I'm not sure why you think it'll be any different in the Senate. — Hanover

I see at least three major differences. There's no need for any Democrats in the Senate to defect because conviction is highly unlikely. Also the population represented is different as Senators represent an entire state. And, I think there are a number of Republican senators who have expressed dislike of Trump in the past..

We know Trump is extremely unlikely to be convicted by the Senate. The issue is which Republican Senators will be inclined to vote against Trump to ensure personal re-election, and what kind of division this will create within the party. And if they do not vote against Trump they face the prospect of being replaced by a Democrat.

The only question now is whether this maneuvering will more energize the left or the right in the upcoming election. It's doubtful it will change a single vote from one side to the next, but it might cause more people to go to the polls. — Hanover

There is probably a lot more to this matter than what you make of it here. The Democrats may have layered the strategy. The Senate has a complex election system, with representation by state. It is likely that some Senators will have a tough decision to make. Some Republican Senators will face the prospect of not getting re-elected if they side with Trump. There may be a shake up of the Senate, or there may be division in the Republican party. Either way, the Democrats come out ahead.

I see where you’re getting at, but do you agree that without the experience of change we wouldn’t even come up with the concept of “existence”? Without the experience of change there wouldn’t be thoughts, there would only be a single thought, or a single color, a single experience that never changes, and we couldn’t even think about that experience. So it seems to me that “change” is more fundamental than a “thing”. There can be change that is so random that no specific thing can be identified within this change, and we can’t identify a thing without change.

In that view then and to avoid confusion, maybe we should talk of change instead of existence? — leo

Yes, it doesn't even really make sense to speak of the possibility of experience without change, as change is so fundamental. However, we shouldn't dismiss its dichotomous partner, "being", if we define "being" as remaining the same, through time, continuity, consistency. In experience, we tend to notice things which stay the same for some period of time. In fact, it appear necessary that something stay as it is for some period in order for us to even notice it. Imagine if at every moment, everything nlittle part of existence changed in some completely random fashion. So if we look at the ancient dichotomy of being and becoming (change) it would be difficult to say which is more fundamental to our experience. To notice one seems to require that we notice the other. To get to the bottom of this, we can divide the two in analysis, and see what conditions underlie each of them.

But what are relations, if not things themselves? It seems you are assuming two fundamental distinct entities: things and relations. You are also assuming that a thing without parts cannot change on its own. Why would a relation without parts be able to change on its own, and not a thing without parts? It seems to me that if you assume a thing without parts cannot change you’re running into the same problem concerning a relation without parts. — leo

I don't understand what you could be talking about here. A "relation" requires two things, therefore the relation necessarily has parts. It doesn't make sense to speak of a relation without parts. I definitely was not assuming a relation without parts.

Perhaps you misunderstood the point I was making. If two distinct things are shown to be in a relation to one another, then by virtue of that relation, we have indicated that those two things are parts of a larger thing. If the "relation" is valid then a larger unity is indicated.

However, things and relations are fundamentally distinct. Relations are what we predicate of things, whereas the things themselves are the subject of predication. So a relation is what a thing is said to have, but it does not make the thing itself. Likewise, a thing has parts, but the parts do not make the thing itself, because the parts must exist in specific relations. These are the analyzed principles of the two above mentioned aspects of experience, parts and relations.

Experience, as a thing, the subject of consideration, has two features, parts and relations between the parts. For the sake of understanding, we say that the parts remain the same, as time passes, and all that changes is the relations between the parts. This is Aristotle's matter and form. The matter remains the same while the form changes. The problem is that we always learn to divide the parts further, then it appears like the part is made of parts with changing relations. To end the infinite regress, some will posit a "prime matter", the fundamental part, not composed of parts, therefore not itself changing, as the basis for all existence. Reality would consist of fundamental parts existing in different relations. The problem is that Aristotle demonstrated this prime matter as illogical,

And if we proceed to assume relations as fundamental, then it doesn't make sense to speak of relations without parts. Therefore we are really missing something in our analysis. What has come up, in much metaphysics is that what is missing here is "the cause". If parts exist in relations to each other, there must be a cause of this. It is our failure to address this feature, that leads to the unending analysis of parts and relations, seeking to find the bottom, the most fundamental, when we are actually neglecting the most fundamental thing, which is the cause of this unity between parts and relations, the cause of parts existing in relations. So to avoid the dead end analysis of parts and relations, we need to turn our attention toward "the cause".

Maybe if we start from the concept of change instead of starting from the concepts of things and relations, we won’t run into these problems. Change occurs, and within that change things can be identified, in that they are parts of the change that temporarily do not change in relation to the rest. What do you think of this? — leo

Yes, if we start with "change", we will see that change requires a cause, and so we are on the right track here.

I don’t see where there is the infinite regress when we say that a part can change, why would we have to assume that a fundamental part does not change? — leo

Change is a difference in relations between things. So if a thing changes, the relations between its parts have changed. There is no other way that a thing could change, that is change, a change in relations. But if a part can change, then it must be composed of parts, and so on to infinite regress. To avoid the infinite regress we assume a fundamental part, what the ancient Greeks called atoms, and in modern physics is fundamental particles. Aristotle demonstrated that this is illogical, as "prime matter".

es we can describe that change. Let’s say you have the experience of ‘white’ (you’re close to a white wall and you’re only seeing white), you might say this is a thing that doesn’t change, but no there is still change, your thoughts are changing, you only see the white as not changing because your thoughts are changing and allowing you to think that. And there the change can be seen as made of parts, one part is the thoughts that you are having and the other part is the sensation of ‘white’ that is not changing in relation to your thoughts, but they form one whole, you can’t see the ‘white’ as not changing without having changing thoughts at the same time. Do you see where I’m getting at? — leo

Sorry, I made a typo, I meant to say we cannot do this without assuming parts, instead of saying "with" assuming parts. My mistake. I meant to say that we cannot explain "change" without assuming parts in relation to each other. Change requires parts.

You've described a potential infinity, but not an actual infinity. To understand an actual infinity we need to understand the actual existence of the elements represented by mathematical language.

Is kind of why I asked about a working definition. It seems to me all those matters depend on context and what is required in and for the context. Kind of a shame you-all didn't. A good topic deserves good grounding. — tim wood

The nature of reality is not an issue here. The nature of an object is. "Reality" is the more general concept, so there is more to reality than just objects. What we are interested in here, is objects.

Here is another example: consider the "potential infinity" defined by the Fibonacci sequence. You can generate every Fibonacci number using a recursive function defining the sequence. In other words, the recursive function defines the first, second, third, and so forth, Fibonacci number. However, you can always consider the collection of elements generated in this way by saying: "suppose that nn is a number in the Fibonacci sequence." What you are talking about, in the latter case, is an infinite set of objects - there is no limit to the number of objects that satisfy this condition, although there are restrictions on the kinds of objects that satisfy the condition. — quickly

Now the issue, which we discussed already in the thread, is whether or not a written numeral necessarily represents an object. In actual usage, the numeral might be used to represent an object, or it might not. If it doesn't represent an object, then any supposed count is not a valid count.

Your example seems to create ambiguity between the symbol, and the thing represented by the symbol. So you would have to clarify whether there is actually existing numbers, existing as objects to be counted, otherwise the claim of "an infinite set of objects" is false. As proof, it doesn't suffice to say that it is possible that a numeral represents an object And actual usage of symbols demonstrates that it is possible that the symbol represents an object, but also possible that it does not. To present the symbol as if you are using it to represent an object, when you really are not, is deception.

No, we didn't really discuss the nature of reality. We discussed the difference between trying to make true descriptions of objects, and creating imaginary figures. Both of these, I would say, are part of reality. The issue I think is whether the imaginary figures qualify to be called objects. So the question would be to define "object", and this is why I turn to the law of identity. An object has a unique identity.

Are you talking about the hypotenuse of a right triangle? — John Gill

Yes.

I think we've covered much ground in this thread so it would be difficult to summarize. The pivotal issue seems to be the reality of Platonic objects. So we had an extensive discussion concerning what various mathematical symbols are representative of, whether they represent objects, if so, what kind of objects, and particularly the identity of the objects. The law of identity was prominent. . It appears like axioms which treat an infinite collection as an actual object, require the reality of Platonic objects. However, the point I argued is that mathematical objects do not have an identity which is consistent with the law of identity. .

OK, so your interpretation is (as I understand it) that that a line segment is not composed of infinite points, but is composed of sub-lengths. I am in agreement. I would point out that the length of a sub-length cannot be zero else all line segments would have the same size. — Devans99

The issue here is that there is an incommensurability between distinct spatial dimensions. Pythagoras demonstrated that the ratio between two perpendicular sides of a square is irrational. The same type of irrationality arises from other two dimensional figures, like the circle, with the irrational pi.

This incommensurability is extremely evident in the relationship between the non-dimensional point, and the one dimensional line, according to TheMadFool's explanation.

Whenever we add another dimension to our spatial representations we add a new layer of complexity to this fundamental incommensurability, such that by the time we get to a four dimensional space-time the irrationality involved is extremely complex. What is indicated by this fact, is that our representation of spatial existence, in the form of distinct dimensions, is fundamentally flawed.

People always say that there are things that science can't explain, and it is such a shit, desperate excuse that it might be to blame for the loss of some brain cells in certain people. Why do they simply not realise that science is an ever-expanding subject, that we may just have not discovered an explanation to said happening that 'science can't explain'. — Athen Goh

I think that what happened is that some people came to understand that there are things beyond the limits of understanding through science, because they are beyond the capacity for empirical observation of the human being. These people still had the desire to understand these things, to take their minds where science couldn't go, past the dead ends and road blocks which ancient science came up against, toward understanding the vast reality of what lies hidden beyond the limitations which are the premises of science.

However, there was still many people who had the attitude such as what is expressed above, by you. So the people with the desire to expand their understanding of reality beyond the limitations inherent within the principles of science, had to create the notion of God and religion, to gather the resources necessary for that crusade.

What is it? I can't open it.

Say, ∑n∈Nf(n)∑n∈Nf(n) is not a process like going shopping and returning home, it's a mathematical expression.
Convergence and divergence has concise technical definitions using the likes of ∀∀ and ∃∃.
I challenge you find and understand them. ;) At this point you might be in a position to launch critique.
By the way, you should know that this stuff has practical applications used every day by engineers, physicists and others. — jorndoe

A process is a process. If your intent is to create ambiguity in the definition of "process", such that it is possible to have a completed process, which by definition has no end, then be my guest. Do not expect me to follow along with such contradiction though.

And if you back up, justify, such contradiction with the report that it has practical applications, I would reply that such applications are nothing more than sophistry, deception.

Honestly I think its both cases. Some structures were actually contemplated due to their own beauty in a platonic world, while others raised secondary to observations and need for application as you depicted. I in some sense do agree you that we'll have infinite possibilities if we were to contemplate just purely, but there are definitely some scenarios that are more attractive platonically speaking than others. — Zuhair

I wonder if this is even true. Can you bring an example of an imaginary structure, created neither for the purpose of copying something in the world, nor for the purpose of resolving a specific type of problem. I suppose that it would be very difficult to distinguish whether the structure was created purely for beauty, or for utility. And, if you were to go and create one right now, saying you created it purely for beauty, I would argue that you did it for the purpose of your argument. So we might leave this point as unresolved, or even unresolvable. However, we might still argue our opinions, in an attempt to get the other into our own metaphysical camp.

Example of "mathematics prior to observation" is that the orbit of planets which suits more of an ellipse. Ellipses where there on board since ancient Greek, and their study didn't arise from contemplating planet orbits as you think. No they actually were studies on our earthly structures which are simply about inclined sections of cones. Then Kepler picked what is already available and matched it with observations about planets movements. — Zuhair

OK, I think you're right here, but this does not exclude the possibility that the ellipse was created for another purpose. So it doesn't really force the conclusion that the model was produced prior to having an application. We just might not be a ware of the application it was first designed for.

Other examples include Riemannian n-dimensional geometry, this was contemplated before relativity theory and other recent theories of physics which use many dimensions. Also non-Euclidean geometry was long contemplated by Al-Tusi and also by various mathematicians long before relativity theory called for their use, and they did arise from the pure study of geometry in the platonic realm, mainly becuase of the non-proof of parallelity postulate. Pure Platonic contemplation is not random, and so it pursue interesting alternative structures, and also can pose general mathematics investigating wide array of those structures. — Zuhair

Again, we cannot really resolve the question this way, because there would always be a reason for speculating about non-Euclidian geometry. You say that it is because the non-proof of the parallel postulate, but as I think I indicated earlier, Pythagoras was dissatisfied with the irrational nature of the square, and we also have the irrationality of pi. These are all good reasons to speculate about non-Euclidian geometry, and it would be difficult to prove that utility is not at the base of this dissatiisfaction.

Pure Platonic contemplation is not random, and so it pursue interesting alternative structures, and also can pose general mathematics investigating wide array of those structures. — Zuhair

So let's assume as we would agree, that pure Platonic contemplation is not random. How could we assign anything other than utility (what Plato calls "the good") as the thing which delivers us from randomness? If we were to contemplate pure beauty, completely devoid of utility, wouldn't this be randomness itself?

So in real practice both lines are occurring, the pure investigation of those entities in the platonic laboratory and on the other hand the on-demand construction of mathematical entities to match needed application. We can say that mathematics can work to enrich our knowledge about the world by detecting behaviors in the later that we known in the platonic world (in approximate manner), and also the other direction is also true, that observation in our real world as the source and the motive to contemplate certain platonic structures, so our world enriches mathematics also. It is a bilateral movement. And I think this bilaterality is important. And it should be observed if we are to have mathematics help enrich our knowledge about our world. — Zuhair

I'm not convinced that there is such a thing as pure investigation in the platonic laboratory. I think this would require that we totally remove ourselves from the necessities of life, and the constraints of the physical world, and this is impossible. That is why Plato himself settled on "the good", as that which makes the intelligible objects intelligible. The good inheres within the essence of the intelligible object therefore, as what gives it the characteristic of being intelligible. If we remove this good, we are overwhelmed by randomness. And randomness might itself be the most beautiful thing there is, such that we would be overcome by the beauty of pure randomness, but such beauty would be inherently unintelligible because of the nature of randonmness, and therefore impossible to be the source of any type of structures.

I know, it's because philosophers can't agree on anything when it comes to time.

That's simply an indication that we can do logic without knowing how the logic works. To know how logic works is a completely different issue. This question is Socrates' claim to fame. The artists and skilled craftsmen would claim to "know", because they had a technique which produced the desired results. This attitude extended into all fields, science, mathematics, even ethics and sophistry. Socrates demonstrated that these people who know how to do something do not know how it is that their activity brings about the desired end. Therefore their own claim to "knowing-how" is not grounded in anything, the activity is just a habit, and so is not real knowledge at all..

Not so for Planck Time. You'll need a real, live physicist to discuss this properly. It used to be that this limit was variable according to some physical features. — John Gill

Actually, what I described is exactly the case with Planck time. The limit (Planck time) is the product of the theories being used. This is from Wikipedia: "The Planck time is the unique combination of the gravitational constant G, the special-relativistic constant c, and the quantum constant ħ, to produce a constant with dimension of time.".

You might say that these theories represent something real in the universe, but they only do so to the extent of our understanding. Any misunderstanding creates a limit to the mathematics which is not representative of a real limit in the physical universe. When this is the case, application of the mathematics to observations will produce an abnormal occurrence of infinities, (as we see in quantum physics) as the things being observed go beyond the limits created by the lack of understanding expressed by the theor.

I don't see where you differ with me. Mathematics can also speak of patterns that had not been yet observed! Because it tackle all possible structures in an unlimited manner. That's what I meant when I said *before-hand*, if we had good mathematics about ellipses, parabola, hyperbola, etc.., even before we observed the movements of planets, that knowledge would make it easier for the astronomer to discover the pattern of movement of those planets, because as I said many times humans don't see what they don't look for. — Zuhair

I don't see how this notion of "before-hand" can be realistic. Before-hand, there are infinite possibilities for spatial shapes. So it could not be practical to produce all these possible models prior to observations, then after observing, attempt to fit a model to the observation. What is really the case, in practise is that we see something, observe it and take notes, then we create a model to represent it. So we work from the purest form of mathematics, simple numbers to represent observed occurrences of events, with the most primitive spatial representation of those events, toward creating a more complex spatial form, or pattern, which fits to those occurrences.

I agree that it is necessary to keep our minds open to "all possible structures" but to approach a problem with all possible structures already apprehended, and developed on paper, is not practical because unrestricted possibility approaches infinity. Therefore we take the information presented to us by the particular problem, and create structures as possible solutions, according to what is required, striving to keep our minds open to many possibilities because once we accept one we tend to close our minds to others. And this is not good, because we never actually obtain "the ideal."

f you have the descriptive arsenal before-hand, you'll predict easily the behavior of matters with fewer observations because it would look familiar to what you have experienced in say the platonic world about those orbits. — Zuhair

This is not true, because the "descriptive arsenal" would have to contain all of the countless possibilities. Then, you would have to compare the observations with each of those countless possibilities to determine which description is the best. This is highly impractical, and not representative of the way that we actually proceed. in reality we create the "platonic world" to represent what we have observed.

Notice that we didn't coin the mathematical structures describing orbits (ellipses, hyperbola,etc..) after the observation had been made, we actually imagined it form more trivial observations on our planet, then we freely contemplated more variety of structures in the platonic imaginary world, this free contemplation is what made us arrive at those orbit mathematical structures way before any application was discovered. — Zuhair

I don't think that this is true either. Kepler noted that planetary orbits were not eternal perfect circles as postulated by Aristotle. This knowledge was produced by inconsistent positioning. Kepler approached this problem with numerous possible curves, and found the elliptical orbit to be most suitable. But I don't see any indication that there are any elliptical orbits available for observation on our planet, from which Kepler could have copied the design, and no indication that the design was created for anything other than the purpose of modeling planetary orbits..

And I think that's one of the most important jobs of mathematics, to supply such descriptive arsenal that objects in our world can possibly follow. I'd say perhaps, the particle physics objects move along some paths that we don't have the descriptive arsenal necessary to match them with, that's why we remain in ignorance about them. — Zuhair

I agree that we are very close to complete agreement on these issues, that's why I have pointed out the specific places of disagreement with "not true", hopefully to help you see that my perspective is better suited. Though you might bring me around to your perspective instead.

So we're back to this question of art (beauty, aesthetic), or utility. Do mathematicians create all sorts of shapes, forms, and structures simply because they are beautiful, and have them lying around for possible use, or do they create them to serve as solutions to particular problems. You seem to choose the former, that mathematicians create a whole arsenal of beautiful shapes, simply because they are beautiful, then physicists and cosmologists might choose from this collection of designs, those which are suitable to them. I think that mathematicians create their forms with purpose, as potential solutions to particular problems.

I did not ask, "How many numerals are there?" This is immensely important. I asked a question about a human being, namely, "How many numerals did you learn to write down?"

This is the category difference which makes Banno's claim of "done" false.

Consider also that proofs are finite objects. — softwhere

Continuing with the Wittgensteinian perspective, the finitude of the proof would be dependent on the definitions of the terms. The definitions create the boundaries of meaning, required for the proof. If there is any vagueness, or undefined terms in the proof, then the proof cannot be considered as a finite object. Therefore it is very unlikely that we actually have any truly finite proofs, because definitions are produced with words, which themselves need to be defined, etc., ad infinitum. Vagueness cannot be removed to the extent required for the production of a finite object.

This makes mathematics a prototypically 'normal' discourse, and perhaps explains the mixed feelings that metaphysicians have toward it. As I see it, the old dream of metaphysics is to do 'spiritual math' about matters of ultimate concern. Proofs of god, etc. But non-mathematical language seems caught up in time to a much greater degree. 'History is a nightmare from which I'm trying to awake.' — softwhere

Yes, we can class mathematics as "normal discourse", but to characterize "normal discourse", as working with finite objects of meaning, is what Wittgenstein demonstrates as wrong. This is why we must work to purge the axioms of mathematics from the scourge of Platonism, To consider proofs as finite objects is a false premise.

A sum is the total. "Diverges" signifies a direction. It would be a category mistake to say "diverges to infinity" is a sum.

But "the sum diverges to infinity" is not "it can't be done"! — Banno

Well, it's not a sum. And to say that the sum "diverges to infinity" says I can't give you that sum. So if you're not saying "it can't be done" then why can't you give me the sum?

Take the other example - 1-½+⅓-¼...

It converges to two.

You disagree? — Banno

I'd need a definition of "converges" before I'd agree to what you're saying, but if you mean comes closer and closer to, as you continue on the unfinished process signified by "...", then I'd probably agree. But this implies that it's not ever done.

The sum! Wasn't that the task, to sum the sequence?

Face it Banno; you're trying to avoid doing the task by giving some answer which amounts to "it can't be done".

Your answer is not a sum. The task has not been done.

Regardless of whether or not they understand the process, unless they "keep going like this" they cannot be said to have done the task. Understanding the task to be done, and doing it are two distinct things.

And, if someone thinks that understanding the task constitutes doing the task, as you apparently do, then that person actually misunderstands.

OK, suppose you tell someone "keep going like this". At what point have they completed (are done) with that command? When they reach infinity?

Here it means "keep going like this..." — Banno

In other words you're never done.

As I said, ellipsis means unfinished. So using the ellipsis and claiming "it's done" is a false claim.

I think that without having descriptive account on "orbits" like those of Ellipses, Parabolas, and hyperbolas that mathematics beforehand supplied us with, it could have been very difficult to observe how the planets moves, and it would be very difficult to predict their movements. Possibly similar things might apply with the uncertainty principle. I don't know really. — Zuhair

This is a very interesting subject which you bring up here, but my opinion is somewhat opposite to what you say. I think that mathematics allows us to make many very accurate predictions based on statistics and probabilities, without having any accurate description of the mechanisms involved. So for example, Thales apparently predicted a solar eclipse in 585 BC. I think it's common that we observe things, take note of the patterns of specific occurrences, thereby becoming capable of predicting those occurrences, without understanding at all, the motions which lead to those occurrences.

So the ancient people observed the motions of the sun, moon, planets, and stars, and described these motions relative to their point of observation, and could make predictions based on those descriptions. But the motions they described were completely different from the motions we describe of the very same bodies, today. And we say that they were wrong. However, we still insist that motion is relative so we don't even really have the right to say that they were wrong.

It all breaks down as limits are approached: — John Gill

That's ironic, the numbers approach infinity (limitless), as the condition approach the limit. What this indicates is that the limit is created by the principles which govern how the numbers are applied. The limit is created by the numbers approaching infinity, and the principles of application dictate when the numbers will approach infinity.

Sure, but what makes the examples in the OP interesting is the active roll played by the third sex. — Banno

Do you think that the infertile female bees, the workers, do not play an active role?

The harmonic series diverges (very slowly) to infinity. What is it that you think is not done? — Banno

It hasn't reached infinity, so it is not "done".

Bees appear to have three distinct sexes, and gender roles which follow. The queen is the fertile female who lays eggs to populate the colony. The workers are infertile females, incapable of reproduction, they do the work of maintaining the colony. The drones are males who fertilize the queen in reproduction. The interesting thing is that the reproductive capacity of the queen's ovaries is actually created by feeding the chosen larva "royal jelly".

SO, here is an infinite task: (1+½+⅓+...). The harmonic series. It diverges to infinity.

An infinite task, done. — Banno

"..." doesn't constitute doing it. And saying "done" doesn't necessarily mean that it is done. Clearly, "..." symbolizes what is not done, not what has been done. The meaning of the ellipsis symbol is "unfinished". So your claim of"'done" is false.

Thanks, John. Also from that wiki page, I'll add "...the mathematical framework of quantum physics does not support the notion of simultaneously well-defined conjugate properties expressed by a single value."

To give Zuhair some credit though, the problem is derived from the Fourier transform which deals with our physical capacity to measure frequencies. The problem I see, is that instead of working to find the principles and axioms which will get us beyond this apparent limit, the physicists and mathematicians, accept this limit, and base their principles on assuming this limit as the real limit (special relativity), so that any real things beyond this limit will remain in the realm of uncertainty. Mathematics is inherently unlimited (infinite), but when we put a limit on physical existence, as SR does, then there is no need for mathematics to extend beyond that limit, so we accept principles which allow infinity to be reached at that limit. There is no longer any need to allow for mathematical principles to extend beyond this apparent limit, because it is assumed that the limit is real, therefore there is nothing beyond it to be measured. The result is that anything real beyond that limit cannot be measured because the mathematics has been shaped so as to disallow this, an all that is there is left as unknown.

I thought the source of the problem is our "physical" means of measurement not the mathematical side of it. — Zuhair

Without a doubt, there is a physical limit to the human capacity to observe our world. We observe with our senses. Molecules are at the limit of what we observe with our senses. It may be argued that we taste and smell them. But any particles smaller than this are beyond our capacity to directly observe. However, we devise instruments to extend this capacity of observation. Mathematics is used in this extension, The information from the instruments is interpreted with mathematics, and assumed to be made commensurable with the things observed by the senses through the principles of application, axioms and physical theories.

I wanted to know what are your objections to the uncertainty principle? and why you think it is the mathematics involved in it that are the source of the problem? — Zuhair

I have no "objections" to the uncertainty principle, uncertainty is the natural product when we arrive at the limits of our capacity to understand. But the issue is, why does the limit appear here, why can't we extend our understanding further. And the answer is that we do not have the principles required to enable us to go beyond this point.

It is not an issue of the human capacity to observe, because we already extend that capacity with instruments. Nor is it an issue of the "physical means of measurement", because we create and produce these, the instruments for measuring, as required. Therefore we ought to consider that the problem, which is causing this limit to appear before us, is a manifestation of the principles by which we interpret the information.

I was told Russians were trying to infiltrate their campaign. I make an entire argument and you quibble about one word. — NOS4A2

No, you changed the subject. Your "entire argument", was irrelevant to what I said. You haven't even demonstrated a clear understanding of the crime that was being investigated, and who the victim was.

I thought that uncertainty principle had nothing to do with the mathematics involved, it has something to do with inability of have complete form of measurement which is due to the nature of the objects studied and not to the mathematics involved in them. Not sure, really. Can you clarify the picture to me? — Zuhair

Mathematics is our means for measurement. I already proposed, and you somewhat accepted, that the reason we have "infinite", or "infinity", as a feature of our measurement scale, is that this assumption gives us the capacity to measure anything. If an object appears to extend beyond our capacity for measurement, (i.e. beyond the infinite), this implies that "infinity" is not being properly applied. We cannot ever blame the nature of the object for our inability to measure it, because this is self-defeating, killing the inspiration required to devise the means for measuring it.

They didn’t tell the victims of the crime and instead investigated them. — NOS4A2

The DNC was hacked and information exposed by WikiLeaks. The victim was the Trump campaign? That's a stretch of the imagination.

So I can agree that “There is existence” and “Existence changes” would refer to the same truth, that existence and change are the same, that through the experience of change we reach the statement that “There is existence, there is change”. — leo

OK, but this is where we need to be careful in our description. Change requires that there is something which is changing And so we have the dualism problem again. We have the thing and the changes which occur to the thing. If we associate existence with change in the sense of "existence and change are the same", then when we direct our attention to the thing which is changing, we need to us terms other than "existence".in that description.

The problem I see with this is that, if a thing which is not made of parts cannot change, why would a part change? A part of a thing is a thing too. And then we get into an infinite regress where each part of the thing requires parts in order to change, and themselves require parts in order to change and so on. — leo

This is why we need to be careful in our description. A thing is a whole, a unity. Suppose that a thing is made of parts, and the parts are in relations with each other. When the relations between the parts change, the thing changes. but this doesn't necessarily mean that the parts themselves change. If a thing has no parts, there are no internal relations, and the thing does not change. The relations between it and other things might change, but this is not a change to the thing itself, it is a change to some larger unity of this thing and other things (as parts).

It has been common in the past, and remains so, to assume a fundamental "part" or element, to avoid the infinite regress, this was the atom in ancient times, matter, or the fundamental particle. What we have here is a base thing, which does not itself change, but by existing in different relations, it composes all existing things.

So I would say that a thing can change, become something other than it was, and a thing may be made of parts which can change. If a thing could not change nothing would ever change, unless we arbitrarily assume that a ‘part’ is fundamentally different from a ‘thing’ but I don’t think we are forced to introduce this complication. — leo

The problem is that we want to avoid the infinite regress. If a thing can change, and a thing can be a part, then a part can change. Now we have an infinite regress of parts, and it really doesn't make sense to think that there is always smaller parts ad infinitum. So we posit the fundamental part, which has no parts. And, since it has not parts, it cannot change. This fundamental "unit", must be different from other entities, because it is not composed of parts. But this creates other problems such as timelessness, etc. This complication we cannot avoid. We can describe things in terms other than parts and changing relations, but to remain true to real observations, the complication will arise in another way.

So again assuming you agree with what I said above, we don’t have to assume that the temporal aspect of existence is made of parts, that change is made of parts, we can simply say that there is change, and that the future and the past do not exist in a strict sense, rather they are experiences that are had in the present, they are part of existence now. This is of course not to say that everything that will ever happen and everything that has ever happened is already contained in existence now, but simply that we experience images of what we think will happen or of what we think happened, and these experiences are part of existence as long as they are had. — leo

But we must say something about "change", describe it, if we want to understand it. And we cannot do this with assuming multiple things (parts) in relation to each other. So it's pointless to just say "there is change", and therefore avoid talking about parts, because then we cannot understand change.

It's called the uncertainty principle.

...and If Barr is right... — NOS4A2

Tell me another one bro... According to Barr, the entire investigation was based on "a vague statement made in a bar". Further, one witness recants, and the proceeding "collapses", therefore the FBI ought to have closed the investigation at that time. Barr plucks a few supportive pieces of evidence, not mentioning the sea of damning evidence, and reports that this is the way that "I felt", about this. I couldn't sit through the entire interview, it was getting too ridiculous

But what really exposes his twisted perspective is the fact that when evidence arose that the Russians were meddling in the election, Barr says the US government should have approached the Trump campaign rather than approaching the Russian government to tell them to stop. However, he also maintains that there was no evidence of collusion.

How does it make any sense not to approach the Russian government, when the evidence indicated their involvement? What sense would it make to approach the Trump campaign when collusion was not evident Furthermore, why would it not make sense to investigate for any evidence of collusion? When the killer is caught with the smoking gun, it is the due diligence of the police force to investigate the possibilities of conspiracy. Clearly there was motive.