To me Adorno seems to be saying that we shouldn't be satisfied with a weak kind of philosophy that pursues restricted problems or else abandons itself to relativism, subject to "contingency and whim". We should want some kind of unity. — Jamal

This I believe is the key point of lecture 4. The reading is quite difficult with numerous twists and turns, so I won't give a full interpretation without more study, but I'll make a few initial comments. The distinction between "system" and "systematization", where a "system" is a whole and objective, while a systemization addresses a specific subject, and is subjective, sets up the framework for the discussion.

The first twist, is that the meaning of "system" has really changed. Now, what "system" refers to in anti-system philosophy, is really systematization. So anti-system, or a-system philosophy, if it's decent philosophy, will demonstrate system in a latent form. The latent system is really quite tricky because it's where the subjective meets the objective.

The point though, is that this systematization type of thinking, which becomes "provincial", and even "cottage" at the end of the lecture, is what true philosophy must strive to avoid.

He points out that Hegel contradicts himself, wanting to have his cake and eat it with a system that, like mathematics or logic, is one "gigantic tautology," yet is supposed to tell us something substantive about the world: — Jamal

I like the circle analogy. The Absolute, as the premise, is the cause of the Hegelian dialectical process, but it is also what is supposed to emerge as the result of that process. So we have an eternal circular motion, similar to what Aristotle demonstrated was logically possible, but is actually physically impossible.

He puts things differently by saying he wants to reject Spinoza's verum index sui et falsi, which is something like, the truth is an index of or standard for the false, meaning what is false can be just read of from what is true. He proposes the alternative: falsum index sui atque veri, the false indicates both itself and the true. — Jamal

I believe that the issue which lies beneath this conundrum is the problem of the relationship between the true and the false. The true, we can never know with absolute certainty, yet we have certainty about the false, as the impossible, beginning with contradiction. This produces a categorical distinction between the false and the true, as the false is "the thing" which is impossible, while the true is the possible, which is not a thing at all, but a multitude of possibility. I believe that this description provides an explanation of Adorno's reference to what is "definite", and to the "concrete expression" in the radio broadcast you quoted.

This outlook is set up in a general way, with the question of "is a negative dialectics possible". The negative actually determines what is impossible, and that forms the determinate, the determinate negation. Since the negative produces the determinate as the impossible, the requirement is to invert the dialectical process, from the Hegelian proposal of determining the positive, which is actually fruitless (or impossible), to a more realistic method of determining the negative. Determining the impossible then places the possible into a proper perspective. I believe that is sort of what is meant at the top of p29, with "index sui atque veri". Falsity is the index for truth.

...that this falseness proclaims itself in whether negative dialectics is possible what we might call a certain immediacy, and this immediacy of the false, this falsum, is the index sui atque veri.

Here's an interpretation from "Adorno Studies Through a Glass Darkly: Adorno's Inverse Theology"

The determinate negation of the negative conditions in
which we find ourselves provides a glimpse of “the only
permissible figure of the Other.”22 Amending Spinoza in his
essay “Critique,” Adorno argues that “the false, once
determinately known and precisely expressed, is already an
index of what is right and better.”23 Echoing this remark in his
lectures on Negative Dialectics, Adorno again rejects Spinoza’s
proposition “that verum index sui et falsi, or that the true and
the false can both be read directly ... from the truth.” Here
Adorno contends that “the false, that which should not be the
case, is in fact the standard of itself: . . . the false, namely that
which is not itself in the first instance–i.e. not itself in the
sense that it is not what it claims to be–that this falseness
proclaims itself in what we might call a certain immediacy, and
this immediacy of the false, this falsum, is the index sui atque
veri. So here then, . . . is a certain pointer to what I consider
‘right thinking’.”24

https://www.adornostudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/darkly.pdf

As well as the structure of a symphony, and the tension and resolution that lead to transformation, there's the way that the parts (movements and motifs) are shaped by the whole, and vice versa. — Jamal

Hmm, parts and whole, in relation. Doesn't this amount to "a system"? I'm in the middle of reading the next lecture, concerned with systems.

Your new example, "empty" and "full", only shows that these two do not properly qualify as contradictory terms, in the context of those fundamental laws we've been discussing. If those two qualified as contradictory, in that sense, then the glass would have to be either full or empty, excluding any middle terms like "half".

This reality is readily understood by recognizing that there is a multitude of states of "not-empty" which also qualify as "not-full", these are the degrees of the intermediate. Because of this, the contrary of "empty", "not-empty", cannot be truthfully said to be "full". Nor can the contrary of "full", "not-full", be said to be empty. Empty and full are distinct concepts which cannot be defined as opposite to each other.

We find this in every case of ideals which act as the extreme limits to a scale, hot and cold, big and small, good and bad, etc.. Each of these is not actually the contrary of the other, in the sense expressed by the law of non-contradiction. They all allow a range of intermediates and the degree may be measured by some sort of scale, warm, medium sized, indifferent acts, etc.. These ideal extremes are the defining boundaries of categories, and this is completely different from "contradictory" as employed by those laws.

What this demonstrates is that our common intuition, or inclination, to judge two terms as opposite, or "contradictory", is not consistent with "contradictory" as stated in those fundamental laws. And, in the activities of the real world, there is a whole slew of intermediates which violate the law of excluded middle, when we assign the contraries to real substance. This is what Aristotle demonstrated as the fact that the physical world of "becoming" is incompatible with the logical opposites of "being and not-being".

Did you read the quote? Maybe it's incorrect by conventional interpretations of Hegelian dialectics, but it is what Adorno is arguing about Hegelian dialectics.

So by Adorno's interpretation of Hegelian dialectics, "Becoming" is just a new proposal for the concept of "Being". It cannot be called "Being" because that word refers to what was identified as opposed to "Nothing". But that original concept of "Being" was manufactured by the mentioned violence, to match that antithesis, because "to put it quite crudely, they are not actually entirely identical".

Being and nothing are only made to be two sides of the same coin, by doing violence to the concept. When they "disappear into Becoming", that is the so-called synthesis, which is really nothing more that an attempt to rectify the violence which was required to establish the thesis/antithesis identity.

Thus once the identity of two contradictory concepts has been
reached, or at least asserted in the antithesis, as in the most famous
case of all, the identity of Nothing with Being, this is followed by a
further reflection to the effect that, indeed, these are identical, I have
indeed brought them together – Being, as something entirely undefined,
is also Nothing. However, to put it quite crudely, they are not
actually entirely identical. The thought that carries out the act of
identification always does violence to every single concept in the
process. And the negation of the negation is in fact nothing other
than the α¸να′µνησις, the recollection, of that violence, in other words
the acknowledgement that, by conjoining two opposing concepts, I
have on the one hand bowed to a necessity implicit in them, while
on the other hand I have done them a violence that has to be rectified.
And truth to tell, this rectification in the act of identification is
what is always intended by the Hegelian syntheses. — p30

And it's like he's saying that this insight is in Hegel already, or more like ... Hegel's dialectic "wants" to rectify the violence, but Hegel himself didn't allow it to. In other words, here's what Hegel should have done. — Jamal

I figure what he is saying is that the concept ("Being" in the example) must be abused (defined in a way which is inconsistent with what it really means to us) in order to produce the identity relationship required by the thesis/antithesis opposition. In other words, the proposed antithesis is the antithesis of an artificially manipulated concept, designed for that antithesis. Then it turns out that all that the synthesis is, is an attempt to rectify the damage caused by that abuse. And, depending on the skill of the dialectician, this may just as likely be a step backward for the concept, as it is likely to be a step forward.

Hmm... I still suspect this whole thing is just a play on words, where "possibly P" and "possibly not P" do not fit the desired format for the LNC and LEM to apply. I'll try one last example and then I'll leave it alone. — A Christian Philosophy

We are taking about P and not P therefore the LNC and LEM apply. The qualification of "possibly" creates an exception, a violation. Why do you see the need to persistently argue against this? I don't understand, it's a very simple matter. There is an aspect of reality, which we call "possibility", which those laws do not apply to. So we've developed a different type of logic, modal logic, to deal with this aspect.

And, like I explained to Banno, it's not the case that any specific system of logic is inconsistent, but it is the case that they are inconsistent with each other. This ought not be surprising because there are aspects of reality which are incommensurable with each other. That is why there is a need for dualism in ontology. The problem is that many people are inclined to reject dualism and attempt to reduce everything to a form of monism, and this is impossible because the two aspects are incompatible.

As per the LNC, we cannot have "P" and "not P" at the same time.
But we can have "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half not full" at the same time.
Does this example violate the LNC? Surely not; it is merely a play on words because the propositions "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half not full" say the same thing in different words. — A Christian Philosophy

I can't see the relevance. To make the example comparable you'd have to say "half full" and "not half full". What you present, "half not full", is meaningless. Either the glass is full or not full, and half full qualifies as not full. "Half not full" is nonsensical, meaningless, as if there could be half of nothing.

I really do not understand this drive to make all aspects of reality fit into one category, so much so that you would make up nonsensical phrases in an attempt to justify this motivation.

I have explicitly pointed out why this is not the case. The speak about two different things, so could not, in theory, tell us hte same thing. — AmadeusD

They don't speak about different things, they both speak about the very same thing, P. One says P might be false, the other says P might be true. Within the context of the fundamental laws of logic, they both say the same thing about P.

I understand what you're saying though, as i noted - they tell us the same thing (in practice). — AmadeusD

I don't think you quite get what I\m saying. In the context of applying the fundamental laws, the phrases tell us the same thing. That's theory, not practice. Theoretically they say the same thing, if the fundamental laws provide the theoretical context. In practice they tell us something different, depending on the context of the practice. In one context it might be something about success and failure of action, as in your example. In another context it could mean something different, like statements about what a person believes.

I don't believe we can really say that Plato had an ontology. Think that's strange? Look at the quote from Adorno, p32, in my post.

But they say different things... Certain contexts will give us the same information from each, but they mean different things as explicitly set out above. Is that translation of the logic above wrong? — AmadeusD

I really don't see the difference. By the fundamental laws, there are only two possibilities, true or false. Therefore "P might be false" means the very same thing as "P might be true". They both imply that there is a correct answer, (as there must be by the laws) but we do not know which is the case. So in the context of those laws they both mean the very same thing.

However, if we allow that there actually is no correct answer (as in the case of the sea battle), then we allow violation of those laws. It is only after we allow this violation that we can say that the two mean different things. But then we've put them into a different context, where the fundamental laws are not relevant, because we've allowed violation to put them into that context.

P1: LEM says one or the other must be true when "P" and "not P" contradict.
P2: "possibly P" and "possibly not P" do not contradict.
C: Therefore, "possibly P" and "possibly not P" both being true does not violate the LEM. — A Christian Philosophy

Ok, I see what you're saying, but I don't see the relevance. Each, "possibly P", and also "possibly not P", both inherently contradict LEM. Therefore to allow that they say something meaningful we must remove them from the context of the fundamental laws, as explained in my reply to Amadeus above. Since those laws must be violated to make the statements meaningful, placing them back into the context of those laws is pointless. We've already declared that the laws are inapplicable, in order to make sense of those propositions. So it's a demonstration of arbitrary application of the laws.

I didn't realize that. — frank

It's dependent on interpretation of a thorough reading. Plato's writing is commonly divided into three stages, early, middle, late. Here is a brief example of how one may interpret.

The early provides a good demonstration of an attempt to understand Pythagorean idealism, and the associated theory of participation, through application of the dialectical method. The middle work reveals problems with this form of idealism, such as what we know as "the interaction problem", so he introduces "the good" as an active principle which bridges this gap. The later work, such as Parmenides and Sophist, reveal all sorts of problems of idealism, especially with sophistry not maintaining clear categories, and arguments produced from a predetermined end, designed for specific purposes. (Compare Adorno's doing violence to the concept.) The Timeaeus uses "matter" as a fundamental principle to sort out categories, and this becomes the base of Aristotle's "primary substance".

Throughout, Plato's belief in idealism is strengthened, but the prevailing idealism is rejected by what we can call his "negative dialectics". This is his critical analysis of the conventional idealism. It does not refute idealism, but exposes problems, and produces the need to revamp outdated principles.

We were talking about "possibly P", and "possibly not P" as having the same meaning. Each means that neither "P" nor "not P" is true.

Which of course, often tell us hte same thing but are do not mean the same thing. — AmadeusD

How can two phrases tell us the same thing without meaning the same thing?

Jamal touched on this above, but at page 26, he appears to approach a negative part of positivity. Notice how saying 'if you have nothing positive to say, don't say anything' is really, itself, saying something negative. This is a negative aspect of positivity. So positivity's approach to negativity, can be, and often is negative.

But I believe that precisely
this aspect of positivity, which acts as a corollary to negativity, is
conjoined with the principle of negativity because it resists being fixed
once and for all in an abstract, static manner. — p27

He then describes this as a "prohibition", and the prohibition is called a "fixed element", which is said to be an "aspect". Notice it is the fixed positive point which becomes an aspect of the negative. This appears to me to be the intended grounding of the "determinate negative", it sort of reciprocates to the positive, or the positive submits to the negative, through prohibition. This must be where we find will power, and the moral capacity to say "no".

He then proceeds to express how the world is overflowing with positivity, but much of it turns out to actually be negative, like the example above. So negative dialectics is called for, and this constitutes an important difference between him and Hegel who taught positive dialectics. And he describes Hegelian dialectics as a sort of vicious circle, where the analytic becomes the synthetic and vise versa.

It is here that critical thinking and Hegel have to part company. — 28

Now he proceeds to the question " is a negative dialectics at all possible?" And, we see how the object can be the subject, or the object be a concept:

Can we speak of a dialectical
process if movement is not brought into play by the fact that the
object that is to be understood as distinct from spirit turns out itself
to be spirit. — p28

Further, the source of determinate negativity is said to be in "bad positivity". This bad positivity is characterized by the claim that the negation of the negation is positive. And he refers to Spinoza for an example. It's a little confusing, but it appears to be, that when the claim that something else is false, is taken to be true, but this claim is really false itself, then this falsity obtains a sort of immediacy.

He then proceeds to criticize the Hegelian concept of synthesis. He does this with reference to Hegel's famous triad of Being, Nothing, and Becoming. He explains how being and nothing must actually be the same, identical. But to make them identical, in the sense of ideally opposed, requires that we "do violence" to the concept. The violence then requires rectification, and the rectification is what is called "synthesis".

His criticism appears to be, that this doing violence to the concept which is required to create two opposites, as ideal, is a sort of mutilation of the concept. Therefore what is rectified, as the synthesis isn't necessarily derived from a true representation of the original concept, it's the mutilated concept. This allows that the synthesis might just as well be a step backward as a step forward. So this seems to be what validates "non-identity". Identity is a creation of that violence, and this need to do violence is a negative aspect of that positive dialectic. Then he describes this as a minimal difference between him and Hegel, but with " large-scale implications".

The final question of this lecture is " the question of whether dialectics is possible without system". He describes a common negative attitude toward systems in philosophy, and states the following:

What I am attempting
here and would like to show you is the possibility of philosophy
in an authoritative sense without either system or ontology – that is
what I am aiming at. — p32

He claims that he will show, through these lectures, "that a philosophical system is not possible".

But we know Plato grooved on the dialectics, so would he have really gotten muted in what Adorno calls idealism? — frank

What we commonly know as Platonism is better named as "Pythagorean idealism". I read Plato as being very critical of Pythagorean idealism, through the use of dialectics. This criticism laid the ground work for Aristotle's more formal refutation of Pythagorean idealism. Because of this, I view "Platonism" as a misnomer, because Plato was actually not Platonist.

By the way, this alienation of subject to object (or concept to content) is what Adorno is calling idealism. — frank

The problem is that this supposed alienation, concept without object, is a very true aspect of reality, what is at the base of creativity, like I explained. So Adorno needs to provide good reasons if he moves to reject it. Because it is idealism isn't a good reason. Idealism itself only becomes problematic when ideas are objectified, reified, as I explained is the case with common Platonism.

There's no getting away from the concept-object confrontation; the question is how much of the object is lost in the confrontation, or how much the nonidentical is otherwise part of the experience in which the concept-object confrontation is central (which is so far unexplained). — Jamal

I don't like this concept-object confrontation, and I do not see the need for it. It appears like it will reduce the activity of mind to mere representation, and this would be an ignorance of what I believe to be the primary activity of mind, creativity. I believe that a proper understanding of concepts reveals that there is no necessity of a corresponding object, and this lack of object is not a fault of the concept, but a feature of its utility, versatility, and infinite applicability. This is what we see in mathematics for example, conceptions produced without corresponding objects.

The issue though is that since there is no object which corresponds with these concepts, a loss of objectivity becomes apparent. There is nothing to ground "truth". Then the pure mathematicians who dream up these concepts with their imaginations tend toward Platonism to fill this gap, producing a vacuous form of "objectivity". The concept and object are one and the same.

I think they're so ridiculous that they must be motivated by strong prejudice, and I guess I won't be able to argue you out of that. — Jamal

There is prejudice here, no doubt. I don't believe it is strong though. Since the matter is the intentions which authors conceal from us in the secrecy of their own minds, it is something which can only be speculated about, therefore confidence cannot be obtained. If one allowed oneself confidence (strong prejudice), in this sort of matter, that person would be subsumed by paranoia. But also the highly speculative nature makes it very difficult to argue one out of it, as well.

Anyway, I'll try to hold off the criticism until the designated time slot, and enjoy the reading. I find the material well written and very interesting. And I don't mean this in the sense of "dead wrong", I'll withhold judgement on that.

I don't get your point. Of course "P" and "not P" say different things, they are opposed in meaning. And, LEM says one or the other must be true.

Yes, "possibly P" has the same meaning as "possibly not P". And, this meaning is that neither P nor not P is true, which is a violation of the LEM.

Consider, what is known by us as "possibility" could be understood in another way. It appears as an aspect of reality which violates those three fundamental laws. It could be understood as a violation of the law of non-contradiction. Then when someone says "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" we would understand it as both "there will be a sea battle tomorrow", and "there will not be a sea battle tomorrow" are true. But this is not the way that we are taught to understand it. We are taught to understand it as neither one is true. If we understand them both as true the result is unintelligibility. If we understand neither as true, the result is a new form of logic, modal logic, which deals with those aspects of reality which violate the LEM. This indicates that when something appears like it might be unintelligible, we might just need to look at it in another way.

He contrasts abstract negativity, or negativity in itself, with what he is really getting at with his negative dialectics, which is something to do with determinate negation: — Jamal

When he talks about "confronting concepts with their objects and, conversely, objects with their concepts", isn't this exactly the type of identity philosophy which he claims to be rejecting?

And, the meaning of "determinate negation" seems very unclear. It appears strangely like a reification. When "negativity of this kind is made concrete", doesn't this imply making it a fixed object? He may attempt to explain this when he talks about the "fixed element" as an aspect rather than an absolute, but it's very unclear what he is trying to do here.

Maybe it will become clearer when he addresses the question of whether a negative dialectics is even possible. Maybe it will end up being self-defeating, and we'll just be negating the negative dialectic.

See I'm practising my negative (critical) thinking, to see how it goes.

Because the matter of rhetoric and logic/dialectic are usually different, rhetoric provides its own appropriate logic. We can call it rhetorical logic if you like... — tim wood

As you can see, I don't like.

Rhetoric employs a number of different means, some logic, some not, depending on the circumstances. We cannot class appealing to another's emotions "logic".

There is no reason for him to mention "The enormous power of Hegel", and speak as if he's awed by this mysterious force of ideology. How is that consistent with his project of negative dialectics? And he did this right after claiming we need to critique the hypostasis of mind. Instead, he's sucking up to it when he says that all his ideas are contained in Hegel.

Anyway, you can call me scurrilous, and I'll say that you turn a blind eye, willfully ignore and deny, a significant aspect of German philosophy. Now we can happily continue on, with these negative opinions about each other.

Then you do not understand what rhetoric is or what it's for or how it differs from logic. — tim wood

You are the one who said "the right logic for this is Rhetoric", implying that rhetoric is a form of logic. It's clearly not.

And, as I said, logic can be used as rhetoric, because "rhetoric" is a use of language intended to persuade. What do you believe rhetoric to be?

And the right logic for this is Rhetoric, in which we consider both alternatives, sea battle or no sea battle. — tim wood

The problem though is that "Rhetoric" is not necessarily logic, it is language intended to persuade. If we class the language which deals with what is possible, and this includes what is named "modal logic", as simple rhetoric, @Banno will not be happy. However, "rhetoric" is the larger category, and logic can be used as rhetoric. But this leaves your statement as meaningless.

This is a minor quibble. He says that all of his ideas are contained in Hegel's philosophy, or are contained at least in tendency. That is, interpreted a certain way, everything he's saying can be spun out of Hegel. I don't think that's the same as saying he adheres firmly to Hegelian principles. — Jamal

Ok, what I said was completely an exaggeration, not an interpretation which remains true to Adorno's intention. It seems I have an odd subconscious habit of seizing on quirky lines and directing attention to them by interpreting them in a strange way. So what exactly is Adorno's intention in mentioning this?
The quirky lines often betray secrets which the author has no intention of revealing.

This what he actually said:

The enormous power of Hegel – that is the power which
impresses us so hugely today and, God knows,
it is a power that impresses me today to the point where I
am fully aware that, of the ideas that I am presenting to you, there
is not a single one that is not contained, in tendency at least, in
Hegel’s philosophy.

So, to pay respect for the difference you point out, what I see is a trick of rhetoric. He apprehends Hegel as hugely powerful in influencing the minds of men, and he has a desire to tap into that power, perhaps having political objectives. To support this end, he has mentioned some work of the younger Hegel, which is somewhat inconsistent with the older Hegel, and with reference to this, he claims everything he says is "contained" (in a qualified sense) in Hegel.

The trickery is this. He implies that he and the thoughts he presents, originate from, or have been greatly influenced by ("contained") by Hegel, suggesting that he is Hegelian. In reality, he is not, but he knows that Hegel is understood as a powerful authority, and he desires to gain support for his project by appearing to be consistent with Hegel.

I don't see it. Wikipedia tells me reification is a form of alienation. So that would be the opposite of this negation of the negation, which leads to the positive synthesis. Are you saying that Adorno's negative dialectics, which disputes this interpretation, is itself a reification?

Yes, but that "it's not a static thing" does not imply that it's not an object. Objects are not necessarily static things, so how is reification implicated?.

OK, but objects are not static things either. So how do you draw the conclusion of reification?

And so... Where's the reification?

But rhetoric certainly existed, with its own logic in which even as a matter of necessity both sides of a contradiction are "entertained." There will be a sea battle; there won't. The ultimate reduction being either-or, to which A. added also neither-nor. And Achilleus, "in the division of his heart," weighting competing courses of action. — tim wood

We are not talking about the situation after a future reduction though, we are talking about the current situation now. At the present time, neither "there will be a sea battle tomorrow" nor "there will not be a sea battle tomorrow" is true. "It is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow" is true, but obviously this violates the law of excluded middle. However, under the principles of determinism, one or the other is considered to be true, even at the current time. But this leaves "it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow" as false. (Note to Banno: this use of "possible" is not consistent with modal logic, but there is a number of different ways "possible" is commonly used). Also, determinism leaves deliberation as superfluous, so only a fool would accept that perspective.

What is it a reification of, "society"?

So, he goes through a bunch of meanings for "positive" and distinguishes two principal uses, "positive" in the sense of good, and positive in the sense of what is posited, or postulated as actual fact. The latter is the sense associated with positivism, and he warns about a sort of equivocation whereby the word "positive" in positivism has connotations from the other meaning, good, approvable, and ideal.

I will add that there is another sense of "positive" which sort of bridges between those two principle senses, it is the sense of a sort of certitude about what is the actual fact. "I am positive that I put the file in the folder, therefore unless someone removed it, it must be there." This appears to signify the positive attitude which Adorno's negative dialectics is opposed to, as a sort of Socratic skepticism. In analogy, the positivists are to Adorno, like the sophists were to Plato.

‘

For this reason,
therefore, we might say, putting it in dialectical terms, that what
appears as the positive is essentially the negative, i.e. the thing that
the negation of negation is to be criticized.
And that is the motive, the essential motive, for
the conception and nomenclature of a negative dialectic. — p18-19

So he describes his negative dialectics as a form of critical theory which goes beyond conventional critical theory, by affecting not only the way that we think, but also the way that we act. By affecting the way that we act, it has an affect on reality itself. This proposition we can reflect back on Hegel's distinction between "being-in-itself" as passive critical thought, and "being-for-itself" as active negative dialectics.

In this context, I remember very well a junior seminar
I gave with Paul Tillich shortly before the outbreak of the Third
Reich. A participant spoke out very sharply on one occasion against
the idea of the meaning of existence. She said life did not seem very
meaningful to her and she didn’t know whether it had a meaning.
The very voluble Nazi contingent became very excited by this and
scraped the floor noisily with their feet. Now, I do not wish to maintain
that this Nazi foot-shuffling proves or refutes anything in particular,
but I do find it highly significant. I would say it is a touchstone
for the relation of thinking to freedom. It raises the question whether
thought can bear the idea that a given reality is meaningless and that
mind is unable to orientate itself; or whether the intellect has become
so enfeebled that it finds itself paralysed by the idea that all is not
well with the world. It is for this reason in my view that the theoretical
notion of a positivity that represents the sum of all negativities is
no longer possible – unless philosophy wishes to live up to its reputation
of worldly innocence, something it always deserves most when
it attempts to become overly familiar with the world and to ascribe
a positive meaning to it. — 19-20

He then proceeds to dismiss the positivist interpretations of Hegel, which I interpret as addressing them as a sort of misinterpretation. They are misinterpretations because they focus on a part, but not the whole of Hegel's work. This thinking, which accepts a part as the whole leads to that positivist notion which he rejects, that the sum of all negatives produces something positive. Further, he explains how dialectics must address the primary question of the hypostasis of mind, which is very appealing to the philosophical mind which apprehends it.

We shall see that the thesis of the identity of concept
and thing is in general the vital nerve of idealist thought, and indeed
traditional thought in general. Furthermore, this assertion of the
identity of concept and thing is inextricably intertwined with the
structure of reality itself. And negative dialectics as critique means
above all criticism of precisely this claim to identity – a claim that
cannot of course be tested on every single object in a kind of bad
infinity, but which certainly can be applied to the essential structures
the negation of negation confronting philosophy either directly
or as mediated through the themes of philosophy.
Furthermore, dialectics as critique implies the
criticism of any hypostasization of the mind as the primary thing, the
thing that underpins everything else. — 20-21

The lecture is concluded by assertions that he adheres firmly to Hegelian principles.

It's good to see that we agree, once in a while.

I don't doubt the consistency of S5. Did I say that one system of logic, or another is not consistent? No, I pointed out two systems of logic which are not consistent with each other.

I'm sorry, Meta, but your post is again risible. You say no one is restricting themselves to Aristotle and then go and do exactly that. — Banno

You seem to have a limited capacity for understanding.

What I said was:

What I am recommending is that we acknowledge the inconsistency between modal logic and the fundamental three laws, and not attempt to argue that there is consistency between them.

I then proceeded to explain the reason why the two are inconsistent.

If that produces for you, the conclusion that I am restricting myself to one or the other, then you have a significant problem in your ability to interpret a simple piece of writing.

Not quite. Running the statement through the law of excluded middle gives: "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" or "there will not possibly be a sea battle tomorrow (i.e. a sea battle tomorrow is impossible)". If, in reality, a sea battle is possible, then the first statement is true and the second one is false. — A Christian Philosophy

The issue, is that you are making "possibly be" into a predicate. By doing this you violate the law of excluded middle, because the meaning of "possible" (what may or may not) is a violation.

The law of excluded middle is a law concerning predication. Now, we introduce a very special predicate named "possible", which we accept as being excluded from the applicability of this law. My argument is that we must respect the fact that this is an exclusion, and not attempt to represent "possible worlds", or "modal" logic as consistent with the fundamental three laws.

As shown in the links above, the logic of possibility and necessity - modal logic - has a strong standing in modern logic. Those who restrict themselves to Aristotle still have difficulties. — Banno

No one here is suggesting that anyone ought to restrict themselves to Aristotelian logic. What I am recommending is that we acknowledge the inconsistency between modal logic and the fundamental three laws, and not attempt to argue that there is consistency between them. Arguing for consistency signifies misunderstanding.

In ancient Greece the three laws were applied religiously, modal logic did not exist. Aristotle demonstrated how sophists (like Zeno who proved that motion cannot be real), could prove absurdities when those fundamental laws were strictly adhered to. He proceeded to expose the root of the problem as being the reality of potential, possibility, as the basis of change and becoming, and showed that we need to allow violation of either non-contradiction or excluded middle to understand this reality.

Aristotle's best examples were future possible events, which needed to be decided upon by human choice, like the sea battle. He determined that the way we understand human choice implies that the law of excluded middle must be violated to enable that understanding. However, he insisted that the law of non-contradiction must be adhered to avoid absolute unintelligibility. This violation of excluded middle, proposed by Aristotle, is the foundation of modern modal logic which is the manifestation of that violation.

Hegel's logical dialectics, on the other hand, allows that being and not being are subsumed within becoming. This is a violation of non-contradiction, which provides the foundation for dialectical materialism. Notice, that Aristotle's violation of excluded middles is based in the potential associated with human choice, while Hegel's violation of non-contradiction is based in the potential of matter.

yeah - there it is — AmadeusD

Yeah, there it is. A relatively new type of logic which is not based in the fundamental three laws, and openly averts these laws. It's really not a big deal, but to deny that modal logic intentionally avoids those laws, because of a perceived need to violate those laws, is to demonstrate a basic misunderstanding of logic.

Yes. Funnily enough, i actually picked up Tractatus for hte bus this morning, so read these exact passages before responding.
The point of Many Worlds is that you can think, logically, of a world which does not exist, but is coherent and possible.

Nothing illogical about that. My comment about Witty leading to the type of thoughts Meta is putting forward was about not contextualizing Wittgenstein as coming out of Russell per On Denoting. Not a great way to move from language use, to what 'can be'. — AmadeusD

I am not saying it's illogical. No principles dictate that all forms of logic must obey those three basic laws, to be classed as "logic". Those three laws are ancient, and concern what we can say about a thing, starting with the law of identity, a thing is the same as itself. If, for some purposes, we find that we need a logic which applies to possibilities (possible worlds), then we would need a different set of laws, because possibilities are categorically different from actual things. However, the fact that one set of logical laws is not compatible with another, because the two apply to completely different aspects of reality, does not imply that one or the other is illogical. It simply demonstrates that there is a significant difference between the different aspects of reality.

Good interpretations, and worded better than mine :up: — Jamal

Thank you. I'm going to take a look at the senses of "negative" referred to. I'm intrigued by the way that "negative" is associated with bad, and "positive" is associated with good, almost to the point of a necessary relation in common usage, yet "no" is not necessarily associated with bad, nor is "yes" necessarily associated with good.

A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. — AmadeusD

The basic laws of logic apply to the the way the world is. They are rules concerning what we can say about things. Adding to this, "or could have been". is a violation.

Your replies are very predictable. When you do not understand the concept, walk away instead of learning.

In other words, the progressive thinker as subject stands against their social context, criticizing the institutions of the status quo, and in such a negative stance represents the emancipation of the spirit (think of Enlightenment thinkers criticizing monarchy). But this negation of institutions, this so-called abstract freedom or abstract subjectivity, is one-sided and unbalanced: it forgets that the ability to critique institutions is itself a product of institutions (like universities). Therefore another negation is required, the negation of the original critical stance, leading to a reconciliation in which the subject's freedom is no longer abstract but is mediated by institutions (parliament limits the power of the monarchy). This last stage is the positive outcome of the process. — Jamal

I interpret this negation of the negation in the following way. The rebellious subject sees the institutions of society as restrictive and infringements on freedom, and therefore acts to negate the validity of them. An example of this is when I argued that "society" is not a proper object, but a concept. That would be a step toward negating the validity of those institutions. But Hegel implies that this gets the subject nowhere, because the subject is actually dependent on these institutions, so it ends up rebounding back upon the subject requiring a negation of one's own negation. Therefore the subject is forced to negate that negation for one's own support.

Now, Adorno says that this is a feature consistent throughout most of Hegel, but also points out that there was a time when Hegel did not accept this principle.

Now it is quite remarkable, a historical fact, and one that is perhaps
of key importance for what I wish to explain to you today, that this
negation of the negation that is then postulated as a positive is a
notion that the young Hegel sharply criticizes in essays which Nohl
published with the title of Early Theological Writings.6 In their central
thrust these youthful essays amount to an attack on positivity, in
particular on positive religion, positive theology, in which the subject
is not ‘at home’ [bei sich] and in which this theology confronts him
as being something alien and reified. And since it is reified and external
and particular, it cannot be the absolute that religious categories
claim it to be. Moreover, this is an idea that Hegel does not repudiate
or abandon later on; he merely reinterprets it. In general, he
abandoned or rejected very few of his ideas. What he mainly did was to
change their emphasis, albeit sometimes in a way that turned them
into their opposites. — p15

Further, there is another possible conclusion, to this issue with the institutions of society. This is the approach described by Plato in The Symposium. In this dialogue the student is being educated on the principles of "love". The student learns to see that institutions are beautiful. This requires no denial or affirmation of any specific institution, only a recognition that each, in its own way, has beauty. And there is no possible reason for them all to be beautiful other than the fact that they participate in the Idea of Beauty.

I believe that in the Platonic approach the double negation is averted, by averting the first negation. Through the teachings of love, the primary desire to negate the institutions is averted by demonstrating the natural beauty of an institution as artificial, a form of art. And when the subject proceeds to inquire how is it possible that an institution, which is fundamentally an infringement on one's freedom, could be beautiful, the person is lead to the reality of the Idea, which transcends all such things. Hegel posits the Idea as prior to, and transcending the state and its institutions, but gets there in a faulty way, so this position is unsupported.

Another topic which comes up in the second lecture is Hegel's distinction between "being-in-itself" and "being-for-itself" (p14). To me, the former represents a passive being, while the latter represents an intentionally active being. I believe that this distinction will help us to understand the sense of "negative" which Adorno is attempting to circumscribe. In a way "No" is at the heart of morality, as the capacity to resist acting on temptations. And this type of negativity, known as will power, is not quite the same as a simple opposition to yes. It's more like the means by which deliberation is capacitated.

This resisting action, which is like the skeptic's "suspending judgement", which allows clear thinking, is the reason I believe he associates negative dialectics with critical thinking:

I would suggest that
the two terms – critical theory and negative dialectics17 – have the
same meaning. Perhaps, to be more precise, with the sole difference
that critical theory really signifies only the subjective side of thought,
that is to say, theory, while negative dialectics signifies not only that
aspect of thought but also the reality that is affected by it. — p20