So now we're back to Isaac's teapot and the missing screw. In that discussion, the question was only about successfully referring to a particular that (might or) might not possess a property you believe (or don't believe) it does. I think it's plain that you can; for some cases, I'm leaning on the causal theory of names, and for others on how demonstratives work: you can clearly demand someone get "that" off your kitchen table even when you know very little about what "that" is. Exactly how that works may be unclear; that it works, I believe, is not. (We may come back to the double-bind theory of reference eventually.) — Srap Tasmaner

I have no problem with referring to particular things, and this is because I accept the law of identity. The real problem is with change to a thing. How can the same thing at one time have a property which it does not have at a later time? Shouldn't this make it not the same thing? So Aristotle proposed the law of identity to say that a thing has an identity proper to itself, regardless of changes to it. It's just an assumption which we must make to allow for the observed temporal continuity of existence. There is said to be a relationship between what a thing actually is (provided for by form) and what it potentially is (provided for by matter). The thing itself is understood as a temporal continuity of this relationship. So issues like Theseus' ship become irrelevant because they propose a problem which is created by failing to properly respect the difference.

Also, I think that we need to respect the difference between an object and a subject. Predication is of a subject, not an object. So when you speak of an object for the purpose of predication, like "my kitchen table", you represent a perceived object as a subject "my kitchen table", and you proceed in predication. We talk as if we are referring directly to the object, but for the purpose of logical clarity it is best to maintain a separation between the subject with predications, and the object which is supposed to be represented. Then if problems arise, with temporal continuity for example, we can always inquire as to how well the name (subject) represents the object.

Here, we might start with the question of whether "being on my kitchen table" is a property of the object in question. It can be expressed as a predicate, as I've just done, but we could just as well express the situation as my kitchen table having the property of "having that on it," assuming again that "that" will manage to refer to the object. Or we could define a two-place predicate "on" such that "on" is true of an ordered pair <that, my kitchen table>. For either of the one-place predicates (of that, or of the table), I would be asking you to make something that is true of one of them false; for the two-place predicate, I would be asking you to make something that is true of the two of them false. — Srap Tasmaner

I would say that logically, you have two subjects, "my kitchen table", and "that", each assumed to be representing an object. And, you are not predicating anything of either of these two, but describing a relationship between them. The relationship you call "an order".

Do we say that "on" takes three objects, the two from before and a third that specifies the order? If so, the third would look something like this: "1 = thing, 2 = table". Such a list can be presented in any order, so we don't have a regress, only a rule about each natural number up to the arity of the predicate being used, so this is a genuine option. But our new on/3 takes two concrete objects and a third which, whatever it is, is not like that. I say "whatever it is," because the semantics of the ordering list are unclear at this point: are those objects in the list, or expressions referring to objects? I guess either would do, but we're still building in a lot of other stuff, some of which looks suspiciously abstract, so we could just give in and have "on" take a single abstract object which is the ordered pair <thing, table>. — Srap Tasmaner

I would say that the "order", or relationship is definitely not a type of object, being completely different from an object, as something inferred through logic and definiions rather than perceived through sensation. "On" is not used to refer to an object, so if we make a subject called "on", this subject does not represent an object, it represents a relationship between objects. And that relationship is defined in spatial terms, or mathematics, or something like that.

Can we do something similar with other cases? For instance, if my bike tire is flat, is it a different object once it's inflated, or is it just a different arrangement of tire and air, the tire itself never changing? (In this case, we may or may not have any specific batch of air in mind.) But then what would we say about the shape of the tire, that surely changes when it's inflated? If anything is a property of an object, surely its shape is. But I make different shapes when I sit and when I stand — does that make me a different person? What all of these examples have in common is that there are at least two different times considered: the tire is never flat and inflated at the same time, I am never sitting and standing at the same time, and so on. So a first attempt at distinguishing what is essential to an object from what is accidental is, naturally, distinguishing what is constant or invariant about it, what does not change from one time to another, and what does or can change from one time to another. Essential is what is time-less, and accidental is what is time-dependent. The same dog barks at one time and not at another. — Srap Tasmaner

i think you've touched on a completely different issue here, a more complex issue. This is the relation of parts to a whole. When we name an object it is composed of parts, and the object is considered to be a whole, consisting of parts. However, as Aristotle described, we speak of privations, and perfection in respect to the whole. So this is a sort of ideal which we impose, on the object. Your bike is more perfect when the tire is filled with air, even though it is still the same object, as having the same identity, regardless.

One solution offered, in a sort of conventionalist spirit, is that this is all a collective fiction: there are no things with identities that we come along afterward and refer to; rather, our various acts of reference, intended and accepted by us as such, and our deeming these acts successful, is all there really is here. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I think I see this in the same way. The law of identity is a useful fiction, like mathematical axioms are. It allows us to talk about a thing's temporal extension, as a thing, thus making it into a subject. We could say that everything changes from one moment to the next, as time passes, therefore there is no such thing as an object with temporal extension. However, we notice that certain aspects appear to remain unchanged for durations, so we want to be able to talk about these things with duration as existent things. So we posit a law of identity which allows that there is something real which remains unchanged as time passes, this provides us with the basis for accounting for the reality of consistency, which is what scientific laws are built on.

That means there are two overlapping arguments here: one the one hand, the conventionalist can keep poking holes in whatever theory of object identity the other side comes up, because he needs no such theory anyway, and may even think no such theory is possible; on the other hand, the object-identitarian has to come up with a theory that works and show that it is needed, which means he also has to find some flaw in the conventionalist account of our referential speech acts — not for the sake of his theory but to show that some theory is even needed. What's not clear in any of this is how the evidence is to be handled: I'll venture that most people's pre-theoretical intuition is that we talk the way we do because things are the way they are, and that our talking the way we do is in fact evidence that things are the way we say they are.

But we have those pesky scientific refutations of how we talk: sunrise, solidity, and so on. That doesn't show that how we talk is never evidence of how things are, but it does show that it isn't always such evidence. On the other hand, the conventionalist can shift from the claim that how we talk is only evidence of how we talk, and nothing more only for methodological reasons, to a claim that how we talk is only we how talk — now meaning our agreement is precisely evidence that there is nothing more. — Srap Tasmaner

The way we talk is really not reflective of the way things are, that should be obvious. Talking is purpose driven, like a tool which conforms itself to what we are doing, so it's really more reflective of our intentions. That's why "meaning" might commonly be defined as "what is meant". But intention stands before us as a dark philosophical unknown, so people are often not inclined to look that way. This is why it takes a special way of talking, the scientific method, based in a special intention, to move toward an understanding of the way things really are, rather than simply following where natural language leads us. In other words, language needs to be disciplined if we desire to develop an understanding of reality.

If that were true, it would not only deny the object-identitarian what was counted pre-theoretically as evidence but change the character of what's to be explained by any such theory. If the mean girls call you a loser, that's just a thing they say: the truth-value of their statement matters to you, but not to them; what matters to them is producing some effect, of hurting your feelings. That's the sense in which it is "just something they say." But not only can you not conclude from someone saying something that it must not have a truth-value, in this case the effect is only produced if you assume that it does, and they assume that you will assume that it does. If they know you will discount what they say as being just mean-girl noise, or just noise period, there's no reason for them to say it. The conventionalist can retreat again and say that the hurt feelings are known inductively to follow utterances of "loser," and that's all the mean girls need. That might actually be true! But you have to show that such an account really will extend to cover all language use. This situation is so simple than I think what we're really seeing is not exactly language at all but something more like dominance signaling that happens to use language because, well, there it is; we tend to use words even when what we're doing is really nothing more than growling articulately. — Srap Tasmaner

Now, it should become clear that the concept of "truth" needs to be based in honesty, the use of language to honestly reflect one's intentions, rather than the notion of an objective truth value. There is no objective truth value, just like there is no thing with its own identity, even though I believe in that law of identity. I believe in it because it has proved very useful in helping us to communicate, and ultimately to help us understand the nature of reality, but I do not believe that it is very accurate, or a perfect representation, or 'true' in the sense of correspondence.

If the entire linguistic community agrees that this ball is "red", then how might our "reasoning" be wrong? What "reasoning" is involved when we teach someone how to use the word "red"? — Luke

There is actually many examples if you look for them. Someone, I believe it was Srap, earlier gave the example of Pluto being a planet. The linguistic community agreed to this, but it turned out to be wrong. We can also say for example that "the sun rises", and "sunrise" are misleading usage, and wrong, because the sun doesn't rise, the earth spins. There is clearly "reasoning" involved in teaching how to use words. One must decide how to approach the task. And the required technique differs depending on whether the student is beginner or advanced. Learning how to use "red" would generally be more toward the beginner level, prior to the complex logical concepts required for science and mathematics. I've never really taught language use, but I think the reasoning involved in teaching the use of "red", might involve deciding how to demonstrate the concept of colour, and deciding how to properly demonstrate a specific colour, "red". There are judgements which must be made.

Is this ball *this ball* if it is a different color? Is redness essential to it? For comparison, if this ball is flat, we can inflate it, and we will not usually say that being flat is essential to what the ball is, just its temporary state. — Srap Tasmaner

I think this is where things get sticky. In the case of a particular object, such as "this ball", each and every property is an essential property, that's what makes it the unique thing which it is, by the law of identity. That is the identity of the ball itself. But when we move to question "what the ball is", as " a ball", or "a red ball", we are assigning an identity to the object, which is distinct from the identity which the ball has, in and of itself, by the law of identity.

When talking about particulars, like this specific ball, we can't make modal claims, I think, without considering what is essential and what accidental about that particular. — Srap Tasmaner

I think it is important to note that there is no such distinction in the case of a particular. Each and every property of a particular must be understood as essential to that particular, that's what makes a particular a unique individual, distinct from every other particular. This is what the law of identity recognizes.

But it is nevertheless true that if it is flat, it is not fully inflated, and that's just the law of noncontradiction. When we say this red ball cannot not be red, are we even saying anything about the ball? Or are we only saying that at this world, as at all others, the law of noncontradiction holds? — Srap Tasmaner

So, let's maintain this distinction, between the identity the ball has, by the law of identity, and the identity which we assign to the ball, through a differentiation between essential and accidental properties. We've assigned essential properties, and have named the ball "red ball", with very good reasons, and we maintain that the ball cannot not be red, for those reasons. However, we need to maintain that the ball in itself might still turn out to be not red, if our reasoning turns out to be wrong. We can't just conclude that the ball cannot not be red because it would be contradictory, because we just have some reasons why the ball must be red, and those reasons might end up being wrong. We cannot impose on the ball that it cannot not be red, just because our reasoning says so, because our reasoning might be wrong.

So it's not even a case of asking whether the law of non-contradiction holds in this world, it's a case of asking do the reasons for calling the ball "a red ball" hold in this world. Then the question is whether the world described in which the ball must be red, corresponds correctly with the real world. But I would say that we must maintain always, the possibility that it does not. Therefore we ought to allow that the thing itself, with the identity it has within itself, could always be other than the identity we give it. So this would not be a case of violating the law of non-contradiction, it would be a case of us having a misunderstanding of the world.

Where this becomes difficult is with the assumption that everything must have an identity within itself. That is what Aristotle proposed, but Hegel for instance saw no necessity even for this principle. But if we relinquish the law of identity, then contradiction could inhere right within the world. It would not be necessary that the object has an identity within itself, and it could actually consist of opposing properties.

To say that there are no worlds at which this ball is both red and not red is to say almost nothing at all. There simply are no such worlds, no worlds at which any ball, this one or another, is both red and not red. If we deem the redness of this ball essential to it, there are no worlds at which this ball is not red, on pain of simply being a different object. If it is inessential that it is red, like being flat, then there are worlds at which it is blue, is green, is white, and so on. And that's what we mean when we say this ball 'might have been' some other color. — Srap Tasmaner

If we let go of the law of identity, then we allow for the possibility of a world in which the ball is both red and not red. Our logic dictates "there simply are no such worlds", but the real world does not conform to our logic, our logic must conform to the world. Therefore we must allow for the possibility that the law of identity is incorrect, and consequently the law of non-contradiction is irrelevant in some circumstances, and it is not accurate to say "there simply are no such worlds".

See, you say that if this were the case, it would be "a different object". But without the law of identity, there is no reason to believe that the real world even consists of objects. The real world might be 'a different world', outside all of the logically possible worlds, which rely on the law of identity. That's what the law of identity tells us, that the world consists of objects. But if the law of identity is wrong, and the world doesn't consist of objects, then we need a new principle by which we name things as objects, and insist that the law of non-contradiction must hold for these supposed objects.

We're in very different territory if there's a bin of red playground balls and you're grabbing one of those. In such a case, it's perfectly clear what we mean when we say you cannot pick a ball that is not red: there is no such a ball to pick. To say that you might get the one with "Zeppelin rules" scrawled on it in Sharpie, is to say there is a ball in the bin so adorned, and this inscription makes it unique; to say you might get one bearing those words, is to say this is a thing someone might have done, that it is possible someone has done it. — Srap Tasmaner

The point for you to recognize, I think, is that when we accept the law of identity, then we accept that any ball might be other than the way we name it. In fact, the object is designated as necessarily other than how we name it. That's what the law of identity recognizes, that we name it by essentials, not by accidentals, while accidentals are what gives identity to the individual. So any particular object, by the law identity, is necessarily inconsistent with how we identify it.

Now I have moved from the claim that we must accept the possibility that the world is other from how we describe it (above), to the claim that it is necessarily other than how we describe it. We do not identify the accidentals, but the accidentals are what are essential to the particulars. And since we do not acknowledge the accidentals, we cannot even name them as possibilities. They are unknown possibilities. And once we see the reality of unknown possibilities, then we must allow for possible worlds which are outside the realm of "logically possible", such as a world with no objects and no law of identity. "Possible worlds" is a restriction imposed by logic which is necessarily inconsistent with reality.

But how do we get necessity out of the law of noncontradiction? That if something is red, it cannot not be red? Since the law of noncontradiction holds at each world, restricting to worlds at which "The ball is red" is true automatically embodies the necessity we were looking for: for any world w in that set, the ball is red at every world accessible (under this restriction) from w. That's our definition of necessity. No world at which it is not red, or also not red, can sneak in. — Srap Tasmaner

The law of non-contradiction, in this sense, is just an artificial restriction imposed on possibility, by us. It only applies to produce a set of possible worlds which is created by our minds. But what the law of identity indicates to us, is that the real world is a world which is necessarily outside this set of possible worlds. The true identity of the particular is within the aspects (accidentals) which we ignore when we assign an identity to the object. Therefore the real world is necessarily inconsistent with the "possible worlds".

You say a lot of things I agree with, but apparently thinking that I don't, because there's still some confusion about the handling of "not." One point I think I clarified somewhere else is that in something like "The book is not red," we place the "not" before "red" purely as a matter of English convention, and because, with no other scope in play, there's no ambiguity. But that's still a proposition-level "not" and a more verbose way to say the same thing is "It is not the case that ball is red." It's sometimes convenient to pretend that "not red" is something we might predicate of an object, but it isn't really. "Not red" is not a syntactical element of the proposition at all, and therefore not a semantic unit either. "Red" is, as a predicate, and "not" is, as an operator on the entire proposition. "Not" doesn't apply to predicates or objects. As long as we keep in mind the logical form of what we're saying, I see no harm in using ordinary English, but I'll switch to "philosophical English" when there's ambiguity to be avoided. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, I think I follow this. Now let me tell you the issue I'm talking about, taking this simple example of "the book is not red". As it stands "not" is an operator which negates "the book is red". There is one necessity implied, i.e. it is impossible that the book is red. It is necessary that the book is not red.

Now, we want to move into a logical mode of possibility, and allow for a possibility that the book is red. So we relate "it is possible that the book is red", with "it is necessary that the book is red" in the ways that you describe. But what happens to the original, "the book is not red", or |
" it is impossible that the book is red" with this move? Because the new mode is the possibility that the book is red, we must exclude this option (it is impossible that the book is red), as not a possibility.

The question is whether it is a valid move to exclude the possibility that it is impossible that the book is red. Isn't this a real possibility which ought to be allowed for in discussing the possibility that the book is red? It is possible that it is impossible that the book is red. According to what you describe, it appears to me like the logical schema denies this possibility by saying that it opens a new category, the category of "not-red", and then we'd have to discuss the possibility of this. In this case "the book is not red" would mean "it is necessary that the book is not red", which would be an instance of predicating "not-red" of the book.

So the issue as I see it, is that I want to allow "it is impossible that the book is red" as a valid possibility, when we are talking about the possibility of whether or not the book is red. But the logical schema disallows this possibility. And, it is the logical schema which makes "not-red" into a distinct category of predication, thereby blocking this possibility. Therefore you cannot use that as an argument for why we ought to accept the logical schema, that if we allow "it is impossible that the book is red" as a valid possibility, it makes "not-red" into a category of its own, distinct from "red", rather than the negation of red, because that's just begging the question. From my perspective, that's just evidence that the logical schema is flawed. Instead of having "red" and "not-red" as the two extremes of one category, with all the possibilities lying between, it treats "red" and "not-red" as distinct categories of possibility, with no proper way of establishing a relationship between the possibility of each of these two.

You are making what I would consider a scope error. — Srap Tasmaner

It can't be me making the scope error, because it's your examples only, not mine. Am I making an interpretive scope error? Here's the example again:

(1) It is necessary that the book falls if and only if it is not possible that the book does not fall.

(2) It is possible that the book falls if and only if it is not necessary that the book does not fall.

"Not" seems to be used in two ways, but it really isn't; under this scheme it is always a proposition-level operator, just like "possibly" and "necessarily". You build necessary this way:

(1) The book is falling.
(2) It is not the case that (1), the book is falling.
(3) It is possible that (2), that it is not the case that (1), the book is falling.
(4) It is not the case that (3), that it is possible that (2), that it is not the case that (1), the book is falling.
(5) It is necessary that (1), the book is falling.

(5) is here just shorthand for (4). There is a single complete proposition (1), and three operators applied to that proposition, which we can abbreviate as a single operator.

This simplified usage of "not" avoids many confusions: you never predicate "not falling" of an object, you deny that it is falling; you never predicate "not possible" of a proposition, you deny that it is possible. By maintaining discipline in the treatment of "not", you avoid any possibility of confusing, say, "I know it's not Tuesday" and "I don't know it's Tuesday". We can be clear about the scope of the operators we apply to sentences, and we can be clear about the order in which we apply them, and we need not abide ambiguity. This is how we win. — Srap Tasmaner

Can you give me a simple explanation as to why you switch from talking about whether or not "the book falls" (future, or perhaps tenseless)), to "the book is falling" (present)?

The issue I pointed out with the dual use of "not" is that "it is not necessary that the book does not fall", the first (2), uses two senses of "not". "Does not fall" does not negate "fall", like "not necessary" negates "necessary". What "not" does in this case is stipulate that there is no real world activity of falling.

You assign a scope error to me, saying the following: "This simplified usage of "not" avoids many confusions: you never predicate "not falling" of an object, you deny that it is falling; you never predicate "not possible" of a proposition, you deny that it is possible." But it was you yourself who predicated "not" of "fall" in your statement: " (2) It is possible that the book falls if and only if it is not necessary that the book does not fall."

It appears to me, like you have created an illusion, by changing the temporal scope of the example. In the explanation you've switched from whether or not the book falls (indefinite temporal scope), to whether or not the book is falling (present time). This allows you to talk about the book not falling without directly predicating "not falling" of the object. But in the other case, there is no temporal scope, so what is at issue is never falling, the possibility that it is impossible for the book to fall, and this requires the denied predication.

Notice that with the restricted scope (present only) it is possible to talk about whether or not the book is falling, without predicating "not falling" of the object. But in the original example we cannot get to the possibility that "the book does not fall" without predicating "not falling" of the object.

This is the meaning of "impossible" which I am trying to bring to your attention, which your schema excludes. "It is impossible that the book is falling", or more properly said, "it is necessary that the book is not falling".

What happens in your explanation, is that by refusing to predicate "not falling" of the object, you put "not falling" outside the scope of what you are talking about, so that you are only talking about the book falling. By doing this you exclude the possibility of "it is necessary that the book is not falling". In other words, you exclude the impossible from your schema. Then "not falling" becomes something completely distinct from "falling", rather than the opposite of it.

Metaphysically speaking, I take these terms to mean:

1. Impossible = cannot occur
2. Possible = can occur
3. Necessary = must occur

This does not make "necessary" and "possible" the same. It opposes the concepts of 1 and 2 to each other, and the concepts of 2 and 3 to each other. This does not require "possible" to be in a distinct category. — Luke

Yes, that's exactly the problem. If (1) is defined as opposed to (2), and (3) is defined as opposed to (2), then (1) and (3) must have the very same meaning, by definition. Obviously though, "impossible" and "necessary" do not have the same meaning. Therefore we need a fix for this problem. My proposal was to put "possible" in a different category from "necessary" and "impossible" which are properly opposed, because "possible" I believe cannot be properly opposed to "necessary" due to our conception of "impossible"

You are making what I would consider a scope error. — Srap Tasmaner

I really do not think that this explains the issue. Allow me to describe the problem more clearly if you will. The issue is with the definition of "necessary". If we propose to define "necessary" in relation to possible, as you did in the last post, then we also have to allow that it has a relation to impossible. The same sense of "necessary", in common usage has a relation with possible and also a relation with impossible (not possible). So if we simply define "necessary" as opposed to possible then we do not provide an accurate (truthful) representation of "necessary" because we do not provide a position for impossible. "Impossible" has been excluded from having a position in the schema because necessary has been opposed to possible.

(2) It is possible that the book falls if and only if it is not necessary that the book does not fall. — Srap Tasmaner

So, look at this rendition of "possible", produced from your (1) where necessary was defined as opposed to possible. We can pinpoint the inaccuracy here. The phrase "it is not necessary that the book falls" is actually ambiguous because it implies (a) it is impossible that the book falls, and (b) it is possible that the book falls. I think you'll agree that (a) is very different from (b). However, your proposal excludes (b) by saying that we must allow (a) only, through definition.

What this proposal does is that it removes "impossible" from the schema through a faulty definition of "possible", induced by the prior definition of "necessary". Everything is either necessary or possible. There is no such thing as impossible. And this is very evident in what we refer to as "logical possibility", anything is possible. So "logical possibility", produced by this means, provides no real defined sense of "impossible", and this is why it does not provide us with a truthful or accurate representation of reality.

Now, we might account for this by saying that impossible is a form of necessary. This appears to be the most accurate way to go. But then we need to distinguish within our definition of "necessary", the difference between what necessarily is, and what necessarily is not. And, the real issue is that when we proceed from here to establish a relationship between each of these two and possibility, we have to respect the fact that one is the inverse of the other, so they cannot have the exact same relation. This inversion becomes very evident in probabilities. The more precise, or particular, the individual specific identified thing is, i.e. that which we want to relate to "necessary" (in its two senses of is and is not), the more certain we can be in the sense of is not, and the less certain we can be in the sense of is. This is why philosophical skepticism concerning claims about "what is", cannot be eradicated, while we can readily dismiss claims about "what is not", nothingness.

There are only two feelings, pain and pleasure, each with varying degree. — Mww

You start off with a false premise. "Feelings" are sensations and there is many different sorts of them, often involving neither pleasure nor pain. Consider sight, sound, or even taste which is a tactile sensation. Many tastes, like spices for example are neither pleasant nor painful. The same is the case for all the different senses, there are many different sensations which are neither pleasurable nor painful. The sense of touch for example, you can feel around, looking for something with your hand, or feeling your way in the dark, and these feelings are neither pleasurable nor painful, though they are informative. That a particular feeling is peasant, or painful, is a judgement.

Whether or not all that is granted, it nonetheless authorizes us to say judgements are limited as constituents of our moral disposition, in that because we are this kind of moral agent we will judge good and bad in this way. — Mww

Sure one's judgements are based on one's disposition, but generally speaking we judge good and bad according to how we were taught, not according to what we feel. That is what constitutes our moral disposition, how we've been trained, not how we feel. I don't know why you deny this. And this is how our moral judgements extend far beyond our personal feelings. We make moral judgements concerning principles which have no feeling about at all.

Now, again, best to keep in mind this kind of judgement is aesthetic, representing a feeling, as opposed to discursive, which represents a cognition. We often do good things that feel bad, as well as do bad things that feel good. From that it follows that the judgement of how it feels subjectively to do something, is very different than the judgement for what objectively is to be done. — Mww

I don't understand this. It seems to be completely inconsistent with what you've been saying. Perhaps you could explain. If "good" and "bad" are solely determined by what feels good, and what feels bad, how is it possible that one could do a good thing which feels bad, or a bad thing that feels good? And what do you mean by "the judgement for what objectively is to be done"? How does objectivity enter morality in your mind?

Simple example of how we do this, instead of all this concept juggling:

(1) It is necessary that the book falls if and only if it is not possible that the book does not fall.

(2) It is possible that the book falls if and only if it is not necessary that the book does not fall.

"Not" seems to be used in two ways, but it really isn't; under this scheme it is always a proposition-level operator, just like "possibly" and "necessarily". You build necessary this way: — Srap Tasmaner

You are just stating the same thing as the last post, in a different way, so the result is the same question i brought up at the end of the last post.

But "not" is definitely used in two different ways. When you say in (1), "not possible", "not" negates "possible" in the sense of proposing an opposite to "necessary". But when you say "does not fall", here "not" does not negate "fall" as an opposite to "fall" it simply says that the action does not happen. To say in particular, "a fall does not happen", and to say in general, "a fall is not possible", is to use "not" in two distinct ways. "Fall" is a verb, "possible" is an adjective. But the use of "not" is beside the point.

All you have here is the meaningless, circular definition, which I objected to earlier. "Necessary" is defined as "not possible", and "possible" is defined as "not necessary". But this is not truthful for the reasons I've given. "Necessary" is properly opposed to "impossible", as I've explained. And "impossible" cannot be opposed to "possible" because this would make "necessary" and "possible" the same. So we need to put "possible" in a place distinct from the category which contains those opposites, necessary and impossible.

I agree. — creativesoul

I know we've discussed this before. You believe self-deception is a nonsense concept.

If it isn't clear, the interdefinability of such operators means you only need one of them, but using the pair is way more convenient, and foregrounds how common and important two particular ways of using such an operator are. In other words, we could get by with just ▢ for a modal operator, and we would find ourselves writing formulas with ▢~, and ~▢, as well as unadorned ▢, but we would also find that we were writing one particular little phrase all the time: ~▢~. Same is true for ∀ and ∃: if we just used ∀, we'd have to write ~∀~ all the time. — Srap Tasmaner

What I see here, is that if we start with "necessary" under the definition provided by Luke, as "must be", then we need an opposing term which would be "not necessary", and this would provide a rendition of "possible" by Luke's reckoning. However, we also have "necessarily not", and this is a rendition of "impossible". And, we can oppose "impossible" (as necessarily not) with "not necessarily not", and we now have an alternative rendition of "possible", which is opposed to "impossible". So we have here two very distinct renditions of "possible", Luke's is opposed to necessary, as not necessary, and the other is opposed to necessarily not (impossible) as not impossible.

Notice though, that "necessary" and "necessarily not" (impossible), are both forms of necessity. That's why I class them together (like hot and cold), as the two extremes of necessity, under the category "necessary". In the terms of ancient logic, these opposing terms are being and not being, is and is not. Then I propose another name, "possible" which we use to refer to all things outside this category. We can say that the things within the category are things known with certainty, what is and is not, while the things outside this category are the unknowns. Possibilities, whether logical possibilities (could be), or ontological possibilities (may be, as becoming), are the unknowns.

In my representation, the negative sandwich is exposed as a sort of misnomer. The first "not" in "not necessarily not", and "not possibly not", is not used in the same senses as the last "not". This is because the second "not" has been given an elusive referent. What does "necessarily not" or "possibly not" really mean? They are both predications, requiring a subject to give them real meaning. And when we allow for the subject we see that "necessarily not" is just a form of "necessary", and "possibly not" is just a form of "possible". So the negative sandwich is just an unnecessary obfuscation which distracts from the reality that what we are talking about has lost the assurance of certainty, because we have removed ourselves from the realm of the necessary, to talk about the possible. The form of "necessary" employed, now called "necessarily not", is opposed to "possible", as "possibly not", just like Luke's rendition, and is no longer opposed to "necessarily so".

This is done by taking the opposite of necessary, necessarily not (impossible), and proposing it as an independent form of necessary independent from its opposite. So the question is whether this is a valid move, to take the opposite of necessary, i.e. what is not (necessarily not, or impossible), and separate it from what is (necessary), and place it into the category of "possible", as a valid form of certainty. Can we import certainty into the category of the unknown in this way? So let me ask you this, can we determine what is not, without reference to what is? We can in principle describe what is, without reference to what is not, but can we describe what is not, without reference to what is? That I think is what is required to separate "necessarily not" from its true opposite, "necessary", and produce a new category in which it is opposed to "not necessarily not".

We have to be able to say that what is cannot not be without falling into a modal fallacy of treating all truths as necessary. — Srap Tasmaner

I’m pretty sure I’m not committing that fallacy, but I can see how MU most likely is. — Luke

We start by opposing necessary with impossible. Fine, no problem. But then we need to give "possible" a position, because "possible" provides a truthful description. It appears like "possible" ought to be opposed to "impossible". But it also appears like "possible" ought to be opposed to "necessary". And those two are already opposed to each other, so the real problem begins.

Best to recognize that I cannot reject that this is a bus when I already have experience of busses, which manifests as a blatant self-contradiction, in just the same way I cannot reject the feeling of moral reprehensibility, but without ever having the experience of an object by which a self-contradiction would arise. This is sufficient to prove feelings are not cognitions, from which follows that moral knowledge is a misnomer. Further support resides in the fact that I may know this is true now yet find later this is no longer known as true, a function of experience in which I must cognize something, but that for which I feel as moral will always be what I feel is moral, as a function of personality, for which no cognitions are necessary. — Mww

We're too far apart on this issue to even start discussion. There's too much I disagree with here. To begin with, I believe that morality consists of judgements of good and bad, not feelings, as you seem to think. There is some merit to your position though, because some feelings are naturally desirable and others we naturally desire to avoid. So it appears at first glance like morality might just be based in whether a feeling is desirable or not. But on a closer look at what morality really consists of, we can see that it involves knowing when and where to seek desirable feelings, and knowing when and where to put up with undesirable feelings. Therefore morality cannot be based solely in feelings, it must also involve knowing when and where specific feelings are appropriate. The problem is that morality is not one or the other, feelings or knowledge, it's complex, and both.

we should find that it is impossible to be dishonest with oneself. — Mww

I do not agree with this. There are many forms of dishonesty, and some of them are applicable to oneself. The common example, lying might appear to be impossible to do to oneself, but there are many subtle forms of dishonesty, like withholding information. And we do this to ourselves often. I might tell myself that I can proceed with a project without proper research first. That's a type of laziness, and laziness is often a case of being dishonest with oneself. Sometimes we know what needs to be done, safety precautions, or something like that, but we dishonestly tell ourselves that it's not required this time. The desire for simplicity, in what is a complex situation, can produce dishonesty. We are dishonest with ourselves in many subtle ways when we follow our feelings and proceed into doing what we know is morally wrong. Sometimes this amounts to what is called rationalizing. But you probably won't agree to these examples because you don't think morality involves knowledge anyway.

Nobody but you uses "necessary" to mean "no longer possible". — Luke

It is actually the common philosophical definition of "necessary", the opposite of impossible. This is why I strongly objected to your proposal to oppose necessary with possible. It is completely inconsistent with conventional philosophy which opposes necessary to impossible. When necessary is opposed to impossible, then possible is completely outside this category. So I said, whatever is necessary or impossible, as dictated by past time, can no longer be considered possible.

This fails to answer whether the original event was necessary or merely possible in the first place. — Luke

Well of course it does not answer that question. No one was trying to answer that question, it's an assumption we make, as part of a world view. What I was doing was attempting to define terms, and under those definitions, it makes no sense to speak about a future event as "necessary".

There is however another use of "necessary" a completely distinct meaning, which we do apply to future events. This is "necessary" in the sense of what is judged as needed as a necessity, for the sake of fulfilling a goal. These necessities are the means to the end. The means are determined as necessary in relation to the end, then the act is carried out. So we judge the possibilities, determine which possibilities are required for our goals, and we say that these things are "necessary". We then act on these possibilities which have been designated as "necessary", and the acts come into existence and become "necessary" in the other sense, as the opposite of impossible.

Whoa! Do I get some sort of prize for bringing this about? — Srap Tasmaner

I'll hand it to you. What do you want for a trophy?

And that's not crazy: counterfactual reasoning is famously dicey; but it is just as famously indispensable — Srap Tasmaner

I think the reason why counterfactual reasoning has become so successful is that we have a very good capacity to control and replicate precise circumstances in scientific experimentation. When we replicate an experiment, it's very similar to going back in time to the same situation over again. Then we can change one particular thing and look at the difference in outcome. And we can repeat, changing something else. After we get familiar with how the particular changes affect the outcome, we can simply apply the counterfactual logic instead, without actually redoing the experiment.

Or, consider this: we don't actually act upon the future directly either; that too, we are incapable of doing. We can only act in the present to select which possible future is realized. But every time we do that, we are also, immediately, filling the past with events of our choosing. The past is what we have some say-so in, never the future. — Srap Tasmaner

I believe this is the most accurate description you've provided. We don't act on the future, nor do we act on the past, we act at the present. The past is filled with events which we've 'had some say in'. Notice the difference between this and what you said, "the past is what we have some say-so in". This is the main contention with Luke. Once it's in the past, we can no longer have an influence on it, so we cannot truthfully say we have some say in it, it's necessary. And, since as you say "We can only act in the present to select which possible future is realized", the present is the most significant aspect of time for us.

Now you also agree that it's only events of the past that are immutable in this way, right? Events in the future are not only not immutable, they're not even fully determined; and the present, well, the present is presumably the moment of an event being fully determined and thereby becoming immutable. — Srap Tasmaner

So we have this issue, the present, which you call "the moment of an event being fully determined and thereby becoming immutable". At this supposed "moment" of the present, events are neither possible (future), nor are they necessary (past), they are "becoming". And this is where logical categories tend to fail us. If we are categorizing past as necessary, and future as possible, then we have to name the intermediate. We could for example use "actual" here, meaning "of the act". But how do we deal logically with things which are of the act itself? If, as you say, the act is when things are being "fully determined",

The glaring problem is that acts always require time, and some parts of the same act are determined prior to other parts of that act. And the length of an act depends on how we identify the particular act. We might divide it in two for example, saying the beginning is the cause, and the end is the effect. So the result is that any identified act consists of aspects which are necessary, and aspects which are possible, and we might find that there is always at the fringes, at the boundaries of what is necessary, always some possibilities which are not "fully determined", such that an act can never be properly said to be "fully determined" in the absolute sense. Conversely, we have the similar argument against free will, that since the human being's capacity to act is very restricted, we do not have "free" will in any absolute sense. This would be because any act identified as a possibility, already has some necessary features. Now events which are occurring at the present contain both necessity and possibility.

Since there is always some degree of possibility intermingled with what we want to say is fully determined, and some degree of necessity intermingled with what we want to say is possible, this implies that the present, what is "actual", really exists as an intermingling of the future and the past. We might call this an overlap. At any precise time in which we make an observation, some aspects of reality are already in the past, necessary, and some are in the future, possible. So the difficulty we have in understanding the nature of reality, is in establishing that relationship between what is necessary, and what is possible. And if some logical axioms deal with possibilities, and others deal with necessities, how could we truthfully relate these two?

And all of this is still circling around the problem of truth, because the past is the paradigmatic realm of truth, eternal and unchanging, while there is no truth about the future and for that reason no knowledge but only belief. — Srap Tasmaner

I do not think that this is a correct representation of "truth". That is what Aristotle proposed, there is not truth concerning things not yet decided, like the sea battle tomorrow, and we ought not attempt to apply truth here, applying it only to things of the past. But we can see that this proposal was firmly rejected by the monotheist community, who associate Truth with God. And God in the Old Testament was associated with the present, "I am that I am".

So it may be more productive to associate truth with the present, what is now, at the current time. And here we have the much more difficult and complex issue of understanding how the past is related to the future.

Seems an awful lot like the same thing, doesn’t it? — Mww

It's not really the same thing, because you describe all decision making as based in some sort of "logic". But I describe "logic" as a specialized form of decision making, which shares in something which all forms of decision making have, but we do not really know what it is. So instead of claiming that all decision making uses logic, I say it uses something else, which logic also uses, but we do not really understand what it is.

Same point as just the innate capacity for empirical knowledge doesn’t contain any. — Mww

But then you are not saying that empirical knowledge is innate, you are saying that the capacity for empirical knowledge is innate. But in the case of morality, you seem to think that moral knowledge is itself innate, what one feels is right, is right. Which do you really believe, is the capacity for moral knowledge innate, or is moral knowledge itself innate?

Truth, as such, is every bit as subjective as one’s moral disposition and experiences. — Mww

That's what I've been trying to get at since the binging of the thread. The idea that truth is some sort of objective independent thing is really just a ruse. That idea leads us down the garden path, you might say, leaving us lost, and with nowhere to turn for guidance concerning what truth really is. So to understand truth we must proceed in the other direction, into the subject, and I see the starting point as honesty, because this is a common use of "truth". And this begins with ridding oneself of self-deception concerning faulty notions of truth.

That does not explain why present/past situations are necessary; or why it is necessary that I had to have toast instead of cereal for breakfast this morning. — Luke

You are simply misrepresenting what I said (as is your usual habit) to continue with a strawman argument. I didn't say that it was necessary that you had to have toast instead of cereal. To the contrary, I said that was a choice you made from real possibilities. What I say, is that now, after you've had toast, it is impossible to change that fact, so it is necessary. So I'll repeat, though I doubt it will affect your strawman, before the act, it is possible, after the act, it is necessary.

I am resisting your "proposal" because if we have a real choice in the matter, like you say we do, then it was not necessary that I had toast instead of cereal for breakfast this morning. I had a real choice to have had cereal instead of toast. That is, the past situation of me having toast for breakfast this morning was not necessary. I am using "necessary" here in the sense of "inevitable" or "predetermined", as opposed to having a "real choice" in the matter — Luke

I agree with all this. You had real choice in that act. What I am saying is that after the act, after you had toast for breakfast, you no longer have that choice. It is impossible, at this time, after you had toast, to decide not to eat the toast you already ate. Since it is impossible for you to change this, it is a necessity, i.e. it is necessary.

We believe we can make a distinction between events that were bound to happen, and events that were not; in which case, there must be a difference between (1) saying, at a time B or later, that nothing can happen that will make it so that the coffee has not fallen, and (2) saying at a time A or earlier, nothing can happen that will make it so that the coffee does not fall. To say that an event in the past was not inevitable, is to say that (1) is true of it but (2) false. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, this would be my position, (1) is true but not (2).

Is there any non-question-begging way to deny this is possible? We cannot, ex hypothesi, object that an event in the past at time X is in the past for any time after X; the hypothesis is exactly that this is not so. In what, then, does the immutability of the past consist? Is it brute fact? Could it conceivably not be? — Srap Tasmaner

The immutability of the past is just a brute fact, which is upheld by empirical evidence, like gravity, the freezing point of water, etc.. Sure we can say that it is logically possible to change the past, just like we can say that it is logically possible to defy gravity, and we simply ignore all empirical evidence when proposing such "logical possibilities". These might even have purpose like hypotheticals or counterfactuals. But that's why there is potentially an infinite number of possible worlds, we can propose any sort of logically possible world, so long as it's not inconsistent or contradictory. Where this might become a problem is if we give priority of importance to what is logical possible over what is physical possible. Then a person might be inclined to say that because something is logically possible it must be true, without regard to whether it is physically possible.

f it was ever possible to prevent the cup of coffee from falling off the car, then at no time is it, was it, or will it be necessary or inevitable that it did fall. — Luke

As I've explained, this response indicates that you do not respect the reality of time. You say, what was once a possibility will always be a possibility. But that ignores the fact that things change as time passes, including possibilities. So it is very often the case that an event which was a possibility at time A, is not a possibility at time B. I think it is really inconsistent with our lived temporal experience to insist as you do, that an event which is truthfully described as "possible" at one time cannot be truthfully described as "necessary" at another time. You do not have to be a rocket scientist to know that possibilities have a window of opportunity.

That being said, I agree moral rules are much more important than conventional rules, but that alone says nothing with respect to their logical ground..... — Mww

Right, now the issue is how are logical rules grounded.

If it should be the case that the human intellectual system, in whichever metaphysical form deemed sufficient for it, is entirely predicated on relations, it should then be tacitly understands that system is a logically grounded system, insofar as logic itself is the fundamental procedure for the determination of relations. Hence it follows, it being given that all rules are schemata of the human intellectual system, and the human intellect is relational, then all rules are relational constructs. From there, it’s a short hop to the truth that, if all rules are relational, and all relations are logically constructed, and all logical constructs themselves are determinations of a fundamental procedure, then all rules are logical rules. — Mww

As I said in the last post, I think you have this backward. Logic is a highly specialized, formal way of thinking. So using rules is the more general category, and logic is a specific type of this broader category of activity. Therefore I think not all rules are logical. There are many rules which are not logical at all.

The question now is, if we break rule behaviour into subgroups, like the categories you did, conventional rules and moral rules, which does logic fall into? Or is it a distinct group on its own?

Logical principles are neither moral nor immoral. Morality is an innate human condition, determinable by logical principles which relate a purely subjective desire to an equally subjective inclination. In other words, this feels right, therefore it is the right thing to do and I shall will an act in accordance with it. — Mww

I don't at all agree with this. What would be the point of moral training if morality is innate? I agree that the capacity to be moral is innate, but this must be cultured to produce a moral character. I believe it is very clear that morality is not based in what feels right. I suppose these opinions are outside the scope of this thread.

For example, if I had a real choice of whether to have toast or cereal for breakfast this morning, then it was not necessary that I had toast (as I did) because I could have had cereal instead. — Luke

Right, at that prior time it was not necessary. However, at this posterior time it is necessary. Human beings have a completely different attitude toward acts in the past, in comparison to their attitude toward acts in the future. You seem to be refusing to account for the reality of time in the human attitude, and the difference between prior and posterior. Here is an explicit example from your earlier post.

If the former, then what is actual is/was not necessary. — Luke

See, you explicitly conflate "is" and "was". There is a reason why we have different tenses for verbs, if you insist on ignoring this, then this discussion is pointless.

You refuse to acknowledge this argument against the necessity of actuality. — Luke

How so? I've responded to your supposed argument. It is simply based in a failure to recognize the difference in temporal perspectives. Looking ahead in time at future acts, is not the same as looking backward in time at past acts. Therefore, within the minds of human beings, future acts have a different status from past acts.

If you are ready to accept this difference then we might be able to proceed by applying some names to describe the difference. I propose that we look at future acts as "possible", and past acts as "necessary". You are resisting this. Can you explain why? Your argument so far seems to be that if we name past acts as "necessary", then future acts must also be called "necessary". But as I've explained, that is to ignore the difference between how we look at the past and how we look at the future.

Is it the same to say logical rules are useful in support of the attainment of personal goals? — Mww

Not quite the same, because what I am saying is that the particular rules which become accepted by people, and therefore form the conventional rules of logic, obtain that status of being the conventional rules, because they are useful. The issue being a question of what a particular set of rules is useful for.

So here is the difference between what I suggest and what you suggest. What you suggest is that anyone could take any set of logical rules, and use them toward personal gain. What I suggest is that particular logical rules could actually be shaped such that their principal purpose is personal gain. So, if the specific type of personal gain is somewhat immoral, then what you would suggest is an immoral person using rational logic in an immoral way. What I suggest is immorality which inheres within the logical principles. This would be irrational logic.

If the most personal one can be, is demonstrated by his moral convictions, and if logical rules are the ground for particular personal goals, then it follows that logical rules are not so much merely consistent with, as in fact necessary for, the dispensation of him toward his moral activities. — Mww

Yes, but this assumes that there is no immorality inherent within the logical principles.

All rules developed and used by us, in private, rational decision-making, re: judgment, without exception, are reducible to logical rules. — Mww

I disagree, I think that all rules, including logical rules are reducible to moral rules. This is because the role of intention and purpose. Logical necessity is reducible to a form of need. We need to follow the rules of logic to understand, or for any other purpose we might use logic for. And the rules which dictate how we relate to our needs are moral rules. Therefore the necessity whereby we draw logical conclusions is a form of need, and how we treat our needs is governed by moral rules, so the rules of logic must conform to moral rules.

I'm pointing at that phenomenon so that I can block it from undermining our claim that actuality entails possibility. If it's only a conversational implicature, it has no bearing on the relevant entailments. — Srap Tasmaner

The issue is the implications for sophistry. "Sophistry" I would define as the misuse, or abuse of logic. If certain accepted principles of logic are designed such that they may facilitate sophistry, through a form of deception which inheres within the principles themselves, then this is an implication which ought to be addressed.

Are they real possibilities which each have a genuine chance of being the actual outcome, or are they merely a function of our knowledge/ignorance and there is only ever one real possibility? — Luke

As I said, they are a feature of one's knowledge. However, this does not mean that they are not real or genuine. Knowledge is real and genuine. The realness, or genuineness of the possibilities which one considers is dependent on the scope of one's knowledge of the situation. Sometimes a person will fail in an effort to do something, and sometimes a person might not grasp a possibility which is obvious to someone else. That the possibilities are in one's mind, and are features of how one understands one's current situation, does not mean that they are not real. Nor does it mean that the person has no real choice.

If the former, then what is actual is/was not necessary. If the latter, then we have no free will. — Luke

Sorry, I don't understand the basis of these conclusions at all.

As I said, the possibilities which are present, at the current time (at t0), are possibilities regarding the future situation (at t1). You acknowledge this with the example about today's possibility of tomorrow's sea battle - the possibilities are regarding the future situation, not the present situation. The possibilities are not about themselves; they are about the future potential sea battle. — Luke

Yes, those possibilities are how we think "about" the future, just like we can say something "about" the future.

And I am saying that if there were other genuine possibilities prior to the act being carried out, then it was not necessary, because one of those alternative possibilities could actually have been carried out instead. It is only if there had been no other genuine possibilities that could actually have been carried out instead, that the act being carried out would be necessary. — Luke

Sure, but at this time, after the act, one of the other "genuine possibilities" (whatever that means) was not actually carried out instead. And, it no longer is a possibility because the act chosen was carried out instead. And, this cannot be changed, there is no possibility of going back in time to alter it, therefore it is necessary.

You do not seem to be properly accounting for the temporal perspective. Prior to the act it is a possibility which can be chosen. Posterior to the act it is an actuality which has already occurred, and therefore necessary rather than possible. This is obvious in our day to day experience. We know that we cannot change the past so we describe it as what has actually occurred, and we also believe that we can describe the future as possibilities. To deny this difference is to deny the reality of time.

So, prior to the act we describe it as a possibility. The possibility is "about the future", as you say. After the act we describe it as an actuality, something which has actually occurred. It is now a fact, not a possibility, and is therefore treated as a necessity in the logical proceeding. Therefore the same act has a different type of description depending on one's temporal perspective, before or after it.

We can apply this to the act of counting the coins in the jar. Prior to counting the coins, the number of coins in the jar is described as a possibility. Posterior to counting the coins, the number of coins in the jar is described as an actuality. This is a true representation of what we believe about the number of coins in the jar. Prior to counting we do not know the number, and we understand it as a possibility. Posterior to counting, we know the number and understand it as an actuality.

Your assertion that all actual situations are necessary negates that there are ever any genuinely alternative possibilities, and thus precludes free will. — Luke

Obviously this is not true. It is a simple aspect of our experience, as human beings, that we view events of the past differently from events of the future. So the very same event is spoken about differently when it is in the future than when it is in the past. This is the result of the difference in temporal perspective. Clearly understanding this aspect of our experience does not negate genuine possibilities. It just provides a healthy respect for the reality of time and its role in relation to "genuine possibilities".

No, the speaker might know that the book is in the car but choose to be coy, though literally honest and correct, in saying "The book might be in the car". If I was looking for the book, then I would not appreciate my friend being coy that way, but he would not be logically incorrect. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Of course you would not appreciate your friend behaving like this, because unless you are engaged in some sort of guessing game, it is dishonesty. And, your claim that it is "literally honest and correct" is very much refuted by your own admission that you would not appreciate it, even though you would assert that the friend is not logically incorrect.

What is at issue here is the inconsistency between what is logically correct, and what is morally correct, honest. Since you accept that this type of behaviour, which is asserted to be logically correct, is in general not appreciated (because it is clearly dishonest I would say), you seem to recognize this inconsistency.

You are talking with a poster not capable of making sense. — TonesInDeepFreeze

What that poster says makes sense. But some who are taught that something contrary to what the poster says makes sense, refuse to allow the possibility that what the poster says also makes sense. Those are the closed minded.

The sad thing is that your clear explanation will not correct the confusion here. That confusion is wilful. — Banno

See, even Banno recognizes that it makes sense, to the poster at least, as it is said to be willful. It is the others, who see things differently from the poster, and see them as clear, who are closed minded to the views of others. The poster in question sees the ambiguity and therefore does not see the things as clear. Yet ambiguity makes sense to that poster because ambiguity is as much a part of reality as the people who see ambiguous propositions as something clear are a part of reality.

Those different possibilities are regarding a future situation, not the current situation. — Luke

That's really not how Srap was using "possible worlds". We were talking about hypotheticals, counterfactuals, and whether or not it is raining out. Here is where Srap Used "possible worlds" in an example.

For example, the hypothetical assumption “Suppose I have lost my copy of Lewis 1973” picks out a set of possible worlds at which I have indeed lost my copy of Lewis 1973. If I determine that in any such world (or only in nearby worlds, or in sufficiently similar worlds, etc., whatever the appropriate restriction is) I would be a miserable cuss, and I would prefer not to be, then I can discharge the assumption by concluding, for example, “If I were to lose my copy of Lewis 1973, I would have to replace it.” — Srap Tasmaner

We do not know whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow, and it is possible today that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or there won't be a sea battle tomorrow. But. come tomorrow, there will be no other possibilities regarding the sea battle except for the one that becomes the actual situation. — Luke

I will follow this example though, if you like.

Exactly. The particular possibilities at t0 are possibilities regarding the future situation at t1; they are not possibilities regarding the present situation at t0. There are no other possibilities (for t0) at t0 other than the actual situation. — Luke

No, the possibilities are the ones which are present, at the current time. Yes, they are derived from our view toward the future, but they are stated as the possibilities which are present. They are an aspect of one's knowledge. So, "that there will be a sea battle tomorrow", is a possibiltiy present right now in my mind, if I believe this. That's why the action involved in this possibility which exists now, is stated as "tomorrow", because the possibility exists prior in time to the act, i.e. today. At the current time, there are many possibilities for the future, within my mind, and yours too I assume.

ou either had other possibilities (prior to eating the cake) at t0 besides eating the cake at t1, or you didn't have other possibilities at t0 besides eating the cake at t1. If you had other possibilities at t0, then eating the cake at t1 was possible. If you didn't have other possibilities at t0, then eating the cake at t1 was necessary. I don't agree that eating the cake at t1 was necessary if you had other possibilities at t0. This a misuse of the term "necessary". — Luke

I'm saying that after the act is carried out it is no longer a possibility in my mind, it is necessary, as what has been carried out, what is actual. Example: Yesterday there was a sea battle. I believe that this actually occurred, therefore there are no other possibilities in my mind. In my mind, by my knowledge, it is a fact, something necessary, impossible to be otherwise, not a possibility.

You appear to be equivocating on the meaning of "means". We're using it in the sense of a definition, not in the sense of entailment. — Michael

Unless someone provides a definition, "meaning" is not being used in the sense of a definition. So in common usage, which is what we seemed to be talking about with the example "the book is in my room", people do not provide definitions for the words they use, therefore the meaning of those words is not "meaning" in the sense of a definition. It is meaning in the sense of how they are used.

The T-schema doesn't say that asserting the proposition "the book is in my room" entails that the book is in my room. It only says that the book being in my room is the truth-condition of the proposition "the book is in my room", and according to Davidson the definition of a proposition is given by its truth-conditions. — Michael

Yes, but don't you see that when someone says "the book is in my room", this can only imply that the book is in that room, if we add the premise that the statement is true (in that sense of "true"). And, the statement only "means" (as in what is meant by the speaker) that the book is in my room, if the person speaks truthfully (honestly). So if you are not talking about what is implied logically through definition, nor what is meant by the language in its use, what other sense of "meaning" are you appealing to?

What you mean by "possible" is that the future holds more than one possibility; that there are several possible worlds and one of those becomes the actual world. — Luke

What was meant in the quoted passage, was that "possible worlds" referred to logical possibilities for what is the case. If we do not know precisely what is the case in a specific situation, we allow for many different possibilities. So it's not really about future possibilities here, but logical possibilities. That was the reason for the use of "possible worlds". Srap introduced that, to try and get a handle on the meaning of "possible".

If there is more than one possible world at t0 and one of those becomes the actual world at t1, then the actual world at t1 is still one of those possible worlds that was at t0; one of the possibilities that could have been. — Luke

The particular possibilities at 10, are no longer possibilities at 11. That's the nature of passing time, things change as time passes

If you had many possibilities prior to the act, then the one that became actual remains one of those possibilities. — Luke

No, none of them are possibilities after the act, not even the one you chose, that's the point. You can't have your cake and eat it too. Once you eat the cake, eating it is no longer a possibility.

Ok. What is communion as you’re using the word? — Mww

Communion would be all forms of participating in and sharing of thoughts, and activities, like communication and working together. What I explained is that logic has a foundation in imagination and is supported by usefulness. So it is, in its foundation, a private activity, like strategy. Since usefulness is defined relative to particular goals, which are personal, and this is what supports these rules, the rules of logic are fundamentally inconsistent with the rules of communion (human interaction), which are moral rules.

That I can assert a falsehood isn't that it doesn't mean precisely what it says. — Michael

That a statement could "mean precisely what it says" is what is nonsensical. The statement consists of words, symbols. What it means is an interpretation of the symbols. The interpretation is not a restatement of the same symbols. The meaning of the statement cannot be "precisely what it says". That makes no sense at all.

No, I don't. It's a nonsensical inference. — Michael

Look at the T-schema discussed earlier by Banno. "The book is in my room" is true iff the book is in my room. In this example, "the book is in my room" only means that the book is in my room, if the statement is true. In other instances "the book is in my room" means something else.

Why do you believe that this is nonsensical?

The meaning of "the book is in my room" doesn't concern what I believe. — Michael

I'm very distressed to hear that. Since it is very obvious that you could state "the book is in my room" when the book is not in your room, then it is also very obvious that "the book is in my room" means something other than that the book is in your room. Do you not agree with this?

It is not the case that (1) entails (2). It just doesn't. But conversationally, we take an utterance of (1) to implicate a commitment to (2). And that commitment is purely conversational; you do not contradict yourself if you say, "Well, it might be in my room — as a matter of fact I know that it is." — Srap Tasmaner

Exactly, and this exemplifies how commonly accepted principles of logic fail us, and can easily be used to deceive. Honestly, (1) does entail (2), as I've explained. If I honestly say the book is possibly in my room, this implies that I do not know where the book is. And if I use that statement when I know where the book is, I would be most likely engaged in deception (or possibly a guessing game).

So, if we define truth with honesty, then we can see that logic strays from truth in this example. Commonly accepted principles of logic allow that "the book is actually in my room", and "the book is possibly in my room", might both be true at the same time, when in reality this represents a sort of dishonesty.

There's no more a contradiction here than there is in Mitch Hedberg's joke, "I used to do drugs. I still do, but I used to too." Implicature is not entailment; that's the whole point. — Srap Tasmaner

But I didn't say the problem is contradiction. That's the point it's not contradiction, which involves opposition, I said it was an inconsistency because opposition is not involved, incompatibility is involved. Contradiction is to affirm is and is not of the same predicate. In this case, the issue is that "possibility" as what may or may not be, naturally violates the law of excluded middle, that's how it is defined. Then, in MIchael's examples, a relationship between what actually is (what is consistent with the law of excluded middle), and what possibly is (what is not consistent with the law of excluded middle) is proposed. This proposal creates the inconsistency which is evident from the dishonesty exemplified.

And that's another reason that approaching all philosophical problems in terms of what people say or can't say is so misleading; there are other rules than logic at work in what people say to each other and what it will be taken to mean. — Srap Tasmaner

Again, this is exactly the issue here. General rules for communication are based in honesty. Honesty is a requirement for communion. However, logic is not based in communion, being more like strategy, so it does not have this requirement. As evident from forms like mathematics, logic is fundamentally imaginary and the rules which become conventional are the ones which prove to be useful. Usefulness and honesty are sometimes inconsistent with each other, as demonstrated by the reality of deception, and so the rules of logic may become inconsistent with the rules of communication.

The inconsistency we've exposed demonstrates two very distinct ways of conceiving the relationship between possible and actual. One way is based in the rules of honest communication, what I call truth, the other way is based in the logical rules of usefulness.

"Possible" is the opposite of "impossible". It is absurd to deny it. — Luke

You obviously have not given any thought to what you are saying here. You just take it for granted that possible opposes impossible, as you claimed, "may or may not be" opposes "must or must not be", and you keep asserting this. I suggest you go back and read the post I made in reply to this proposition, exposing the problem with this assumption, and if you have any specific issue with what I said, you can bring it up with me. To reiterate what I said very succinctly, what is "possible" (as what may or may not be), must be outside the category of what is "necessary" (as what must or must not be) rather than opposed to it because if "possible" is opposed with "necessary" this places them in the same category. Placing "possible" in the same category as "necessary", or "impossible" (as a special form of necessary), leaves the true nature of "possible" as impossible to understand. In other words, it is a misrepresentation of "possible" which is not consistent with the truth about "possible".

You do not get to personally decide the meanings of these words. — Luke

Why not? This is how we proceed with logic, define the terms (personally decide the meanings of the words) then proceed with our propositions. The question is rhetorical though. I know we disagree on what constitutes meaning, so there's no point in you replying to that.

Whether or not the book is actually in my room has nothing to do with what I believe. — Michael

Exactly! And, we are not talking about whether or not the book is actually in your room. We are talking about the proposition "the book is actually in my room", along with the proposition "the book is possibly in my room", and what these two propositions mean. Since the meaning concerns what you believe, rather than what is actually the case, then whether or not the book is actually in your room is completely irrelevant.

No it isn't. It's the only thing that's relevant. We're concerned with truth, not belief. Your mistake is to continue to treat the word "true" as meaning "honest", which it doesn't. — Michael

"True" is a predicate of "belief", in the sense of knowledge, "justified true belief". When we talk about propositions like "the book is actually in my room", and "the book is possibly in my room", what is being represented here is beliefs, not real world situations. If you think that real world situations are being represented by these propositions, explain to me what real world situation could possibly be represented by "the book is possibly in my room".

Since "the book is possibly in my room" cannot possibly represent any actual real world situation, we must conclude the obvious, that it represents a belief. And, since this proposition represents a belief, then to maintain consistency we must also affirm that "the book is actually in my room" represents a belief as well, or else we are comparing apples and oranges and your assertions just are a big category mistake.

The book doesn't just cease to exist, or fail to have a location, simply because I don't know where it is. — Michael

Right, and this is why the proposition "the book is possibly in my room" must refer to what you believe, not some real world situation. And so, to correctly establish a relation between this proposition and "the book is actually in my room", without a category mistake, we must assume that the latter refers to a belief as well. Then we see that the two beliefs are inconsistent with each other.

Interesting. What other rules might those be? — Mww

I addressed this above. The rules of communion are based in moral principles, which are quite distinct from the rules of logic.

That's a pretty good explanation. Put simply "the book is in my room" implies that I know where the book is. "The book is possibly in my room" implies that I do not know where the book is. That's why the two are inconsistent with each other.

But I'm not implying that the book isn't actually in my room. — Michael

What you don't seem to understand MIchael, is that whether or not the book is actually in your room is completely irrelevant here. These statements have nothing to do with whether or not the book is actually in your room, because you could be lying, mistaken, creating a fiction, whatever. The statement refers to what you think, what you believe. And, by stating that the book is possibly in your room, you are implying that you do not believe that the book is actually in your room. "The book is possibly in my room" represents a belief distinct from that represented by "the book is actually in my room. And the one is inconsistent with the other.

If you honestly state that the book is possibly in your room, you imply that you do not honestly believe that it is actually in your room. Therefore your statement "the book is possibly in my room", implies that you do not think that the book is actually in your room. If you belief that the book is actually in your room, and you state that it is possibly in your room, you are being dishonest in your statement. Whether or not the book is actually in the room, or possibly in the room (whatever that might mean independent of belief), is completely irrelevant, so there is no point for you to keep bringing this up. It's just a distraction. We need to focus on the beliefs represented by the statements.

However, if I recall correctly, you made the absurd claim earlier that "possible" is not the opposite of "impossible". — Luke

That's right, imposible ought not be considered as opposite to possible, because it leads to the ambiguity of "necessary" which I described and you don't seem to understand.

Then you have likewise rendered "possible" as extremely ambiguous and misleading. — Luke

Yes, "possible" is extremely ambiguous and misleading. But it has been this way for a long time, so it is not I who has rendered it thus.

This thread's going swimmingly. — Banno

Said Pilate who wouldn't stay for the answer. Come on, jump in! Or is it a little too frigid for you?

But to say that the future is as yet undetermined, for instance, or that we cannot change the past, if those are to be substantive claims, have to mean something besides the future is future and the past is past. What underwrites that understanding of the temporal modalities? — Srap Tasmaner

I think what underwrites these modalities is experience. But it isn't direct experience, like we tend to say that sensation is experience, it's more like an analysis of what constitutes experience. This is a philosophical approach to experience. So it is a philosophical activity of the human being, which reflects on its own living experience, recognizing that experience is complex rather than simple, and seeing the need to break it down into its constituent parts.

I think we can say more, and the way to say more is to turn to mathematics, from which time has been deliberately excluded. See what you still have without time. What we find is that there are ways to make issues we are familiar with most often in temporal terms tractable for reason in non-temporal terms. — Srap Tasmaner

To simplify the complex by ignoring the difference between the distinct parts which make it complex, is to produce misunderstanding.

I would have thought the opposite to "may or may not be" was "must or must not be". — Luke

I don't' think this would be a proper expression. I believe it is very similar to the mistake which Michael was making, when you try to oppose possible with necessary. The problem is that when we turn to the temporal nature of reality, what is, is what is necessary. And what is, is in the same category as what is not, as its opposite. Now we would have two very distinct opposites of "necessary", what is possible, and what is not.

So if we accept your proposition, "necessary" becomes very ambiguous. There is the "necessary" which is opposed to "what is not", related to empirical description, and there is the "necessary" which is opposed to "possible", related by your definition, as a proposition for logical proceedings. These two senses of "necessary" are very different, yet very difficult to distinguish.

The issue is that opposites are members of the same category, hot and cold, big and small, positive and negative, etc.. But in a philosophical examination of reality, we find that we need to allow for the reality of things which have no opposite. These are the categories themselves, heat, and size, for example. They have no opposite. And, we've come to know, through experience, that the categories provide the potential (possibility) for actual description. They've been given this name.

But even in the description I just provided, "possible" might be understood as a further category, the category of categories. But this type of description is how the problem of sophistry which Socrates and Plato exposed arises. If we understand this as a category of categories, then this category of categories must be the same as the other categories, being a itself category. Then we want to make sure it is like the other categories, for the purpose of deductive logic, and we represent it as consisting of opposing extremes for the purpose of description. The category of categories is then a category. But it's unsound.

So you would propose that we oppose "what may or may not be" with "what must or must not be", thereby opposing "possible" with "necessary", so that we have an unsound category of "the possible" allowing the possible to be described for the purpose of deductive logic. But all this does is defeat the purpose of putting "possible" outside the categories of logic, thus rendering the reality of possibility impossible to understand through this faulty definition. At the same time, you produce a fictitious, or completely imaginary conception of "the possible", which is totally misleading.

If what is actual is not (also) what is possible, then what is actual is (also) what is necessary.

If what is actual is (also) what is necessary, then this precludes free will. — Luke

Yes, this is exactly the problem with defining "possible" like you propose, which I explain above. It renders "necessary" as extremely ambiguous and misleading.

Clearly this is opposed to common use. — Michael

To the contrary, it is exactly consistent with honest use. When you say that the book is possibly in your room, you imply that the book may be elsewhere. When you say that the book is actually in your room, you imply that it is not elsewhere. So when you say that it is possibly in your room I must decide whether to look there or elsewhere. or how long I should spend searching your room, etc.. But when you say it is actually in your room, no such decisions are required.

This is why it would be deception for you to say that the book is possibly in your room when you believed that it is actually in your room. These two beliefs are inconsistent with each other. So you would be misleading me by telling me something inconsistent with what you honestly believed. Therefore if you continue to insist that this is common usage, I will insist that you commonly deceive.

What’s incoherent in the successive accumulation of the real? When the accumulation is the content of the possible, the quantity is irrelevant. It is whatever it is. — Mww

When you are talking about "the sum", quantity is not irrelevant. And, a successive accumulation without end, does not produce a sum.

Agreed. That in quotation marks and taken from my comment, indicates I said it. But I didn’t. I said that which exists is in the sum of the possible. — Mww

Sorry, my mistake. Regardless, it is "the sum of the possible" which is incoherent.

I don't know, to be honest. We always describe things through terms of actuality, what a thing is. So possibility, being not actual, must be something other than this, something which does not submit to description. I believe this makes it impossible to say what "possible" is a subset of, because that would be assigning it some sort of actuality. Therefore, I believe that "possible" must be understood in ways other than descriptive ways. The best way, I think, is with reference to time. Like I said before, prior to the free will act, the act is a possibility. After the act it is an actuality. So possibility is likely some sort of feature of time. And, since the concept of "time" in the way I spoke of it here, encompasses both possible and actual, then we can say that it is neither possible nor actual, but both.

So what's the difference between "not actual" and "non-actual"? — Michael

That is explained in the post. Iif you will take the time to read it, you can ask me what you do not understand. Depending on what you mean by "not actual", "possible" does mean "not actual". This is because the two concepts are mutually exclusive, inconsistent with one another, such that if something is truthfully said to be possible, it cannot at the same time be truthfully said to be actual. That's what I explained to say one when you believe the other, is to be dishonest.

That aside, either if something is possible then it isn't actual or something can be both possible and actual. So which is it? — Michael

The former, as I explained, and described how this is a logical conclusion derived from the definitions. You can go back and read the posts if you want to understand why this is necessarily the case.

Kant says no....That which exists is in the sum of the possible. The sum of the real, the actual, cannot exceed the sum of the possible, therefore is contained by it. — Mww

The idea that the possible can be summed can be shown to be incoherent, because the possible can be assumed to be infinite. So it is also incoherent to say "that which exists is the sum of the possible", or to speak about "the sum of the possible" in any way.

Having said that, the actual, as we know it, is definitely contained, and it may be the case that it is contained by the possible. But if there is a limit to the possible (a sum of the possible), then the limiting thing must be some sort of actuality. This is a sort of version of Aristotle's cosmological argument, where he demonstrates that in an absolute sense, the actual must be prior in time to the possible. It just isn't the same sort of actuality which is known to us, as this sort is contingent actualities, and these are preceded in time by the necessary possibility. It's a special type of actuality known by theologians.

You asserted the latter, which is false. — Michael

You misquoted me. I said "non-actual". I suggest you read my post before replying. Your rapid response indicates a strong probability that you did not allow yourself to understand it.

This is false. That the book is possibly in my room isn't that the book isn't actually in my room. — Michael

You are not adhering to the definitions Michael. "Possible" refers to what may or may not be. "Actual" refers to what is and is not. If you say that the book is possibly in your room, then you are saying that it may or may not be in your room. This is logically distinct from saying that it actually is in your room, or actually is not, according to the definitions. Therefore the conclusion I stated is sound.

I have no doubt that there is much common usage which is represented by your examples. People say that if there is a multitude of possibilities as to how many coins are in the jar, one of these possibilities is the actual number. And, people also say that if the book is actually in your room, then that it may or may not be in your room is true. But the issue is, whether speaking like this is correct. And I use "correct" here in the sense of what we ought to do, rather than in the sense of what is common practise. Sometimes habits of common practise are not what we ought to be doing.

As I explained above, this habit you describe is the manifestation of a sort of dishonesty. When you say "the book is possibly in my room", this would be a dishonest statement if you believed that the book is actually in your room. Therefore the belief represented as "the book is possibly in my room" excludes as inconsistent with, the belief represented as "the book is actually in my room", in an honest discussion of whether or not the book is in the room. What "the book is possibly in my room" means is distinct from, and excludes as inconsistent with, what "the book is actually in my room" means.

Furthermore, if in the instance of the coins in the jar, we allow that one of the possibilities is the actual (what is actually the case), then all the others must be designated as impossible. Therefore, it should be very clear to you, that if we allow that one of the possibilities is what is actual, this would negate the status of "possible" from all the others. So to correctly maintain the status of "possible", in an honest way, we must not allow the idea that any one of the possibilities is the actual, thereby maintaining the categorical separation between possible and actual. Allowing the separation to be closed contaminates the idea or concept of "possible", in the minds of each of us, rendering us susceptible to deception through that type of usage which has a dishonest base. (I'm trying to appease Srap by not calling your particular use dishonest, rather saying that this type of usage has a dishonest base).

When I say "the book is possibly in my room" I'm not saying "the book isn't actually in my room". — Michael

As I said, the two (possible and actual) are not opposed to each other. But obviously, saying "the book is possibly in my room", is to say something completely different from saying "the book is actually in my room". I think you'll agree that these two each say something distinct. And what I am saying is that the two beliefs expressed with these sayings are not consistent with one another. If you believe the book is possibly in your room, you do not believe that it is actually in your room. And if you believe that it is actually in your room you do not believe that it is possibly there.

To assert that the book is possibly in your room when you beilieve that it is actually in your room is to be dishonest. And, to assert that it is actually in your room when you think that it is possibly in your room, is to be dishonest. That these are instances of dishonesty indicates that the two are incompatible with each other.

I admit that there is a way to formulate things, so that we say that one of the possibilities is what is actually the case (one of the possible numbers is the actual number of coins in the jar). But as I explained earlier, this is just based in the assumption that one might be determined to be the actual. It doesn't mean that one already is the actual, because that would be deceptive. They must all be equally possible, and when one is determined as the actual, then all the rest lose their status of "possible", and therefore become impossible. So no matter how you look at it, one cannot be the actual while the rest are possible. They must be all possible without an actual, or one actual and the rest impossible.

Otherwise telling you where something might be is telling you where not to look.

Your position doesn't appear consistent with common use. — Michael

In common use, telling me where something might be, is completely different from telling me where it is. And if you know where it is, and I ask you, and you tell me "I don't know where it is, but I know where it might be", you are being dishonest. Likewise, if you don't know where it is, but know where it might be, and you tell me you know where it is, you are being dishonest. Clearly, it is your position which is not consistent with normal usage. Common usage demonstrates a healthy respect for the difference between what is actually the case, and what is possibly the case. And we do not mix these two up, to say that we think something is possibly the case, when we believe that it is actually the case, or vice versa.

I use a different definition, but the ends are the same. Possibility is merely one of the ways to think about things; a thing is possible or that thing is impossible, but that does not make the conceptions themselves opposites. All they do is condition the thought of the thing. Just as cause is not the opposite of effect; just as necessary is not the opposite of contingent. — Mww

But the issue is the relationship between what is possible and what is actual, and the fact that one is not a special case of the other, such that the actual would be one of the possible. What we believe as "actual", is what is, of necessity, and therefore not one of the possible. But being not one of the possible in no way implies that the actual, or necessary, is impossible.

As a temporal sort of modality, that seems fine. Once I have marked a box, would either of you say that it is true of each of the other boxes that, though it is not the box I marked, it might have been the one that I marked? If actuality is the closing off possible futures, can we not imaginatively consider an early time at which the actual present was only a possible future, one among many? — Srap Tasmaner

I think this is the common misconception of free will, which leads to all sorts of problems. After you have marked the box, engaged in the free will act, we cannot, from that temporal perspective, say that you might have marked a different box. From that temporal perspective, after the fact, it is impossible that you might have done otherwise. You did what you did, and at this time it is impossible that it might be otherwise. And this misconception (straw man), that if you had free will, you might have done otherwise, when you really can't because what's done is done. gives fodder to the determinist argument, . However, this does not change the fact that prior to the act you have many choices, and there are many possibilities for boxes which you might mark. So free will is very real from this perspective, despite the fact that you cannot have dome other than what you did. What this indicates, is that the two distinct temporal perspectives, prior to an act, and posterior to an act, are very different perspectives.

Above I spoke hypothetically of having a stack of boxes one of which I intended to mark. How do you conceptualize what we are doing when we reason in this way? Am I talking about a possible future in which I do have a stack of boxes? — Srap Tasmaner

I would say that this is simply imagination. However, I would also say that imagination is closely related to the way that we anticipate the future. The principal difference being that we anticipate the future in a way which is grounded in the reality of the past, so it is a disciplined imagination, but we may allow our free imaginations to escape this grounding in an undisciplined sense.

Yes, I was. But I can adapt to your usage. All I need to say, using your terminology, is that the actual world is a world. Done. In my usage, if the actual world is not a member of the class of possible worlds, it’s a member of the complement, which would be the class of impossible worlds — if there are any such things, depending on the accessibility relation. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't understand your use of "complement". You need to explain how there is a "complement" to "possible". As I said, there is no opposite to "possible". And to use "impossible" as the opposite to "possible" is to stray from the definition "what may or may not be". What "impossible" means is outside this category, not a member of "what may or may not be", and this is completely distinct from opposite to, and what I believe is your meaning of "complement."

An assumption H, for the purposes of hypothetical reasoning, picks out a set of worlds at which H is true. The actual world may be such a world. — Srap Tasmaner

You have a double layer of actuality here which needs to be clarified. First, H is true, or actual, in a set of worlds. Then, "the actual world" is one of these worlds. If we assume that the set of worlds is possible worlds, then we cannot say that H is true in these worlds, because "possible world", as "may or may not be" excludes truth. Since you say H is true in these worlds, then I conclude they are all actual worlds, and you have given no possible worlds.

Perhaps you need to define "true".

All good? — Srap Tasmaner

No, very bad.

In modal logic, p → ◇p. If something is true then it is possibly true. Possibility is defined as "not necessary", and something is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds. — Michael

Obviously, this is the problem, we are working on a different definitions of "possible". I define it as what may or may not be, consistent with common use. You define it as "not necessary". Your definition is a problem, because not only is modal logic working with a sense of "possibility" which is completely inconsistent with common use, but your definition is completely circular, leaving modal logic irrelevant to the real world.

You defined "possible" relative to "necessary", and "necessary" relative to "possible worlds". Therefore you have no real grounding to either of these terms, they simply exist and are used relative to each other, having no real meaning. This is why, as I explained earlier, we always need to establish a relationship between the possible worlds, and the actual world in any such application.

This relationship restricts the set of possible worlds, through the determination of "what may or may not be", which is derived from a determination of what is necessary, according to a judgement of the real world. In application, we determine what is necessary through judgement of what is assumed to be the actual world, and from this is created a set of possible worlds. So "possible" then is grounded in what may or may not be, in relation to an assumed real world.

Fine. It’s not my usual usage, but if you want to reserve possible for non-actual, it makes no real difference. It makes world carry a little more of the burden, but that’s also fine. — Srap Tasmaner

"Possible" is not defined as non-actual, it is defined as what may or may not be. And, since actual is defined as what is, it is a logical conclusion that the possible is non-actual. it is impossible that something which is said to be possible, could also be said to be actual, without logical incoherency, inconsistency. The proposition that X may or may not be (is possible), is inconsistent with the proposition that X is (is actual).

This is the issue discussed earlier in the thread, with the number of coins, prior to the count. Prior to the count, the true proposition is "it is possible that there is 66 coins in the jar". After the count, the true proposition is "there is actually 66 coins in the jar", because they've been counted. But we cannot turn around and say that there was actually 66 coins in the jar, prior to counting, because the true proposition at this time was that it is possible that there is 66 coins in the jar. And to say of what may or may not be, that it is also at the same time, what is the case, is incoherent. And this is, at the same time, the time prior to the count, but just from different temporal perspectives.

Not *only* the same, because it's the one with the x on it, but it's still a box. You forgot to give an argument that putting an x on a box makes it not a box, or that you have to erase "possible" in order to write "actual". — Srap Tasmaner

The problem is that you have no argument for me to address, your analogy does not relate. Look at it this way. I'm not saying the actual world is no longer a world. It's still a world just like the box with the X is still a box. The X signifies that the box is not in the same category as the unmarked boxes, just like "actual" signifies that the world is not in the same category as the possible worlds. In other words, putting an X on the box separates it from all the rest, in a way which gives it a unique status so that it is no longer an unmarked box, like the others. Likewise, designating one world as "actual" gives it a unique status so that it is not one of the others, the possible worlds.

You cannot have your cake and eat it too, unless you employ ambiguity and equivocation. Try this way of looking at it. Suppose "possible world" means that if we identify all the possible worlds, one of the possible worlds must be the actual world. That is, we assume such a thing as the actual world, and we assume we've identified all the possible worlds, so necessarily one of the possible worlds is the actual world. Then we proceed to identify one of the possibilities as the actual world, the real world. As soon as we do this, we negate the defined status of "possible" from all the other worlds. They can no longer be the actual world, because we've identified the actual world and it's something else. Since we've named one as "actual", the others can no longer be classed as "possible", without changing the original definition of "possible".

What's odd here is that the complement of possible is impossible. Me, I assumed actuality implied possibility. I'm puzzled why you think actuality implies impossibility. — Srap Tasmaner

I never used "impossible", you are putting words in my mouth;

But actuality does not imply possibility. Check your categories. Actual and possible are distinct categories. What is actual is what is, and opposed to this is is not. "Is" and "is not" are of the same category, being. What is possible is what may or may not be, and that is a distinct category from being. Because possibility, by this definition, violates the law of excluded middle, it has no opposite. So the common use of "impossible" places it as outside the category of "possible", as not within the realm of what is possible. This is not to say that it is the opposite to possible, because there is no opposite to may or may not be.

It is a common misunderstanding to think that impossible is the opposite of possible. Consider the example above. When the actual world is identified, all the other proposed worlds must be removed from the category of possible (by that definition), because now it is impossible that any of them is the actual world. But this is not the opposite, of possible, as possibility has been removed by designating an actual. Impossible therefore, is the opposite of actual.

We don't know with deductive certainty. But that's not the relevant or appropriate standard. The relevant standard is to look out the window and see whether it's raining. — Andrew M

But this is just going around in a vicious circle. The example says that someone might be hosing the window. So according to the example, looking out the window doesn't give us the certainty required to know whether it is raining.

So if I have a stack of boxes and put an X on one of them with a Sharpie, it’s no longer a box. Cool. Nice job. — Srap Tasmaner

That is not what I implied at all. The point being that "possible" must be taken ais a value judgement. So to make your analogy accurate, we'd take a bunch of boxes, and assign the same value to each of them, "possible". Then we take one, mark it with an X, and assign to it a special value, "actual". We cannot say that the one with the special value still has the same value as the others.

The difference, which makes your analogy unacceptable, is that the X is not just an X, being a property of the box, as you propose. The X signifies something. And what the X signifies is that the thing has a value unique from the others which all have the same value, therefore it cannot be categorized with the others as having the same value.

An assumption H for the purposes of hypothetical reasoning picks out a set of possible worlds at which H is true. That set may or may not include the actual world. We may or may not know whether it does. — Srap Tasmaner

The problem I see with the possible worlds scenario, is that if we assume possible worlds, and we want to assign "actual world" to one of them, then we need some principles to support the "actual world" as distinct from the others. Then, the actual world is a special world, and cannot be one of the possible worlds, because it has that special status which sets it apart as distinct. So if hypotheticals assume "possible worlds", we must maintain that none of these possible worlds is the actual world, because the actual world would necessarily require a separate category, as having the distinction of being unique and different from the set of possible worlds.

So in conclusion, if we are applying "possible worlds", we must maintain that we necessarily do not know whether the set of possible worlds contains a world which accurately describes the actual world, because this would make it distinct from the others, and therefore not one of the others. If we allow that we know one of the possibilities to be actual, this would be a prejudice, and it would support a disguised sort of begging the question, a dishonesty.

The goal then would be to discharge the hypothetical assumption in a true counterfactual conditional, which may be degenerate in the sense of having an antecedent that is true at the actual world. I understand those are tricky to deal with, but oh well. — Srap Tasmaner

According to the principle described above, the "counterfactual" is completely wrong, in principle. It proposes a possible world in which the actual world is already assumed to be distinct and known as distinct, hence counter to fact. So unless we describe all the details which distinguish the proposed possible world from the actual world, and account for each one of the relevant differences, the proposed counterfactual provides us with nothing valid toward our assumed actual world, and is likely more misleading than anything else. In other words, the usefulness and reliability of the counterfactual is completely dependent on the principles whereby the actual world is related to the counterfactual world.

The "true" option would be to relate the counterfactual only to other possible worlds, and produce conclusion completely in the realm of possibilities, with no reference to anything actual, as explained above. But this removes any usefulness. And to produce usefulness, we'd have to assume an actual world, and then relate each counterfactual world to the actual world. And that's where the problem lies, the prejudice which constitutes any proposed "the actual world".

For example, the hypothetical assumption “Suppose I have lost my copy of Lewis 1973” picks out a set of possible worlds at which I have indeed lost my copy of Lewis 1973. If I determine that in any such world (or only in nearby worlds, or in sufficiently similar worlds, etc., whatever the appropriate restriction is) I would be a miserable cuss, and I would prefer not to be, then I can discharge the assumption by concluding, for example, “If I were to lose my copy of Lewis 1973, I would have to replace it.” — Srap Tasmaner

Taking this example, in order for it to be useful, you need principles to relate the possible world to an actual world. Otherwise nothing grounds "my copy of Lewis 1973", and "I would be a miserable cuss", etc.. The "true" way to proceed with the hypothetical would be to relate the possible world to an endless number of other possible worlds, you don't have a copy, you have one and you hate it, etc.. Then each aspect of any proposed "actual world" which might be introduced, to narrow the field of possible worlds, would have to be assessed, and valued for 'probability of accuracy', through the application of standards, before any aspects are accepted as true aspects of the actual world. Now, in this scenario, we still fall back on the basic principle of judging the truth and falsity of the propositions. However, the truth of the proposition is judged as a 'probability', rather than bivalence. The whole structure hinges on maintaining the separation between possible worlds and actual world, and enforcing the principle that any aspect of a possible world has only a probability of accurately representing the assumed actual world.

Obviously it is an assumption of the hypothetical that it is raining. But Alice makes no such assumption. She instead forms the justified belief that it is raining because she looked out the window and saw what looked to her to be rain. (Or, for Srap Tasmaner: in knowledge-first terms, Alice knew that it was raining because she looked out the window and saw that it was raining.) — Andrew M

And we do not know whether it is raining or not, if knowing requires truth in your sense, despite the assumption of the hypothetical. The hypothetical gives us an assumption, not something about the actual world. So it does not give us truth. My belief is that if we pretend that something said, which says nothing about the real world, actually does say something about the real world, this is deception. Lying is the common form.

Yes, of course. What the hypothetical shows is that knowledge is possible on a JTB view. Alice's belief was justifiable in both hypotheticals even though there was the possibility (from her point of view) that she could be mistaken (as she was in the second hypothetical). — Andrew M

There is no truth though, in the hypothetical, because the hypothetical gives us assumptions, not truth. So there is no truth to Alice's supposed knowledge, just a hypothetical truth.

BTW, as a general observation, you and I are, in effect, speaking in two different languages. What makes it especially difficult to translate is that we use the same words to convey very different ideas, such as "know" (which is ordinarily used in a factive sense), "true", "assumption" and I suspect a few others. — Andrew M

There is a lot of ambiguity in these words, and I agree it is a problem.

Still not sure what point you’re making though. — Srap Tasmaner

Just demonstrating the faultiness of Andrew's example.

Perhaps the assertion "I know that p" is implicitly the assertion "I know that p and I am certain" and so the assertion "I know that p but I am not certain" is implicitly the contradictory assertion "I know that p and I am certain but I am not certain"? — Michael

I think this is a sort of self-doubt, a form of skepticism related to one's own beliefs. Sometimes it is acceptable to say, I know that such and such is the case, but I'm not quite ready to accept it. Or something like that. For example, after something really bad happens, and you wake up in the morning and have to remind yourself that it really happened. It's a sudden change in your life, and you know that it's true, but it takes a while to permeate your entire mental capacity, so your old self in its usual habits, is still pushing you to doubt it, though you know it ought not be doubted.

No, the hypothetical shows the logical consequences which follow from the condition that it is actually raining in the real world. People make assumptions. But whether it is raining or not is a condition that is independent of people's assumptions. — Andrew M

Yes, and the hypothetical consists of statements which someone makes, therefore, assumptions. Do you understand that there is a separation between the hypothetical, which states the condition "it is actually raining", or "if it is raining", and the real world? You put these together as "the condition that it is actually raining in the real world". But they don't belong together, and in producing the illusion that they do belong together is where the deception lies. The real condition of the hypothetical is the assumption that it is raining, while what is actually happening in the real world is completely independent from this assumption, unless we account for a person's act of judgement.

I for one would appreciate it if you stopped saying things like this. Andrew and Michael are clearly not trying to deceive you. If they are mistaken, then they are mistaken, but there’s no deception here. — Srap Tasmaner

As far as I know, meaning involves intent, what was meant. So in the use of statements such as the above from Andrew M, where the speaker blatantly refuses to recognize the separation between what is said (the hypothetical in this case), and a real world situation represented by what is said, when this separation is pointed out to that person, I cannot conclude anything other than intent to deceive. I suppose the person might simply misunderstand, but why would a person keep insisting on something they have no understanding of?

(2) If, for the sake of a hypothetical bit of reasoning, and with some concern about the weather but no access at the moment to a weather report, suggest that if it is raining, we won’t be able to go for a walk, I hold no belief either way about whether it is raining; I only mean to suggest how we should act if it turns out (that is, if at a later time we actually know) that it’s raining. Quite different from (1), in which the “assumption” is what I honestly believe. That’s simply not the case here. NB: these are the sort of assumptions that must be discharged; it’s just the terminology of natural deduction. — Srap Tasmaner

Do you recognize that #2, the hypothetical itself "if it is raining, we won't be able to go for a walk", is an assumption, just like #1 consisted of an assumption. It's just more complex. This says nothing about the real life consequences of it actually raining in the real world, it says something about your attitude toward your assumption stated in #1 if you assume that it is raining you will not take a walk.

You may of course do as you like, but the rest of us have not invented some special usage for “know” or for “true”; I’m using them exactly the way everyone I know uses them, this being the population that is also perfectly comfortable saying “I could have sworn I knew where I left it, but it’s not there, so I guess I was wrong.” — Srap Tasmaner

Neither am I inventing any special usage, "tell the true" is common usage, meaning speak honestly. The problem is in the ambiguity of the terms, not in an individual inventing idiom.

Here, I’ll give you a good one. When I was a kid, I was taught, and I learned, that there are nine planets. That is no longer true, but it was true at the time, because there is a specific body of astronomers who make the “official” determination of whether a solar object is a planet. In such a case, I might be able to say I used to know that there were 9 planets, but now I know that there are 8. Note that I have made no mistake and have no reason to retract my knowledge claim. But suppose it was a couple weeks before I heard that Pluto had been demoted; during that time I might get into a heated argument with someone I think a fool because he says there are only 8 planets. At this point I will be wrong; I will be in the position of thinking that I know how many planets there are, and I will be wrong about that. Once he points out to me that there was a change in Pluto’s status, I will readily admit that I thought I knew, but that he was right. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so you say at one time it was true that Pluto is a planet, and at a later time it is not true that Pluto is a planet, though nothing significant changed in the object itself, there was a change in attitude toward the object. This allows that "Pluto is a planet" was true knowledge, and at the later time, "Pluto is not a planet" is true knowledge.

I go further, and ask the question, what is it about this use of "true", which allows that something which is true at one time, later ends up being not true, without any change to the object itself. And I answer this with, it is the subjective nature of "true", that "true" represents the attitude of the subject, more than anything else, which allows that what is true can change to being what is not true, in this manner. This attitude expressed by "true" is an attitude of honesty.