Even if "the things sensed are in the past by the time they are sensed", that needn't contradict the statement that "we are sensing at the present". The present could just as easily be defined as the time at which we are sensing, instead of "the time of things" - whatever that is. — Luke

I did not deny that we are sensing at the present, I deny that we experience the present, as Javra said. What I was trying to argue is "that we sense at the present" is a logical conclusion, not directly derived from experience. Your post simply demonstrates a logical necessity to assume 'the present", as I've argued. We conclude, from logic, that we must be experiencing at the present, but we do not actually experience the present.

That is, when is the present moment if "the things sensed are in the past by the time they are sensed"? If the present moment is not 'the time at which things are sensed', then the present moment must presumably be time shifted by adding or subtracting some arbitrary amount of time to or from 'the time at which things are sensed', in order to account for light bouncing off an object, brain function, or something else. In other words, you are still using 'the time at which things are sensed' as your benchmark of the present moment, except that you account for some arbitrary "gap" or "medium" between an event and our sensing it. I can tell you what I am sensing at any given time, but what is the definition of this arbitrary gap or "medium" between some event and my sensing it? What, according to you, is the amount of time between the present moment and the moment things are sensed? — Luke

As I explained, we derive directly from experience, memories, (that something just happened, or happened a long time ago), and also anticipations (concerning things which will happen). This provides what you call the "benchmark of the present moment". We do not derive directly from experience, the idea that things are happening (and we are experiencing things happening) at the present.

The reason why I say this is that "time" is conceptual. So to have a concept of "the present" which is grounded in, or substantiated by a concept of "time" (i.e. to have a temporal notion of "present"), requires that there is coherency between the two "time" and "present". To produce a concept of time requires reference to past and future, as I described. And when the concept of "time" is constructed in this way, the idea that things are happening at the present moment becomes incoherent. because no time passes at the present moment, and activity requires the passage of time.

As an alternative, you might suggest that we start with the simple notion that we are experiencing things occurring at "the present". From here, we cannot derive a concept of time though, without referencing past or future, .so this concept of "the present" is not temporal.

This is the problem with Javra's proposition. If we start with the assumption that we are experiencing "the present", then there is no means by which 'the present" says anything temporal, it's just, 'being-here', 'being-there', or something like that, in an eternal (as in outside of time) way. And there is no problem with saying that we experience the present, so long as we do not conflate this idea of "present" with the temporal idea of "the present", which gives the present a relation to past and future. to give 'being present' a temporal meaning requires reference to before and after. So Javra's proposition gives us no approach to "goals".

It's merely two different ways of describing "experience". Javra describes experience as being present, and I describe experience as consisting of memories and anticipations. What I am arguing is that Javra's description, of being-here, or being-there, excludes temporality from experience, whereas my description makes temporality an essential part of experience. And unless we start with a description like mine, we have no basis for a "goal" based ontology which is also supported by experience. We could still make a goal based ontology but it would be supported by assumptions produced in some way other than experience. In other words, Javra has no way to get from the description of experience as "being present", to the premise that having a goal is experiential, without switching to a description of experience which includes the anticipation of the future as an essential part of the experience.

Hm. We here hold different perspectives. I find that the separation of all experiences strictly into past and future is the product of a logical, rather than experiential, conclusion. I again find that the present is extended experientially, as in the experienced sound of a musical note. An interesting topic for debate, though I'm not sure it is pertinent to the issue of where goals are temporally located. — javra

Well, what does "experience" mean to you? Let's say, it's real observation, or something like that. Isn't all observation, and all experience, past? You assume that it occurs at the present, but the present is not an experiential aspect of time at all. Imagine that you sit and do nothing, meditate, or just enjoy the experience of being present, or something like that. This in itself, is not a temporal experience, and does not give rise to any notion of "present" in time. It is only when you take notice of things having just happened, or anticipate things in the future, that temporality becomes part of the experience. Temporality only becomes a feature from these determinations of past and future. Then, it is from these constructed notions of past and future, that we produce a concept of time, and proceed to the logical conclusion that we are experiencing something called "the present". But without the construction of these temporal notions of past and future, we would not see ourselves as being at the present. We might say that a creature without temporal conceptions would still enjoy the experience of being present, but I do not think this being would be cognizant of being "present" in the sense of present in time.

That is why I argue that our base "experience" gives us the past as memories, and the future as anticipations, but it does not give us the present. All of our feelings concern the past and future, and although we say "we are sensing at the present", we are really sensing things which are separated from the mind by a medium, and because of this separation, the things sensed are in the past by the time they are sensed. We sense the past, not the present. That we are experiencing "the present" is a sort of self deception which we impose in our attempt to come to grips with the overwhelming difference between past and future.

This to me points to goals having an important relation to the yet to be actualized - hence potential - future. I'm trying to see where our disagreements dwell and how we might, maybe, remedy them. If a goal is not, in and of itself, a potential future (of which we are aware and yearn to actualize), then, given the aforementioned agreement, how would you say a goal differs from a memory or a perception? This with agreement that all three (memories, percepts, and goals) in at least some sense also always occur in the present. — javra

See, I look at this as if you are starting from a faulty premise, that premise of self-deception in which "all three (memories, percepts, and goals) in at least some sense also always occur in the present". Memories tell us of a past, and anticipations tell us of a future. The substantial difference between these two inspire us to assume "the present", to separate them. But "the present" only serves as a non-dimensional boundary, a division between past and future. As a divisor between the two parts of time, past and future, the present cannot partake in time at all. Then there is no time passing at the present, because all time is on one side or the other of the divisor, so we cannot say that these things occur "in the present".

This is a dilemma, and it leads to the notion which Joshs was talking about, the "thick" present. I like to think of two dimensional time, and call it the breadth of time. Now we do not have a single dimensional timeline with an arrow, but a wide line, and within that line, we do not really understand the directionality..

So to answer your question, how does a goal differ from a memory, it differs by the same principle that the past differs from the future. And, as I say, I believe this is a substantial difference, because we know from our experience that we cannot go back in time. Things which have happened cannot be changed, they are necessary, but things of the future have no real existence, being contingent. The difficult question is, how do things change from being contingent to being necessary, at what we call "the present" It is impossible that things can change in an instant of a dividing line, so the present must consist of some parts of past, and some of future.

For there to be an endpoint, there has to be goal, but not only in the sense of determinism. The goal also determines what counts as an endpoint, either by supplying any given state with flags such as "success", or "give up", "hey, that's even better", or whatever. — Dawnstorm

This is an important point. When one attempt fails, we often try another, so in these situations there is no real "endpoint", until success is achieved. This is actually a fairly common aspect of life, trial and error. Also we see a similar situation when one practices to better oneself, a musical instrument, a game, an athlete, etc... The goal is simply to get better, and this is like an "ideal", as there is no real endpoint because we never reach perfection.

What you call "forward' causation is really, backward, and this is because determinations of forward and backward are perspective dependent, they are determined according to which way one is looking. If we place cause and effect in a temporal relation to each other, the cause is always further away from the observing perspective, than the effect is.

So if we orient ourselves in time, such that we are looking backward, into the past, the cause is further back in the past than the effect is. You call this "forward-determining causation", but it is dependent on a backward looking perspective. If, on the other hand, we turn ourselves around, such that we are facing the future, then the goals which are furthest in the future are the more final ends, and we prioritize the nearer goals as means toward those more final goals. In reality therefore, a true forward looking perspective will see things furthest in the future as being most significant causally, and things furthest in the past as least significant causally.

Now it is only from that backward looking perspective that "forward-determining causation" appears to be responsible for shaping the world. This is the perspective of those cave dwellers in Plato's cave allegory. They are looking at the past, as if it is the true reality, when the remembered past is really just a shadow of the activity which is occurring at the present. The memories are a representation, a reflection. Until they apprehend this fact, and turn around to look directly at the other side of this activity at the present, the future side, to see the good (what is intended, the goal), as the cause of whatever activity occurs at the present, they will not recognize that all the occurrences of the past are just reflections, shadows or representations, of that cause of the activity at the present, final cause, intent, free will, and so they are merely the effects of final cause, or intention.

I see where you're going with this. Still, connotations stand in the way for me. For instance, given the possibility of hallucinations, one could say that all our present perceptions constitute our "imaginary present", since our perceptions are only in the mind, and since there is a slim possibility that they could be wrong. In short, describing all our awareness of past, present, and future as imaginary on account of it taking place in the mind fails to distinguish between imagined truths and factual truths - for me at least. — javra

Yes, this is the point, all such temporal distinctions are imaginary, even our designation that now is the present. Notice that even by the time you say "now", it's in the past, so the present is just as illusory as the past and future. What I think is that we recognize a real difference between past and future, and this leads us to believe that there must be a division between them, hence "the present" is afforded reality. However, from this perspective we only come to believe in "the present" as a logical conclusion. The present is not experiential, we experience the past, and anticipate the future, and since we understand a substantial difference between these two, we come to the logical conclusion that there must be a present which separates them.

I really don't know what you mean when you suggest a difference between imagined truths and factual truths. I think that "truth" is always a judgement, so it is always a product minds, and in that sense, always imagined. We might assume a "factual truth" as independent from human minds, but that would imply a judgement of God, or something like that, as truth is a judgement.

In assuming as much of an ontological ignorance as possible, can we experientially agree that our goals reference a future that has not yet been actualized but which we want to see objectified, i.e. to see actualized? Furthermore, that it is this referenced unactualized future of which we are aware that then determines our present choices (regarding how to best actualize this as of yet unactualized future)? — javra

Yes, I'm in agreement with this.

There's something subtly difficult about goal-driven determinacy (whose occurrence I find is incontestable) and, as mentioned in a previous post, it as determinacy is a different category from that of causality as understood in modernity. — javra

By "determinacy" here, do you mean that we, in a sense, determine the future, through our goal-driven acts? This is obviously different from "determinacy" in the sense of determinism.

How is "the intended fulfillment of the goal" - which, as you say, is understood as in the future - not a redundant way of saying "the goal"? (e.g., Wiktionary defines "goal" as "a result one is attempting to achieve". To which I add that this result is not yet achieved, hence not of itself in the present.) — javra

Perhaps I didn't phrase that well. There is a difference between the goal, and the fulfillment of the goal. The former is what exists in one's mind, at the present, as a determinate thing, the latter is indeterminate. Because it is indeterminate, I could not refer to it as a thing, "the fulfillment of the goal", so I referred to the "intended fulfillment of the goal". I think we must distinguish between "the goal", as a determinate thing intended, and the "intended fulfillment of the goal", to maintain the possibility that the goal might not be fulfilled.

Also, as I mentioned in a previous post, memories, perceptions, and goals all occur, ontologically speaking, in the mind and in the present. Everything that we are consciously aware of does. Yet our memories are our epistemological past, our perceptions are our epistemological present, and our goals are part of our less than certain epistemological future. To say that a goal takes place in the present holds the same weight as saying that a memory takes place in the present. Yet the memory is our awareness of the past (of past present moments we have already lived through) just as a goal forms part of our awareness of the future (of future present moments we have yet to live through). — javra

I agree with this, but I would not say that our memories are necessarily our epistemological past, nor that our goals and anticipations are necessarily our epistemological future. I wouldn't even say that our perceptions are necessarily our epistemological present. This is because I think we use other conceptions to form our temporal conceptions, which serve as the base for our epistemological "time", therefore, past, present, and future. This is why we can have an epistemological "time" like eternalism, which removes past present and future from the experiential definitions which you give them.

I believe it is important to ground epistemology in solid ontology, so I think that going in the way which you do, referring to the ontology of time, for your epistemological definitions of past, present, and future, is the correct way. But I do not think that this is necessarily the way that epistemological definitions of past present and future, are formulated.

What I'm maintaining is that the future is not fully fixed ontologically. A goal is as much of the future as a memory is of the past. — javra

This is why I insisted on the distinction between the goal, and the (intended) fulfilment of the goal. A goal is "of the future", just like a memory is "of the past". But this is an imaginary past and future, existing in the mind, at the present. We ought to stress this point, that a memory, though we say it is "of the past", is a creation of the mind, it is the mind's attempt to recreate the past, so it is a product of the imagination, at the present. Therefore it is not a true product of the past, It may be influenced by the mind's anticipations of the future for example. This is why the memory can often be wrong, it is not truly "of the past", it is an imaginary recreation of the past.

Because of this situation with the memory, the past is not fully fixed epistemically., just like the future is not fully fixed ontologically. This results in two very distinct senses of "possibility", the epistemic, or logical possibility as to what may have occurred in the past, and the ontological possibility as to what may occur in the future.

Yet the "result each is attempting to achieve" resides in the potential future and not in the present. — javra

You use "potential future", here, in a similar way to my "imaginary future". I think it's better that we use something like "imaginary", to maintain that this future is only in the mind, and the future within the prey's mind is different from the future in the predator's mind. We can compare this to two people who have different memories of the same past situation. They have competing "pasts". And we might say that these are two "potential pasts", referring to epistemic potential. But when we're talking about "potential futures", it's a different type of "potential", because there is no real future, as there is a real past, so this is an ontological potential.

As an aside, do we agree that a goal partly determines one's present choices of how to best achieve given goal? — javra

Yes, I mostly agree with what you have written. It's just that the terminology is difficult with this subject, so I'm trying to clarify some things to make sure that we actually do agree.

That said, because a goal is always a potential future which one strives to make objectively real (here placing goals found in fantasies and dreams aside), a goal as telos is always found in the future. It doesn’t matter if it occurs prior to the intending or is contemporaneous to the intending; in both aforementioned cases, the goal always holds place in the potential future (and, contingently, in the actual future as an endstate if one’s intending is fortuitous). — javra

I don't think you can truthfully say that the goal is in the future. The goal always exists in the mind, at the present, and it is the intended fulfilment of the goal which is understood as in the future. The goal itself is in the present. That there is a difference between the goal itself (in the present), and the apprehended potential fulfillment of the goal (in the future), is evident from what you say about telos-accordant, and telos-discordant endstates. If the goal itself were in the future, then fulfilment of the goal would be necessitated, and telos-discordant endstates impossible.

So the following assumption cannot be held either:

And, since in telos-driven activities the telos always occurs in the potential future relative to that which it determines, then telos-determinacy can be further specified as backward determinacy. — javra

We cannot make backward determinacy out of telos-driven activities, because the goal is always existent at the present, with only a view (imagination) toward the future. It is not a real future, that the goal pertains to, but an imaginary one. That is why the telos discordant end state is possible. Therefore the activity which is supposed to be the means to the end might occur without the desired end state occurring, so we cannot say that it was the end state (in the future) which caused the activity. It was the goal, in the mind, at that time, with the imaginary future, which caused the activity which followed.

SO this potentially comes back to asking if logic is normative. I'm thinking that it isn't. That is, it sets out what we can think, but does not set out what we ought think. — Banno

I think the evidence shows that you have this backward. Often people think illogically. So thinking is definitely not contained by logic. We can, and do think in ways far outside of logic (yours truly being your living example). So if logic gives any directional influence to thinking, it must be normative.

You don't seem to have any idea what the concept of free will encompasses. Ever look it up? Or do you just dismiss it as "a cultural meme" every time you see or hear the words, and your eyes glaze over?

Or maybe freewill is just a cultural meme - a faulty characterisation of a human social construct as something metaphysically fundamental?

(Spoiler: That is indeed all it is.) — apokrisis

I see that you continue in your contradictory ways. Free will is a necessary requirement for the existence of any "human social construct".

This denial, that ideas, goals, and intentions, are the real causes of artificial structures, is the reason why you'll never be able to understand that part of reality. Until you face the reality that immaterial ideas are real active causes in the world, causing the existence of artificial material things, you'll be forever lost in your bungled metaphysics which attempts to explain final cause using the contradictory notion of retrocausation.

if the theories are faulty then you wouldn’t be receiving these distant disturbing ideas over the technological marvel of the internet. — apokrisis

That a theory can provide us with a particular convenience, does not demonstrate that the theory is not faulty, unless the judgement of faulty/non-faulty is based solely on the desire for that end. Really, it just demonstrates that the theory suffices as the means to that end. But that is not the end we are concerned with here, we are concerned with characterizing the nature of reality

There is a fundamental incompatibility between the concept stated as "Newton's first law of motion", and the concept stated as "free will". A very similar incompatibility was questioned extensively by St. Augustine, as the question of how it could both be true, that human beings have free will, and God is omniscient. If God can know everything, then everything must be predetermined, and there is no room for free will.

The free will creates motions without the application of force, as it is a first cause, producing an efficient cause with no efficient cause prior to it. Only a final cause is prior in time to this first efficient cause.. This incompatibility between free will, and Newton's first law, has no affect on the marvel of the internet, but it means that physics, in it's acceptance of this law, is incapable of understanding that part of reality which provides us with free will.

But what is for certain is that the existence of the Universe has zero to do with human consciousness, or any kind of idealist schtick. — apokrisis

Your denial of idealist principles leaves you incapable of understanding how ideas are causally active in the world. That ideas are causally active is empirically verified by each and every artificial object observed. Instead of recognizing this fundamental fact, and the corresponding idealist principle, that the idea is prior in time to its corresponding material object (which by Plato's cave allegory is a reflection or representation of the idea), you resort to an illogical, incoherent , proposition of "retrocausality". You refuse to be lead out of your cave, in your rejection of the "idealist schtick".

I think that's consistent with what I said. It's a teleological process, i.e. working towards an end or outcome. In this case, a plausible step towards the 'end or outcome' is just the emergence of rational sentient beings such as h. sapiens. This also ties in with the cosmic anthropic principle. — Wayfarer

The important point, is that the concept of "final cause" is not consistent with the concept of "retrocausality". In final causation the cause is the end, as an idea, or goal existing in the mind as intention, and this goal precedes in time, the action brought about as the means toward the end. The idea, as the goal, or end, is the cause of the action, and the action follows the end, in time, it does not precede it.

The way that modern physicalism turns this around, is to deny the causal reality of the idea, or goal (as apokrisis demonstrates), assigning "the end" to the material object brought about by the action, that action being the means. Then "the end", (incorrectly understood as the material object produced by the means), which is posterior in time to the action which produced it, is assigned the title "final cause", and "final cause" is said to be a cause which is after its affect. As you can see, this is just a misunderstanding of "final cause".

There is no such thing as "retrocausality", this is basic logical incoherency, inconsistency, therefore logically impossible. "Cause" is a temporal concept. In all of its senses the "cause" is always prior in time to its effect this is essential to the concept of cause. To posit a "cause" which is posterior in time to its effect, is to negate the definition of "cause", in the way of contradiction. To proceed with such an incoherent principle would render spatial-temporal existence as unintelligible.

Now you can choose other interpretations - like Many Worlds. But they ought to be even more offensive. — apokrisis

There are other options, such as physicists apply faulty theories. and faulty mathematical axioms. But to many, these options are even more offensive.

What about the final cause? The final cause of a match is fire, in that matches only exist for the purpose of starting a fire. The match exists before the fire, but the fire is the final cause of the match, being the reason for its existence. — Wayfarer

I take this sort of explanation as a slight misunderstanding of "final cause", common to our modern, materialist society. The final cause of the match is actually the intent to produce fire, and the intent is prior in time to the manufacture of the matches. So we say that fire is the final cause, but it is really the idea of fire, within the mind as the motivating factor, being "the end", or "that for the sake of which", that is the actual cause of the manufacture and existence of the match.

In Aristotle's "Physics" you'll find the example of health being the cause of a man walking about.

'(Why is he walking about?' we say, 'To be healthy', and having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through the action of something else as means toward the end, e.g. reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, surgical instruments, are means toward health. All these things are 'for the sake of'' the end, though they differ from one another in that some are activities others instruments. — Aristotle, Physics 194b

As "the end" the final cause is a goal, or objective. That's what "the end" means in Aristotle, so it is in the mind, as an idea. As such, "the end" acts as a cause of intentional human action. So it is not the material existence of the thing itself, the fire in your example, which is the cause, but fire as "the end", the goal, or intention, an idea which acts as a cause in bringing about the activity which is understood as the means to the end. The end is the cause of the activity, or instrument, which is the means, but the end is the idea, the goal, as intention, which exists within the mind. The end is not the material thing brought about by the means, because the means are the efficient causes of that material thing. So the end (mental intention) is the (final) cause of the means, and the means are the (efficient) cause of the physical object produced. This is an important part of understanding final cause, which is derived from reading Aristotle's "Nichomachean Ethics".

OK, by "retrocausally", I assume you mean an effect which is prior in time to its cause. That's what I mean I say such a concept is illogical, incoherent due to contradiction. Causation is a temporal concept. To reverse the temporal order of cause and effect is simple contradiction, unless you are no longer talking about causation. But then what are you talking about?

It must be a matter of self-organised Becoming rather than merely brute Being. — apokrisis

The problem with this concept of "self-organised Becoming", is that within an organized being the parts all have a specific function in relation to the whole being. This implies logically that the being as a whole, is the organizing agent. Since this organizing agent, the whole, the being, cannot exist prior in time to itself (that would be contradictory), it cannot be assigned the role of the cause of itself, nor can it be responsible for the "Becoming" of itself.

Therefore, when we look to understand the becoming of an organized being, we need to look beyond the Being itself, to understand the cause of it. The proposed concept "self-organised Becoming" is illogical because the becoming of the being is necessarily prior in time to the being, and "self" is a property of the being. So in that time of "becoming", there is no such thing as the self, to be doing the organizing. And "self-organised Becoming" is incoherent.

Because of this problem we must dismiss "self-organised Becoming" as illogical, and investigate elsewhere for the organizing agent. There are two basic possibilities which are not completely incompatible, immanence and transcendence. The former would hold that there is inherent within each part, the intent which is necessary to create the organized whole, and the latter would hold that the intent which creates the whole is external to the parts. They are not incompatible because the intent may come from an external (transcendent) source, and be placed within the parts (therefore also immanent), if the parts are themselves created intentionally.

My reading of the correspondence theory of truth requires two essential components:

1. An actual reality. Call this R
2. A proposition about that actual reality. Call this P

When P matches R, there's a correspondence and then we can claim P is true. — TheMadFool

That two things correspond is a judgement. Correspondence is never anything more than a judgement. So there's really no such thing as "when P matches R", just the judgement, and the claim.

Consider mathematics, like any form of language, to be a tool. As such, the part of reality which it must correspond with is the part which consists of means and ends, intentions,, and fulfilling them, described by final cause, purpose, and function.

As rightly points out, "reality" is not something which we have a firm grasp of (though many like to deny this fact), so a judgement of correspondence is never a simple issue. This part of reality, which consists of final causes, means and ends, intentions, purposes, functions, etc., we barely even recognize as being a part of reality.

Do you deny that some animals see different colours? What explanation could there be for seeing different colours other than that there are different colours? I would see different colours regardless of what I called them; or are you denying that? So what does it matter if you call two colours red and I call one red and one orange? — Janus

You seem to be missing the point altogether. A person might see two completely different shades of red, hence different colours, yet call them both "red". Likewise with orange. And, the same thing which I might say on one day is "red", I might say if instead I encountered it on another day, under different conditions, is "orange".

The issue is not a matter of seeing differences of colour, it's a matter of seeing instances of different colours, and calling the different colours by the same name, "red". In this case we are saying that two different colours, which we clearly perceive as different, are the same colour, red.

This is why I say there must be theory involved. It is not a matter of always seeing the very same colour, and calling it by the very same name, "red". It is a matter of seeing a very wide range of different colours, and calling them all the same, "red". The capacity to categorize a particular instance of colour, under the classification of "red", cannot be a matter of habit, because one can see a completely new shade of red, never before encountered by that person, and have no problem categorizing it as red. How could one be employing habit in the completely new activity consisting of categorizing a colour never before encountered?

I am at a loss to know what it is that is confusing you about this, so I am afraid I can't be of further help. — Janus

It's not that I'm confused, not at all. I just find it a very poor explanation, and therefore unacceptable. If you said "that thing is red, and this thing is orange", and I asked you why you say so, and you said because I associate the term "red" with the colour of that thing, and the term "orange" with the colour of this thing, I'd say that's a very poor explanation. In fact, I'd reject it as most likely false. It's the answer of a lazy person who does not want to take the time and introspection required to determine the real reason why the one was designated as red and the other as orange.

The thing about habits is that they must get formed, created. They cannot be taken as granted. So when asked, why do you do things in that particular way instead of another way, the explanation is not "because it's my habit". The true explanation is the process which formed the habit. And, it is the person who is avoiding the question due to intellectual laziness, or some other infliction, who simply says "because it's my habit".

You're not paying attention. I already said I am not making any claim beyond what is the case in the context of seeing colours. IF we see different colours we see colours as different from one another, from which it logically follows that there are differences between colours, as seen. — Janus

Then you've changed the subject. We were discussing how one would distinguish red from orange, not simply how one would see that one thing's colour is different from another thing's colour. The former, distinguishing red from orange, is what I argued requires theory.

If we see them as different then from the point of view of seeing there just is a difference, otherwise how could it be that we see them as different? — Janus

We can't take that for granted, that's the point of skepticism. Things are not necessarily as you perceive them. So the conclusion "they are different" is not validly derived from "I see them as different".

The theory would be that humans cab see different colours on account of differing wavelengths of light (and also possess the requisite visual capabilities, obviously). But I don't need that theory in order to see different colours, obviously; I don't need any theory at all to do that. Animals can do it too, to varying degrees and in different ways. — Janus

We were not talking about simply seeing them as different. We were talking about labeling them as "orange" and "red", and this is what I said requires theory.. You seem to be either attempting to deny that there is a difference between seeing things as different, and being able to identify the specifics of that difference, or else you are just not grasping that there is such a difference. So whenever I say something about the latter, identifying the specifics concerning the difference between what is called "orange" and what is called "red", you attempt to reduce this to a general capacity of seeing that there is a difference. But seeing that there is a difference could apply to any different colours, and what we are talking about is specifically the difference between orange and red, not the general capacity of seeing that two things have different colours.

The difference between two colours is on account of the fact that we can distinguish between them. — Janus

This is the faulty principle which falls to skepticism. You claimed, :I'm only talking about what we see not some purported reality beyond that", yet you claim that there is a real difference on account of the fact that you see a difference. Until we thoroughly understand the means by which colours are sensed, and discount as impossible that one could be deceived in sensation, this conclusion is not valid.

I'm only talking about what we see not some purported reality beyond that. — Janus

But we don't see with our eyes, the difference between red and orange, that's the point. We see red things and we see orange things, and since we perceive them as not having the same colour, i.e. we see them as different, we infer that there is a difference between them. That you see them as different does not imply that you see the difference between them. Do you grasp the difference between these two, seeing two things as different, and apprehending the difference between them? The latter is a matter of understanding theory.

I used the word continuum to refer to the fact that there are many many gradations between red and orange, not a clear boundary, I haven't said the gradations are infinite. — Janus

That's just your theory, and as I explained, it's not a very plausible one. In the classic spectrum, orange is beside red. There are different shades of red, and different shades of orange, and people may disagree as to whether certain shades are properly called "orange", or "red", but there are no other colours between red and orange. If your theory explains the difference between two colours as a matter of there being a third colour between the two, you will have an infinite regress of colours, and the necessary conclusion of an infinity of colours between any two different colours. Between colour A and colour B is another colour, C. But between A and C there must be another colour D, Then between A and D there is another colour, ad infinitum. And the same between C and B, and all of the other colours required as the difference between two colours. It's a completely unrealistic theory as to what constitutes the difference between two colours.

If there are different colours then there is a difference between the colours. — Janus

Right, but that's a logical inference, that there is a difference between them. It's not something sensed. If we simply sense that one colour is different from another colour, there is no necessity to proceed logically to the conclusion that there is a difference between them. But when we label them as "red" and "orange", there is a desire to use the words correctly and the need to determine the difference between them arises from this desire. It is from this desire, that the inference "there is a difference between them" is derived.

Notice that the logical conclusion requires the unstated premise, of a correspondence between what you sense, a difference of colour, and the reality that there actually is such a a difference. This constitutes the assumed truth of "there are different colours". The assumed truth of the proposition, "there are different colours", relies on an assumed correspondence between sense and reality, so the conclusion ":there is a difference between the colours", is dependent on that assumed correspondence. The skeptic doubts this correspondence, and is not lead to that conclusion. The determination, and designation of "different colours" might be completely arbitrary. Therefore a justifiable theory is required to account for "the difference between the colours", in order to prove the truth of "there are different colours".

Of course red and orange are not each one determinate colour; there is a continuum shading between them; a range that goes from almost mauve or purple to almost yellow. There is nothing controversial or puzzling about any of this. — Janus

This is just theory though, which you appear to be presenting to justify your claim "there are different colours". I will warn you that this principle, a "continuum" fails in any attempt at such a justification. It implies that there is an infinite number of differences between any two colours. To justify real "different colours" requires discrete differences without the necessity of assuming another colour which lies in between, as this results in infinite regress of different colours between any two colours. The infinite regress negates the original purpose and requirement of correspondence with reality. Aristotle demonstrated this problem in his bid to combat sophism.

No I don't agree it is a theory; it is a name for a perceptible difference, a distinction. — Janus

There's no name for the perceptible difference. One thing is an orange colour, and another thing is a red colour. What would be the name of the difference between them? There is no name for the difference between them, only an explanation for the observed phenomena, one has yellow in it, the other does not. Seems to me like such differences, or distinctions, are not named, they are described by exactly what you say theories are, "plausible explanations for observed phenomena".

If you think it is a theory then explain just what the theory is and what its predictions could be. — Janus

How could I know that theory? It's your theory which is being applied, and you refuse to tell it to me. You even refuse to acknowledge its existence. Isn't "associations" of ideas exactly what theory is? How can you say you are making associations, but the associations are not theoretical?

This reminds me of Plato's portrayal of Socrates. Socrates would ask all sorts of people (artists and craftspeople) who obviously had some sort of practical knowledge because they knew how to do things, to explain the knowledge which enabled them to do what they did. And they couldn't, just like you can't explain the knowledge which enables you to judge something as orange. You seem to think that it's just something that your senses do, you "feel" the difference between orange and red.

Consider this imaginary scenario. A very young child is learning colours. The person sees that if there is a hint of yellow in the red, it ought to be judged as orange. So the person applies this theory (you agree that this is theory?) and states "orange" accordingly, and this is accepted by others. After some time, the person no longer needs to apply the theory, as the judgement is habitualized, it becomes 'automatic'. The person then completely forgets all about that learning process, and having to apply that theory to make the decision, because this process is no longer present to the person's conscious mind. What happens to this theory? Is it not still playing an important role in the person's judgement of colour?

When I look at something and it feels or seems or looks orange to me I say it is orange. There is no right or wrong in this as there is no definite boundary between orange and red. — Janus

The issue is not whether there is a right or wrong to this judgement, but whether there is theory employed in this judgement. When you say "it feels or seems or looks orange to me", how do you think you can make that judgement without applying theory? Obviously your eyes are not making the judgement that "orange" is the word to use, so it's not the sense organ which judges that the thing is orange. Do we agree that it is the mind which makes this judgement? If so, then how do you think that your mind can judge the colour as orange rather than red or some other name for a colour, or even some other random word, without the use of theory? What type of principles do you think your mind might rely on in making such a judgement if they aren't theoretical principles?


A "shared body of experience"? What do you mean by this?

Regarding the status of the color red, the old Philosopher seems to be favoring Janus during this discussion of Protagoras' view: — Valentinus

The point I was making is that I think it is impossible to make any sort of measurement at all, even the most basic sense judgement, what Aristotle refers to as a "measure", in your quoted passage, without applying theory. As he says in that passage, to judge a flavour is to "measure", and what I say is that to measure requires theory.

It's not theoretical (for me at least). I would say it's red rather rather than orange if it seems to be red rather than orange. It's just a seeming or a feeling. as associated with my felt sense of my overall experience of colour, not theoretical at all. — Janus

You "feel" the difference between the meaning of two words, rather than thinking it? That's a new one on me. You call it "orange" because when you see it you get the feeling of orange from it?

I can't say that I know what orange feels like, but I think I can judge whether or not something is orange. When I make this judgement I do not refer to my feelings, I refer to my memories, so clearly my judgement is not derived from my feelings, it's derived from my mind.

That said, agree that Aquinas speculations on the nature of light don't deserve to be considered scientific, although, on the other hand, light does seem to occupy a special place in the grand scheme. — Wayfarer

To be fair, modern day speculations on the nature of light do not deserve to be called "scientific" either. Even the conventional description, "wave/particle duality" cannot be said to be scientific because of the incompatibility between "wave" and "particle" demonstrated by the incoherency of the observations, the "collapse".

I don't think that's right. What I call 'red' at the two extremes of the range some may call 'orange' or 'mauve'. That would just be personal perception and choice; I can't see what it has to do with theory. — Janus

On what basis would you say "it's red", rather than "it's orange", unless you are applying some sort of theory which enables your judgement? But I really don't know how you are proposing to define "theory". Doesn't personal choice involve theory in your understanding?

In the case of the colour chart, the fact that there is theory involved in the judgement is more obvious, because it's recorded on paper. But if you do not refer to a colour chart aren't you still referring to some sort of theory in your mind, which supports your choice? I don't think you'd say that the choice of words is random.

And yet precsiely those same people who demand the Universe to be a welcoming place for them, who demand it to be secure and comforting for them get to thrive in it. Because such people, believing they are entitled to security and comfort in this world, tame rivers, kill the infidels, and pursue science, in order to make the world a safe place for themselves. And they get it done. — baker

The materialist/determinist metaphysics is persistent in its denial of the obvious, that intention is a cause. Aristotle produced volumes of material which explains the reality of this obvious fact, as "final cause". So this materialist/determinist perspective ought not even be called "metaphysics", because it's simply a denial of the reality of that whole realm of activity which lies beyond the grasp of physics. It's more like anti-metaphysics.

Then they'll posit "a world" which is at the same time, both beautiful and terrifying, with complete disregard for the fact that such are simply the judgements of intentional beings. So they never get to the real metaphysical questions, such as how does this world support, or provide for real intentional judgements, because they employ contradictory statements like that, to make the reality of intention disappear behind a cloud of smoke and mirrors.

This is also a reason why "ancient wisdom" isn't so popular: to acknowledge ancient wisdom would be to acknowledge that one's ideas aren't one's own, but that one got them from others. Now, that's deflating. — baker

Actually, far from deflating, this realization may be very motivating. When one's ideas are "out of sync" with the conventional knowledge of the day (materialist/determinist), that person may become quite isolated in one's own disillusion. To find consistency in "ancient wisdom" is satisfying and encouraging.

For me 'red' is just a word we use to refer to a certain colour or range of colours that are commonly observed. — Janus

The incompatibility between "a certain colour", and a "range of colours" is the important point to recognize here, which makes your observation, when you use the word "red", theory dependent.

There is a difference between observational and theoretical claims in science. There are no simple observable confirmations that can be made with theoretical claims in the way there can be with claims about what is directly observed. — Janus

We do not agree here. Every observation is theory laden, starting with the words we use to describe something. Call it "red", and there is theory behind the meaning of that word. There is no real separation between observational claims and theoretical claims in science today, because all claims have elements of both. This reality underscores the need to determine which of the principles within an observation, are based in intuition, therefore unproven theory.

If for example you are describing something you saw as having been "red", then unless there are strict criteria as to what constitutes red, this part of your description is based in intuition, unproven theory. That's why in a litmus test there is a colour chart for the purpose of comparison, it removes the unproven intuition of "red" with a definition, a chart, derived from proven theory. Either way, the intuitive judgement or the colour chart judgement, when you say "it's red" the judgement is based on theory, one is just better proven than the other..

Regarding your example, wouldn't you say that the observed connection between sunlight (and other sources of heat). warmth and evaporation is as certain as anything can be? The usual counterexample to this kind of intuitive understanding is Aristotle's belief that heavier things fall faster. Even Aristotle could have tested this theory, though with a heavy sheet and a small stone lighter than the sheet, if he had thought to; the raw materials for the experiment would have been readily available to him. — Janus

The example of the sun and evaporation is just one example. I'm sure there are many examples of deluded minds, and mentally ill people making connections which are not sound. Your example of falling objects is a good one. Heavier things in general do fall faster, but in this case the intuition was wrong. Further testing proved that intuition to be wrong. This is the point, science proceeds from first principles derived from intuition. and since we trust science we tend to believe that these principles provide us with certainty, even though they haven't been properly tested. Einstein's relativity is a good example of such a principle, derived from intuition, but not properly tested.

That's why there's a major thread in 20th Century philosophy and literature that life is a kind of cosmic accident, the 'million monkeys' theory. — Wayfarer

This I believe, is the principle of plenitude. Given an infinite amount of time, every possibility will be actualized. But of course "infinite amount of time" is not a wise intuition.

Perhaps, but I'm an enthusiast for Aristotle's idea of phronesis—commonly translated as "practical wisdom". I think wisdom is, and can only be, tested by action. "By their fruits ye shall know them". I think this applies to oneself; by your fruits shall ye know yourself—"talk is cheap". — Janus

What do you think of the role of intuition in Aristotle's "practical wisdom". I have great difficulty understanding what is meant by "intuition" in Aristotle because he describes it as the highest form of knowledge, and in his logic he implies that it cannot be wrong.

I've seen "intuition" explained as the means by which we establish connections, relations between things. So for example, if a primitive person noticed that when the sun comes up in the morning there is warmth from the sun, and water on the ground, dew, dries up, by intuition, the person would establish a connection between these three things, sun, heat, and drying up, and one could create a couple of principles, the sun creates heat, and the sun dries things up. From other information, such as heat from a fire drying things up, one might deductively conclude that heat dries things.

So I think that intuition is necessary, as prior to any form of logic, inductive or deductive, as the part of the intellectual process which determines meaningful relations (causal perhaps). But I think Aristotle gets the whole hierarchy of certainty backward, when he says that these first principles can't be wrong. Clearly delusional thinking and mental illness demonstrate that such intuitions are often wrong. And this backwardness reflects on Aristotle's complete epistemological structure. He states that logic proceeds from the more certain, toward conclusions which are less certain. But if the first principles are provided by intuition, and intuition is not reliable, then how is it possible that we start from a higher level of certainty in our logical proceedings?

Of course that is true. Galileo rightly demolished Aristotelian physics but there's a deeper issue, which is along with it, banishing the idea of any purpose other than mechanical interaction. And besides in many other respects Aristotle's philosophy still has much to commend it. But you can't deny the aspects of it that were just plain mistaken, either. — Wayfarer

The fundamental issue I see is the continuity of existence. This is the question of how do some things remain the same, as time passes, in a changing world. The idea of eternal circular motions supports what was observed in the world as a continuous sameness.

When the Aristotelian assumption was removed, there was no replacement provided. Instead, the continuity of existence was taken for granted, as expressed by Newton's first law of motion. Notice the difference between Aristotle and Newton. Aristotle has a reasoned eternal motion, a perfect circle has no beginning or end, so if something is moving in a perfect circle it could just keep going around forever, perpetual motion. Newton, on the other hand, assumed any, or every motion is eternal, unless it is caused, by a force, to change. I hope you can see the fundamental difference here. In Aristotle, there must be a reason for the temporal continuity of motion, and existence in general, but in Newton that continuity is taken for granted.

In modernity an important problem has evolved. Newton did not actually take the continuity of motion completely for granted, as stated in his first law, he presented this law as dependent on the Will of God. So it was granted by God, and dependent on His Will. Therefore we have implicit within that law, the requirement of the Will of God, in order for that law to be a reasonable law. This is part of the process of Neo-Platonist metaphysics becoming supreme over Aristotelian metaphysics in western society. Material existence for Aristotelian metaphysics is supported by the eternal circular motions, and the divine thinking which is thinking on thinking, whereas the Neo-Platonist perspective from Augustine supplanted the divine thinking with the Will of God.

Modern western society in its atheist tendency, has removed the Will of God, and left Newton's first law as unsupported and unreasonable. So we have in quantum mechanics for example, nothing to support a temporal continuity of fundamental particles. The wisdom of the ancient people tells us very explicitly that the temporal continuity of material existence, from one moment to the next, is not something which we can take for granted. It must be supported by reasoned principles. When the reasoned principles which have been handed down to us over time (the Will of God) appear to no longer be reasonable, we cannot just dump them and forget them as if they've provided no service to us, they need to be rethought, and restructured, or else we are left with a huge hole in our understanding of reality.

Aristotle equates the contemplation of the wise man with the self-contemplation of the unmoved mover. Platonic philosophy sees ascent in wisdom as progressive assimilation to the divine (WAP 226-7). Hadot goes as far as to suggest that Plotinus and other ancient philosophers “project” the figure of the God, on the basis of their conception of the figure of the Sage, as a kind of model of human and intellectual perfection” (WAP 227-8). However, Hadot stresses that the divine freedom of the Sage from the concerns of ordinary human beings does not mean the Sage lacks all concern for the things that preoccupy other human beings. Indeed, in a series of remarkable analyses, Hadot argues that this indifference towards external goods (money, fame, property, office . . . ) opens the Sage to a different, elevated state of awareness in which he “never ceases to have the whole present in his mind, never forgets the world, thinks and acts in relation to the cosmos . . . ” — IEP Entry on Pierre Hadot

In his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle positioned contemplation as the most virtuous activity. The highest form of thinking is thinking about thinking. This is directly from Plato where the highest form of knowledge is knowledge of intelligible objects, i.e. knowledge of knowledge.

But in Aristotle's cosmology he posited eternal circular motions. as the orbits of the planets. Then to support the eternal circular motions he posit unmoved movers involved in the virtuous circular thinking of thinking on thinking. The idea of eternal circular orbits has been proven faulty, and circular thinking is now considered a vicious circle. So this aspect of his metaphysics seems to have failed

However, he left another door open in his Nichomachean Ethics. He divided knowledge into practical and theoretical, which was quite a bit different from Plato's division. Each section has different levels, but what happens is that "intuition" is designated as the highest form of knowledge, in both the theoretical and the practical divisions. It's difficult to grasp exactly what intuition is supposed to be, but it seems be something concerning the relating of theory to practise, and practise to theory.

However, if "meaning is use", there can be no such thing as misuse/abuse of language. In the book analogy above a book can be anything at all i.e. we can use it for anything and everything and no one would/could say I've misused/abused the book. In terms of words, I'm free to say the word "water" is, intriguingly, fire and that "god" means devil. You couldn't object to this because the notion of word misuse/abuse is N/A. This is taking Wittgenstein's theory taken to its logical conclusion, if you plant Wittgenstein in your garden and tend to it with care and love a particulalry exotic flower will bloom. What is this flower? Total chaos, utter confusion of course. — TheMadFool

I believe ideas similar to this are what lead Plato to "the good", as the goal, the purpose, or "the end" in Aristotle's words, that for the sake of which. Likewise, in Wittgenstein's PI you'll find a reference to the requirement that a signpost (analogous with a word), serves the purpose. In this conceptualization an inability to serve the purpose might be called misuse. Chaos and confusion have been avoided because people are inclined toward the good. that is to say that they act with intention.

The issue of abuse is very complex and difficult, well represented by a common form of abuse in language use, commonly called deception. When reading Wittgenstein I suggest you be very wary of the many instances where he demonstrates the reality of deception. This is why there are many distinct interpretations of his work. If a man's goal with his use of words (signposts) is to deceive (mislead), then the possibility of a correct interpretation is negated.

Only sophists claim to be wise, or to possess "wisdom". — 180 Proof

In modern usage we normally refer to others as being wise, like in this thread, Wayfarer refers to the wisdom of the ancient people. So in this context it's a judgement concerning others, not about oneself. And, as I mentioned in the other post, one might have the goal of being wise, and look for a method to provide this end, without ever thinking oneself to be wise.

Yes, each of my selections can be characterized better as "a way towards wisdom" (i.e. philosophy) than as "wisdom" itself (i.e. sophistry). — 180 Proof

Do you equate wisdom with sophistry? I would think that wisdom is more the opposite of sophistry, the capacity to detect, identify, and disprove sophistry.

Can't say I read the thread so I don't have an opinion. I'll flag your post, maybe you'll get some attention.

I would like to re-post the part of the discussion that I was interested in: Namely, does the expansion of space take place everywhere, including between the atoms in my body? Or only "way out there," among the distant galaxies? — fishfry

That sounds like a good topic for a new thread.

So we've both hit upon the same idea (AND replaced by OR in definitions), I'm honored, but you remain unconvinced that this violation of definitional criteria is the real culprit that causes words to be used in such a fashion that no common thread (essence) is found to run through all the ways in a particular word is used. — TheMadFool

You've reversed the causal relation TheMadFool, portraying effect as cause. In natural language use most words are used prior to receiving definitions, and people use words prior to learning definitions. So words develop meaning without being defined. Due to the differences in the ways that the same word is used, "the meaning" a word develops has differences within, similar to family resemblances.

Since words are used without definitional laws as to how they must be used, and prior to having their meanings defined, it is incorrect to say that "violation of definitional criteria is the real culprit that causes words to be used in such a fashion that...". In reality, words are simply used, and develop meaning from usage. And, since the particular situations in which they are used vary due to differences in circumstances, the meanings developed for the same word, will vary as well.

This is why we cannot assigned essentials to meaning in natural language use. The accidentals of the particular circumstances, within which the words are used, influence the meaning which the words develop, so that there is always accidentals inherent within the meaning.