Once again, "sensation" is not ambiguous given the context, as it clearly refers to an "inner experience" such as pain. It doesn't seem sensible for it to have any other meaning. Only "S" or the type of sensation denoted by "S" might be considered ambiguous or vague. — Luke

Good, we finally have agreement, "the sensation", referring to the particular sensation named "S" is ambiguous.

Now we can ask whether this ambiguity is intentional or not. In any attempt to understand the meaning of an ambiguous passage of writing, it is necessary to determine whether the ambiguity is intentional or not. It seems obvious to me that in this case it is intentional, as it is meant to be this way for the purpose of the demonstration. Do you agree?

What definition of a private language are you using? — Luke

The definition you stated, referring to 243. The demonstration of 258 is not an example of a "private language" according to the description of 243, for the reasons I explained.

258 is a kind of reductio ad absurdum, where Wittgenstein attempts to play along with the private language advocate only to show that their assumptions lead to an impossible conclusion. It is not Wittgenstein contradicting himself, but the idea of a private language contradicting itself. — Luke

There is no contradiction, 258 is simply not an example of a private language. It is only if you think it is supposed to be an example of a private language that the appearance of contradiction arises. But that's only because the example is not consistent with the description of "private language".

He notes at 261 that "sensation" cannot be a word of a private language because it is "a word of our common language, which is not a language intelligible only to me." — Luke

Right, so it is very clear, that at 258, where Wittgenstein proceeds to name "a certain sensation" with "S", this is not an example of a private language. What is being named with "S" is "a sensation", and "sensation" is a word of our common language. Therefore this is not an example of a private language

So the example at 258 is already set up within the bounds of common language, to talk about something which is being referred to through the use of common language as a certain sensation. Therefore it is impossible that this is an example of a private language.

When he goes on to say: "And it would not help either to say it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S" he has Something," he is talking about "Something" as being a lesser claim than a "sensation". The private linguist may accept that "S" cannot refer to a sensation, as Wittgenstein notes, however he may try to respond that "S" could still refer to "something" (not nothing), even if it is does not refer to a sensation. Wittgenstein is saying that it would not help to make the lesser claim that "S" refers to "something" instead of a "sensation", either. This is because ""has" and "something" also belong to our common language". Just like "sensation", "something" is also "a word of our common language which is not a language intelligible only to me." — Luke

This is totally confused, and going in the wrong direction. Wittgenstein never says "'S' cannot refer to a sensation", nor is this implied. That explicitly contradicts the premise of the demonstration, that the diarist is using "S" to name a certain sensation, as I've already told you.

I think you need to pay closer attention to the subtleties of the demonstration. Notice that at 258, the author, Wittgenstein, is providing the first person perspective: "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation." Then by 261 he switches to the third person perspective "when he writes "S", he has something". This switch is not accidental.

It is demonstrated at 258, that from the first person perspective, the use of "S" need not be justified.: "whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'." There is no such thing as the diarist justifying his use of "S" in naming something, because he can use "S" however he wants, to name whatever he wants. That's the way Wittgenstein set up the example.

Now proceed to 261. The author of the demonstration, Wittgenstein, has switched places. He is no longer the diarist, but is now an observer, one of us, or "we", and he refers to the diarist as "he". From this perspective, that the thing named with "S" is "a sensation" needs to be justified. This is because "sensation" is a word of the public language, and therefore has meaning within such a language game. We are no longer concerned with how the judgement is made whereby something is judged as fitting the name "S", we are concerned with whether the thing which has been given the name "S" qualifies as a "sensation".

So the diarist has said at 258, 'I am naming something "S"', and naming this thing this way is his own little private language game. No justification is required for this simple private game of naming something with "S". However, since the diarist has said that the thing named is a "sensation", and "sensation" is a word from a public game, then from the perspective of the people in that game, 'us', or 'we', the diarist needs to justify the assertion that the thing called "S" is a sensation.

You appear to be considering it a matter of course that the person is making a note of something, despite what Wittgenstein says here. — Luke

It is not a matter of course, but it is stipulated by the parameters of the demonstration. From the first person perspective, 258, it is stipulated that the diarist is making a note of something. That is a premise of the example, so it cannot be otherwise, and we cannot ignore this.

However, when Wittgenstein switches to the third person perspective, he has to allow that from the perspective of the observers, within the example, it is possible that the diarist is completely lying, and there is absolutely nothing which "S" refers to, he is using the symbol in a completely random way. This is why justification is required. The diarist has claimed 'I have a sensation which i am calling S". That the diarist has something, and that the something is a sensation needs to be justified.

At 258 Wittgenstein asks us to imagine that he keeps a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation that he associates with the sign "S". He can only be talking about the diarist's use of "S" at 261. "What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation"… in the imagined scenario at 258? — Luke

You are not abiding by the switch in perspective. "What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation". Notice "we"? He is no longer talking about the diarists use of "S", he is talking about our use of "S", as indicated by "we". "Sensation" is our word, in our language game, and if we want to allow "S" into our game, as the name of a sensation, that the thing called S is a sensation must be justified.

If it is "well established at 258" that the use of "S" cannot be justified, then why would we need to justify the use of "S" at 261? — Luke

The use of "S" in the private game (258) cannot be justified. But when 'we' (the public) refer to 'his' use of "S", saying that "S" is the sign of a sensation (261), where "sensation" is a word of our language, then justification is required.

The key to understanding the demonstration, which you are not getting, is that when we switch to the perspective of the observers, 'we', it is not a question of whether his use of S is justified, it is a question of whether our use of "sensation", to refer to the thing which he has named S is justified. That is why the first question is whether there is even "something" which the name refers to.

Wittgenstein poo poos the idea that the private linguist could have something (if not a sensation). But, assuming you are correct, what do you view as Wittgenstein's supposed reason for stating that "something" cannot be justified as a sensation? — Luke

If I claim that I am using "S" to refer to a certain sensation, and you ask me to justify this claim, that the thing I am calling S is a sensation, how is proving that there is something which S refers to, justification for the claim that the thing is a sensation?

Surely the private linguist has their own rule for the use of "S". Otherwise, how do they recognise the same thing as "S" again each time? How do they use "S" in the same manner each time? Surely the use of "S" is at least intelligible to the user of "S". If "S" denotes a different type of thing each time, what purpose could that possibly serve? — Luke

No, the possibility of a private rule is denied by Wittgenstein. To think of oneself as following a rule, does not mean that the person is actually following a rule. So whatever means the diarist uses to judge the occurrence of a sensation as qualifying for the name "S", it cannot be a rule. That is why we cannot talk about "right" here. According to Wittgenstein there can be no rule being followed here, therefore no such thing as the "right" judgement.

So all these points you raise, are from Wittgenstein's perspective, unanswerable, and therefore ought not be asked in that way. These questions get approached from the third person perspective outlined at 261. We look for justification that S actually names a sensation.

Perhaps "disallow" is not the right word, but Wittgenstein shows at 261 that "S" cannot refer to a sensation if "S" is supposed to have only a private use. — Luke

This is not true. What is shown is that the diarist's claim 'S refers to a sensation' remains unjustified (i.e. no such thing as correct or incorrect use) so long as the use of "S" remains private. The problem though is that the diarist already steps outside the bounds of a "private language", by using "sensation" to say what "S" refers to, because "sensation" is a word of public language. So the diarist has already gone beyond private use with this claim. "Private use" and "private language" are two distinct things.

The Good manifests itself as Beauty. Man craves Beauty. But when he comes to see Beauty itself, he really sees the Good, which is within himself. This is why he becomes able to give birth to things that are beautiful, good, and true. You can’t give birth to things from outside yourself, giving birth, producing, or creating is always from within. — Apollodorus

This is not consistent with what is written at 206. What people crave is the good, and there is no mention of "Beauty" at this particular section of the discussion.

"In a word then, love is wanting to possess the good forever" Symp. 206a.

Then Diotima proceeds to describe Beauty as something godly:

Now no one can possibly give birth in anything ugly; only in something beautiful. That's because when a man and a woman come together in order to give birth. this is a godly affair. Pregnancy, reproduction---this is an immortal thing for a mortal animal to do, and it cannot occur in anything that is out of harmony, but ugliness is out of harmony with all that is godly. Beauty, however, is in harmony with the Divine. Therefore the goddess who presides at childbirth---she's called Moira or Eilithuia---is really Beauty. — The Symposium 206 c-d

It is very evident that there is a separation made here by Plato, between the mortal animal's (man's) wanting to possess the good, and Beauty, which is godly. Hence the conclusion:

"'You see, Socrates', she said, 'What Love wants is not Beauty as you think it is."

What you don't seem to grasp Apollodorus, is the proper relationship between these two, love, as the desire to possess the good forever (immortality), and Beauty, which is the actualized immortality, made real by reproduction. What Plato goes on to explain, is that the actual immortality, which is reproduction, and the real presence of Beauty, manifests itself in the animals as a sort of disease, called Love. This drives them to do all sorts of "sick" things for intercourse, and to nurture and protect their young.

So you have the relationship backward. The Good does not manifest itself as Beauty, Beauty, as the Divine, manifests itself as a desire for the good. What is important to understand here, why this inversion is the reality, is the role of Necessity. There is no necessary relationship which would make the desire for the good necessarily cause the existence of something beautiful. The desire for intercourse, for example, does not necessarily bring about birth. So we cannot say that childbirth (which is beautiful), is the necessary result of the mortal desire for intercourse. Therefore we cannot say that Beauty is the manifestation of the good. We are lacking the required necessity. On the other hand, if we posit Beauty as the cause of love, and the mortal desire for intercourse, we have a necessary relationship, and therefore the mortal desire for the good can be apprehended as the manifestation of Beauty.

I think this point is important if one is to understand the supposed causal role of the Forms. The Form is prior to the material manifestation. The material manifestation is what we know and accept scientifically as "reality", the behaviour of animals and stuff like that; but the Forms are prior to this, as the true cause of that behaviour. That's why the cave dwellers just see the material manifestation as reality, when that material "reality" is really just a reflection, or representation, being what has been caused by the true reality of the Forms.

Accordingly, the point Plato is making is that many beauties lead to one Beauty and Beauty leads to its source which is the Good. — Apollodorus

So this is really the opposite of what Plato indicates in "The Symposium". The true source is Beauty, as the Divine. Then the good is the means by which the mortal animals relate to the Divine. "The good" for Plato is fixed to desire, as the object which is needed, wanted, the end, represented here as immortality. And this reality, that human animals have desires, needs and wants, is a manifestation of the Divine, Beauty, which is the cause of it. The desire for the good is a manifestation of, i.e. caused by, the Divine Form, Beauty.

So what you describe here is the process of learning, the logical process, which is established on the basis of logical priority, but it is actually a reversal of the temporal priority of causation. We see many beauties, and this leads logically to a necessity to assume one Beauty, and the one Beauty appears as if it must be temporally, or causally prior to the many beauties. But it occurs as an unintelligible dilemma, as to how the one Form, Beauty, could be the cause of the many beauties. This dilemma is only resolved by placing "the good" (love and the desire for the good, described as immortality), as the medium between the many beauties and the one Beauty. Then the one Beauty may be apprehended as the cause of many beauties, through the intermediary, which is the desire for the good. This is why "the good" is the fundamental principle, because it allows us to apprehend the Forms as causally active.

Eventually, we realize the beauty of the knowledge-holder, the soul itself, and we understand that the source of all knowledge is intelligence which is the essence of life in general, and of our soul in particular. — Apollodorus

Again, this displays your backward approach. You completely misrepresent "intelligence". The source of all knowledge is not intelligence, intelligence is the product of knowledge. The source of knowledge is the desire for the good, the desire for immortality, which is a manifestation of the Divine Form, Beauty. As the Form Beauty is the cause of that desire for the good.

Personally, I think the “problem” is artificial and stems from reading Plato through an Aristotelian or Christian Platonist lens. I am taking the traditional Platonic view here. — Apollodorus

The problem here, is that your "traditional Platonic" view is an off-shoot, a perspective which is not consistent with Aristotle and the majority of western readers of Plato (Christian Platonists). So we have a relatively small group of so-called traditional Platonists, who adhered to the Pythagorean principles which Plato actually rejected, and directed Aristotle away from, such as yourself, and you claim to have the true Platonic metaphysics. However, as evidenced above, this off-shoot is just a misunderstanding of Plato.

Why do you need this question to be answered in the context of 258? — Luke

The question does not need to be answered. The point is that with no way of knowing what "the sensation" refers to, we can conclude that it is used ambiguously. And if the ambiguity is judged as intentional (and I believe it can be), then we need to determine what he is doing with this ambiguity, in order to understand what he is demonstrating with the example.

In other words, if we judge the ambiguity as intentional, then we conclude that the question of what the thing is which "the sensation called S" refers to, cannot be answered, as I explained to you already. Then to understand the meaning of the passage we need to determine what Wittgenstein intended to do with that ambiguity.

oes "C" have only a private use? No one else but the diarist is supposed to know what "S" refers to.

However, I know what "chair" refers to, because you have defined it as "a seat for one person". And I know what "sensation" refers to in Wittgenstein's scenario because he talks about it in the context of "inner experiences" and "pain". — Luke

"C" in my example has the same use as "S" has in Wittgenstein's example. The fact that you claim to know what "S" refers to in Wittgenstein's example, as "a sensation", indicates that Wittgenstein is not giving us an example of a "private language". Remember, as I explained to you, 258 is not an example of a "private language" as you define it. A true "private language" in that sense, could not be described like that, using words of common language, like "sensation". It is impossible for Wittgenstein to give an example of a "private language" as you define it, because that would be unintelligible to us, so he gives us an example of something different; "S" is the sign for a certain sensation, but no one knows what that sensation is.

So the scenario he sets up at 258 is not a "private language". It is a supposed situation where a person has named something (a sensation in this case) with a symbol, and according to what is described at 257, Wittgenstein wants to examine how the person would establish a relationship between a particular thing (the sensation), and the symbol. It is concluded that this is unintelligible, as "private".

The type of sensation that "S" refers to is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's point. "S" has a private use so you can imagine any type of sensation you like. It makes no difference. Moreover, Wittgenstein proceeds to establish that the diarist cannot rely on the public word "sensation", so "S" cannot name a sensation anyway. — Luke

You seem to be missing the fact that Wittgenstein is making a demonstration, he is giving us an example for the purpose of demonstrating something. Therefore we need to consider the big picture, what he is trying to demonstrate. That's what we learn from experience of studying much philosophy, how to determine what the person is trying to demonstrate.

We definitely cannot say, as you do, "the type of sensation that 'S' refers to is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's point", because Wittgenstein has clearly taken steps to set up this scenario intentionally. And since expressions like "a certain sensation", and "the sensation" are very deliberately employed at 258, we must respect the reality of this situation, that this is very significant to Wittgenstein's point.

What you propose, "so 'S' cannot name a sensation anyway", directly contradicts what Wittgenstein says in the example, that "S" is the sign for a sensation, therefore we must reject your proposal. The problem appears to be that you believe Wittgenstein is giving an example of a "private language", when he is not, because this is impossible, so you can only support your belief by contradicting what Wittgenstein actually wrote. Therefore your belief is incorrect.

He doesn't say "all we can say is that he has something." He says: "And it would not help either to say...that when he writes “S” he has Something."

That is, according to Wittgenstein at 261, we cannot say that the diarist has Something. — Luke

I believe you are misreading this. He is talking about justifying the use of the word "sensation" here. He is saying "it would not help", (in relation to the attempt to justify this use), to point out that when he writes "S" he has "something" which "S" refers to. This is simply due to the obvious, saying that it is "something" doesn't justify calling it a "sensation".

That is, according to Wittgenstein at 261, we cannot say that the diarist has Something. — Luke

He does not say that we "cannot" say this. He says that it would not help, either, in the attempt to justify the use of "sensation", to say that he "has something". Therefore he says that saying this does not help (in relation to the attempt to justify the use of "sensation").

We cannot say that he has something. Wittgenstein shows us that the diarist fails to establish a use of "S" by inwardly associating it with a particular sensation. — Luke

You are stuck in your faulty representation of 261 which I pointed out to you earlier. What needs to be justified, according to Wittgenstein, is the use of "sensation" here. He has already shown at 258 that the use of "S' by the diarist cannot be justified, there is no "right" here.

The diarist has a use of "S", that cannot be denied, because it is stipulated by Wittgenstein's example. Therefore your claim that the diarist "fails to establish a use of 'S'" is false. What Wittgenstein claims, is that whatever criteria, or principles which the person applies in making the judgement of "S", they cannot be understood or described by words. This is the "private" part. It is simply the person's memory, and the application of "private" judgement which cannot be described in words, because we describe things in terms of rules, and this is not a matter of following rules. This "private" aspect of language we cannot describe, so even metaphorical, or analogous description, such as 'it's sort of like rules' or "impressions of rules", are not really useful according to Wittgenstein:

259. Are the rules of the private language impressions of rules?—
The balance on which impressions are weighed is not the impression
of a balance.

Therefore you need to respect the fact that he is asking a question at 260, when he asks did the man make a note of "nothing". He is not stating that "S" signifies nothing. The parameters of the example stipulate that "S" signifies something, so this would be contradictory. However, he has set up the example with so much ambiguity as to what "S" signifies, that it might appear like "S" could signify nothing. That is why, in our attempt to answer the guessing game, what "S" signifies, we must first rule out the possibility that "S" signifies nothing.

Remember how I treated your example of "bank". You set up the example of "bank", with intentional ambiguity so as to make an example of ambiguity. Because this ambiguity was intentional, I could say that "bank" in your example referred to neither the financial establishment, nor the side of the river. Because you intended "bank" to be ambiguous, it actually referred to neither. However, this does not mean that "bank" has no meaning in your example. The meaning is ambiguous. But you refused to accept "ambiguous" as meaning.

What is (further) explained at 265 is that the private use of "S" is not justified, since "justification consists in appealing to an independent authority." — Luke

According to my translation, this is incorrect. What I have is "—But justification consists in appealing to something independent."

Furthermore, we are not talking about justifying the use of "S" here. That is the misunderstanding which I dealt with already. It is well established at 258, that the use of "S" cannot be justified. So we must drop this notion at that time. Now, proceeding onward he is talking about justifying 'our' use of "sensation" to refer to what the diarist signifies with "S", not the diarist's use of "S".

The example stipulates that the diarist, Wittgenstein himself, has classed the thing which "S" refers to as "a sensation". Since "sensation" is a word of public language (261), we need to justify that the thing which "S" refers to is a token (to use your word) of the type, sensation. It is asserted by the diarist that it is, but this does not justify it.

Wittgenstein disallows the private use of "S" to name a sensation because "sensation" is "a word of our common language". But Wittgenstein also disallows "that when he writes "S" he has Something" for the same reason - because "has" and "something" are also words of our common (public) language. — Luke

Again, this is a bad interpretation. We cannot say that Wittgenstein "disallows" such. He is saying that use of these public words needs to be justified, he is not disallowing them. Obviously the claim that he has "something" does not justify the claim that "the something" is a sensation.

This is the guessing game I described to you. The person has named a thing, "S", and this naming is private to the person. Whatever method the person employs when attaching the name to the thing is completely private, as not being a matter of following a rule, and so it is unintelligible to us. So the person cannot justify the use of "S", that has been ruled out. Therefore, we are given the task of 'guessing' what "S" refers to. The first possibility to rule out, is that "S" refers to nothing (260).

However, we can rule out this possibility based on what is stipulated in the example. The demonstration stipulates that the person is using "S" to signify "a certain sensation". Therefore the proposal that he has "nothing", can be ruled out as contrary to the premises. Next, Wittgenstein wants us to justify "sensation", that what he has is a sensation. That we've ruled out nothing, and assume that the person has something, does not necessitate the conclusion that what the person has is a sensation.

Once again, we can turn to the parameters of the example, it is stipulated that what the person has is a "sensation". But this is where it gets complicated. The word "sensation" implies that there is an object sensed, as I explained. If there is nothing sensed, no source of the sensation, then it is not a real sensation, and we're back to nothing. But this is not what is stipulated, it is stipulated that there is a sensation. Therefore we can conclude that there is an object sensed, a source or cause of the sensation. That there is a sensation implies that there is something sensed, and like the example of the chair, the something sensed is the "something independent", which serves to justify the use of "sensation". If there is nothing sensed we cannot call it a sensation, the use of "S" would be a fiction.

You have misread if you think Wittgenstein allows the use of "S" to name Something, and you are wrong that what "S" refers to "must be something". The entire point is that a private language is not possible. — Luke

Obviously, it is you who has misread. The demonstration is set up very clearly so that "S" is the sign of a sensation. This is very deliberate and explicitly stipulated. You want to turn back on the premises of the demonstration, and deny the principle premise, saying that Wittgenstein disallows such a use. But this would be blatant contradiction. Instead, we must accept what is shown at 258, as Wittgenstein's word on this matter. He shows that the person can use "S", in the way described, but there is no such thing as "right" here. The person uses "S" according to some judgement which is private (not by a public rule), so the person's use of "S" cannot be judged as to whether the rule is followed or not.

What you are claiming, that Wittgenstein disallows such a use of "S", certainly contradicts the premises of Wittgenstein's demonstration.

The "separation" is only apparent. What Plato means is that Beauty is an expression of the Good. It cannot be otherwise as the Form of the Good contains all the Forms that participate in it. By pursuing Beauty, the philosopher arrives at the Good. This is the true meaning of Diotima's instruction. — Apollodorus

I've told you a number of times now, "the good" as Plato uses this, is not a Form. This idea seems to really skew the way that you read Plato, resulting in your misunderstanding of Symposium 206. The passage is very explicit. It is said that Love wants the good. Then it is said: "You see, Socrates' , she said, 'what Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is'." Clearly what is described is a separation between Beauty and the good.

Similarly, individual intelligences are made of the same stuff as the Creative Intelligence. It doesn't mean that they are identical with it in all respects. — Apollodorus

But this is wrong, and a problem which philosophers have grappled with for millennia. It is well described by Aquinas. The human intellect is deficient because of its dependency on the material body. The supposed Creative Intelligence has no dependence on material existence, being prior to it. Therefore individual intelligences cannot be made of the same stuff as the Creator Intelligence.

If you think you have to guess what "sensation" means then you have missed the surrounding context.

If you think it's necessary to guess what type of sensation he means, then you don't understand the purpose of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language.
— Luke

We've been through this so many times now that I can't count them. The issue is not what "sensation" means. The question is what does "the sensation" refers to in the context of 258.

Saying that he identifies it as an internal experience shows that you know how he is using the word. — Luke

Knowing that a sensation is an internal experience, as defined by Wittgenstein, does not tell me what he is referring to with "the sensation". Yes, "the sensation" is supposed to refer to a sensation, which is an internal experience, as defined, but knowing this does not indicate to me, the particular which "the sensation" refers to.

Suppose I define "chair" as a seat for one person. Then I tell you that I have named a certain chair "C". And then I proceed to talk about "the chair" named C, without telling you any of its identifying features, only that it is a chair. How can you not see that there is ambiguity with respect to what "the chair named C" refers to. Suppose I asked you to bring me the chair named C, so I could sit on it, because it's my favourite chair. How would you know which chair is named C?

This is why I call it a guessing game. Wittgenstein is saying, that there are many different things, which go by the name "internal experience", further, many of these are called "sensations". Now, out of these many things called sensations, I have taken one and named it "S". Then he leaves it completely ambiguous (a guessing game if you will), as to which sensation is the one which he has named S.

At 261 he questions calling "S" the sign for a sensation. There is no such “answer” given. — Luke

The answer is at 270, that's why I said the answer is given "eventually".

And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here?
Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,—
And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time?
Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?

Regardless, you haven't explained what this has to do with the private language argument. — Luke

Yes I have, but you haven't been paying attention. At 258, Wittgenstein leaves it ambiguous as to whether "the sensation" as an internal experience, refers to the sensation itself, or the source of the sensation (what I called the thing sensed), as both are internal in sensations like pain. In the case of the chair, the thing sensed is external, so the separation between the sensation and the thing sensed is obvious. At 261 he makes it clear, when he says all we can say is that he has something, that "something" here must refer to the source, rather than the sensation itself. This is because if there was no source (or cause) of the sensation, we could not say that he had anything, the sensation would be completely fictitious. We could not say that he has any sensation

What makes it not fictitious is that there is an object, a thing being sensed. Otherwise we could not say that he has something, because he might have nothing, and be naming nothing with "S", i.e. using S randomly.

So, as I explained in the other post, he makes a switch at 261, so that "S" refers to the object, the thing sensed, rather than the sensation itself, from this point onward. That's why it's very important to understand the ambiguity, in order to understand the so-called private language argument, and why the "switch" is made. From 261 onward "S" does not refer to the sensation itself anymore (if it ever did, because that was ambiguous in the first place), it refers to the object being sensed, the source, or cause of the sensation. This "switch", is what allows his use of "S" to be justified, as explained at 265. That there is an object sensed, or that there is a source, or cause of the sensation is what justifies the use So at 270 "S" might simply refer to his blood pressure.

Actually, he says "And it would not help either to say...that when he writes “S” he has Something." — Luke

Right, this exemplifies the ambiguity he has employed. The use of "sensation" needs to be justified because nothing has indicated to us, that "S" actually refers to something we would call "a sensation". It has not been justified, that whatever it is which is being called by "S" is a token of sensation, that has simply been asserted, S is a certain sensation. So, it does not help, as a means of justification, to say that he must have "something". This is because we still do not know what it is which is referred to as "S", that was left ambiguous, and remains ambiguous. That it must be something does not justify that it is a sensation. And if it's nothing it's totally fictitious, and still not a sensation.

The particular something is identified, as "a certain sensation". — Luke

Uh-huh, just like I can identify a particular colour, as "a certain colour". It might be good for a guessing game, but not too good for philosophy

Is that the real ambiguity? You keep saying that the type-token distinction is irrelevant here, except where it suits you to say that the type-token distinction is the main problem here. — Luke

There is no type/token distinction here, only a distinction between a type and a particular object. The reason why a type/token distinction is insufficient in Wittgenstein's example is that "a token" is necessarily a representative of a type, and Wittgenstein wants to avoid this necessity. That's why he asks at 261, what reason do we have for calling this a sensation. And the answer, eventually, is that it's a sensation because that's what it's called. At this point it becomes a token of a type, when "sensation" is justified. but prior to this, Wittgenstein intends that we just recognize it as a particular. But he has to give it some identity as an internal experience, to be able to even lay out his example, so he just calls it a sensation. The hidden thing must be referred to, in order to set up the guessing game.

The diarist is supposedly naming a type of "certain sensation" with the use of "S". This means that "S" is the type and its tokens are also called "S", being instances of the type. The "objects" of inner experiences can only be tokens or instances of the type "S". The type "S" cannot be an object, token or instance itself because it is only a conceptual category. — Luke

This doesn't make any sense to me. As I said "certain sensation" and "the sensation" can only refer to a particular to me. Yet you insist it can only refer to a type. Therefore any reasonable person would conclude ambiguity. I don't know why you're being so unreasonable, insisting that it is not ambiguous.

It seems that, in the case of pain, pain is both the thing sensed and the sensation. — Luke

This is ambiguous though. The "thing sensed" is the wound, injury, or whatever it is which is the source of the pain. If you say "pain" refers to both, the sensation which we call "pain", and the injury which is the source of the pain, you may be charged with equivocating.

If you deny that there is a thing sensed, as the source of the pain, then you deny the reality and objectivity of the sensation which is called "pain". The sensation of "pain" would be completely imaginary. This is what I tried to explain to you earlier, but you refused to attempt to understand the metaphysics.

You still refuse to attempt to understand this. But I've made clear the distinction for you, so if you continue to insist that "pain" refers to both the sensation, and the injury, or source of the pain, I will continue to insist that you equivocate.

"Something" doesn't refer to the source of the pain; it doesn't really refer to anything. — Luke

Come on Luke, you must see how ridiculous this looks. Wittgenstein explicitly says, "He has something", and this is what he means, that there is something which is being referred to. We can either say that "the sensation" has a real source, or it is imaginary. If it's imaginary we can't say that he has something, because he made it up, therefore he would not really be sensing anything and there would be no sensation being referred to. Therefore "something" must refer to the fact that there is a source of the sensation.

It makes no sense for you to try and say that it isn't anything. That's explicitly contrary to what Wittgenstein said. What he has explicitly done, is create the highest degree of ambiguity possible, a guessing game where the intent is to remove the thing referred to from any category of type whatsoever. Ever play "twenty questions"? That's the type of guessing game we're into here. The thing referred to must be something in particular, something definite, so the person cannot just make it up as the game proceeds.

I would concur that at 258 he is talking about "a certain sensation", and, yes, the sensation itself. However, I would not agree that this sensation is "pain". Wittgenstein does not specify what type of sensation it is. — Luke

Right, that's why it's ambiguous, and just like a guessing game. I have a sensation named "S". I cannot show it to you, therefore it cannot be a token (example) of a type. Can you guess what type it is? See, he is attempting to create the highest degree of ambiguity possible.

In his dialogues, Plato uses the imagery of reflection multiple times to point either to the individual self or to the Universal Self/Ultimate Truth.

For example, in the Phaedo, he compares looking for truth in theories and arguments about things, to studying the image of the Sun reflected in water “or something of the kind” (Phaedo 99e). The phrase “something of the kind” is Plato’s way of alerting the reader to the fact that this is not an exact comparison, analogy, or account.

The metaphor refers to one seer or cognizing subject. Hence the illustration of the mirror. What Plato is saying is that the philosopher must look at himself, i.e., at his own intelligent soul, using his own intelligence as a mirror. This is the path to self-knowledge as well as the path to knowing the Ultimate. — Apollodorus

I look at the reflection metaphor as something more specific, something more scientific. We see in the mirror image, an inversion, right is shifted to the left. So looking at a reflection does not give us a true representation, but it is so close to being true that it fools us. So while you say "The phrase “something of the kind” is Plato’s way of alerting the reader to the fact that this is not an exact comparison, analogy, or account", I look at Plato as saying the reflection itself is not a true representation. So much of Plato's work involves informing us of ways to distinguish reflections from reality, so that we can be aware of the inversion which occurs in reflection, and not accept it as a true representation. That a reflection contains an inversion, and is therefore not a true representation is a key point.

That which “sees itself in the other” and "is the source of all knowledge", is Ultimate Reality which reflects itself in itself. The “Other” and resulting “Many” here is conceptual. When Ultimate Reality which is Pure Intelligence reflects itself in itself it recognizes the “Other”. i.e., its own reflection as itself, not as some other reality different from itself. — Apollodorus

Based on what I said above, I think that this is incorrect, especially the last sentence. "When Ultimate Reality which is Pure Intelligence reflects itself in itself it recognizes the “Other”. i.e., its own reflection as itself, not as some other reality different from itself. " There is no such thing as "reflects itself in itself". A reflection is always external to the thing reflected, so there is already an Other implied by "reflection", the thing which reflects. Otherwise there is no reflection. And, I believe this is critical to understanding Plato, because this Other is the cause of the deficiency and misunderstanding in knowledge. If we ignore the Other, then we think we have pure, true knowledge, ignoring the role of the Other, and the inversion of the reflection, thereby deceiving ourselves.

So your statement is really self-deception, which can be apprehended as self-deception when analyzed and seen as self-contradicting. The Intelligence which sees itself in the reflection must see the reflection as Other, to see the true reality, because the true reality is that the reflection is Other than itself, as it is an inversion. It's contradictory to say that the reflection of a self is itself. And if we fall for that self-deception, to think that the reflection of oneself is oneself, and not recognize that it is Other than oneself, this is self-deception.

Even when we look inward, what we call "introspection", or reflecting on one's own existence, it is imperative that we recognize a division between the outer self, and the inner self. This is why we have a dualism. To deny this division, and make the thing reflecting the very same thing as the thing reflected on, is to wrongly dissolve dualism, and fall for the illusion that the reflection is the true reality.

In the world of Being, the Creative Intelligence that contains the Forms, for example, is cognitively identical with the Forms and is aware of this identity. The sense of real difference only arises in the world of Becoming, where things are not perceived as different manifestations of one cognizing intelligence but as separate and independent of one another and of the cognizing subject. — Apollodorus

This is simply an unsupported speculative proposition concerning the nature of the "Creative Intelligence". As I I explained already, and exemplified with your finger/hand analogy, we have no reason to believe the Creator is an "Intelligence", just like we have no reason to believe that the unity of five fingers is a "Finger": A hand is something completely different from a finger, therefore we ought to also believe that the Creator is something completely different from an intelligence.

So you simply ignore the separation I described above, which is an essential part of "intelligence", (dividing the reflecting self, in the case of introspection, from the thing being reflected on), to say that the Creative Intelligence is identical with the Forms. But if the Creator was truly an intelligence, we'd have to respect this separation which is an essential feature of "intelligence". It is respect for this separation which creates the need for Plato's tripartite soul, and the Trinity of Christianity. The separation between the two aspects of a dualism requires a third thing which maintains the division. I believe this situation is touched on in the Parmenides.

The reality of Becoming impresses itself onto any intelligence in a way which cannot be ignored. This results in a division between the "beings" which we know, and are intelligible to us, always being contingent as the result of a becoming, and the "Being" which is assumed as prior to contingent being. This division cannot be ignored in any introspection (self reflection) as it separates the introspecting self as the activity of a contingent being, from the Being of the so-called "Creative Intelligence" (which I argue is not properly called an intelligence).

If we follow the pattern established by Plato and developed by later Platonists, we can avoid most of the misunderstandings or misinterpretations that have arisen especially in more recent times.

The relation between the Good and the Beautiful is a case in point, showing how two apparently distinct things can be ultimately one. — Apollodorus

This idea, that the Good and the Beautiful are one, is itself a misunderstanding.

It follows that, as Diotima says, love of Beauty is really love of Good (Symp. 206a): We love Beauty because it is in some sense Good. Love of Beauty is the desire not only to behold Beauty, but to hold it for ever and to manifest it in everything we do in every way we can. The Gods do not judge man by what he sees but by his actions.

Plato clearly equates Beauty with Good and with Truth — Apollodorus

This is a misrepresentation of what is presented by Plato at Symposium 206. Notice, at 206a, that the object of Love is the good. This is what Diotima gets Socrates to agree with. People love the good, and they want the good to be theirs forever. There is no mention of Beauty here. Then Diotima proceeds to discuss Beauty. Beauty is described as being consistent with the gods, harmony with all that is godlike.

So we have Aristotle's distinction here between apparent good (the good which a person loves and wants to keep forever), and what is called by A as the real good, harmony with all that is godlike, what Diotima calls "Beauty". What Plato has set up therefore, is the division between "the good", what people desireor love, and "the beautiful", what is godlike.

Now we proceed to the end of 206, where Diotima states "You see, Socrates' , she said, 'what Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is'."

So the point made by Plato at 206 is actually the opposite as to what you propose. Diotima is actually establishing a separation between the good, and Beauty, and proposing that the good is what is desired and wanted by people, "loved", and this may be very inconsistent with what is beautiful, i.e. what is godlike, Beauty.

How definite do you need him to be? — Luke

Well, if he's talking about a particular item, or a particular type, referring to it as "the...", then this particular "something" ought to be identified. I mean, this is philosophy, not a guessing game. "I have a type of fruit in my bag, can you guess what type it is?"

Of course the real ambiguity is as to whether he's talking about a particular object, or what you call a type, because this is the question of Platonic realism, what sort of existence the so-called "objects" of inner experiences have. But you refuse to acknowledge this.

And it is quite possible that Wittgenstein is talking about a particular (or a particular type), and hiding the thing he is talking about from us, for the purpose of making a philosophical point, but then we must conclude that the ambiguity is intentional.

Is pain not a sensation? Or can we not sense pain? Or both? You said: — Luke

If you refuse to acknowledge a difference between the thing sensed, and the sensation, then we simply cannot go any further in this philosophical discussion. Do you apprehend a difference between the chair, as the thing sensed, and the sensation of the chair. If so, then why not recognize a difference between the thing sensed, and the sensation, in the case of pain?

Suppose we assign "pain" to the sensation itself. We still need a thing sensed, let's say the thing sensed is a wound, or an injury, what I'll call the source of the pain. Can we discuss Wittgenstein's so-called private language argument while maintaining this distinction, without conflating the two in ambiguity? Would you agree, that at 261, when he says "he has something", what the word "something" refers to here, is not the sensation, but the thing sensed, the source of the pain? Would you concur, that at 258 he is talking about the sensation itself, which we call "pain", but at 261 he switches and proceeds from this point onward to refer to the thing sensed (the source of the pain). If a person is not careful in one's reading, one might think that the "something" here is the sensation itself, rather than the source of the sensation.

In terms of the type-token distinction, the type is “a certain sensation”.

How definite do you need him to be? What more information do you need and why do you need it?

Let’s assume that instead of “a certain sensation” Wittgenstein had said that the diarist has “a certain fruit”. Then you would complain that Wittgenstein was using the word “fruit” ambiguously because he does not tell us what type of fruit it is. And if he said it was an apple you would then complain that he doesn’t tell us what type of apple it is, etc. How far does Wittgenstein need to go before you are satisfied that he is no longer being ambiguous, vague, unclear or indefinite? . — Luke

Luke, if he says "a certain type of fruit", then the type of fruit is left unidentified and this is ambiguous. If he says "a certain type of apple", then the type of apple is left unidentified and this is ambiguous. If he is saying "a certain type of sensation" then the type of sensation is left unidentified and this is ambiguous.

There is nothing unclear in the first place about what he means by “fruit” or what he means by “sensation”. If there is, then you need to be more exact about what you mean by “definite” and tell us: At what level of detail does it stop being “indefinite” and become “definite”? Otherwise you face the same charge of “ambiguity” in your use of the word “definite”. — Luke

I don't believe you can be so persistent in your ignorance of Wittgenstein's use of "the".

You’ll need to remind me why you think this is nonsense. — Luke

No, I will not do that, because you totally ignored me the last time, saying you refuse to follow any metaphysics. Until you change your attitude I will not waste my time.

Okay, we sense sensations. What’s your point? — Luke

No, this is not an acceptable relation between sense and sensation. Sensations are the result of sensing, and they are apprehended by the conscious mind. Sensations are not what is sensed. So you have things backward. Sorry Luke, but I see no attempt by you to demonstrate what I asked for.

The particular type has been identified - as "a certain sensation". What's your definition of "definite"? — Luke

Definite: clear and distinct, not vague..

If you don't see "a certain sensation" as indefinite and ambiguous, I don't think I can help you to understand ambiguity. You need some elementary level training. Which sensation is he talking about? He's talking about a certain sensation. How does that identify the particular type of sensation referred to, making clear and distinct that type of sensation?

So we can only ever talk about something if "the talk is aimed at discussing the identifiable features" of that something? — Luke

I've clearly indicated that we can talk about an unidentified thing, Such talk is most likely ambiguous though.

The purpose of all discussion about something is always to better define it? Go back to PI 71 - sometimes a blurry (or more general) picture is just what we need. — Luke

When the ambiguity is unintentional, we often get beyond it through the use of contextual references, and circumstantial aids like gesturing.

That Wittgenstein says "sometimes a blurry (or more general) picture is just what we need." is further evidence to my accusation that he employs intentional ambiguity. You ought to take notice of such hints, if you want to really understand what he was doing.

You're jumping to Wittgenstein's conclusion about the scenario at PI 261 here. I am (and we previously were) discussing the scenario at PI 258 itself. — Luke

When ambiguity is evident, we need to make contextual references, to make a determination of the intended meaning (what was meant by the author). The contextual references which we've looked at in this case, all indicate that the ambiguity is intentional. If it is intentional we can conclude that there is no correct interpretation of what "the sensation" named "S" refers to at 258. as I explained are the consequences of intentional ambiguity.

If I've "insisted" anything, it's that you cannot experience the same token of a sensation (e.g. a pain) twice. — Luke

And, as I've already explained to you it's nonsense to claim that there is such a thing as a token of a sensation. But there is no point to revisiting that, you have no inclination toward understanding any metaphysical principles.

What do you think "occurrence" means? It need not have anything to do with "experience". Your experience of a chair is not the chair's occurrence. The chair's occurrence is its existence. The chair has one existence or instance, and thus there is one token of the chair. You can experience the chair's existence many times. Or zero times. There is still one token of the chair. — Luke

You've already made it very clear that you are completely uninterested in trying to understand any complex metaphysics. So I'm not going to waste my time on any complicated explanation when you have not the will to follow. If you truly have the intent to enter into such an endeavour, and have an honest desire to understand, then demonstrate to me that you understand the following, simple principle.

Any sensation requires an object of sensation, the thing sensed, and the object sensed is distinct from the act of sensing it. In the case of a sensation of a chair, the object is the chair itself, and in the case of a sensation of pain, the object is the pain itself. The object of the sensation is distinct from the act of sensing, such that the thing we call "the pain" is separate and distinct from the act of sensing it, just like the thing we call "the chair" is separate and distinct from the act of sensing it.

My request from you, is to demonstrate that you understand the logical necessity for this principle. If there was no object of the sensation, then the sensation would be completely imaginary, totally within the individual's mind, without any objectivity. Consider the sensation of the chair, if there was no object, called "the chair" which was being sensed, existing independently of the act of sensation, then the sensation would be completely imaginary. The same principle is applicable to the sensation of pain. If there is no object called "the pain", which was being sensed, existing independently of the act of sensation, then the sensation would be completely imaginary. Do you recognize this need, to assume an object which is being sensed, in any form of "sensation", as a requirement for producing a real representation of what a sensation is?

The definite article can be used for both the type and a token. For example:
"The blue whale is the largest mammal."
"The giraffe has a very long neck."
"The sensation is a tingling in the toes resulting from a lack of oxygen." — Luke

I've told you already, type or token is not the question, it's only how you represent the issue.

Let's suppose that Wittgenstein's use of "the sensation" is meant to single out a particular type, like in your examples, then unlike your examples he hasn't given anything to identify this particular type. So he is using "the sensation" to single out a particular type of sensation, which supposedly has been identified, and made definite as his use of the definite article "the" indicates, yet the particular type has not been identified and made definite. Hence the ambiguity.

Imagine that I have an imaginary type of thing in my mind which I refer to as "the thing" and I name it with "T". I can talk about this type, "T", and you can talk about it. So we can talk about this type all we want, as "T", asking me is T in your mind now, was it in your mind yesterday, etc.. But talking about it, unless the talk is aimed at discussing the identifiable features, does not remove the ambiguity (obscurity) as to what T is the name of.

And in Wittgenstein's case, he doesn't even go so far as to say that "S" represents a type of thing. that is simply your assumption. At 261, he explicitly says we cannot make such a judgement. It is only you who is claiming that "S" names a type, as an attempt to remove the inherent ambiguity, and make the passage intelligible to you.

You said in the quote at the top of this post that "S" refers to a single token of the sensation. You have also argued previously that "a certain sensation" refers to a single token of the sensation. You are now arguing that neither the symbol "S" nor the word "sensation" can refer to the sensation. So which is it? Do "S" and/or "sensation" refer to a single token of the sensation or can they not refer to the sensation? — Luke

I've been telling you over and over, it's ambiguous, that means "which is it" cannot be determined. That's why I can coherently argue both sides. There is no answer to "which is it", that's the nature of ambiguity. You just don't seem to grasp the nature of ambiguity. We can apprehend ambiguity as either this or that, or neither. If the ambiguity is unintentional, the meaning is either this or that, with potentially a correct answer, but a lack of capacity to determine the correct answer. If the ambiguity is intentional it is neither this nor that, because there is no correct answer. We can't say "both" because we'd be allowing contradiction. If we do not know whether the ambiguity is intentional or not, there is the three basic options, this or that, or neither. Both is nonsensical. We do not know whether Wittgenstein's ambiguity is intentional, so we cannot rule out "neither".

This is all you could possibly mean by saying that "S" and/or "the sensation" refer to a single token of the sensation. If there are two tokens, then you face the same contradiction that "one particular sensation is being referred to two different times". — Luke

This is not contradiction, and that's what Wittgenstein shows with the chair example. You keep insisting that we cannot experience the same token twice, but this is blatantly false. I see the same token of chair here today, which I saw here yesterday, therefore I experience one token two different times, and refer to it as "the chair". If I didn't believe it was the same token, I would just say that there is a chair here today, and there was a chair here yesterday. But since I believe both instances of "chair" to be instances of the very same token, I refer to them both with "the chair".

To associate a "certain sensation" with a name/symbol is (supposedly in this scenario) to establish a type, not merely to name a single token. This has been my point. In the most basic terms, it is not logically possible to have the recurrence of a single token, which has only one instance, so Wittgenstein could only be referring to a type of sensation. — Luke

This is completely wrong. "Recurrence" signifies another occurrence of the very same thing, a sort of repeating. The mistake you are making is that you produce the assumption "it is not logically possible to have the recurrence of a single token", and you apply this to what Wittgenstein has said, and this causes you to misread. You refuse to accept what he has said, because you believe strongly in your assumption that it is not logically possible to have a recurrence of the same token. But the chair example proves otherwise, that sensation commonly provides a repeated or recurring experience of the very same token.

Why do you refuse to consider the example of the chair? Every day I see the same chair in front of me. Is it not true that my sensation of that chair is a recurrence of a sensation of a single token?

When you come around to accepting the reality that what you claim to be "not logically possible", regularly happens on a daily basis, then you'll reject this assumption that such "is not logically possible", and allow yourself to understand what Wittgenstein is exemplifying.

Should the diarist now [after one year] mark “S” in their diary as per Wittgenstein’s instructions, or does “S” refer only to a single token of the sensation? — Luke

"S" clearly refers to only one token, as is indicated by the definite article, "the" sensation. That's what "the" means, a particular member of the type signified by "sensation" is being talked about.

We can't say whether or not the diarist should mark "S" because of the ambiguity as to what "the sensation", or "S" is supposed to refer to. We have no criterion of identity. Whether It is, or is not what is called "the sensation", named "S", cannot be answered. There is no such thing as "what should be done" in this context.

How does the person know to write “S” every day for 10 years? Same problem. — Luke

You're quite right, it's the same problem. We went through this already weeks ago,. It's very clear in Wittgenstein's example, that the person doesn't "know" when to write S. No one knows this. The person decides when to write "S", but this in no way implies that the person "knows" when to write "S".

So if you have a pain and it goes away for one year and then returns, it is still the same instance of the pain? You were just unaware of it for a whole year? Garbage. — Luke

I would never refer to them both as "the sensation" in the same context of speaking. However, Wittgenstein is talking about "the sensation" when referring to both occurrences, the use of "the" indicating that one particular sensation is being referred to two different times.
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So the ambiguity is with respect to how that person, or anyone else for that matter, knows that this sensation which occurs at a later time is "the sensation".

Here's where the ambiguity lies:

And when "the sensation" (same token in your words) appears a year later, the diarist ought to mark another S. Both occurrences must be "a single token" (as in Wittgenstein's example of the chair), because that's what the definite article "the" signifies, that an identified particular is being referred to, i.e. a single token. — Metaphysician Undercover

My mistake, but that's not where the ambiguity lies.

I think we all know that it's ambiguous. Only a few, including yourself, refuse to admit it, despite knowing that it is..

et’s say that the diarist has a single token of the sensation which lasts for 10 years. The diarist recognises it as the same sensation every day and so they write “S” in their diary every day. After 10 years the diarist does not have any further experience of the sensation until exactly one year later when the diarist recognises the sensation again. Should the diarist now mark “S” in their diary as per Wittgenstein’s instructions, or does “S” refer only to a single token of the sensation? — Luke

I don't know, because as I say, what you call "Wittgenstein's instructions", are ambiguous. Why would the person mark a new "S" every day for ten years, if that time period is only one occurrence of "the sensation"? The person is not keeping track of the temporal duration of "the sensation", only how often "the sensation" occurs. Wouldn't that entire time period just qualify for one S, one occurrence of "the sensation?

And when "the sensation" (same token in your words) appears a year later, the diarist ought to mark another S. Both occurrences must be "a single token" (as in Wittgenstein's example of the chair), because that's what the definite article "the" signifies, that an identified particular is being referred to, i.e. a single token.

You recently made the issue about the meaning of the word “sensation”, with your claim that its meaning was not only ambiguous but that it could also mean “ambiguous” (as well as “token” and “type”). I’ll take the quote above as your retraction of this foolish claim. — Luke

Luke, my issue has always been with Wittgenstein's use of the word "sensation", in particular, his reference to "the sensation" at 258. Our disagreement as to what "the sensation" refers to in this context indicates very clearly that his use is ambiguous.

I just provided you with a detailed response and reading of 258 here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/617672.

You declined to respond. — Luke

You provided nothing that we hadn't already discussed, therefore nothing to resolve the disagreement, and nothing which would alter the judgement of "ambiguous".

You incessantly refuse to acknowledge Wittgenstein's use of the definite article "the". The issue is not strictly concerning the word "sensation". The issue is with the particular referent identified as "the sensation", at 258. This is the thing which the diarist names with "S".

And, as you admit we spent two months discussing what was meant by "the sensation" with no agreement. Therefore I can conclude that there is ambiguity here. The only question which remains is whether the ambiguity is intentional or not.

It is my opinion that ambiguity is a prevalent and significant feature of philosophy, which is often simply the result of the nature of language. But I also believe that intentional ambiguity is a feature of bad philosophy.

Yes, but it is not just the dyad particular and universal. — Fooloso4

Particular and universal are not opposite to each other, they are categorically distinct. For example, hot and cold are opposite, and these opposites are within the category of temperature. But temperature is not the opposite of size, they are categorically distinct. Likewise, particular is not opposite to universal, it is a different category.

Neither is many opposed to one, as I explained to Apollodorus above. Many consists of a multitude of one's, so "one" is included in "many" as part of many, therefore not opposed to many but a part of many.

When people propose different dyads and dichotomies, we must be cautious, and analyze them carefully to determine whether or not they are reasonable proposals. Otherwise the person might proceed with a logical argument, using the unreasonable proposition as a premise, and the result might be an absurd conclusion.

OED: ambiguous 1. "having an obscure or double meaning".

Maybe you have something else in mind for "ambiguous", or maybe you don't think that Wittgenstein's writing at this part of PI is obscure. But if the latter is the case, I think it's time for you to justify this claim. I already justified my assertion, that the writing is ambiguous, with the evidence that you and I discussed this section for two months without being able to come to any agreement as to the meaning.

You brought it up again. — Luke

I brought it up, because our disagreement on interpretation, and the fact that we could not resolve that disagreement with two months of discourse, is very clear evidence that what Wittgenstein said is ambiguous.

And, I believe that we will never resolve that disagreement because what Wittgenstein wrote actually is ambiguous, as the evidence indicates. So I think that after two months, any further discussion on the particulars of that disagreement is pointless because we will both be reiterating the same points.

Therefore I think we should both agree to disagree on the interpretation of that passage, and accept the fact that it is ambiguous. It appears like you need more time to maturate. But I will not be your sitter. So I'll leave you to do that on your own time

Since ex nihilo nihi fit, Parmenides rejected becoming; after all becoming implies an initial stage of nonbeing which in Parmenides universe is either nothing or too close it for comfort. — TheMadFool

This is not how Plato represents Parmenides in "The Parmenides", as indicated by the passage I've referred to above, at 135.

It is not that Parmenides rejected becoming, clearly Plato represented him as accepting the reality of "becoming". He just presented the extreme difficulty of understanding "becoming" logically. This is the same situation we find with Zeno's paradoxes. Zeno does not reject the reality of motion, he just demonstrates that the principles employed to understand motion, at that time, were insufficient to provide a real understanding.

Sorry Luke, I will not go back to where we were two months ago, and pretend that we didn't already discuss this.

And you do not seem to have any grasp of the reality of ambiguity, or the desire to discuss it. So, I don't see any point in proceeding.

How is it ambiguous to define green as a colour? — Luke

Red is a colour. Pink is a colour, so are brown and blue, and many more. The definition is very ambiguous because there are many colours and it provides nothing to distinguish the colour green from the others.

What is in question is whether the phrase "a certain sensation" refers to a one-off particular instance of a sensation or to a recurrent particular type of sensation. I have given you all the quotes about "recurrent" and "every time" to support that he means the latter. — Luke

After discussing this issue for a month or two, with no consensus between us, I came to the conclusion that "a certain sensation" is ambiguous. Further, I gave some reasons why I believe that Wittgenstein practiced a technique of creative writing which employs the intentional use of ambiguity.

I thought we were making some progress. But obviously you just want to go back and argue the same thing, all over again, so that we can establish once again, that "sensation" is ambiguous.

You might have an argument for your interpretation of "type", if Wittgenstein hadn't used the definite article "the", four times at 258, when referring to "the sensation". Do you understand the grammar of this definite article?

It appears to me, that we have established beyond any reasonable doubt, that "a certain sensation" is ambiguous. The question which remains is whether that ambiguity is intentional or not. If it's not intentional, then one or the other interpretation might be the correct one. But if it is intentional, then neither interpretation is the correct one.

Recall that for Parmenides, it doesn't really make sense to say a thing is not, because if X is not, then how were you just talking about it? — frank

But this is the point which Parmenides makes at the end of 135, when he speaks about visible things, and "their wandering between opposites". He says to Socrates, who he views as young and full of potential, yet untrained: "...If you want to be trained more thoroughly, you must not only hypothesize, if each thing is, and examine the consequences of that hypothesis, you must also hypothesize, if that same thing is not."

He says this because visible things come into being and go out of being, they pass through opposites. We can say of the same thing that "it is X" at one time, and "not X" at another time. And so, "among visible things, it's not at all hard to show that things are both like and unlike and anything else you please."

Very simple. Take the example of the five fingers of one hand. They are different extensions of the same one hand. Different intelligences are products of One Supreme Intelligence as Plato says in the Timaeus. — Apollodorus

The analogy doesn't work because a hand is something different from a finger. Five fingers does not make one finger, it makes something different, one hand. So by your analogy a multitude of intelligences would not make One Supreme Intelligence, it would make something different.

Of course seeing oneself in the other requires more than one. But this is just a metaphor. — Apollodorus

Well, if "seeing oneself in the other" is metaphorical for something which involves only one, that would be very very strange.

The point Plato is making is that by seeing itself reflected in a being that is similar to itself, the soul becomes aware of its own identity. — Apollodorus

So, do you not agree that this, "seeing itself reflected in a being that is similar to itself", requires more than one being? And if this, "seeing oneself in the other", is, as you said, the source of all knowledge, then knowledge cannot be derived from One, it requires more than one.

Wittgenstein uses the word "sensation" to refer to an "inner experience" such as pain. There is no ambiguity about it and none has coherently been pointed out. — Luke

There is no question that defining "sensation" as "an inner experience" is extremely ambiguous, just like defining "green" as "a colour" is extremely ambiguous. And it doesn't help to say "such as pain", just like it wouldn't help to say "such as red".

But that is not the issue here. The issue concerns what Wittgenstein refers to with "the sensation", at 258, what he has called "a certain sensation". You have consistently ignored Wittgenstein's use of the definite article "the" at 258, when referring to "the sensation", since we engaged in this thread. And it appears, you will continue to do so.

Do you think that it's possible to argue against the idea of "the one" as presented by Parmenides? — Manuel

I would ask how is it possible to not argue against such an idea. "The One" appears to me, to be presented by Parmenides as being self-contradicting in every possible way. It is a demonstration of the problem which arises from the assumption of independent Forms.

Parmenides describes to Socrates how we see in visible things the existence of opposites. Visible things change, therefore they pass from 'is..." to "is not..." in different ways. The Form itself, if we assume such a thing, must contain both of these opposites. But how is that possible for a thing (the Form) to both be and not be) in the same sense at the same time.

So I believe that the One is presented by Parmenides as an example, of how opposites can coexist in one Form. So the question we ought to ask would be whether this is an acceptable presentation or not. Does Parmenides provide a good demonstration of the Idea of One, one which cannot be argued against.

That's interesting. If I understand you correctly you are saying that what a person derives from a sign, is dependent on what they want to derive from the sign. But what role does the intent of the author play in this act? Does the intent of the author enter into the act, or is it only through pretense, as the reader pretends to want to derive the intent of the author?

Where does he say at 261 that "sensation" has no referent or that we cannot say what it refers to? — Luke

I've quoted it numerous times already.

Let's say that what I meant by the statement "I am going to the bank" is "I am going to the financial establishment". How does my intention remove the ambiguity from the statement? It could still mean either the financial establishment or the side of the river. — Luke

I didn't say intention removes ambiguity, I distinguished between intentionally creating ambiguity, and unintentionally creating ambiguity.

But if we define "meaning" as what is meant, then what you say here would be contradiction. If, what you meant was "I am going to the financial establishment", then it is impossible that what you meant was " I am going to the side of the river. So we cannot say that it could mean either.

And, in the example, you are the one saying both, "I am going to the bank", and "it could mean 'financial establishment' or 'side of river'". Being the person who made the statement, you would know whether it means the former or the latter, in that instance of use. So for you to say that it could mean either, indicates that it really means neither, because you would know which of the two is the case, if it meant one of them, so you could not say that it could be either one. If one of the two is the case, you cannot truthfully say that it could be either, because you know which one it is. Therefore you are intentionally being ambiguous.

You have a lot of work to do to demonstrate that Wittgenstein intentionally uses the word "sensation" ambiguously (or at all ambiguously). And I know you're wrong about it, but you cannot be reasoned with, so I'm out. — Luke

I don't intend to make any such demonstration. I don't know how such a thing could be demonstrated. I am simply stating my opinion, and demonstrating the reality of, and the effects of, intentional ambiguity. But I know that you are very set in your ways, and could never be convinced of something you refuse to even try to understand.

What reason do you have for thinking that Wittgenstein intends multiple interpretations of the word "sensation"? This might seem like a silly question, but what makes you think Wittgenstein is not using the word "sensation" to mean a sensation such as pain? — Luke

I answered this:

Plato teaches us very well, how to recognize the intentional use of ambiguity, through multiple examples including ancient poetry. Then he proceeds to attack the intentional use of ambiguity by the sophists, to produce fallacious logic, in the form of what we now call "equivocation".

There are key signifiers of intentional ambiguity. One is an absurd logical conclusion, which signifies a likelihood of equivocation, and the need to carefully consider the use of terms. Another is the author's alluding to one's own use of ambiguity. This is what Wittgenstein does throughout the PI, and especially at the passage I quoted from, at 261. What he is saying at 261 is that "sensation" has no referent (or, we cannot say what it refers to), and this is very consistent with intentional ambiguity, as I've described. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have still failed to explain how having more than one possible meaning implies having less than one possible meaning. Or, that is, how either implies neither. — Luke

I didn't say "less than". And, I explained very clearly how the appearance of either, implies neither, when the appearance of either is intentionally created. You just seem to be incapable of apprehended the intentional use of ambiguity. That's your failure, not mine

Go back to your "bank" example and reread my reply carefully. Remember, you, as the author said both, "I am going to the bank", and, "the word 'bank' which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment". In saying that the word could mean either of the two, you are admitting to intentional ambiguity, and you are saying that neither one is the correct one, because if there was a correct one you would have to say which one is the one which is meant, thereby negating the possibility of either.

Here, I'll repost, and don't get distracted by the question of whether "I am going to the bank", and "'bank' which could mean either... or..." is two distinct statements. Just accept the reality of the example, that you are saying both, I am going to the bank", and "bank" in this phrase has an indeterminate meaning. This implies that you are intentionally creating ambiguity with the word.

If the first statement means that you are going to a financial establishment, then you would not allow that it possibly means the side of a river, and vise versa. You know where you are going, and you know what you mean by the statement, one or the other. If you meant that you are going to a financial establishment then it is not possible that you meant that you are going to the side of a river, However, you do say that this is a possibility. On the basis of this statement, your statement, that "bank" in this expression could mean either the side of a river, or a financial establishment, we can come to the conclusion that "bank" means neither. — Metaphysician Undercover

See, if a person intentionally uses a word ambiguously, the appearance is that the word has numerous possibilities for meaning. However, since the use of ambiguity is intentional, we can conclude that the author cannot possibly mean any single one of these possibilities. Furthermore, it is impossible that the author means all of the possibilities because that would be contradictory. Therefore we can conclude that the author means none of the possibilities.

Ad so I continued the explanation with this:

Further to this, we cannot say that "bank" in this context has no meaning. It definitely has meaning, because it definitely serves a purpose in your example of ambiguity. And since you are not telling us where you are going at all, as you are creating ambiguity with the word instead, we wouldn't say that you have said "I am going to the ambiguity", the word "bank" simply makes the entire statement an expression of ambiguity. And of course it is very reasonable to say that the meaning of "bank" here is ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you are still having difficulty understanding, that if an author intentionally uses a word to create the appearance of numerous possibilities, then not any one of .these numerous possibilities is what is meant by the author, then please let me know what aspects of the explanation are insufficient

Is a trail with a fork ( ---< ) vague or ambiguous?

If one intends to use the trail as a path to a destination in mind, then the trail is ambiguous. If one merely intends to use the trail without a destination in mind, then the trail is vague. And if one doesn't intend to use the trail for walking, then the trail is neither vague nor ambiguous. — sime

The issue is the intent behind the creation of the thing. So the trail with a fork is not analogous, because each fork may have been created and intended to lead you somewhere different. Instead, we could talk about a sign which is intended to lead you in two distinct and incompatible directions. Such a sign is really not intended to lead you anywhere. However, this does not mean that it is not intended to do something, i.e. it does not mean that the sign is meaningless.

I don’t find that “awareness and consciousness is more compatible with Many than with One” at all. On the contrary, my common sense and intuition is that awareness and consciousness is one, not many. So, unfortunately, this is where we will have to disagree. — Apollodorus

How do you account for the fact that there are many different people with consciousness and awareness, when you say that consciousness and awareness is more compatible with One?? And each of these different people is a distinct instance of consciousness and awareness, making Many rather than One. Clearly, consciousness is Many, and not One.

What I am talking about when I say “the One”, is the Divine Awareness or Consciousness prior to the creation of the universe, i.e., in its role as First Cause of all, when no world full of distinct instances of awareness or consciousness existed. — Apollodorus

You never did demonstrate why the "First Cause" ought to be consider to be some sort of awareness or consciousness. All we have to go on, is that the so-called First Cause, is a movement toward a good, a final cause. But we see that all sorts of living creatures, with or without consciousness and awareness, engage in this type of movement toward a good.

Not knowledge, but that which knows, the subject of the known objects (whatever and however many they happen to be, including Forms), is the highest reality which is One. This is the true focus of Plato’s philosophical quest and the true meaning of “source and cause of knowledge”.

The cleansing or purification process (katharsis) is nothing but the elimination of everything that is not “us”. This is the only way to discover our true self. If we mentally strip or chisel away all the accretions of sense-perceptions, emotions, and thoughts, we arrive at a new type of non-discursive, image- and concept-free, intuitive knowledge.

But it is important to understand that this knowledge itself must be transcended. And as we transcend it, we get to the consciousness we have of this knowledge, and beyond that, to pure awareness itself. It is this awareness that is the ultimate self, not the knowledge. The knowledge belongs to the self but is not the self. It is at the most an extension of the self in the same way thoughts, emotions, and sense-perceptions are extensions or “accretions” of the nous.

The key to the correct understanding of this is provided in the First Alcibiades.

Already in the Charmides (164d ff.) Socrates discusses the Delphic inscription “Know thyself” and the possibility of there being any such thing as knowledge of knowledge (episteme epistemes).

The discussion is carried on in the First Alcibiades (132c ff.) where Socrates proposes substituting “see” for “know” and gives the example of seeing oneself in a mirror.

He next compares this with seeing oneself in the eye of another, the only part of another person in which one can see oneself. The same is true of the soul: if it wishes to see itself in another soul, it must look at that part of it that most resembles it, namely the seat of wisdom (sophia).

Socrates and Alcibiades agree that the seat of wisdom (the nous) is the most divine part of the soul, and that a soul can truly know itself only by looking at God himself: — Apollodorus

Look at the inconsistency you have presented here. You start off saying, "Not knowledge, but that which knows, the subject of the known objects", and you call this "One". Then you proceed to talk about "us". But "us" does not refer to one, it refers to many. Further, you talk about a soul seeing itself in another soul. Obviously this is not a feature of one soul, but of a number of souls.

So you start with an assumption of One, but everything which follows concerns Many, rather than One. Your assumption of One is totally out of place here.

As Awareness, the supreme Intelligence is “the Same”. As its own reflection in the mirror of itself, it is “the Other”. Seeing oneself in the other is “the best knowledge of oneself”. And that self-knowledge is the source and cause of all knowledge and all things. — Apollodorus

Again, this "seeing oneself in the other" requires more than one. So if this is "the source and cause of all knowledge", then knowledge cannot be derived from One, it must be derived from Many.

.

Note that it says differential/different (i.e. more than one) interpretations. — Luke

Right. Now do you see that if the author intends multiple interpretations, there is no such thing as the correct interpretation of the word? So if meaning is rule dependent, as you think it is, then the word has no meaning in these situations.

You may claim that W uses the word “sensation” to be ambiguous (not to mean ambiguous), but then you will need to say what (more than one) meanings the word “sensation” could possibly have in the text. — Luke

Didn't I already give you three possible meanings for the word "sensation" in that context?

You can’t have it both ways by saying that the word has more than one possible meaning but also no meaning. — Luke

As I said, the third is not really "no meaning". In the third possibility the meaning is "ambiguous": It's just your refusal to acknowledge the reality of this sort of meaning, and your insistence that meaning is given by following a rule, which creates the appearance that ambiguous meaning is no meaning.

You either don't understand my argument or you are purposefully ignoring it. It was your claim that the word "sensation" is ambiguous (having a "multitude of possible meanings") and that "ambiguous" is one of its possible meanings. It is the latter half of this conjunction that I find ridiculous. — Luke

You do not seem to be recognizing the difference between using a word with a specific intended meaning, but which could be wrongly interpreted because it is ambiguous, and intentionally using a word to create ambiguity. In the latter case there is no such thing as what the word means (or we can simply say as I did, its meaning is ambiguous). You do not seem to acknowledge the reality of intentional ambiguity, as a tool in creative writing.

This intentional ambiguity, I explained to you with reference to your example "bank". Your use of "bank" was meant as an example of ambiguity. Therefore there is no correct interpretation of "bank". It does not mean "financial establishment" nor does it mean "side of a river", because it was intended by you, the author, to signify the possibility of either one.

If you so desire, you can continue to refuse to acknowledge the reality of the intentional use of ambiguity. I suppose, then you will not have to address the issue of whether or not Wittgenstein is engaged in this activity. But, if he is, then you will have an incorrect interpretation, a misreading. So I really see no point in that approach, especially since you gave a clear example of intentional use of ambiguity in your post concerning "the bank". So it is hypocritical of you to deny the reality of the intentional use of ambiguity.

It is one thing to describe the meaning of the word "sensation" as ambiguous, which is to say that the word "sensation" has more than one possible meaning. It is quite another thing to say that the word "sensation" itself has the possible meaning of, or is possibly synonymous with, the word "ambiguous". — Luke

The first :"thing" here, is to unintentionally create ambiguity. In this case, the person attempting to interpret would have to choose between "possible meanings". However, one of the possible meanings is the correct interpretation; "correct" here means what was intended by the author. The ambiguity is not intentional, and there is a true meaning intended.

The "quite another thing", is the intentional creation of ambiguity, by the author. In this case none of the possible meanings which the interpreter might come up with is the "correct" meaning (the one intended by the author), because what the author intended was to write something ambiguous.

You somehow make the leap from describing the use/meaning of the word “sensation”as ambiguous to giving the word “sensation” a use/meaning which is synonymous with "ambiguous". That's ridiculous. — Luke

What is ridiculous, is your refusal to acknowledge the reality of intentional ambiguity. And, when someone uses a word to intentionally create ambiguity, the person does not intend that any of the apparently "possible meanings" is the correct meaning, because what was meant by the author (the intent), is that the meaning would be ambiguous.

What makes you think that Wittgenstein is using the word "sensation" to mean "ambiguous"? Please do not repeat your spurious reasoning that if the word "sensation" has an ambiguous (more than one) meaning, then the word "sensation" means "ambiguous". Look up the word "sensation" in the dictionary if you want to know its common meanings/synonyms. — Luke

I've read much philosophy in my life, and I am very well acquainted with the intentional use of ambiguity. It is a technique derived from poetry.

Poetry uses forms and conventions to suggest differential interpretations of words, or to evoke emotive responses. Devices such as assonance, alliteration, onomatopoeia, and rhythm may convey musical or incantatory effects. The use of ambiguity, symbolism, irony, and other stylistic elements of poetic diction often leaves a poem open to multiple interpretations. — Wikipedia: Poetry

Plato teaches us very well, how to recognize the intentional use of ambiguity, through multiple examples including ancient poetry. Then he proceeds to attack the intentional use of ambiguity by the sophists, to produce fallacious logic, in the form of what we now call "equivocation".

There are key signifiers of intentional ambiguity. One is an absurd logical conclusion, which signifies a likelihood of equivocation, and the need to carefully consider the use of terms. Another is the author's alluding to one's own use of ambiguity. This is what Wittgenstein does throughout the PI, and especially at the passage I quoted from, at 261. What he is saying at 261 is that "sensation" has no referent (or, we cannot say what it refers to), and this is very consistent with intentional ambiguity, as I've described.

Moreover, how is it sophistry to say that the One and the Good are identical? — Apollodorus

I might agree that the One is the same as the Good, in the sense of "the first" principle. This provides a clear defining feature of the One, as meaning the first. But Plato has Parmenides attributing all sorts of ridiculous properties to the One in the Parmenides. That's what happens if we just choose a name "the One" without any definition, and allow ourselves absolute freedom in describing it. We end up with a completely contradictory description. However, if we start with a limiting feature, such as "the first", or "the good", then we come up with a completely different description than the one which Plato represents Parmenides as providing.

Certainly, the Stranger’s claims in the Sophist are not refuted. — Apollodorus

Direct logical refutation was not Plato's method. His way was to provide a very clear and accurate description of different perspectives, revealing the flaws, and allowing the reader to determine the parts of the perspective which were inconsistent and problematic, thereby requiring replacement or revision. So it is definitely as you say, that we are not advised by Plato to reject everything a particular individual is saying, absolutely, but we are to analyze critically, and reject the parts which produce unresolvable logical problems, while accepting the parts which are reasonable.

But the fact of the matter is that, though on the whole correct, Plato’s original Theory of Forms (as presented in the Phaedo) that defines particulars as things that participate in the properties of the Forms, is not sufficient to explain the exact nature of particulars. Plato, therefore, introduces new concepts like Limit, Matter, and Receptacle (Philebus, Timaeus). — Apollodorus

Yes, that's what I said earlier in the thread. Plato reveals through the method described above, that the theory of participation, as presented, is deficient, flawed, and needs to be revised or rejected.

There is no denying that Forms do have some common characteristics such as One and Being. So, it is not incorrect to say that the One is the cause of the essence in all Forms and, therefore, above both essence and Forms. — Apollodorus

If One is defined as the first, then it can be the cause of others. But there is a problem here with a difference between logical priority and temporal priority, as the defining feature of "the first". Temporal priority is required for cause, as "cause" is a temporal concept. However, logical priority does not necessitate temporal priority. And the Forms are related through logical priority. So if "the One" is related to other Forms as "first" in the sense of logical priority, we cannot necessarily conclude that it is first in the temporal sense, therefore we cannot conclude necessarily that it is the cause of the others.

This also leads to the question of how the first principle of all can be both One and Many. The problem of One and Many is a key issue discussed in the Philebus. And the whole purpose of it is to explain how the Good, which is one, or undifferentiated unity, can generate multiplicity. — Apollodorus

Here, One is defined as distinct from Many, and that is a completely different definition from "first". To make the two consistent it is necessary to show how One is logically prior to Many. But the demonstration that One is logically prior to Many, does not show that One is temporally prior to Many, It is only through the introduction of "the Good", as a causal principle, in the sense of final cause, that we derive the temporal priority which is required for causation.

Now it is required to show whether the Good is more compatible with One or with Many. And as I explained earlier in the thread, I believe that The Good is better described as a multiplicity than as a single, the good being complicated and complex. Therefore Many appears to be temporally prior to One, when One is defined in relation to Many. So temporally, Many is first rather than One. But when we define Many logically, it must consist of individuals, so One is logically prior to Many. This implies that "Many" is not a good defining term for One, as that which One is distinct from or opposed to. We would be better to define One with unity, and the opposing term would be ununified, as this does not necessarily imply distinct particulars like Many does, making the Many dependent on One. It makes Many dependent on ununified instead, and the ununified are not necessarily distinct individuals, or ones.

This is explained by introducing the Dyad of Limit and Unlimited that is at once “One and Many” and, through its interaction with the One, brings forth multiplicity. Limit being that which imposes form on what is unlimited, is the principle of Form. Unlimited is the principle of Matter. The two are used by Creative Intelligence (which is a manifestation of the One or the Good) to impose Form on Matter and thereby generate the Physical Universe. — Apollodorus

Limit and Unlimited is another proposed way to deal with the difference between logical priority and temporal priority. But the mathematical conception of unlimited is distinct from the philosophical conception, and this method gets lost in sophisticated confusion. That's why Plato moved to "the Good" instead. And Aristotle demonstrated that "infinite" in the mathematical sense has the nature of "potential", while anything eternal must by "actual" which is a distinct category from "potential". This drives a wedge between "infinite" (unlimited), and "eternal" (the principle of temporal priority), making it impossible to speak of "unlimited" or "infinite" in a causal application.

So, it is clear that when Plato takes up a theory that appears to be inconsistent with his own, he does not necessarily do so in order to eliminate one of those two theories. On the contrary, his tendency is to combine them into a new or improved theory that is superior to both and serves to provide additional support to the general Platonic framework. — Apollodorus

Right, this is the matter of critically analyzing the theories, and accepting the good, while rejecting the bad.

The fact is that one is prior to many. When we reduce a multiplicity to the absolute minimum, we reduce it to one, not to “good”. — Apollodorus

This, what you call a "fact" provides a clear demonstration of what I described above, the division between logically prior and temporally prior. One is logically prior to many, as you say, a multiplicity is defined as consisting of ones. One is a defining feature of many, and is therefore logically prior. But this does not give us what is required to make any statements about causation, because of the gap between logically prior and temporally prior. If we want to make statements about causation we need principles of temporal priority rather than logical priority. This is where the principles derived from mathematics, one and many, limited and unlimited, fail us. They do not provide temporal principles.

So, to get a principle of temporal priority Plato turned to "good", as a motivating feature, the cause of activity. here we have the basis for a temporal priority. But now we have a problem of establishing compatibility, or commensurability, between temporal priority and logical priority. If, the real "fact" is, as it appears to me, that good is more compatible with many than with one, we have a reversal between temporal priority and logical priority.

This is why Plotinus says that the One (or the Good) has (or is) a kind of awareness or consciousness. For the same reason, Plato calls it the source and cause of all knowledge: knowledge presupposes awareness or consciousness. This ultimate Awareness or Consciousness that is the source and cause of all knowledge, is the One or the Good. — Apollodorus

Using your own common sense and intuition, don't you find that awareness and consciousness is more compatible with Many than with One? Isn't the world full of distinct instances of awareness and consciousness? Why would we say that the many consciousnesses which make up the reality of human existence is One, when it is very clear that it is Many?

The desire to return to the One is the root of “love”. We love things that make us feel one with them and with ourselves. This is why we call them “beautiful” and “good”. But their beauty and goodness come from the Forms which in turn come from the One. Therefore, our love must be redirected to its true object. Love of the beautiful and the good, when practiced as indicated in the Symposium, takes us to the direct vision or experience of the Good or the One that is the Higher Self of all. — Apollodorus

See, you have this backward. each of us is a one, an individual, a self. The desire is not to return to the One, because we already are, each one of us, the One. The desire is to return to the many. This is the problem with the theory of participation, as exposed by Plato. It is backward. It portrays the Many as actively participating in the One, which is a reversal of the active/passive reality. This is caused by the inversion between logical priority and temporal priority. When we turn this around, to give us the clearer perspective of reality, provided by giving the Good priority, we find that the One participates in the Many. Now the One is causally active within the Many, as participating in the Many, because the One is defined by temporal priority, (Good), rather than logical priority (mathematically One is prior to Many).

To use an example off the top of my head, if I say "I am going to the bank", then there is potential ambiguity in the word "bank" which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment. What the word "bank" does not mean here is "ambiguous" because "I am going to the ambiguous" makes no apparent sense. Although the meaning of the word "bank" may be ambiguous - because it has more than one possible interpretation - it does not seem that the word "bank" could possibly mean "ambiguous" or could be one of the possible interpretations. — Luke

I do not understand why this is so difficult for you Luke. Let me provide a very clear explanation by referring to your example. You say "I am going to the bank". You also say "the word 'bank' which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment". Since you are the one making both these statements we can see the two as inconsistent with each other. If the first statement means that you are going to a financial establishment, then you would not allow that it possibly means the side of a river, and vise versa. You know where you are going, and you know what you mean by the statement, one or the other. If you meant that you are going to a financial establishment then it is not possible that you meant that you are going to the side of a river, However, you do say that this is a possibility. On the basis of this statement, your statement, that "bank" in this expression could mean either the side of a river, or a financial establishment, we can come to the conclusion that "bank" means neither.

Do you understand this so far? By saying that "bank" could mean either one, you are implying that it means neither one. This is because if it meant the former, it could not mean the latter, and if it meant the latter it could not mean the former. And if you were in fact telling me where you are going, you would mean one or the other. So by saying that it could mean either, you are saying that it does not mean the former, and you are saying that it does not mean the latter. Therefore, you are giving "bank" a third and very distinct meaning. You are saying that "bank" in this context does not mean a financial establishment, nor does it mean the side of a river.

To know what "bank" means we have to look and see what purpose the word serves in this context, what you are doing with it. And, here we can see that you are giving an example of ambiguity. You are using the word to create ambiguity for your example. The meaning of the word is ambiguous, and you have inserted into the sentence to create an ambiguous statement. Now, we can see that "I am going to the..." is irrelevant because you are not telling me where you are going at all. Your intention was never to tell me where you are going, it was simply to make an example of ambiguity. All that "bank" is doing for you is allowing you to make a statement of indeterminate meaning.

Further to this, we cannot say that "bank" in this context has no meaning. It definitely has meaning, because it definitely serves a purpose in your example of ambiguity. And since you are not telling us where you are going at all, as you are creating ambiguity with the word instead, we wouldn't say that you have said "I am going to the ambiguity", the word "bank" simply makes the entire statement an expression of ambiguity. And of course it is very reasonable to say that the meaning of "bank" here is ambiguous.

That is what I propose Wittgenstein is doing with "the sensation" at 258. He is making a statement of ambiguity. He is intentionally using it in a way which you might interpret as referring to a type, and someone else might interpret as referring to a particular token. And, since this way of using it is intentional, I can conclude that it refers to neither, as in your example of "bank". This is a third and distinct meaning for "the sensation". Its meaning is ambiguous.

Furthermore, when Wittgenstein says "S is the name of...", he is not at all saying what S is the name of (as indicated by 261), just like when you say "I am going to the..." you are not at all saying where you are going. "S is the name of..." is completely irrelevant in Wittgenstein's example, just like "I am going to the..." is completely irrelevant in your example. In each case, the word "sensation" and the word "bank" are simply being used to create an expression of ambiguity. Wittgenstein is not telling us what S names, he is simply creating ambiguity with "the sensation", just like you are not telling us where you are going, you are simply creating ambiguity with "the bank".

Since any word could be used in an ambiguous way, then all words mean "ambiguous". Right? You're an idiot. — Luke

The meaning of a word is only ambiguous when it is used in an ambiguous way. I agree that any word can be used in an ambiguous way, and therefore have "ambiguous" as its meaning. But do you not understand that the meaning of a word is dependent on how it is used? Often words are not used ambiguously, so in those situations we cannot say that their meaning is ambiguous. You seem to be especially thick on the subject of ambiguity.

Wittgenstein's private language is private in principle: "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." (PI 243) That is, it's not possible for others to ever come to understand a private language, or for a private language to ever be translated into a public language (or vice versa). — Luke

As I explained, the example of 258 is not supposed to be an example of a private language as described at 243. So this is not relevant to our discussion.

The third is not a possible meaning of "sensation". Additionally, you later said: — Luke

A word's meaning is a function of the way the word is used. If it is used in a way so as to be ambiguous, then its meaning is ambiguous. Therefore the third option, "ambiguous", is a possible meaning.

See PI 243:

But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? — But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.
— PI 243 — Luke

Obviously, the example at 258 is not such a private language, because the terms are given to us in a way which we can potentially understand. I explained this to you already, 258 provides an example of naming a sensation, it does not provide an example of a private language, as described at 243. The fact that you do not understand the example at 258 does not mean that "another person cannot understand" it.

If a person speaks a public language, why would their private language be unintelligible to them? Why does the private sign "always need to exist within" the context of a public language? — Luke

I didn't say "speaks" a public language, I said "understands through the means of" a public language. That's the example of 258, we as observers understand the use of "S", through public language, "S" is the sign of "a sensation". Further, it is written by Wittgenstein, so that the diarist is also recognizing what is signified by S as "the sensation". Therefore the meaning of "S" is within the context of a public language, as "sensation" is part of a public language. However, that whatever "S" refers to is actually what ought to be called "a sensation" is what needs to be justified.

In theory, a private sign does not necessarily exist within the context of a public language. That's why a private language is not impossible in theory. But since we as human beings learn language at a very young age, and language rapidly becomes a fundamental feature of how we understand things, it is impossible for a person to create a private language, because any attempt would be within the structured understanding provided by public language use, within one's own mind. Therefore it would not be a private language as described at 243.

How would that work? Or are you unable to tell me? If you can't justify the possibility of a private language, or provide anything more than a mere assertion that it is possible, then why should I believe you? — Luke

I could tell you how it would work, just like Wittgenstein does at 243. The person would have unique signs and symbols referring to one's own experiences. That might happen if a person grew up in complete isolation from other human beings or something like that. If the person meets up later with other people speaking public language, the person's private language would need to be altered to become consistent with the others', to understand them, and would no longer be a "private language", even though it was a "private language" prior to this alteration.

That's similar to if an individual person travels to an isolated part of the world. The natives there speak a public language, and the stranger arrives with what is in relation to their language, a private language. The private language, as the context for understanding, must be altered to become consistent with the native language, in order for the person to learn the language. This alteration to the private language renders it as something other than a "private language", it's been affected by the public. But the fact that the new language, produced by the alteration is not a private language, does not mean that it wasn't a private language prior to alteration.

You say there is no reason that there cannot be a private sign or private language, but there also seems to be no reason that there can be a private sign or private language. — Luke

Clearly, there is no obvious reason for a "private language" as described at 243. We learn in the context of public language. Wittgenstein is producing these thought experiments as an aid toward understanding the nature of language. As for a private sign, one could think of many reasons for that. It could be used as a memory aid. You write something down, so that you do not forget it, and if it's a secret, you don't want anyone else to be able to understand it. And of course private meaning plays a big role in deception. Therefore we cannot exclude the "private" aspects of language as being irrelevant to language use. Hence Wittgenstein's discussion.

What examples? Where? Quote them. — Luke

So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

He refers to "S" here twice, which undermines your assertion that he is not talking about "S" here. — Luke

He calls "S" a sign, and "sensation" a word. Then he says the use of this word stands in need of justification. You really can't read.

The point is that the use of the word "sensation" stands in need of a justification which everybody understands because it is a word of our common language. If the word "sensation" has a public use then how can we be talking about a private language? "S" is meant to be a private word with a private meaning, but this cannot be if it refers to a sensation, where the word "sensation" has a public meaning. For the same reason, "S" cannot refer to "Something" which is also a word of our public language. In the end, the private language advocate has no recourse but to emit an inarticulate sound in defence of their claims. But that won't do either. — Luke

This makes no sense at all.

"S", the private sign, is supposed to represent something which has been called "a sensation", public word. That "sensation" is the appropriate word to call whatever it is which the sign "S" represents is what needs to be justified

It is not the case that "S" cannot refer to a sensation, because S is part of a private language. What is the case is that if "S" is to be said to refer to "a sensation", this must be justified. There is nothing mentioned about "private meaning", or "private word".

But if we assume that "S' starts out as a private sign, then to be understood, even by the private person using the sign, it must be placed into the context of a language (justified). So a private language will always be unintelligible from the perspective of a person who understands through the means of a public language, because the private sign will always need to exist within that context, making it a part of a language which is not private.

However, there is no reason why there cannot be a private sign, and other private signs, and even a private language, which has no part of any public language.