Any examples of that you could show us? — Wayfarer

I think the best example is "virtual particles". The issue I believe arises from the the practise of positioning mass as a "centre of mass". Interactions between massive objects are modeled on the basis of a centre point of mass, very similar to what we commonly call the centre of gravity. This places the mass at a non-dimensional purely hypothetical "point". Since it is not a real, or true representation of how the mass of an object actually exists, when we model two centres of mass interacting, there is a need to employ "virtual particles" as a medium between the two points which represent the two centres of mass of the two objects, in order to model the two cetnres of mass as interacting with each other. In other words, instead of modeling how the two massive objects actually interact with each other, two hypothetical centres of mass are modeled as interacting, via the medium of hypothetical virtual particles.

Your position presupposes matter, mine presupposes the possibility of matter. You’re talking about matter as if its already given, I’m talking about how it possible that it is given. — Mww

But "matter" is purely possibility in the first place. As defined by Aristotle, it is potential, the potential for change. So in talking about "the possibility of matter" you are proposing the possibility of a possibility. This would either be redundancy, and we would take possibility (as matter) for granted, like I do, or else the two possibilities might negate each other to form some sort of actuality. The latter is incoherent, so we are left with the former, we take matter, as possibility, for granted, as a given.

For that matter which affects my senses, I don’t care about matter that is merely “extended in time”, but absolutely require matter that is extended in space, otherwise there is no affect on my senses at all, and for me in which case, I would have no means to know matter exists, a most profound absurdity. — Mww

The problem is that it is not matter which affects your senses. If we adhere to the formal understanding of "matter" as expounded in Aristotle's hylomorphism (which our current understanding of matter is based in), it is forms which affect your senses, not matter. What affects your senses is activity, actuality, and it is the forms of things which are active, and changing. Matter is posited as the principle of potentiality, to allow for the possibility of such active forms, but it is purely cognitive, a logical principle required for our minds to make sense of the reality that forms are active.

To be extended does not make necessary extension in a certain way. — Mww

My OED says of "extend", "lengthen or make larger in space or time". The problem is, as I explained, that "matter" does not require any spatial extension. This leaves only temporal extension, and temporal extension is explained by the concept of inertia. But we still have the issue of "mass". "Mass" cannot be explained by "extension". It is directly related to inertia, as a sort of quantity of inertia, but it is not the same thing as inertia, So "extension" fails as a proposal for the principal property of matter, because the principal measurement of matter, mass, is not a measurement of an extension.

All shapes are reducible to extension in space, which is all that is necessary for the matter of objects, as far as our sensibility, and thereby our representational faculty, is concerned. — Mww

But the issue is matter which has no spatial extension. This is what denies spatial extension from being the defining feature of matter.

Yes, to be plunged into the dark ages was a very good thing. The problem is that when the principles of a culture are untrue, corrupted by falsity, or other forms of vice, and philosophers point out these problems, no one really listens. That's what happens in this forum, when I point out the falsities which are currently abundant in mathematics and physics. People here say, the principles serve their purposes, so unless I have something better to offer, forget about criticizing those conventions. But since the principles serve their purposes, no one is inclined to look for better ones. Therefore it is necessary to first recognize the principles as bad, and destroy the bad principles, thereby providing the necessary conditions for the development of better ones. The phoenix rises from the ashes.

Christianity actively demolished the philosophical schools of Athens and Alexandria, destroyed philosophical texts and persecuted teachers of philosophy. The detrimental impact of the Christin hegemony on intellectual life was not reversed for a thousand years. The classical texts were so utterly destroyed in Europe that they had to be "rediscovered" in the east, mostly from Islamic sources. — Banno

Trashing that shit and corruption was for the good of humanity. Look at how much further we are ahead today, in our knowledge, than if we would have kept up the ancient Greek traditions.

I think to reduce further: the principle property of matter, is simple extension, the one thing impossible to abstract from matter, and still have matter identifiable as such. — Mww

I don't think I'd agree with this, because I don't think that "extension" is a well defined term. In a sense, it means to be extended in a specific way, but that way is left unspecified. So, what does it mean to be extended in a specific unspecified way?

If we say that temporal extension, to be extended in time, is the defining property of matter, then this would be reducible to inertia, as inertia can be conceived of, as the cause of being extended in time. But if we stipulate that matter is defined by having spatial extension, then this may not be supported by empirical evidence. It appears like fundamental particles may not have any spatial extension at all.

So, I think that if we define matter with "extension", it must be temporal extension, and this is consistent with "inertia". "Mass" is a more difficult concept, because it relates the temporal inertia to spatial presence, through a value, a quantity which is equivalent to its inertia, which is assigned to a place, or thing with a spatial position. So mass is, generally speaking, a quantity of inertia. The problem is that there is no requirement for any specific shape, or size (in the sense of spatial extension). So mass is a quantity which can be assigned to a dimensionless point in space. This is evident in the practise of marking the centre of mass.

Strictly speaking yes, "stuff" and "matter" are different things. But to signify something that is independent of us, these terms can be used loosely to point out this general idea. — Manuel

The issue I see is the question of whether "matter" actually is something independent of us. When I start to analyze the concept, I find that it is only that, a concept. And there really doesn't seem to be anything real, independent from us, which corresponds with this concept. We could say that it is a useful principle, but nothing in the world corresponds with it, it's just a principle which helps us to do things in the world, and better understand the world.

I anticipate a lot of interesting exchanges, though this may be my imagination going rampant. I agree, pre 1905, space and time were absolute presuppositions. But then I wonder, in manifest experience, would we be able to isolate space and time absent stuff (matter, substance, etc.)?

We need space and time to access matter, but without matter, I don't see how space and time, innate as they are, could be exhibited. Perhaps matter, alongside being presupposed by space and time, allows us to discover that space and time are a priori.

For if we had no empirical world to use these faculties, I don't see how anything could become manifest as a priori or as being formed by our experience. — Manuel

I think you need to separate "matter" from "stuff". Experientially, stuff is prior, as what we experience. Then we understand that the concepts space and time are the necessary conditions for the behaviour of stuff, activity (or that the intuitions of space and time are the necessary conditions for even sensing activity). Then "matter" is posited to account for the substance of the stuff, which is active. So matter is purely conceptual.

The issue which Berkeley pointed out, and process philosophy continued with, is that the concept of "matter" is not logically necessary for the existence of stuff, as activity. If all is change, flux (Heraclitus), then there is no matter, because "matter" is the concept used to explain how something remains the same over an extended duration of time. If there really is nothing which stays the same over a duration of time (as with relativity theory), then there really is no matter.

The possibility of matter absolutely presupposes space and time, — Mww

Matter is what maintains its spatial presence as time passes. That's why its principal properties are inertia and mass. Density is another can of worms altogether.

Much of what you write is correct, but it fails to take into account logical type levels. — Marvin Katz

I have no idea what you mean by "type levels".

Question of ethical relevance at an ethics site: Why is this your will??
Is your character (moral nature) - ethikos- such that you go about rejecting what people say when they make a philosophical assertion in their attempt to contribute to a better comprehension? — Marvin Katz

Yes, that is exactly why it is my will to reject. My will is to reject because you have not justified your claim, and I am of a skeptical nature, especially in matters of ethics.

So I ask: is this looking to poke holes in people's efforts, or to find fault, or to be negative and argumentative ...is that your idea of 'being ethical'? — Marvin Katz

It is a philosophical outlook, I seek the truth. So, I don't simply accept as a matter of course, what someone else proposes. To begin with, I don't succumb to the illusion of "authority", because this is a known fallacy.

Is that the conduct of one who has a good character? Why not just ignore what seems to you to be stupid remarks? I hold that that would be the more-ethical procedure.} I will explain that your personal choice to reject is on a higher type-level than the S-value you are rejecting. — Marvin Katz

This is just subjective babble to me. If you want to explain "type-levels" to me, then be my guest. Perhaps you might justify your proposal. Or, you might expose it as truly contradictory (the way I see it), depending on which is actually the case.

BTW, that is not my formula. Professor R. S. Hartman, a logician and formal axiologist, worked it out. I am not the only one, though, who finds that formula to be useful in the field of Ethics: an entire institute is dedicated to honoring him and doing further research to extend his work. See the academic Journal of Formal and Applied Axiology. — Marvin Katz

I am generally not impressed by axiologists. They tend to produce axioms designed for a purpose, deny this, and claim that the axioms produce are derived from some pure absolute intention, beyond rebuke, and not subject to judgements of truth or falsity. Since they deny that the axioms are created for a purpose, when they really are, it is a form of deception.

The issue brought up in the Hoffman quote is the same as the true vs. useful issue. It is the fundamental problem of empiricism. So long as scientific hypotheses are judged according to a principle of usefulness, such as predictive capacity, those hypotheses will never give us truth. Evolution is guided by usefulness, not truthfulness.

That valid, coherent formula is:
I > E > S. — Marvin Katz

I think my criticism holds. Let me spell it out in another way. Your formula, I > E > S, is itself an instance of S. My will, being an instance of I, is to reject your formula, as a faulty form of S. Therefore my rejection of your formula is justified by your formula.

In other words, your proposal, that I ought to accept your system, I > E > S, is incoherent, or at best hypocritical, because your proposal is to put your system (S) as higher than my personal values (I).

That's one smart cat. Many human beings wouldn't make that jump with a safety net below; you'd have to push them or throw them.

I think there is confusion in this thread between what is "essential" to being human, and what distinguishes human beings from other beings. What is "essential" is what is necessary. So to be an animal is essential to being human. But of course, being an animal is not what distinguishes human beings from other beings. So the question of what is essential to being human is not the same question as what distinguishes human beings from other beings.

That's how a cat can jump out a three story window without injury, and they are said to have nine lives, they are above the laws of physics.

E > I [ e.g., putting materialism ahead of people; caring more about stuff or money than about a person.]

S > E [giving a dogma, an opinion, or an ideology higher priority than a thing, a possession, a meal, etc.] — Marvin Katz

These two are obviously inconsistent, or contradictory. If, it is wrong to give priority to material things over human persons, then how can it also be wrong tp prioritize an ideology or dogma as higher than a material thing?

Isn't it the case that the first E > I, is itself a dogma or ideology? So the only way to see a person as higher than a material thing is to allow that dogma and ideology are also higher than material things. But this contradicts the second, S > E.

If the idea is to transport heat from the depths to the surface, then water/steam is probably the most feasible. If the idea is to convert the heat to some other form of energy, like electricity, at the source, then transmit that energy to the surface, this is a much more difficult problem. You would need a thermoelectric generator which created a very high voltage, to be able to efficiently transfer substantial electrical energy to the surface. I don't think the technology is available.

I would think that the fact that water boils, therefore greatly expands, at a relatively low temperature, would be a great benefit, even though such expansion might appear to be a little bit more risky. It's really not more risky because we have all the technology required to contain steam pressure. And, harnessing energy always involves some risk.

Gas provides a better way to transport energy, like a heat pump. Also, there's a substantial distance to cover, and velocity is more important to energy transport than mass. This is the system we already have naturally in the atmosphere, water evapourates, and releases its energy into the atmosphere when it condenses. We just need to set up a multitude of similar (contained) systems in the ground.

The extreme temperatures you speak of, are the true causes of the greater risk. This would require a much greater depth in the earth, and significantly stronger transport materials. Lower temperatures and higher velocity is obviously the more practical choice.

Sure, but it's a different technology. Iceland's geothermal is hydrothermal; energy drawn from underground bodies of hot water. — karl stone

Water is an efficient way to move energy through the ground.

Iceland already receives a large portion of its energy from geothermal sources. Wikipedia says:

"Five major geothermal power plants exist in Iceland, which produce approximately 26.2% (2010)[2] of the nation's electricity. In addition, geothermal heating meets the heating and hot water requirements of approximately 87% of all buildings in Iceland."

But again, since the contention of (1) is that we can explain some things, and not that we can explain everything, it is pretty irrelevant. — Banno

I don't see where you get this idea. (1) states very explicitly "We live in an ordered universe that can be understood by humans.". It does not say 'some of which can be understood'.

So we end up with that there are patterns in the world, and a conservation principle. — Banno

The conservation principle is clearly inadequate. It dismisses losses (entropy), which are clearly significant, as irrelevant.

I'm a philosopher too, and I consider myself a peon. So no insult was intended. Philosophers with grand ideas are not given much esteem in our society. Now, if you were a scientist, you might give them something to discuss, study, debate, study again, discuss, vote on, study again, debate again, vote on again, ad nauseam.

NATO claims that it’s got a “right of expansion”, allegedly, as a “defensive” measure in response to "Russian aggression". But if NATO has that right, so does Russia.

In other words, if NATO expands for fear of Russia, Russia invades Ukraine for fear of NATO. — Apollodorus

This is ridiculous Apollodorus. There is a big difference between an organization like NATO expanding because other countries are willfully joining, and a country expanding through forceful invasion of another.

It’s exactly the same logic. — Apollodorus

You sure have a bad sense for logic.

Any claim that physics provides an inadequate understanding of the way things work, made via the internet, is a laughable performative contradiction. — Banno

This all depends on you criteria for "adequate". Some of us seem to have far have higher standards than others.

The most I'm asking of the ruling classes is the stroke of a pen when they ought. — karl stone

It appears you're not very well informed as to how democratic governments proceed. Everything must be discussed, studied, debated, studied again, discussed, voted on, studied again, debated again, voted on again, ad nauseam. It is not just a matter of the supreme ruler signing off on some peon's proposal.

I disagree. It is both Collingwood's and Kant's understanding that you can't dispense with all underlying metaphysical assumptions. I agree with them. Science cannot proceed without them. — Clarky

Dispensing with all underlying metaphysical assumptions is not the issue though. The issue is the consequences of science proceeding from false metaphysical assumptions. So it is not a matter of removing all such assumptions, and proceeding with none, it is a matter of subjecting them all to a rigorous form of skepticism, and proceeding only from those which pass.

The way I said it was awkward and potentially misleading. Your formulation is probably better. Kant himself wrote "All phenomena, then, are continuous quantities" which is probably even better. — Clarky

The problem is, that ideas such as this, "there is an infinite number of points between any two points", are very useful principles, which are not true. Work done at the Planck level demonstrates the falsity of that principle. So useful principles, when not true, tend to have their limits, and when employed at those limits, are counter-productive, producing misleading and deceptive conclusions.

We can take the position, that these fundamental principles, absolute presuppositions, need not necessarily be true, (which they are not in actuality), and we can also hold that the laws of physics which follow from them need not be true as well, (they just require a predictive capacity), but we will suffer from the consequences of such a choice. At those limits, where the predictive capacity of those laws breaks down, where the fundamental presuppositions no longer apply, we will be forced to make all sorts of exceptions, excuses and rationalizations, to continue application of those principles, in acts of self-deception.

Therefore the more appropriate position to adopt is to be skeptical and doubtful of these absolute presuppositions, and the laws of physics which follow from them. We need to subject them to formalized principles of skepticism, reveal the falsities hiding within, and reject them accordingly. In short, we ought to look for truth in such principles rather than usefulness.

It isn't that they are so much opposed to geo-thermal as they are opposed to risking their economies, as currently operated. This is not a mistaken danger. A sudden switch away from fossil fuels to any other system could not be done overnight, and the transition is more likely to be wrenching and wrecking rather than smooth and pleasant--whether the destination is geothermal, hydrogen, photovoltaic, wind, or hydro. — Bitter Crank

People do not do a lot of things they should and could do, whether that is giving up tobacco, exercising more, avoiding war, or demanding magma wells NOW. — Bitter Crank

The pivotal concept here is "laziness". As we get older we get set in our ways, happy to relax, live off our investments, and just sort of enjoy the luxury which the hard work of our younger days has providing for us. The prolonging of one's life becomes the principal focus. It's natural that older people get lazier, as the body gets weaker. And western society is generally governed by the elders, now the baby-boomers. At this age, they have not the motivation and ambition required for radical change. The governing class, in a word, are lazy, this renders them as incapable of effecting significant change.

They create a specific ‘way’( a metaphysics), and assume future philosophy will follow this path and add more clarity and detail.
In other words, they claim to have reached the bottom (the way) as far as they can tell. — Joshs

The way to the bottom is not the bottom. And until one arrives at the bottom, any specified "way" may prove to be faulty. Any philosopher knows this, and despite the fact that I think my way is the best way, as philosophers do, I also respect the fact that my way may prove to be faulty, as other philosophers do as well.

[8] The universe is continuous. Between any two points there is at least one other point. — Clarky

Isn't there supposed to be an infinite number of points between any two points? Why would you state it as "at least one"? It seems like the incoherency of this idea, demonstrates the falsity of the proposition "The universe is continuous". A number of your stated "absolute presuppositions" can be demonstrated to be false.

I don't agree that those authors claim to have reached the irreducible basis of things. In general, they each describe an approach, a method, but they do not claim to have reached the bottom. There's a big difference between claiming to be pointing the way, and claiming to have reached the end of the voyage.

Would you like to elaborate? — Joshs

I don't think I've read any philosopher who believed oneself to have "reached the irreducible basis of things and has stripped thought of superstitious accretions". If I knew that this was the case, before reading it though, I'd reject it as bad philosophy, and not bother reading it. Perhaps Wittgenstein thought that way when he wrote the Tractatus, which was bad philosophy, but then he later realized that he was wrong to think that way, and produced some better material.

I have to say that every philosophical position I’ve ever read believes that it has reached the irreducible basis of things and has stripped thought of superstitious accretions. One can only recognize their position as just one more worldview once they have transcended it. — Joshs

Sounds like you haven't read very much philosophy.

Is it your position then, that objects do not have independent existence? — Mww

That's right, that's what I've been arguing. The appearance of "an object" is something created by the subconscious system. What this appearance, or "objet" is, is a representation, or a symbol, which signifies something meaningful. Remember, I didn't allow a real, essential difference between an appearance created from memory, imagination, or dreaming, and one created through sensation. The appearance of an object is created by that sub-conscious system, what I called the brain, so I have no reason to believe that there are objects independent of that system. We call the independent "objects" because that's the way it appears to us, and it is convenient for communication.

I hold “appearance”, not as what a thing may look like, which you’ll call its image....maybe..., but that a thing has initially presented itself, has made its appearance, a euphemism indicating something’s made itself available to sensibility. I don’t need to distinguish anything about appearances; they, in effect are the distinction, between having and not having sensations. As such, I rather think sensations are derived from appearances, not the other way around. Nothing is actually lost by deleting the term, going straight from perception to sensation. — Mww

How do you account for the reality of dreams then? How can it appear to a person, like one is having sensations, when the person really is not. The reality of this issue is not as simple as a simple distinction "between having and not having sensations", because in dreams it appears like I am having sensations when I am not. Therefore we have to account for the reality of the "appearance" of sensations. When it appears like I am having sensations, sometimes I am (when I'm awake), and sometimes I'm not (when I'm asleep).

So, having and not having sensations is not a useful dichotomy because it doesn't explain the reality of having the appearance of sensations. And, if the brain can create the appearance of sensations (in dreams), then there is no reason to rule out the possibility that the brain is creating the sensations themselves. And if this is the case, it is better to call this the appearance of sensations. That's why you cannot accurately say "nothing is actually lost by deleting the term", because something actually is lost. What is lost is the possibility that the brain is actually creating what you call "sensations", and if this is the case, it would be better called "the appearance of sensations".

So we say, the sensation represents the appearance of an object. — Mww

This is not the way we describe this. The appearance is in the mind. We might say that the sensation represents an object (assuming the object to be external), but to" appear" is to have been perceived. So the appearance of an object is always said to be in the mind. What I am saying, is that the sensation, in the conscious mind is the appearance of an object. But "sensation" requires the production of that appearance of an object within the mind, and this production is not done by the senses. And the "appearance", which is within the mind, represents whatever it is (having meaningful significance), which is external.

Only, such faculty needs a division, which I mentioned previously, as productive and reproductive. — Mww

This is the division I've denied. I say that they are essentially the same process, except one utilizes more sense input.

The conscious part, the one with which we are familiar, is the reproductive imagination, which fabricates that which will become the representation of the external object as it is actually cognized. Or, simply put....as we think it to be. — Mww

I don't get this. If the sub-conscious has already synthesized the object of sensibility, isn't that already the representation of the external object (assuming an external object)? All that the conscious mind can do now is recall that object from memory, think about it, and perhaps name it. The only real fabrication that the conscious mind does is in conception. But conception deals with abstractions, universals, or generalizations, and these are not representations of an external object, they are generalizations from many objects. So the division which needs to be made is between the part which deals with particular objects (or representations of the external object), and the part which deals with conceptions, abstractions.

Yes, this creative activity is between sensing and reasoning, but it doesn’t create principles. — Mww

I disagree, I think that principles are created by this intuitive, creative part of the mind. It clearly isn't reasoning which creates principles, because many people follow unreasonable principles. Furthermore, if reasoning created principles, we'd have that vicious circle. Reasoning is to think in a principled way. But if principles are created by reasoning, there is no way that the first principle could have come into existence. So we need to allow that principles are derived from something other than reasoning, something like intuition.

No, because brain and nervous system are physical realities, but the sub-conscious mind is only metaphysical, and speculative at that. No empirical proofs possible kinda thing. — Mww

The problem here is that the senses are physical realities, just like the brain and nervous system. So we have to cross that bridge between the physical reality of sensation, and the metaphysical reality of what's in the mind, some place if we want understand the role which sensation plays in relation to the conscious mind. I place that crossover at the brain and nervous system. If we do not allow the crossover, then we cannot even talk about sensations as having any real external input into the mind.

So the "sub-conscious" serves to bridge that gap. From the perspective of the conscious mind, in the act of introspection, the sub-conscious marks the end, the limit. So we can understand sensations as being derived from the sub-conscious, because we can't get to the senses themselves through introspection. And, from the physical perspective, the brain is the limit, as to how far the physical explanation can proceed toward the conscious. Empirical science can explain sensation up until the brain, but it cannot say how the brain produces a conscious sensation. So I propose that the sub-conscious, and the brain, are essentially the same thing, approached from different perspectives.

As far as the reasoning process in and of itself is concerned, why do representations need to be given names? What the reasoning process is actually doing as a reasoning process, doesn’t use names. The reasoning process assigns names post hoc for no other reason than to describe itself. The use of words in your consciousness is mere rehearsal, the method by which what is thought is then going to be objectified in some form of physical action. — Mww

I think you must have a different idea of what constitutes "reasoning" from what I do. "Reasoning", from what I understand is to proceed with thinking in a logical way. Logic requires symbols, names, for its proceedings. That's what separates us from other animals, we think using symbols (we reason), and when formalized, this is called logic. Therefore assigning names, symbols, or words, is necessarily prior to, as required for, the reasoning process.

I also think that if you tried to describe a "reasoning process" which did not use names, symbols, or words, you would just be describing "thinking". But thinking is much more general than reasoning, as many animals think, but only human beings reason. So reasoning is a very specific type of thinking. In introspection we find reasoning at the very top of consciousness, as the highest form of thinking. When we go deeper we find different types of thinking, which utilize images that are initiated for whatever purpose, and even deeper we find daydreaming where the images are initiated without any real purpose or reason. All these are forms of conscious thinking. If we try to go even deeper in introspection, we find that the mechanism which creates the images is unassailable, as sub-conscious, but we can still conjure up the images, call for them, with the conscious mind.

I propose that we could make an analogy, a comparison. We have access, to some extent, through introspection, to the way that the conscious mind assigns words or symbols in representation. In analogy we could say that the sub-conscious creates images or representations in a similar way. And this is how I come up with the arbitrariness.

I offer that there are two kinds of representation, not levels, and, names are assigned to indicate how a thing has been understood because of the logical synthesis of representations. — Mww

This is where we differ, as I explained. I see names as necessary for, and therefore prior to a proper (rational) understanding. If you propose a deeper, more fundamental level of "understanding", such as what another type of animal might have, which is prior to naming, than this type of understanding still would require symbols, or representations, which are images.

But I firmly reject your proposal because I think it is very important to understand that representations, as images, symbols, words, or in whatever form, are necessarily prior to thinking, and used by thinking as the required "building blocks". It is important to understand this, because these fundamental building blocks of thinking, having been synthesized at a level prior to the actual thinking which utilizes them, are the weak points of that thinking. This is what I meant when I said that the premises, or axioms, are the most fallible aspect of the logical process.

This is very significant, because this is where the actual meaning, content, or subject matter, of the thinking lies. So our intellectual world might be full of logical formalisms, which amount to meaningless fluff, chaff, because the actual meaning is veiled behind the principles which support the formal structure. And if we dig down to that fundamental meaning, which supports the entire formal structure, we find that it is extremely vague, indefinite, and uncertain.

When a word is a foreign language is heard by a person, he will not understand the meaning of it. Or, say, an action indicating a meaning is given to a person who doesn’t understand the act, like....putting a finger orthogonal to the lips to indicate being quiet....if a guy doesn’t know that sign, he won’t understand what is expected of him when he perceives it. Only from experience, then, does meaning antecede understanding. — Mww

Doesn't this indicate to you, the exact opposite of what you are claiming, and that is what I am claiming, that naming is prior to understanding? We can receive a name, and even use it as a child learning to speak demonstrates, without having an understanding of its significance.

This works for a two-party communication. You naming something must occur before my understanding of what you mean by that name, yes. We see that right here in this dialectic, wherein each of us uses words with their inherent meaning derived by our individual cognitive systems, and that use is not thoroughly understood by the other. “Appearance” is a good example, insofar as a word common to each of our vocabularies carries different understandings with it pursuant to what it is meant to indicate. As we can see, we each misjudged the understanding of the other in his use of a common word. The prime indicator of all that is...we each refrain from calling out the other as wrong in what is said, but rather, we say we do not agree (do not concur from similar judgement) with what was said, or we say we do not understand what was said (cannot afford a judgement at all). — Mww

So, I request that you carry this one step further, to see that I can use a word without an understanding of how I am using it. This is a sort of trial and error process, as children do when they are learning to speak, and I submit that it is fundamental to the existence of knowledge. It is very evident in cutting edge science like high energy physics. The experimenters will assign names (like the names of various fundamental particles) without any sort of understanding of the thing being named. Naming is the very first step toward understanding, because it allows for logical proceedings.

Half and half. Yes, knowledge is always emergent: in me because of me, or, in me because of you. Understanding is only emergent in me because of you but is intrinsic in me because of me. Understanding here indicates the specific function of a faculty in a systemic whole, not that on which the faculty operates as means to an end.

You probably mean you can get me to understand something, which seems to say understanding emerges, but it is still my understanding that does all the work, such that I may know what you mean. Which is to say, An understanding emerges. The understanding of something emerges.

Please don’t consider this as mere quibbling, when in fact, it is the very reason why decent metaphysics tomes are of so gawd-awful-many pages. Getting things just so, no over-lap, no confusion in terminology. — Mww

What you say here doesn't completely make sense to me. When you say understanding "is intrinsic in me because of me", I see this as somewhat incoherent. If it is intrinsic in me, then it is an essential aspect of me, and cannot be caused by me, it must be caused by whatever caused me. Otherwise it would be like a thing causing itself, which would mean the thing is temporally prior to itself, and this is incoherent. So if understanding is "because of me" (caused by me), which I agree with, then it is not intrinsic in me, but emerges within me. This is a very important difference because now we need to seek an internal cause of understanding, which is other than understanding itself.

The difficulty is in the ambiguity between the noun, an "understanding", and the verb, "understanding" which is the process that causes an understanding. When we make the act or process of understanding the cause of the noun, the understanding, we seem to neglect the need for a cause of the act, the process. So you say understanding is "intrinsic" within me, but this is not really true because the act of understanding is really caused within you by something else. This makes "understanding" as something emergent within you rather than something intrinsic within you. Evidence of this, is that a baby must learn how to understand, it is not an innate capacity. The baby is not born with the ability to understand. These finer points, what you say is not quibbling, but making terminology clear, are very important in understanding the nature of agency, which is the feature of causation.

It is within this matter of "agency", where you and I are furthest apart. You think that external objects cause the sensations, impressions, or representations of the external world within us, I think that internal agency is the cause. When you neglect the need for a cause of the activity or process which is called "understanding", and take understanding for granted as intrinsic within me, you do not apprehend the need for internal agency in the same way.

Careful here, not to conflate reason the human condition, with reason the cognitive faculty. In the first sense, there is nothing antecedent to a necessary condition, but in the second sense.... — Mww

This I believe is incorrect, there is definitely something antecedent to "reason" as the human condition. This is what defines "being reasonable". Even a "necessary condition" must be defined. These are the conditions which must be met in order to fulfill the human condition of "reason". And the issue is that the human baby is not born with this condition, "reason", reason must be learned. Aristotle approached this question in his ethics, at what age is a person morally responsible for one's own actions. There is a necessity for children to develop a consistency in character before we can accurately say that they are rational, or reasonable. Wittgenstein inquired in a similar way, as to what degree of consistency in behaviour is required before we can say that a person is following a rule. So there is clearly a human condition which is prior to the condition of "reason", or more properly "reasonable", and this is the condition which we find the human baby to be in.

......it is true reason-ing, the action of the cognitive faculty, needs these things, but reason the distinguishing human condition is that which makes reason the faculty even possible. When I offer the two conditions for being human and you counter-offer something which seems to reference those conditions but doesn’t belong there, it is technically a categorical error. Nevertheless, you are correct if you mean these things are necessary for reason the cognitive faculty. But you didn’t stipulate it as such. So I did it for you. — Mww

By means of the reasons explained above, I conclude that it is you who is making the categorical mistake in assigning "reason" to some sort of faculty, or "human condition". Reasoning is an act, and to reason is also an act. There is no identifiable faculty which can be called faculty of reason. The cognitive faculty is that which thinks, and to reason is a specific form of thinking. Any animal who thinks has the cognitive faculty, but not every animal who thinks has the capacity to reason. The ability to reason is learned through the ability to communicate. It is a special function of the cognitive faculty, not equivalent to it.

Agreed. But again, you’re responding to my stipulation of reason the condition, which is not reasoning itself. Reason is a self-contained causality, reasoning is not. — Mww

So here, you proceed from that category mistake, which sees "reason" as some sort of independent faculty, to say that reason is a "self-contained causality", but this is mistaken. Reason cannot be separated from the act of reasoning, as you assume, because all it is is a special type of act of the cognitive faculty, which thinks. There is no separate faculty which reasons, there is only the cognitive faculty which thinks, sometimes using reasoning, sometimes not.

Suppose for example, there are many things which the legs can do, walk, kick, etc.. You want to take one, kicking for example, and say that there is a special faculty which kicks. But in reality it is the same faculty which both walks and kicks, and kicking is only one of the acts of this faculty, so there is no separate faculty which kicks, just like reasoning is only one of the acts of the cognitive faculty, and there is no separate faculty which reasons.

I don’t care about wanting to learn, insofar as I’m perfectly capable of learning stuff even if I had no desire for it. And if I want to learn something, I must do it in the exact same way as if I didn’t care if I learned it or not. — Mww

I think that this is demonstrably false, but I'll leave it at that because you seem to be disinterested in how the will to learn is imperative to real learning.

Possibilities, the possibility of things, is dealt with the modal logic and probabilities. Possibility, in and of itself, as a singular pure category, having no object belonging to it, is not dealt with at all; it is what things are dealt with, by. A thing is possible, or it is not. We understand a thing to be possible or not, only because the conception “possibility” already resides within the system a priori. Logic and probability affirm or deny the validity of the object to which the pure conception “possibility” applies.

Think about it: we can neither think nor perceive an impossible object. It follows that to think or perceive an object, the reality of that object must be possible. In addition, if this object only exists because of that object, that object must exist necessarily. Some conceptions belong to the faculty of understanding simply because it is that kind of understanding, the human kind. Hence....speculative metaphysics. — Mww

It appears like our difference in approach renders each one of our comprehensions of "possibility" incoherent to the other one of us. I believe that a "pure category, having no object belonging to it" is itself impossible, because a category can only be exemplified by the objects which belong to it. The pure category with no object, is like the empty set, which is itself impossible. A collection of things which contains no things is not a collection of things. Likewise, a category of things which has no things is not a category of things. And, because we can readily conceive of the impossible (the empty set for example, a group of things without any things), your claim, "we can neither think nor perceive an impossible object" appears completely false from my perspective.

I guess you could use the brain. But the brain is physical, and the conscious mind is metaphysical, so you’re making it so the t’wain shall meet. While it is true the brain carries sole responsibility for whatever goes on between the ears, as soon as you bring abstractions into the picture, you’ve removed the brain from doing anything, insofar as the brain functions in concreto according with natural law. I agree the brain creates images, but how the images are made usable by the conscious mind has never been determined, and whether or not there is any conscious mind to make use of them, the physicalist will deny outright. — Mww

The point though, is that it is necessary that the "t’wain shall meet" Otherwise we cannot reconcile the activity of the senses, sensing, which is physical, with the activity of the conscious mind, thinking, which is metaphysical. If we do not allow the two to meet, in the brain (or subconscious) for example, then we will end up with two separate realities, the physical and the metaphysical, which could be completely incompatible.

So we have abstractions in the conscious mind, and this conscious mind might be involved in the act of reasoning, but is is not a "self-contained causality", because the conscious mind, in its act of reasoning, requires the images which are created by the brain, or subconscious.

I vote for consciousness. The conscious mind is a philosophical construct, therefore, to develop a sufficiently explanatory theory, any participant in that construct, must be philosophical as well. In fact, the brain does all that stuff, but we don’t know how, so we are free to hypothesize logically, in order to satisfy ourselves. — Mww

It cannot be consciousness though, which creates the images, because we get them in our sleep, in dreams. That's why I say these images must have a subconscious source. We can hypothesize all we want, but if the hypotheses are not consistent with experience, it's pointless.

Ok, I can see that. Truth be told, we’re both sailing first class on the ship of ignorance here: you can’t tell me exactly how the brain gives images to the conscious mind, and I can’t tell you how exactly intuition creates phenomena. — Mww

We are not actually sailing on the same ship of ignorance, because we can each choose the direction one wants to go. This does not necessarily release us from ignorance, but it may put us on different ships. However, once we realize the importance of internal agency, it's easy to understand how we can all be going in different directions in our ignorance. This is why the will to learn is very significant. Without it one might be pushed (persuaded) in any direction, and that is what empowers the deception of sophistry. So there is a very real difference between wanting to know the truth, and just accepting whatever anyone tells us.

So if you insist on a cause for THIS Universe then the answer is, a previous universe and that can regress eternally.
If you insist on a trigger for that cycle then I can offer you a mindless, no longer existent, spark, as opposed to any still existent divine spark. — universeness

This is exactly what I rejected, for the reasons I explained.

Natural must have a cause, yes, but the Universe does not need a FIRST CAUSE. So no supernatural required. — universeness

If the universe is natural then it must have a cause. If all natural things are within the universe, then the cause of the universe, not being within the universe, must be supernatural.

I see no reason why the theists can declare their god eternal and not in need of a first cause but science cannot offer 'eternal energy,' based on posits such as the Penrose bounce as also not in need of a first cause. — universeness

You said "natural must have a cause". If something is eternal, like your proposal of "eternal energy", then it does not have a cause, and it must be supernatural.

Energy is a concept, the capacity to do work. It is a potency, or power, which is attributed to moving things. As such, it is not an actual part of the universe, it is supernatural. So your offer of "eternal energy" is just an alternative form of "the supernatural".

The poor sods the two 'evils' get to do their fighting for them. — Isaac

Wait, aren't the ones fighting, the "evils"? You call them "poor sods", but they're fighting an evil war, so I think that makes them evil.

The Innocents caught in the crossfire, or deliberately targeted.

The poor, who inevitability pay the most for the damage both sides have done to their livelihoods. — Isaac

If it's a contained battlefield, why would there be any "innocents" there? I guess what you are saying is that it's not a contained battlefield. Do you think that the good of the world does not have the capacity to contain the evil to that battlefield? Seems to me, like the evil has already run amok, and pervades the entire world. This is why providing it with a battleground might not be a bad idea.

Which is why things which are not caused can't be empirically proved? — SpaceDweller

You mean like a coincidence?

I am not convinced 'nature' cares about the 'state' or dissatisfied status of the philosophical or even the scientific mind. — universeness

I am not talking about whether nature cares, I'm talking about whether human beings care.

Philosophers will simply have to 'suck up' their feelings of repugnancy until science can provide them with more of the knowledge they seek. — universeness

But the problem is the people who say that there is no cause, that it's a random occurrence. Whoever believes this will not seek a cause. And, if we agree the natural must have a cause, this cause must necessarily be something other than natural, i.e. the supernatural.

'De-nazify' doesn't "literally" mean 'force regime change' any more than it "literally" means 'take over'.

It "literally" means 'remove Nazis'. As an objective it could have been satisfied by anything from destroying the Azov battalion, to changing legislation, to killing every last person Putin even vaguely suspected of being slightly right-wing. — Isaac

Clearly, the Nazis which Putin desires to remove are supported by the present Ukrainian government, so Nazism must go to the top. I think Putin's goal of de-nazifying necessarily requires regime change.

Therefore we ought to stop looking at potential solutions presented by one of these 'sides' as if they were beneficent manna from heaven with no downsides.

There's only one issue (beyond the pointless moralising others seem to delight in) and that's whether we lend our support to our own governments (and media). Decisions such as joining NATO, sending weapons, taking part in negotiations, the terms of those negotiations... all involve an assessment of honesty, intent and integrity on both sides. Treating one side as saints and the other as the devil gives an inaccurate assessment of how those decisions will impact the people they are made on behalf of. — Isaac

Now we're getting somewhere. Both sides are evil. So, what's wrong with evil fighting evil in a contained battlefield? It would appear like the only outcome could be a negation of evil. Of course the innocent good people who own property in the battlefield would have to flee, thus surrendering their property. But any good person knows that property is not the greatest good.

I think that what he have to consider, is that in our experience, observation, and evidence, what we call "the natural", is observed to consist of things which are caused. If "natural" things necessarily have a cause, and a cause is necessarily something other than its effect, then we must allow for a class of things which is other than "natural". We do not need to call this class "supernatural", but the name is fitting.

However, there are some who would insist that natural things need not be caused, rejecting the principle of sufficient reason, attributing the existence of all naturally occurring things to some random fluctuation or a similar random event in a chaotic pool of randomness. But this approach stipulates that nature is inherently unintelligible, having no reason or cause for natural existence. Therefore it is counter-productive to the philosophical mind, which has the desire to know, extinguishing the desire to know by designating knowledge of this cause as impossible. I.e., there is no such cause. So such a position is extremely repugnant to a philosopher. And philosophers readily accept the reality of the supernatural as a logically necessary principle.

Yes we do have a way of thoroughly understanding: we declare what each and every single thing that is existentially independent of us, how it is to be known by us, in direct accordance to the rules by which understanding works. We may fail in our thorough knowledge of what the object actually is, but we do not fail to understand the existential independence of them. — Mww

But we do not have a thorough knowledge of the rules by which understanding works, therefore we cannot come up with the thorough understanding of the independence of things. These are the issues debated in epistemology. If we had a thorough understanding of such rules (if understanding is even based in rules), there would be no need for epistemology and we wouldn't be having this discussion

And while space and time are conceptions, they have nothing to do with the ontology of objects themselves, but only with the human method of granting their possibility. — Mww

Yes, but that comment I made was in regards to something else you said about space and time. You said objects had extension in space and time, and existed independently from us. Here:

Ok, that’s fine, if you like. I hold that objects are material substance with extension in space and duration in time. With that, objects cannot be created by the sensing system, but exist as physical things independently from it. — Mww

You were using space and time to support independent existence of objects. Independent existence of objects is what I disputed.

Appearances are merely informative impressions, affects on physiology, hence not yet part of the reasoning process. — Mww

But the issue is, how can you distinguish between an "appearance" (I'll call it an 'image' maybe) which is a direct percept, derived through sensation, and an image which is a creation of the mind, like a dream, or a memory.

I ask this, because I do not know how you can separate out "the reasoning process" as you do. In a dream, my mind will somehow create images, without the requirement of sense input, but I cannot say that this is part of "the reasoning processes". I think that because of this reality of the mind creating such things, and it's not the conscious mind doing the creating, nor the sensing process, we must allow that there is creative activity of "the mind" which is neither sensing nor reasoning. I place this creative activity as intermediate between reasoning and sensing because it can create principles (or rules if you like) for reasoning to follow, but it does not necessarily derive the things that it creates directly from the senses.

So this is how I propose that the mind creates the objects which we believe that we are sensing. It takes some information received through sensation, and creates within this subconscious process, which is not a reasoning process, the appearance of objects (objects being the apparent static aspect of existence in the external ). When the conscious mind has static "objects" to deal with, it can then make up rules, identity etc., for a reasoning process to proceed.

Yes, the images are in your conscious mind, but they are representations, which are not given by looking around with your eyes. All looking does, and perception in general, is give material to form the representations. — Mww

Let's assume that this is true, that the images in your conscious mind are representations which are not given by the senses, they are somehow created by the subconscious mind, or maybe "brain" or "nervous system" would be more appropriate here. The point I made earlier, with the nature of a "representation" is that the thing which "represents", I'll call it the symbol, need not be a similitude of the thing represented. Therefore the images within your conscious mind, which are representations of the independent "objects", may not even be similar to what the supposed independent existence is really like. We see that symbols always have some degree of arbitrariness.

Now I need to address the capacity of this subconscious process, which is not a conscious reasoning process, to maintain consistency within its imaging. And here, I mean consistency between the various senses. So when I see something as a solid object, I can touch it, and pick it up as a solid object, so there is consistency between the way that the different senses image things. However, water for example, looks solid, but my hand will plunge right into it. So the consistency my not be as thorough as we might think. We just learn to compensate with the conscious mind, to account for the inconsistency. We learn to distinguish things like water which look to be solid, but really are not.

Actually, this is quite impossible. A name is assigned to a thing at a time strictly in accordance to how it is understood at that time. That is not to say such named things are understood correctly, but that has nothing to do with the naming of them. — Mww

I think you go by a different definition of "understand", or "understood" than I do here. I would say that "understand" implies the use of the conscious reasoning process to derive some sort of meaning. The meaning may be correct or incorrect, according to a separate standard of criteria, as you say. However, "understanding" is a product of the reasoning process.

Now, we have to consider the "objects" given by the subconscious system, which is is not a part of the conscious system, not a part of the the reasoning process. These are the representations. In order for the conscious system to work with them in a reasoning process, a logical process, they must be given names. So we have two layers of representation. The images or representations, received into the conscious mind, and the names, words, which the conscious mind assigns to these representations, to represent them, in order to understand them. From this perspective then, the naming is necessarily prior to the understanding, as a prerequisite for understanding.

We could say that there is some sort of "understanding" inherent within the images that the subconscious gives to the conscious, but I think we ought to maintain this separation, and not call this "understanding". Otherwise we might go to deeper and deeper levels within the living being, by which the being discerns "meaning", and we'd be using words like "understanding" which are really only proper to the conscious discernment of meaning. Then we'd get all sorts of ambiguity and equivocation. We see this in panpsychism for example.

The issue is the arising of a vicious circle, if not an infinite regress. If we say that naming, representing, or using symbols requires understanding, then we have to analyze "understanding". We will find that all sorts of understanding require some kind of symbols or representations. But now you've stipulated that we can't name or use symbols without some sort of prior 'understanding'. The way of Pythagorean idealism, or Platonism, is to give eternal existence to some kind of "understanding", as ideas or forms. But this doesn't solve the problem if we understand knowledge and understanding as things which come into being, or emerge.

So I suggest limiting the definition of "understanding" such that it is a product of the reasoning process. And, naming, symbols, and representations are required as necessary for the reasoning process. Therefore we can conclude that naming must occur without understanding, as a primary step toward understanding. This allows that knowledge and understanding can be emergent. Then we don't have to deal with odd theories like the one referred to as Plato's theory of recollection, in which the knowledge, or understanding of a thing always pre-exists any given instance of that knowledge or understanding.

There are two major necessary characteristics imbued in the human being, such that he can be so called: morality and reason. In keeping with the topic, reason the condition, is antecedent in time to all that for which it is the condition. Hence, the notion of self-contained causality is logically justified. — Mww

What I am trying to get you to consider is the conditions which are antecedent to reason. As explained above, we can start with the requirement for images, representations, or symbols. Reasoning cannot proceed without some such things. The reasoning mind manipulates these "things" (objects which have associated meaning), so these things (images, symbols, or representations) are prerequisite to reasoning. This means that reasoning cannot be a "self-contained causality".

.....shows up, in that, where reason is the conclusion, understanding is the major and judgement is the minor premises respectively. It is common knowledge our judgements are quite apt to be erroneous, hence the conclusions will be as well. Understanding, on the other hand, the faculty from which all our conceptions arise, cannot be in error, with respect to that part of a synthesis for which it alone is responsible. This requires some exposition which I won’t go into here. — Mww

I surely do not understand this at all.

Nahhhh....that ain’t gonna work. Any developed sensing system still needs to go through the one we have, in order to obtain knowledge. Telescopes were such a system, but we still need to look through the eyepiece, or look at the the display which obtains its information directly. — Mww

No no, you misunderstand. The proposed sensing system would be completely independent, sort of like an AI. It is not proposed as a way for us to gain knowledge, but as a way for the system itself to gain knowledge. This was intended as an analogy of how living beings could evolve to produce sensing systems. Prior to being able to sense, the beings could have no knowledge of the things which were to be sensed. So at the fundamental level, the sensing system is created without any knowledge of the thing to be sensed.

Before sensing systems, what sense does it make to say creatures wanted to learn? — Mww

Right, this is where that problem with terminology rears its ugly head. However, I think that "wanted to learn" makes more sense then saying that the creature already had some type of "understanding". But this is the question, 'what is prior to understanding and knowledge?'. We cannot say that it is a type of understanding, or knowledge. But, it's something similar to understanding and knowledge, which provides the capacity for learning. What provides the capacity for knowledge and understanding other than the desire to learn?

Possibility is dealt with in one way only, in affirmation or negation, one or the other, not both simultaneously for the same thing. — Mww

This is not true, possibility is most successfully dealt with through modal logic and probabilities.

I understand we can’t remove what’s already there deep within the sensing system. I understand all objects are completely unknown with respect to the sensing system we have, which is that very system we cannot remove. Again.....the senses do not give knowledge; they merely set the stage for the possibility of it. — Mww

I don't think you are grasping the necessity for an intermediary between the sensing system, and the conscious mind which is the knower. The intermediary (for simplicity I'll call it the brain) produces the images or representations which the conscious mind works with. These representations are not produced by the sensing system (evidenced by the reality of dreams), nor are they produced by the conscious mind. So we must assume something intermediary.

I don’t understand why the fundamentals of basic sensation are very arbitrary. I guess I’d have to ask.....what are the fundamentals of sensation, such that any sensation can be of any thing? I mean...I cannot see an odor and I cannot hear a twisted ankle. — Mww

So it's not the sensing system whose assignments are arbitrary, it's the assignments made by the intermediary, the brain, which are arbitrary. So the brain gives to the conscious mind, a representation of something sensed. The representation is just like a symbol, or a word, which 'names' the sensation as representing it. The arbitrariness is the same sort of arbitrariness that exists when we assign a word to an object, as a name for the object. We can make up any sort of word to attach to an object as its name. Likewise, the brain can make up any sort of an image or representation, and give this to the conscious mind as a representation of the sensation. Each sensation gets a different image, like each object gets a different name. Two different instances of sugar both get the same representation (sweet), because the brain cannot distinguish between them (tell them apart).

I agree we would use trial and error to invent a sensing system for that which we know nothing about, but I disagree we have no knowledge of where to start. First, whatever sensing system we set up must possible, which is the same as we won’t set up a system we don’t know how to design. Second, whatever sensing system we set up must be capable of sensing something that will be intelligible to us, for to set up for sensing that which we would never understand, is quite impossible. To get technical, the categories always tell us the absolute bare necessities of anything we sense, but we’ll leave that alone for now.

Nahhhh....I suggest we might very well set up an arbitrary sensing system for objects we know nothing about, but that system must be conditioned by what we already know. Case in point, we really knew nothing about celestial manifestations, and the telescope sensing system for far-away big stuff we set up to find out about, was designed specifically with respect to the sensing system we already have. Going the other direction, we knew absolutely nothing about germs until we set up a sensing system that magnifies close-in little stuff, which also respects our own sensing system. — Mww

The point is that when the sensing system which we as human beings have, first came into existence (that is to say that when living sensing systems first evolved), the living beings had no knowledge of the things to be sensed. So the system must be based in a trial and error set up. We might argue that plants already had some sort of "knowledge" of the external objects through nutrition etc., but again, we stretch the word "knowledge.

The issue is the type of sensing system which we as human beings currently have. The proposal of inventing a sensing system was to be analogous to the situation in which living beings were in, prior to having developed a sensing system. We cannot say that they had any real knowledge of the things to be sensed, yet they developed a sensing system, which we currently employ, to gain knowledge about the things being sensed. The pivotal point is that the type of sensing system which we, as human beings have and use, was created prior to there being knowledge about the things to be sensed. This is fundamental to the nature of knowledge, as emergent, coming into being from not being, and the question of how is this possible.