Bowdlerising his argument, it simply is not the case that the grey of a cloud and the grey of this laptop have something in common - apart from our use of the word "grey". Or if you prefer, abstract objects do not exist. — Banno

It seems Marchesk prefers to use the word "gray". Do you think that the use of the word "grey", and the use of the word "gray" have something in common?

I’m proposing an idea of truth as intersubjective , not simply subjective. Yes, each of us enters into relations of communication with others bringing with us our own personal perspective , but the ever evolving ‘intricate and intimate interconnections in the way we interact with the world and each other’ I described allows for a gradual convergence among personal perspectives , but not the complete disappearance of subjective perspective. Think of this subjectivity within intersubjectivity as variations on a common theme. They would be no basis for communication with anyone else if our inner perspectives were all at all times completely different from each other. — Joshs

This looks more like justification than truth, to me, demonstrating that my perspective is compatible with yours. How does truth enter this picture?

There are 22 quarks in an atom. So from simple multiplication N is 2.2e81 iff the only objects that exist are these quarks. Let's call this for now Nᵩ (and conceptually separate it from Nₘ). — Kuro

On what principles would you decide how to count all the dark matter?

Truth as correspondence with what is out there independent of us is one sort of attempt to discover ordered relationships. When I say this way masks something, I mean that it treats a complex series of intricate relations as one single sort of relation. Why does it do this? Because these more intimate dynamics within the abstraction that we call a fact of the matter are too subtle to be noticed. The generalizations that truth produces reflect what seems obvious to us: there are real objects out there in a real world, whose features are subject to conceptual interpretation but whose existence does not dependent on our concepts. What I am arguing is not that the real world is actually fake or imagined. I am arguing that this real world is not a conglomeration of objects, laws and forces that are what they are independent of us. We and the world form a single integrated web, and each human perspective contributes to the evolution of that web. Knowledge doesn’t passively represent, it changes, builds and creates within this web. The notion of objective truth assumes parts of the web of reality just sit there waiting for us to capture what they are and do. But no aspect of the web of reality remains unchanged by what changes in any other aspect of it. The world is a moving target for our scientific inquiries, and our participation in its transformation through our investigations of it change its rules, laws and facts in subtle ways. — Joshs

I take this to be saying that there is no such thing as "objective truth".

But this reciprocal
dance between us and world we call science gradually makes the world more intelligible, and thus more ‘true’ , by allowing us to build more intricate and intimate interconnections in the way we interact with the world and each other. The world becomes more anticipatable in its behavior over time this way. This is a deeper notion of truth than that of simple correspondence between concept and object. — Joshs

So how are you using "true" and "truth" here? You've denied any objective truth as correspondence, but now you say there is some sense of real truth, a "deeper notion of truth", but you haven't given any indication of what it is. Is it a subjective truth? If truth is simply "intricate and intimate interconnections in the way we interact with the world and each other", then the way I understand my relationship with you and the world is completely different from the way that you understand this relationship, and truth, it appears, would be completely subjective. Or do you propose some objectivity to these relations? In which case, I think we're back to what you denied above.

We find truth all around us, whenever we participate in forming broad abstractions that mask the interpersonal differences in purpose and perspective that accompany our social engagements. These broad abstractions can take the form of propositional truth statements producing the picture of objects existing independently of human conceptualization, and are true facts for all of us. — Joshs

Well Joshs, I don't understand this post at all. I don't see how truth could be a masking. I think it is more the opposite, an unmasking. So I think your explanation is a movement away from truth, toward deception, rather than toward truth.

This is the attempt at measurement, referred to by above.

Wage, is fundamentally a method for assigning a quantitative value to a good deed. Next, in the basic principles of economics, comes a proposal of a harmony between the value of a good deed, wage, and the value of property, capital. The problem is that these two values are not necessarily compatible, as they most often are derived from different ideals, yet they are quantified by the same monetary scale. Economics can only be successful if the two are related to each other as the means to the same end, but capital generally has a different source from wage. And Karma would probably be better measured as a form of capital rather than a form of wage.

Yes, that would involve making holes smaller. — Bartricks

Is this when you make half a hole?

:up:

No, rightness is where the world and language meet, and rightness is not about truth and falsity but coherence of fit. What fits and what does not , and in what way, depends on lour purposes. — Joshs

So, where do we find truth then?

I would like something for beginners. — musicpianoaccordion

I don't think there is such a thing as dialectics for beginners.

...I consider it a real shame for the forum to lose someone who can contribute to those types of discussions. — emancipate

True, but the shame is Streetlight's only, for the absence of restraint required to restrict oneself "to those types of discussions".

By the terms of that post, Aristotle would be a nominalist, not a realist, because ideas would only potentially exist, prior to being actualized by the human mind. The common use of "real" is to refer to what is actual.

Furthermore, Aristotle, in his law of identity, definitely gives priority to the particular, as having a form which is proper to itself, and unique to itself. That is hylomorphism, every object consists of matter and form The mind grasps universals, and the form of the particular is not a universal, so the perfection of the form, as the ideal and independent form, the form of the particular, is not grasped by the human mind, not being the form of a universal.

Therefore the Neo-Platonist "One", as a particular cannot be grasped by the human mind. And Neo-Platonist metaphysics is rendered impotent in this way, because its first principle, the "One", fundamentally cannot be grasped by the human intellect, leaving it as a useless first principle for human minds. "The One" must refer to a particular, not a universal, and therefore cannot be grasped by human beings. Even though we can understand "the One" as a universal, this would constitute a misunderstanding of the true nature of "one".

Somewhere along the way, Streetlight turned from philosophy to politics, and it was all downhill from there. Let that be a lesson to all good philosophers.

As I just said, which you seem to have missed, I am quite persuaded by platonic realism - by which I also mean Aristotelian's take on it. — Wayfarer

I don't think that Aristotle's metaphysics is consistent with what is today referred to as platonic realism. It is commonly said that Aristotle refuted this form of idealism, Pythagoreanism. What Aristotle argued in his metaphysics is that if geometrical constructs existed before being discovered by the mind of a geometer, their existence would be purely potential. The mind discovering the idea actualizes that idea, allowing it actual existence. Then he showed how anything which is eternal must be actual. So he effectively shows that the theory of eternal ideas, independent from human minds, is an impossibility.

And as 'the world' is actually 'our experience of the world', then these are not simply 'in the mind' as conceptualism argues. They're as real as tools or utensils or anything else we use, but they're not physical. — Wayfarer

What you seem to be missing is the advancements which Aristotle and Aquinas have made, the division between the non-physical Forms which are independent from the human mind, and the non-physical forms which are dependent on the human mind. It is necessary to uphold a separation between these two, to allow for the reality of human failures in knowledge, the deficiencies of human knowledge.

The human being has extreme difficulty in its attempt to understand the divine (independent) Forms because of this separation, which is actually matter itself. And the material aspect of the human being, its body, provides the means by which we gather information about the independent Forms, through sensation. This is why Aquinas says we cannot properly understand God, a divine Form, while being united with a body. Our knowledge, existing as a unity of human minds, is tainted by this medium, matter, which separates human minds.

What I think, is that the only true way to the independent Forms is through one's own internal being. I think we do have a direct point of contact with non-physical, independent Forms, through the internal being of oneself. And this is why mathematicians who practise what is called pure mathematics, can produce principles which are purely a priori, and completely independent from any dependence on empirical verification.

We cannot ever get to an adequate understanding of the internal aspects of a physical object through the approach of empirical science. This is because the observations required for the scientific method will always be an act of looking at the object from the direction of from the outside of the object, inward, so there will always be the medium of matter in between. The only way that a human being can truly access the inner aspects of a physical object is from within oneself, where one truly has access to the inside, from the inside, thereby avoiding the medium of matter. So this is the only way that we'll produce true knowledge of the inner aspects of a physical object.

Conspiracy does not require cunning foresight. There's a lot of inept conspirators.

To have a model of a cup necessarily implies there's a cup. — Isaac

This is not true at all. The model could be completely fictious. Architects make models of things which are only in their minds. There is no need at all, that the model represents a thing which is being modeled. The model may be a complete fabrication. To have a model of a cup, does not imply that there is a cup, other than to the degree that the model itself is a cup.

We're not dreaming it up, but the sense in which it exists 'outside of' or 'apart from' that constructed reality is unknown to us. We can't 'compare' the proverbial 'cup' with 'the real cup' because the real cup is just an temporary collection of atoms. — Wayfarer

We cannot even justify a claim of "the real cup". So to say 'the cup is just a temporary collection of atoms' is begging the question, by assuming there is 'the cup'. Contrary to what Isaac says above, the existence of the model does not logically imply the existence of the thing modeled.

These ways of 'modeling the real world' are inherently misguided because they start with the assumption that what is in the mind represent what is outside the mind. The only true way is to completely reject this assumption, and start with the premise that the mind is constructing the world from nothing. Then we proceed to inquiry as to why the mind constructs the world in the way that it does. The first principle must be intention, (Plato's "the good") or else we have nowhere to start. This is why Plato insists that the true reality must be apprehended as within the mind.

So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. — Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271

Not only is it a "dead universe", but if we assume a universe, independent of observers, then proceed to introduce an observer to this model, we must assign to the observer a temporal perspective. We have assumed an independent universe, and this includes the entirety of the temporal duration of the universe, from beginning to end, and then we want to assign a moment of observation, a "now".

If the proposed "now" is a static point in time, when nothing is moving, such that we can describe 'the way things are' at that point in time, then this is completely inconsistent with experience, therefore an empirically false observational perspective. If the proposed "now" is a duration of time (including some degree of temporal extension), then we must decide how long that "now" is to be. The choice will be completely arbitrary, with possibilities ranging between the tiniest imaginable amount of time (infinitely less than a Planck length), to the longest imaginable time (infinite, forever).

The conclusion therefore, is that if we start with the assumption of an independent universe, and try to introduce an observer to this universe, the observer's temporal perspective, hence what the observer observes from that perspective, will be completely dependent on the choice of perspectives, which will be completely arbitrary.

There is a cause of this data, and we assume that cause is external to us (no solipsism). — Isaac

You ought to recognize here, the distinction between raw data, simple information, and what is produced, or created from the data. There may be a cause of existence of the data, but that "cause" is completely inaccessible to us except through the means of interpreting the data itself. And, the data needs to be interpreted according to some 'principles'. If we are trying to determine something about the cause of the data, how do we derive such 'principles'?

So, any "model" created will be produced from these principles of interpretation. The true cause of the model therefore, are the principles of interpretation, not the data. So the data is nothing more than raw material (material cause), and the model produced is guided by the intention from which the principles are derived (final cause). What is important to notice, is that the model still cannot tell us anything about the cause of the data (material cause), unless the principles applied are somehow consistent with that cause.

You speak of errors in the perception, and modeling process. The biggest, most common, and most influential error, is the assumption that the principles applied in creating (causing) the percept, or model, are consistent with the cause of the data. This produces the conclusion that the percept, or model is fundamentally consistent with, or representative of, the cause of the data received. This is the error which leads to naive realism, the external world is just how it appears to us. In reality, how the world appears to a person, is a creation of that person's own internal processes, which interpret data according to whatever "principles' are employed by that being, and these 'principles' are likely not at all representative of the cause of the data because they are derived teleologically. What we have is a huge gap between material cause and final cause.

I hear you. But I guess it is saying there is no 'material', so there is only ideas or mind. In such a reality, is there a difference in how we develop a priority of ideas and how would we go about determining what is important for human beings? — Tom Storm

Such an idealism, one which says that there is no matter, is an extreme form of idealism which is very difficult to understand. I can only understand it under the terms of process philosophy. We must remove the idea of a static, passive, inert matter, and assume that there is absolutely nothing which remains the same, from one moment to the next. That which persists through a change is said to be the "matter", so no matter would mean that everything has changed from one moment to the next.

In this type of philosophy, it is difficult to establish a temporal coherency, or a continuity of existence from one moment to the next in time. So process philosophers end up positing some sort of spiritual element which produces a relationship between one moment of time and the next, to account for the observed temporal continuity and apparent consistency of being as time passes.

I really haven't studied this philosophy enough to know how they would develop an ethics, i.e. how they would determine what is good.

Interesting. Does idealism in your view necessitate the reality of a spiritual world (as opposed to a reality where mentation is everything)? I can see how it might support some forms of spiritual belief, with suppositions and additional work - what kind of spiritual world does idealism establish as real? — Tom Storm

I do not think that idealism establishes any specific type of spiritual world as real, per se. What it does though is give us the principles required to understand the priority of the spiritual over the material.

Is this a kind of preaching?
This is a philosophical medium, not a religious one. And the above statement does not sound at all like a philosophical one or belonging to any kind of philosophy, including Philosophy of Religion, i.e. Theology. — Alkis Piskas

In case you didn't notice, it was a response to Banno's expressed fear of having to face the reality of the spiritual world. Banno will not read an argument which gives validity to any theological ideas, because of this fear.

But Wayfarer has presented converse arguments such that those who espouse materialism are afraid less they be obliged to face the reality of a spiritual or transcendent world - they refuse to countenance such things out of fear of having their world overturned. — Banno

This makes no sense at all. You’re saying that some third thing is required for the two apples to be separated. Then what separates the two apples from this third thing? — Michael

You don't seem to have apprehended what I said in the other post Michael. The apples are things. What separates them is not a thing. The point I am making is that it cannot be a thing. You've simply assumed again, that it is a thing. It's not a thing, and it cannot be a thing or else there would be three things, not two, and then more things to separate those things, and the infinite regress you mentioned. The logic of mathematics would be rendered useless if that which separates two things from each other was a third thing.

However, something must separate the two things from each other, or else they would be only one thing. And, the logic of mathematics would be rendered useless in that way, as well. As I explained above, that which separates them cannot be a third thing. Therefore we need to employ a dualism to understand the existence of independent things. Aristotle resolved this type of logical dilemma with hylomorphism, a type of dualism.

Edit: I am having difficulty locating our disagreement, apart from your insistence on separating a material and spiritual world. — Banno

Such a separation (dualism) is necessary for the reasons I explained to Michael, above. Without such a separation (and the ensuing law of identity, which requires that each of the two aspects is real), logic is left impotent.

That's because you're still criticizing a strawman version of idealism. — Wayfarer

I believe that a proper representation of idealism places the ideal as prior to the material. Most forms of idealism do not deny the reality of matter, they simply affirm that matter is logically dependent on mind. This is the real issue of modern metaphysics. The laity tend to place matter as first, assuming that mind evolved through some form of emergence. But this illogical position renders the entire universe as unintelligible (cosmological argument being the ultimate demonstration), so the higher educated tend to adopt some form of idealism. You'll see idealism as the most common perspective of physicists, placing the wave function (ideal) as prior to the material object (particle).

But Wayfarer has presented converse arguments such that those who espouse materialism are afraid less they be obliged to face the reality of a spiritual or transcendent world - they refuse to countenance such things out of fear of having their world overturned. And I think this is probably right, too, in many cases. — Banno

Why the fear? The logical necessity is that we must accept the reality of that second aspect of reality. It is a "logical necessity" not because it is demonstrated as a logical conclusion, but a necessity because it is required for logic to be applicable. If logic is rendered impotent, then what are we left with as the means to understand reality? So we must accept that which you fear, the reality of dualism, and get on with the enterprise of understanding reality. Why live in a veiled world of self-deception, simply because you fear reality? Release your fear of God, and accept Him into your heart. Denying Him out of fear is nothing but self-deception.

There could not be two distinct things without separation between them, otherwise they'd be only one thing. And, if there is separation between them, that separation must consist of something. If it's not something real, then we're back to there really being only one thing.

For A and B to be separate there must be some C that makes them separate? Why? What then separates C from A and B? Some D? And so on ad infinitum. Seems an unreasonable requirement. — Michael

I think you misunderstand. It's obviously not "some C" which separates A from B. What is the case is that A is different from, or other than B. C could not make A other than B, because C is of the same type as both A and B, and this is why the infinite regress appears, you have not grasped the need for something of a different type. What makes A different from B, must be something categorically distinct from both A and B, as well as C, D, E, F, or anything else of that category, because these are all of the same type, and cannot account for the difference within the type. Another thing of the same type cannot account for the differences between things of the same type.

This is why there is a need for dualism, rather than pure idealism, or solipsism. If A and B represent distinct minds, then there must be something which makes A other than, or different from B. This must be something categorically distinct, like "matter" is supposed to be distinct from mind, not another bit of the same substance, C. Or else we would have one continuity of mind, A, B, C, D... with nothing really separating one from the other.

It's not solipsism because there are multiple minds, and it's not a hive mind because they're separate. — Michael

If there is multiple minds, then isn't it necessary that there is something which separates one mind from another? Isn't this what matter is?

I've absolutely no interest in a God-of-the-gaps argument. Even if there were an uncertainty to resolve around the means by which potential states become actual states it would a) be best resolved by experts in that field, and b) have absolutely nothing to do with a character from some 2000 year old folk story. — Isaac

Well, you seem to be ill-informed. Theologians and metaphysicians are the "experts in that field" of "the means by which potential states become actual states". So, from your reply, I conclude that you have no interest in this question, and you just want to take for granted that such a thing happens. That's fine, it's the assumption made by most.

But I think the question needs to be asked, in what sense do possibilities exist? — Wayfarer

The answer to this question depends on how one understands the nature of time. Obviously, the future consists of possibilities, that's why we deliberate before acting, because we can decide which possibilities to actualize. The future consists of possibility, and this is known as that which is between existent and non-existent, because we assign "existence" to material things, and future things have not yet materialized.

There is however, a trend in modern culture, to deny the reality of "the present" in time. This denial is to ignore the distinction between past and future, rendering the principles by which we understand "possibility" as unintelligible. Of course this denial of "the present" as a real division between two completely distinct aspects of reality, the past and the future, is completely opposed to the way that all of us live our lives. So this is the ultimate in extreme forms of hypocrisy. We all live, act, and think, in complete acceptance of a real difference between things of the past and things of the future, in all of our mundane activities, so to deny the reality of the present, as the necessary division between these two completely different aspects of reality, is an extreme form of hypocrisy.

Measurement can be just a physical process and that can be enough to actualise probabilities from their res potentia. — Isaac

What exactly does this mean, "to actualize probabilities"? If possible things have no material existence, and actual things are material things, then what does it mean to give materiality to a thing?

This is the question of "the present". At "the present", which is arguably the time of our experience, and observations, future things have no material existence, being possibilities, and past things are things which have materialized with actual existence. At "the present", something happens whereby immaterial things (possibilities) are "actualized" into real material existents. What could be this process where immaterial possibilities are actualized into real material things, other than some form of "being chosen"?

That choice of words, "being chosen", was made to demonstrate the traditional understanding, that the actualization of possibilities, at the moment of the present, is caused by "the Will of God".

I take the question of how things are to be subservient to the question of what to do. We only need to know how things are so far as it helps working out what to do. — Banno

You have your priorities reversed, and this is probably why you perceive an interaction problem with dualism. You place your own desire to act, "what to do" as higher in priority to "how things are". But in reality, many things are impossible for any of us to do, because of the state of "how things are". We must therefore give priority to "how things are", in order to determine "what to do".

Without any respect for the priority of 'what actually is', "how things are", and the force of necessity which this bears upon us, any determination of "what to do" is unjustifiable. In other words, "what to do" can only be justified by the logically prior, and necessary, "how things are". Your refusal to accept the reality, and priority, of necessity, leads you to believe that 'the necessary' cannot interact with the real world.

Wayfarer would discuss a spiritual aspect of the world, which seems to me an impossible task. It's not that I deny this sublime aspect of reality, but taking seriously that it is ineffable, and hence beyond discussion. Hence it becomes a place of disagreement. — Banno

Here it is, your rejection of 'the necessary', disguised as "a spiritual aspect of the world", which you cast off as "ineffable". Reasonable philosophies commonly refer to "the necessary" by means of the term "God".

Relativity does to show that reality is dependent on the observer.

It is based on the converse view, that the laws of physics are the same for all observers. That reality is the same for all observers. — Banno

Here, you try to sneak 'the necessary' in through the back door. There is, it seems, something necessary after all, "the laws of physics". The problem with this proposed backdoor necessity has been well documented by physicists such as Lee Smolin. All the laws of physics have limitations to their applicability, and break down, fail, when approaching the extremes of their applicability. Therefore it is not true that the laws of physics are the same for all observers, and your proposed backdoor necessity, "the laws of physics are the same for all observers" is an unacceptable proposition.

Furthermore, your claim to reject scientism is hypocrisy, as you replace "God" as your means of referencing "the necessary" with "the laws of physics" in your actions. And actions speak louder than words.

That leaves wide open the problem of how mind interacts with those other substances - the basic problem for dualism. — Banno

That problem was solved long ago by Plato. Moderners who like to try and reintroduce it simply haven't studied enough to understand the resolution.

It looks like forgetting something.

I don't see how that follows at all. If metal-detecting can find metal in a metal-detector, does that imply that metal is inherent in metal-detecting (or detectors)? — Isaac

If a metal detector finds metal in itself, then unless the metal detector is wrong, metal is inherent in the detector.

No we can make plastic metal detectors and some metal-detecting is completely without metal. — Isaac

Sure, but metal inheres within the detector in which it is found. So by analogy, meaning inheres within the thinking in which it is found. If some other thinking does not practise introspection (detecting itself for meaning), this does not produce the conclusion that there is no meaning inherent within that thinking.

Since the same thought "I'm cold" can have different meanings (to you it might be unpleasant, to me it might be desirable), those meanings cannot be inherent to the thought. — Isaac

I think you are using "inherent" or "meaning", or both, in a way which I am unfamiliar with. Generally, "inherent" means to exist within. If meaning inheres within thought, this does not mean that the same meaning ought to inhere within your thought, as the meaning which inheres within my thought. How would that even be possible, since we are two distinct thinking beings.

Just like an actual apple has a different meaning (values, emotions, utility) to you as it does to me, so the meaning cannot inhere in the apple. — Isaac

But I am saying that the meaning inheres in the thought, not in the apple. It's possible that meaning inheres in the thing itself as well, but I haven't said anything about that yet.

Yes. I've already agreed that my asking of that question doesn't have any inherent meaning. — Isaac

Do you recognize the difference between a sentence written on a page, as a material object, or arrangement of objects, or part of an overall page, or collection of pages, and the existence of thought, or some thinking, which that material arrangement is supposed to be a representation of?

If so, then you can apprehend your act of "asking of that question", as a third thing, the action which caused the existence of that material object which is supposed to be a representation of some thinking or thought.

Of course, if one accepts that 'thoughts' and 'neural networks' are the same thing from different perspectives, the problem disappears. — Isaac

I believe, the issue is the activity which is involved here. When we describe the activity of thinking, and when we describe the activity of neural networks, we produce completely different descriptions. The question comes down to "what is the causal agent?". Is it the self, me, thinking, or is it a bunch of electrical impulses. If the latter, what produces (creates or causes) coherency in this bunch of impulses. The former takes coherency as "the self", for granted.

So it is impossible to accept that thoughts and neural networks are the same thing, because one perspective assumes natural, inherent coherency (I'll use "coherency" instead of "meaning"), and the other perspective provides no indication as to how coherency is possible. Coherency and lack of coherency makes the two descriptions worlds apart, and not the same thing at all.

I don't see how our thoughts are any different to the "marks or shapes or whatever" in that they lack 'inherent' meaning. We might find meaning in them on reflection, but I don't see any evidence that the meaning is inherent. — Isaac

Are you serious? Isn't reflection a form of thinking? So if you say that it requires reflection to find meaning in thought, then all you are really saying is that it requires thinking to find meaning in thought. If thinking can find meaning in itself, doesn't that imply that meaning is necessarily inherent in thought?

What is not understood, is what constitutes "mass".

Each atom of electromagnetic matter has a density of aether infused into it, and interferences within and especially between atoms produce agitation in the aether, making its motions effectively random at largish mass, so quantum decoherence correlates to some extent with aether decoherence, one of the reasons why aether is challenging to detect on Earth. — Enrique

The Michelson-Morley experiments would show the presence of the aether if the aether was a separate substance from the massive object. What quantum physics demonstrates to us, is that the massive particle, and the wave substance are one and the same. This means that the aether and the object are not separable as hypothesized in the experiment, rendering the experiment useless.

How would I know? Do you know what matter's made of?

I looked into the word 'noumenal' - it is derived from that seminal Greek word, nous, which I often remark, has fallen into disuse, and for which there is really no modern equivalent (outside specialised philosophy departments). So 'noumenal' means literally 'an object of nous', meaning, something that can be understood as a pure concept without reference to a physical instance. It's very close in meaning to the eidos of Platonism. However Kant seems to have overlooked that derivation, which is commented on by Schopenhauer: — Wayfarer

When Kant starts using "noumena" in the CPR, there is extensive footnotes. In the footnotes, he describes the noumena as intelligible objects. If we interpret "noumena" as external, and "intelligible objects" as ideas, then Kant is definitely an idealist, of the same sort as Berkeley. I think it is generally believed that Berkeley had influence on Kant

Well, I think the actual movement of material objects is something more than the juggling play of our concepts. But, we all see things differently, and that's why there's so many different metaphysics.

But it has nothing to do with real metaphysics, for in real metaphysics the initial description of the case (we have a statue and the lump of bronze of which it is made) already gives us all the relevant facts. — Mww

The question is, how is it the case that the statue is something different from the lump of bronze. Intuitively, we'd be inclined to say they are both the same, the statue is the lump of bronze. But the lump of bronze may be many different things, while the statue can only be the statue, or else it is not the statue. So clearly there is a very real difference between the statue and the lump of bronze. Call this the 'juggling play with out existing concepts' if you like, but isn't that what metaphysics is?

.Matter is essentially dynamic, essentially temporal, essentially changeful. — Mww

Matter, is essentially temporal, but it does not change. It is the aspect of physical existence which does not change as time passes, hence 'inertia', and "conservation of mass'. That's the way matter was defined by Aristotle, and the meaning has been maintained. Form is the aspect which is dynamic and changing.

What is matter, on this mistaken view? — Mww

Notice, matter as dynamic, and changeful is described by Nietzsche as a mistaken view. That's what I am saying too.

So the issue is what is a true representation of "matter"? And the answer is that it is that aspect of things which does not change as time passes, while the form of the thing changes. Here's what Aristotle says in Bk 2 of his Physics about "material cause", under 'The Conditions of Change': "that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists". In his Metaphysics he explains how the matter is the potential for an actual thing. So if we talk about bronze for example, as a material, or wood, we are not talking about any particular bronze thing, or wooden thing, but a material which is potentially many different things.

The "mistaken view" conflates matter with form. It is common in monism because monists do not accept the principles of separation required to understand this.

I have a rule not to reply to Meta, it's not worth one's while. — Banno

I guess it's true what they say, 'rules are meant to be broken'. Maybe that's a new rule we ought to apply more often.

The Principle of Relativity is that the laws of physics must be the same for every observer. — Banno

So you say, the laws of physics are rules which are not broken. You can express relativity theory in this way, but the outcome is the same as what I expressed. Applying the same laws of physics from different observational perspectives renders "the way things are" as different from each of those perspectives.

The "laws of physics" don't describe the way things are, they describe the way things behave. Notice that in all activities and interactions, there are things which are engaged in those activities. If we adhere to the principle that the laws which apply to those activities must remain unbroken, then the things which are involved in those activities must be different, depending on one's observational perspective. This is shown in concepts such as "length contraction", and "relativistic mass".

Either we can start with the premise, "the way things are is different from different perspectives" as I did, and conclude "the laws of physics are the same for every observer", or we can start with your premise, 'the laws of physics must be the same for every observer", and conclude "the way things are is different from different perspectives".

It's really just a matter of what happens when we uphold your expressed necessity, the laws of physics "must" be the same for every observer. If we maintain this necessity, and apply this principle to empirical observations, we are forced to conclude that "the way things are" is different, depending on the observer's perspective.

What this demonstrates is that if realism assumes that there is a single reality of "the way things are", then the laws of physics are incompatible with realism. This ought not be surprising to you, given the issues with quantum mechanics.

You might find the principle, 'rules are meant to be broken' to be more consistent with reality. Then if you replace your stated necessity, that the laws of physics "must" be the same from every observational perspective, with 'the laws of physics are not applicable in some observational perspectives', you could have something consistent with realism.

The "way things are" is the same for all observers. — Banno

Clearly this is false as demonstrated above. The laws of physics which are assumed to be the same for all observers, do not describe "the way things are". They describe the physical interactions of things, how things behave, not the way things are.

Anyway, back to ignoring Meta. — Banno

It's always the same. Whenever someone proves you wrong, you resort to ignoring that person, and persist with your evil ways of preaching what has been demonstrated to you as wrong. Maybe you ought to break that habit.

Any idealism worthy of the name goes further, insisting that there cannot even be a way that things are without mind. — Banno

This is right, an idealist would claim "that there cannot even be a way that things are without mind". But this is easy to understand, and accept. The way that things are, is commonly believed to be perspective dependent. The way things are is different dependent on one's spatial-temporal perspective, and only a mind cam have such a perspective. This is the fundamental principle of relativity theory. And it is why many modern sciences, especially the disciplines which employ physics, are inherently idealist. Look at "model-dependent realism" for example.

You apparently wish to be both an idealist and a realist. I can't see, on the logic offered, how you could make these compatible. — Banno

There is no basic incompatibility between realism and idealism, hence the common position of Platonic realism, which is compatible with idealism. This is because "realism" is very versatile, and used in many different ways. The extreme form of Platonic idealism, Pythagorean idealism, posits a real independent world which is composed of mathematical ideas (God's ideas or whatever), and this is a form of realism. You'll find this also in Berkeley. Wayfarer I believe is a Platonic realist, as most modern mathematicians are (mathematics employs axioms which assume the reality of mathematical objects). So there is no problem for Wayfarer to be both idealist and realist. It seems to me that you believe in the reality of mathematical objects as well, Banno.