility"? In a way, it must be, because the only way to give reality to possibility is to annihilate the reality of truth, and that seems to leave us with falsity. The only remedy, if we desire to push forward in this vein of understanding nothing (which can't be called misunderstanding) is to equally annihilate falsity, leaving us with something like a model-dependent realism. But this means we must completely deny identity, so it requires an ontology similar to dialectical materialism.

For example I could identify as a Police Officer. Is that problematic? Does it entail I should have to do some police work? Am I undermining the police force? — Andrew4Handel

I identify as the greatest metaphysician of all time. It is problematic for me, because I need to keep this fact undercover so that I do not end up like Socrates. So I intentionally hide my true identity from others, and present myself as an idiot.

Someone might be deceiving one's self however in self presentation. We can deceive ourselves and hence portray a false image of ourselves not reflecting some facts about us. — Andrew4Handel

Considering what I wrote above, where does my deception lie? Am I deceiving others in not portraying my true self? Am I deceiving myself by portraying a false image which others can see through, seeing the true me? Or am I deceiving myself by thinking that I am something other than what others see me as?

Kripke didn't want to unite contingent with identity, he wanted to unite necessity with identity. — RussellA

That might be a better way of putting it, but it really means the same thing due to the way that "contingent" is being used. The contingent statement is really just a special type of necessary statement, as a proper separation between the two is not provided. This is just a category error, but it is intended as the means to bridge the gap between identity and logical necessity.

The two of course are fundamentally incompatible, as identity is within the thing itself, while logical necessity is within the human mind. Therefore identity will always present itself as infinite possibility, hence fundamentally incompatible with logical necessity which is a limitation of possibility. That's why it's an exercise in sophistry.

When I enjoy content I tend to value it more, regardless of its actual merit. — Tom Storm

That, I would say, is the subjective nature of "value". It appears tp me like we are always seeking to objectify our systems for evaluation, but we can never completely rid ourselves of that subjective aspect.

Best I can do is tell if something is riffing off fallacies and banalities. And I am more likely to value a contribution if I can understand the position being articulated on account of clear English and coherent conceptual framing. — Tom Storm

I can see why being able to understand what is written would be a primary concern when judging for quality, but wouldn't this be more like a prerequisite thing? Not being able to understand the material would exclude it from the category of being judgeable (as to quality), and clear understanding would mean it's easily judgeable. So this would be a type of preliminary judgement, judging the judgeability.

Fair. Do you have such a criteria or can you imagine one? — Tom Storm

I'm considering this question right now. I never really thought about judging the content on TPF before, maybe this is a subject which has come up because of the short story competitions where members are asked to judge pieces of work. I am not naturally inclined toward making such judgements. To me, this is like judging the quality of individual people. Who is a higher quality person than another? We are all different in unique ways, having a mix of good characteristics and bad. Judgement of the overall quality of the person would require a formula for summing up the good and bad. And some characteristics would have to be weighted as more important than others. That's a very difficult subject.

Sorry, but it's entirely legitimate to ascribe the predicate of existence of Mary in a possible world. Why is there so much confusion about counterpart theory or possible world semantics? — Shawn

The point I was making, is that in this situation, the predicate "exists", is predicated as a possibility, therefore a possible predication, as is the case in "possible world" language use. "Mary", as the subject, on the other hand, must be given a place in relation to the possible predication. "Mary" does not signify a part of the possibility, the predication is the logical possibility. We can say that "Mary" represents an individual, but we still cannot assign "existence" to this individual without justification, as is the case with all such logical subjects. That it is logically possible that the individual represented by "Mary" does not exist demonstrates that we cannot assign existence to that proposed individual without justification. Only when "Mary" is shown to refer to a real physical individual (substance), can we say that Mary exists.

Otherwise "Mary" just signifies an individual in the general sense, in abstraction. And when "Mary" signifies an individual in the general sense, the logical possibility that Mary exists, takes on a completely different meaning. When "Mary" is not assigned to any specific individual, then the logical possibility of Mary's existence just means that it is possible that there is an existing person named Mary.

Kripke wants to unite the contingent with identity... — Mww

That's what I would call a category mistake.

Sure, the first time they hear the phrase "there is a possible world such that blah-blah-blah". Then someone explains it to them, and they're all good. The only problem here is your stubborn insistence that people can't or shouldn't use terms in a way you don't like or agree with. But that's a problem on your end: possible-world semantics works, it is a useful tool, and so logicians and philosophers are going to continue to use it. If you don't like it, you're free to not participate. — busycuttingcrap

Again, you're failing to grasp the issue. The separation between the logical subject and the physical object provides the force for Aristotle's refutation of Pythagorean idealism, commonly known as Platonism. So the fact that logical subjects are not individuals, or particulars, is the premise whereby the illusions of Platonist fantasies can be dispelled.

Take the proposition of the op for example. "We are math". If the "we" of this statement refers to a multitude of physical individuals (conventional usage), then the answer to the question of the op is no, because there is a separation of category between these physical objects referred to with "we", and the logical subjects of mathematics. To say "we are math", when "we" is understood in this conventional way would be a category mistake. But if "we" is understood as a logical subject instead of a collection of particulars, then there is no such category mistake, and Platonism is allowed to flourish. Then there is nothing to prevent "we are math" from being a true proposition.

Of course, it ought to be obvious to you, that "we" is not a proper logical subject, it is vague, ambiguous, and not well defined. So the latter use of "we" ought not be allowed into any logical proceeding because of the ambiguity it brings with it. And this is exactly the problem with your and Banno's use of "individual". You insist on allowing an individual to be a logical subject (above mentioned category mistake), thereby introducing this ambiguous, ill-defined, form of logical subject into your logical proceedings, 'the individual'. I've argued against this practise in many threads on mathematics, where the ill-defined logical subject which is claimed to be a particular entity is called a mathematical object. But this is just a well-known category mistake, which was thoroughly exposed by Aristotle in his efforts to disclose the pervasiveness of sophistry in his time.

So I agree completely with you in your assessment of "your stubborn insistence that people can't or shouldn't use terms in a way you don't like or agree with". But I disagree with your characterization of this being a "problem", in this particular instance. My stubbornness and insistence is well justified and supported by the fact that what you and Banno propose constitutes a well-known category mistake. And this type of behavour, of insisting on allowing such ambiguity into your descriptions of logical possibilities, displayed by you and Banno, has been well documented as the basis for logical sophistry. So my insistence is warranted as well. Therefore my insistence that you use terms in a way consistent with good philosophical practise is not a "problem" at all, but has already been well demonstrated to be the solution to a problem, while your practise is the problem.

In the expression "an individual exists in a possible world", the word "exist" is being used metaphorically, not literally, in the same way that it is being used metaphorically in the sentence "I existed on my desire for vengeance". The problem with a metaphorical language is that meaning depends on context and if the context is vague then the meaning is vague. — RussellA

RusselA, we know that metaphor has its uses. But creating ambiguity in terms which already are well-defined in philosophy, for the purpose of sophistry, is clearly not a good use. That is very poor epistemology.

The problem is, that if we said "an individual exists in our actual world", are we still using "exists" metaphorically or literally ?

And then again, where does this "actual world" exist. I think it exists in the mind, though others would disagree. But even "the mind" is a metaphor.

IE, an individual exists in a possible world metaphorically, a possible world is a metaphor, exists in our actual world is being used either metaphorically or literally, and our actual world exists either metaphorically in our minds or literally as mind-independent. — RussellA

Metaphors do not provide good premises for logical proceedings. That is why we separate out ill-defined things like "particulars", "individuals", "objects", and speculate metaphysically about the existence of these things, rather than allowing them into our logical premises. When we allow ambiguity into the premises, soundness suffers.

I think it's you who needs to read more carefully, I asked "why" do you feel that this personal preference of yours constitutes a higher quality? I didn't ask why it is your personal preference. Generally we distinguish between things which we like due to personal preference, and things which we like due to higher quality. Personal preference does not equate with higher quality for most of us.

I generally associate high quality with pellucid English sentences that state things elegantly and simply. — Tom Storm

So this is a specific type of form which you believe to be of a higher quality than others. Can I ask why you believe that this type of writing, rather than some other type like Platonic dialectics for example, or other types of less pellucid language used by modern philosophers, would constitute higher quality philosophy?

If we stipulate that we're using phrases like "there is a possible world such that X" to mean "X is logically possible", then that's what we mean when we use those phrases- if you don't like it, too bad. — busycuttingcrap

It seems you misunderstand the situation. I have no problem with you using the modal language mentioned here. Sure, "there is a possible world..." means ... is logically possible. That's obvious, and not an issue.

The problem is when people like you and Banno, also Kripke, use ontological language to talk about how an individual "exists" and the "existence" of an individual within your modal logic. This is what creates confusion for people. Aristotle set this separation years ago, to combat sophism. The individual exists as primary substance, and is therefore separated out from the logical structures. That is the difference between the subject which serves for predication, and the object which has separate, independent existence.

I'm sorry that you object to people using ontological-sounding language to talk about modality and possibility rather than existence, — busycuttingcrap

The problem is that you use "existence" to talk about something other than existence. What's the sense in that? If you're talking about modality rather than existence, then obviously the appropriate thing to do is not to use "existence". Let me remind you again what you said.

So yes, an individual "exists" in numerous, maybe even uncountable, possible worlds, because there are numerous, maybe even uncountable, logically-possible propositions, predicates, etc that we can say of a given individual. — busycuttingcrap

It appears that you stand corrected. The same individual does not exist in numerous different possible worlds, because if individuals did exist in these possible worlds they would be distinctly different individuals, according to the possibilities proposed. Therefore they would not be the same individual. If they were considered to be the same individual, the law of non-contradiction would be violated.

For some reason, since that's not a position I actually hold (nor is it likely one Banno holds, either). We're just that diabolical I guess. :roll: — busycuttingcrap

Regardless of what you "actually hold", it is what you actually said. That's the problem, what you say is not consistent with what you actually believe. So you are diabolical in your attempts to describe things in ways which you do not yourself believe.

And the Kripke explanation quoted by RussellA above, makes the very same deceptive statement, stating something which nobody actually believes

What do I mean by ‘rigid designator’? I mean a term that designates the same object in all possible worlds. — RussellA

There simply isn't any objects in logical possibilities (possible worlds), and nobody actually believes that there is, despite the fact that many people like busycutter, and Banno, argue that there is.

Regardless, I'd like to ask the general question of the title of this thread in terms;
A) If true, are you looking for higher quality content?
B) If false, disregard. — Shawn

As is the case in the world in general, in regards to most everything, we're always hoping for high quality, but never expecting to find it, because it is rare. How we respond to the rare occurrence of higher quality is what is pivotal, because not expecting to find it leaves us vulnerable to shock and a wide variety of other emotional responses which may happen.

So you might ask questions like the following. Do you recognize quality as such? Do you recoil in shock at its occurrence? Do you attack it aggressively in fear of the power that superlativeness has over you? Are you humbled by quality?

All these are considerable issues for anyone seeking higher quality, and the key is a person's ability to recognize the occurrence of higher quality. Anyone who actually believes that higher quality is possible ought to have clear criteria as to how to recognize its occurrence. Otherwise its all subjective and simply emotional responses to differences, producing the condition of 'my content is always the higher quality content'.

The alternative, is to start from a fair and unbiased position of 'all content is fundamentally equal in quality'. This makes quality attributable to something other than content. Then we can look at the numerous different features of writing, allowing for the reality that each person has one's own preferences as to which of the different features higher quality is being looked for. Consequently, the meaning of 'higher quality' would differ according to one's preferences.

None of what has been said here is making ontological claims; it is only setting up consistent ways of talking about counterfactuals. — Banno

The concept of "counterfactuals" has ontological assumptions intrinsic to it. By designating something as counter to fact, you assume to know the fact, and that's an ontological claim.

That's the problem with your way of looking at logical possibilities. You make ontological assumptions, like the existence of the individual, such that the individual becomes a necessity within your possibilities (in all possible worlds). But this necessity is not a logical necessity at all, its just produced from your ontological assumption, the existence of the named individual. If you remove the necessity of the individual, to support your claim of making no ontological assumptions, then the logical possibilities (possible worlds) look completely different (explained above).

The claims in question aren't ontological claims; that's the entire point. They sound or look like ontological claims, but they are not. So when I say that "there is a possible world such that X", for instance if I say "there is a possible world such that MU is president of the United States of America", I am not making an ontological claim, I am not asserting the existence of anything: the phrase "there is a possible world such that X" is synonymous and interchangeable with the phrase "X is logically possible/self-consistent/non-contradictory". So I'm not asserting that there exists any such world, I'm just saying that the proposition of MU being the president of the USA is logically possible/does not entail a contradiction. — busycuttingcrap

Sure, this is what you say now, but both you and Banno were making ontological claims. Banno said that in every logically possible world, mww is still the same individual, the same person. That is an ontological claim about the person named mww, which is completely independent of the logical possibilities you are talking about. And you yourself said the following:

I think you're missing the point/meaning of possible-world semantics, MU. Aside from people like Lewis (who is a realist wrt possible worlds), "existing in a possible world" is (essentially) just a different way of saying that something isn't contradictory, that it does not entail a contradiction. That's it. So saying an individual exists in a possible world is only to say that some particular description, predicate, or state of affairs involving that individual is logically possible- it doesn't involve any contradiction or inconsistency.

So yes, an individual "exists" in numerous, maybe even uncountable, possible worlds, because there are numerous, maybe even uncountable, logically-possible propositions, predicates, etc that we can say of a given individual. — busycuttingcrap

Notice, you assume the existence of an individual here. That is an ontological claim. Without the assumption of the existence of the named individual, logical possibilities take on a completely different role. Consider your example "MU is the president of the United States of America". If we assume the existence of a person named MU, then you are saying that it is possible that this person (with ontological status) is the president. But if we do not assume an ontological person named MU, then you are saying something completely different. You are saying that it is possible that the person who is the president is name MU. That is because we haven't given any necessary existence to an individual named MU.

These differences are dependent on the ontological assumptions made. So in this quote above, you are assigning ontological status to "an individual", then you are proposing to use modal logic to make statements of possibility concerning this assumed ontic individual. And you conclude that the individual "exists" in each of these numerous different logical possibilities. But that's where you are wrong. Each of the logical possibilities is a description, a predication, which could possibly be assigned to the individual. The 'possible predication' is not being assigned to the individual, it is proposed only as a possibility. Therefore the individual is really not there, in that logical possibility, because no actual predication is being made in that scenario of logical possibility (possible world). The individual must maintain an existence, separate from the possible predication, to maintain logical consistency, and ensure that the predication is a possible predication rather than an actual predication.

In this case, the 'possibility' was maintained to exist between the individual and the predication. We have the actually existing person, name MU, and the possible predication "is the president...". In the other case I described, there is no assumed person named MU, just the possibility "MU is the president...". The two cases have very different meaning, and the difference is due to one's ontological assumptions concerning the individual, MU.

Sure it does: "existing in a possible world" means not entailing a contradiction. And there are numerous claims we can make about a given individual that do not entail contradictions (remember, "there exists a possible world" is synonymous with "does not entail a contradiction"). — busycuttingcrap

But the claim was that the individual exists in the possible world, not that what is said about the individual exists in the possible world. We know that the predication, the claim about the individual is a possibility, and therefore exists in the possible world. What is at question is whether the individual exists in the possible world.

So I'll tell you again, and maybe you'll make more sense of it this time. If the designator ("MU" for instance) is assumed to name a real individual, with existence in the world, this is an ontological assumption which denies the possibility that the named individual is a part of any logical possibilities proposed (therefore not a part of the possible worlds). So in this case, we cannot say that the named individual has any existence in any of the logical possibilities. This is already denied, because the real existence, the reality, or actuality of the named individual is already assumed by that ontological assumption, therefore no possibilities about the existence of that individual can be entertained. The reality is that the existence of the person is completely removed from, and irrelevant to the logical possibilities scenario.

And so this suffices to address your concern about "the existence of the individual": as far as modality goes, the existence of an individual in different possible worlds is the same thing as having multiple logically possible/self-consistent propositions or predicates we can assert of that individual. MU "exists" in multiple possible words... because there are multiple propositions or predicates we can assert of MU that do not entail contradictions. — busycuttingcrap

This is where your mistake lies. The problem is that with logical possibilities we can make contradicting predications, because they are only possible predications. So we can say for example it is possible that the person we know as MU is the president, and also that it is possible that the person we know as MU is not the president, if we do not have the actual predications for MU required to make that decision.

And this is why these cannot be considered as predications, they must be considered as possible predications. And, as I explained, this puts the division between possible and actual between the predicate and the individual, such that the individual is actual and completely separated from the predicate is a possible predicate, and therefore there is no proper predication.

If we claim as you state, that the same individual, the one we know by MU, exists in many possible worlds, then we have logical inconsistency because the law of identity and non-contradiction would be violated. We'd have to say that this same person, MU, is president in this possibility, and also not president in a different possibility, but in both scenarios is still the very same person. Well we cannot say that these are the very same person without contradiction, so the two scenarios would have to involve different individuals. Instead, we must say that just the predications are possibilities, and the individuals are separate from these possible predications (worlds), being actual and real. Therefore only the possible predications are within the possible worlds, while the individuals are not. In Aristotelian terms, the individuals are primary substance.

It seems like you didn't hear me the first time. Every time you read "there is/exists a possible world such that X, Y, or Z", mentally substitute "it is not contradictory/inconsistent that X, Y, or Z". Possible-world semantics isn't actually making an ontological claim (at least, not if you're not David Lewis), its making a claim about logical consistency. And so obviously, the actual world is a possible world, since "being a possible worlds" means "not being contradictory/logically inconsistent". And the actual world is not self-contradictory or logically inconsistent, so, it is a possible world. I mean, obviously, how could the actual world be actual, if it wasn't possible? — busycuttingcrap

OK, I understand what you are saying here. Now the problem is that when someone like Banno says that X,Y, or Z refers to "an individual" this is an ontological claim. So you can have your X, Y, and Z referring to nothing if you like, or even refer to a type, and claim logical consistency, but as soon as you say that one of these refers to an individual then you need to account for the existence of that individual because you have made an ontological claim.

Sure it does, because "existing in a possible world" isn't an existence claim about other worlds, despite appearances to the contrary. Replace "existing in a possible world" with "being logically possible/self-consistent", and your objection disappears. — busycuttingcrap

This does not solve the problem, because Banno's claim was that the designated individual exists in numerous possible worlds. And this produces logical inconsistency because the description of the designated individual is different in the different logical possibilities. Therefore these cannot be the same individual in distinct logical possibilities because of that inconsistency. Each logical possibility must necessarily represent a distinct individual.

So for instance, it is possible that MU is male, and it is possible that MU is female. In these two logical possibilities (these two possible worlds), "MU" does not refer to the same individual. In one possible world the individual is male and in the other possible world the individual is female. Therefore if the claim is that MU refers to an individual within each of those possibilities, these are necessarily two distinct individuals, on male, one female.

Understanding how certain technical terms are actually used in the relevant sub-field is actually just about the opposite of misguided philosophy: its trying to understand what philosophers mean, on their own terms. So its sort of necessary for a proper understanding of any philosopher. But I was admittedly tentative about engaging with you on this, because you are, frankly, sort of known for being stubborn about these things and not amenable to correction. But I assure you, as someone who spent most of their undergrad philosophy degree focusing on contemporary analytic philosophy and philosophy of language (so, for instance, folks like Saul Kripke), you're simply misunderstanding what these terms usually mean, in the context of contemporary philosophy/modal logic. — busycuttingcrap

Great, now are you ready to address the issue, which is the existence of the individual, in relation to logical possibilities, because you seem to have completely skirted the issue in this post.

Here's an example for those of you having difficulty understanding. In possible world #1, X is red. In possible world #2, X is not red. Clearly it cannot be the case that "X" refers to the same individual, unequivocally, unconditionally, or in any unqualified way, or else there would be contradiction, in saying that X is both red and not red.

So we have two principal choices, either "X" refers to a different individual in possible world #1, from what it refers to in possible world #2, or else it is just like a placeholder within those possible worlds, as a representation of a single individual which is supposed to exist in a separate world all together. The latter is the conventional interpretation. The contradicting propositions are statements of possibility for an individual believed to exist in a separate actual world. But this means that "X" refers neither to an individual in possible world #1, nor to an individual in possible world #2, but to an individual in some separate world. In those 2 possible worlds, "X" just provides a means for us to talk about possibilities for that individual which exists in a completely separate world.

It appears like the existence of the Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, has produced an acceptance of the other principal interpretation. When the numerous different possible worlds are each assumed to have actual existence, as in MWI, then X must refer to a different individual in each possible world. Being a part of a different world in each case would render the individuals as different individuals. If X is taken to refer to the same individual existing in many different worlds at the same time, incoherency results from the contradiction of saying that numerous different things (different by way of each having a different description) are actually one and the same thing.

Carry on with your terribly misguided philosophy (if one can call it that) then.

According Kripke, his wooden lectern is made of wood in every possible world where that lectern exists. There are all sorts of properties we could change and still have the same lectern, but being wooden isn't one of them.

It's an essential property. Do you disagree with him about this? — frank

Trying to get through to Banno is like banging your head on a brick wall. Banno's been trying to argue that the essential property (what's common to every possible world), is the individual.

Kripke brought up possible worlds as an aid to understanding how modality works. There are ways of parsing modal expressions that turn them into nonsense, and I think MU would be inclined to do that. He'd say we can't assert that Nixon could have lost, because if he lost, that wouldn't be Nixon.

I think this confusion arises from trying to do something ontological with modal expressions, when that's not the intent behind them. We're generally just playing with logical or metaphysical possibility, and that's the way possible worlds should be taken: as logical hypotheses. — frank

Yes, that's exactly the point, "an individual" speaks of something in a completely different ontological category from what a "logical hypothesis" speaks of. So Banno's attempt to bring the individual into the logical hypothesis was a category mistake.

We see this same mistake quite often when people speak of "possible worlds". They will say for instance, that one of the possible worlds is the actual world. But the possible worlds are just representations, logical hypotheses, and although one of the possible worlds might be judged as the correct representation, or some feature might be common to a whole set of possible worlds, it is still not the actual world, as this is a distinct category from the representation.

So yes, an individual "exists" in numerous, maybe even uncountable, possible worlds, because there are numerous, maybe even uncountable, logically-possible propositions, predicates, etc that we can say of a given individual. — busycuttingcrap

No, that's the category mistake described above. An individual does not exist in any possible worlds. As frank explained, possible worlds are logical hypotheses. Individuals are actual objects in the physical world. There might be individuals represented by such hypotheses, but no individuals exist in these hypotheses