My problem in the realm of ethics here is that it is forced on autonomous adults. — schopenhauer1

I think you ought to distinguish ethics from law. Law is enforced, but law is not properly "ethics". Ethics is a code of principles for moral behaviour, and adhering to that code is a matter of choice. You might have people criticize you for being unethical, but so long as you break no laws in your unethical behaviour, ethics will not be forced on you. I believe it is fundamental to western ethics, that ethical behaviour is a matter of choice.

I think it more properly belongs under a larger axiology though because it has to do with "value". — schopenhauer1

I think you are moving in the wrong direction here, to make "value" the broader term than "moral". But that's my opinion, and this is a matter for debate. I place morality as the highest possible value, and all other values must fall in line behind this. This is the Platonic tradition of "the good". The modern trend however, is to place quantitative value (mathematics) as the highest value. Then morality is segregated as a distinct form of value which is fundamentally incommensurable with quantitative value. Now we are left with at least two distinct and in some ways incompatible and competing hierarchies of value.

While it might be something we might recommend, to others, the negative ethics of preventing suffering when one clearly sees it, seems more obligatory. Once one gets into the realm of unnecesasry "force" onto autonomous beings (adults with usual faculties let's say) we are treading on not just amoral (yet axiological grounds), but actually unethical grounds. — schopenhauer1

I agree, this is a fundamental problem with negative ethics, enforcement is required. As I see it, in the western world moral principles have evolved in a positive direction, away from the negative. The Old Testament has ten commandments, negative. The New Testament has one principle, love your neighbour, positive. I believe the transition to positive is a Platonic influence, identification of "the good" as the first principle. Guiding people towards the good, as a general principle discourages them from the bad, such that a listing and outlawing of every bad thing is not of foremost importance.

Thus, ethics proper (not just axiological pursuits of "the good") if it is based on what is obligatory, seem to be balancing preventing harm/suffering while balancing not unreasonably forcing others into one's own agenda. — schopenhauer1

The principle of "the good" is based in what is natural, not in some form of obligation. As living beings we have needs and wants, so we naturally seek what is apprehended as "good". Obligation is a result of relations with others, and we are required to adjust our perception of "good" accordingly.

Force being the key here. Thus for example, procreation is definitely a force because life itself is the agenda of the challenge/overcoming-challenge (you may spin it as a chance for character-building). That doesn't matter what you call it, it is a forced program that others have to follow. If that person doesn't feel this program was something they wanted, you have have now assumed an agenda that violated their own autonomous attitudes, feelings, experiences, etc. — schopenhauer1

I'm not sure what you mean by "force" here. Could you expound? I don't see how procreation is a force. But I would see two distinct types of force, an internal force which inclines one to act, which I would associate with "the good" as described above, and an external type of force, which if it isn't consistent with the internal force is a hinderance to action. The difficulty in moral philosophy is the effort required to create consistency between these two types of forces. Consistency facilitates good actions.

However, the problem remains that there can be any number of internally logically coherent language games, and the sceptic may rightly ask for justification why a particular language game corresponds to an external reality.

IE, "hinge propositions" are part of the logical form of the system and not part of the content. — RussellA

This conclusion is clear evidence of how the metaphor of "language games" leads us astray if we take it seriously, as a literal description rather than a metaphor. The concept imposed as "language games" produces the need for hinge propositions as foundations for the games. But what is required from "hinge propositions" dictates that they are neither formalities (rules of a game) nor foundational content (subject matter). Upon analysis, the concept of "hinge propositions" turns out to be a logical impossibility, a fundamental incoherency produced from the assumption that "language games" provides a literal description, rather than a metaphor. In other words, Wittgenstein proposed language games as a metaphor, then took himself too seriously and had to look for hinge propositions as required to support the literal interpretation.

This little illustration helps us see that time is potentiality and exists only so far as motion is happening, — Gregory

Potentiality is a requirement for motion and is therefore prior to it. So is time a requirement for motion and is prior to it. How would you support your claim that potentiality only exists if motion is happening?

Things exist in between Aristotelian actuality and potentiality, and move by virtue of their material constitutions. — Gregory

In Aristotelian physics and metaphysics, the potentiality of a thing is its matter, and the actuality of a thing is its form.

Well, in my defence, I do find you verging on the incomprehensible. — Banno

Ten days ago it was more than just "verging on".

Meta does not see that he is writing nonsense. — Banno

Why pretend that you can understand what I'm saying? Is this what your form of anti-skepticism gives you, confidence that you know what another is saying when what the other is saying is incomprehensible to you?

A little more on this. I think the concept of 'hinge propositions' has a certain utility. As we use the sign 'hinge propositions,' its fuzzy public meaning will float and drift like a cloud. This semantic drift seems to be slow enough so that we can understand one another well enough to keep the conversation going. (Now we can say the same thing about 'semantic drift' and so on. We all depend on our ('blind') skill of navigating the rapids of language. ) — j0e

I think there is a problem with accepting a proposition or a premise on the basis of its utility, when it is known to be a falsity. This is what deception is made of, the utility of falsity.

Hinge propositions cannot be questioned within a language game - that's what they are. In order to doubt them we must change the way the game works - change the nature of the game itself. — Banno

The real solution is to recognize that language is not a sort of game at all, nor is it analogous to game playing. When we see that "game" when applied to language is just a metaphor, and not a description, then we can grasp the fact that there is no such thing as language games, and we do not need to step outside the language to doubt its terms.

Meta (in so far as he can be understood) apparently accepts a referential theory of meaning - the meaning of a word is the thing it names. After the Linguistic Turn, vey few philosophers would accept this. But that view has the result that Meta thinks a proposition can be compared to the world directly; that is, without considering how the proposition fits in to what we are doing with the words in which it occurs. So it is not the individual hinge proposition that can be doubted, but the entire game. Compare this to Quine's epistemology. So I think your critique of Meta hits the mark. — Banno

This is so far from what I've been expressing. Where did I say that a word refers to a thing? Just because I do not agree with you about the nature of meaning, doesn't mean that you can choose randomly, a theory of meaning which you do not agree with, and say that this is a theory I accept.

Preventing/reducing suffering seems to be the only ethical stance that avoids assuming others should deal with X thing, even if you yourself thinks it is valuable. It is much harder for people to eschew the idea of preventing suffering than it would be almost any other value (including the oft-praised "character-building" trope and "flourishing" when discussing virtue theories). — schopenhauer1

I don't think that this is a true claim. As Plato demonstrated pain and pleasure are categorical distinct. They are not simply the opposite of one another, such that pleasure is only derived by means of a delivery from pain. There are pleasures which do not have an opposing pain. Ethics may focus on bringing about such pleasures, and this would be completely distinct from preventing suffering.

So in a truly ethical (and not mixed with some other concern such as political decision-making), one must ask, "Is this going to reduce or prevent harm to someone without unreasonably assuming what is "best" for another person"? Procreation, for example fails this test, because it does the opposite of prevent harm, and at the same time, thinks what is best for someone else. — schopenhauer1

Preventing harm, whether it's to oneself or another ought not be the primary focus of ethics. The primary focus ought to be bringing about what is good. When we look at the future, we move toward what is designated as the "best" course of action, we do not make our decisions based on avoiding the worst. It is only when an extremely bad circumstance is imposing itself, that we must focus on avoiding it, but in most ordinary situations we are focused on bringing about the good. This is the same principle which Plato demonstrated, the good is not diametrically opposed to the bad. So avoiding the bad does not produce the good.

Why not doubt then this need for subjecting the system to doubt? — j0e

Sure, why not? But be careful not to categorize this doubt as a form of certainty. To doubt is to be uncertain as to yes or no. So to doubt whether or not the system ought to be subjected to doubt, is not to be certain in one way or the other.

This is the problem with the way that many here categorize doubt, as a form of certainty. Doubt is what prevents one from proceeding in action, whereas certainty is what induces action. So the doubters of skepticism, and there are many here in the forum, represent skepticism and doubt as the act of subjecting a belief, or beliefs, to doubt, thereby making the category mistake of representing doubt as an act supported by some form of certainty, rather than an unwillingness to act, supported by uncertainty. This is to incorrectly represent doubt by failing to see it as categorically distinct from certainty, thereby presenting it as the polar opposite within the same category. In reality certainty inclines us to act, while doubt inclines us to be unwilling to act, and they coexist as categorically distinct rather than being the extremes of the same category, and cancelling each other out as hot and cold would.

Instead the system is a big, baggy monster of ways that people do things, things that people 'know,' without having to think about it. — j0e

But then it is incorrect to call this a "system", that's the whole point. If we move away from the "system" representation, to the "big, baggy monster of ways that people do things" representation, then the idea of hinge propositions makes no sense at all, because there is no system for them to be supporting. If there are systems, then the systems themselves must be coherent, so to doubt any aspect of the system implies a doubt of the entire system, including any supposed hinge propositions. Either way, the notion of hinge propositions which are beyond doubt is fundamentally incorrect. That's why Kuhnian paradigm shifts are a reality, the entire system along with its foundations must be dismissed.

Why must hinge propositions be doubted? To what extra-systematic authority do you appeal? This 'system' is not intended as some philosopher's pet system but as something like a shared system of meanings and taken-for-granted quasi-facts. — j0e

A belief system must be coherent to fulfill the conditions of being a "system". This means that if one belief within the system is dubious, then the entire system is dubious due to all the beliefs being related through coherency. So it makes no sense to say that some beliefs within the system are dubious but the foundational ones, hinge propositions cannot be doubted. This is like taking a deductive argument, and saying that the logic is valid, the conclusion is dubious, but the premises are beyond doubt. If the logic is valid, we cannot doubt the conclusion without doubting the premises.

Why must hinge propositions be doubted? — j0e

I'm not really arguing that hinge propositions ought to be doubted. I am arguing that the concept of hinge propositions which are beyond doubt is itself incoherent. So my point is not that hinge propositions ought to be doubted, but that there is no such thing as hinge propositions.

I say 'quasi-facts' because worldviews change. — j0e

If you allow that worldviews change, then how can you subscribe to hinge propositions which are beyond doubt?

IMO, all concepts are more or less disputed and more or less unclear. — j0e

So I assume that you do not believe in hinge propositions either.

However, the problem remains that there can be any number of internally logically coherent language games, and the sceptic may rightly ask for justification why a particular language game corresponds to an external reality. — RussellA

Without any reference to "external reality" we can assume that one language game might have expressions, statements, or propositions which contradict those of another language game. Since this is the case, then we cannot say that the hinge propositions of any particular language game are beyond doubt. This is why it is unreasonable to designate beliefs which are seen as foundational to any particular language game as beyond doubt.

Zev Bechler, whom I quote briefly in my op, does indeed assume two kinds of potentiality.

The German philosopher Trendelenburg dealt with this topic:

"There is a problem, it seems, in ascribing such importance to Aristotle’s influence on Trendelenburg. For when he does comment on Aristotle’s explicit definition of motion, Trendelenburg explicitly rejects it. In Physics III,1 Aristotle had defined motion as “The actualization of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially.” (201a) Trendelenburg took issue with this definition in the Logische Untersuchungen on the grounds that the concepts of actuality and potentiality are less primitive than motion itself, and indeed need to be defined through it (I, 153). Potentiality made no sense, for example, unless it was understood as a direction toward something, and so as a motion." (Frederick C. Beiser - Late German Idealism. Trendelenburg and Lotze) — spirit-salamander

This criticism by Trendelenburg is not altogether truthful of Aristotle's concept of "potential", because it does not pay attention to the second usage of the term which you mention above. Aristotle not only assigns "potential" to the possibility of motion, but also to the possibility of substantial being itself, through the concept of "matter". It is this sense of potential which is more primitive than motion, because motion implies something which is moving, an object, thing, or being, and we see that the potential for existence of that object necessarily precedes its actual existence. This necessity, that the potential for an object is prior to its actual existence, is produced as a principle by inductive reasoning.

The cosmological argument deals with this sense of potential, the potential for existence of a thing, as a being, or an object, and this potential is given the name of matter by Aristotle. The argument shows how it is necessary to assume a form of actuality which is prior in time to the potential for an object or being (matter), in an absolute sense. Since motion is a thing, object, or being, changing place, this form of actuality which is prior to the existence of such a thing, cannot be classed as a motion.

There is a also distinction between "energy" as "potential" and "kinetic" made by physics. With "potential energy" only the "rest energy" is meant in contrast to the "kinetic energy". However, both are essentially an "actual" energy. So the actual "potential" energy can also be actualized. — spirit-salamander

I think you characterize energy wrongly here. Since energy is defined as the capacity to do work, it is inherently a potential, the potential for work to be done. We might say that energy has taken the place of Aristotle's "matter" in modern physics, as the fundamental potential. "Energy" represents the potential for work to be done, whereas "matter" represents the potential for the existence of an object. You can see the similarity So it is somewhat misleading to say that both kinetic and potential energy are "actual" energy, because "energy" by definition is potential.

But you run into a viscious circle justifying why "strength of character" matters other than Aristotle said it. — schopenhauer1

It's not a circle, but there is the possibility of an infinite regress. Why is A good? For the sake of B. Why is B good? For the sake of C. Etc.. That's why Aristotle posited happiness as the ultimate end, to curtail that possibility of infinite regress.

In my discussion with Mr. Pearce, the question is whether agony and despair are ever good, in the sense of valuable. In my examples, we value these in some relations with others, as we inflict them onto others and it helps us to get what we want from them. Intentionally inflicting agony and despair is a pressure tactic. It was evident in President Trump's so-called great deal making ability.

But in a much more subtle way, these feelings are a natural part of our relations with others, (not intentionally inflicted on others, as my examples bring out the extremes), and they form a large part of what we call empathy. So for example, (another extreme), if a good buddy is suddenly killed accidently, one feels great agony and despair. This is part of the empathy we have, we feel another's pain. And when the other is the victim of circumstances beyond our control, there is an immense feeling of agony and despair.

The issue I see is that it appears to be the wrong approach, to rid ourselves of the internal cause of such painful emotions, rather than addressing the external conditions which are conducive to these feelings. The real wrong, bad, or evil in the world, is the external conditions which induce within us those painful feelings, it is not the feelings themselves. So moving to rid ourselves of those feelings is nothing more than addressing the symptoms rather than the illness itself. And if we could succeed in removing such emotions, it would just render us oblivious to the real evil in the world.

In other words, these goals proposed, provide us only with an illusion of a better life, because what is really necessary for that better life, more power over the external world (omnipotence), is not addressed. But this is an extremely difficult issue because it involves human relations.

But short of radical scepticism, the claim that agony and despair are disvaluable by their very nature is compelling. If you have any doubt, put your hand in a flame. — David Pearce

I don't agree with this. As much as you apprehend it as compelling, it is not the truth. The point I made is that agony and despair are often seen as valuable when they are inflicted upon others. The extreme case is torture, but the common practice is the more subtle application of agony and despair in the pressure tactics of negotiating. So you cannot remove the value from these so easily. And if you look closely, you'll see that agony and despair play an integral role in most all human relationships. Without these feelings we'd be emotionless robots.

Now I really think it is a bad idea to turn human beings into emotionless robots no matter how strong your own personal opinion on this issue is. Perhaps you might compromise, and look at some types of agony and despair as inherently bad, or some intense forms of these as inherently bad, but I hope you don't really think that you can throw a blanket over them all like this. That is what Chattering Monkey has been trying to tell you. Some forms of pain are necessary to build strength. And not only is exposure to certain types of pain necessary to build physical strength, exposure to different types of agony and despair are necessary to build strength of character.

You could look at Aristotle's ethics for an example. Virtue does not consist of negating the bad for the sake of its opposite, it is to be found in the mean between the two opposing extremes. That is what we call moderation. We really cannot approach ethics with the attitude that such and such feelings are bad, let's annihilate all these bad feelings and we'll be left only with good feelings. So you might instead propose a way to take the edge off our feelings, eliminate the extremes. And I think the medical profession already works toward this end with medications. But even this is not completely accepted in our society because it dulls the emotions.

I don't know if you will find it better, but there are alternatives. Every object has potential to be painted, burned, thrown in the air, and lots of other things. But it is actual. All objects are like this and have always been this way. — Gregory

Here, you are assuming the existence of objects. The point of the cosmological argument though, is that every object comes into existence, and before it can actually exist there must be the potential for it. But that potential need not be actualized. This is why objects are said to be contingent. Since objects are contingent, each one's existence requires the appropriate cause, or causes, necessary for its existence. Therefore it is wrong to take the actual existence of objects for granted, as you do here.

Your idea of seinsfrage ("what is being") in terms of potency and actuality, to use the terminology of Heidegger, leads to a very strange notion of zeitlichkeit (the here and now as "this very presence"). "The sense of the world must lie outside the world" says Wittgenstein. If you don't want to read a Hegel book from to cover and really try to understand it (which is the best way to get past Thomism), then maybe try Being and Nothingness by Sartre, who tries in a very subtle way to cure Aristotle's horror of nothing — Gregory

Sorry to disappoint you, but I've read a lot of Hegel's material, and also a good portion of Being and Nothingness. And I really cannot even see how you might relate any of these to Thomism. They are worlds apart, and you don't seem to know what you are talking about. "Aristotle's horror of nothing"?

Did I ever say, or imply that my reasoning is infallible? If you can show me a way to understand the concepts of potential and actual which you think is better than the one I've derived from the Aristotelian tradition, then I'd be happy to discuss it with you. But all you seem to do is make oddball off the wall, or incoherent, assertions.

I will not accept the proposition that a distinction between potential and actual is not required, because the nature of time, and the evident division between future and past necessitates such a distinction as a first step toward understanding reality.

What if the system is not perfect? — j0e

Perfection is a requirement of logic, that is how logic works. Following the rules to the degree of perfection is necessary. If you propose a part of a logical system which does not follow the rules of that system, we must exclude it as not being part of the system. Otherwise logic loses its effectiveness because invalidities are acceptable.

It seems to me that you are thinking of some philosophical system when the issue is rather what 'reasonable' people take for granted, some of which the 'reasonable' people of the future will find absurd or cruel. — j0e

I think reasonable people will see the need to have logic rule over any system of beliefs. If you are proposing that beliefs ought to be ruled by a system which is not a logical system, it is rather an imperfect system, then you rob yourself of the capacity to exclude doubt. The exclusion of doubt requires perfection in the logical system.

This is the point I made, which Banno scoffed at. Allowing that a system of beliefs may be imperfect means that the entire system needs to be subjected to doubt. This is proof that the idea of hinge propositions, which it is unreasonable to doubt, is fundamentally flawed.

If we make an analytical separation between the rules of the system (formal aspect), and the subject matter, and adhere to perfection in the rules, as the means to exclude doubt, then the subject matter, content becomes the source of mistake. Since the subject matter comes from outside the system and therefore has not been subjected to the rules of the system, doubting of the subject matter is a requirement, if certainty is the goal. The proposed hinge propositions are subject matter, content, and therefore need to be doubted, just like any other portion of the subject matter.

209. The existence of the earth is rather part of the whole picture which forms the starting-point of belief for me.

...

211. Now it gives our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form. Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts. — OC

Wittgenstein misuses the word "form" here. Such ideas like "the existence of the earth" do not form starting points, nor do they give our way of looking at things, a form. Form is principles of formulae, definition, logical rules, etc.. The "existence of the earth" is not such a principle, because "existence" is a complicated and very much disputed concept. That the earth must in some way "exist" comes about as a conclusion, as a requirement when we seek to justify other beliefs. And the way that we seek to justify these beliefs shapes the concept of "existence". That's why "existence" is a disputed and unclear concept. The basic beliefs roll around in people's heads, and off their tongues and pens, for many years as a the subject matter of thinking, with an inherent rule or form (such a bud belongs to a specific type of tree for example), without asking to be justified by "the existence of the earth".

But when we seek to extend the rules, the formal structures, uniting them such that all of our beliefs must maintain coherency within a single system, each itself justified by others, then we approach the need to conclude "the existence of the earth". But this idea, "the existence of the earth", does not give our way of looking at things their form, it is a conclusion derived from our way of looking at things, deemed as necessary to give that way of looking at things a place within a larger unity. The larger unity is an attempt at completion, logical perfection within the distinct belief systems. So it is derived from the form of our way of looking at things, it does not give our way of looking at things its form.

You're say in response to the question "how many parts does a tree have": "our minds are fallible"

You're response to the question of whether a lamp or a street sign have one form or many: "our minds are fallible"

Yet you think you have fully figured out that there is deity based on two petty ideas? — Gregory

What?

As you yourself have repeatedly stated, in this thread, your proof is that 2+2=4. And, you've also stated that you recognize that I do not dispute the fact that 2+2=4.

So, I am acknowledging that your proof is irrelevant, as I've done before.

Why do you keep bringing up, and referring to, an irrelevant proof, as if it is something which is relevant to our disagreement?

Everything has potential and actuality, simplicity and matter. Its one reality that goes back to infinity and to nowhere — Gregory

In other words, you can't distinguish between the potential for something, and that thing's actual existence, so you conclude that the two coexist for eternally.

Why are you going on about this? — fishfry

Me? I was happy to participate in this thread, and proceed in many other discussions with you, without ever mentioning this small disagreement we have. We probably agree on many other things. But it seems you have some need to keep bringing it up.

Metaphysician Undercover is on record stating that he does not believe that 2 + 2 and 4 denote the same mathematical object. He's wrong but confirmed in his belief. I did at one point present to him a clean proof from the Peano axioms in which I defined "2", "4", "+", and "=", and proved that 2 + 2 = 4. Of course the truth of any symbolic expression depends on the interpretation given to the symbols; but it is NOT in dispute that 2 + 2 and 4, with their standard interpretations, denote the same mathematical object. — fishfry

See, it's you who brought up the past. Obviously, for you it's not yet over. But that doesn't surprise me.

I think that the easiest way to understand the cosmological argument is from the way that it is expressed by Aristotle. He demonstrated that anything eternal must be actual, it cannot be potential. Any potential requires an actuality to be actualized. The actuality must be prior in time to the potential, because if there was ever a potential without the actuality required to actualize it, it could not ever actualize itself. This would mean that there would be forever potential without actuality. However we observe the reality of actuality, therefore we must conclude that actuality is temporally prior to potentiality.

Aquinas expounds on this in his "first way". He denies that potentiality and actuality are coexisting eternities by explaining that a thing cannot be both actual and potential in the same respect. He also describes how if there is a succession of things, activities in this case, there must be a first, as an infinite regress is impossible.

That infinite regress is impossible is a principle commonly argued against. And we can assume the reality of infinite regress if we so desire, but as Aquinas explains, this assumption is repugnant to the intellect. What such an assumption does is render any particular motion as unintelligible by removing its start and end. If we assume that a particular motion has no start or end, then we do not have a complete understanding of that motion. In reality we see that no motions can be perpetual. The difference between start and end is what gives the motion a temporal context. However, it is evident, by the use of infinities in modern mathematics, that the possibility of infinite regress is not denied in the application of laws of physics. This contributes to the unintelligibility of motion which we find in quantum particles, and is evidence that failure to observe these Aristotelian principles is a hinderance to modern science.

It's a basic proof that 2 + 2 = 4 from the Peano axioms. — fishfry

You know I do not dispute the fact that 2+2=4. That's why I'm fulling justified in ignoring your strawman proof.

You never even bothered to acknowledge my proof. I asked you repeatedly to criticize it or disagree with it and you just ignored those posts too. And now you're making claims contrary to facts. Your recent objections to the proof are three years after the fact. This is a silly conversation. I'm not playing anymore. — fishfry

I really don't remember the specifics of your so-called proof. I remember that you produced something you called a proof, and it was very easy for me to show that it did not prove what you intended it to prove, through reference to the law of identity. So I demonstrated this and moved along. You did not seem to have a firm grasp of the law of identity at the time, so you did not seem to understand how your supposed proof failed. Then you kept referring back to this supposed "proof", as if it really proved what it didn't.

If you really think that you have a proof that "2+2" denotes the same mathematical object as "4", when "same" is held to the rigorous definition of the law of identity, then produce it again, and I'll show you how it fails, again. Maybe this time you'll pay respect to the law of identity.

The law is a system of rules adopted by or which were adopted by a controlling authority or authorities in a nation or society applicable to the conduct of those who are citizens/members of that nation or society, and considered by the relevant authority to be binding, the violation of which may result in the imposition of criminal or civil penalties imposed through a recognized system of enforcing and applying it. — Ciceronianus the White

According to how you have characterized laws already, I think you are wrong to say here "the law is...". You'd have to say "a law is...", because you've provided no premise whereby you might put one law above another law if two distinct societies have laws which are not compatible. So one law might govern one society, and another law govern another society, but we can't say one or the other is "the law", unless we are members of one society, calling our own laws "the law". In this case we'd have to exclude the laws of other societies from the title "the law".

But my question concerned the existence of a law. You seem to be adamant on the assumption that laws exist. What type of existence do you think this "system of rules" has? Does it exist as writing on paper, or some other medium, or does it exist as the writing interpreted by a mind? The difference is significant because in one case laws need to be interpreted, and the interpretation might be subjective, but in the other case they are already interpreted, and so are inherently subjective.

Legal positivism/realism doesn't maintain that every law is good. It merely maintains that every law is a law. It doesn't cease to exist if it's bad. — Ciceronianus the White

Can you explain to me exactly where, or how a law exists? In other words, where is the law in relation to interpretation? Is the law what is written on the paper? If so, what distinguishes a law from other things written on paper? Are all written things laws? If it is the interpretation, the meaning derived by the reader, how do you account for differences? Is each different interpretation a different law? Or do you assume a separate perfect, ideal interpretation which is the law.

Let me see if I properly apprehend your position. There's an independent world, but there's no shared access to it. Because of this lack of commonality in our distinct approaches to it, the independent world is theoretical. So I assume that this is not the independent world itself which is theoretical, but each individual's approach to it, which is theoretical. Each person has one's own theoretical independent world, but we still assume a real non-theoretical independent world which is separate from us.

How do we validate "science" then? From what I understand, the principles of science are validated by empirical evidence, yet according to the principles above any such science must be made compatible with one's own theoretical independent world, to be accepted as correct. The theoretical independent world within each of us, provides the standard for judgement of what to accept or not to accept within the realm of science.

So, when you say

Science suggests I’m not special. — David Pearce

How do you justify this, or even find principles to accept it as having a grain of truth? You have described principles which make each and every individual person completely separate, distinct and unique, "special". Now you claim that science tells you that you are not special, and this is the basis for your claim that sentient beings everywhere disvalue agony and despair.

Agony and despair are inherently disvaluable for me. Science suggests I’m not special. Therefore I infer that agony and despair are disvaluable for all sentient beings anywhere: — David Pearce

I do not believe that science suggests you are not special. I think science suggests exactly what you argued already, that we're all distinct, "special", each one of us having one's own distinct theoretical independent world. And I think that this generalization, that we are all somehow "the same", is an unjustified philosophical claim. So I think you need something stronger than your own personal feelings, that agony and despair are disvaluable to you, to support your claim that they are disvaluable to everyone.

I think your claim to 'science" for such a principle is a little off track, because we really must consider what motivates human beings, intentions, and science doesn't yet seem to have a grasp on this. So we can see for example, that agony and despair (of others) is valued in some cases such as torture, and even in a more subtle sense, but much more common, as a negotiating tactic. People apply pressure to others, to get what they want. And if you believe that agony and despair ought not be valued like this, we need to defer to some higher moral principles to establish the right of that. Where are we going to get these higher moral principles when we deny the reality of true knowledge concerning the common world, the external world which we must share with each other?

However, if we consider what people want, we can validate science and generalizations through "the necessities of life". Don't you not think that we need some firm knowledge, some truths, concerning the external world which provides us with the necessities of life, in order to produce agreement on moral principles? Would you agree that it is the external world which provides us with the necessities of life? Isn't this what we all have in common, and shouldn't this be our starting point for moral philosophy, the necessities of life which we must take from the external world, rather than your own personal feelings about agony and despair?

I've just been ignoring those claims because you ignored my reply to your proof.. And you continue to ignore this. If I remember correctly, your proposed proof violated the law of identity, and you refused to acknowledge this. And that violation of the law of identity was what I was already discussing in the first place, so your proposed proof was completely irrelevant because it did nothing to mitigate this violation..

The proof shows that the two expressions denote the same mathematical object. But we're making progress. For three years (has it been that long?) you totally ignored the proof. Now at least you're acknowledging it. — fishfry

I didn't ignore the proof, I showed you how it was not a proof of what you claimed it was. But we could go through it again if you want.

And Davidson would certainly not agree that language isn't necessary for knowing and believing. Nor I suspect would Wittgenstein.

But yes, doubt comes with propositional content and hence is also inherently a linguistic enterprise - a language game. — Banno

What I meant to say is that these premises are simply unacceptable, as false, just like your claim that knowledge is shared, which I can't seem to find now. It must have been deleted for low quality. If knowledge was necessarily shared, deception would be impossible. But deception is very real, and it consists of a person hiding what one knows. And since the skeptic can doubt what another is saying, knowing that deception is possible, without any understanding of what the other is saying, doubt does not require a language game.

The intent of honest communication produces language games. The intent to deceive produces doubt, destroying the possibility of language games.

And Davidson would certainly not agree that language isn't necessary for knowing and believing. Nor I suspect would Wittgenstein.

But yes, doubt comes with propositional content and hence is also inherently a linguistic enterprise - a language game. — Banno

Oops, posted accidentally.

This just indicates that the concept of energy is deficient. It is not applicable where it is being applied, to the vast expanse of the universe, because the reality of spatial expansion is not accounted for. However, this brings up another question, how applicable is the concept of energy? If spatial expansion is a real part of a very large extension of space, then it is probably also a real part of a small extension of space. So the point mentioned in Lee Smolin's Time Reborn is that the concept "energy", really has a narrow range of applicability, the midsize we might call it. It is not applicable to very large things, nor is it applicable to very small things. It's an indication of how little we really understand the universe.

I don't believe I have ever said that you deny 2 + 2 = 4. I am always careful to note that you deny that 2 + 2 and 4 denote the same mathematical object. Can you please point me to an instance where I failed to make that distinction? — fishfry

You just said:
"I did at one point present to him a clean proof from the Peano axioms in which I defined "2", "4", "+", and "=", and proved that 2 + 2 = 4."
If you knew that I didn't dispute 2+2=4, then your so-called proof is an intentional strawman.

If your definition of "=" is "denotes the same object as", then you're begging the question with a false premise.

I did at one point present to him a clean proof from the Peano axioms in which I defined "2", "4", "+", and "=", and proved that 2 + 2 = 4. — fishfry

I never denied that 2+2=4. That would be stupid. What I deny is that "=" indicates is the same as. I think that to believe such a thing would be stupid as well. So your proof that 2+2=4 really does nothing for your claim that "2+2" denotes the same object as "4".

Consider lucid dreaming. When having a lucid dream, one entertains the theory that one's entire empirical dreamworld is internal to the transcendental skull of a sleeping subject. Exceptionally, one may even indirectly communicate with other sentient beings in the theoretically-inferred wider world:
https://www.the-scientist.com/news-opinion/researchers-exchange-messages-with-dreamers-68477
What happens when one "wakes up"? To the naive realist, it's obvious. One directly perceives the external world. But the inferential realist recognises that the external world can only be theoretically inferred. For a nice account of the world-simulation metaphor, perhaps see Antti Revonsuo's Inner Presence (2006): — David Pearce

I have no problem with the idea that the external world is theoretically inferred, because I lean toward idealism, but I think "theoretically inferred" is a stretch. This is because inference is a conscious rational process, and I think recognition that there are things external or independent of oneself is a deeper capacity, not dependent on logical inference

However, naive realism and naive idealism can be very similar in the sense that they both suffer the same problem, which is that without a medium between the perception and the thing sensed, we cannot account for the existence of mistakes. So from the idealist perspective, there must be something which separates the ideas of your mind from the ideas of my mind, otherwise we'd be thinking each others thoughts. What exists between us is that medium, and we call it the external world.

You remark, "To say that something is theoretical is to say that it is mind-dependent." But when a physicist talks of, say, the theoretical existence of other Hubble volumes beyond our cosmological horizon (s/he certainly doesn’t intend to make a claim of their mind-dependence. Of course, how our thoughts and language can refer is a deep question. Naturalising semantic content is hard: https://www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#aboutness — David Pearce

I don't think this analogy really suffices to resolve the issue. If we make the external world consist solely of possibilities (as in the use of "theoretical" in your example), then we need some principles whereby we discern what is real, actual, or true to the world. The "world" is what is supposed to be common to us. Aristotle used hylomorphism for example, the concept of "matter" gives us the realm of possibilities external to us, while "form" is applied to what is real, actual, allowing us to understand through common terms.

If we do not have any such principles to apply, then there is nothing to prevent your theoretical world from being completely different from my theoretical world. And there need not be any commonality, or even an inclination toward consistency between us, because there is no single reality, or the Truth, which we ought to conform our ideas to. So allowing that the world is theoretical in this way, will only increase strife between various people who have no desire to make their theories compatible with the theories of others. And strife produces conflict.

Unique individuals?
Yes, our egocentric world-simulations each have a different protagonist. Yet we are not uniquely unique. When I said that "science suggests I'm not special", I was alluding simply to how the fact that I seem to be the hub of reality is (probably!) a fitness-enhancing hallucination: — David Pearce

Now don't you see the problem here? If the external world is theoretical, as you said, then a human being's mind, as the holder of a theory, is by that fact, the hub of reality. We cannot escape this unless we have some way to get the theory outside of the mind. Therefore under your idealist principle that the external is theoretical, that I am the hub of reality is a true principle. And if this principle is "fitness-enhancing", it must be good. So it is clearly wrong to call this an hallucination unless we deny that the world is theoretical. To say that this is an hallucination is an act of self-deception, but for what end is that deception being applied? If it is not self-deception, is it aimed at others?

That makes sense to me. It was my understanding though, that space only grow between those aspects of non-space that are so far apart that gravity no longer influences them? I don't know if that is a cluster, or super cluster or what, but space is not increasing the distance between us and the earth, earth from sun, sun from galaxy etc. — James Riley

Imagine that wherever there are massive objects, spatial expansion is slowed, and the result is what we observe as gravity.


Thanks for the link fishfry, I do appreciate it. If I had a bad attitude at the time, it was probably because you started the post with "2+2=4".

If some other force is at play to cause the different rates, then I guess I might not be at the center so long as there was an equally spaced, equal number of parts speeding away at their various rates. — James Riley

I would say the evidence suggests that gravity is the other force which is at play here, causing different rates of expansion. But gravity and expansion might actually just be two aspects of, or two ways that we approach, the very same thing.

I believe in the existence of mind-independent reality (cf. https://www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#idsolipsism). Its status from my perspective is theoretical not empirical. — David Pearce

What exactly do you mean by "theoretical" here? I see this statement as self-contradicting. To say that something is theoretical is to say that it is mind-dependent. To say that reality is theoretical, but mind-independent is to contradict yourself. In other words I don't see this as a valid way to account for the reality of he external world, to say that it is theoretical, yet also mind-independent It can only be one or the other.

Agony and despair are inherently disvaluable for me. Science suggests I’m not special. — David Pearce

Are you not a unique individual? It is this very idea, that what is valuable to me, is valuable to everyone else, which is the root of jealousy, coveting, greed, hoarding, and numerous other vices. This is probably why Plato, in The Republic, centered justice around having a respect for each others differences, rather than the false assumption that we are all the same, which Science doesn't really suggest.

You're off on some strange tangent. Someone alluded to a recent discovery in physics. You asked what it was. I gave you a link to a New York Times article on the subject. Your next post was bizarre and off the wall. I know you think you're making a point, but you're not. — fishfry

You asked me "Would you put the earth at the center of the universe in denial of subsequent discoveries?". I only wanted to show you that, "subsequent discoveries" indicate that the evidence points toward the earth being at the center of the universe. So as much as you are having difficulty understanding what I am saying, this is due to the confused nature of your questioning.

We can go back to what I said before that if you want. You referred me to an article which said that the muon doesn't behave as it is supposed to, and this calls into question the validity of the Standard Model. I said, this is no problem because they'll just dream up some mathematical principles to account for these exceptions. That's what they do, it's evident with dark energy, dark matter, etc.. When anomalies appear, instead of questioning the underlying theories which produce the anomalies in application, they dream up some principles which account for them.

I am not personally sure of why we appear to be at the center of it, or if an observer in a distant galaxy would also see themselves at the center. — fishfry

We appear to be at the center, because this is a map of the expanding universe. If the substratum of the universe, space-time itself, is expanding, then it must expand from every point. The result is that any point becomes the center point, when mapped in this way.

The overall point of my somewhat random replies, is that until we get an understanding of what spatial expansion actually is, there's no point to thinking that any of the models which physicists or cosmologists come up with are correct models.

. Unless rather naively we believe in free will... — David Pearce

But shared access is still a fiction. — David Pearce

You deny the truth of a shared external reality. If you also deny the reality of free will of the individual, as inferred from the individual's capacity to create the external simulation, then how can you ground any moral ethics? What is the cause of human activities if neither the external nor the internal? Where do you position "activities" in general in this schema if they are not caused by the external reality, nor the internal free will? Is activity an illusion? If so, then why do anything?

Knowledge is not individual, Meta. It is shared. — Banno

Thanks for telling me your dreams.

It might be a judge decreeing an interpretation of a law in a manner that comports to morality, and that would require a single person. — Hanover

This does not resolve the issue, because now we have the question of what makes one person's judgement that such an interpretation is the correct one, and that the judge's claim to morality is a true one.

The issue now being that intent to morality doesn't necessarily produce morality, because mistakes occur. This is why I find it difficult to understand how we can even talk about laws correlating with morality. If sometimes they do, and sometimes they do not, how could we ever know whether they do or don't? And if we cannot, there's no point to discussing it.

. The word “theology” means logic about God; theo means God. But there can be no logic about God. There is love about God, love for God, but no logic about God. There are no proofs possible. The only proof is the existence of the mystic. The presence of Dionysius, of Ramakrishna, of Bahauddin – the presence of these people is the proof that God exists, otherwise there is no proof. Because Buddhas have walked on the earth, there are a few footprints of God left behind on the shores of time. — Anand-Haqq

This is not true. The cosmological argument distinctly proves the need to assume a creator "God" to account for the reality of what we experience as the sensible world. Grasping the principles behind it, and the forcefulness of this argument is just as much a "revelation" as anything else.

Somewhere logic and love have to meet, because they both exist. — Anand-Haqq

When the need for "God" is grasped by logic it is undeniable, and this is where love and logic meet. Excluding the possibility of grasping God through logic is a mistake which will only prevent the union of love and logic, by feeding the whims of those atheists who insist God is illogical.

There's stuff we don't know anything about.

When folk talk about that stuff, despite not knowing anything about it, they are being mystical.

Honest folk will remain quiet. — Banno

This is just a statement of personal bias. What you really mean is "stuff I don't know anything about", and you fallaciously conclude that this means "stuff we don't know anything about", And when you accept this faulty proposition you can proceed to the deductive conclusion that those talking about it know nothing about it. See below:

"There are these two young fish swimming along and they happen to meet an older fish swimming the other way, who nods at them and says “Morning, boys. How’s the water?” And the two young fish swim on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the other and goes “What the hell is water?” — Manuel

Banno is one of those young fish. But Banno proceeds to the conclusion that since "we" don't know what the hell water is, the older fish who uses that term doesn't know either.