I don't see how any nonpublic information was used.

I don't see that you have a point.

Now the ugly side of just how corrupt and sleazy politicians are: — ssu

How is that corrupt? Corruption is when one acts on inside information, private to the company. Coronavirus was public information, and if some savvy individuals could foresee problems coming for specific types of companies, and sold, you cannot call that corruption. The market was extremely high anyway, and it was obviously time to sell, if you are inclined toward making money off the market.

What would be glaring is if they don't even get a slap on the wrist. — ssu

What would the slap on the wrist be for? The people were just doing what we are all entitled to do. If there was evidence of inside information that would be punishable, but Coronavirus is fully and completely an external condition. But only so many stocks can be sold before a crash. First come first served.

And despite the fact that Trump insisted it was not a problem, there is no indication that any evidence was withheld from the public, which would constitute a conspiracy within the governing body. It's just a matter of which media companies one would source their information from. Trump's fake news tweets can hit you in the pocket book. Some poor innocent people were taken advantage of, to make them even poorer. What else is new in the world of Trump?

Color is a frequency-property of light/EM waves. — TheMadFool

You clearly do not know what colour is. Do you recognize that what we sense as colour is combinations, mixtures of wavelengths, and that the eyes have three different types of cone sensors, sensitive to different ranges of wavelengths? The fact that human minds judge EM wavelength using mathematics, and we classify the different types of sensors with reference to these mathematical principles, does not mean that the cones use mathematics to distinguish different wavelengths.

Consider a couple different repetitive patterns, a clock ticking every second, and something ticking every seven seconds. You can notice that the two are different without using math to figure out that one is 1/7 of the other. It's just a matter of noticing that the patterns are different, not a matter of using math to determine the difference between them.

Noticing a difference does not require mathematics. We notice that it is bright in the day, and dark at night without using math, and we notice that it is warm in the sun, and colder at night without determining what temperature it is.

Change the frequency of light and color changes i.e. without changes in frequency there are no changes in color. — TheMadFool

Your logic is deeply flawed. Change the amount of salt in your dinner and the taste changes, therefore there are no changes to taste without changing the amount of salt

In fact color is an excellent example of our brain doing math because we can discern colors and color is completely determined by a mathematical quantity viz. frequency of EM waves. — TheMadFool

This is wrong, the eyes are what we use to determine colour, not mathematics. And colour is not determined by frequency of EM waves. That's a false myth.

Just keep in mind, what appears to be a failure to grasp is really nothing but a difference in points of view. I would never be so presumptuous to think you fail to grasp your own philosophy, so I’d appreciate reciprocity. — Mww

OK I respect that. Sorry, too much time spent at TPF and I've developed bad habits. Since you said "lay it on me", you get a long post. Feel free to ignore parts, or just reply to any issue which is important to you, or the thread, as the dialogue has gotten unruly.

So, the first point I'd like to make, external/internal is not clear cut. If we make these two into categories, and say that some things might be of the internal, and some might be of the external, then we need a boundary in order to classify, and I don't think such a boundary can be established. But if we make these two into directions, then we can conceive of them as opposite directions. Something can be moving from the inside outward. or from the outside inward. No boundary is needed, just a sense of direction.

There is a problem with assuming boundaries between external and internal, because we see from chemical analysis that things which are supposed to be individual, like atoms and molecules, actually overlap each other. Furthermore, we see that things are active, and the nature of interaction is that it crosses external/internal boundaries. Therefore the external/internal division, while it appears on the surface to be a clear cut division, is not very useful because it can't help us to represent the reality of the activity of things. We'd be best off to place internal/external as the two extremes of a single category, spatial existence, and represent all activities as occurring by degrees in between.

It has already been agreed, that any content of a thought prevents all other content for that thought. This is a necessary prevention, because its negation is impossible. If the thinker doesn’t think something at some time, it is a contingent prevention, for the impossibility of a thought is not given merely from the not having of it, but from the having of a different one. — Mww

OK this is a starting point of agreement The thought prevents contrary thoughts, at the same time. This is during the act of thinking. But what do you think happens when a decision is made? I propose that the conclusion (decision) is either acted upon immediately, or relegated to memory, then the act of thinking on that subject, therefore all thoughts on that subject, are prevented. If the conclusion is acted on and the act is successful, this is relegated to memory as well. So anytime there is an urge to think about that subject, the mind is directed toward that conclusion in the memory, and thoughts on that subject are avoided. If the conclusion is acted on and there are problems, thoughts might be resumed.

Not sure of any benefit in mixing the two greatest thinkers known to man. — Mww

There is a very good reason for mixing great thinkers. As people say, great minds think alike, but that does not mean that they think the same. When we find principles of consistency between them, we are likely on the right track. But every great thinker has weaknesses, and it takes comparison with another great thinker to find the weakness.

Not sure how you arrive at form as possibility in a Kantian sense. Seems to me the idea always refers to something definitive, re: space and time are the forms of all sensible intuition; categories are the forms of all experience, and so on. — Mww

Do you apprehend the suffix "ible" on "the forms of all sensible intuition"? This introduces possibility into the phrase, in an ambiguous way, because Kant does not make it clear as to where the possibility lies. We have a capacity for sensation, which he calls "sensibility". We have forms, which are intuitions, and "matter" to an extent, as a representation of the sensation itself. The "form" of the intuition, is a priori. But this designation, that the form is a priori renders it as nothing other than the capacity for sensation. So this is where the ambiguity lies. If the form of intuition is supposed to be something other than the capacity for sensation (a possibility), to ensure that the "form" is something actual, as is necessary under Aristotelean terminology, Kant does not provide us with that separation. The forms of intuition, space and time, as a prior to sense experience, are rolled together under the term "sensibility", which is the possibility for sensation, and this is a category mistake from an Aristotelian perspective, to make "forms" possibilities.

What is at issue here is the source of activity, and that defines what is actual, rather than possible. When we look at living creatures like human beings, we see the source of activity as internal, moving outward toward the environment. This is the essence of free will, the human being acts according to an internal principle, rather than being determined by the external activities. Now, we ought to represent sensation in the same way, the living being is actively sensing, such that the activity comes from within, as the being senses its surroundings. Under this representation, the possibility for sensation (sensibility) is provided by the environment. And in Aristotelian categories, possibility, or potential, is provided by matter. So the "forms of intuition", would be proper to the activity of sensation, not properties of sensibility, because the capacity for sensation, as the possibility for sensation is provided by the external, matter.

However, placing matter (potential, possibility) as only external, is inadequate. We need to bring the capacity for activity (potential, possibility) inside the individual being, by providing for the necessary potential within. This is where Aristotle excels (oddly enough), in his biology, "On the Soul". Capacities are the powers of the soul. However, since these powers, or capacities, like self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, and intellection, are not active all the time, they must be represented as potential, potencies, the possibility for action. And, since potential is properly assigned to matter in categorization, this creates the dilemma of the nominalist/realist debate. How do we allow matter into the mind to account for the passive intellect? The problem with the passive intellect was already identified by Aristotle, as inherent within the ancient understanding of the act of abstraction. The ancient understanding was that the mind received the forms of object, in abstraction. But this would mean that the mind is passive in abstraction, rather than active.

In any case, this is how Aristotle provided the principles whereby we can understand ourselves as material beings. The powers of the soul are potentials, and potential is grounded in matter, so he brings matter right into the living being, as an essential part of "the being" in this way. However, it is still necessary to posit a first principle of activity, and this is the soul. Any powers or potentials, as possibilities, must be actualized, so the soul (as the first form) accounts for the activities of a living being, while matter accounts for the powers that it has. This allows that all the powers of the soul, including intellection itself, are accounted for by the material aspect of the being (the brain in the case of intellection), yet there is still an immaterial source for the activities of the material being.

There are alternatives for categorization which the Scholastics take advantage of. If matter and potential are not categorically the same, then there might be potencies which are not material.

In Kant, though....two things: matter is not a category, and, possibility for thought does not require matter, if the thoughts are a priori, re: space, time, causality, existence, geometry, etc. — Mww

This is the difficulty I have in interpreting Kant. If a "possibility" is not grounded in matter, its existence cannot be logically supported. This is the problem Aquinas had in interpretation of Aristotle's passive, or possible intellect. In the attempt to keep the intellect free from matter, he speculated about the nature of time and potentiality, in order to come up with a form of possibility, or potential, a passivity, which is not grounded in matter. I believe he posited a medium between eternal and temporal, as "aeviternal".

A priori implies "necessary for", prerequisite, or required for. Any sense of "prior" is reducible to a temporal sense. People try to argue that logically prior is distinct from temporally prior, but in the end this makes no sense, because logic is dependent on understanding, which is a temporal process.

So the issue here is that a priori thoughts have to be grounded in something. If they are looked at as the potential for a posterior thoughts, then this is a temporal priority. If we do not ground them in the Aristotelian way, by saying that they only have actual existence by being "discovered" (which really means created) by the human mind, then they become eternal like Pythagorean or Platonic idealism. So Plato could not validate Pythagorean idealism, and Aristotle decisively refuted it with what is known as the cosmological argument. Because of these principles, a priori thoughts, or thoughts which do not require matter (or perhaps some other form of potential) are incomprehensible. We could move toward some other form of potential, but what's the point? All this does is add an extra layer of complexity for the sake of denying the reality that human thought requires a material element.

That being said, you are correct in that the synthesis of the two is phenomena. It must be kept in mind, that there is no matter, per se, except external to us. Internal to us is merely representation of matter. It follows “subject matter” can attributed to any of the individual faculties for which there is an object derived from it, therefore “subject matter” of the unconscious part of the mind in general, is phenomena. The subject matter of the faculty of sensibility is represented as appearance; the subject matter of the faculty of intuition is the form of the appearance. — Mww

This is hard for me to grasp, because as human, we are material beings. So I don't see how you can say matter is only external to us. The physical body which we use in the acts of sensation, and the brain which we use in thinking are composed of matter. If I am supposed to assume that all matter is external to me, then where does this leave "me"? If I am internal to all matter, this just leaves me as an inner soul, with the entirety of my body somehow clinging to me from the outside. How could the sensations, and all unconscious faculties relate to the conscious mind if not through the means of the material body?

The production of phenomena itself must be a complex process, whereby the immaterial soul would use the material body. The material body is a necessary condition for the faculty of sensibility so we cannot remove matter, as the passive element (providing the possibility) from sensibility. And for the same reason we cannot remove matter from the faculty of intuition.

As history would have it, yes. However, in order to theorize on the possibility and truth of a priori cognitions in general, as the means to explain the certainty of mathematics in particular, rather than just take such certainty for granted, the entire historical methodology for the understanding the real world needed a paradigmatic overhaul. And the most radical part of the overhaul, was the speculation that it is us that assigns form to objects, not, as history warrants, that objects come to us with their forms included. — Mww

I don't think the idea of "a priori cognitions" really makes sense, for the reasons explained above. I don't think that cognitions free from the influence of matter are possible. And so these cognitions cannot be free from the influence of that matter interacting with other matter which is the essence of experience. But this brings up the importance of differentiating between activity which is sourced internally, from the soul, and external activities which are understood as the relations between material bodies.

Suppose there's an internal source of activity within me, the soul. I also see other people moving, so that motion is sourced externally to me, though it is internal to them. Now, whether the motion is internal or external is completely dependent on one's perspective, of what constitutes "an object". For example, if a culture or society is taken as an object, then all the different activities, sourced from the different people is all internal to that object, the culture. But from the perspective of myself, as an object, only what's within me is internally sourced. Now look at what happens if I divide myself into distinct objects, like we could divide a culture into distinct individuals. Where would I find the internal source of activity? Does each part of me have its own internal source, or is some part specially equipped? We might resolve the issue by dissolving the boundaries between individual objects, allowing them all to overlap, like atoms and molecules overlap, but then we might completely lose the meaning of "internal".

Granted. Actual a priori and actual a posteriori. Both from the principle of cause and effect. Done deal.) — Mww

The problem here is that "a priori" is given the status as prior to sensation, in the form of sensibility. In this way it becomes a possibility rather than an actuality. So the principle of cause and effect doesn't really apply. The a priori does not cause the a posteriori by any sense of necessity as is required for causation. The a priori is required as a condition, or possibility, required necessarily for it, but not necessarily producing it. That's why the a priori is more properly called a possibility rather than an actuality.

Yeah, I guess, sorta. The external activity is given, so not a possibility, but knowledge of what the external activity entails, is possibility. In effect, what we are trying to establish is not compatibility, but intelligibility, insofar as the external activity could be anything at all, but in order for us to comprehend it, it absolutely must at the very least be logically possible, or......intelligible.) — Mww

Yeah, intelligibility is compatibility. The internal activity produces principles for understanding, and those are applied towards the external activity. But even the principles are just part of the internal activity (going back to our discussion on thinking, where I argued a conclusion is a stopping point for activity). The stopping of internal activity (perhaps you'd understand it better as "redirecting") must be caused by resistance which itself is the opposed, the external activity. So the internal sourced activity must seek ways out through the opposition, and these ways become possibilities, as weak points in the external activity, and the way through the resistance. When a way out is determined, it is remembered as a possibility.

[quote="Mww;393406"(But we can; there is compatibility or there is not. Either of which is an establishment with respect to ontological disparity)[/quote]

Sure, but that ontological disparity is misunderstanding, plain and simple, and that's what we need to dispel. One can assert "it is possible to understand ontological reality, the reality of existence is intelligible". But if that person applies principles which render ontological reality as unintelligible there is an inconsistency between the person's assertion and the person's actions. That's a form of hypocrisy. And if the person says it is impossible, then there's no point to even trying. So the only logical approach is to seek compatibility. If the principles we employ lead us to a dead end (we think and think and think without coming to a conclusion, i.e. finding no way out) then our principles have mislead us, and it is time to discard then (that itself being a conclusion, and possible way out).

[quote="Mww;393406"[(Isn’t external/internal clear cut?)[/quote]

This is the type of principle which needs to be discarded. We find that through language and communication, ideas which are internal to me are also internal to you. The boundary between us therefore, is porous. The internal is shared through the medium, which forms the boundaries. But that's an odd concept to wrap one's hand around, and it results in many people insisting that the boundaries between us are not real. We see a very similar issue in our attempts to understand physical reality, physics. We have in the past, individuated objects, separated the earth from the moon, and from the sun, divided things up in labs, etc.. However, such separations are incomplete as there are gravitational fields, electromagnetic fields, and other fields, which permeate distances and penetrate objects, making these principles, this dichotomy of internal/external, inapplicable to the objects we've actually individuated in practise.

(I take “imposing activity onto the external possibility” to mean we tell Nature what it is rather than Nature telling us, to which I agree. — Mww

Right, we impose our activities onto nature. However, Nature grants us real limitations, real impossibilities which must be respected. So in that sense we must allow also that Nature tells us what it is. We can have great success in telling Nature what it is, going very far in one direction, but that is simply one direction out of many possible directions. If we hit a dead end, the confidence produced by that progress will impede any inclination to turn back, and find a fork in the road that may have been missed. This is where skepticism is essential. Consider the history of evolution, and the creation of dinosaurs. Back then, bigger was better, and that's the direction evolution followed. But it was a dead end, the creatures could only get so big and it didn't really help them get anywhere, so it all collapsed. Then the mammals superseded, with the capacity to teach their young, and smarter was better. The point being that if the dead end is not recognized as a dead end, we won't seek the real way out.

(Correct, we may fail to abide by law as the condition of our thinking, as witnessed by our possible errors in judgement, which is the same as being unintentionally irrational. All that means is that it was never absolutely necessary we think in a certain way to begin with, which is the same as saying reason is not law-abiding in itself. It couldn’t be, given the differences in subjectivity in otherwise perfectly similar people. Still, if a cognitive system as a whole is theoretically predicated on logic, then reason should theoretically adhere to logical law in order for us to trust in its authority.) — Mww

Unintentional irrationality is one possibility, but what I was talking about is intentional irrationality. That is the dilemma of moral philosophy, first identified by Plato, or Socrates. A person can know that it is irrational to go ahead with a particular act, yet go ahead with it any way. This reality was Socrates' ammunition against the sophists, who claimed to teach virtue. Since knowing the right thing to do does not necessitate the right thing being done, the claim that virtue is a type of knowledge is effectively refuted. This reality is extremely evident in the fact that bad habits are extremely difficult to break. Augustine, who has probably the most comprehensive treatise on free will is somewhat stymied by this dilemma.

So the issue you point to is dependent on how one defines "reason". If "reason" is defined by the principles produced by a rational mind, as rules or laws, then it is impossible for reason to be non law-abiding. But remember, in the model I propose, the rational mind is itself constrained by matter, the human brain. So the rules or laws produced by the rational mind, principles which we say the free soul ought to follow, are not infallible. And, the free soul is not necessitated to follow those principles, which are the habits of thought, but are essentially possibilities, so the person might act in a way which is knowingly irrational.

Yes, if we wish to instill a necessary ground for something. It is never the case we absolutely must know some external object as a single thing, but it is absolutely necessary we act in a very certain way iff we wish to think ourselves as moral agents. That is to say, we are allowed to contradict ourselves with respect to what we know, which merely makes us silly, but we are never allowed to contradict ourselves in our moral determinations, the occurrence of which jeopardizes our very human worthiness. Thus it is the power of necessity, and the authority of law given from fundamental principles, from which a singular effect called “morality”, is at all possible. — Mww

That we cannot contradict ourselves in moral determinations is an irrelevant platitude. The fact is that we actually knowingly do what we know is wrong. So we actively contradict our moral determinations with our actions, as hypocrisy. And hypocrisy is not a rare occurrence, it's widespread. Therefore, if we take as a fundamental epistemological principle, that hypocrisy is impossible, or that it would make us look silly, irrational, or inhuman, we are starting on falsity. Hypocrisy is common place and widely accepted, "do as I say, not as I do".

Again, not to put too fine a point on it, all knowledge is possible from pure reason; morality is possible from pure practical reason. The difference is that morality has its own object, that being the agency that both formulates its own criteria for formulating his moral disposition, then obligates itself to conform to such formulation in order that becoming such an agent is possible. — Mww

Here is the difficulty. Thinking is itself the activity of an agent. And thinking produces the principles to be followed, even if you assert that these are principles of "pure reason". So even the principles of "pure reason" have come into existence through practise. Understanding follows from the production of those principles, it is posterior, requiring principles of reason. The principles are posited prior to understanding, as enabling understanding. Following understanding, i.e. posterior to understanding, it may be determined that some thinking practises, and therefore some principles of pure reason, are wrong, or unacceptable. Since these principles are already accepted epistemological practise, the only recourse for redress is the precept of morality. The thinking practises which produces the principles of pure reason, which understanding reveals as possibly faulty, cannot be demonstrated as epistemological faulty, because they are by their very nature the principles which ground the epistemology. Therefore the skeptic, who recognizes through understanding, the possibility that the principles are unsound, must turn to moral principles to demonstrate how this practise could possibly be wrong.

I would say logic has determined the need to assume distinct ontologies, but not so much distinct intellects. Transcendental idealism dictates there is but one intellect, which functions under two ontological conditions. The external condition is a passive ontology, insofar as everything about it is given to us. The internal condition is the active ontology, insofar as everything about our cognitive system arises from itself. There is one inconsistency intrinsic to this system, in that we think perception to be passive, which falsifies the notion that our entire cognitive system is active. We just allow an overlap between them, so we can move on. Hence the lack of precision?? — Mww

Yes indeed, apprehending the system of sensation as passive is a serious issue which needs to be resolved. This is why the Aristotelian biology "On the Soul" is so coherent and comprehensive. It allows passivity, and therefore matter to enter into our principles of understanding, as a necessary condition. By describing the powers of the soul as potencies, potentials, or possibilities for action, we allow the required passivity into the human being. Now we can create consistency between all the various powers, including intellection. But passivity is only allowed for by matter, and this means that we must allow matter as an essential part of the intellect. In doing this we separate "mind" from "soul", as a potency of the soul. So even "mind" is a contingent property, and not a necessity of the soul.

I would say that this is true relative to human understanding (only) — but not in an absolute sense. Because humans experience time one instant at a time and don't know the future with any certainty (needless to say). — Daz

If you believe in free will, the future is not determined. So it is true in an absolute sense, if free will is true. If you think that "X will happen" is the same a "Y has happened", in an absolute sense, then you are a hard determinist.

Mostly, we are saying the same thing, but you are considering all traders as some sort of "cohesive group" that have some sort of agreed on strategy. This is not true. — boethius

I agree that "traders" are not a cohesive group, and they don't have an agreed strategy. Nevertheless, they have the same intention, which is to make money off the market. And they make money in similar ways, so they develop similar strategies, which feeds the herd mentality.

n my robot-human analogy, not only is the ability to catch near-identical when observed but the methods employed seem to be similar in terms of needing quantification (math). — TheMadFool

Your analogy is worse than mine. A human being doesn't use math to catch a ball. That's a false premise. You admit this yourself when you say a human beings adjustments are "vague". Math is not vague.

So, there's something non-mathematical in human and animal physics? If that's true then how come mathematical physics is applicable to kinesiology and biomechanics; after all human limbs are essentially mechanical levers and the amount of force muscles can exert can be quantified. I don't see how the body's physical abilities are quantifiable mathematically and yet the brain controls it non-mathematically. At the very least the applicability of physics, a mathematical enterprise, to our bodies indicates that somewhere along the chain from intending a movement to the actual movement itself there is some math involved. — TheMadFool

The fact that mathematics cannot adequately predict human motions, because it cannot predict changes due to free will decisions, ought to indicate the falsity of that premise to you. Human motions cannot be modeled with mathematics.

Well, to be fair, there is no reason why there shouldn't be non-mathematical determinants of motion. However, given that we can model motion based on only math it seems either these non-numerical determinants of motion are superfluous or operate in parallel to the mathematical ones. Do you have any idea what such a system of non-numerical determinants of motion that makes predictions possible would look like? — TheMadFool

Perhaps we model motion only with math, but math is inadequate for modeling human motions. So you ask what is the nature of such "non-numerical determinants of motion", and the answer is conscious judgements. A mathematical judgement is one very specialized type of conscious judgement. However, the vast majority of conscious judgements, including those which induce motion are not mathematical judgements.

To disprove your theory, just watch a dog jump for a stick, or a treat, then try to get the dog to apply some mathematics. I'm pretty sure that the dog catches without applying mathematics.

If they think the market is going down they will tend to sell. If they think it's going up they will tend to buy. If they think it will stay the same they will tend to hold. — boethius

Traders make their money from transactions. If they think the market Is staying the same (stable) they will hold, as you say, therefore they make no money. So the trader's livelihood is dependent on an unstable market, and they will do what they can (strategic buying and selling) to ensure that the market is unstable.

"encourage traders to believe the market will stabilize" — boethius

Impossible, because a stable market makes no money for the traders.

If traders believe "geniuses in the FED obviously know what their doing, as otherwise they wouldn't wear suits and hold press conferences" they interpret any actions by the FED as "obviously going to work in stabilizing the market", regardless of the primary consequence of the FED's actions (indeed, the primary consequence of the interference could actually have a negative effect, because they don't know what their doing, but the secondary psychological effect could completely dwarf that; just like the placebo effect can completely dwarf negative side-effects and the treatment seems to "work great" reinforcing the placebo effect). — boethius

Traders know they have more control over the market than the FED could ever hope to have.

So, if the FED has a carefully cultivated cult following that believe the public providing a private entity with the monopoly on what legislatively created entity people can pay taxes in, then basically anything it does or says to move the market will move the market because people believe it will work and thus anticipate it working, moving the market to were the FED wants it to be. And it works! Prediction came true! Reinforcing this psychological influence over traders. — boethius

Your analysis is faulty boethius, because you are not distinguishing between the general population and the traders. Perhaps the general public might believe that the FED has control over the market, but this is an illusion, and the traders know that. The traders will play along with the FED at strategic times, because it's in their interest to encourage the deception, which keeps the public money rolling in. The FED may claim to act in a predictive, preemptive way, but the fact is clear that its only significant acts are post hoc. Therefore the Fed's actions do not move the markets, stabilize them, or anything like that. This is an illusion created by the traders playing along with the Fed, to exercise what you've called "psychological influence" over the general population. In the end, what influences the general population in its perception of the market, is what happens in the market place, and this is where the traders have all the leverage.

However, if traders lose confidence in the FED, then the psychological leverage can not only be zero, but can actually be negative. — boethius

The traders don't give a fuck about the FED. The FED protects their livelihood, but when it's time to make their money they don't give a damn. It's not a symbiotic relation.

Due to the 2009 crisis (and wanting to bail out their friends, and even make them richer, rather than pursue any sound fiscal policy even according to their own ideology, which is just a public position to keep useful-fools inline and not their private position of doing whatever idea, socialist or capitalist, will get them more power in any given situation), the FED and central banks have spent all their ammunition blasting holes in their own floor in which to shovel in trillions of dollars and lighting it on fire. — boethius

See, now the traders are not only taking money from the general population, they are taking it from the FED as well, in the form of bailouts. Clearly the traders don't give a fuck, so long as they can feed the greed, and keep stuffing it in their pockets, they'll take it from wherever they can get it. Greed is an incorrigible disease.

At some point even economists will be going around saying "tut, tut, tut, no free lunch, tut, tut, tut, no free lunch" and wagging their fingers in the faces of every econ 101 students who is trying so desperately to believe regulators are playing some sort of arcane zero dimensional chess and have a point to their actions. (wagging those fingers through video-link of course). — boethius

So long as traders are allowed free access to the market there will be always be an abundant supply of free lunches.

3. There are no more tools available (nor the prospect of until now "unthought of" tools) that can encourage traders to believe the free market will be stabilized by collectivists schemes of one form or another. — boethius

The unstable market is the trader's market. That's where the traders make easy money. So why would the traders want to stabilize the market? Traders will never allow for a stable market. And unfortunately, if traders are making easy money it usually means that other people are losing their hard earned money. If a stable market is desired, the solution is to ban traders. This was demonstrated by the 2008 crash.

By analogy, hopefully not a poor one, the processes that confer the catching ability should also be similar if not identical. — TheMadFool

Why would you ever conclude that? If a group of people show up at work in the morning do you conclude that they took similar, if not identical modes of transportation, just because they demonstrate that they have the capacity to get to work?

Charges against the individual Russians are maintained!

DOJ moves to drop charges against Russians accused of funding troll farm — NOS4A2

This statement, as well as the headline of your referred article, is false and deceptive.

No charges against Russians have been dropped. Charges against Russian companies have been dropped.

The reasons given for dropping charges against the companies, was that the companies display no inclination to comply with rulings of the court, the court has no jurisdiction to enforce compliance, and the companies have the capacity to abuse information given as disclosures of evidence.

The US government cannot charge Russians for national security reasons? — NOS4A2

Get with it Nos4A2! It's not "Russians" who are the defendants here, it's Russian companies.

Yes, not be able to bring the responsible individuals into court to face trial, and having only representatives from a company who have the sole intention of abusing the judicial process show up, is a failure.

What and/or who determines the selling price? — creativesoul

The selling price is determined by what people are willing to pay. it's a simple matter of supply and demand. Sellers are plentiful, buyers are not, prices drop. The sellers are motivated for numerous reasons, to cover margins (loans), or whatever, and the buyers are not. There are times of year, where the markets are more vulnerable due to predictable expenses, like income tax payment in the spring, people need cash.

or would those lower prices be the new share price? — creativesoul

Right, the share price reflects the last sale.

There are many ways to make money from buying and selling stock. Some actually contribute to the market drop. Check out short selling. In this practise, you take advantage of the period of time which you have to settle your transaction. You can sell stock which you do not presently own, and buy it at a later time, for a lower price. Your time is limited, so it's extremely risky, but if the market is in free fall one might reap significant rewards in that short period of time. Strategic short selling can actually induce a market drop by providing an abundance of stock for sale (large lots) creating significant drops, margin calls (demands to pay up debt as collateral vanishes), and general panic, while buying back in dribs and drabs to cover what has been sold. Don't underestimate conspiracy within the market place. Prostitution might be the oldest known sin, but conspiracy remains unrevealed and therefore might be even older.

The government drops the charges against the only Russians to show up for trial. — NOS4A2

Did you read the article you referred? They dropped the charges against the company, or group of companies, "Concord", for various reasons, mostly due to the fact that the company had the capacity to, and practised non-compliance, and it would be capable of taking advantage of the court case through access to information. Pursuing the case was clearly detrimental to the interests of the United States. However, charges against the 13 individuals have not been dropped.

"The United States will continue its efforts to apprehend the individual defendants and bring them before this Court to face the pending charges..."

Recent research suggests that a more computationally efficient strategy is to simply run so that the acceleration of the tangent of elevation of gaze from fielder to ball is kept at zero. — StreetlightX

Right, if you're a sailor you'll know that avoiding the zero tangent is how to avoid a collision. And, if you're a storm chaser, and the tornado isn't moving to the right or the left, it's coming right at you. These are the situations when evasive maneuvers are called for.

In the Kantian sense, form is a priori, hence derived from the unconscious, and from that the fun, and rampant confusion, really begins...... — Mww

Here's another thing to consider Mww. The precise separation between passive (possible) intellect, and active (agent) intellect, has never been resolved. Logic has determined the need to assume both of these as distinct categories, but no one has been able to adequately demonstrate which things are property of each, because all things are a combination of both (matter/form). This was a fundamental issue in the nominalist/realist debate. Some wanted to deny material elements within the mind, attempting to maintain the pure immateriality of the human mind. But then the passive aspect of the intellect needs to be accounted for by some sort of passive element which is other than matter. And if matter (as passive intellect) is proper to the individual mind, then the active intellect must be something external to human minds, to maintain the separation between the two. It remains an unresolved issue as to how the passive intellect and active intellect might both be features of one human mind.

On the other hand, one might characterize the same division as a priori/a posteriori like Kant. The problem is that we create these categories of separation as a means for analysis, because such a division is "necessary" (in the sense of needed for understanding the operations of the mind), when we do not have adequate principles to define the categories; "and rampant confusion, really begins...". So a philosopher might say "these are the categories required for analysis", without paying due respect to the fact that everything to be categorized already contains aspects of both categories. So there is confusion That's why I propose we go to a different form of analysis, a sort of analysis where we look at the things to be categorized as essentially of one category, with accidents of the other category, in an attempt to avoid the confusion.

But you can't say that time becomes space as you go backward in time. — god must be atheist

Under Einsteinian relativity theory there are no good principles to distinguish spatial measurements from temporal measurements. That is a deficiency of Einsteinian relativity which I mentioned above. So if you look backward in time through the lens of Einsteinian relativity, there is no principle to prevent an interpretation of "time becomes space". But that's just a matter of theory-dependent interpretation. The "seemingly impossible situation" is produced by application of a faulty theory.

Meaning what, exactly? Material? If not material, then what, exactly? — tim wood

By "actual" I mean active. If you are insisting that to be actual, something must be material, then I'll look to you for an explanation as to why you believe this. I see all sorts of indications that immaterial things are actual, starting with gravity and electromagnetism.

Your (b) is correct: the time of action taken, is the time of the thought of the solution, and because we have but one thought at a time, all other thoughts, as alternative solutions, are prevented therefrom. — Mww

OK, we're starting to have better understanding of each other, and better agreement.

From his post-solution time, he can easily think another solution, which means it is false further solutions are prevented. — Mww

He can think of another solution, but he doesn't because he believes the problem has been solved. Therefore these thoughts (looking for other solutions) are prevented. Please don't think of this as a situation of necessity, because we are talking about free willing beings. Yes, "he can easily think of another solution", but he doesn't because his mind is made up by the present solution. Any person can change one's own mind, at any time, I mentioned this, but so long as the mind is made up, the thoughts are prevented.

The one and only time in which no other and all alternative solutions is prevented, is the time of the thought of a solution. This principle applies for any number of successive thoughts, for each and every thought can be a solution in itself. — Mww

It's not "the one and only time", because it's an extended period of time. So long as the person has made the decision, and adheres to the decision, the thoughts are prevented, just like we prevent thoughts in meditation. Of course it is possible that at some future time the person will reconsider, and at that time allow those thoughts, but that's irrelevant to the fact that during that period of time (no matter how long it is), when the thoughts were prevented, they were being prevented. Delaying the occurrence of something is a matter of preventing it for a period of time. While it is being prevented it is being prevented, but when it is no longer prevented it is no longer prevented. Nothing about the concept of prevention implies that prevention must be eternal. It refers to the here and now; I prevented myself from falling down the stairs many times when I used the stairs, but maybe not next time.

I should have given your comment on conscious vs unconscious parts of mind, and the general uselessness of the conception itself, more attention. It is relevant now, because you brought up coming to the mind, and we never agreed on what that really means. In the Kantian sense, form is a priori, hence derived from the unconscious, and from that the fun, and rampant confusion, really begins...... — Mww

I'm wary of the Kantian use of "form", because in the Aristotelian sense "form" is strictly actual, while Kant seemed to allow "form" to be possibility. So when we talk about what is derived from the unconscious, if this is understood as possibilities for thought, then we must place it in the category of matter rather than form, if we adhere to Aristotelian terms. However, as you state below, all these possibilities must be present as particular forms. So even if it is categorized as matter, subject matter, or possibilities for thought, it still must have some type of form.

Physical objects do have proper form, which is the particular arrangement of its matter. So....“subject matter” as mere sense data alone, does come from the unconscious part of mind in a particular form, but is yet unknowable to the conscious mind. This kind of form is called intuition, by which we represent to ourselves the arrangement of the matter of a thing as it is perceived. This is the fur, claws, whiskers, etc., thought to belong to some yet unnamed thing, which will eventually become conceived as some kind or another, of “cat”. — Mww

So I'm in agreement with this paragraph.

Forms from intuition and appearances from sensibility are the subject matter of the unconscious faculty of imagination, the synthesis of which gives us phenomena. — Mww

I wouldn't say this though. The faculty of imagination gives us forms, as images, what you call phenomena. If that faculty works with both, forms from intuition, and appearances from sensation, I would say that only one of these is the "subject matter". Since we have a workable form/matter distinction, and we say that the imagination gets forms from intuition, then we ought to say that it gets subject matter from sensation, and synthesis of the two is phenomena.

An important point though, is that the subject matter, the appearances from sensibility, must already have forms of their own, the particular forms mentioned above. So even within this unconscious faculty of imagination, there must be something (a faculty) which establishes compatibility or consistency between the forms from intuition and the forms from sensibility (which are the material aspect, as the possibility of phenomena, contrary to Kant), in order that phenomena be intelligible. There is a fundamental difference between the two types of forms, universal and particular, so this faculty must focus on, and work with the matter from sensation, as providing the possibility of phenomena. The particular forms are reduced to possibility because they are fundamentally incompatible with the universal forms from intuition.

The conscious mind works with. Imagination works with forms. — Mww

I think we have a lapse in terminology here. I would understand "cognition" as what the mind does, but we still have the issue of what it is working with when it is engaged in that activity, the content. "Form" historically has a wider range of applicability, as ideas and concepts, in the sense of "formulae".

Moral philosophy has nothing to do with speculative epistemology) — Mww

Wouldn't you be surprised! Do you see the problem we've had with this issue of preventing thoughts? If you'd only release your idea of necessity, and approach this from the perspective of a free willing human being with the capacity to choose, that being the approach of moral philosophy, rather than the approach of some epistemological necessity, perhaps the reality would reveal itself to you. But you have created that wall of incompatibility between your intuitive forms of necessity, and the forms of the particulars which must be understood as possibilities. It is only moral philosophy which gives us a true understanding of possibility, and this is the only way to understand the particular. And the particular does enter the mind, as is evident in the case of individual words. Therefore the existence of a word, as a particular, must be understood by the terms of moral philosophy, the terms of possibility.

Within the conscious mind is subject matter, yes, but that subject matter is what is known, or possibly known. Experience or possible experience. — Mww

I don't think you are adequately grasping the role of the possible. There are two distinct roles for "the actual". There is the actual which is activity within, creating forms of intuition, knowledge, etc.. And, there is the actual which is activity outside the individual subject, creating the material world of objects. The two types of activity need to be understood as distinct, as I described, because the internal forms are universal principles, while the forms external to me are individuals, particulars. Since we cannot establish compatibility between these two types of activity, within and without, we look at all the external activity as possibility. Then we have the basis for a dichotomy. But the dichotomy doesn't work, because it's not clear cut. Judgement and decision are how we impose activity onto the external possibility, while indecisiveness and skepticism is how possibility seeps into the internal activity. So we cannot hold such a dichotomy. The real dichotomy it is far more complex.

If that were the case, irrationality would be impossible. We would never make a mistake in judgement if all understandings were predicated on necessity and universality. — Mww

Why do you say that? Failing to abide by the law is a real possibility. What you don't seem to realize is that law does not produce necessity, laws are produced out of some necessity. This is why it is far better to approach this subject from the precepts of moral philosophy, rather than to approach it as a speculative epistemology. From moral philosophy, the law says what one ought to do, but the law does not provide the necessity to ensure that what ought to be done is what is actually done. Moral philosophy is the only philosophy which provides us with real principles to give us a real understanding of possibility.

But some things seem to me to be part of ultimate truth, in the sense that they are not fuzzy. The categories that come to mind are, in no particular order:

1) Physical reality. Meaning, everything that exists or occurs in the physical world. Whether in the past, present, or future. Anywhere in our universe, or even in disjoint universes, in case there are any. — Daz

The problem here is that the future is indeterminate, so "vague" or "fuzzy" are not even applicable terms for the future, it's more like non-existent.

Do the Forms exist? Why not pure potentiality, or even spiritual nothingness, instead? — Gregory

Pure potentiality is demonstrably irrational. This would exclude anything actual, but a cause must be actual. Therefore pure potentiality cannot produce anything actual, and if there ever was pure potentiality, it would always be the case, because nothing actual could ever come from it. However, we do notice that there is actual existence, so we can exclude the possibility of pure potentiality as an unreasonable proposal.

Our 20th century teaches us that at the level of the large those are probabilities that at the level of the small don't necessarily work out. At the level of the small the unlikely and even the seemingly impossible occur with regularity. — tim wood

Actually it works at all levels, that's why quantum physics provides us with such good predictions. if you think that events at the small level are absolutely random, and completely unpredictable, then you misunderstand quantum physics.

Further, laws of physics and nature are descriptive and problematic, not prescriptive. — tim wood

Laws of physics are descriptive, but the metaphysics I referred to assumes that these laws are representations of the "laws of nature" which govern the behaviour of the physical universe. And this is modern metaphysics I am referring to, not ancient metaphysics.

There are no oracular structures or imperatives, though probability make it seem so, and indeed we can live a whole life as if there were. — tim wood

Actually, the science of physics works really well to make accurate predictions, and there is a reason for this, physical things behave in predictable ways. If you want to start with the premise that all prediction is based in probability, that doesn't effect the argument, because we already know that inductive principles are based in probability. The fact remains, that accurate predictions are possible. Due to this fact modern people tend to assume that there are laws which govern the way that things behave.

Do these forms exist in any sense whatsoever? If yes, then what form would that be? After all, it's a form; seems reasonable a form has a form. — tim wood

Some people refer to them as "the laws of nature". They determine material existence by restricting the behaviour of physical things. There is an inclination in some modern metaphysics to describe physical existence in terms of behaviour. This is based in our conception of "energy". In this perspective, all physical existence is simply activity. But since the laws of physics are very applicable, something must dictate which activities are and are not possible. So the laws of physics are said to be representations of the laws of nature. These "laws of nature" must necessarily be prior to physical existence, if physical existence is law abiding activity. Hence we have a necessity to conceive of immaterial "Forms" which are prior to material existence.

Yes, insofar as it is false that alternative solutions are necessarily prevented. — Mww

But it's not false. Alternative solutions are prevented, just like in my analogy, when an action is taken alternative possibilities, which as possibilities, are just as real as the one decided upon, are prevented from occurring. That's how we work to avoid bad situations. We take action to prevent the possibility from materializing. By ceasing to give the problem further consideration we prevent the possibility of alternative solutions from materializing.

Once the thinker has solved the problem, further thoughts about that problem, and alternative solutions qua solutions, are just redundant, and if pursued could actually be irrational, illogical or even catastrophic. — Mww

Right, the thinker sees thinking about that subject as irrational and avoids thinking about it. Therefore thoughts on the subject are prevented. Where's the problem for you? When a person apprehends a specific course of thought as irrational, it is avoided. Why do you insist that this is not a case of preventing those thoughts? In the analogy, we apprehend a bad situation as possible, and we act to avoid it. Here, irrational thinking is apprehended as a bad situation, and we act to avoid it. That bad situation consists of irrational thoughts, and those thoughts are avoided. Therefore the irrational thoughts are prevented from occurring.

On the other hand, there’s nothing preventing further thought on an alternative solution facilitating a solution of greater benefit. But even a greater benefit is not a necessity in itself. Nahhhhh.....not thinking an alternative solution is not the prevention of it; not thinking an alternative solution is merely the lack of causality for it. — Mww

I agree that there is nothing to prevent these thoughts from occurring at a later time, if the thinker changes one's mind, but for the time being, the thoughts are prevented from occurring. Furthermore, the later thoughts would not be exactly the same thoughts anyway, being triggered by new information or some such thing.

With respect to your determination of "lack of causality", consider my analogy. We are on course for a bad situation. Preventing that situation requires action, causality. The bad situation would happen, following from the present situation without any causality. The issue is that the continuity of the current situation, as understood by the principles of physics, inertia, momentum, will continue with no cause required.

Thoughts are not different. The thinker is actively engaged in thinking about something. If this particular activity, thinking on this specific subject, continues indefinitely it will develop into a bad situation, severe anxiety, or some sort of incapacitating fear of the impossibility of deciding. So the thinker puts an end to it by preventing this type of thought from occurring anymore. Therefore stopping the current situation, i.e. stopping from thinking about the specific subject, is causation, as defined by the principles of physics. And so there must be an act of causality and this prevents the continuity of further thought on the subject.

And I question the relevance. When we’re awake and aware, we always have something to work with, because it is impossible to prevent, which has been my position all along. The questionable relevance arises from the fact that the something we always have to work with is not always a problem to be solved. Problem solving is the domain of empirical psychology/anthropology, where the analysis of words and concepts is the domain of pure reason, or, speculative epistemology. — Mww

I agree with this, we cannot prevent thoughts in an absolute sense. So I grant you this principle, that there is always something there, "something to work with". If you agree, we can call this "content", or "subject matter". I like the latter because it implies a sot of "matter" which is proper to the individual human "subject".

Would you agree that this "subject matter" is what is derived from the unconscious, and taken by the conscious mind to be worked with? As required for thinking, it is temporally prior to the conscious act of thinking, and therefore the conscious mind has no capacity for causal impact on this subject matter. However, if we adhere to the Aristotelian concept of "matter", we might allow that this subject matter has no necessity of any particular form, though it necessarily has "form". There is no particular form which is proper to it. So it might come to the mind in any "form", a problem, a word, a concept, etc., it still must come to the mind as a form.

However, since the "form" is what the conscious mind works with, and the conscious mind has the capacity to change the form which the subject matter has, through imposing the causal limitations described above, the subject matter itself has no inherent capacity to restrict the conscious mind. So in spite of the fact that we tend to think that things come to the conscious mind from the unconscious systems, and these things constitute the content of the thought, as imposing on the person, what that person will think about, this is actually false, because the conscious mind will actually impose the form (the 'whatness') on to that subject matter, through the imposition of the restrictions described. This is how we can say that the will is free.

But the will is not free in an absolute sense. If we say that when the content comes to the conscious mind it necessarily has form, adhering to Aristotelian metaphysics which dictate that there is no such thing as pure matter, prime matter, then the subject matter necessarily has some sort of form, but not any particular form of necessity. Then the possibilities for the thinker would be determined by that form which the content has when presented to the conscious mind. The thinker is therefore restricted in the capacity to prevent thoughts which are already dictated by that prior form.

Me: something necessary; minimal; conception;
You: problem, conception, solution;

How in the hell am I suppose to relate those? I never said anything about a problem, or anything that could relate to a problem.

What is a problem if not a separation between what is given and what is known. Conceiving the exact nature of a problem is understanding the synthesis of its fundamental a priori representations, and judging that relation to experience. So no, a problem to be solved is not a conception alone, but rather, it is reason in conflict with itself, temporarily if subsequently solved without contradiction, other than temporarily if solved with contradictions, hence irrationally, or, permanently, if unsolved because of insufficient rational predicates. — Mww

You appear to be claiming that the subject matter, the content which comes to the conscious mind, from the unconscious, is necessarily a "conception", and this is what I dispute. Yes, the content comes to the mind as subject matter with a form, but the form is the form of a particular, in the case of "subject matter". So this is what separates it from a "conception", as a conception is known as the form of a universal. It is only the subject matter that is worked with by the conscious mind, that has the nature of a universal, conception. Therefore we have a necessary separation here, the forms (abstractions) which the conscious mind is applying, and the subject matter which the conscious mind is applying it to. The subject matter already has a particular form, and the conscious mind is working with universal forms, so there is an incompatibility here, a necessary separation between the two.

You are not upholding this necessary separation, to claim that anything within the conscious mind must be a conception. But we must maintain this separation to properly account for the nature of temporal existence, and the fact that new material, material from the particular circumstances, which must be dealt with, is continually coming into the conscious mind. Relating the new subject matter, to the already existing universal forms, or conceptions, is what is called abstraction. So, "a problem" is exactly as you describe it "a separation between what is given and what is known". And since that separation is very real, we need to respect the reality of it, within the conscious mind. So within the conscious mind there is both "what is given", subject matter with a particular form, and "what is known", conceptions, as universal forms.

This is not "reason in conflict with itself", it is two incompatible aspects of reason. But it is the essence of reason, because with out these two distinct aspects there would be no need for any reasoning whatsoever. The conscious mind must reconcile the particularities of the present situation, given to it as subject matter, with the universal conceptions it holds within, produced from prior processing of situations.

Therefore the conceptions, being extensions of past situations, are simply memories. And the memories are held within the brain and presented to the conscious mind as representations of what has occurred, images, and symbols. Primitive conceptions exist as images which are recreated, requiring extensive brain power, while advanced conceptions exist as symbols which have a known representation, reducing the required brain power.

Absolutely necessary is one of two principles of law, the other being universality. Reason, and by association, human thought, is not law-abiding, which is sufficient reason to justify the proposition that thought at t1 does not legislate thought at t2. Thought may be random, and often is, but it stands just as much chance of being pertinent, or logically related, to its antecedent.
—————— — Mww

I disagree, thought cannot be random. That is contradictory. If one's mind is changing at every moment of passing time (random thought), this cannot be called "thought". As describe at the beginning of this post, breaking up a line of thought, creating a discontinuity, requires causation, under accepted principles of physics. Therefore thought is naturally continuous, and breaking it up with discontinuity (randomness) requires acts of causation.

Absolutely necessary is one of two principles of law, the other being universality. Reason, and by association, human thought, is not law-abiding, which is sufficient reason to justify the proposition that thought at t1 does not legislate thought at t2. Thought may be random, and often is, but it stands just as much chance of being pertinent, or logically related, to its antecedent. — Mww

"Reason" by definition is law abiding.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but what we’re conventionally calling the subject is actually the object. That which is thought about is the object of thought, the subject being that to which the thought belongs, the thinker, represented by “I”, or other grammatically coherent personal pronouns. The proper form of all human thought is “I think (__x___), x being the object to which the subject directs himself. Such is the only reasonable way to account for subjectivity, even if it is only an appearance. — Mww

Can you see the separation between the particular and the universal, which I described above? The particular we might call "the object" of thought, and the universal we might call 'the subject" of thought. All thought must consist of both, as the mind operates with the two. However, if we take the Aristotelian principles of matter and form, the role of each of these two is inverted between the object of thought, and the subject of thought. The universal, being a conception, is essentially a form, and the material aspect is accidental to it, this is the subject. The object, being the peculiarities of the particular situation, provides the material aspect. to the thinker.

And what would that be, except thinking? Is there something else we do mentally, such that knowledge is possible from it? Feelings don’t count here; they are not cognitions, and we’re not interested in whether or not feelings “look right”. — Mww

I think it is necessary to distinguish the different mental activities. The two fundamental ones, described above, are receiving present information, and retrieving past information. That they are fundamentally separate, I believe, is evident from the activity of dreaming. There is a third fundamentally different mental activity which is judgement. The nature of judgement (what I described as preventing unwanted thoughts) is what we have been disagreeing on.

The problem with the Hawking proposal is that it defines time in relation to spatial existence, as derived from Einsteinian relativity. So, when looking backward at spatial expansion, which has been revealed as a fundamental feature of the universe, we see a time when spatial existence becomes unintelligible. The size of the universe was infinitesimally small at that time. Because the Einsteinian conception of time is dependent on spatial existence, time before this point is completely unintelligible. But that's just a flaw in the Einsteinian conception of time. If we conceive of time as independent from spatial existence, this allows for time prior to spatial existence.

Refusal to allow for time prior to spatial existence is a manifestation of modern scientism. Monist materialism denies the possibility of anything real, independent of material existence. However, dualist principles support a world of immaterial Forms independent from material existence, which act as the cause of material existence. Can you see how this allows for time prior to material existence?

Hopefully you can comprehend that it is only a scientism based metaphysics which supports the Hawking-Hartle no-boundary proposal. With disciplined philosophy we see this world view as insufficient, and unable to account for the immaterial aspects of reality. Therefore such proposals are rejected as inadequate.

We can make truthful 'is' and 'is not' statements concerning the past, because the past has already occurred and is therefore determinate. We cannot make truthful 'is' and 'is not' statements concerning the future because it is indeterminate, characterized by possibility. So statements concerning the future are predictions.

Now, WE, in order to responsible for preventing something from coming into the mind, must have something presented to us, otherwise we have nothing to work with, and if we have nothing to work with it cannot be said anything occurred, in this case, the occurrence of prevention for which we are the cause. — Mww

It is not the case that we have nothing to work with. We have something to work with, this is the subject, what is being thought about, what I described as the problem to be solved. Once the thinker believes oneself to have solved the problem, further thoughts about that problem, and alternative solutions are prevented. Are you denying this?

From this, it is clear it makes no difference what this something is that is necessary for us to work with, but the very minimal thing it can be, and still be an affect on the mind, is a conception. — Mww

Are you saying that a problem to be solved is a conception? I don't think so. Conceiving the exact nature of the problem is half way to solving it.

We, as conscious, otherwise fully cognizant individual humans, cannot prevent things from coming into the mind. — Mww

We already discussed this, meditation and such. You agreed that we can prevent words from coming into our minds. Saying that we can prevent things from coming into our minds does not imply that we can prevent everything from coming into the mind, to have an absolutely empty mind. That would be a ridiculous conclusion. How can you assert that we cannot prevent things from coming into our minds, yet agree that we can prevent words from coming into our minds, then insist that this is not contradictory?

The content of the thought at t1 makes no absolutely necessary restriction whatsoever on the content of the thought at t2 — Mww

Are you serious? Despite the fact that I do not know what you might mean by "absolutely necessary restriction", if it were true that the thoughts at t1 had no restriction whatsoever on the thoughts at t2, we'd have no control over our thoughts at all. The temporal progression of thoughts would be completely random.

Issue grasping? So what...you have a bunch of ideas on a subject, one right after another, pick one, cease examining further ideas, stop thinking about the subject. Move on to the next. How is that any different overall than what I said? — Mww

What I say is different from what you say because I say that "picking one", deciding, choosing, is what allows one to stop thinking about the subject. You are arguing that a person cannot stop oneself from thinking about a subject. You are insisting that a person cannot prevent thoughts, because the thoughts would have to be present to the person's mind, in order for that person to prevent them. But that's contradictory nonsense. And it leaves you in the position that if an individual did happen to stop thinking about something, it would just be random chance. In fact, it appears like under your principles all thoughts would be random occurrences.

Carried out without the same thinking that went into solving the problem, but not without thinking of some kind. — Mww

Where do you derive this necessity to talk about not thinking, in an absolute sense. I am surely not talking about a person doing something while not thinking at all. How would that even be possible? This is how we multi-task, things we do routinely we put on auto-pilot, and do them while we think about other things.

Even if you’ve done the same problem repeatedly, since the solution of it, you still have to do something mentally in order to ensure the solution you give actually belongs to the problem given to you. — Mww

Yes, I agree you must do something mentally, but all you have to do is pass it in front of your conscious mind to make sure it looks right. That is the point, the person is not solving the problem at this point, just making sure that it looks right. So back to the example of speaking in the habitual way. When the words come to my mind, in response to a question, I simply make sure that they appear correct for the circumstances, and I speak them, without thinking about what they actually mean, or considering if they are the best words for that situation.

If “we” have that much influence on “mind”, than we and mind must be separate entities. I reject that “I” am in any way distinct and separate from my mind; “I” am my mind. To say some natural activity that justifies and legitimizes what this “I” is, by means of the manifold of my thoughts, is willfully prevented by that very same “I” from thinking something less than that manifold, is ultimately a self-contradiction. This condition can be alleviated by granting reason as possessing sufficient power for preventing things from coming into the mind, in as much as reason prevents nothing except logical impossibilities from coming into the mind, as a consequence of the human methodological system. — Mww

This all depends on how one defines the terms. The point is that there must be some sort of divisions. If "mind" means "conscious mind", Then these things which come from the unconscious, like memory, feelings, and emotions, are separate from mind. If "mind" is supposed to include these, then where do we draw the line? You ask me about images, and sure they are real, but are they produced by the conscious mind, or the unconscious? Images come to me in my sleep when I am unconscious so if images are produced by the mind, the mind must extend to the unconscious. But is my finger part of my mind because it has feelings? I think "mind" is a somewhat useless term here because it is commonly used in so many different ways that it's really hard to know how someone is using it. Often people will equivocate, because it's very easy to do with a term like that, and the equivocation is not intentional.

To say we can prevent a thing from coming into the mind presupposes the thing. The thing presupposed is at least a valid conception, otherwise we are preventing a thing that is nothing. But to conceive a thing makes explicit it has already entered the mind, for the faculties of mind in general are the sole arbiters of validity in conceptions. — Mww

This is not true at all. We commonly prevent things which we haven't even identified. We do this by limiting the possibilities. By doing one thing in the next minute I prevent a whole bunch of things from happening which were possible, but now impossible, which I haven't even identified. So it's completely untrue that the possibility has to come to my mind, as a valid conception, before I can prevent its occurrence. By choosing to do anything which excludes that possible occurrence, I prevent it without even knowing about it. Sure, the possible thing is "nothing", but that's what preventing something is, ensuring that it remains a nothing. But this does not mean that it didn't exist as a real possibility at some time. This is why a possibility is really nothing, but at the same time as being nothing, it has some sort of reality.

Such are two arguments refuting the assertion we can prevent things from coming into the mind. — Mww

You argument is clearly contradictory. It assumes that something must exist before it can be prevented. But that's nonsensical contradiction, because if it exists, it hasn't been prevented.

Can you honestly tell me you’ve had more than one thought at a time? I’d be very suspicious of an affirmative claim, insofar as it is generally accepted in the literature that human thought is singular and successive, rather multiple and co-existent. It follows that words representing thoughts and phrases representing groups of thoughts, and eventually representing cognitions, must also be singular and successive. — Mww

You don't seem to grasp the issue. Suppose I have an open question in my mind, "what will I do tomorrow morning?". As soon as an idea comes which I accept, and I decide that's what I will do tomorrow morning, then I stop thinking about it, and no more ideas for what I might do tomorrow morning come to my mind. I close my mind to that subject. It's not an issue of multiple ideas coming to my mind at the same time, it's a succession of ideas, one after the other, as possibilities to consider. But I put an end to that succession as soon as I decide, therefore no further possibilities come to my mind. For instance, if I decide right away, I have to go to work tomorrow, then I plan for my commute, etc., and don't let anymore alternative ideas of what I might do tomorrow morning come into my mind. Having a conclusion puts an end to any line of reasoning and allows one to move on to other thought..

So you think that as soon as I, e.g., learn arithmetic propositions, I don’t think about them the next time I find myself in the presence of one? — Mww

What I mean is that you do not think about how to solve them now, you already know. So when you come across more, you simply act to solve them rather than thinking about how to solve them. Take my example of walking. The child has to learn how to walk, and puts much effort over many days, trying different things. I'm sure the child puts a whole lot of thought into learning how to walk. But when we get up to walk we don't put any of that thought into it, because we already know how to walk. The thinking goes into solving the problem, but once the problem is solved the procedure is carried out without thought.

Even if I need no noticeable time in the accomplishment of any learned task, I am still required to relate something to something else, such the solution of the same problem is consistent. — Mww

When you say ten times ten is a hundred, what is the other thing you are relating it to? It's nothing other than a memory. If a new problem comes to your mind, then you'll have to relate it to something else in your memory to figure it out. But the solution to "the same problem" ought to come straight form your memory.

Hmmmm....possibly correct; I should have been more precise in my terminology. If I see a red apple more than once, the observations of apples is repetitive and its relations hold, but if I’ve never seen a green apple, the concept “apple” fails in at least one of its relations, so technically I have no right to know the green thing as an apple. Nonetheless, if I observe this green thing on the ground under an apple tree, surrounded by red apples, similar extension and mass being given, I am safe in drawing a new relation, such that future observations will abide as repetitive relations. — Mww

Let's take this example of an apple. If someone asked me, when I see an apple, how do I know it is an apple, I would say I don't know, I just kind of recognize it as an apple. So I can start to describe an apple, different features, but this is not really how I know an apple is an apple, by naming these features I see in it. I just see an apple, and somehow I know it's an apple, without relating it to anything else, or comparing features. You might suggest that when I learned how to recognize an apple as an apple I had to learn these features. But I don't think I did, I just saw a number of apples and learned how to recognize an apple. So where's the concept apple? It's not in any features of an apple, it's simply the capacity to recognize an apple as an apple.

Some concepts go together, and some situation will trigger concepts to come forward. Introspection resolves the “inner voice” reality, but we spend far less time introspecting than we do understanding the world’s relationship to us, which just means we use words less than we use the means to understand the world, through the representations of mental imagery. — Mww

This is just a feature of our society. The society we live in is very much science oriented, so we learn from a very young age, and develop the habit, of trying to understand the world. We are far less directed toward introspection, so we do not develop that habit.

Do you recognize how screwed the system would be, if it required absolute precision for each of its responses to any given situation? If “it was an accident” was the habitual response for tipping over a glass of water, wouldn’t it suffice for tipping over a glass of milk? Particular relations can hold in general experiences. — Mww

I can't see what you're saying here. Are you saying we shouldn't cry over spilt milk?

Some corporations (like people) are good, but obviously not all of them. Here in the US it is preached that corporations should be able to do whatever they like and that any government hindrance will hurt both profit and people's well being. I personally think not having corporations answerable to anyone other than their shareholders is no better than trying to run a town or city without any police and why corporations act like their in the "Wild West" when dealing with their employees and the rest of the world as a whole. — dclements

There seems to be a trend in government to hand over enforcement of consumer protection rules, to the corporations themselves, as a form self-governance. The health and safety rules are set by government agencies, but the task of inspecting and enforcing the rules is given to the companies which manufacture or produce the goods. This saves the government a good deal of money by not having to set up a network of inspection agencies, but it has a complex negative effect. First, the corporations are so huge that the same company in production might have a branch involved in health research, advising the government on health rules. Second, it excludes from existence small companies without the capital to set up their own inspection and enforcement system, reporting to the government. And third, as I think might be the case in the Boeing situation, the inspections and governance might not be very rigorous, falling into loopholes for the sake of profit.

When the third becomes evident, in the food industry for insistence, with listeria outbreaks, E.coli outbreaks, and other contaminants, consumer confidence in the corporations' capacity of self-governance wanes. We've lived under the illusion that the government has agencies and systems designed to protect our health and safety, when in reality that responsibility has been assigned to inanimate entities, corporations, without feelings, emotions, or sensibilities, structured for one purpose, profit. I can't wait for the self-driving car revolution, might have to stay home for the rest of my life and learn how to practise agoraphobia.

I don’t care for “allowing to come to one’s mind”; it carries the implication I could actually prevent something from coming into my mind. — Mww

We prevent things from coming into our mind all the time. Once you accept as the phrase you will say, and say it "…" you prevent other possibilities from coming to your mind. But if you don't accept what first comes to your mind, you leave your mind open to other possibilities, so more and more possibilities come to your mind. Preventing things from coming into one's mind is what is commonly called being closed minded. Though it's often considered a vise rather than a virtue, it's not at all self-contradictory.

We don’t “allow” thoughts; they arise from reason necessarily, invited or uninvited, from our very nature as humans, and we may allow them to matter if they relate to something or we may reject them because they don’t. — Mww

Thinking and reasoning are carried out for a purpose. In general the purpose is to solve a problem. When we pass judgement, decide that the solution has been found, we no longer think about that subject. At this point, thoughts concerning that subject are no longer allowed. That's why people on this forum will defend a position to no end, refusing to even consider contrary arguments. They disallow further thought on that subject. So disallowing thoughts, closed mindedness, could be in some cases be related to a confidence in what one believes, or it might be related to some sort of fear of the unknown, and allowing thoughts, open mindedness, is related to a type of skepticism.

From here, that which comes to one’s mind by habit is just a repetitive relation, or, which is the same thing, good ol’ experience. — Mww

If this were really the case, how would it differ from straight forward memory? It's not really the case though, because each situation that a person finds oneself in is different from the last, so we can't describe this as a "repetitive relation". When a phrase comes to one's mind in a habitual sort of way, it may be that the person recognizes a similarity in the present situation in relation to a remembered situation, but I don't even think that this the case. It's more like the words just come to mind in relation to each other, like some words just kind of go together, and the situation (being asked a question with specific words for example) just sort of triggers a particular grouping of words to come forward as a reply.

I don’t know or care much about “the whole apparatus of speaking”, but I suspect it is mostly sheer mechanics — Mww

"Mechanics", do you really mean that?

But there must be some part of the speech apparatus in which the thought of what to say transitions into being said, at least in general conversation, which would seem to be a lot like your walking muscles.....operating behind the conscious scenes and only comes to the fore upon defect or accident of some kind. Just as stumbling is not necessarily the fault of muscles, so too is speaking falsely not the fault of the language. — Mww

I would say that the thing operating behind the conscious scene is what is putting the words into the mind. The reply to the question just pops into the mind, as if hearing the question asks the unconscious to produce a reply. But the words have to pass in front of the conscious mind to be judged, before they are spoken. The conscious mind might just glance at them as they pass by, or it might prevent them from being spoken, and allow other options to come forward. So this is not like walking muscles at all. If it were, then each potential act of the walking muscles would have to pass in front of the conscious mind before being carried out.

Positing that words come from a place still needs justification for the ways and means of them being there. Going to be pretty hard to tell ourselves something about that of which we are not consciously aware, except as a logical possibility. Which sometimes just has to be good enough. — Mww

There's no problem with the place where the words are, they are in the memory, just like other memories.. A person doesn't speak words that one has never heard before. But we are clearly not consciously aware of everything which is in the memory. What I suggested is that certain combinations of words come from the memory into the conscious mind, depending on the situation, in a sort of habitual way. But how can this really be habitual, when all the situations are different, and the combination of words which comes forward into the mind as ready to be spoken, is tailored for the situation already, when it comes into the conscious mind? How can an action be said to be habitual when it is different every time it occurs?

You know very well that free will is defined in terms of choice; no choice, no free will. — TheMadFool

Actually there are two aspects of "free will", one is the will itself, and the other what is attributed to it, freedom. "Choice" defines the "free" part, but it doesn't define the "will". I think Possibility outlined this for you in the reply. "Will" is the actual motivator of the act, it causes the act to occur. So even when we make a choice according to preferences, an act is not necessitated, because one might act on that preference later, or something else. Therefore we say that someone with a "strong will", or with "will power", can resist acting in ways one is inclined toward acting by one's preferences, because an act is not necessitated.

This is why your op, which says that preferences determine the will, is wrong. Preferences are what are judged in a "free choice", but they do not necessarily cause action. That is the only way we can prioritize things, by judging that even though I prefer this to that, I prefer something else even more, so I do not choose that. Notice the preference does not cause an action, because will power causes me not to act, allowing me to create a hierarchy of preferences prior to acting..

This is a distinction without a difference. The capacity to choose must include the act of choosing. How would I know if you had the capacity to eat? By eating, right? The capacity to do x is inferred from doing x. How else would I know you had the capacity to do x? — TheMadFool

Your request here is unreasonable. You are asking to demonstrate the existence of the capacity to act, with an act itself, when the act will only demonstrate an act, not the capacity to act. The determinist will cease this demonstration to say you acted therefore you are determined.

The capacity to act is a power, the potential to act, and is therefore a withholding of the act, like a seed which is some sort of alive thing withholding its power to act, until the environment is right. Any energy withheld within a material object is a capacity to act, and that's what E=MC2 signifies. Nuclear energy demonstrates that a physical object contains the capacity to act. In the case of "will", what we have not identified is the thing which withholds the action, creating the potential (capacity to act), such that it can be directed towards a preference. This is what is called the agent. But notice that the agent creates the capacity to act by withholding activity, will power, just like the seed does.

This thread's dead. Where's NOS4A2 to grease the wheels?

Unfortunately because of the nature of share markets a large part of the common human good, in simply economic and lifestyle (including healthcare) terms at least, has become dependent upon corporate profits. — Janus

But this is to make corporate profit into the public good, it is not to prioritize it "over" the public good. See the difference? One says corporate profit is more important than the public good, while the other says corporate profit is the public good. But even the latter is just an illusion anyway because the profit is not shared equally by the public.

.in that me telling you all about the human faculty of representation, for which the necessity of language is given in the objective telling but not in the subjective doing, is congruent to subjectively getting right into the activities of the muscles used in objectively walking. In other words, inasmuch as we only think about walking muscles for some reason other than merely walking, so too do we only think about the unconscious operation of the faculty of representation for some other reason than merely thinking. We walk, but how is it that we walk; we think, but how is it that we think. Same-o, same-o. — Mww

We were talking about awareness. Have you switched this for the faculty of representation? Or do you think they are one and the same?

So....answering from habit still requires thought, just doesn’t require understanding to waste any time on it. Because answering a question even out of habit, presupposes a set of empirical conditions in the form of the receptivity of the question, the unconscious cognitive apparatus remains in play just as in any other empirical consideration. Of the myriad of intuitions residing in consciousness, of all the possible answers to that question, just slightly different this or that (his shirt was red (redwood, rosewood, rust, terra cotta and auburn)) the habitual answer is only one, because its precedent has been set, hence the impossibility of understanding contradicting itself. This is how contemplation in judgement, from which the answer is delivered as its cognition, is shown to be unnecessary, and from which follows the immediacy of habitual cognitions in general. — Mww

I don't see how you get to this conclusion. The habitual answer is not the only answer, because a person might interrupt one's own inclination to speak, and decide on a different answer. So the whole apparatus of speaking appears to be an interplay between allowing what comes to one's mind by habit, and also at the same time possibly declining this, to decide on saying something else. Therefore it is only sometimes that contemplation is unnecessary, but this itself would be a judgement, that contemplation is unnecessary. It may be the case that all words come from the unconscious cognitive apparatus, and the conscious mind only makes the judgement of whether or not to say them. Would this mean that the conscious awareness doesn't actually think with words, because it would need to think with something else in order to judge the words coming from the unconscious?

C. most importantly that corporate profits should be prioritized over any given concept of the public good — boethius

Do any human beings actually support this principle?

...sounds good as a neoliberal sound bite... — boethius

In your usage, how would you define "neoliberal"?

That’s why I insist it should be referred to as “infinite divisibility” rather than “continuity”, it is far more specific and avoids this kind of misinterpretation. — Zelebg

But "continuous" is the more descriptive word, it says more about the named property than "infinitely divisible". Infinitely divisible is the way that mathematicians treat the thing which is said to be continuous. Therefore the subject has been changed. Instead of "S is continuous" we now have "S (a continuity) is infinitely divisible. The subject is no longer the thing which is continuous, it is the attribute "continuous" itself. This is how mathematicians quantify, they turn the attribute, or property into the subject, and assign a scale of values, degrees of existence, of the attribute. So for example, when colour is the property we might say "S is red", or "S is Blue". But then we turn the colour itself into the subject and attempt to create a scale of wavelengths to define the different colours. The quantifying of the attribute is only as accurate as the understanding of the attribute which the scale is based on. So a specific scale of wavelengths is not a very accurate way to represent different colours because most real instances of colour are a mixture of wavelengths.

So, when we quantify the attribute, which is called "continuous", with "infinitely divisible", the quantification scale is only as accurate as our understanding of what it means to be continuous. For simplicity sake, the mathematician will say let's just define "continuous" as infinitely divisible and it doesn't matter whether there is such a thing as "real continuity", or even what is being referred to when people say "time is continuous", because this is mathematical continuity we are defining, and so long as we adhere to the definition there ought tot be no problem. However, there is a problem whenever we decide to apply that mathematical scaling to the natural thing which appears to have the attribute of being continuous. It was exemplified by Zeno. The problem arises because there is a discrepancy between what "continuous" means when we say "S (time or space for example) is continuous", and when we say "continuous is infinitely divisible". The thing referred to as continuous is not "continuous" as defined by mathematics. This is because the mathematical definition of "continuous" is adopted for the simplicity or eloquence of mathematical principles, and does reflect what is being referred to when "continuous" is predicated of a subject like time or space. If one is to assert, and insist that the thing which is said to be continuous must have the property as defined in mathematics, this indicates a misunderstanding. The misunderstanding is analogous to one who insists that a thing which is a particular colour, must have only a specific narrow range of wavelength (ignoring the fact that in reality colours are mixed wavelengths). The situation is that the "official", mathematical definition of the property does not match the perception which is named as that property.

Your logic is not wrong, just inadequate because you don’t get two logically opposite and mutually exclusive categories: continuous / divisible vs. discrete / indivisible. — Zelebg

The goal is to describe how things are in reality, not to produce mutually exclusive categories. The reality of categories is that they always overlap and envelope each other, more like sets. A human being is a mammal, is an animal, is a living thing, is an existing thing. The categories are not mutually exclusive.

However, within some categories we will establish extremes, like hot and cold, and scale according to those extremes. But it's not proper to say that they are mutually exclusive, because they are in the same category, and all the intermediates, can be said to be degrees of the two. So "divisible" and "indivisible" are better represented as the two extremes of the same category, like hot and cold. Then these two are the ideals, the perfect extremes, and all things in reality fall somewhere in between, as divisible in some ways, but not divisible in other ways.

So no, we divide a line and we do not get two parts, we get two lines, and if we supposed lines are continuous, then obviously we get two continuities. Think of it as analog vs. digital. — Zelebg

Right, we start with AB as one continuous line. Then we insert C to divide at C, so that AC and CB are distinct line segments. Therefore each of these two is a distinct continuity, but there is no continuity of AB anymore, because that line has been divided at C. However, AB still exists as something we can talk about, so we can say that it consists of two parts, AC and CB. Do you agree or not?

Perhaps your attempt to describe things in terms of a continuous/discrete dichotomy is confusing you. Let's determine what "continuous" means in application, and also what "discrete" means in application, to determine whether these two signify the extremes (ideals) of one category, or whether they signify distinct categories. There could be ambiguity such that sometimes they mean one, and other times they mean the other.