Here's an off topic question for you Banno. If you don't like it, complain to the mods. Why did you start a new thread on "truth", distinct from the old one, then import a post of mine from the other thread, to discuss it here, instead of over there?

Now we're getting somewhere. Perhaps you might explain why you see it as wrong.

Again, it would be beneficial to the conversation if you would actually read what a person writes.

So, where's this use of = and ≡ you are talking about? I only see "Iff" here, which I clearly did not confuse with "=", nor did I confuse it with "≡". In case you are unfamiliar with language, different symbols have different uses, and also different meanings. Please do not misquote me anymore.

It's much better conversation if you actually read a person's posts.

Sorry, you must be talking about someone else.

It's not my approach. It's formal logic over the last hundred and fifty years. — Banno

When you accept, adopt, and preach that approach, then it is yours. All of us here are rational human beings with the capacity to think for ourselves, and freely make our own decisions. That it is the approach of formal logic over the last hundred and fifty years, to portray "true" as a special form of justified, is no reason to accept this approach yourself. That's a fallacy known as appeal to authority.

t is a challenge to throw aside all the ideas of oneself relating to others' opinions. Even if one seeks to do it, I wonder to what extent it is possible because as a person one is involved in group situations throughout most of life, like being part of an intersubjective bubble. — Jack Cummins

I suppose this is why many will say that the truly authentic self is an impossibility.

Yes, I understand that using logic as a justification is a problem for you. — Banno

Obviously you don't understand. It appears you didn't read the post, yet claimed to understand me. That's a mistake. You ought to read the post, or not bother to make a reply, which is what you usually do.

Using logic is the means for justification, as I said. No problem. The problem is with your approach to truth, as I also said. Truth is not a special case of being justified, as you seem to think. Do you have a coherent reply to this, or will you stick to your usual?

The problem with your approach is that logic is the means for justification. So when you define truth in terms of satisfaction you simply reduce "true" to justified in a special way. Some of us like to maintain a separation between true and justified, such that they are distinct properties. Therefore we can see that defining truth in this way is simply a way of avoiding what it really means to be true. So you propose a purposeless exercise.

But
"Snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, and
"Snow is on the ground" is true IFF snow is on the ground, and indeed
"Snow is turquoise with purple polkadots" is true IFF snow is turquoise with purple polkadots

are all true. — Banno

As implied here , this is a fine example of equivocation. The final phrase, "are all true", uses "true" in a different way from the other three.

So, which form of "true" are you talking about in this thread? Or is it the case that "the logic of truth" is itself just deceptive sophistry?

I am asking the question of what it means to find the "true" self. It is a fairly complex question because it involves the social and existential sense of selfhood? How important is the idea of a 'true' self? To what extent is the self bound up with relationships with others, or as being, alone, in relation to the wider cosmos, and making sense of this? — Jack Cummins

For an uneducated opinion, based in intuition, I offer you this.

The first step toward understanding a 'true self' would be to move beyond assigning importance to thoughts about how others perceive you. You would have to assign no significance at all to any thoughts about what others might think about you, and how they might view you, completely freeing your mind from such influence.

After realizing the value of freeing one's thinking from such external influences, the next step would be to extend this freedom toward a more absolute level. This would require the effort of freeing oneself from the idea that any external influences have any importance. In classical terms, this is to completely deny any importance of any material goods, for the sake of spirituality. The external is not a part of the 'true self', so it cannot be allowed to have any influence over any thoughts developed by the authentic self. These thoughts are the source of anxiety, stress, and suffering.

If this could be obtained, one might find the 'true self', the real inner being, free from external dependence. The true self would be free to assess the aspects of internal dependence, where one would find a 'true' dependence, and ultimately develop principles of 'true dependence' to establish a navigable relationship between the internal and the external.

But it's not black and white, and the point is that, insofar as one's attention and memory have reliably informed them of some aspects of the event, then an honest account of what is remembered will be an accurate, that is true, if not a complete, account. — Janus

Your logic here is unacceptable induction. If we know that our observational capacity can and does regularly fail us, from time to time, with regard to different aspects, then we cannot conclude that an honest account gives us an accurate account. Even if most times an honest account is an accurate account, we cannot make the conclusion that an honest account is an accurate account. That' is simply the way that inductive reasoning works, exceptions to a proposed rule invalidate the rule.

Therefore we must seek justification for each aspect of each honest (true) account, because without this procedure we will never know where the faults in these honest descriptions lie. Not knowing where the mistakes lie is what happens if we take it for granted that an honest description is an accurate description.

But the main point is that we think that there is, even if it is not realizable, a true account of all events, and that if someone were to be able to give such an account it would necessarily also be an honest account. — Janus

Well, some people might believe that, it's an ontological decision. But most of these people are the ones who believe in God. Consider that "a true account" is given in words, or maybe other symbols like mathematical ones. How do you think that there is a "true account" of things which human beings have no understanding of, and have no symbols for, fundamental particles which have not yet been named for example. Obviously there are no human words or symbols for these things which have not yet been apprehended by the human mind, so how could there be a true account of them. Or do you believe that God has words for these things? Then your God supports this notion that there is a true account for all events.

Why would an honest opinion about, say, what happened not be an accurate account of what happened? — Janus

There are very many reasons for this. Simply put, human beings do not have infallible observational skills. Here's a few of the reasons. We do not pay attention. We do not have superb descriptive skills (knowing the best words to use, etc.). And, we do not have an infallible capacity for memory. If you come to recognize the weaknesses in your own observational capacity, you will come to see that an honest opinion doesn't guarantee an accurate account of what happened. Perhaps though, you believe yourself to be some sort of divine being.

Perhaps you could give an example showing how these might diverge. — Janus

I already did give an example, the court of law. Have you ever been in a court of law, and listened to the variance between different peoples' honest account of what happened?

Here's another example which might be easier for you to relate to. My wife and I sometimes will go out to an event. The next day we may discuss what happened at the event. Most times we have conflicting descriptions about various details. Since the two descriptions are both honest opinions, and they directly conflict one another, we can conclude that an honest opinion about what happened is not the same thing as an accurate description of what happened.

Another consideration; what if we drop the use of the word "false" and replace it with some substantial notion of falsity? — Michael

It's best not to oppose false with true. This is because a true and honest statement may be demonstrated to be unjustifiable (false). So "false" is best presented as unjustifiable, which is not the same as untrue (dishonest).

What could a truthful account of an event be if not an accurate portrayal of what happened? — Janus

This is precisely where the problem is, unwarranted attempts such as yours, to reduce the meaning of "a truthful account" to "an accurate portrayal of what happened". We all know, that "to tell the truth" means to state what one honestly believes. Therefore, we should also know, and adhere to the epistemic principle, that "a truthful account" means one's honest opinion. Now if we look at what "one's honest opinion" means, and what "an accurate portrayal of what happened" means, we see a huge gap between these two.

So if we simply assume that "a truthful account" means "an accurate portrayal of what happened" when it could equally mean "one's honest opinion" we have made a very serious mistake which could badly mislead us. And of course, as explained above, the problem is with the assumption that "a truthful account" means "an accurate portrayal of what happened". That one's honest opinion is an accurate portrayal of what happened is something which needs to be justified.

At this point, justification enters the scheme, allowing us to move from "one's honest opinion" to the conclusion of "an accurate portrayal of what happened". But we clearly ought not make this move without justification. Since there is in principle, such a huge gap between those two (ones honest opinion, and an accurate portrayal of what happened), we cannot move from one to the other without justification. To do so would be an irrational leap of faith.

Taking your radical skeptical line we could never know. I could have witnessed the same event someone is giving an account of, and so be in a position to judge whether the account were truthful or not, but according to your line of reasoning, my memory might be faulty, which means I could never be in a position to judge the truthfulness of any account of anything. — Janus

This is not "radical skepticism" in any way shape or form. It is a simple reflection on the reality of things. Different people have different descriptions of the same event, very often conflicting. That is commonplace, everyday, and not a statement of radical skepticism. Therefore every "truthful account" ought to be justified before we act on it. Have you never observed the proceedings of a court of law where people are sworn to tell the truth? These are not the proceedings of some sort of radical skepticism, these are the day to day proceedings of people who are working to determine the Truth.

Notice, I say "Truth" here with a capitalized T. That is because this is supposed to be some sort of Divine Truth, independent of human opinion, which we think we might be able to get at, through the process of justifying human truths (honest opinions). However, we of course, being only human, will never achieve that Divine Truth, that perfect, absolutely accurate portrayal of what happened. So, all this talk about "truth" in that sense, what I call "Truth" here (the perfect portrayal), is just pie in the sky nonsense for us lowly human beings.

But the point is we must understand what it would mean to be able to judge whether some account were truthful or not, in order to be skeptical about our ability to do so. — Janus

As explained above, this is the purpose of "justification". To properly judge the accounts of other people requires an understanding of justification. These accounts may contain honest mistakes as well as dishonesty, and uncovering these two requires different investigative skills. That is why we cannot simply assume an account is an honest, or truthful account.

Therefore... they are not free... — creativesoul

What kind of conclusion is that? Do you think "free" means incapable of considering the environmental circumstances when choosing one's actions? That would be more like "random" wouldn't it?

What do you mean by asking for a "necessary relation"? Aren't all relations contingent...on context? The contingent relation would be one of correlation; we can see that the description is an accurate portrayal of what is described, can't we? — Janus

I don't quite understand your use of "contingent" here. If you ask someone to tell the truth about something that happened, and the person gives you an honest reply, there is no necessity which would allow you to conclude that the person's reply is an accurate portrayal of what happened. The person might have a faulty memory, as we all do to some extent. This produces the need to allow for all sorts of varying degrees of what you call accuracy, depending on what features of the particular occurrence you are asking the person to describe.

I do not see where any sense of "contingency" is relevant here. The person's reply is not contingent on any specific feature of the occurrence, and might actually recount something totally irrelevant to what is asked for. So we can validly conclude that it is not contingent on any form of "correlation" at all. And, I do not even understand your sense of "correlation" here either. That word implies an interdependence, a mutual relation between things. How would the context, in any way, depend on the description, unless the context was totally fictional, being created by the description? But if that were the case, then there is really no context at all to be involved in such a correlation.

We like to imagine animal signals as, in essence, caused by the occurrence of particular features within the animal's environment. — Srap Tasmaner

I think that is wrong. Animal signals are caused by the animal itself, not the animal's environment. The human being acts by free will for example, not "caused" by one's environment, and the actions of other living things are created in a similar manner. The living being's actions are influenced by, and affected by it's environment, but not caused by its environment.

When we demand (or command, or request, etc.) that someone tell the truth, we are demanding that they behave in a certain way. It would be a senseless demand of an animal that has no choice in the matter. But at the same time, we are demanding that the speaker relinquish their freedom to say whatever they like and instead be bound by the truth. — Srap Tasmaner

This paragraph is consistent with what I said, but it is inconsistent with what you said, about animal signals being caused by the animal's environment. Here, you imply that the human being is free to choose, to either tell the truth or not. If a human being chooses not to tell the truth, how can this act be construed as having been caused by one's environment.

In a sense, this is all counterfactual business: you can ask someone to speak as if this situation now were the one they were in yesterday. And, further, if the link between your experience and what you say is not so snug as it is for non-linguistic creatures, we can ask you to behave as if it were. That is, we can ask you to say what you would, if you were in some particular situation, and if you had no choice about what to say.

On such an account, bizarre and cartoonish though it may be, honesty is a matter of the connection between a, possibly hypothetical or counterfactual, situation and what you would say in that situation. You can interpose beliefs here if you like, but the content of such beliefs goes back to situations. (For it to matter to your speech that you think, correctly or not, this is a snake-situation, you have to know how to speak in snake-situations.) — Srap Tasmaner

This type of speculation is all pointless, because the person can choose to be dishonest. You cannot base your speculation about what "honesty" is by assuming that a person will act in an honest way when asked to, because this ignores the reality that a person may just as likely choose to act dishonestly.

What does telling the truth consist in if not giving an honest and accurate account. What does giving an honest and accurate account consist in if not a correspondence of the the account with whatever it is (purporting to be) an account of? — Janus

The point is that there is no necessary relation between giving an honest and accurate account, and the account corresponding to to whatever it is purported to be an account of. Therefore, giving an honest and accurate account is not the same thing as providing an account which corresponds with the thing given an account of. The necessity required, to say what you say here, is not there.

In relation to "truth" then, if to tell the truth is to give an honest and accurate account, then there is no necessity that "the truth" which is spoken, actually corresponds with the reality of the thing which the spoken truth has given an account of.

There is a trend in epistemology to give "truth" some kind of unreal, divine definition which would have "truth" be a type of exact account of the reality of the thing given an account of, or even some form of precise replication of the thing using words, ("snow is white" is true iff snow is white, for example), but this is a completely mistaken idea of what we ought to think "truth" really is. Human beings are incapable of providing such precise, exact replications of reality through the use of words, so we ought to allow that if they provide to us, a replication of what they truly believe, to the best of their ability, they are speaking "the truth".

No theory of truth is going to cover every use of the concept truth. It seems that most uses of the concept point to a relationship between propositional beliefs, and states-of-affairs. — Sam26

I don't think so. Most uses of "truth" point to honesty, as in "are you telling the truth?". It's just a certain type of philosopher, practising a defective form of epistemology, who wants to reduce "telling the truth" to a "relationship between propositional beliefs, and states-of-affairs".

This proposed reduction ignores the fact that 'telling the truth" refers to making a statement about what one honestly believes, and there is no necessary connection between what one honestly believes, and any real "states of affairs". So, this proposal, made by some epistemologists, that "truth" is mostly used to "point to a relationship between propositional beliefs, and states-of-affairs" is fundamentally flawed. It is flawed because there is no necessary relationship between one's honest belief, which "truth" is normally used to refer to, and any real "states-of-affairs".

Consequently, these epistemologists will endlessly discuss how it is possible that "truth" could actually refer to a relationship between propositional beliefs and states-of-affairs, because there will always be a problem which makes it impossible that this is actually the case. And of course, that is because there is no necessary relationship between one's honest belief, what "truth" actually refers to, and any real states-of-affairs.

Ok, change the example to a coin. There's a categorical difference between a dollar and a piece of metal. Which do you have in your pocket? — Banno

The piece of metal in my pocket is not a dollar, properly speaking. It's a coin which represents a dollar. That's what makes the categorical difference, a dollar is a value, and a coin is not a value, it is a representation of a value. And that's how numerous different things, different coins, bills, makings on paper and in cyberspace, can represent the very same value. The representations are not actually the thing represented.

That is the issue with the sentence and the fact. The sentence is supposed to be a representation of the fact. and so there is a categorical difference between the two, the sentence and the fact, which makes it impossible that a sentence is a fact. However, in common vernacular we take shortcuts and simplify to facilitate expedience. So that I might say "the coin in my pocket is a dollar", just like one might say "snow is white is a fact". These shortcuts appear to be saying that the sentence "Snow is white.", is also a fact, just like it appears like I am saying that the coin in my pocket is a dollar. The representative aspect is just taken for granted.

Not quite right. I don't think I've said that the sentence is a fact. Again,
1. snow is white - fact
2. "snow is white" - sentence — Banno

What I think Bongo Fury is trying to point out to you, is that in #1, you are trying to utilize that invalid shortcut, to say that "snow is white" is a fact, when in reality it is a sentence which represents a fact.

To insist that "the sentence is a fact", when you clearly recognize the categorical difference in your reply to me, quoted above, indicates that you are being dishonest in your communion with Bongo Fury. I can conclude that you are employing a dishonest use of words, a type of sophistry, because you recognize the categorical difference between the sentence "snow is white", and the fact which it represents, yet you premise that the sentence is the fact in your logical procedure.

Like gluttons and hoarders, they evoke a kind of disgust or loathing; but gluttons and hoarders often are victims of compulsions, and so may be pitied and assisted. — Ciceronianus

I'd gladly assist any billionaire, if it would help to release them from that great burden of having an endless supply of money.

Unlike knife and piece of metal, there's a categorical difference between a sentence and a fact. It really can't be both.

I'll take that point, but make anther. Trust - and honesty - stand in much the same relation to all our utterances, not just to statements. Even dishonesty only works against a background of honesty. So what we have here is not peculiar to truth per se. Indeed the very act of understanding someone is underpinned by a charitable expectation of honesty.

But our topic here is truth. — Banno

What you are saying here is that meaning, as well as other human relations, requires truth (in the sense of honesty). So we should take it that truth, in that sense, is prior to meaning, and therefore does not require meaning, "truth" being the more general concept and logically prior to the more specific concept, "meaning".

For example: sworn testimony is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. If this is true, then how could truth be anything other than this?

Surely I understand truth in this pre-theoretic way, as everyone who tells a truth does, but is there a post-theoretic way to understand truth as its being used? — Moliere

Like I said earlier, truth is best described in terms of honesty. And as such, it is quite simple. Use words to express what you honestly believe, to the best of your ability, and you are telling the truth. So if we want to understand the nature of truth we need to inquire into the nature of honesty.

The mechanistic worldview contains within it a promise of power. A promise of complete control over our reality. A promise of certainty - of complete understanding. — Tzeentch

This is oxymoronic. The mechanistic world view is simply the deterministic view. What it really says is that we have no power over the world, that we are doomed to our fate.

I'm not concerned with it because there are no known instances of "changes to the temporal continuity of existence", which means we have no reason to take their possibility into consideration. If we do find one, then we can start worrying about it. — Janus

I am talking about everyday occurrences. And yes, there clearly is changes to the temporal continuity of existence of things, that\s what "force" does. By Newton's laws, "force" is required to alter the temporal continuity of existence of a thing. This is known to us as "change".

So your plums in the fridge will continue to exist in the same way that they were put there, until a force is applied. Now the issue is whether the force required to substantially alter the existence of those plums, is necessarily observable to you watching the fridge from the outside. Well, the plums will rot, even in the fridge, and this change is not observable to you from outside the fridge. That's clear evidence that the justification for your assumption that the plums will continue to exist, as you left them, is faulty. There are unperceived forces being applied to those plums all the time, altering the continuity of their existence.

We can ask what such a theory might look like. If it is adequate to its task, it will deliver, for every sentence, something that tells us if that sentence is true.

So it will have the form

For any sentence p, p is true if and only if ϕ

Further, to avoid circularity, the notion of truth cannot occur in ϕ.

And finally, this will not work for a language strong enough to talk about its own sentences, because directly it will be able to generate a sentence of the form — Banno

This will never work, because "truth" is a feature of particular circumstances, and the accidentals of particular circumstances cannot be captured in a universal statement such as you propose. Therefore your enterprise is doomed to failure.

You might however, change your definition of "truth", such that truth is not a feature of particular circumstances, and define it so that it is a feature of some sort of universal statement or generalization, thereby creating the illusion that success is possible, but that would really be a failure as well.

Socrates, the prime example, the lover of wisdom. but in possession of none. Remember though, the relationship between "love" and desire and want, especially for the ancient Greeks. The ancient Greek concept of "love" is well drawn out in Plato's "The Symposium". They were not in possession of the Christianized concept of "love" at that time.

What I seek is the reality of the matter, not victory. You keep reasserting unreal claims, despite my demonstrations that these claims are incorrect. So you provide nothing toward compromise or mutual understanding. And now you claim "victory", as if mutual understanding was never the goal. What's the point to your behaviour?

Perhaps unsurprisingly, I have a different view. For me knowledge is about certainty, certainty that is, not in any "absolute" sense, but in the context of everyday experience. If I see plums in the fridge, I am certain they are there. If I close the fridge door, and am still standing in front of the fridge I am virtually as certain that they are there. If I leave the room for a few moments and then return, I might still be almost as certain. If I left the room for an hour, and was confident no one else was around then I might still be almost as certain. And so on. But I would say that I only know, that is I can only be certain ( i.e. without any attendant doubt) that they are there if I am looking at them. Once I step away, knowledge steps aside with me, and belief kicks in, to be assessed as more or less justified. — Janus

The issue you describe here is a problem with the justification. The justification is somewhat faulty and therefore truth in the matter cannot be ascertained. This allows for the encroachment of doubt and skepticism.

The justification is based in our ideas of temporal continuity, inertia, which are well represented by Newton's first law. Principles such as this law tell us that a thing will continue to exist, exactly as it has in the past, unless it is caused to change. This is the temporal continuity of existence which forms the foundation for that justification. And, since your observations apprehend nothing which would cause such a change, you conclude that the plums are still in the fridge.

We can see that the fault in this justification lies within the assumption that a change to the temporal continuity of existence would necessarily be observed by you. Since this is a required premise in that justification, and it is not a sound premise, truth cannot be ascertained through that justification, and doubt is summoned.

Now you've really got something to do. Read, read, read! That's if reading qualifies as doing something.

I think opposition, and negation, are very useful tools for logical processes, but descriptions and definitions are not logical processes.

But even if it were true and not false, then my argument is about the definition of categories like thingness itself. — apokrisis

Categories also are described, and not defined through reference to opposites, like the categories of colour, heat, etc.. These are not defined by referring to an opposite. What often happens, is that when we create a scale for measurement of a categorized quality, we place the two opposing extremes within the same category forming opposite ends of the scale. So the scale of temperature for example has both the extremes, hot and cold. But hot and cold are not the defining features of temperature, it is defined with reference to the movement of particles. And colour is defined in reference to wavelengths of light. And so on with other categories.

An essential difference is different from an accidental difference. One is treated as signal, the other noise. — apokrisis

But you were talking about particulars, and every accidental difference is significant to the identity of the particular, as a particular.

I don't see that. for me, the words on the right of "iff" in '"Snow is white" is true iff snow is white' point to the grounding fact of snow being white (or not).

To be sure 'snow is white' is a generality, and, in a sense an approximation, since there is no absolute standard of white, but if snow is, generally, white, then it is that actuality that leads us to count '"snow is white" is true', or 'snow is white' as being true. — Janus

It's really just a piece of redundancy which says nothing useful. It says "Snow is white" is true, if and only if "Snow is white" is true.

You haven't addressed the issue, only attempting to change the subject. The simple fact is that we define a thing by describing what it is, not by saying what it is not.

Sure you can refer to some sort of vague generality such as "Being", and say that it is the opposite of "not-Being", but that is not providing a definition.

Yet even at the level of a logic of particulars, we have Leibniz and the argument from indiscernibles - the differences that don’t make a difference and so speak to identity as sameness. — apokrisis

By Leibniz's principle, "identity of indiscernibles", there is no such thing as a difference which does not make a difference. Any type of difference makes the two things not indiscernible, therefore different things. A difference which does not make a difference is straight forward contradiction. And to ignore a difference with a claim like 'it's a difference which doesn't make a difference, therefore the two are the same', is to violate the law of identity.

If I want to define A, I need to conceive of it as the negation of everything that it is not. — apokrisis

I don't think this is correct at all. We define "A" with a description, not by saying what it is not. "Man", for example, was defined by Aristotle as a rational animal. We have a much more refined description now, of "human being", but we clearly do not define "human being" by stating everything which is not human. I really cannot think of anything which is defined by stating what it is not.

This sort of thread is unseemly, unproductive, and lowers the tone of the site. — unenlightened

I've got a great idea. Open a new thread to bitch about this thread. Then someone can open another thread to bitch about that thread, on and on, until the whole front page consists of threads bitching about threads, and the mods will have some real work of consolidation. Then the mods can demonstrate the true nature of the age-old metaphysical question of whether an infinite number of things can actually be consolidated into One.

I won’t agree “p” represents a judgement, but even without that, “p is true”, does, so the feature of truth residing in judgement, holds. — Mww

That's not necessarily the case. "P is true" represents a judgement, but the truth or falsity of that judgement is not a feature of that particular judgement. That's why I explicitly said that truth is what is attributed to judgements. And this does not imply that the property which is attributed, necessarily inheres within the thing it is attributed to. So for example, "the grass is green" represents a judgement in which the colour green is attributed to the grass, as a property. What makes that judgement true (honest), is the judgement's relation to other judgements. Therefore truth is not a feature within the judgement itself, just like a property is not a feature within the thing itself, which is claimed to have that property.

But I say, A false statement is one that expresses a dishonest judgement. So "p is true" means that the person making that statement is presenting themselves as making an honest judgement. which only an habitual liar needs to do. The rest of us always present our honest judgement and the truth of it it 'goes without saying'. That is the redundancy of truth (amongst honest speakers). — unenlightened

Oh, I see. We assume the person is speaking honestly, unless the person is known to be dishonest. And the person who knows oneself to be known as dishonest, will apprehend a need to qualify "p" with "is true".

But wouldn't some forms of insecurity, or paranoia, also incline a person to not necessarily assume that the others are being honest. Maybe some type of skeptic is insecure in this way. It would probably do no good to ask another, 'are you telling the truth?', because if the person were lying they wouldn't admit it.

Since it is very common, that for one reason or another, people do not honestly reveal their judgements, and there are also many people who are skeptical about whether or not what is stated represents an honest judgement, there is a need for the concept of "truth" and it is not redundant at all in these common situations.

What would you say if “truth” and “false” weren’t so much attributed to judgements, but ARE themselves judgements? — Mww

That's a good question. But I think that this is actually what I was trying to avoid. If we make a judgement of true or false, then there must be something which is judged according to those terms. That something being judged, would be judged as having the attribute of true or of false. What I am saying is that this something, which is judged, is itself a judgement. So a judgement of true or false is a judgement of a judgement. It is not the statement itself, or the proposition, which is actually being judged, it is the judgement which produced the statement which is being judged. In the example, "p" is what is said to be true, so "p" represents a judgement which is judged as a true judgement.

I think it is important to understand truth in this way, because this is the way toward understanding why we must allow the law of excluded middle to be violated. When the judgement which is to be judged as true or false has not been made, it is suspended, then the judgement of that judgement is neither true nor false. The judgement has not yet been made, therefore it can be neither true nor false, as in Aristotle's famous example of the possible sea battle tomorrow. This is also the situation alluded to in the title of the thread. Pilate chooses not to judge Jesus, so there is neither truth nor falsity to his judgement concerning Jesus' guilt. He refused to judge what what was said about Jesus, so he neither truly nor falsely judged Jesus.