Notice that instead of referring to the actual program, and what is being carried out by the program, (the president would have clear access to this information); he refers to press reports about the program.

For example, according to press reports, employees across the Executive Branch have
been required to...

Critical race theory extirpated from federal training from here on out, according to a new memorandum. Good riddance. — NOS4A2

Framed as "divisive, anti-American propaganda".
It boggles the mind to think of what this guy's concept of "American" might be.

What is the probability aliens will land on the WH lawn tomorrow? — RogueAI

That ship has sailed, they're already in the WH.

Ever noticed that physics had to invoke the creative bookkeeping of potential energy to make the equations work? — Banno

If energy is the potential for doing work, then what's potential energy, the potential for the potential for doing work?

The real problem is shutting down polling stations, wrongly purging voter rolls, and removing mail sorting machines. — Michael

Yes, for many, organized voter suppression has become a serious election strategy.

There is what appears to be an irreconcilable difference between the interest of the individual, and the interest of the community. However, it is really reconcilable, through understanding the particular day to day interactions between different people in specific situations. This is what I think the op expresses, a community is built upon particular interactions, rather than indoctrinated ideology. This is morality in its basic, real existence, learning the habits of respect for others. It is not a case of learning some principles of good.

You've been ambiguous about identity and said that essence is the form in the mind. — Gregory

I've been very clear about identity, "a thing is the same as itself". Therefore, unless the form in the mind is the very same as the thing itself, it is not the identity of the thing. Where is this claimed ambiguity?

But you can continue to ignore the fact that I've refuted your position many times, that's up to you. — Gregory

That's strange, I don't recall your refutation. Perhaps you could refresh my memory.

I am trying to think in terms of your own premises, I am just trying to do it critically as opposed to affirmatively. I am not trying to invent premises to attack. — JerseyFlight

OK, so I'll repeat the principal premise. Aristotle distinguishes two types of "form", one being the abstracted essence of a thing, an idea, formula, or definition, and the other being the form which a material object has inherent within itself. Whenever you go astray of this premise, I will point it out to you.

The question still remains, from what then are you apprehending and determining properties? If the mind constructs the form of a Snark would this mean a Snark has existence? Further, where does the mind even get the properties to construct the idea of a Snark? — JerseyFlight

I don't see how "existence" is relevant, we haven't defined that term in this discussion, so it appears like you want a digression. I'm sure you are aware that the mind creates things, some imaginary, perhaps like a "Snark". Some might pass from being imaginary, to be material, like when an architect plans and then has a building constructed. I really don't know where a mind gets its creative ideas, but I don't see how the fact that I don't know how a mind can be creative could be used as evidence that a mind is not creative. Obviously minds are creative, whether or not we know how the creative activity works.

Do you then say that the chair has no existence beyond your mind? — JerseyFlight

No, this would be contrary to the principal premise stated above.

(And I should like to make it clear, this is exactly the position of idealism, of which you are indeed proving yourself to be most consistent. Idealism states that there is no reality beyond the mind, which is to say, even though it tries to posture away from this and violates it repeatedly in the course of action, it is the actual conclusion and solipsism of the position). — JerseyFlight

Again, contrary to the principal premise stated above, and so nothing but a straw man.

Now this seems like a direct contradiction of what is stated above, an example of the posturing I alluded to: — JerseyFlight

Correction, it's a direct contradiction of your straw man interpretation.

I recognize that objects exist outside my mind. — JerseyFlight

So do I recognize that objects exist outside my mind,, as is stated in my principal premise, and also is supported by the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself".

I do not understand how you arrived at this conclusion? — JerseyFlight

Let me explain. If the form of the chair comes from the chair and goes into my mind, then what exists in my mind is the same form as what came from the chair. Since the form is the same form, then there can be no mistake. If the form in my mind is different than the form in the chair, then it cannot be true that the form in my mind came from the chair because it is a different form. If there is a form which comes from the chair, and it is mediated, or altered in any way, then this different form comes to be in my mind, and it is not the same form as what came from the chair, so we cannot say that the form in the mind came from the chair, because the mediated form is a different form. This is the nature of "form". Any change in form, constitutes a distinct and different form.

Why do you here assume that your act of "taking" would be (and must be) one of perfection? — JerseyFlight

For the reason stated above. Any difference of form constitutes a different form. If the form of that chair in my mind is not exactly as the form within the material object (chair in this case), I cannot say that the form comes from the object. It is a different form, therefore this particular form must originate from a different source.

(It is clear to me that this demonstrates the superiority of Hegel's approach over that of Aristotle, because Hegel did not see this process as an automatic transference of perfection, but that it is mediated by thought, hence, the logic by which thought mediates must be more — JerseyFlight

Actually Hegel's position is consistent with Aristotle on this point. It is your idiosyncratic perspective (straw man) which creates the difference. If there was a transferal of form from the object to the mind, as you suggest, then perfection would be necessary. Since there is not perfection Hegel sees this perspective or proposition, i.e. unmediated understanding, as a distortion of reality. That there is mediation of thought, indicates that the form in the mind is different from the form in the object, and therefore not the same form. Therefore what I've argued above, that the form does not come from the object, is consistent with Hegel. Neither Hegel's nor Aristotle's approach is superior on this matter, because they both say the same thing in different ways.

I see a serious dilemma here. If the form of the mind is created by the mind then what is the chair? How can the mind create the form of a chair without the concrete existence of a chair to "apprehend" and "determine" its content? — JerseyFlight

I guess you do not recognize that minds create things. Would you think that it's a serious dilemma that an architect can design a building without ever seeing the building? This is one area where Aristotle is far superior to Hegel, his exposition of final cause, which is derived from Plato's dialectics concerning "the good".

How do you know that it (the chair) doesn't play a role in this process? — JerseyFlight

I didn't say that the chair doesn't play a role, I said that the form in the mind doesn't come from the chair, it is created by the mind. This is consistent with Hegel's "mediated" by thought. And, when you recognize that a difference in form implies that the two different forms are not the same form, you will conclude that the form in the mind did not come from the chair, but was created by the mind.

Your argument seems to be that the existence of "mistakes" is proof that your idealism is true? This seems very much like a non-sequitur. How can you even determine when something is a "mistake" if there is no difference between your mind's idea of a chair and an actual chair? — JerseyFlight

Another failure to respect the principal premise for the sake of a straw man.

I do not see how there can be "material objects" from the basis of your position? If you are referring to "forms" your mind produces, then you are neither referring to "material" or "objects" but mental abstractions. You then have no right to use the term, material objects. — JerseyFlight

I have no idea what you're trying to say here but it appears like another failure to respect the principal premise. That premise states that a material object has a form, and the form which the material object has is distinct from the forms which are in my mind. Material objects are taken for granted by the premise, so if you perceive my perspective as denying the possibility of material objects, you need to demonstrate this, not just appeal to your straw man named "idealism", and knock it down as if you were hitting me.

It seems very much like you are just asserting these sweeping metaphysical premises into being without a way to substantiate them, like you are constructing your own imaginary world out of abstract premises. If everything is reduced to your mind and objects have no independent being, then wouldn't that leave you trapped in your own mind? If you can't make a distinction between what your "mind creates" and what actually exists, then it seems to me you cannot escape the conclusion that this entire discourse is just a "creation" of your mind. — JerseyFlight

Failure to respect the principal premise.

When you say this "doesn't make sense to you," that is correct, because you're not considering the law of identity as it is in the actual movement of its being, hence you are oblivious to its negation. — JerseyFlight

I think I've addressed this for you already, in the other thread. A material "thing" is changing as each moment of time passes. Nevertheless, we say that it remains the same thing. This changing activity is what you call "the actual movement of its being". The material thing has a new form at each passing moment, yet it maintains its identity as the same thing. What is negated is certain attributes, not the identity of the material being. Negation, as a dialectic of attributes, what a thing has and has not, does not suffice to refute the law of identity.

Hegel's point is not that the law of identity specifically states these attributes (unity and difference) but that the law not only presupposes them, but makes use of them within the movement of its own being. — JerseyFlight

So this is Hegel's faulty representation of the law of identity; the one which can be struck down with negation, but it's just a straw man. Identity does not presuppose any attributes. The only presuppositions are "a thing", and "same", neither of which is an attribute.. If Hegel introduces "the movement of its own being" here, then he is talking about attributes which are negated, not the thing nor its identity.

What's most interesting is that you have actually validated Hegel's position throughout this exchange because you have admitted that the law is too narrow to deduce content. — JerseyFlight

That's right, the law of identity is not at all intended to produce conceptual content. It is applied as an aid to judging truth and falsity of conceptual content. So it would be better described as a principle of skepticism. The problem though is when people like you, and perhaps Hegel, represent it as if it is supposed to produce conceptual content, then denounce it as inadequate for that endeavour. All this demonstrates is a misunderstanding of it, on your part.

You speak as if the form in the mind is the same in essence as the outside forms. — Gregory

It seems your reading skills are not so good Gregory. I have, for days now been trying to get Jersey to recognize the distinction between the form in the mind, and the form of the material object. "Identity" in the sense of the law of identity, refers to the latter. In Aristotle, "essence" refers to a form in the mind. Therefore essence is not identity.

There is too much sophistry in your reply. You did not answer my question: 'How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing?' — JerseyFlight

I didn't say "from the thing". That is just your materialist interpretation,, like saying that the image of the chair in my mind when I see a chair "comes from the chair". It does not. It is created by, and therefore caused by, my mind. You interpret from a perspective completely different from mine, then instead of trying to understand what I am saying, you create a straw man from your faulty interpretation, to knock down. You are not in this discussion to understand, but to discredit names like "idealism". So you represent me with your straw man named "idealist" and knock it down, pretending that you are knocking me down.

You just cannot get out of your determinist/materialist way of seeing things, to be able to understand what I am saying. Do you recognize two distinct types of forms, the form which the object called "chair" has, within itself, and the form of it which exists in my mind when I see it?

If the form in my mind came from the chair, it could not be mistaken. It would be taken necessarily from the chair, and therefore could not be anything but a correct representation of the chair. However, this is not the case, mistakes abound, because the form in the mind is created by my mind, not taken from the chair. And that is why the form in my mind must be understood as distinct from the form in the material object

Do you understand the nature of representation? One thing, like a symbol for example, represents something else. The symbol is not taken from the other thing, nor is it necessarily a facsimile or even a likeness of the thing which is represented.

He is using the word "essence" to describe thoughts because he thinks the world is literally in his head thru the forms — Gregory

I am trying to be consistent with Aristotle in my use of "essence", regardless of how others use it. Jersey is neither consistent with Aristotle, nor Hegel, but is clinging to some idiosyncratic notions which are disabling any proper understanding of either.

Why are you obsessed with proof? What I meant by "thorough" was complete, rather than superficial. That he wrote more words, and makes more sense, is evidence (as in proof), that he is more thorough.

Aquinas is one out of thousands of interpreters of Aristotle. — Gregory

I said "the most thorough". Sure there are many less thorough. Do you know any that are more thorough?

The first distinction I should like to make is that being is an actual, concrete thing, not a mere concept or word — JerseyFlight

You need to explain your use of "being", because it makes no sense to me. You are not using it as a noun, to talk about "a being", or individual "beings", so I assume that it is used either as a verb, or as an adjective like "existence" is used as an adjective when we say that a thing has existence or being. Either way, you'd be talking about the concept of "being", not a concrete thing which would be a being. If "being" refers to an activity which many things are engaged in, then this is a concept. If "being" refers to a property, like existence, which things have, then again this is a concept. So it really makes no sense for you to use "being" in the way that you do, and insist that you are referring to an actual concrete thing, this would be "a being". And if "being" refers to some activity which things are involved in, then clearly this is conceptual, because each activity of each individual thing is distinct from the activity of every other thing, so to generalize and say that all these distinct activities have something in common which you call "being", is to conceptualize.

I am well aware of the fact that you will likely claim I am attacking a strawman of your position. If this is actually the case then my argument has not made contact with your discourse. — JerseyFlight

Yes, you have not really made contact with my discourse. I have stressed that Aristotle distinguishes two types of "form", one being the abstracted essence of a thing, and the other being the form which a material object has inherent within itself. Until you recognize this distinction, understand it, and either proceed from this, or refute it and offer something better, then you will just be attacking the straw man.

You claim that if the Aristotelian formation is rejected that we cannot make sense of objects in reality, but this presupposes that we actually form our concepts through the narrow prism of identity, but we don't, this is the naive idealistic assumption, it is akin to the idealist drinking his own Kool-Aid. Hegel proved that every occurrence of identity is making use of other principles, namely, unity and difference. — JerseyFlight

This is not the case at all. We do not produce concepts through "identity" as defined by the law of identity. We produce concepts in the mind, through abstractions, essences, logic, and other mental processes. The law of identity just serves to remind us that what we say about things, in conceptualization, may not be the truth about the thing. And if we think that the identity we like to give to the thing is the thing's true identity, then we are making such a mistake. So "identity" is not a principle by which we would construct concepts, rather we would deconstruct, by acknowledging that the so-called reality which we describe in words and meaning, concepts, is just an illusion, grounded in a false identity which recognizes the similarity between things rather than the differences between things.

The point of dialectics is that you cannot arrive at an accurate essence (understanding of reality) through identity, but must make use of unity and difference, these not only negate the narrow Aristotelian formation of identity, but go beyond it. Just because one produces a formalism, through the method which you are here defending, doesn't make it accurate or comprehensive. One could in fact understand reality in such a way that they extract error from it, thus leading to an erroneous formalism. That is to say, a comprehension of reality can only follow from a dialectical process. — JerseyFlight

As I just explained, the law of identity is not a principle by which we arrive at essences. It was formulated as a tool against the mistaken arguments of the sophists. It is a principle by which we demonstrate mistaken conceptualizations, not a principle to be used for the production of concepts. So your reference to unity and difference are not relevant in this context.

Perhaps the clearest formation of the refutation of the principle of identity presented by Hegel, is when he notes that A=A requires three different symbols linked in unity to even form the syllogism. Merely within the symbolic logic you have the diversity of Unity, Difference and Identity, which are all required and presupposed in order to make sense of identity. There is no identity without them, where there is identity, there you already have the negation of Unity and Difference. — JerseyFlight

This really does not make sense to me. "Difference and identity... [are required to make sense of]... identity"? If your wish is to put this forward as an argument against the law of identity, you need to formulate it in a coherent way. The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. One might represent this as A=A, but you need to bear in mind that this is what A=A represents in this instance. So I have no idea how you infer "diversity", "unity", and "difference" from "a thing is the same as itself".

Here your idealism shines through with vibrant colors. It is not a matter of "rejecting," I think this might be the problem in your characterization, it is a matter of incompletion, a lack of totality, Hegel demonstrates that the principle, as Aristotle forms it, is neither conscious nor consistent with itself. — JerseyFlight

I don't see how a principle could be conscious, and I'm still waiting for you to produce the demonstration you've told me Hegel made. So far you've only shown me how Hegel misunderstood the law of identity, and attacked a straw man.

Isn't it actually the case that no material thing is a particular? — JerseyFlight

I don't know what you could possibly mean here. We know material things as particulars, individuals. That chair is a particular, so is the table, and my computer. How could there possibly be a material thing which is something other than a particular thing? Care to explain?

"Hegel argues that these three concepts [particular, individual, universal], though they seem quite distinct, are intimately bound up with each other. The understanding, however, does not see this and holds the three strictly separated. The understanding sees universals as externally related to particulars. In its extreme form, this may issue in an ontological separation between them, as in Plato’s philosophy, where universals or ‘forms’ are held to exist in a different reality altogether separate from their particular exemplars. Hegel rejects any such approach, and shows how in a real sense it is quite impossible to think the universal, particular, and individual apart from each other. For instance, if the universal is thought to be absolutely separate from individuals, and unique in its own right, then isn’t the universal an individual? Further, if an individual is understood as absolutely separate from universals, doesn’t it become an empty abstraction (i.e., a kind of universal) without specific quality? Hegel argues that the concepts of universal, particular and individual mutually determine one another." The Hegel Dictionary, Glenn Alexander Magee, Continuum International Publishing Group p.255 — JerseyFlight

Sure, the concept of particular is related to the concepts of individual, and also universal. But still, we understand material things as particulars, or individuals, and we understand universals as concepts. So this passage does nothing to refute the distinction between particular and universal. Just because we have a concept of what a particular is, and a concept of what a universal is, and these concepts are related as concepts are, doesn't mean that there is not a difference between what is understood by "particular", and what is understood by "universal". One is understood to be a material thing, while the other is understood to be a concept.

It seems to me this is the crux of everything you are saying. How can you say the essence of a thing "does not abide in the thing," and then claim to "apprehend" and "determine" it from the thing? — JerseyFlight

Do you understand the duality of "form" which I described above? Here's an example. When I see a chair in front of me, there is an image in my mind, we can call this the form of the chair. But the form of the chair, which exists within my mind, is not the same as the form which the material object I am seeing has. The material object I am seeing has molecules, atoms, etc., which are not evident in the image in my mind. So the form of the chair, which exists within my mind, is not the same as the form of the material object which I am calling a chair. These are two distinct "forms" of the very same thing. One is the abstraction, from which we might produce, concepts, and essences, the other is the form which is proper to the chair, constituting its identity.

So the essence of a thing is present to a human mind, as the concept of that thing, or type of thing, and is therefore not concealed. What is concealed, is the thing's true form, or identity, due to the deficiencies of our capacities of sense. Nevertheless, through sensation we do determine "a form" of the thing, and we may proceed to produce an essence, we just do not apprehend "the form", in the sense of the thing's true identity.

This seems exceedingly problematic to me, but there is more... what the mind apprehends is precisely the immediacy of an object, unless one goes beyond this mere apprehension (which takes one beyond bare identity) one cannot inform essence with totality from the narrow category of identity. Here you are trying to smuggle in content that cannot be furnished by bare identity alone. The fact that you are doing this, and that you must do this, only stands to demonstrate the accuracy of Hegel's critique of Aristotle. — JerseyFlight

As I said, we do not use identity to produce concepts and essences, we use the appearance of the thing to us, how the thing appears to us, its image etc., to produce such conceptualizations, and this is not "identity". So you are really attacking a straw man here. In no way am I arguing that identity provides the content for conceptualization. I am arguing the exact opposite, an unbridged gap between identity and conceptualization, such that "identity" in the sense defined by the law of identity, does not even enter into conceptualization..

This seems to contradict your previous premise, when you said "the essence of a thing is not concealed," and while I note the use of a new term to overcome the limitations of your identity position ("accidentals"), — JerseyFlight

It only seems like contradiction because you are not recognizing the duality of "form" which I've been talking about, and trying to get you to apprehend.

It seems you are trying to walk two roads at once... — JerseyFlight

There are two roads, two distinct types of "form". When you come to apprehend what I am saying, what Aristotle was saying, then make your point. But don't just keep hitting the straw man.

What you are actually doing, which is to say, what you must do, in order to furnish being with adequate content, forces you to go beyond the so-called law of identity. — JerseyFlight

Of course, being is conceptual, while identity is within the thing itself. So identity doesn't even enter into the content of being, or any such conceptualization. The thing itself cannot get into the content of our minds. But your straw man is to claim that I pretend to use identity as some sort of content or foundation for conceptualization. That's not the case, and that's why it's a straw man.

So it's a new form every time a color dims on an object? — Gregory

Of course, it requires a different description, therefore it's a different form.

Most of us have no problem seeing something as the same even though parts change, without positing an underlying principle under another one that changes. — Gregory

I know, that's why two principles are required, to account for how we can see that the thing is the same despite having changed, and understand that this is true. One aspect of the thing changes while another stays the same. Without this separation making two distinct aspects, we'd have to say that the thing is the same, despite having changed, which is contradictory.

BTW, MU, are you a mathematical realist or anti-realist? — 3017amen

If I had to take a label, I'd say anti.

How to interpret Aristotle is highly contentious. You indoctrinated yourself into a Thomistic take on this, which says existence is a thing added to form. But form must exist to have existence added to it. — Gregory

Aquinas offers the most thorough, and rigorous interpretation of Aristotle available, so such an "indoctrination" is a very good step toward understanding Aristotle.

It was Aristotle himself, in his metaphysics, who demonstrated that the form of a thing is necessarily prior to the material existence of that thing. Of course we would say that such an immaterial form would have "existence. This is why Neo-Platonists, and Christian theologian claim the existence of immaterial Forms. I don't see what you're trying to get at.

ollowers of Duns Scotus thought that prime matter can exist on it's own. — Gregory

As I explained, there is no good reason to take this position. It contravenes the conclusion of the cosmological argument, and, designating a part of reality as unintelligible in such an absolute sense is contrary to the philosophical will to know.

Please provide a real argument that a tree is composed of two principles instead of one. Why not just the treeness principle instantiated? — Gregory

The two principles, matter and form, are required to understand the reality of change, as explained in Aristotle's physics. If a tree was just form, then with every passing moment that the form of the tree changed, it would be a hew object. We could not refer to it as one continuous, existing "tree" because every new moment it becomes something different, with change. So Aristotle posited "matter" as the underlying thing which stays the same, as the form changes, grounding the identity of a changing thing, allowing us to say that the tree continues to be "the same tree" despite changes to its form. If a thing's identity is associated only with its form, then at each moment when it has a new form, due to change, then it must also be identified as a totally distinct object. .

So until matter 'takes form' or 'receives form' then it is 'inchoate' or formless. (The emergence of order from chaos is of course one of the underlying problems of all philosophy and science.) — Wayfarer

In Aristotle's metaphysics, matter without form is an impossibility demonstrated by his cosmological argument. He also explains why the form of a thing is necessarily prior to its material existence. This is why Aristotelian principles are consistent with Christian theology which posits immaterial Forms in the act of creation.

Furthermore, he argues that if the form of the thing was not prior to the material existence of the thing, then the thing, when it comes into existence, could come into existence as something other than it is. But it's impossible that a thing is something other than the thing that it is. So by this argument, what a thing will be (its form) is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of the thing, in order that the thing is the thing that it is, and not something else.

And by the cosmological argument it is impossible that there ever was matter without form. To posit the reality of matter without form, is to posit something real which is unintelligible, as form is what is intelligible. To assume that there is something which in its very nature is unintelligible, is self-defeating to the philosophical mind, which is the desire to know. So regardless of the cosmological argument, there is no benefit to the assumption of formless matter. This would only postulate something which is impossible to comprehend. Therefore we ought to assume that all matter has form, and so it has identity, and formless matter is a nonsense proposition.

The propositional form itself already contradicts it, since a proposition promises a distinction between subject and predicate as well as identity; and the identity-proposition does not furnish what its form demands. — JerseyFlight

This is another example of Hegel's misrepresentation of Aristotelian principles. A thing, for Aristotle consists of both matter and form. A thing's identity is form alone. Therefore we have the required distinction between subject (the thing as matter and form), and what is predicated of the thing, identity (its form). It is this separation of a thing's true, real form ("identity" rather than human abstraction), from the material thing, which allows Christian theologians to conceive of immaterial Forms, which are prior to, and necessary for, as the cause of existence, of material things. Aristotelian principles disallow matter without form, but not form without matter.

-Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. — JerseyFlight

Let's say that the law of identity is an ideal. As such, it is proposed as a limitation, or rule for abstraction. As a proposal, or proposition, it might be judged for truth or falsity and rejected or accepted accordingly. What I am arguing is that Hegel's rejection is unjustified, being based in a faulty dialectic, consisting of a misunderstanding of the Aristotelian conceptions of "form" and "essence", evidenced by Jersey Flight's quotes.

Furthermore, if we reject the law of identity there are consequences which need to be respected. Initially, the assumption that there are particular, determinate individuals, beings or objects, in the real, or actual world, is unsubstantiated, unsupported and unjustified. So it makes no sense, as hypocrisy or self-contradiction, to both deny the law of identity and also talk about "actual being". Without the law of identity, or an adequate replacement, the claim of "actual being" is completely invalid.

1) you only assert all this. You have no evidence — Gregory

The evidence is right there in JF's quotes from Hegel. When compared with a thorough understanding of Aristotle, like that displayed by Aquinas, Hegel's faulty representation of Aristotelian concepts is clearly evident.

3) a thing exists, it does not "have evistence". Descartes was right about that, Aquinas wrong — Gregory

How does " a thing exists" mean any thing different from what "a thing has existence" means? Are you saying that "existence" means something other than what it means to exist. What could that difference possibly be?

Hegel's position on being, as you seem to use the term, is that it is not only inconsequential, but dangerous insofar as it serves to distort essence: "For here we are not concerned with the object in its immediate form, but want to know it as mediated. And our usual view of the task or purpose of philosophy is that it consists in the cognition of the essence of things. By this we understand no more than that things are not to be left in their immediate state, but are rather to be exhibited as mediated or grounded by something else. The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed. Now, when we say further that all things have an essence, what we mean is that they are not truly what they immediately show themselves to be. A mere rushing about from one quality to another, and a mere advance from the qualitative to the quantitative and back again, is not the last word; on the contrary, there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence." — JerseyFlight

This passage demonstrates how this so-called distortion of essence is a feature of Hegel's misunderstanding of the Aristotelian concept, "essence" and nothing else. As I explained to you already, Aristotle defined two senses of "form". The one is the human abstraction, and this is how we come to know the essence of things. The other is the form of the material thing itself. Each material thing is a particular, an individual with a form proper to itself. This form is distinct from the essence of the thing, which is the form which human beings know in abstraction, because it consists of accidentals, whereas the essence does not. Do you apprehend that difference? The essence does not contain the accidentals which inhere within the form of the material object. Both are "forms", yet "forms" in two distinct senses of the word.

So the following statement reveals Hegel's misunderstanding "The immediate being of things is here represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed...there is something that abides in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence." The essence of a thing is not concealed at all, nor does it abide in the thing, it is the form which exists within the human abstraction, what the human mind apprehends and determines as the essential properties of the thing. What is concealed is the independent "form" of the thing, complete with the accidentals which the human being does not necessarily perceive. And this independent form constitutes the identity of the thing. That this is the proper interpretation is evident from the writings of Thomas Aquinas, who did much work expounding on the difference between the forms of human abstraction (essences), and the independent "Forms".

Hegel, with this use of "essence" puts us right back into the confusion of Plato's Timaeus. "Form" as "essence", is a universal. The problem which confronted Plato was the question of how a particular could come into existence from a universal form. He thought it necessary to assume this, because things, like human beings for instance, come into existence as a determinate type. So the human form, as a universal, must be prior to the particular, the individual human being. He was stumped because the medium between the universal and the particular was seen as matter, but the universal form could not account for the existence of the particulars of the material individual. Aristotle got beyond this problem by assigning all such universal forms (essences) as the product of human abstraction, therefore posterior to the things themselves, while also positing a new type of form, the form of the individual. which substantiates a thing's "identity". Hegel, in not upholding this distinction confuses identity with essence.

You are free to pretend that Aristotelian logic deals with actual being, but it does not, it deals with abstract being, with dead images. Dialectic is thought suited to essence, Aristotle's axioms are principles suited to the creation of abstract categories, not the comprehension of reality. — JerseyFlight

That's right, formal logic deals with essences, not with actual things. But dialectics is not formal logic. How do you suppose that a person might create useful abstract categories without an appropriate understanding of reality? Creation of suitable abstract categories can only follow from a comprehension of reality.

The object's identity and the object's real identity? Then what is the non-real-identity of the object that you are maintaining against the object's real identity? How is this not an exercise in abstraction? It proves that what you are talking about is nothing more than an idea, a stale and lifeless category. — JerseyFlight

Right, there is a distinction to be upheld, between the form of the thing, within the human mind, the abstraction, and the form of the thing in reality. The "non-real identity" is the identity given to the thing by the human mind, the abstraction, the essence. It is "non-real", because it is lacking in the accidentals which are a part of the identity of the individual thing.

My position is not that the abstraction is not the object, but that it distorts our comprehension of the object, the actual being of being is its movement not its fragment. I am saying exactly what Hegel says, take your categories from the phenomena, do not impose them on the phenomena. — JerseyFlight

This is not what Hegel says. The "movement" you refer to here is called by Hegel "becoming". It is not called "the actual being" in Hegel's dialectics. That is the point I'm trying to impress on you, "Being" is subsumed within the category of becoming, "movement". That's how Hegel can argue against Aristotle's concept of identity. There is no such thing as beings in the real, actual world, only becoming, because Hegel has done away with any independent Forms. All forms are dependent on the human mind, as essences, and there is no true form or being concealed behind how the thing appears to us, only movement, becoming. A thing only has being through human apprehension. Other than this it is just a becoming.

Thus the principle of identity reads: "Everything is identical with itself, A = A'; and negatively: "A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time." -Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. — JerseyFlight

See, this is Hegel's misrepresentation, a straw man. The law of identity says that a thing has an identity unto itself. It says nothing about abstract understanding. It is a law against the abuse of abstraction reasoning. It says nothing about what abstract understanding is, or how it ought proceed, only what it is not, i.e. a thing's identity. It was created by Aristotle as a tool against sophists who claimed that the human abstraction (essence) of a thing is the thing's identity. This sophistic claim denies the possibility of human mistake as to identity. That is why we must uphold a distinction between a thing's true identity, its own particular and unique form, and the identity which we assign to it in abstraction (essence). Without this distinction there can be no such thing as human knowledge being mistaken, because what we say about the thing is what is true about it.

So yes, the scientist can chose one or the other view of causality as the most pragmatic for modelling reasons. That is the right way to think about it.

But then in everyday life, folk get rather passionate about which of these stories is “true”. And even scientists might want to get down to the “truest” model even if it ain’t also the most pragmatic (in the everyday and unphilosophical sense of being the maximally simple, or most utilitarian, encoding of Nature. :razz: ) — apokrisis

There is a problem with assigning pragmaticism as the guiding principle of science, and that is that any human activity (the means) is produced and directed as seen fit for the desired goal (end). If there is not a stated, and adhered to goal of the scientific activity, (such as truth), then it may be guided by the particular interests of the particular participants, or groups of participants, in that activity.

Due to these concerns, "the most pragmatic for modelling reasons" is clearly not the right way to think about it. This way of thinking about it is to forfeit objectivity and truth, for the sake of undisclosed goals, which may or may not be morally acceptable. It places the goals of individual scientists, and interested parties who provide funding for scientific research, as higher than good moral principles.

I would consider two basic categories, which may be named as immaterialist and materialist, or something like that. The immaterialist perspective assumes an active, internal, and immaterial first principle, such as the soul, which is the cause of the conscious experience. The materialist perspective assumes that the consciousness is fundamentally passive, being acted upon by external forces and therefore caused to be what it is. The difference is best seen in the freewill/determinist debate, and the various attempts at compatibility.

It is logically necessary to eventually have sadness in the place of happiness. — 3017amen

Plato demonstrated that this type of opposition does not apply to emotions. Pleasure is not the opposite of pain, nor is happiness the opposite of sadness. They are distinct emotions, not dependent on each other. He demonstrated this by bringing into the discussion, pleasures which are not a release from pain.

It's just that the opposites are logically necessary for existence of any binary concept. — 3017amen

This may be true, but the point I am making is that these things, something/nothing, happy/sad, are not binary opposites.

Yes there is, by virtue of time and change. Consider time and relativity. The changes in time, span from temporal time to timelessness by virtue of the speed of light, and any gradient of speed in between. If life was completely static (logically impossible), opposites would not be logically necessary. — 3017amen

How is this relevant to the subject?

Though there might be right-wing mobs out there swarming and harassing people... — NOS4A2

The police.

I think what you really mean is that" something" would be inclusive of temperature both hot and cold. — 3017amen

No that's not what I meant, because I meant to show a category difference between particular instances of hot or cold, and the general category of temperature. The particular instances of something being hot, or something being cold, would be represented as subjects to which hot and cold are predicated. Since the term "something" references the subject, not what is being predicated, there is no opposite, like there opposition within the predicates, hot and cold. Any attempt to negate the subject is a completely different matter than the negation of a predicate which is a simple opposition.

The more appropriate comparison relates to opposites because something and nothing are diametrically opposed as opposites. — 3017amen

That is what you are asserting, but I think it is wrong, for the reason I'm trying to explain. "Something" indicates that there is an object which can be represented as a subject for predication. Opposition is only a valid logical procedure in reference to the predicate. There is no valid procedure by which the subject can be opposed, or negated. That would be a matter of declining the proposition, but declining the proposition (skepticism, or agnosticism), does not constitute proper opposition. Proper opposition is a feature of predication.

You might claim that if the proposed subject, "something" has no corresponding object, as may be the case with a counterfactual, there is an imaginary subject which is presented as something, then this something is really its opposite, nothing. But that would be incorrect because an imaginary subject is not the opposite of a corresponding subject, and it is obviously not nothing. They are both valid subjects. So, as I say there is no proper way to oppose the subject, only to claim falsity or lack of correspondence, which is not the same as opposition.

That's what is meant by simple a priori comparison (semantics/antonyms). We're just using strict definitions from the meaning of words themselves. (Which is in the same spirit as logical necessity/a priori truths.) — 3017amen

If you would follow strict definitions, you would see that nothing is not the logical opposition of something, as I explained. "Something" represents "an unspecified thing". The opposite of this would be "a specified thing". Clearly "a specified thing" is not nothing. "Nothing" represents "not anything" so the opposite of this would be "anything". "Anything" means "a thing without significance or importance as to which thing". Do you see the difference between "something" and "anything"?

And likewise I don't believe that we need evil for the concept of "good" to make sense, or that whatever is least good we would necessarily call "evil" any more than there needs to be an opposite of an itch, and the most non-itchy I ever feel must be labelled as some discrete concept in itself. — Mijin

I believe Christian theology has attempted to remove evil as the opposition of good. It views all existence (any something) as good, being created by God it is good. It is only through privation from its full potential, that a thing is less than perfect, but less than perfect is still good. This is why traditionally Catholicism focused on love, forgiveness, and confession. Jesus can deliver us from our sins. No matter how far we are from perfection there is still good within us, and that means we're not evil. To leave the realm of "good" we'd have to jump over into the category of non-existent, but it doesn't make sense to say that non-existence is the opposite of existence, because opposites are the extremes within a particular category.

It's not that you need the opposites, it's that the opposites are logically necessary for existence of any binary concept. — 3017amen

Binary concepts are applied as predicates as your examples hot and cold, upward and downward, show. "Something" and "nothing" are not predications. That is your mistake, you are trying to represent them as predications, a binary concept, when they are not.

For example 'upward' cannot exist unless there is a 'downward', they are opposites but they co-substantiate one another, their unity is that either one exists because the opposite is necessary for the existence of the other, one manifests immediately with the other. — 3017amen

OK, so talking this analogy, upward and downward are opposing directions. In the case of "something", it would refer just to "direction", not any particular direction, so there would be no opposite.direction.

Hot would not be hot without cold, due to there being no contrast by which to define it as 'hot' relative to any other condition, it would not and could not have identity whatsoever if not for its very opposite that makes the necessary prerequisite existence for the opposing condition to be. — 3017amen

And in comparison to this example, "something" would be like temperature, neither hot nor cold, with no opposite.

No exceptions taken! (The concept of nothing is logically necessary, for there to be something.) — 3017amen

This is not really true, because we can consider all sorts of things without considering the possibility of nothing. This is why the concept of zero came rather late in the development of number systems. And being was not properly opposed with not-being until Parmenides presented it in this way. In fact, the proper opposite of "something" is not "nothing". This is because "something" refers to a particular thing, which has not been specified. It is an undetermined thing, something. So the opposite of "something" is a particular thing which has been specified, as this or that particular thing, a determined thing. "Thing" is the subject, and there is no opposite to the subject, only what is predicated has an opposite

Trump has really made America great.

I don't think it is necessary to have a concept of property. — Andrew4Handel

As evident from the participation in this thread, there doesn't seem to be any logical principles to support one thing being the property of another thing.

In logic we use "property" in relation to predication. With predication we describe things through the attribution of properties. In the case of human beings, we might refer to one's actions, and habits to produce a moral description of the person. The habits which are attributed to a person, in relation to presupposed moral principles, supports moral judgement. The act of claiming ownership of objects (what you call "property") can be judged as a habit. Many habits are morally acceptable in moderation, but not in excess. The problem might be to determine an acceptable level.

A thing’s purpose is whatever it is good for, regardless of whether or not anyone created it with that use in mind. Our use of the word in the blackbird case demonstrates that we are generally okay with this sense of “purpose” in everyday speech. — Pfhorrest

This doesn't avoid teleology, because to say that something uses something toward a good, implies teleology. So to say that the blackbird uses its wings for the purpose of flying is to make a teleological statement.

In trust you have access to the Greek, what is that word for "cause." — tim wood

Huh? How is Greek relevant? I was speaking about what English speaking philosophers refer to as "final cause". Don't change the subject, address the issue. Do you accept that the will, and therefore intention is a cause of human action, or do you believe in a determinist materialism?

From what I understand, quantum mechanics is observable, and therefore material. — Pinprick

We were talking about the wavefunction, which describes the existence of the particle when its not being observed. The particle only has material existence when it is being observed because when it's not being observed it cannot be said to have a determinate spatial-temporal existence. How could there be a material thing which has no determinable spatial-temporal location?

Actually - no. I think your OP fails to come to terms with the existential angst behind the question. The original question was posed by Liebniz, thus:

Why is there something rather than nothing? The sufficient reason [...] is found in a substance which [...] is a necessary being bearing the reason for its existence within itself. — Wayfarer

Aristotle examined this question of why there is something rather than nothing, in his Metaphysics, and determined that it was unanswerable, and therefore the wrong question to ask, because it's a sort of nonsensical thing to ask. Instead, he replaced this question with the more appropriate question of why there is what there is, instead of something else. It is in answering this question that he is led to believe that form is necessarily prior in time to matter, validating the assumption of immaterial Forms.

This is consistent with Leibniz' principle of sufficient reason. If we look at every thing which exists, and conclude that there must be a reason (cause) for it being what it is rather than something else, then the cause of a thing being the very thing that it is (rather than something else) is necessarily prior to its material being as that thing which it is. If we propose a first thing now, we cannot conclude that the first thing comes from absolutely nothing because there must be a reason (cause) of it being the thing that it is, rather than something else. And, since the existence of each material thing is organized in a specific way, and not completely random, we must exclude random chance as a possible cause of the first thing.

edit: the seed of this idea is found in Plato's Timaeus.

Haha, that's brilliant. It's both funny and alludes to exactly the issue I'm talking about. — Mijin

That's called equivocation. It's a logical fallacy resulting from the misuse of words. It would be very helpful for you in discussion on this forum, to understand this fallacy, and be able to readily recognize it, because it's commonplace here.

Are we really just about a word, or something more important. If you can tell me how intention moves or creates anything like a brick, then you can be sure I'll pay attention. — tim wood

I already told you. A person gets angry at you, sees a brick, and gets the idea to hit you with the brick, picks up the brick and hits you on the side of the head. Obviously the person's intention to hit you with the brick causes the person to pick up the brick and hit you with it. What more do you want? In philosophy we call this "final cause". In case you are unfamiliar with it, it is a recognized form of causation, and intention plays an important role in law.

You can play dumb, and pretend that it was not the person's immaterial intent and immaterial ideas which causes the brick to get up and hit you, but then why be two-faced, trying to deny your materialism as you have been? If you do not agree that it's the person's idea to hit you with the brick (intention), which causes you to be hit with the brick, then just admit that you're a determinist materialist, and argue what you believe, .instead of pretending. If it is not the intent of the person which causes you to be hit with the brick (final causation), then is the person not morally or legally responsible for this act?

In the meantime, I distinguish between material things and immaterial things, these latter being ideas. Do you? And if you do, on what basis? And if you don't, why not? — tim wood

If you had read the posts I made addressed to you, you would know that I do not make the same distinction as you. And, I gave the reasons, I think that there are more accurate and productive distinctions to be made.

Furthermore, I think that yours is a false distinction because what you call material things, like bricks, have what must be according to your distinction, an immaterial aspect, as demonstrated by quantum mechanics. And what you call immaterial things, human ideas, have what must be according to your distinction, a material aspect, as demonstrated by the involvement of the human brain in these ideas. So if we wanted to distinguish between material and immaterial we would have to make the division in a different way from what you suggest.

You're claim of contradiction, in not addressing what I mean, is merely offensive. — tim wood

You can give "reality" whatever definition you want, and proceed to talk in very strange ways, claiming not to contradict yourself, but then your definition contradicts what the rest of us know as "reality". That is how your claims are contradictory. The claim that there are real things which are not part of reality contradicts the conventional use of "reality", which we know as the collection of all real things. And you've given no supportive reasons for your exclusive definition, demonstrating that your definition is merely the product of a materialist bias.

But you've got nothing to show on your side except your unsupported claim, that itself can stand only as an unsupported claim. So I invite you for the last time to make your case. — tim wood

You did not address at all what I've shown as support for what you call my "unsupported claim".

That was the matter of how intention, which is immaterial and not part of reality in your book, can move, and even create, material things like bricks, which are part of reality in your scheme. I used this as evidence that the division, or distinction you have made is not a true division, it is not consistent, or correspondent with observed reality.

How do you propose to maintain this distinction when things like intention cross the boundary. Intention appears to exist as an immaterial thing in the mind, but causes effects on, and creates material things. Where does intention exist relative to your division? Is it part of material reality or not? You have yet to address this, but I suppose it is not, being a thing of the mind. But if it is not, then how does it have such a massive effect on material things if it is not a part of that material reality?

A materialist, fool!, apparently maintain that ideas are material, that all that is, is material. Which. I. Have. Made. Clear. Is. Not. What. I. Think. Get your terms straight! — tim wood

You haven't made it clear. Saying that there are real things which are not part of reality is contradiction, rather than making things clear. And you think I need to get my terms straight.

You ignore my distinction between reality and real, even as I tell you it's my distinction and why I make it. — tim wood

Obviously I'm not ignoring your distinction, that's why I'm in this discussion. I just think it's not consistent with reality, and therefore it's wrong.

But put it away: my distinction is between ideas and things not ideas, ideas being matters of mind. If they're not matters of mind, say so, and tell me what they then are and where they are. — tim wood

I have no reason to say that ideas are not matters of mind. The issue is with your assumption that matters of mind are not part of reality.

"• x is subjective = x's existence is mind-dependent (e.g. fictional (fictions exist too))
• x is objective = x's existence is mind-independent (e.g. real)"

I've been using mass and materiality to try to make this distinction. Subjective/objective seems good too. — tim wood

The problem is that mass, and materiality, are concepts, what we say about things, descriptions, and therefore not mind independent. Likewise, subjective/objective has the same problem, these are just concepts, proposed for division. But on what basis can you divide two categories and say that the things in the one category are not part of reality? The simple act of dividing, and designating this part as a part of a larger whole, denies that the part could be outside reality. What could that even mean, to have identified two distinct types of things, and then say that this one type is not part of reality?

I think that this 'of the mind', and 'not of the mind' distinction is not a good one to base an understanding of reality on. And to make a distinction like that and remove one side from the realm of reality, yet try to say that this side is somehow "real", is just contradiction. There are other distinctions which are much more productive, like passive/active, and past/future, which allow both sides to be part of reality, and also allow that both mind and matter partake of both sides. Then we bypass this bias which makes you want to contradict yourself by saying that there are real things which are not part of reality. If you'd open your mind to other possibilities you might see that if it's real, it's got to be part of reality. Then, when we except the reality of immaterial things, we can get to work on understanding them. But denying the reality of them doesn't give us any headway toward understanding them.

...because I suspect I am not a materialist... — tim wood

Wow, a person who defines "reality" with "materiality" and doesn't consider that to be a case of materialism. I'm dumbfounded.

So I can tell the difference. I asked you if we were fruit salad. It appears we are. And I think you are allowing for a careless equivocation in your usage. — tim wood

What the hell are you talking about? You distinguish between reality and not reality, on the basis of materiality, because that makes it easy for you? Does being easy mean your distinction is correct?

Sorry I didn't reply to your quip about "fruit salad", I thought you were making a joke.

And how would they know? Are they making any distinction between real and reality? And, "part of" reality: what part, how? — tim wood

What kind of a distinction is that? I really don't see how reality can be anything other than the complete collection of what is real. Isn't that what reality means to you? That's what the dictionary says, so it must be what it means to most people. What sense does it make to say that there are some real things, which for some obscure reason, are not part of reality? As I pointed out, with my example of wavefunctions and particles, it really doesn't make the distinction any easier for you. All it does is defer the question of whether a thing is a part of reality or not, to a question of whether the thing is material or not. And if this is the wrong question in the first place you are just making a mistake.

It appears you mean "inside itself." That is not what I mean (nor, I suspect, anyone else on the planet). I merely meant that which corresponds to your act of naming and pointing. "Brick" is an idea. But a brick, the particular one named and referred to, the one having mass, is both real and (ok, here) inside of reality, in ways that "brick" is not. — tim wood

I don't understand why you believe that a thing must be capable of being pointed at in order to be part of reality. The fact that we cannot point to it might only indicate that our knowledge of it is deficient. But why should we exclude things from reality just because our knowledge of these things is deficient. Something makes an unfamiliar sound in the night. We cannot exclude this from reality just because we can't point to it. We cannot exclude wavefunctions from reality just because we cannot point to the particle. Nor can we exclude ideas from reality just because we cannot point to them. All these things, we cannot point to them merely because we are deficient in knowledge about them. This does not mean that they are not part of reality.

And, to be sure, wave functions in any case just are ideas - methods of describing. — tim wood

Sez you, but "wavefunction" describes something real, just like "brick" describes something real. And, just like you can point to a particular place where "brick" is applicable (an object called a brick), you can also point to a particular place where "wavefunction" is applicable. (in a field of electromagnetic radiation). I'm afraid your distinction is really not getting you anywhere. Use of the word "brick" is supported by ideas, so that we can use "brick" to refer to something in the world, but so is "wavefunction" supported by ideas so that it can be used to refer to something in the world.

Why, tell me please, are the ideas which are employed in the use of words, any less a part of reality than the things which are referred to by the words. If using words is part of reality, then we must include both of these essential aspects of word usage as part of reality as well.

But ours is essentially simple. There are various ways that I might demonstrate to you the reality of a brick. And those criteria I define as being the criteria not for the real, but for reality. You're certainly free to not like my definition and to have your own. But I invite you to show me how an idea, by these criteria, is, in reality. And I will allow that my criterium, for it's an -um and not an -a, is mass. — tim wood

Suppose someone takes a brick, and slaps you upside the head with it. Are you going to turn around and tell me that intentions are not a part of reality, because they are not material like the brick is? Do you think it's the brick that gets up and slaps you in the head? Do you think a brick could even exist in the first place, without intentions to create it? Tim, get your shit together, and face reality! Otherwise it will slap you in the face while you're standing there thinking, ideas can't do that, they're not part of reality.








,

It appears to me that for clarity I should start to explicitly refer to the materiality that I hold is the key to admission to reality, as I think most folks do most of the time. — tim wood

I don't think most folks would agree with you. I think that most folks believe that what other people are thinking, their intentions and such, are part of reality. Are you solipsist? How do you defend yourself against deception and abuse from others, if the intentions of others are not part of reality in your belief?

Did you miss what I wrote above? — tim wood

No, I didn't miss it, but as I said, I didn't understand what you meant by "all that is each in itself". A brick is in the world, an image of a brick is in a mind. A mind is in the world. Nothing is "in itself". A molecule is in a brick. Do you think that a molecule is not part of reality because it is in something which is in the world, like an idea is in something which is in the world?

What grounds your notion of materiality? Is a wavefunction material? Is it in reality? If not then where is the material particle when its position is not being measured? I don't think you have a very practical division between what is in reality and not in reality

Minds, ideas, real, but not material, and on my understanding of reality, which calls for some materiality, not in that reality. — tim wood

This is what I question. Why does reality call for materiality in your belief? Are intentions not part of reality? Surely they have a real affect in the world, and many are external to you. But clearly intentions are not material. How can you not see that defining "reality" with "materiality" is a big mistake?

I understand reality to comprise all that is each in itself. — tim wood

All that is "each in itself"? What the heck does that mean?

Things in reality are real, but not all real things are in reality. — tim wood

OK, so "real things" names a bigger category than "things in reality". If therefore, there are real things, which are not part of reality, what are they a part of? Where do they exist, and by what premise do you say that they are real things?

Examples: ideas, seven, the meanings of words. — tim wood

Let's take a look at some of these things then, to see where they exist if they're not part of reality. It appears like you are talking about things which are in minds. If these things exist within minds, yet they are not in reality, am I correct to conclude that you believe that minds are not part of reality? What is a mind a part of, if it is not a part of reality? Do you think it is some sort of falsity, or fiction to say that people have minds, and minds have ideas, because all these things are not in reality?

Let me try this. Suppose, for WHATEVER reason, that a pen glued to a table means something to an aboriginal culture. To you it is two things, or three if you include the glue. But to them it's one. So how many forms does it objectively have??? — Gregory

The point is that human intelligence is deficient.

"Thing" is a word used by humans to demarcate objects of being. Further, the word 'thing" is itself insufficient to encompass the reality of being, this is why you must use other words to demarcate the nature of being. — JerseyFlight

You are trying to give "being" a meaning which is not consistent with the meaning that it has in its status when opposed to not-being, or nothing, in Hegel's logic. We need to adhere to the meaning of "being" as used in Hegel's dialectics to avoid equivocation. "Being" refers to the abstraction, the human determination. I already explained to you the incompatibility between the world of becoming, and the logical determinations of what is and what is not, being and not-being. Now you want to talk about "the reality of being" as if being is really becoming, but all this does is confuse the issue, making it difficult to distinguish the incompatible categories which were disclosed by the ancient Greeks.

The kind of identity you are talking about is precisely the idealist identity, the mysticism, that Hegel disposes of. Further, all that you are distinguishing here, does require, as your articulating presence proves, a human to make the distinction. This is because the abstract formation that you are putting forth is not the object, it is a characterization of the object invented by humans. — JerseyFlight

Yes, you continue to assert that Hegel demonstrated "identity" to be faulty, or contradictory, but you have yet to produce the argument. The argument you have here does nothing. Just because the abstract formation I put forward, describing the identity of the object, is not the object itself, does not mean that there is not an object, with its own identity. So long as I maintain the separation between what is said about the object's identity, and the object's real identity, there is no problem. That is, until you deny that there are any real objects.

Now I agree that objects exist beyond words, but what you are trying to do is equate essence as being synonymous with your concept of identity. But essence and identity are not the same. — JerseyFlight

No, clearly I am not trying to do this. I have said that an object's identity consists of both its matter and its form. I never said anything about "essence", another confusing word with multiple meanings, just like "being". Again, I request that you read clearly what I say, and do not try to distract in this way, by saying that I am talking about something I haven't even mentioned.

It is agreed that matter exists beyond concepts. It is not agreed that your concept of identity explains or contains the essence of matter. It is too narrow and one-sided to even come close to accomplishing this purpose, enter now Hegel's dialectic. — JerseyFlight

No,no,no, this is totally confused. Essence is formal, and matter is a completely distinct category from form, so it doesn't even make sense to talk about the essence of matter. Furthermore, we haven't discussed matter enough to have any agreement as to whether it is more than conceptual.

Once again, we are beyond identity, which states, A = A, are you saying this is false? Hegel's point is that identity never makes it to reality precisely because it never makes it to -A, which is actually the concrete reality of what occurs in being, the essence of being. — JerseyFlight

I don't know what you're talking about. The law of identity is represented as A=A. There is no need to reference -A. Of course A would never make it to -A, that would violate the law of identity. The relation of A to -A is what is called "becoming". It is not being! And you cannot represent it as "the essence of being". That is an incorrect interpretation of Hegel. It is a movement, a becoming. If you think that becoming is being, in Hegel's dialectics, you are simply wrong. Read the Stanford article I referred for you. Being is the abstraction, there is no such thing as the the concrete being. This is why identity doesn't make sense to Hegel. There are no individual beings in the concrete reality, only the process of becoming, Therefore identity, which is what Aristotle gives to individual things, beings, makes no sense. Individual things are what a mind distinguishes in the act of individuation, but in reality the thing vanishes into not that thing as fast as time passes, so identity makes no sense.

The real trick to your sophistry, and every last ounce of your philosophical leverage, is achieved by trying to smuggle in a loaded premise; you are trying to say that identity embodies negation, but the concrete problem is that it has no negativity in it, the formation is entirely positive! — JerseyFlight

You are completely neglecting predication. The subject is A. What is predicated of A, may be negated. and this represents change to the thing. Clearly, identity embodies negation when the object which is being represented as A, changes yet maintains its identity as A. What may be predicated of A at one time is negated and cannot be predicated at another time. There is no need for A=-A, for identity to embody negation. You are just making this unwarranted claim without considering the nature of predication.

This is undeniable, A = A does not say, A = -A, and this proves you are distorting and twisting the position, no doubt, because you know you cannot get the content you need for essence from the empty tautology of identity. — JerseyFlight

Why do you keep bringing up "essence" as if it has some relevance? As I said last post, stick to what I have written, and please try not to read your straw man presuppositions into what I write. Essence is something completely different from identity. I have no desire to discuss essence here. So unless you can show how essence is relevant, just leave that term alone. But please, don't pretend that it's my desire to discuss essence.

Where your mysticism arises is that you are trying to claim that your concept is the most basic representation of reality, thus attempting to fuse it with the highest philosophical authority. — JerseyFlight

Did I ever claim that? Stick to what is written! Please.

One more thing can be mentioned here. When you make use of this concept in discourse, you most assuredly do not, and will not, use the form you are here trying to assert for reasons of posture, A = -A. Instead you will assert the positive image against the negation. On all fronts then you are defeated and exposed as a practical negator of the position you espouse. — JerseyFlight

Burn the straw man! When did I say A=-A? The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself, and this is sometimes represented as A=A. As time passes, the thing which remains the same as itself, represented as A, changes. So the properties we predicate of A, may be negated, while A remains A. Therefore negation is contained within identity. How you can possibly interpret this as me saying A=-A baffles me. Your capacity to produce straw men is simply amazing.

It's relevant because form becomes dependent on how cohesive "two" things are to each other. — Gregory

Two things are two things, and therefore two distinct forms, it makes no difference how cohesive the things are. This is why Aristotle placed identity in the thing itself, rather than in the way we describe the thing. We might describe the same scenario, the solar system for example, as one thing, or as a group of distinct things, depending on the purpose. The truth of the matter though, whether it is one thing or a group of things, is a feature of the thing itself (or things), regardless of what humans believe.

You say a metaphysical "spook" (not to be derogatory) was replaced by something else. Was the prime matter replaced too? This line of questioning tends to show that there is something arbitrary about Aristotle's system — Gregory

I don't know what you mean by "spook" here, but placing identity within the thing itself ("a thing is the same as itself") was actually meant to remove the arbitrariness from identity, a step toward objectivity, by denying the arbitrariness of the sophist's claims of identity, that a thing's identity is what we associate with the thing.