As you yourself have repeatedly stated, in this thread, your proof is that 2+2=4. And, you've also stated that you recognize that I do not dispute the fact that 2+2=4.

So, I am acknowledging that your proof is irrelevant, as I've done before.

Why do you keep bringing up, and referring to, an irrelevant proof, as if it is something which is relevant to our disagreement?

Everything has potential and actuality, simplicity and matter. Its one reality that goes back to infinity and to nowhere — Gregory

In other words, you can't distinguish between the potential for something, and that thing's actual existence, so you conclude that the two coexist for eternally.

Why are you going on about this? — fishfry

Me? I was happy to participate in this thread, and proceed in many other discussions with you, without ever mentioning this small disagreement we have. We probably agree on many other things. But it seems you have some need to keep bringing it up.

Metaphysician Undercover is on record stating that he does not believe that 2 + 2 and 4 denote the same mathematical object. He's wrong but confirmed in his belief. I did at one point present to him a clean proof from the Peano axioms in which I defined "2", "4", "+", and "=", and proved that 2 + 2 = 4. Of course the truth of any symbolic expression depends on the interpretation given to the symbols; but it is NOT in dispute that 2 + 2 and 4, with their standard interpretations, denote the same mathematical object. — fishfry

See, it's you who brought up the past. Obviously, for you it's not yet over. But that doesn't surprise me.

I think that the easiest way to understand the cosmological argument is from the way that it is expressed by Aristotle. He demonstrated that anything eternal must be actual, it cannot be potential. Any potential requires an actuality to be actualized. The actuality must be prior in time to the potential, because if there was ever a potential without the actuality required to actualize it, it could not ever actualize itself. This would mean that there would be forever potential without actuality. However we observe the reality of actuality, therefore we must conclude that actuality is temporally prior to potentiality.

Aquinas expounds on this in his "first way". He denies that potentiality and actuality are coexisting eternities by explaining that a thing cannot be both actual and potential in the same respect. He also describes how if there is a succession of things, activities in this case, there must be a first, as an infinite regress is impossible.

That infinite regress is impossible is a principle commonly argued against. And we can assume the reality of infinite regress if we so desire, but as Aquinas explains, this assumption is repugnant to the intellect. What such an assumption does is render any particular motion as unintelligible by removing its start and end. If we assume that a particular motion has no start or end, then we do not have a complete understanding of that motion. In reality we see that no motions can be perpetual. The difference between start and end is what gives the motion a temporal context. However, it is evident, by the use of infinities in modern mathematics, that the possibility of infinite regress is not denied in the application of laws of physics. This contributes to the unintelligibility of motion which we find in quantum particles, and is evidence that failure to observe these Aristotelian principles is a hinderance to modern science.

It's a basic proof that 2 + 2 = 4 from the Peano axioms. — fishfry

You know I do not dispute the fact that 2+2=4. That's why I'm fulling justified in ignoring your strawman proof.

You never even bothered to acknowledge my proof. I asked you repeatedly to criticize it or disagree with it and you just ignored those posts too. And now you're making claims contrary to facts. Your recent objections to the proof are three years after the fact. This is a silly conversation. I'm not playing anymore. — fishfry

I really don't remember the specifics of your so-called proof. I remember that you produced something you called a proof, and it was very easy for me to show that it did not prove what you intended it to prove, through reference to the law of identity. So I demonstrated this and moved along. You did not seem to have a firm grasp of the law of identity at the time, so you did not seem to understand how your supposed proof failed. Then you kept referring back to this supposed "proof", as if it really proved what it didn't.

If you really think that you have a proof that "2+2" denotes the same mathematical object as "4", when "same" is held to the rigorous definition of the law of identity, then produce it again, and I'll show you how it fails, again. Maybe this time you'll pay respect to the law of identity.

The law is a system of rules adopted by or which were adopted by a controlling authority or authorities in a nation or society applicable to the conduct of those who are citizens/members of that nation or society, and considered by the relevant authority to be binding, the violation of which may result in the imposition of criminal or civil penalties imposed through a recognized system of enforcing and applying it. — Ciceronianus the White

According to how you have characterized laws already, I think you are wrong to say here "the law is...". You'd have to say "a law is...", because you've provided no premise whereby you might put one law above another law if two distinct societies have laws which are not compatible. So one law might govern one society, and another law govern another society, but we can't say one or the other is "the law", unless we are members of one society, calling our own laws "the law". In this case we'd have to exclude the laws of other societies from the title "the law".

But my question concerned the existence of a law. You seem to be adamant on the assumption that laws exist. What type of existence do you think this "system of rules" has? Does it exist as writing on paper, or some other medium, or does it exist as the writing interpreted by a mind? The difference is significant because in one case laws need to be interpreted, and the interpretation might be subjective, but in the other case they are already interpreted, and so are inherently subjective.

Legal positivism/realism doesn't maintain that every law is good. It merely maintains that every law is a law. It doesn't cease to exist if it's bad. — Ciceronianus the White

Can you explain to me exactly where, or how a law exists? In other words, where is the law in relation to interpretation? Is the law what is written on the paper? If so, what distinguishes a law from other things written on paper? Are all written things laws? If it is the interpretation, the meaning derived by the reader, how do you account for differences? Is each different interpretation a different law? Or do you assume a separate perfect, ideal interpretation which is the law.

Let me see if I properly apprehend your position. There's an independent world, but there's no shared access to it. Because of this lack of commonality in our distinct approaches to it, the independent world is theoretical. So I assume that this is not the independent world itself which is theoretical, but each individual's approach to it, which is theoretical. Each person has one's own theoretical independent world, but we still assume a real non-theoretical independent world which is separate from us.

How do we validate "science" then? From what I understand, the principles of science are validated by empirical evidence, yet according to the principles above any such science must be made compatible with one's own theoretical independent world, to be accepted as correct. The theoretical independent world within each of us, provides the standard for judgement of what to accept or not to accept within the realm of science.

So, when you say

Science suggests I’m not special. — David Pearce

How do you justify this, or even find principles to accept it as having a grain of truth? You have described principles which make each and every individual person completely separate, distinct and unique, "special". Now you claim that science tells you that you are not special, and this is the basis for your claim that sentient beings everywhere disvalue agony and despair.

Agony and despair are inherently disvaluable for me. Science suggests I’m not special. Therefore I infer that agony and despair are disvaluable for all sentient beings anywhere: — David Pearce

I do not believe that science suggests you are not special. I think science suggests exactly what you argued already, that we're all distinct, "special", each one of us having one's own distinct theoretical independent world. And I think that this generalization, that we are all somehow "the same", is an unjustified philosophical claim. So I think you need something stronger than your own personal feelings, that agony and despair are disvaluable to you, to support your claim that they are disvaluable to everyone.

I think your claim to 'science" for such a principle is a little off track, because we really must consider what motivates human beings, intentions, and science doesn't yet seem to have a grasp on this. So we can see for example, that agony and despair (of others) is valued in some cases such as torture, and even in a more subtle sense, but much more common, as a negotiating tactic. People apply pressure to others, to get what they want. And if you believe that agony and despair ought not be valued like this, we need to defer to some higher moral principles to establish the right of that. Where are we going to get these higher moral principles when we deny the reality of true knowledge concerning the common world, the external world which we must share with each other?

However, if we consider what people want, we can validate science and generalizations through "the necessities of life". Don't you not think that we need some firm knowledge, some truths, concerning the external world which provides us with the necessities of life, in order to produce agreement on moral principles? Would you agree that it is the external world which provides us with the necessities of life? Isn't this what we all have in common, and shouldn't this be our starting point for moral philosophy, the necessities of life which we must take from the external world, rather than your own personal feelings about agony and despair?

I've just been ignoring those claims because you ignored my reply to your proof.. And you continue to ignore this. If I remember correctly, your proposed proof violated the law of identity, and you refused to acknowledge this. And that violation of the law of identity was what I was already discussing in the first place, so your proposed proof was completely irrelevant because it did nothing to mitigate this violation..

The proof shows that the two expressions denote the same mathematical object. But we're making progress. For three years (has it been that long?) you totally ignored the proof. Now at least you're acknowledging it. — fishfry

I didn't ignore the proof, I showed you how it was not a proof of what you claimed it was. But we could go through it again if you want.

And Davidson would certainly not agree that language isn't necessary for knowing and believing. Nor I suspect would Wittgenstein.

But yes, doubt comes with propositional content and hence is also inherently a linguistic enterprise - a language game. — Banno

What I meant to say is that these premises are simply unacceptable, as false, just like your claim that knowledge is shared, which I can't seem to find now. It must have been deleted for low quality. If knowledge was necessarily shared, deception would be impossible. But deception is very real, and it consists of a person hiding what one knows. And since the skeptic can doubt what another is saying, knowing that deception is possible, without any understanding of what the other is saying, doubt does not require a language game.

The intent of honest communication produces language games. The intent to deceive produces doubt, destroying the possibility of language games.

And Davidson would certainly not agree that language isn't necessary for knowing and believing. Nor I suspect would Wittgenstein.

But yes, doubt comes with propositional content and hence is also inherently a linguistic enterprise - a language game. — Banno

Oops, posted accidentally.

This just indicates that the concept of energy is deficient. It is not applicable where it is being applied, to the vast expanse of the universe, because the reality of spatial expansion is not accounted for. However, this brings up another question, how applicable is the concept of energy? If spatial expansion is a real part of a very large extension of space, then it is probably also a real part of a small extension of space. So the point mentioned in Lee Smolin's Time Reborn is that the concept "energy", really has a narrow range of applicability, the midsize we might call it. It is not applicable to very large things, nor is it applicable to very small things. It's an indication of how little we really understand the universe.

I don't believe I have ever said that you deny 2 + 2 = 4. I am always careful to note that you deny that 2 + 2 and 4 denote the same mathematical object. Can you please point me to an instance where I failed to make that distinction? — fishfry

You just said:
"I did at one point present to him a clean proof from the Peano axioms in which I defined "2", "4", "+", and "=", and proved that 2 + 2 = 4."
If you knew that I didn't dispute 2+2=4, then your so-called proof is an intentional strawman.

If your definition of "=" is "denotes the same object as", then you're begging the question with a false premise.

I did at one point present to him a clean proof from the Peano axioms in which I defined "2", "4", "+", and "=", and proved that 2 + 2 = 4. — fishfry

I never denied that 2+2=4. That would be stupid. What I deny is that "=" indicates is the same as. I think that to believe such a thing would be stupid as well. So your proof that 2+2=4 really does nothing for your claim that "2+2" denotes the same object as "4".

Consider lucid dreaming. When having a lucid dream, one entertains the theory that one's entire empirical dreamworld is internal to the transcendental skull of a sleeping subject. Exceptionally, one may even indirectly communicate with other sentient beings in the theoretically-inferred wider world:
https://www.the-scientist.com/news-opinion/researchers-exchange-messages-with-dreamers-68477
What happens when one "wakes up"? To the naive realist, it's obvious. One directly perceives the external world. But the inferential realist recognises that the external world can only be theoretically inferred. For a nice account of the world-simulation metaphor, perhaps see Antti Revonsuo's Inner Presence (2006): — David Pearce

I have no problem with the idea that the external world is theoretically inferred, because I lean toward idealism, but I think "theoretically inferred" is a stretch. This is because inference is a conscious rational process, and I think recognition that there are things external or independent of oneself is a deeper capacity, not dependent on logical inference

However, naive realism and naive idealism can be very similar in the sense that they both suffer the same problem, which is that without a medium between the perception and the thing sensed, we cannot account for the existence of mistakes. So from the idealist perspective, there must be something which separates the ideas of your mind from the ideas of my mind, otherwise we'd be thinking each others thoughts. What exists between us is that medium, and we call it the external world.

You remark, "To say that something is theoretical is to say that it is mind-dependent." But when a physicist talks of, say, the theoretical existence of other Hubble volumes beyond our cosmological horizon (s/he certainly doesn’t intend to make a claim of their mind-dependence. Of course, how our thoughts and language can refer is a deep question. Naturalising semantic content is hard: https://www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#aboutness — David Pearce

I don't think this analogy really suffices to resolve the issue. If we make the external world consist solely of possibilities (as in the use of "theoretical" in your example), then we need some principles whereby we discern what is real, actual, or true to the world. The "world" is what is supposed to be common to us. Aristotle used hylomorphism for example, the concept of "matter" gives us the realm of possibilities external to us, while "form" is applied to what is real, actual, allowing us to understand through common terms.

If we do not have any such principles to apply, then there is nothing to prevent your theoretical world from being completely different from my theoretical world. And there need not be any commonality, or even an inclination toward consistency between us, because there is no single reality, or the Truth, which we ought to conform our ideas to. So allowing that the world is theoretical in this way, will only increase strife between various people who have no desire to make their theories compatible with the theories of others. And strife produces conflict.

Unique individuals?
Yes, our egocentric world-simulations each have a different protagonist. Yet we are not uniquely unique. When I said that "science suggests I'm not special", I was alluding simply to how the fact that I seem to be the hub of reality is (probably!) a fitness-enhancing hallucination: — David Pearce

Now don't you see the problem here? If the external world is theoretical, as you said, then a human being's mind, as the holder of a theory, is by that fact, the hub of reality. We cannot escape this unless we have some way to get the theory outside of the mind. Therefore under your idealist principle that the external is theoretical, that I am the hub of reality is a true principle. And if this principle is "fitness-enhancing", it must be good. So it is clearly wrong to call this an hallucination unless we deny that the world is theoretical. To say that this is an hallucination is an act of self-deception, but for what end is that deception being applied? If it is not self-deception, is it aimed at others?

That makes sense to me. It was my understanding though, that space only grow between those aspects of non-space that are so far apart that gravity no longer influences them? I don't know if that is a cluster, or super cluster or what, but space is not increasing the distance between us and the earth, earth from sun, sun from galaxy etc. — James Riley

Imagine that wherever there are massive objects, spatial expansion is slowed, and the result is what we observe as gravity.


Thanks for the link fishfry, I do appreciate it. If I had a bad attitude at the time, it was probably because you started the post with "2+2=4".

If some other force is at play to cause the different rates, then I guess I might not be at the center so long as there was an equally spaced, equal number of parts speeding away at their various rates. — James Riley

I would say the evidence suggests that gravity is the other force which is at play here, causing different rates of expansion. But gravity and expansion might actually just be two aspects of, or two ways that we approach, the very same thing.

I believe in the existence of mind-independent reality (cf. https://www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#idsolipsism). Its status from my perspective is theoretical not empirical. — David Pearce

What exactly do you mean by "theoretical" here? I see this statement as self-contradicting. To say that something is theoretical is to say that it is mind-dependent. To say that reality is theoretical, but mind-independent is to contradict yourself. In other words I don't see this as a valid way to account for the reality of he external world, to say that it is theoretical, yet also mind-independent It can only be one or the other.

Agony and despair are inherently disvaluable for me. Science suggests I’m not special. — David Pearce

Are you not a unique individual? It is this very idea, that what is valuable to me, is valuable to everyone else, which is the root of jealousy, coveting, greed, hoarding, and numerous other vices. This is probably why Plato, in The Republic, centered justice around having a respect for each others differences, rather than the false assumption that we are all the same, which Science doesn't really suggest.

You're off on some strange tangent. Someone alluded to a recent discovery in physics. You asked what it was. I gave you a link to a New York Times article on the subject. Your next post was bizarre and off the wall. I know you think you're making a point, but you're not. — fishfry

You asked me "Would you put the earth at the center of the universe in denial of subsequent discoveries?". I only wanted to show you that, "subsequent discoveries" indicate that the evidence points toward the earth being at the center of the universe. So as much as you are having difficulty understanding what I am saying, this is due to the confused nature of your questioning.

We can go back to what I said before that if you want. You referred me to an article which said that the muon doesn't behave as it is supposed to, and this calls into question the validity of the Standard Model. I said, this is no problem because they'll just dream up some mathematical principles to account for these exceptions. That's what they do, it's evident with dark energy, dark matter, etc.. When anomalies appear, instead of questioning the underlying theories which produce the anomalies in application, they dream up some principles which account for them.

I am not personally sure of why we appear to be at the center of it, or if an observer in a distant galaxy would also see themselves at the center. — fishfry

We appear to be at the center, because this is a map of the expanding universe. If the substratum of the universe, space-time itself, is expanding, then it must expand from every point. The result is that any point becomes the center point, when mapped in this way.

The overall point of my somewhat random replies, is that until we get an understanding of what spatial expansion actually is, there's no point to thinking that any of the models which physicists or cosmologists come up with are correct models.

. Unless rather naively we believe in free will... — David Pearce

But shared access is still a fiction. — David Pearce

You deny the truth of a shared external reality. If you also deny the reality of free will of the individual, as inferred from the individual's capacity to create the external simulation, then how can you ground any moral ethics? What is the cause of human activities if neither the external nor the internal? Where do you position "activities" in general in this schema if they are not caused by the external reality, nor the internal free will? Is activity an illusion? If so, then why do anything?

Knowledge is not individual, Meta. It is shared. — Banno

Thanks for telling me your dreams.

It might be a judge decreeing an interpretation of a law in a manner that comports to morality, and that would require a single person. — Hanover

This does not resolve the issue, because now we have the question of what makes one person's judgement that such an interpretation is the correct one, and that the judge's claim to morality is a true one.

The issue now being that intent to morality doesn't necessarily produce morality, because mistakes occur. This is why I find it difficult to understand how we can even talk about laws correlating with morality. If sometimes they do, and sometimes they do not, how could we ever know whether they do or don't? And if we cannot, there's no point to discussing it.

. The word “theology” means logic about God; theo means God. But there can be no logic about God. There is love about God, love for God, but no logic about God. There are no proofs possible. The only proof is the existence of the mystic. The presence of Dionysius, of Ramakrishna, of Bahauddin – the presence of these people is the proof that God exists, otherwise there is no proof. Because Buddhas have walked on the earth, there are a few footprints of God left behind on the shores of time. — Anand-Haqq

This is not true. The cosmological argument distinctly proves the need to assume a creator "God" to account for the reality of what we experience as the sensible world. Grasping the principles behind it, and the forcefulness of this argument is just as much a "revelation" as anything else.

Somewhere logic and love have to meet, because they both exist. — Anand-Haqq

When the need for "God" is grasped by logic it is undeniable, and this is where love and logic meet. Excluding the possibility of grasping God through logic is a mistake which will only prevent the union of love and logic, by feeding the whims of those atheists who insist God is illogical.

There's stuff we don't know anything about.

When folk talk about that stuff, despite not knowing anything about it, they are being mystical.

Honest folk will remain quiet. — Banno

This is just a statement of personal bias. What you really mean is "stuff I don't know anything about", and you fallaciously conclude that this means "stuff we don't know anything about", And when you accept this faulty proposition you can proceed to the deductive conclusion that those talking about it know nothing about it. See below:

"There are these two young fish swimming along and they happen to meet an older fish swimming the other way, who nods at them and says “Morning, boys. How’s the water?” And the two young fish swim on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the other and goes “What the hell is water?” — Manuel

Banno is one of those young fish. But Banno proceeds to the conclusion that since "we" don't know what the hell water is, the older fish who uses that term doesn't know either.

Doesn't the evidence of the cosmological background radiation put the earth at the center of the universe?

The more accurate statement then would be that the law does not necessarily correlate to morality, but sometimes it does, and sometimes it intentionally does. — Hanover

I find this to be an interesting statement. How could a law intentionally correlate to morality? Let's say that different lawmakers make laws for different reasons, morality might be one. Suppose a lawmaker proposes a law which is apprehended by that lawmaker as correlating to morality. Doesn't that law have to be passed by all the other lawmakers involved, before it becomes a law? Each of those lawmakers has one's own intentions. So, by the time the law is passed, the one who proposed the law had the intent of morality, but all the others had some other intentions, and unless those other intentions were morality, then we shouldn't say that the law intentionally correlates with morality.

If your local government legalized rape, wouldn't your objection to the law have something to do with the immorality of it, and don't you think your local politicians would be motivated to change the law based upon an appeal to their sense of right and wrong? If they do illegalize rape out of respect for its immorality, wouldn't that be an instance of a law having something to do with morality? — Hanover

Oh, this is a nice one. You appeal to your "local government". What happens when the local government is not consistent with the regional government? Who has the real authority?

If by an "assumed standard" you mean something that is adopted by a state or sovereign to regulate conduct, is codified, is enforceable by the state or others through an established system of processing and adjudicating violations or claims and making judgments, then I suppose an "assumed standard" may include laws. But I doubt that is what Austin intended by it. — Ciceronianus the White

Well if not that, which seems the obvious meaning of "assumed standard", what else could Austin possibly mean by "assumed standard"? Is Austin talking about some sort of "assumed standard" which has not actually been assumed? Wouldn't that be contradictory?

Oh no! The muon is a fiction and now the whole Standard Model is fucked. Oh well, I'm sure the physicists can apply the appropriate mathematical smoke and mirrors to make it all work out just fine.

I say: There is no Law but the Law! — Ciceronianus the White

What does "the Law" here refer to, other than an assumed standard?

They're not as interesting as your goats, and they're very destructive and mean. — Hanover

Being very destructive and mean makes them quite interesting. The wild boars are so destructive that many states have open season on them, no laws whatsoever governing the killing of them. This makes them a prime target for people who want to test out their own home made weapons of mass destruction. The YouTube footage seems to get a lot of views so some people must be interested. And you think the backyard slaughter of a few goats is disturbing.

Metaphysician Undercover commits a similar act, desiring uncertainty of the language he uses to formulate that very uncertainty. The difference is that Meta does not see that he is writing nonsense. — Banno

The fact that I express my uncertainty with language, just like I might express other emotions with language, doesn't mean that the emotion is a feature of the language.

This is just what is impossible, unless we want to consider screaming madness. — T H E

I explained very clearly why doubting the entire belief system is the only reasonable form of skepticism. Beliefs within a system are necessarily logically consistent and interrelated. That's what makes it a "system". To doubt one belief within a system requires doubting the beliefs it is dependent upon, and it is implied that the beliefs dependent upon the doubted belief are doubted as well. So it's unreasonable to doubt one belief without doubting the entire system within which it is integrated,

This is why the idea that there are hinge propositions which are somehow indubitable is unacceptable epistemology. If the entire system is intrinsically consistent, and valid, which it must be to be a "system", then no part of the system can be doubted without doubting the whole. And this would require doubting the supposed hinge propositions as well.

The preceding result, is the logical conclusion of assuming that beliefs exist as part of a "system". If we remove that premise, and allow that beliefs have individuality, free from the influence of an overall system, then it is reasonable to doubt individual beliefs. But then the whole game analogy, and the idea of hinge propositions is completely inapplicable. .

Yes, it appears quite possible to me too that a person could be uncertain. However, you do not appear to be uncertain, but quite dogmatically certain. you are playing the uncertainty card in order to dispute something that you do not in fact dispute. and that is the game I am playing back at you, that you are now disputing in turn. This is by way of a demonstration of something, rather than a proof of anything. You want to tell me "you probably already know what I mean," but you will not have it the other way about. — unenlightened

I am arguing that a certain type of doubt is reasonable to assume, not that I have that type doubt. Anyway, the fact that it appears to you that my personal form of doubt is actually dogmatic certainty, is irrelevant because you may be misunderstanding me. When you see a dog standing its ground, barking at you, and forbidding you to come closer, would you think that these actions of the dog are based in a dogmatic certainty?

I propose we revisit the premise, "doubt can occur only within a system of believe", and maybe we can find an acceptable compromise.

Let's first distinguish true doubt from fake doubt. Fake doubt is what you accused me of, playing the doubt card when I am actually dogmatically certain. True doubt is when a person is truly uncertain. So for example, an atheist might play the doubt card of fake doubt, in a discussion with a theist, pretending to doubt the reality of God, when that person really has certitude about the opposite. Only an agnostic would have true doubt in this situation.

Now let's position the "system of believe" relative to the true doubt. The doubting person cannot be "within" the system of believe because that would mean that the system is already accepted by that person. The doubt must be aimed at the system as a whole, because as "a system" we must assume that there is consistency between the parts (individual beliefs) of the system, and one cannot reasonably doubt one part of a consistent system. So true doubt must be directed at the system as a whole.

Would you agree with that? If we say doubt can only occur from within a system of belief, that system of belief must be other than the system being doubted. The two systems may not even be remotely related. So the assumption "doubt can occur only within a system of believe", is really an irrelevant point, because that system of belief must be other than the one which contains the belief being doubted.. And if we take the game analogy, true doubt can only come from the person who refuses to play the game, because to play the game is to consent to the rules, and to consent to the rules is to forfeit your right to doubt them.

Part V
Claiming to know only makes sense when doubt is possible.

This depends on the notion that our beliefs are to be found only within language games, each of which is formed by taking some beliefs as non-negotiable.

And is threatened by truth and knowledge being dependent on the language game in which the claims of truth or knowledge occur.

This is the claim. I can't at the moment see the argument. — Banno

Here's how what I stated above is relevant to this thread. If we assume that any specific language-game is a representation of a system of beliefs (consistency being a necessary requirement of "system"), then true doubt can only be directed at any specific language game from outside that particular game. I.e. the person who refuses to play. I'll call that person the skeptic, is the only one who may cast true doubt. If we assert that the skeptic must pose one's doubt from a position of being within a language-game, within a system of beliefs, then that system providing the skeptic's approach, must be other than the one doubted, and there cannot be consistency between these distinct language-games, or else true doubt would be impossible. This implies that language in general, as a whole, cannot be represented as a single language-game, because of the inconsistency between distinct language-games which makes true doubt a real thing.

The other course we could take, is to allow inconsistency within any specific language-game, and system of belief, thereby allowing for doubt within the system. If there is inconsistency within the game, or system, then doubt from within would be true justified doubt. But that ought to be seen as epistemologically unsound, to allow inconsistency to inhere within a system. It produces a faulty definition of "game" or "system", one in which the rules of the "game" contradict each other, or the "system" has parts which oppose each other, or are not conducive to its function.

So the logical course is to maintain that a language-game, or a system of beliefs, is necessarily consistent, and true doubt must be directed at the system as a whole, from outside that system. This is also the most practical solution, because if inconsistency appears to inhere within a system of beliefs, it is extremely difficult to isolate the defective parts, with the goal of doubting just those parts. So the entire system must be doubted as a whole. This implies that refusal to play the game is required, and we're at the point of doubting the entire system anyway.

If Moore held up his hand as said: "This is a hand" we could look and confirm that it is indeed a hand. — Fooloso4

What if he raised his arm and said "this is an arm"? How would that act of holding up his arm be different from the act of holding up his his hand? How do you propose that we could confirm whether he's actually holding up a hand, or an arm?

No it isn't. What is this 'doubt' of which you speak? — unenlightened

I could try to explain it to you, but if you are already doubtful of what I am saying without understanding what I am saying, then you probably already know what I mean, through your own doubt which requires no understanding, so there is no need.

From what perspective can a perspective be said to be deficient? — unenlightened

The perspective I speak of is the perspective of being uncertain. From the perspective of uncertainty, the claim that uncertainty requires certainty is seen as deficient. It appears as a misunderstanding of uncertainty. If you are uncertain about this "doubt" of which I speak, as you imply with your question, do you really believe that it is necessary that you are certain of something in order to support this uncertainty as real uncertainty? Do you not think that it is possible for a person (Socrates for example) to have a general, overall attitude of uncertainty, and therefore truly be uncertain about everything? Many people demonstrate an attitude of certainty, and others demonstrate an attitude of uncertainty. Why conflate these two opposing attitudes by insisting that the attitude of uncertainty is really a form of certainty?

It appears completely logical to me, that a person could actually have such an attitude of uncertainty, such a lack of confidence. So I really don't know why the idea is quickly rejected by so many people, as if uncertainty is just a form of certainty in disguise. Doesn't certainty require faith? Are there not people living without faith? Rearrange Grayling's argument. Certainty only occurs when there is faith. Sometimes faith is lacking. Therefore sometimes certainty is lacking. Where certainty is lacking there is doubt. Grayling's premise "doubt can only occur within a system of belief" is false. Those outside a system of belief are there because they lack faith in that system, therefore they are uncertain and doubtful of it, and this doubt is not from within the system, it is external to it.

Is there somewhere in the text where Witt states that hinge propositions, or indubitable propositions, are neither true nor false? — Luke

I think what Wittgenstein intends, is that it doesn't make sense to ask this question, because to ask whether they are true or false is to doubt them. The truth of them is accepted without having to say they are true, or ask of them, is this true.

I of course do not agree with this, as I see that there is no such thing as a proposition, or any sort of belief, or idea which is indubitable. That supposition seems so obviously false. Hinge propositions are a fiction and that's why it's so difficult for these people who believe in them to agree on the criteria of being such.

Or you're clearly not trying if it makes no sense to me. Someone speaking a different language to me clearly does not understand that I don't understand that language. Speaking and writing requires an understanding of your audiences understanding of the words you are using. It requires two or more following the same protocols to communicate. How you might communicate with a child or a person just learning English will be different than how you communicate with an adult that speaks English fluently. — Harry Hindu

The question you asked me was how can I apprehend that there is something which I cannot conceptualize. The example was, when someone speaks a foreign language to me, I can apprehend that the person is speaking to me but I cannot conceptualize what the person is saying. Therefore it is an example of what I said, there are aspects of what I am hearing, which I cannot conceptualize.

So you're saying that your dualism isn't one of mind vs. body, rather one of understanding vs mis-understanding? I still don't get it. — Harry Hindu

Don't fret, it's not a big deal if you do not understand dualism. But if you want to, I suggest studying some classical philosophy to get a grasp of the concepts.

And humans and their actions are outcomes of natural processes. The only reason you'd want to distinguish between what humans do and what everything else does is because you believe in the antiquated idea that humans are specially created or created separate from nature. — Harry Hindu

No, my reason for separating intentionally constructed things (artificial) from natural things, is to help me understand reality. Clearly we haven't yet obtained a firm grasp on reality, so I don't know why you would think that this is an antiquated approach.

Tree rings symbolize the age of the tree because of how the tree grows throughout the year, not anything to do with the intent of some human. — Harry Hindu

Obviously, the intent to determine the age of the tree is implied in this description. Otherwise you simply have a growing tree with the form that it grows into, nothing symbolized by that tree without the intent to determine something about it. Therefore you have not separated this relationship from intent, as you claim.

Humans come along and observe the tree rings and their intent is to understand what the tree rings are. The human attempts to grasp what is already there and the processes that produced the tree rings. This is how the human comes to understand what the tree rings are, which is what they mean. This is what humans do, we attempt to understand what exists by explaining the causal processes involved in producing what we observe. — Harry Hindu

Right, you seem to understand here. The relationship between the tree rings and the age of the tree is something determined by human beings through their intent to understand. It is a form of measurement. Do you agree? And do you see that measurement is an act of comparison carried out by human beings, relating one thing to another, rings to a time scale in this case? This comparison, act of relating one to the other, does not occur without those human beings.

The case Grayling has in mind seems to be that doubt can occur only within a system of believe; but doubts occur; hence there must be a system of belief in which to doubt. — Banno

The deficiency in this perspective is the idea that doubt must be justified. Once this idea is dismissed, doubt is merely uncertainty, and uncertainty need not be based in any form of certainty. So the proposition "doubt can occur only within a system of believe" is false. This assumes that "doubt" must be defined relative to something which is doubted, and does not respect the true nature of "doubt" which is lack of definition.

And you cannot get beyond this brute fact in the way unenlightened suggests: "If you want to play chess, you have to accept the rules as 'given'.", because the nature of free will, and the phrase "if you want..." does not produce the necessity required. So there is always the possibility that someone does not want to play the game, and this person's skepticism concerning the game itself, rather than the any specific rule, is still a valid "doubt", even though it remains unjustified.

This makes no sense. How can you apprehend something which cannot be conceptualized? Apprehend and conceptualize are synonyms. Both are akin to "grasping" something mentally. — Harry Hindu

You're clearly not trying, if it makes no sense to you. Have you ever "grasped" the idea that you do not understand something? That's what I mean. When someone speaks a foreign language for instance, you might apprehend that you do not understand what the person is saying.

Are not concepts natural things?? You seem to be making a special case for human minds, as if human minds are seperate from nature, when minds are just another causal relationship, like everything else. — Harry Hindu

In the ontology which I respect, concepts are artificial. Do you not respect the difference between natural and artificial? "Artificial" is commonly defined as produced by human act or effort rather than originating naturally.

What if it's interpreted wrong? Is it still a symbol? It seems more accurate, and less religious, to say effects represent/symbolize their causes. — Harry Hindu

I don't see any principle, other than 'what was intended by the author', whereby we'd distinguish a wrong interpretation from a right interpretation of a symbol. Therefore your claim that a natural effect symbolizes its cause (without an appeal to intention), is just as likely to be incorrect as correct. So it's a worthless assertion.

I don't understand. You apprehend both what? What is incompatible? — Harry Hindu

You asked me:

When you look at the world what do you see?

Is it concepts all the way down? — Harry Hindu

It is not concepts all the way down, I am dualist, so I see (apprehend with my mind), that there are aspects of the sensible world which cannot be conceptualized. That is the incompatibility between the intelligible and the sensible, which gives the need for dualism.

It don't see how fundamentally, symbols always represent something mental when you just said that concepts can represent natural things, unless you're saying that natural things are mental, but then that would make you an idealist/pansychist, not a dualist. — Harry Hindu

A concept is not a symbol. So a symbol can represent a concept which can represent a natural thing. But a symbol cannot represent a natural thing directly because it is required that a mind establishes the relation required in order that something can be a symbol. Therefore, it is necessary that a mind acts as a medium, between the symbol and the thing, in order that the symbol can be a symbol. This is what it means to be a "symbol" to be related to soemthing by a mind.

Do tree rings represent the age if the tree independent of someone looking at the tree rings? — Harry Hindu

No, that's nonsensical. A symbol must be interpreted to represent anything, and what it represents is a function of the interpretation.