I always thought of myself as an introvert, and I am, but the problem is it became an excuse to dodge socializing, even in situations where it was really in my best interest to try. — Mijin

How do you know though, that it was really in your best interest to try? If socializing makes you feel uncomfortable, then you'd have to assume something which has a higher priority than your comfort, to make you say that in some situations socializes is in your best interest. Suppose there are some "things" which you can get from socializing. Are those things really more valuable than being happily anti-social?

You have said that our understanding of gravity is flawed.
The theory of gravity itself does not include the suggestion that we necessarily find the center of gravity.

However, finding the center of gravity is a useful mathematical simplification, and has been proven to result in accurate predictions. — Mijin

Right, our understanding of gravity is very clearly flawed, because all we have is a multitude of different ways of representing the effects of gravity on things, chiefly the movement of things. That there is not one unified "theory of gravity", only different ways of representing its effects, indicates that we do not understand the supposed physical thing referred to as "gravity". Some principles are good for modeling its effects in one context, while other principles are required for another context, depending on the type of prediction you want to make. And, the two principal ways, Newtonian and Einsteinian, model it in completely different ways. Clearly we have never made contact with the supposed physical thing called gravity, and in reality there is something completely unknown there which is responsible for these effects. And, we can model the effects in opposing ways depending on the context, and still come up with acceptable predictions.

You have this backwards.
Dark energy is a phenomenon we have discovered on the largest cosmological scales. At those scales it appears proportional to distance.
We assume this force operates on all scales, and when we do the calculations, we find that if the force is proportional to distance then it should be immeasurably small on earthly scales, and completely cancelled out by gravity within our galaxy.

So it's not that we need to prove that cosmic expansion does not have significant effects on smaller scales. It's that the null hypothesis is that there are no such effects until we see them. — Mijin

This does not address the issues I pointed to. If the effects of spatial expansion are observable to us only at large scales, and not at small scales, then our modeling of it will show it as proportional to distance. But until we separate out the effects of gravity from the effects of spatial expansion, at small scales, we cannot even say that the effects of spatial expansion are not observable at small scales. We have no principles to distinguish the effects of spatial expansion from the effects of gravity. And, since we do not even know the thing which causes the effects which are referred to as "gravity", it is very possible that these effects are actually caused by spatial expansion. If this were the case, then at one scale we'd be looking at the cause, "spatial expansion", and the other scale the effect, "gravity", of the very same thing.

Obviously then, the two would not be present in each other's scale, because they'd each be a different way of representing the very same thing. But until the relationship between them is established we could not claim to have an understanding of either one. And look what would happen in the mid-scale range if this were the case. If we chose "gravity" for the model, then all the motions of objects, which are actually cause by spatial expansion would not be properly accounted for because spatial expansion is not represented in that model. There'd be many anomalies and we'd have to posit strange things like dark energy and dark matter to account for these.

No model of gravity includes cosmic expansion. This is just flat out wrong. — Mijin

That's exactly my point, and the very reason why the models of gravity are flat out wrong. When gravity is modeled there is no cosmic expansion. When comic expansion is modeled there is no gravity. There is no model of the very real situation in which these two coexist and are active together. Until you model the relationship between the two you cannot assume to have an understanding of either one.

What are ‘things’? This is where the assumption of a self-conscious system, in recognising concepts or things, distorts the way we understand the structure of reality. If it were not for our temporal relation to the ‘thing’, then there is no other distinction between its description and creation. — Possibility

The temporality of a thing is its reality. Having temporal extension makes a thing real because there is no such thing as existence which is just an instant (no extension in time). Therefore "our temporal relation to the 'thing'" is our access to the thing's reality.

This ‘thing’ we create is conceptual, in relation to what is real, and so the blueprint is a rendering of relational structure, the limited perception of which consolidates that particular form within the mind. Existentially prior to the ‘thing’ is only a relation to what is real: pure possibility structured by the limited perception of the observer (who consolidates) and the limited expression of the observed. — Possibility

The blueprint of the thing, which precedes the thing's material existence, is just as much a part of the thing's reality as is the thing's material existence, because it is a necessary part of the thing's existence.
So to remove this part of the thing's existence, as not real, is to make a false representation of the thing's reality.

And again, this assumption of intentionality in time turns creativity into specific rules of how events ought to be done, rather than a variability in how events can be done, limited by awareness, connection and collaboration. ‘Ought’ implies a priori knowledge, an illusion created by the temporal shift of conscious perception, constrained to a logical structure of time. — Possibility

You are reversing what I said. You had mentioned rules, and I said rules imply "ought". Ought implies intention. But intention does not necessarily imply ought, that's why the will is free. So the person with intent makes a plan to bring about the desired material situation, and this is reality. But whether or not the person ought to do this is another issue altogether. However, if we start with the assumption of rules which one ought to follow, then intention is already implied. So intentionality does not necessarily turn creativity into rules and "ought", that's a misrepresentation which is a reversal of reality.

The invariance required to describe a ‘thing’ is an internal relation of perceived potentiality, but no such invariance is required to create the ‘thing’ prior to describing its form, and no such existence need be assumed. — Possibility

But this is the difficult point. In order for a thing to be a thing, it must have a form, and this implies invariance. Because we believe that there were things in existence before human intention, we want to remove the intention, which we know to cause invariance by the examples above, so that we can have a real thing which is not dependent on intention. We cannot say that "no such invariance is required to create the 'thing'", because to be a thing implies such invariance. And, we have no principles which will tell us where that invariance could come from other than intention. So where can we go?

I’m not saying that mathematics produces conclusions that are unintelligible, but that they make use of imaginary numbers and infinities - allowing for their illogical possibility - to produce intelligible conclusions from what would otherwise remain unintelligible. This is not misunderstanding - rather, it enables understanding unbound by logic. — Possibility

When the conclusions contain contradiction, such as the idea that the same energy is transmitted both as a wave and as a particle, this must be classed as misunderstanding. Despite your claim that this might be somehow be "intelligible" it is not. There is no such thing as understanding which is unbound by logic. You should easily see that this is illogical and clearly a misunderstanding. Logic is the means for understanding, so anything outside the bounds of logic cannot be understood.

If modern science is so great then how come we are threatening our very existence with technological devices today? — Thinking

It is very evident, that the knowledge of how to make a device precedes the knowledge of how to safely use it. This is mostly because a device must be in use for a period of time before we get an understanding of how it will actually be used. Science itself is very similar, it advances our knowledge at a great speed, and we are very quick to employ the knowledge, without understanding the effects which using that knowledge will have. The destruction of the ozone layer is a good example of this. This makes the ethics of using scientific knowledge very difficult.

In order to win sympathy, you need to show interest in people. Only if you are interested in them just to gain sympathy, you are not really interested: your focus is not on them, but on you, it is subjective, then that will fail. So the practice is about teaching yourself to have a genuine interest in people. In other words, you don’t need to think about sympathy. Because? Because it is implied, you will gain sympathy anyway. If you are really interested in listening to the person, he’ll sympathize with you even if you don't thinking about it; so why are you going to try to win sympathy, if sympathy is already built in? So the focus shifts from winning sympathy to genuine interest, and so on many other things. I mean, there will be a change in the axis of conduct, and then you will see that the sympathy you want to get is not worth the effort, because it is very easy. Then you will not arrive with shyness and such because you know that what you are offering is good. — Rafaella Leon

I don't see the relationship you are trying to draw between shyness and sympathy. Anyway, the issue at question is not a matter of preventing shyness from arriving, it is a matter of getting rid of it once it is here.

So you leave the subjectivism of youth because you know that you have true love for one person or for several people (not only in the sexual domain, for instance). And notice well: if you have true love and that love is rejected, you don’t feel depressed, you don’t feel diminished, you feel sorry for the person. I mean, as your concern goes up, you lose that fear, that fear of not being accepted, of not being liked. Because being liked is the easiest thing in the world! There is no reason to waste so much time on it. Have a genuine interest, have a true love for people, and they will like you; and if they don’t like it, then you’ll be sure they’re stupid. — Rafaella Leon

In other words, if the others don't behave in the way required to make my shyness go a way, it is because they are stupid. "Everybody knows that the world is full of stupid people" - The Refreshments. So just how far down do you want to go?

In short, you gradually extract yourself from the judgment of others as you gain certainty of your intentions. It is not that you will despise the opinion of others — we should never despise the opinion of others — you simply do not need it because you already know what you are doing. All courses that promise to "overcome" shyness are concentrated and always return to that: love your neighbor. Anyone knows, without having to take a theology or philosophy course, that the Greek word "love" has its variations — eros, philos, and agape — and the word used to say that God is love in 1 John 4:8 is "Agape". Love is sacrifice, objective and disinterested. — Rafaella Leon

OK, so let's say that I know what I am doing, and I have confidence, but I'm still shy. What next? Is my confidence fake? How do I get real confidence? And how can I love my neighbours when they're not making my shyness go away, and are therefore stupid?

They had the "not Trump" turn out now but that's gone next time. — Benkei

Not if Trump maintains any sway, which he seems to have a lot of right now, then he'll be right back next time.

I guess Trump does not have any. — tim wood

Wow, What a surprise! Maybe that's why all those judges keep rejecting him, I thought it was because they're all part of the anti-Trump, anti-America conspiracy.

Firstly, the expansion is approximately 6 km per megaparsec per second. Scaling that to the human body, say, we get an expansion rate of around one ten thousandth of the width of a proton... This doesn't make a huge difference when calculating eg the gravitational force on a human on Earth. — Mijin

The problem is, that the rate of expansion which you give is based in conclusions about the relation between gravity and spatial expansion derived from models which employ a center of gravity. A proper relation between gravity and spatial expansion cannot be derived from such a model, because spatial expansion is not centered like that, it occurs everywhere. So your quoted rate of expansion is derived from false premises, and probably doesn't represent anything even close to the real feature of the universe which is called spatial expansion. Cosmologists really do not know the rate of expansion, or how it might vary from one place to another, or vary from small scale to large scale, or even the simple issue of how gravity effects it, or how expansion effects gravity..

And secondly, on scales up to anything intra-galactic, the expansion is not enough to overcome gravity. — Mijin

Whether or not spatial expansion overcomes gravity is not the issue here. The fact is that spatial expansion is very real, and if its effects at a small scale are just incorporated into the model of gravity as one representation, called gravity, then this model is flawed, in the sense of incorrect. It is incorrect because it does not separate out the effects of expansion from the effects of gravity. No matter how small the effects of expansion are, in relation to the effects of gravity, you cannot claim to have an understanding of either one until you can represent them individually at a range of different scales. You cannot do this while representing an object as having a center of gravity, because there is no such center to spatial expansion, so the relationship between gravity and expansion would vary depending on distance from the center of gravity. But obviously the representation of an object having a center of gravity is flawed in the sense of false, because the form or shape of any object is not perfectly round. So despite the fact that the representation, of a center of gravity, is very useful for prediction, it is false, and application of this falsity in models makes it extremely difficult to develop a good understanding of spatial expansion.

But, since gravity falls off with the square of distance, over vast scales, galaxies can be slowly pushed apart by this expansion. — Mijin

Here's what Wikipedia says. Notice the mention of "faster than the speed of light". I don't understand why you would describe something faster than the speed of light as "slowly pushed apart".

In June 2016, NASA and ESA scientists reported that the universe was found to be expanding 5% to 9% faster than thought earlier, based on studies using the Hubble Space Telescope.[2]

While special relativity prohibits objects from moving faster than light with respect to a local reference frame where spacetime can be treated as flat and unchanging, it does not apply to situations where spacetime curvature or evolution in time become important. These situations are described by general relativity, which allows the separation between two distant objects to increase faster than the speed of light, although the definition of "separation" is different from that used in an inertial frame. This can be seen when observing distant galaxies more than the Hubble radius away from us (approximately 4.5 gigaparsecs or 14.7 billion light-years); these galaxies have a recession speed that is faster than the speed of light. — Wikipedia:Expansion of the Universe

If anyone wishes to suggest science should be using a different methodology then step 1 is showing what this alternative method allows us to accomplish. — Mijin

From Wikipedia on "scientific method":

It involves formulating hypotheses, via induction, based on such observations; experimental and measurement-based testing of deductions drawn from the hypotheses; and refinement (or elimination) of the hypotheses based on the experimental findings.

Clearly there are two forms of logic which ought to be properly applied within the scientific method, induction within the formulation of hypotheses, and deductions from the hypotheses utilized in experimental verification. Experimentation is applied to the deductive conclusions. So if either, or both, the inductive conclusions, or deductive conclusions are faulty, then the underlying assumption, that the predictive power demonstrated in experimentation proves the hypothesis, is completely undermined.

What I am concerned with are claims that such and such experimentation verifies a specific hypothesis when the logic between, supporting the claim, is unsound. has brought up a good example. The Michelson-Morley experiments are often claimed to prove that there is no aether. In reality, what this experimentation demonstrates is that the relationship between objects and the aether (if there is an aether) is not as expected. Therefore it is unknown whether or not there is an aether, it is only known that the relation between object and aether is not as hypothesized.

Again, please publish your data and receive your Nobel prize. If you're right and physicists are wrong, that's a big deal and you should reap those rewards. — Mijin

I told you, I have no desire for those gratuitous awards. There's a reason why I call myself "Undercover".

No inconsistency. We're simply talking about means versus ends here.
I might test whether my car's tires are inflated by kicking them. Is my goal to kick tires? — Mijin

No, we are not talking about means versus ends here, because you haven't demonstrated the end which predictive capacity is the means for. It is necessary to specify the end in order to judge something's usefulness as a means. Predictive capacity may be the means toward all sorts of different ends, as the tale of Thales and the olive presses demonstrates. But in saying that predictive capacity is the principle by which we judge science, you are treating predictive capacity as an end in itself. If science is judged according to predictive capacity, then the goal (end) of science will be to provide predictive capacity, because that's the only thing which will be judged. Therefore predictive capacity is the end of science, under this assumption.

We could argue over the semantics, but let's just say that within the context of scientific models, saying a model is "flawed" would absolutely be understood as meaning the model makes incorrect predictions or inferences in some context.
If flawed simply meant incomplete then, like I say, we could argue all of science is flawed because we can never know any model is complete. It would be, at best, a meaningless word, and at worst horribly misleading. — Mijin

This is a great example. You define "flawed" in the context of scientific models such that "flawed" references only the predictive capacity of the model. This means that a model which totally misrepresents reality (is false in the sense of correspondence), but allows the person who employs the model to make some hand waving predictions, is not at all flawed. Clearly, the models employed by Thales were not at all flawed by your definition, look at the predictions he made.

This is incorrect.
All of space appears to be expanding, according to our best model. Inside the galaxy, outside the galaxy, inside your body, inside your body's nuclei.

The reason we don't see this expansion is because it is small over these scales (even over the scale of the galaxy), and swamped by the gravitational force that is binding these various things together.

Are we done here? Was all of this based on this common misconception? — Mijin

No we're not done here. We're discussing the calculations you insisted would be the same. Why do the numbers which account for spatial expansion not show up in calculations concerning measured distances inside the galaxy, inside my body, and inside my body's nuclei (whatever that means), yet they do show up in calculations concerning measured distances external to galaxies? I suggest to you, that if it's true, that spatial expansion occurs within these objects, then it needs to be accounted for in the calculations, just like it needs to be accounted for in extragalactical calculations. However, the practice of modeling an object as having a center of gravity is incompatible with the idea of spatial expansion within that object, so there are no such calculations because the relation between gravity and spatial expansion is unknown. Spatial expansion within a massive body is incomprehensible by the principles employed by physicists. So this necessity, to change the calculations of internal distances within objects, to account for spatial expansion within objects, is rejected for the far simpler, yet far more primitive, and obviously flawed idea, that an object has a center of gravity.

If you have the temptation to be shy, drop it immediately. — Rafaella Leon

Suppose I feel shy. How do you propose that I could drop this feeling?

If you wish to claim that our understanding of gravity is flawed, it's on you to show how. — Mijin

I did that already, very clearly and concisely, the utilization of the concept of a center of gravity, or the center of mass.

It's a critical part (the critical part) of the scientific method, but not a goal in itself. — Mijin

OK, so you say that whether or not the understanding which science gives us is flawed, is determined by its ability to predict, but the capacity to predict is not a goal of science. That is a great example of inconsistency, the success or failure of science in relation to understanding, is determined by the capacity to predict, but this in not its goal. Don't you think that the judgement of whether or not science is successful, should be made in relation to its real goal? If the capacity to predict is not the goal of science, then why insist that the products of science ought to be judged in relation to their capacity to predict? That's inconsistency

Because "flawed" and "incomplete" are not synoyms. — Mijin

Right, as I explained one is a type of the other, like a rose is a type of flower. They are not synonyms. Incomplete is a type of flaw. "Flaw" being the more broad term, allowing for types of flaws other than incompletion.

Flawed OTOH implies incorrect. — Mijin

No, no, in what institution did you learn English? Flawed does not imply incorrect. It implies imperfect, and incomplete is a type of imperfection. "Incorrect" requires a judgement of right or wrong, and a judgement of imperfect has no such implication. Most things are view as imperfect, but being imperfect does not make them wrong. Maybe incorrect is a type of imperfection, just like incomplete is.

But we know that when we do calculations like that, the answer comes out essentially the same as if we had modelled it as objects with centers of gravity. — Mijin

This, on the other hand, is demonstrably incorrect. You'll know that the concept of "spatial expansion" only applies to space between objects, not the space within objects. So if we take as "an object" something like a galaxy, there is a center of gravity for that object, and no spatial expansion occurs within that object. But if we took individual stars as objects, we would need to account for "expansion" within the galaxy itself, because there would be "expansion" between the individual stars. Therefore it's very clear, that the answer does not come out the same if we model each individual part as an object with its own center of gravity.

If you ever find your calculations are non-negligibly more accurate than physicists', then congratulations on your Nobel prize. — Mijin

No thanks, I have no desire for your gratuitous offer. There is no need to make the calculations, the principle of "spatial expansion" demonstrates very clearly that the calculations would necessarily be quite different.

I would agree with you that truth would be better than predictive power, but sadly this universe does not feature a magic scorecard that tells us when we got something right. Predictive power is the best we have. — Mijin

Oh, poor deprived science, it cannot fulfill the expectations of philosophy, truth. It's been so degraded that it doesn't even know how to find truth, and can only produce predictive power, while philosophy still demands truth. I'll tell you how we proceed toward truth, it's really not difficult. We do this by eliminating falsity. And we eliminate falsity through the use of logic. We don't need to rely on predictive power to find contradictions and inconsistencies and therefore eliminate the principles which cause them, as falsity. When did science relinquish logic from its tool box, opting to grandstand predictive power as the only principle for judgement?

You said that our understanding of gravity is "flawed" and "primitive". This is a claim of scientific understanding, not philosophy. — Mijin

I said it as a claim of philosophical understanding. Philosophers are allowed to judge scientific principles, in case you didn't know this. Otherwise, ethics would not be applicable to science, for example. And if you posit prediction as the highest goal for science, this might become a real problem when people start using predictive capacity toward evil ends.

But secondly, yes, if someone can predict the occurrence of an eclipse then they do have an understanding. — Mijin

Sure, the ability to predict is evidence of "an understanding". The question is what type of understanding, and whether or not that understanding might be a flawed understanding. This would mean that within that "understanding" would be elements of "misunderstanding".

I'm sure you respect the fact that our understanding of gravity is less than perfect, or as you imply, not "complete". Why are you incapable of proceeding logically form this premise, to conclude therefore that our understanding is "flawed". Do you not see incomplete as a flaw? If not, ask yourself why the understanding of gravity is incomplete, and in answering this question you will find the flaws. The principal flaw, which sticks out like a sore thumb to me, is the practice of modeling a physical object as having a center of gravity. This makes it impossible to understand an object as consisting of distinct parts, which is completely incompatible with our understanding of objects as having distinct parts. How can you assign a center of gravity to a distant galaxy when that galaxy is understood as being composed of a multitude of objects each with its own distinct center of gravity?

But yes, the measure of understanding is correct predictions and inferences; if you can make crude predictions then you understand the phenomenon on at least one level.
It's not all-or-nothing in science, you can have levels of understanding. — Mijin

Very good, let's assume "levels of understanding" then. Would you agree that one level can be judged as higher, or better than another? So for example we would say that the modern level of understanding the solar system is higher or better than the one which Thales and the ancient Greeks had. And on the premise that worse indicates flawed, we can say that Thales' understanding was flawed.

On what principles ought we base "better" and "worse" on, in relation to levels of understanding? I think that we ought base our levels of better and worse on principles of truth and falsity. You seem to think that better and worse ought to be based in predictive capacity. Why do you think that predictive capacity makes a better principle for judging understanding than truth does?

The reason why I think that truth makes a better principle for judgement, is that predictive capacity itself still needs to be judged. And there are many different modes of ambiguities and generalities which people can apply to create the appearance of great predictive capacity, when the predictive capacity is really not that good. This is an occultic practice, like soothsaying, which ought to have no place in science. However, if predictive capacity is the principle of judgement then such occultic practices are actually encouraged within science. And unless we appeal to a higher principle like "truth", there is no way to judge apparent predictive capacity to distinguish scientific from occultic.

So, let's see, it is claimed that Thales predicted a solar eclipse. You say that this is disputable. Don't you agree that truth is a better principle for judging science than prediction? Have you heard the one about Thales and the olive presses? People made fun of him because he supposedly had great predictive wisdom of the stars and heavenly bodies, but was very poor. To teach them a lesson about the value of predictive capacity, he used his knowledge of the stars, and predictive capacity, to foresee a great olive harvest at a particular time. He proceeded to buy up all the leasing options on the olive presses for the precise time of that future harvest. He did this the winter before, and bought the options for a short period of time, at a very low rate with no competition. When the harvest materialized, as predicted, there was a great demand for the presses and Thales made lots of money by renting them at a huge mark up. That story is commonly presented as evidence of the usefulness of Thales' predictive capacity. But wouldn't you agree with Aristotle, that it is more appropriately described as a demonstration of the usefulness of monopoly? Do you see how occultism might blur the boundary between scientific predictive capacity and deception?

As a pleasing interlude, perhaps the Earth's gravity does not pull objects towards its center but rather fails to resist by its outward pressure the greater array of incoming gravitational fields while permeating objects such that those at lower elevation which experience greater gravitational field compression move slightly slower as per the observations of relativity and clocks...or maybe an ever so slight redshiftinglike effect? — Enrique

Isn't this basically the premise of general relativity?

I can't emphasize enough, that the way we measure our level of understanding is in our power to make good predictions and inferences. — Mijin

In philosophy we do not judge an understanding by the ability to make predictions. The fact that I can predict that the object in my hand will drop to the floor when I release my grip on it, does not at all indicate that I understand gravity. I don't even know what it would mean to talk about measuring our level of understanding. We'd have to have a scale of understanding which understood things that we don't understand, in order to compare our understanding to this scale, and measure our understanding.

But gravity OTOH, is clearly something humans understand very well. We can predict where the solar system planets will be in thousands of years time, or the return of a comet centuries from now. — Mijin

Thales predicted a solar eclipse, when they did not even know back then, that the earth revolves around the sun. The capacity to predict is developed by applying mathematics to repetitive patterns which may have slight variations. It actually requires very little, if any, understanding of the thing demonstrating the repetitive pattern which is being predicted, nor the reasons for the variations which may or may not be predicted as well. It's when we move along toward accounting for the reasons for the repetition, and the variations, which we have developed the capacity to predict, that we actually start to produce an understanding.

If this is not a "real representation", you'll have to explain to me what you mean by that concept. — Mijin

I think you know what I mean. The so-called center of mass, or center of gravity, does not represent any real feature of an object. It's just a principle applied for the sake of facilitating predictions. And you know that Thales must have been applying some comparable principles (the earth as the center of the universe), which facilitated his prediction but didn't represent any real aspect of the phenomenon being predicted.

I agree. — jgill

Yes, well I think that a definition should be the starting point for a scientific inquisition, not the final say. The next step would be to inquire into the two aspects of that simple definition, what is "change", and what does "results in..." entail (maybe cause).

I find the definition is difficult to understand because your use of undefined ambiguous terms like "piece of matter", and "free energy". So it appears like you have something like "free energy which...transfers some kind of energy...which...results in a change...".

Wouldn't your definition for "action" be a lot simpler, and say essentially the same thing if it was worded something like this: "anything which results in a change"?

Valuing your own space, thoughts and inner life can only be a good thing. — Corinne

In a pandemic that's for sure.

There are of course elements of introversion that may hamper a person's progress. Sometimes we can be observers instead of participants in life and Extroverts seem to naturally win... — Corinne

There is an issue here of what do you value. What do you want in your life? What constitutes winning? If what is valued is cooperation and peaceful coexistence, rather than competing for the same goods, then the extroverts who will forever be in competition with other extroverts cannot be said to win. But there is really many more characteristics which need to be factored into the equation.

What can Introverts bring to the party... — Corinne

There is something called privacy, which is for some reason valued quite highly in western societies. Being an introvert would naturally make one value privacy more highly than being an extrovert would. But we would need to question whether privacy ought to be valued. Is this an objective value, or is it just personal preference? What would support the request for privacy as morally justifiable?

But it's a big problem for alternative hypotheses, like that our understanding of gravity is flawed. — Mijin

The idea that our understanding of gravity is flawed ought to be taken as a given, rather than rejected and argued against. The commonly employed representation of a center of mass, or center of gravity is so ridiculously primitive, and cannot provide anything close to a real representation of the relationship between a massive object and its gravity.

A ‘form’ is a consolidated arrangement, whereas ‘relation’ refers to the variability in arrangement: the structural potential that informs any consolidation. It is very much a matter of perspective (that is what we’re talking about). Relation does not necessarily imply ‘distinct things’ but the existence of rules and laws that structure consolidation at each dimensional level. While I agree that a consolidation of form would validate top-down relational structure, its insubstantiality does not preclude its possible existence. — Possibility

The problem I see here, is that if "relation" refers to something variable, then a "relation" is inherently indefinite, as a "variabilitiy in arrangement", rather than a definite arrangement. A "form", as "a consolidated arrangement", requires true definability, and therefore cannot be composed of "relations" as you have defined it.

Relation does not necessarily imply ‘distinct things’ but the existence of rules and laws that structure consolidation at each dimensional level. While I agree that a consolidation of form would validate top-down relational structure, its insubstantiality does not preclude its possible existence. — Possibility

So we need a third thing here, to validate "consolidation". A form cannot consist of relations because relations are variable, and the consolidated structure of a form is invariable. To change, for example, is not to continue existing as the same form, but to have a new form, so invariability is essential to the form. So you propose "the existence of rules and laws". Clearly these rules and laws cannot be derived from the form itself, because they are necessary to create the prerequisite invariability, from the relations which are observed, and described as variable, in order for a form to be created. This is the point I've made numerous times to apokrisis. The form itself cannot be the source of the rules and laws, as these are necessarily prior to the existence of the form, as cause of its existence.

This is where we have to be careful to differentiate the two distinct ways that "form" is used, one referring to our description of the thing, which is posterior to the thing, and the other referring to the creation of the thing, which is prior to the thing. So we have a "formula" or blueprint, by which we create a thing, and a "form" which is a description of a thing, and each is a distinct sense of "form".

Now, our subject of inquiry is the rules or laws which apply to forms being responsible for invariability. In describing a form, the rules are descriptive, in creating a form, the rules are prescriptive. Notice that both refer to what "ought" to be done, therefore the two types are reducible to a single type rule, as prescriptive rules. So the rules and laws, which are responsible for the creation of forms, of both types, are of the prescriptive type, rules of how things ought to be done. "Ought" implies the activity of intention, final cause.

We can apply this back against the dilemma of variable (indefinite) relations, and consolidated (definite) forms. We see that a "relation" implies members, elements, particles, or some form of a multitude, distinct differences which are related in that condition of variability. And, there is some form of "ought" which is applied to these relations which converts the existence from variable to invariable, creating a form. The existence of human beings provides our example of individual members, with intention, acting with final cause. We see that the final cause and intention inheres within the particulars, who produce principles from within their own minds, as rules to act by, each person attempting to constrain one's own acts with personal principles which they adhere to. Therefore from this example, we can see that the invariance required to produce a form comes from within the individual members, as final cause, so that all forms are bottom-up.

That also doesn’t make them necessarily impossible - only logically so. — Possibility

You don't seem to understand, logic is necessity. What is logically so is necessarily so. What is logically impossible is necessarily impossible. How can you introduce a form of necessity which is outside of logic? You could appeal to a "need" in the sense of pragmatism, and final cause, as the means to an end, what you call "usefulness", but then your proposed end needs to be justified. This justification is a process of logic. So you say, mathematics is "useful" for understanding, but to use mathematics which produces conclusions which are unintelligible is misunderstanding. That is the position we're in with quantum mechanics. Imaginary numbers, infinities, and such, are used for the sake of prediction, so they are useful, but the result can in no way be described as understanding. If we apply good principles of logic, and rid ourselves pragmatic necessity in favour of logical necessity, we have a true course toward understanding. When your pragmatic end must be justified, on what would you pretend to base any other form of true necessity on, other than logic?

My approach is developed partly from Carlo Rovelli’s deconstruction of time, and his resulting description of physical reality not as objects in time, but as ‘correlated events’. As individual points they are each different (and ‘move’ in relation to each other), but when each is the centre of an unfolding universe of spacetime, they are the same. — Possibility

The problem with process philosophy and assuming "events" as fundamental, is that traditionally relations would be inherent within the classical description of an event. An event in the classical sense is a changing of relations between things. Now, as the fundamental element, the "event" is the thing. So we have two new problems. How do we describe what is internal to the fundamental "event", so as to make it consistent with the traditional "event"? What is changing inside that fundamental event to justify calling it an event? And the second problem is on what principles do we relate one event to another, to represent the passing of time. At this point, since we do not have any real understanding of the passing of time, and science turns it into something subjective, the trend is to appeal to panpsychism to justify the apparent continuity of the passing of time.

Well, Pantagruel argued that a lack of ambiguity is required for us individuals to commune, and exist as part of a whole (the species). I argued that such ideas of groups being social entities are inherently ambiguous themselves, and therefore demonstrate a lack of clarity rather a lack of ambiguity.
By saying "There isn't anything you can point at and say 'if it has this, it's that species'." you seem to be agreeing with me.

What follows, and the point I was trying to make, is that we cannot represent language as the property of the species, or of any other social grouping, because those supposed things, as entities, don't have any real definable existence. To get a clear understanding of language we need to represent it as individual acts of individual people. Such individual acts are responsible for the creation of these social groups, and the ambiguity of the boundaries between these groups is the manifestation of the ambiguity within these acts.

Kant’s aesthetics suggest that the noumena does not consist only of independent, intelligible forms but of qualitative relations that transcend logical construction - accessible to us through the ‘free play’ of our faculties of understanding, imagination and judgement in relation to experience. — Possibility

I don't see your distinction between forms and relations. Surely a relation is a form, isn't it?

I agree that all consolidation of forms are fundamentally bottom-up, but I would add that all relations are fundamentally top-down, and that their structure prevails over form, regardless of logic. It will require both to render our existence fully intelligible. — Possibility

I really can't see this distinction. A "form" is an arrangement of parts. A "relation" is the way in which one thing is connected to another. The only difference appears to be that "relation" implies distinct things, related to each other, whereas "form" implies that those things which are related to each other compose a whole, a form. So the matter of whether a relation is simply a relation, or whether it is a part of a whole, is just a matter of perspective.

Now, your top-down/bottom-up distinction is just a matter of perspective. If you apprehend the whole (form) which the related things are parts of, it appears as top-down, and if you do not, the relations appear to be bottom-up. But as I explained already, the whole is just an unsubstantiated Ideal, so all such relations are really bottom-up, as the whole which would validate any top-down relations is just an imaginary ideal which cannot actually be found.

And yet, despite all logic, it remains possible to imagine such an ideal. — Possibility

Oh yes, quite definitely. It is possible to imagine all sorts of impossible things, but that does not make them possible. But with logic we can assess imagined things, which people might claim as possible, and designate some as impossible, and this is the epistemic basis for certainty.

To clarify, I’m not saying that we should remove the self-conscious perspective itself, only the assumptions that centre it. — Possibility

What I am saying is that this is impossible. The reality is that the self-conscious perspective is central, and placing it anywhere else would be a false premise. Notice that Copernicus did not remove self-consciousness as central, but just found the means to account for the illusions created by this position. These illusions are the false Ideals, "the global position", which lead to the idea of top-down causation. Self-consciousness being at the center of reality is constrained by the forms that surround it, and this creates the illusion of top-down acting constraints, what you call relations. But in reality, all these other constraints are just bottom-up forms produced from other points which are equally the center of reality.

That is the difficult part to grasp, there is not one particular "center of reality", but each point is equally a center of reality, just like each self-conscious being is equally a center of reality. We attempt to build "relations" between these points of self-consciousness, with our intellectual powers, so we assume an overriding whole, the Ideal external world, and model the points with a spatial-temporal reference. But these top-down relations are all artificial, imaginary relations, while the real relations are internal to these points which are each equally the center of reality. This is what the study of genetics indicates, the real relations are internal, and from within these internally related points the bottom up causation is active. Now each point of self-consciousness has its own bottom-up formal structure, and to build a true model of reality requires relating them one to another, each as the center of reality. This is why the principles of physics cannot model the true reality, because it hasn't developed the principles required to relate individual points to each other, when each is the center of the universe. As the center of the universe, they are each the same, but as individual points, they are each different.

Despite our best efforts, we continue to act contrary to logic when it suits us to do so. Reality is not a purely logical structure. It must be understood as inclusive of illogical relations, or we will remain ignorant of its possibilities, and continue to be blindsided by suffering. — Possibility

There is fault in this line of thinking. Just because we act in ways which are contrary to reason doesn't mean that we ought to act in these ways. What is implied is that our ability to apply logic, and understand, surpasses our capacity to control our actions. Therefore we can figure out what we ought to do, but we cannot necessarily make ourselves do it. Our actions are very much constrained by our physical bodies, but our minds are much freer. So as living creatures, our minds can evolve much quicker than our bodies, apply logic, and determine thing such as the way that we ought to behave, while our bodies might not provide us with the will power to actually do what is logical.

Sure, you might allow that illogical relations are part of your reality, just like when you do something which you know that you ought not do. But the point is that we can, and ought to dismiss these from our epistemology. Illogical things cannot be accepted into any sort of knowledge, so we can dismiss them as bad, just like my actions are bad when I do something which I know I should not.

So "reality" being what is produced by the self-conscious being within, through its judgements (as it is illogical to try and exclude the self-conscious being from reality) must exclude what is illogical. That would not be an acceptable judgement. And when we act in ways which are contrary to reason, this is not the reality of the illogical, it is just a failure of our ability to understand why we act the way that we do. But just because it appears to the rational mind that the actions are illogical, doesn't mean that they are, in an absolute sense. It's really just a matter of not understanding why we act the way we do.

Not deny the reality of the self-conscious perspective, but deny its necessity - dislodge its central, immovable position. — Possibility

That's the point, the self-conscious perspective is necessarily the central, immovable position. It is the self-conscious being which has the perspective, so it is impossible to assign the perspective of the self-conscious being to something else. That's what gives us the false ontology, assuming that this perspective can be "dislodged". Once we realize that this is the one and only ontological perspective which we have, then we can proceed toward analyzing how the constraints of the real, physical human being, influence, and even taint, the way we understand reality, in ways which we cannot escape, but we can compensate for.

I would have thought my continual reference to existence and understanding, rather than certainty and knowledge, made it clear that my perspective is ontological. You’re referring to logical, not absolute, possibility, here. I understand that what we can know with any true certainty will always be relative to a particular value structure - such as logic. But I also understand that this is not reality. So eliminating the impossible, while it enables us to articulate what we know, deliberately excludes accessible information about reality. — Possibility

It is reality though. And once you come to realize that there is nothing further beyond this, no other elusive "more real reality" which is outside of, or beyond your own personal perspective, then you can look at every other perspective as equally "reality". Then we might all partake in the same "reality", because we are related from within, in ways we do not yet understand, but a way that gives us each a different perspective. Then there is nothing more to ask ontologically, and we can move on to epistemology.

Again, you’re after truth in a logical structure - what you can claim to know with certainty, not what you can understand or relate to. When I talk about ‘understanding the system’, I mean access to information that enables us to improve predictions about future interactions with reality. That includes not just recognising falsehood in order to reject it, but understanding the relational conditions under which such falsehoods arise. — Possibility

Once you see that reality is within, you'll see the value of honesty and truth, as fundamentally prior to understanding, and you'll stop talking about trying to relate to, and interact with, some external reality, as if this is the route to understanding.

I haven't read the whole discussion, but I think you needed a word that was capable of tighter definition. — Daemon

To make my point:

Ambiguity is a feature of universal understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why would I want a word with a tighter definition? However, you might propose another word which would be more capable of refuting my claim.

That is a good explanation of why Possibilitiy's proposition makes no sense.

It’s an ideal reference to what matters when we remove the assumptions of a self-conscious perspective. — Possibility

We cannot assume in the same proposition, to remove the means by which we understand things, and also still maintain the assumption that there is the means for understanding things. Logic demonstrates itself as the means for understanding, and we have no basis to assume anything else as the means for understanding.

So there is absolutely no sense to the proposition which removes the means for understanding, because it leaves us with absolutely nothing intelligible and no possibility to proceed anywhere from that proposition. Therefore we must turn things around and start with the assumption that the capacity to understand, logic, cannot be removed from reality, thus it is fundamental. This is the assumption which enables us to understand reality, and denies emergence (which posits a reality without logic as the starting point), as an impossibility.

But we know that there's a polygon with infinite sides: a circle.
OK technically mathematicians do not consider a circle to be a polygon, but it's only for essentially this very reason; that the maths is simpler if we separately handle shapes with finite vs infinite sides. — Mijin

If the point you're making requires that a circle is a polygon, and mathematicians do not consider a circle to be a polygon, then it really doesn't make your point, does it?

Forms can be either emergent (bottom-up) or intentional (top-down). An intentionally-created form is contingent upon a conscious system that perceives the potential form. An emergent form is contingent upon a conditional relation between components, such that the form’s potential is realised. The difference between these two descriptions appears to be the perception of potential. But it isn’t. The difference is the assumption of a self-conscious system that apperceives the form’s potential. — Possibility

I don't accept this bottom-up, top-down distinction. I see no real principles to support it. I do see a distinction to be made, in the Aristotelian tradition, between the material forms of particular things, and immaterial forms, which are abstractions, universals, or concepts. Since abstractions are produced from individual human minds, all forms are bottom-up in creation. The universal Ideal, the One, or Same, "global condition", which apokrisis proposes, and might be used to ground top-down constraints, I find to be nothing other than a bottom-up, intention guided, human idea.

What is consistently overlooked in this discussion of consciousness is an assumption of self-consciousness inherent in top-down explanations. — Possibility

Right, so the supposed top-down forms are really, fundamentally bottom-up. So we hit the Kantian problem, the supposed top-down forms, the independent, intelligible forms, the noumena, are inaccessible to us, as independent. We assume top-down forms, we assume that they are inaccessible, and this makes these supposed top-down forms fundamentally unknowable. In reality though, this assumption is unsubstantiated and unwarranted because all forms are fundamentally bottom-up, and this is what Plato described as apprehending "the good". When all forms are apprehended as bottom-up, we dissolve the division which makes some forms appear to be fundamentally unintelligible. That any forms could be unintelligible is itself a basic contradiction.

‘Sameness’ refers to absolute, not physical, possibility. It’s an ideal reference to what matters when we remove the assumptions of a self-conscious perspective. — Possibility

This ideal is fundamentally incoherent. To remove the self-conscious perspective from the self-conscious perspective makes no sense. If we could do such a thing, we would not be left with an "ideal", we would be left with a non-ideal. So anything presented as an absolute, as an ideal, produced from removing the self-conscious perspective, is fundamentally wrong. We can see this in your phrase "...what matters when we remove the assumptions of a self-conscious perspective". Clearly, without that self-conscious perspective, nothing matters, therefore there cannot be an ideal here.

It is from our relation to this possibility/impossibility of ‘sameness’ that any potential for difference can be perceived - a binary relation that renders ‘the self’ either non-existent or as existence itself. — Possibility

The problem is that you come up with the opposite conclusion of what is logical. You cannot render the self-conscious mind as non-existent in a thought experiment, and then use that self-conscious mind which is supposed to not be there, to come up with an ideal which represents existence without the self-conscious mind. That is illogical, as contradictory. Therefore it is just fundamentally illogical to propose the removal of the self-conscious perspective, and we must accept the absolute reality of the self-conscious perspective. If we deny the reality of the self-conscious perspective we rob ourselves of the capacity to access reality.

That proposing an ideal ‘sameness’ is illogical doesn’t give you cause to exclude the possibility as such, in an absolute sense. — Possibility

Yes it does. That something is illogical is very good reason to reject it from the realm of possibility, as impossible. This is fundamental to epistemology, and the only means for obtaining true certainty, the process of eliminating the impossible.

Illogical or not, it is a necessary part of understanding the system. — Possibility

Understanding that if it is illogical, it is therefore impossible, is of the highest priority. This is falsification, it is how we reject falsehood. And, "understanding the system" which has been rejected as false, is what guides us away from falsity in our quest for truth.

It's not about you though. — Benkei

This is why masks have to be mandatory. The world has too many selfish people like Book273 who say wearing a mask won't protect me, therefore there's no point in me wearing one.

Bad example, because the individual could find something other than another individual to stand on, and reach twelve feet without another person. But even if there are things which two people can do, which one person clearly cannot, that doesn't address the issue of my last post. It doesn't indicate that two people are an entity. It just means that we do not have an accurate understanding of, and therefore not an accurate measurement for the human capacity of doing things, which all individuals have anyway, and is in some way increased when people work together.

I don't assume that it is not so. I agree that in this context, 1+1 gives something other than 2. What I disagree with is the conclusion that therefore 1+1 gives us an entity. If 1+1 gave us 2, we'd have grounds to say that this is an entity, as 2 is considered to be a unified entity, as a Platonic Form. But the fact that 1+1 gives us something we cannot account for with 2, only indicates that our application of 1 is faulty.

I argue therefore, that the reason why 1+1 gives something other than 2 in this context, is because 1 does not properly represent the characteristics of the individual. A human being, with an intellect, and the capacity for intentional actions cannot be adequately represented simply as an entity. The human being, as all living beings, has special powers over its environment, which make it a special sort of entity. When a group of human beings work together, that special power is amplified. We do not know and understand the power itself, well enough to quantify it to say whether the power is simply summed together as 1+1+1..., or whether it's exponential, or something else. Likely its not even quantifiable. However, I believe the evidence is clear, from the historic reference of unique individuals (famous people), that the same special capacity which we observe as the property of a social groups, is also evident in individuals. Therefore it is wrong to say that putting two or more people together into a group magically causes the appearance of a special power, because that same special power is already observable within individuals.

The notion that what constitutes an entity is relevant to your frame of inquiry seems to elude you. — Pantagruel

This is why there is such a thing as "ontology", so that we can have sound principles as to what constitutes an entity, and we can recognize when people make up fictitious entities to support unwarranted inquiries. Theoretically we would not fund those inquiries.

A genetic population can been analyzed as an entity, and exhibits unique characteristic properties, as well as being attached to a specific organic extension. No different from you my friend. — Pantagruel

So you say, but you have not provided me with the ontology and empirical evidence to back up this claim. As I explained there are physical systems which unite the various parts of my body, and are required to sustain those parts. So I have the ontological principle of unity, and the empirical evidence of physical systems uniting all the parts of my body, which support my claim that I am an entity.

I see no such unity in the human species, because I see no such physical systems which unite the entire species. Let's suppose that possibly language is a type of physical system. The problem still, is that different groups are speaking different languages, so they rely on distinct physical systems. This denies the unity required to say that the species is an entity. And commonly in biology species are divided into varieties. That a physical system such as language, which supports one group in unity, acts to segregate it from other groups, indicates that the unity required to call the entire species an entity, is just not there.

I'd like to apologize. I got a bit hot under the collar when you implied that pragmatism somehow was a slippery slope to scientism. However I do respect your commitment to a metaphysical purity. But I really do feel that metaphysics must evolve along with the rest of our knowledge. Otherwise, what is the point? — Pantagruel

No problem, I don't intend to insult, so I apologize if I did. Certain words have connotations which really stir the emotions, depending on the individual. Take a word like "racism" for example. Usually, if you call someone racist they will take great offence. This is just a reaction caused by their acknowledgement that it is very bad to be racist. But the emotion is often so strong, because the connotations are so bad, that the person will be insulted and simply go into denial, thinking "no I'm not". Now, the emotion and denial is so strong that the person won't even consider researching what it means to be racist, and analyze one's own character to see if it might be true, and perhaps better oneself. So instead of thinking that the other person might have identified a fault in my attitude, so I should look into this and see if I need to improve myself, the connotations of the word are so bad, that the response is to think that the person's a mean bully, calling me names, and insulting me.

Here's a pretty good survey of "social ontology" including the ontological status of collectives: — Pantagruel

I read through this article on social ontology, and I disagree with the author's concept of "constitution". Constitution is supposed to be responsible for the unification of an entity, but there is nothing to prevent it from being completely arbitrary. Anyone can make up any sort of fictitious entity simply by naming what constitutes that entity. So, for example I could say that these two books constitutes a "library", and now I have an ontological entity called a library, because I have arbitrarily designated these two books as such.

I believe that the author does this because the author is dualist, and wants to allow for the real existence of immaterial objects, like Platonic Forms, as entities. But there is a problem with allowing that any imaginary idea has real existence as an entity, because we need rules of logic, such as non-contradiction, to disallow illogical things from being designated as real entities by way of Platonism.

Furthermore, the author doesn't really explain how "constitution" is supposed to provide unity to the presumed entity. Perhaps we could say that if the concept is coherent, then there is unity, but in the way that it's described in the article, it sounds like all one needs to do is name x as constituting the entity y, and this act of naming is supposed to provide unity.

In the conclusion the author states this:
"Since ontology pertains to what there really is, anyone interested in what really there is, social scientist or not, ought to care about ontology."
But in the argument for social entities, the premise is that anything must be a real entity if we can state what constitutes it. So there are no principles given to us, by which we might distinguish between real entities and fictitious entities. If we give ontological status as an "entity", to anything we can name, then of course social institutions are going to have ontological status. But what's the point in doing this if it requires removing all the principles by which we would distinguish a real entity from a fictitious entity.?

For example, "Social complexes, as entities, have causal powers that the individuals who make them up do not have, either singly or collectively. For example, a university confers degrees." — Pantagruel

Here's the problem I see with this perspective. Let's say that 1+1 does not equal 2 because something else is produced, so we might say that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. But if we do not have 2 when we put 1 and 1 together, by what principle do we have a whole? All we have is 1 and 1, along with something else. Now, 1+1+1 equals something other than 3, and we can't even relate this to 2+1, because we have no principle to say what 2 is. So if your argument is that one person working with another person gives us something more than two people, what is it that it gives us? It's not an entity, because the entity would be simply two people. And three people would make another entity and so on. Yet the argument is that these people make something more than just these people.

Well, we do not need to go to two people, to see the special status which the human mind, with intention, gives to an entity. This special status is just as much within one person as it is within a group of two. It's just the case that the larger the group is, the more the special status stands out. But it's an unsound premise to say that the special status is only the property of a group of individuals, and not the property of one.

So if you are asserting that only entities of type X can constitute an identity, then you are likewise asserting that "inquiry is only valid within certain contexts." Which would be where we disagree. — Pantagruel

Right, now I think you've got it. Inquiry under many contexts is simply worthless, without value. We call it barking up the wrong tree. This is where we distinguish the right or wrong use of words. Inquiring in a misguided direction is pointless. Stopping a random person on the street to interrogate that person for hours concerning the bank robbery, when that person has absolutely no connection to it, is a worthless inquiry, and therefore an improper use of words.

Or it self-organises and so intent and concrete possibility co-arise. The form is simply finality finding its fullest expression. The usual Peircean reply. — apokrisis

This self-organization, what you call "the usual Peircian reply", is the illogical part of your perspective which I indicated when I first engaged you in this thread. With this type of holism it is required that the parts already communicate with symbols before the whole, as a system, is created. You insist that there is a "co-arising", but clearly the description of the system necessitates the logical conclusion that the individual parts are in communication with each other prior to the existence of the overall whole. Since the constraints are property of the whole, it is impossible that the global constraints co-arise with the local freedoms. The local freedom is necessarily prior to the global constraint.

It appears like you attempt resolve this issue by positing your global condition of Ideal sameness. This Ideal sameness provides some constraint which is prior to the emergent constraints, which are necessarily posterior to the local freedoms. But this Ideal constraint is unsubstantiated by evidence, and it is just posited for the pragmatic purpose of allowing you to ignore the logical implication of your principles, that individual freedom, and intent, are prior in time to constraints, therefore the assumption of "co-arising" is unsound.

Formal and final cause are the diachronic and synchronic view of the same essential thing. In the moment, you can see that there is some structure. In the long run, you can see that was expressing some reason. — apokrisis

Formal and final cause cannot be said to be the same thing without a misrepresentation of the nature of time. Each, as a "cause" implies a necessary temporal order. The diachronic nature of formal cause, the constraints of actually existent forms in the past, which impose deterministic restrictions, cannot in any way be identified as the intent which will cause (final cause) the existence of forms in the future. Formal cause is the deterministic effect of actually existing material forms, while final cause, as intent, utilizes immaterial forms to create new material forms in a way which escapes the constraints of existing material forms. If you approach these two from a determinist world view, you will be inclined to reject the reality of final cause, as a true cause (free will), and portray it as formal cause. This is the influence which the modern concept of time holds over us. "Time" as employed in science is based in deterministic principles to enable the theories of physics, but if we accept this representation as the truth about time, we deny ourselves the possibility of understanding final cause.

I don't think you listen.

Where does a river get its snaking curves from? From the constraints of a least action principle. It must arrange itself so as to balance the amount of water feeding it and the slope of the land which it must cross. If a straight line is too short to shift enough water in enough time, then it must throw out snaking loops and house the water that way.

So the constraints are all the physical boundary conditions - the volume of water, the slope of the land, the hardness or softness of the terrain. The finality lies in the imperative of least action. The form is found in some degree of sinuosity. The river is the result - constrained within its suitably designed banks. It now seems a stable thing - an object of some kind we can honour with a name. — apokrisis

To state, and describe the multitude of physical boundary conditions which are evident in the world, is not to "give an account of how these constraints come into existence". It's not that I don't listen, it's that you don't give an acceptable answer. And to say "they emerge", is just another way of saying you do not know.

So you are failing to demonstrate that language could have private meaning. Any meaning I could decode from the situation is relying on some familiarity with a communal habit. — apokrisis

The argument is not that language has private meaning, it is that language has meaning regardless of whether it is interpreted or not. There is nothing here to imply that this meaning is necessarily private. Meaning is evident in the act of producing the physical symbols. Therefore your claim that meaning is dependent on the interpretation of the symbols is false. This is a very important aspect of meaning which you don't seem capable of grasping. Meaning is something general, so it can have existence without any specific identity. This refutes your claim that meaning is the property of the constraints which attempt to give it a specific identity. Meaning is actually within the thing that is being constrained not the constraints.

Seems a simple point. If I draw a line in the sand, there are now two sides to the matter.

To be constrained is to be the one thing, and thus not any other thing. The usual negative space story.

And talking of wiggling out of trouble, you've skirted the key issue - that sameness seems singular and difference plural for good systems reason. That was a poor choice of target on your part. — apokrisis

You're still talking gibberish and avoiding the issue. Your singularity of "sameness" is just an Ideal which has not been substantiated, or sustained by any physical evidence. I say it's a perfection which is physically impossible, for very good reasons, just like Aristotle's eternal circular motion is physically impossible, and like any sort of perpetual motion is physically impossible, for very good reasons. You assume this Ideal sameness, for "good systems reason", but that's just a pragmatic reason, to facilitate the creation of your model. And since this Ideal has in no way been substantiated by physical evidence, and it actually appears to be most likely physically impossible, your good pragmatic reason turns out to be actually a very bad ontological reason.

If you stick your big toe over the line I've drawn in the sand, I might just over-look it. If it's your whole foot, I would start to get peeved.

Between black and white, we can leave as much grey as we like - if we are actually indifferent.

As far as I'm concerned, I can decide you haven't yet done enough to cross my line. — apokrisis

In relation to your proposed Ideal "sameness", which is supposed to be "not different", any degree of difference must be respected as a difference or else you are being illogical. You cannot define "same" as "not different", and then turn around and say that there are some differences which you might accept as the same. That is fundamentally illogical.

This is so sad. You propose an Ideal sameness. Then you seem to recognize the impossibility of this perfection, so you allow that it might be diluted by some degree of difference. But of course you want to proceed as if the Ideal sameness you propose has some form of validity. How can you not apprehend the illness here?

But science shows that forms are emergent and so themselves form a developmental hierarchy. There are the most truly general constraints - we call them the laws of physics, or even the principles (like the least action principle). And then there are all the local rules and regulations, such as the strength of gravity on a planet the size of earth. — apokrisis

As I said above, to say that forms are "emergent" is simply a way of saying that where they come from, how they come into existence, and why they come into existence, is unknown. So let's be clear here, science does not show that forms are emergent. Science leaves these aspects of the understanding of forms as unknown. Then speculators such as yourself will apply some metaphysical principles, and conclude "forms are emergent". But these speculations completely ignore the well respected metaphysics based in the evidence that final cause, intention, creates forms. Therefore the claim that forms are emergent (where they come from, how they come into existence, and why they come into existence, is unknown) is completely unwarranted, because we already know very well, that intention creates forms.

Did you know the CDC restricts the use of masks on newborn babies? — Merkwurdichliebe

That explains your actions then, you've found yourself a loophole. Go ahead, continue acting like a newborn, maybe you'll avoid the fines.

Dude. Seriously, take some science classes. — Pantagruel

I have, that's how I know that in the science of biology "species" refers unambiguously to a system of classification. And from this system of classification we assume a group of individuals, which we call "the species". And this definition is contrary to your very unscientific claim:

The species, as an organic entity, exists, in exactly the same fashion as the cells in your body.
...
If you adopt the perspective of evolutionary biology, then the species becomes the the operative entity... — Pantagruel

You already agreed with me days ago, that mine is the scientific use of the word, but at that time you asserted:

...we are not in a science class... — Pantagruel

Yet now you proceed to insist that your usage is based in some sort of science. Clearly it's not.

Why can’t it be the Holism of the relation that is meaningful? The form represents the intent. The resulting materiality is the degree to which an intent is being manifested. — apokrisis

The form "represents" the intent, but this implies that the intent is prior to the form. The intent might be the cause of existence of the form, but the intent is not itself a form. This is what we see in human relations, society, community, the intent is prior to, and cause of existence of the formal constraints. And, we see that intent resides within the individual who is a willing member of the community. So the individuals, who are the parts, are constrained by the form, but these constraints are derived from the will or intent of the parts, the individuals. Therefore prior to the existence of any constraints, there are the individual entities with the will, or intent to be constrained. The form, which is the constraint itself, is a manifestation of this intent. Meaning, as what is meant, is by definition found in the intent, not in the manifestation of the intent, the form. We might abstract the form, from the material act, but we must look beyond the form, to the intent behind it, to apprehend its meaning.

Matter is always found as part of a process and so is in-formed by some set of constraints. — apokrisis

OK, but intent, if we are to call it a constraint, is a different sort of constraint than form is. Form is an actual physical constraint, but intent is more of a desire, a motivation to act. As human beings, we have the will power to resist the desire, or motivation to act, so intent does not have the same force of constraint as form has. This is why the will is said to be free, intent (which is rooted in desire and want) does not have the capacity to force us into action. Therefore we must separate form, as actual physical constraint, from intent, which I would prefer not to call a constraint at all. Free will allows that we are not constrained in this way. Aristotle put intent in a different category from formal cause, as final cause. So in relation to your proposition above, it is possible that matter might be free from all formal constraints, yet still be "in-formed" by intent, but "in-formed" implies something other than "formed".

Reality is a hierarchical web of constraints given localised form to materiality. This is the opposite of the merological metaphysics you are trying to argue. — apokrisis

Yes, that is what I said, it is the opposite of what you propose. But I am only forced into this opposing position because you propose idealistic constraints which are completely unsubstantiated, and not grounded in reality. You are incapable of giving an account of how these constraints come into existence, where they come from, and why. From observations of human experience, I can say that constraints come from intent. But now I have to account for the existence of intent, and this pushes me in the opposite direction from you. You seem to think that intent is somehow inherent within constraint, but this defies observation, as we see that intent creates constraints, but it does not leave itself within the constraints it has created. Therefore we know that there is a separation between formal constraints and intent.

I’m not sure quite what you are thinking. But it is obvious that we don’t construct the entirety of reality through words. A lump of rock has already formed by some natural process before I decide to call it a stone, a boulder or pebble.

Yet if I ask you to bring me a stone and you bring me a pebble, then something has gone wrong. My attempt to constrain your material behaviour in some meaningful way does not yet fit the bill.

You in turn could reply a small rock is as good as a large rock surely? Your belief is that the size difference is pretty immaterial - a matter of vagueness or indifference.

So your argument simply confuses levels of semiosis. — apokrisis

I think you misunderstood the argument. The argument, as I've argued in this thread, is that it is incorrect to associate meaning with constraints, because meaning as Wittgenstein demonstrates, is prior to constraints. Take your example. You ask me to bring a stone. I misunderstand, so you've failed in your attempt at constraining my behaviour. You created no constraints. Would you not agree that your words still had meaning even though no constraint was created? And we do not need to assume other previously existing constraints amongst other people to justify the assumption that the words have meaning. All we need to do is consider the fact that you wanted something, and asked me to get it. This is all that's required for those words to have meaning and it doesn't matter if anyone else is capable of being constrained by your symbols (understanding them), the fact that you spoke them says that you meant something with them.

But that was my point. So you are confirming my position again.

A constraint imposes conditions. It defines the differences that make a difference. In that, it is imposing a generalised sameness.

Yet by the same token, that act of constraint is also ruling on what are the differences that don’t make a difference. It is also defining what can be left free as material accidents.

You might come along and declare those differences are differences that count for you and thus mar the “absolute perfection” in your eyes. if a black dog has a single white hair, it fails your test. — apokrisis

This is all gibberish to me, like you're try to change the subject again, trying to wiggle away. You clearly talked about sameness as "the global condition", and difference as "the local exception to the general rule". So you are positing this Ideal, "same" as the real global condition. What I pointed out is that this Ideal cannot be a real global condition, because the perfection required for that Ideal, "same" cannot be obtained in the physical reality. You seem to be still trying to justify your assumption of the physical reality of this Ideal, "same" by positing "differences that don't make a difference". All you seem to be saying is that if we overlook certain differences, assume that they make no difference, then we can have a true physical reality of this Ideal, "same". But that's illogical, because by allowing some differences you no longer have the Ideal "same". A diluted Ideal is not an Ideal.

Forms rule because they have evolved to the degree needed to produce a lawful and regulated cosmos. — apokrisis

Do you not see that "same" is itself a form? It is the supreme, highest form in the hierarchy. It's often called "One". If you posit this form as the real global condition, then you already assume the highest form as the background. There is no sense in talking about the evolution of forms, when you already assume the physical existence of the highest possible form as the background for your model.

The species, as an organic entity, exists, in exactly the same fashion as the cells in your body. — Pantagruel

This is not true. The cells in your body are united and supported in their existence by physical systems like the blood system, the respiratory system, and the nervous system. The cells in your body cannot exist without the support of these physical systems. There are no such physical systems which are required to maintain the existence of the individuals within a species.

Whether you ascribe identity to the cells in your body, or your body/brain/ego complex, or the species, depends on which perspective you adopt. — Pantagruel

From the point of view of science, which proceeds from strict principles of empirical observation, the individual human body is an entity united by physical systems. Therefore the unity of the human body, as an entity is empirically verified. There are no such empirically verifiable physical systems which unite the individuals of a species as an empirically verifiable entity. So this perspective which you propose is not scientific. It is a metaphysical perspective. And unlike my metaphysical perspective, it cannot obtain the requirement of science (empirical verification), and therefore it cannot serve as a perspective which could unite science and metaphysics.

The question is, do you understand how all observation is theory-laden? — Pantagruel

Sure, that's what we're discussing. The words used to describe something observed have meaning and this is theoretical. Therefore all descriptive observation is theory-laden. That's why it is very important to use clear, unambiguous terms as descriptors, in application of the scientific method. Otherwise there can be undisclosed theories lurking behind the poor choice of words, which might be validated through ambiguity. In other words, a dishonest observer might choose ambiguous descriptors with the intent of supporting a theory which the observations really ought not support. Or, an unintentional sloppy choice of ambiguous words might lead someone else toward an unwarranted conclusion due to misinterpretation.

Every perspective is exactly that, a perspective, with antecedent assumptions. Granted, most of the time, these assumptions are deeply buried and prejudicative. But that is certainly one of the challenges of philosophy. So your assuming that the human body-ego is the exemplary ontological entity is just that, an assumption. And, as I've just explained, you can equally apply ontological primacy to a variety of physical entities, depending on which perspective you take. It really isn't complicated. You are making it so. — Pantagruel

I know your pragmatic relativism already, you don't need to reiterate. You think that there is no such thing as truth in relation to physical existence, which things have real existence is determined by one's perspective. That's called relativism. And so you think theories ought to be judged by pragmaticism. Honesty and dishonesty are irrelevant because there's no truth anyway, all that matters is that I get what I want.

That would be great and all if masks actually prevented the spread of covid, but we all know they do NOT. — Merkwurdichliebe

I thought masks are supposed to be quite effective. Where do you get your information from?

I thought that a bunch of Democrats are supposed to be members of a satanic cabal of elites, according to QAnon. It looks to me like "witch hunt" does refer to a hunt for evil witches in some circles.

I see what you mean. But that is part and parcel of the constraints-based approach here. — apokrisis

I find your "constraints-based approach" interesting and informative, but as I've explained already, I think it has a fundamental problem of a reversed representation for the roles of the foundational elements. You associate meaning with the constraints (form), I associate meaning with the thing which is constrained (content, or matter). So from your perspective, what is required to make matter meaningful (a symbol), is constraints. From my perspective, matter is inherently meaningful, because it cannot exist in a meaningless way. To exist as matter is to already have meaning. So even when matter appears to be free from constraints in an absolute way, it is still meaningful. This implies that we need to look beyond "constraints" to find the foundation of meaning.

With constraints, is the way that one might represent meaning in a systems model; having meaning is to have constraints. But there is always the fundamental elements, the parts or particles, which are modeled as being constrained. Since the existence of these parts is taken for granted by the systems model, and meaning is confined to the constraints which are applied to the fundamental parts, these elements are necessarily meaningless within that model, and therefore out of the range of intelligibility. You might, as I do, see this as a defect of the modeling system, it leaves the basic parts of the system as fundamentally unintelligible.

A proposal to rectify this situation would be to assign meaning to the fundamental elements themselves. This would allow those fundamental elements to be intelligible. But this would annihilate the validity of the widely accepted idea that meaning is produced through constraints, and is therefore proper to "constraint". This is very much a Wittgensteinian approach. We apply boundaries (define words) for specific purposes. This creates the appearance that the meaning of the word is associated with the boundary. However, such a boundary (definition) is not necessary for the word to have meaning. And, the word inherently has meaning simply by the fact of being used. We can use a word, and therefore it has meaning, without employing any boundary. So prior to all the constraints or boundaries which we create and employ to restrict the meaning of the word, there is meaning inherent within the word's capacity to be used freely, in any possible way. Now, the foundation, the base of meaning is placed within this freedom, rather than within the constraints which are applied to the freedom.

Once you allow for this possibility, that meaning is properly identified as within the freedom, rather than within the constraints, the real existence of living beings, and their vast array of apparently unconstrained or random acts, suddenly makes so much more sense, as purely intelligible, rather than as unintelligible anomalies. No longer are the free acts of living beings considered to be unintelligible, "random" acts, they are now meaningful acts. Therefore at the base of evolution for example, the cause of genetic variation, what appears to some people and is often described as "random mutation", is really meaningful expressions of freedom. Clearly the evidence which is the process called evolution, indicates that these mutations are meaningful.

Sameness (or synechism in Peircean parlance) is the global condition. All are within one. A continuity. A lack of differentation.

So sameness is about wholeness and the single general large scale state. It maps to the bounding constraints in other words. A constraint is an ultimate measure of sameness. It constitutes "the same". — apokrisis

So, to support my way of looking at this, which is the reversal of yours, I will point to the problems with yours. To begin with, we cannot ever have this perfection in sameness which you propose as "the global condition". "Similar" can never obtain the absolute perfection of same. "Same" is merely an ideal, produced as a modeling condition, like an artificial scale. In reality there is no such thing as perfect continuity with a lack of differentiation. I would say that this is so highly improbable that we can rule it out as physically impossible. So if this is proposed as a starting point for the existence of real constraints, it cannot be accepted, because it's just an ideal, an artificial perfection, which has a purpose as the basis for a scale in helping us make judgements, but it doesn't represent any reality.

But differences still then divide into differences that make a difference and differences that don't. — apokrisis

This I see as a mistake of contradiction. To say that it is a difference, implies already that it has made a difference by allowing you to say that it is a difference. It is only by ignoring the reality that in relation to absolute sameness, this is contradiction, can we get to the reality of your proposed ideal, absolute sameness. If you stipulate that the most minute, infinitesimal differences do not make a difference, you might propose that this form of similarity is the reality of absolute sameness. It is not, it is contradiction.

And then difference is the local exception to the general rule. In hierarchical terms, it is down there at the ground level as the grain of atomistic action. It is the many within the one. It is something plural rather than singular simply because that is how our hierarchical model of any system works. — apokrisis

Now, since this ultimate "same", "the global condition", has been ruled out as an unsound starting point, being simply an ideal, and not actually representing anything real, we can move to the opposite, "difference". We cannot describe difference as "the local exception", because the global, "general rule" has been ruled out as impossible. Therefore we now have a multiplicity of grains of atomistic action, free and different, and we cannot say that they are "within the one", because the real existence of that perfection, that Ideal, the One, has not been validated. The multitude of free and different grains of atomistic action is verified by empirical evidence, but the global condition of perfect continuity and absolute lack of differentiation, remains an unsubstantiated ideal, judged on principles of probability as impossible.

So, the question is, where do the constraints come from. Since the global Ideal has been ruled out as extremely improbable, we need to look at what inheres within the individual grains of free and different atomistic action.

I guess it's just what playing music is like in general. You work long hard hours to learn a piece, practise, practise, pracitse. Still, you'll make mistakes, so you need to practise more. You never reach perfection so you always need to practise more. But at some point you say good enough, and quit practising.

Your logic is all over the shop... — apokrisis

That's where I like to be, all over the shop, it means I'm on top of the situation. You are a master at changing the subject. So even when I'm all over the shop you duck into a worm hole and pop up somewhere else.

I make the obvious point that similarity and difference are terms relative to each other. — apokrisis

In reality, this is not really true. And all it takes is a bit of thought about what similarity is, and what difference is, to understand that. Look, let's take "the same" as an absolute. Now, different means "not the same". And similar also means "not the same" but in a different way. They both mean "not the same", but in completely different ways. "Different" signifies the absolute, "not the same" in an absolute sense. "Similar" however, requires a judgement of sameness in some respect. It is a qualified, or relative form of "not the same". So "similar" takes us to a completely different category from "different", because it requires not only the initial judgement of "not the same", as an absolute judgement, but it also requires a relative judgement, it is in some respect "the same". Therefore "different" is an absolute sense of "not the same", while "similar" is a relative sense of "not the same".

his is why Mead stipulates that, in order to understand the meaning you are trying to convey, you must first understand the way that meaning is going to be perceived by someone else. — Pantagruel

I can't believe that you do not see how this is a false premise. To know how someone else is going to perceive something requires that you have communicated with the person already. But you cannot communicate without having an understanding of the meaning being conveyed. So this statement reflects a vicious circle, where it is implied that you cannot communicate unless you've already communicated.

Sociology is a very real and valid science. — Pantagruel

Sure, sociology is a valid science. But like in all sciences, theories will be put forth which are illogical and not adequately supported by evidence. And, just like in the other sciences, proponents of these theories will twist the evidence in an attempt to support the illogical theories.

Alternatively, I'd like to suggest that your conception of metaphysics really amounts to a mass of speculations, loosely attached to some collection of metaphysical notions, not borne out by any significant historical metaphysical thinkers. I reread the introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason last night. Kant certainly never construes metaphysics as contradicting science. Quite the contrary, he maintains the validity of science, within its domain. It just so happens that our current level of science has reached the point where it is able to account for mental constructs and entities, at least to some degree. — Pantagruel

Right, "within its domain" being the key words here. And when people twist the evidence to make it appear like science has answers to issues which are outside of its domain, that is called scientism. Do you recognize, that the proposition that the human species, or that society, or the community, is an entity, is an ontological claim. It is metaphysics, and therefore such claims are outside the domain of science.

I have nothing against science, and I do not construe metaphysics as contradicting science. The two must work together. But when someone insists that some theory ought to be called "science", when the so-called "science" is really an attempt to validate bad metaphysics, through the misrepresentation of evidence, it is impossible to call this "bad science". That is because there really is no such thing as bad science. Therefore we must say that it is not science at all. This is what you have shown me in this thread, an attempt to support bad metaphysics (the human species is an entity) through the misrepresentation of evidence (this must be true because systems theory which treats the human species as an entity is useful). There is no science here.

And so you are claiming instead that the first person to utter this particular noise had exactly that clear intent of it being understood in that fashion ... by some linguistic community used to noises meaning something ... — apokrisis

What I am saying is that the first person to use the word had some sort of intent, therefore the word had some meaning. Why the sudden requirement of "clear" intent? I thought you had respect for vagueness. Do you not see vagueness as inherent within meaning, and it is what we might try to exclude through the application of constraint? It appears like you want to associate meaning with the constraints (form) rather than with what is constrained (content).

It is pretty clear that the more private your meanings, the less useful they would be in a communal setting. — apokrisis

Again, you're speaking untruths as if they were true. What language is used for, is to put across one's own personal ideas, which are unique and particular to the circumstances. Therefore, "the more private your meanings are", the more useful they are, because they must accurately convey something personal and private. How would you ever understand what I was trying to say, if everyone was saying the exact same thing?

A major feature of a constraints-based causality is that it gives a solid answer on why nature repeats with variety. Similarity and difference are generated by the same process. — apokrisis

Well, your "constraints-based causality" as stated here, is clearly contradictory. An answer which is contradictory ought to be rejected no matter how much the proponent insists that it is "solid".

That is why when I say "baby" to you, I expect that to constrain your thoughts in a certain direction. But I don't make the mistake of expecting you to have some complete exact replica of whatever I have in my mind. There is always an element of variety or unconstrained spontaneity in the response you will have. Or even a surprisingly large degree of that uncertainty in your case? — apokrisis

Do you not apprehend the role of context in meaning? Context provides the difference. The word "baby" might be very similar each time it is used, but it is always used in a different context. And context changes with each passing minute. Therefore, despite the fact that we say it is the same word, it has a different meaning each time it is used, due to the difference in context. Obviously the word, "baby" and its physical similarity over hundreds of years, is not the same process as the instantaneous process whereby the individual user of the word puts that word into context, giving it its meaning according to the circumstances of use. Therefore you are way off base in your contradictory claim, that similarity and difference are generated by the same process. What makes a word the same, is long term repetition. What gives a word its meaning is its context within the particular and unique circumstances present in its use.

So what actually is the story in terms of a constraints-based causality is that both similarity and difference can be produced. Difference will always exist in some degree. But we can regulate that to limit it to differences that don't make a pragmatic difference. Or we can also work to ensure that a difference that does make a difference gets maintained. — apokrisis

What you do not seem to be acknowledging is that "same" is defined by a process which requires the longest possible period of time, and "different" is defined by a process requiring the shortest possible period of time. These cannot be resolved, or reduced to one another, so they will always be fundamentally distinct processes. To think that meaning is produced from an act of constraining the differences involved within an extremely short period of time, by applying principles of long term similarity is completely misguided. There is no such "constraint" actually going on. The basis of meaning is the freedom of choice of the individual. The true process which produces meaning is the expression of short term freedom within the context of long term constraint. So meaning is actually found within the freedom of difference, rather than within the constraints of similarity.

I never would say similarity was primary, nor that difference was primary. That is a false dichotomy you want to pursue. — apokrisis

How do you expect anyone to believe your proposition that there is no real distinction to be made between similarity and difference? Once you allow that similarity is not the same as difference, it becomes evident that it is impossible that the two are created by the same process.

Yes, that is exactly what systems theoretic analysis does, establishes that systems of all types exist and behave according to predictive models. — Pantagruel

Right, so understanding the supposed "system" cannot adequately inform us about the behaviour of individuals who comprise that "system". And evidence (evolution for example) indicates that it is the unique and particular features of the individual which provide the meaningful aspects of the "system". Therefore systems theoretical analysis cannot provide us with an understanding of meaning.

The system doesn't have to be the cause of the actions per se. Only that the actions of the individual components of the system, taken collectively, have additional effects at the (inter)systemic level. That is the essence of emergence. — Pantagruel

To understand an activity requires understanding its cause. To remove this requirement and claim that you have an understanding of the activity without identifying its cause, is misunderstanding. That's what systems theory and "emergence" give us, when represented as an understanding, they give us misunderstanding. "Emergence" very clearly leaves the cause of what emerges as unknown. If "emergence" is presented as an understanding of that activity which falls under that name, it is a misunderstanding. If you recognize that "emergence" does not give an understanding of that activity, you would see the need to go beyond "emerge" for some real principles.

What terms like "systems theoretical analysis", and "emergence" actually signify is a lack of understanding of the activity being referred to. This is evident from the quote I brought from your referred article on extended memory and extended cognition. They simply describe the evidence in a way which is intended to support their pet theory. There is no real understanding involved.

In doing so, you therefore rely upon a commonly accepted vocabulary of "social acts." — Pantagruel

This is a false premise. If it were true that we rely on "commonly accepted vocabulary" to get our ideas across, nothing new would ever "emerge" in the realm of ideas. But clearly new ideas are coming out all the time, and being incorporated into the public domain. And each time we communicate it is actually a different idea which is being communicated. That's the reality of spatial-temporal being. Therefore what is really the case is that we rely on something other than "commonly accepted vocabulary" to get our ideas (which are fundamentally unique), across to others. You will baulk at this and say come on MU, obviously we use the same words. But what we "rely" on, to get our ideas across to others is unique formulations of words, and other unique aspects of context, such as our surroundings. So this proposed premise misrepresents what we "rely" on. Since each one of our ideas is unique and specific, occurring in unique and specific circumstances, what we "rely" on to get that unique and specific idea across to others is a unique and specific formulation of words. And, such a unique and specific formulation of words must be represented as a unique and specific "social act".

For illocutionary acts, the intent is to evoke a behaviour from the other. But, in general, communication is an illocutionary act where the intent is to evoke understanding of a specific meaning. So "consciousness of the content and flow of meaning involved depends on...taking the attitude of the other towards [your] own gestures" (p. 47) Gestures become symbols for particular types of responses within communities of understanding. The existence of mind is only intelligible in terms of these symbols. — Pantagruel

So this paragraph actually contradicts the proposition which I objected to above. Notice the use of "depends on" in the middle of the paragraph. After first proposing that we rely on something common, the author now states that the flow of meaning "depends on" something very unique and specific, i.e. adopting the very particular, and unique "attitude of the other".

Do you apprehend this contradiction Pantagruel? The obvious way to resolve it is to reject the original premise, that we "rely upon a commonly accepted vocabulary of 'social acts'", for the reasons I explained. The evidence is clear that we rely on a unique formulation of words, rather than something common, to get an idea across. And if it were true that we actually did rely on a commonly accepted vocabulary to get any ideas across, language could never have come into existence ("emerged") in the first place, because we could never have gotten any ideas across.

As Dewey says, meaning arises through communication. In other words, communication is fundamental to identity, not the reverse. The notion sociation if fundamental to the genealogy of the self-concept is basic to the science of sociology. — Pantagruel

It's starting to appear to me, like the so-called "science of sociology" is one big misunderstanding; if it really is as you say it is.