But this is ambiguous. He promotes the need for a system, in that he thinks there is something important in this need that can be redirected into "blasting open the phenomena with the insistent power of thought". But I don't think he's saying he wants to actually do a philosophical system. — Jamal

That idea, "blasting open the phenomena with the insistent power of thought", has given me much difficulty in understanding. I just couldn't get it. Here is another stab at it:

Upon further reading, I realize that the lecture gets very complex and difficult at page 38, where he addresses Heidegger directly. This induces me to reassess my interpretation of the defining aspect of "system". I had interpreted the essential feature as being one whole which includes everything, but now I'm inclined to see it as 'being guided by one principle'. So in the notes we see "System in this philosophical sense is the development of the fact from a principle, in a dynamic manner, in short, as a development, a movement that draws everything into itself...". And at page 39 when he says that the question of the possibility of philosophy without a system hasn't been given the serious thought it deserves, he says: "The question then becomes how can thought be unified if it is not guided by a principle?"

Now the difficult part of the lecture. When he addresses the influence of Heidegger on philosophy, he describes a change, a transformation of the concept of "system", a "secularization", whereby "system" becomes a "latent force". The central question is the unification of thought, how is thought unified. The issue of unification is brought up in the quote I already provided from page 39, where Adorno speaks of criticism of his own "apercu" thoughts, and says he didn't have to lay his cards on the table and reveal what unifies his thoughts. It is implied that the unifying force may remain latent. The issue is that without a guiding principle philosophy would be whimsical, or arbitrary. But the question appears to be, can the unifying principle remain latent within a philosophy?

So that is how Adorno approaches Heidegger. In my understanding, Heidegger employs the concept of "region" in "Being and Time", so that "Being" is divided into modes of Being generally corresponding with the three aspects of time, past present and future. "Being" is not a single principle, but a sort of plurality of distinct aspects derived rom the aspects of time. I would say that this plurality is unified by a single principle "time", but perhaps Adorno see things differently.

Starting from page 38, he explains how, from Heidegger the concept of system undergoes a qualitative change:

This means – and I am not
embarrassed to say that at this point I feel a certain emotion – that
the path on which system becomes secularized into a latent force
which ties disparate insights to one another (replacing any architectonic
organization) – this path in fact seems to me to be the only road
still open to philosophy. Admittedly, this path is very different from
the one that passes through the concept of Being, exploiting en route
the advantages provided by the neutrality of the concept of Being.
And it is from this standpoint that I would ask you to understand
the concept of a negative dialectic: as the consciousness, the critical
and self-critical consciousness of such a change in the idea of a philosophical
system in the sense that, as it disappears, it releases the
powers contained within itself. — p38

Then at page 39 the latent force is described as what produces the unification of thought, so that the unity of thought becomes the central issue. He distinguishes positive thinking from negative by applying an internal/external distinction. Positive thinking imposes its own authority on itself, and creates its own objects from within itself, while negative thinking is in a sense a response to the external, the situation, or environment, what "confronts" it.

We might say, then, that thought which aspires to be authoritative without
system lets itself be guided by the resistance it encounters; in other
words, its unity arises from the coercion that material reality exercises
over the thought, as contrasted with the ‘free action’ of thought itself
which, always concealed and by no means as overt as in Fichte, used
to constitute the core of the system. — p39

However, we cannot forego, or overlook the latent aspect of this unity, so he adds:

I would ask you to combine this
with an idea that I have hinted at in quite a different context, that
of the idea of the secularization of system or the transformation of
the idea of system, in other words, with the fact that philosophical
systems have ceased to be possible. — 39-40

I interpret this as meaning that philosophical systems are not possible because we now have a form of contradiction where the latent aspect, which forms the system or unity, is within, yet at the same time the philosopher must be guided by the external circumstances. So Adorno gives priority to the external, and seems to imply that confrontation of external circumstances must be given priority over the latent tendency toward system. I believe that the implication is that the internal inclination toward unifications is inverted to the external inclination of division. Hence "blasting open the phenomena".

Now we have a duality of criticism, noological, as directed inward toward judgement, and phenomenal, as directed outward toward phenomena. This duality Adorno recognizes, but refuses to separate, so he sort of rejects the duality. And in this way, the power that was formerly directed inward toward criticism of judgement, creation and production of a coherent system, is directed outward toward the criticism of individual phenomena, the "blasting open".

Thinking would be a form
of thinking that is not itself a system, but one in which system and
the systematic impulse are consumed; a form of thinking that in its
analysis of individual phenomena demonstrates the power that
formerly aspired to build systems. By this I mean the power that is
liberated by blasting open individual phenomena through the insistent
power of thought. — p40

And the conclusion:

This means that something of the system can still
be salvaged in philosophy, namely the idea that phenomena are
objectively interconnected – and not merely by virtue of a
classification imposed on them by the knowing subject. — p40

I'd say that conclusion is doubtful. What supports " the idea that phenomena are
objectively interconnected"?

The final issue is the naivety of modern philosophy in relation to visibility. This naive attitude produces a sort of provincialism. This I take as a belief that our immediate circumstances are indicative of reality as a whole. This is where the incompatibility between the positive (system) and the negative (confrontation of phenomena) is exposed in philosophy. This I believe is the "philosophical cottage". It's the belief that the conditions which I am subjected to are indicative of the conditions which others are subjected to. And this produces a false unity (system). The real issue which arises in my mind, is how can he support this claim that "phenomena are objectively interconnected" when "phenomena" is already plural, and they can be blasted open with the power of thought. How can we justify an objective interconnectedness?

Anyway, I'll give it another read, and make a report one way or another.

He is saying there is value in the need for a system, but he is not promoting the project of a philosophical system itself. He is on board with the modern rejection of systematic philosophy, and makes that quite obvious. This is where he differs from Hegel and Fichte (and Kant, although it’s more complex with Kant). — Jamal

I did not read it like that. The "need for a system" speaks for itself. I think he rejects systematic philosophy as systematization. Further, he shows how the current use of "system" actually refers to what he calls systematization. So what is known as "anti-system philosophy" is really anti-systematization. He is anti-systematization, so we could call him "anti-system", but he really promotes the need for a proper philosophical system.

The way I'd put it is, philosophy should avoid both traditional system and systematization, but it should take the energy of the former. — Jamal

That's what I thought after first reading. After second, I realized that he is actually promoting the need for a true philosophical system. To unlock this understanding required that I take the time to fully consider the distinction between system and systematization laid out at the beginning. Systematization treats one subject as a whole and so is subjective according to the choice of subject. A system "is the development of the fact from a principle, in a dynamic manner, in short, as a development, a movement that draws everything into itself, that takes hold of everything and is itself a totality; it claims objective validity such that, as Hegel would put it,7 nothing between heaven and earth can be conceived of as being outside such a system."

The difference between the two is the difference between part and whole. The systematization treats the part as a whole, and this is where I see the problem. Treating the part like a whole leaves out the aspects where one part relates to another, in the larger whole. So each subject (each form of science for example) will have its own systematization, and there could very easily be contradiction between the distinct systematizations.

The provincialism he talks about can't just be a matter of systematization, because its problem is that it still acts like it's able to do traditional systemaic philosophy: — Jamal

That's exactly the problem which he is bringing to our attention, systematization (in this context provincialism) pretends to be system, and this gives "system" a new meaning as such. This would leave a sort of void where the true "system" ought to be, and the "latent system" creeps in to fill the void.

The "latent system" is is similar to what I was talking about which brings the charge of scurrilous. This is the author's secret intention. When only systematizing a part of reality, as a single subject, there are personal reasons why the author likes to address that part, in that way, and this is why the systematization is subjective. For example, in my early criticism, I faulted Adorno for focusing on Hegel (systematizing), instead of philosophy as a whole (system). I implied that Adorno believed Hegel had authoritative power as a philosopher, and Adorno's intention was to tap into this power.

So the latent system is the secret intentions of the author in the systematization. Intention is "the good" of Plato, what Aristotle described as "that for the sake of which", final cause. The good is what sort of guides our knowledge directing it toward this or that subject. When a philosopher presents a systematization, or a multitude of systematizations, there is usually an undisclosed intention behind the author's choice of subjects and how to deal with them. This undisclosed intention is what really unifies the systematization, but that unity is relative to something external to it, a larger "objective", in the sense of a goal, and this makes a latent system.

And this very criticism, that of the aperçu-like
nature of my thinking, has frequently been levelled at me too, until
finally – simply because so many things came together and created a
context – it then lost ground in favour of other objections, without
my having had to put my cards on the table13 and without my having
had to show what joins up my various insights and turns them into
a unity. — 39

So a proper philosophical system has the true unified understanding of all reality as its goal (objective), and hides nothing in latency because there is no further concealed unifying principle. The objective, a system, is presented as a system, without any hidden intentions which would make what is presented as a system really a systematization.

To me Adorno seems to be saying that we shouldn't be satisfied with a weak kind of philosophy that pursues restricted problems or else abandons itself to relativism, subject to "contingency and whim". We should want some kind of unity. — Jamal

This I believe is the key point of lecture 4. The reading is quite difficult with numerous twists and turns, so I won't give a full interpretation without more study, but I'll make a few initial comments. The distinction between "system" and "systematization", where a "system" is a whole and objective, while a systemization addresses a specific subject, and is subjective, sets up the framework for the discussion.

The first twist, is that the meaning of "system" has really changed. Now, what "system" refers to in anti-system philosophy, is really systematization. So anti-system, or a-system philosophy, if it's decent philosophy, will demonstrate system in a latent form. The latent system is really quite tricky because it's where the subjective meets the objective.

The point though, is that this systematization type of thinking, which becomes "provincial", and even "cottage" at the end of the lecture, is what true philosophy must strive to avoid.

He points out that Hegel contradicts himself, wanting to have his cake and eat it with a system that, like mathematics or logic, is one "gigantic tautology," yet is supposed to tell us something substantive about the world: — Jamal

I like the circle analogy. The Absolute, as the premise, is the cause of the Hegelian dialectical process, but it is also what is supposed to emerge as the result of that process. So we have an eternal circular motion, similar to what Aristotle demonstrated was logically possible, but is actually physically impossible.

He puts things differently by saying he wants to reject Spinoza's verum index sui et falsi, which is something like, the truth is an index of or standard for the false, meaning what is false can be just read of from what is true. He proposes the alternative: falsum index sui atque veri, the false indicates both itself and the true. — Jamal

I believe that the issue which lies beneath this conundrum is the problem of the relationship between the true and the false. The true, we can never know with absolute certainty, yet we have certainty about the false, as the impossible, beginning with contradiction. This produces a categorical distinction between the false and the true, as the false is "the thing" which is impossible, while the true is the possible, which is not a thing at all, but a multitude of possibility. I believe that this description provides an explanation of Adorno's reference to what is "definite", and to the "concrete expression" in the radio broadcast you quoted.

This outlook is set up in a general way, with the question of "is a negative dialectics possible". The negative actually determines what is impossible, and that forms the determinate, the determinate negation. Since the negative produces the determinate as the impossible, the requirement is to invert the dialectical process, from the Hegelian proposal of determining the positive, which is actually fruitless (or impossible), to a more realistic method of determining the negative. Determining the impossible then places the possible into a proper perspective. I believe that is sort of what is meant at the top of p29, with "index sui atque veri". Falsity is the index for truth.

...that this falseness proclaims itself in whether negative dialectics is possible what we might call a certain immediacy, and this immediacy of the false, this falsum, is the index sui atque veri.

Here's an interpretation from "Adorno Studies Through a Glass Darkly: Adorno's Inverse Theology"

The determinate negation of the negative conditions in
which we find ourselves provides a glimpse of “the only
permissible figure of the Other.”22 Amending Spinoza in his
essay “Critique,” Adorno argues that “the false, once
determinately known and precisely expressed, is already an
index of what is right and better.”23 Echoing this remark in his
lectures on Negative Dialectics, Adorno again rejects Spinoza’s
proposition “that verum index sui et falsi, or that the true and
the false can both be read directly ... from the truth.” Here
Adorno contends that “the false, that which should not be the
case, is in fact the standard of itself: . . . the false, namely that
which is not itself in the first instance–i.e. not itself in the
sense that it is not what it claims to be–that this falseness
proclaims itself in what we might call a certain immediacy, and
this immediacy of the false, this falsum, is the index sui atque
veri. So here then, . . . is a certain pointer to what I consider
‘right thinking’.”24

https://www.adornostudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/darkly.pdf

As well as the structure of a symphony, and the tension and resolution that lead to transformation, there's the way that the parts (movements and motifs) are shaped by the whole, and vice versa. — Jamal

Hmm, parts and whole, in relation. Doesn't this amount to "a system"? I'm in the middle of reading the next lecture, concerned with systems.

Your new example, "empty" and "full", only shows that these two do not properly qualify as contradictory terms, in the context of those fundamental laws we've been discussing. If those two qualified as contradictory, in that sense, then the glass would have to be either full or empty, excluding any middle terms like "half".

This reality is readily understood by recognizing that there is a multitude of states of "not-empty" which also qualify as "not-full", these are the degrees of the intermediate. Because of this, the contrary of "empty", "not-empty", cannot be truthfully said to be "full". Nor can the contrary of "full", "not-full", be said to be empty. Empty and full are distinct concepts which cannot be defined as opposite to each other.

We find this in every case of ideals which act as the extreme limits to a scale, hot and cold, big and small, good and bad, etc.. Each of these is not actually the contrary of the other, in the sense expressed by the law of non-contradiction. They all allow a range of intermediates and the degree may be measured by some sort of scale, warm, medium sized, indifferent acts, etc.. These ideal extremes are the defining boundaries of categories, and this is completely different from "contradictory" as employed by those laws.

What this demonstrates is that our common intuition, or inclination, to judge two terms as opposite, or "contradictory", is not consistent with "contradictory" as stated in those fundamental laws. And, in the activities of the real world, there is a whole slew of intermediates which violate the law of excluded middle, when we assign the contraries to real substance. This is what Aristotle demonstrated as the fact that the physical world of "becoming" is incompatible with the logical opposites of "being and not-being".

Did you read the quote? Maybe it's incorrect by conventional interpretations of Hegelian dialectics, but it is what Adorno is arguing about Hegelian dialectics.

So by Adorno's interpretation of Hegelian dialectics, "Becoming" is just a new proposal for the concept of "Being". It cannot be called "Being" because that word refers to what was identified as opposed to "Nothing". But that original concept of "Being" was manufactured by the mentioned violence, to match that antithesis, because "to put it quite crudely, they are not actually entirely identical".

Being and nothing are only made to be two sides of the same coin, by doing violence to the concept. When they "disappear into Becoming", that is the so-called synthesis, which is really nothing more that an attempt to rectify the violence which was required to establish the thesis/antithesis identity.

Thus once the identity of two contradictory concepts has been
reached, or at least asserted in the antithesis, as in the most famous
case of all, the identity of Nothing with Being, this is followed by a
further reflection to the effect that, indeed, these are identical, I have
indeed brought them together – Being, as something entirely undefined,
is also Nothing. However, to put it quite crudely, they are not
actually entirely identical. The thought that carries out the act of
identification always does violence to every single concept in the
process. And the negation of the negation is in fact nothing other
than the α¸να′µνησις, the recollection, of that violence, in other words
the acknowledgement that, by conjoining two opposing concepts, I
have on the one hand bowed to a necessity implicit in them, while
on the other hand I have done them a violence that has to be rectified.
And truth to tell, this rectification in the act of identification is
what is always intended by the Hegelian syntheses. — p30

And it's like he's saying that this insight is in Hegel already, or more like ... Hegel's dialectic "wants" to rectify the violence, but Hegel himself didn't allow it to. In other words, here's what Hegel should have done. — Jamal

I figure what he is saying is that the concept ("Being" in the example) must be abused (defined in a way which is inconsistent with what it really means to us) in order to produce the identity relationship required by the thesis/antithesis opposition. In other words, the proposed antithesis is the antithesis of an artificially manipulated concept, designed for that antithesis. Then it turns out that all that the synthesis is, is an attempt to rectify the damage caused by that abuse. And, depending on the skill of the dialectician, this may just as likely be a step backward for the concept, as it is likely to be a step forward.

Hmm... I still suspect this whole thing is just a play on words, where "possibly P" and "possibly not P" do not fit the desired format for the LNC and LEM to apply. I'll try one last example and then I'll leave it alone. — A Christian Philosophy

We are taking about P and not P therefore the LNC and LEM apply. The qualification of "possibly" creates an exception, a violation. Why do you see the need to persistently argue against this? I don't understand, it's a very simple matter. There is an aspect of reality, which we call "possibility", which those laws do not apply to. So we've developed a different type of logic, modal logic, to deal with this aspect.

And, like I explained to Banno, it's not the case that any specific system of logic is inconsistent, but it is the case that they are inconsistent with each other. This ought not be surprising because there are aspects of reality which are incommensurable with each other. That is why there is a need for dualism in ontology. The problem is that many people are inclined to reject dualism and attempt to reduce everything to a form of monism, and this is impossible because the two aspects are incompatible.

As per the LNC, we cannot have "P" and "not P" at the same time.
But we can have "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half not full" at the same time.
Does this example violate the LNC? Surely not; it is merely a play on words because the propositions "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half not full" say the same thing in different words. — A Christian Philosophy

I can't see the relevance. To make the example comparable you'd have to say "half full" and "not half full". What you present, "half not full", is meaningless. Either the glass is full or not full, and half full qualifies as not full. "Half not full" is nonsensical, meaningless, as if there could be half of nothing.

I really do not understand this drive to make all aspects of reality fit into one category, so much so that you would make up nonsensical phrases in an attempt to justify this motivation.

I have explicitly pointed out why this is not the case. The speak about two different things, so could not, in theory, tell us hte same thing. — AmadeusD

They don't speak about different things, they both speak about the very same thing, P. One says P might be false, the other says P might be true. Within the context of the fundamental laws of logic, they both say the same thing about P.

I understand what you're saying though, as i noted - they tell us the same thing (in practice). — AmadeusD

I don't think you quite get what I\m saying. In the context of applying the fundamental laws, the phrases tell us the same thing. That's theory, not practice. Theoretically they say the same thing, if the fundamental laws provide the theoretical context. In practice they tell us something different, depending on the context of the practice. In one context it might be something about success and failure of action, as in your example. In another context it could mean something different, like statements about what a person believes.

I don't believe we can really say that Plato had an ontology. Think that's strange? Look at the quote from Adorno, p32, in my post.

But they say different things... Certain contexts will give us the same information from each, but they mean different things as explicitly set out above. Is that translation of the logic above wrong? — AmadeusD

I really don't see the difference. By the fundamental laws, there are only two possibilities, true or false. Therefore "P might be false" means the very same thing as "P might be true". They both imply that there is a correct answer, (as there must be by the laws) but we do not know which is the case. So in the context of those laws they both mean the very same thing.

However, if we allow that there actually is no correct answer (as in the case of the sea battle), then we allow violation of those laws. It is only after we allow this violation that we can say that the two mean different things. But then we've put them into a different context, where the fundamental laws are not relevant, because we've allowed violation to put them into that context.

P1: LEM says one or the other must be true when "P" and "not P" contradict.
P2: "possibly P" and "possibly not P" do not contradict.
C: Therefore, "possibly P" and "possibly not P" both being true does not violate the LEM. — A Christian Philosophy

Ok, I see what you're saying, but I don't see the relevance. Each, "possibly P", and also "possibly not P", both inherently contradict LEM. Therefore to allow that they say something meaningful we must remove them from the context of the fundamental laws, as explained in my reply to Amadeus above. Since those laws must be violated to make the statements meaningful, placing them back into the context of those laws is pointless. We've already declared that the laws are inapplicable, in order to make sense of those propositions. So it's a demonstration of arbitrary application of the laws.

I didn't realize that. — frank

It's dependent on interpretation of a thorough reading. Plato's writing is commonly divided into three stages, early, middle, late. Here is a brief example of how one may interpret.

The early provides a good demonstration of an attempt to understand Pythagorean idealism, and the associated theory of participation, through application of the dialectical method. The middle work reveals problems with this form of idealism, such as what we know as "the interaction problem", so he introduces "the good" as an active principle which bridges this gap. The later work, such as Parmenides and Sophist, reveal all sorts of problems of idealism, especially with sophistry not maintaining clear categories, and arguments produced from a predetermined end, designed for specific purposes. (Compare Adorno's doing violence to the concept.) The Timeaeus uses "matter" as a fundamental principle to sort out categories, and this becomes the base of Aristotle's "primary substance".

Throughout, Plato's belief in idealism is strengthened, but the prevailing idealism is rejected by what we can call his "negative dialectics". This is his critical analysis of the conventional idealism. It does not refute idealism, but exposes problems, and produces the need to revamp outdated principles.

We were talking about "possibly P", and "possibly not P" as having the same meaning. Each means that neither "P" nor "not P" is true.

Which of course, often tell us hte same thing but are do not mean the same thing. — AmadeusD

How can two phrases tell us the same thing without meaning the same thing?

Jamal touched on this above, but at page 26, he appears to approach a negative part of positivity. Notice how saying 'if you have nothing positive to say, don't say anything' is really, itself, saying something negative. This is a negative aspect of positivity. So positivity's approach to negativity, can be, and often is negative.

But I believe that precisely
this aspect of positivity, which acts as a corollary to negativity, is
conjoined with the principle of negativity because it resists being fixed
once and for all in an abstract, static manner. — p27

He then describes this as a "prohibition", and the prohibition is called a "fixed element", which is said to be an "aspect". Notice it is the fixed positive point which becomes an aspect of the negative. This appears to me to be the intended grounding of the "determinate negative", it sort of reciprocates to the positive, or the positive submits to the negative, through prohibition. This must be where we find will power, and the moral capacity to say "no".

He then proceeds to express how the world is overflowing with positivity, but much of it turns out to actually be negative, like the example above. So negative dialectics is called for, and this constitutes an important difference between him and Hegel who taught positive dialectics. And he describes Hegelian dialectics as a sort of vicious circle, where the analytic becomes the synthetic and vise versa.

It is here that critical thinking and Hegel have to part company. — 28

Now he proceeds to the question " is a negative dialectics at all possible?" And, we see how the object can be the subject, or the object be a concept:

Can we speak of a dialectical
process if movement is not brought into play by the fact that the
object that is to be understood as distinct from spirit turns out itself
to be spirit. — p28

Further, the source of determinate negativity is said to be in "bad positivity". This bad positivity is characterized by the claim that the negation of the negation is positive. And he refers to Spinoza for an example. It's a little confusing, but it appears to be, that when the claim that something else is false, is taken to be true, but this claim is really false itself, then this falsity obtains a sort of immediacy.

He then proceeds to criticize the Hegelian concept of synthesis. He does this with reference to Hegel's famous triad of Being, Nothing, and Becoming. He explains how being and nothing must actually be the same, identical. But to make them identical, in the sense of ideally opposed, requires that we "do violence" to the concept. The violence then requires rectification, and the rectification is what is called "synthesis".

His criticism appears to be, that this doing violence to the concept which is required to create two opposites, as ideal, is a sort of mutilation of the concept. Therefore what is rectified, as the synthesis isn't necessarily derived from a true representation of the original concept, it's the mutilated concept. This allows that the synthesis might just as well be a step backward as a step forward. So this seems to be what validates "non-identity". Identity is a creation of that violence, and this need to do violence is a negative aspect of that positive dialectic. Then he describes this as a minimal difference between him and Hegel, but with " large-scale implications".

The final question of this lecture is " the question of whether dialectics is possible without system". He describes a common negative attitude toward systems in philosophy, and states the following:

What I am attempting
here and would like to show you is the possibility of philosophy
in an authoritative sense without either system or ontology – that is
what I am aiming at. — p32

He claims that he will show, through these lectures, "that a philosophical system is not possible".

But we know Plato grooved on the dialectics, so would he have really gotten muted in what Adorno calls idealism? — frank

What we commonly know as Platonism is better named as "Pythagorean idealism". I read Plato as being very critical of Pythagorean idealism, through the use of dialectics. This criticism laid the ground work for Aristotle's more formal refutation of Pythagorean idealism. Because of this, I view "Platonism" as a misnomer, because Plato was actually not Platonist.

By the way, this alienation of subject to object (or concept to content) is what Adorno is calling idealism. — frank

The problem is that this supposed alienation, concept without object, is a very true aspect of reality, what is at the base of creativity, like I explained. So Adorno needs to provide good reasons if he moves to reject it. Because it is idealism isn't a good reason. Idealism itself only becomes problematic when ideas are objectified, reified, as I explained is the case with common Platonism.

There's no getting away from the concept-object confrontation; the question is how much of the object is lost in the confrontation, or how much the nonidentical is otherwise part of the experience in which the concept-object confrontation is central (which is so far unexplained). — Jamal

I don't like this concept-object confrontation, and I do not see the need for it. It appears like it will reduce the activity of mind to mere representation, and this would be an ignorance of what I believe to be the primary activity of mind, creativity. I believe that a proper understanding of concepts reveals that there is no necessity of a corresponding object, and this lack of object is not a fault of the concept, but a feature of its utility, versatility, and infinite applicability. This is what we see in mathematics for example, conceptions produced without corresponding objects.

The issue though is that since there is no object which corresponds with these concepts, a loss of objectivity becomes apparent. There is nothing to ground "truth". Then the pure mathematicians who dream up these concepts with their imaginations tend toward Platonism to fill this gap, producing a vacuous form of "objectivity". The concept and object are one and the same.

I think they're so ridiculous that they must be motivated by strong prejudice, and I guess I won't be able to argue you out of that. — Jamal

There is prejudice here, no doubt. I don't believe it is strong though. Since the matter is the intentions which authors conceal from us in the secrecy of their own minds, it is something which can only be speculated about, therefore confidence cannot be obtained. If one allowed oneself confidence (strong prejudice), in this sort of matter, that person would be subsumed by paranoia. But also the highly speculative nature makes it very difficult to argue one out of it, as well.

Anyway, I'll try to hold off the criticism until the designated time slot, and enjoy the reading. I find the material well written and very interesting. And I don't mean this in the sense of "dead wrong", I'll withhold judgement on that.

I don't get your point. Of course "P" and "not P" say different things, they are opposed in meaning. And, LEM says one or the other must be true.

Yes, "possibly P" has the same meaning as "possibly not P". And, this meaning is that neither P nor not P is true, which is a violation of the LEM.

Consider, what is known by us as "possibility" could be understood in another way. It appears as an aspect of reality which violates those three fundamental laws. It could be understood as a violation of the law of non-contradiction. Then when someone says "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" we would understand it as both "there will be a sea battle tomorrow", and "there will not be a sea battle tomorrow" are true. But this is not the way that we are taught to understand it. We are taught to understand it as neither one is true. If we understand them both as true the result is unintelligibility. If we understand neither as true, the result is a new form of logic, modal logic, which deals with those aspects of reality which violate the LEM. This indicates that when something appears like it might be unintelligible, we might just need to look at it in another way.

He contrasts abstract negativity, or negativity in itself, with what he is really getting at with his negative dialectics, which is something to do with determinate negation: — Jamal

When he talks about "confronting concepts with their objects and, conversely, objects with their concepts", isn't this exactly the type of identity philosophy which he claims to be rejecting?

And, the meaning of "determinate negation" seems very unclear. It appears strangely like a reification. When "negativity of this kind is made concrete", doesn't this imply making it a fixed object? He may attempt to explain this when he talks about the "fixed element" as an aspect rather than an absolute, but it's very unclear what he is trying to do here.

Maybe it will become clearer when he addresses the question of whether a negative dialectics is even possible. Maybe it will end up being self-defeating, and we'll just be negating the negative dialectic.

See I'm practising my negative (critical) thinking, to see how it goes.

Because the matter of rhetoric and logic/dialectic are usually different, rhetoric provides its own appropriate logic. We can call it rhetorical logic if you like... — tim wood

As you can see, I don't like.

Rhetoric employs a number of different means, some logic, some not, depending on the circumstances. We cannot class appealing to another's emotions "logic".

There is no reason for him to mention "The enormous power of Hegel", and speak as if he's awed by this mysterious force of ideology. How is that consistent with his project of negative dialectics? And he did this right after claiming we need to critique the hypostasis of mind. Instead, he's sucking up to it when he says that all his ideas are contained in Hegel.

Anyway, you can call me scurrilous, and I'll say that you turn a blind eye, willfully ignore and deny, a significant aspect of German philosophy. Now we can happily continue on, with these negative opinions about each other.

Then you do not understand what rhetoric is or what it's for or how it differs from logic. — tim wood

You are the one who said "the right logic for this is Rhetoric", implying that rhetoric is a form of logic. It's clearly not.

And, as I said, logic can be used as rhetoric, because "rhetoric" is a use of language intended to persuade. What do you believe rhetoric to be?

And the right logic for this is Rhetoric, in which we consider both alternatives, sea battle or no sea battle. — tim wood

The problem though is that "Rhetoric" is not necessarily logic, it is language intended to persuade. If we class the language which deals with what is possible, and this includes what is named "modal logic", as simple rhetoric, @Banno will not be happy. However, "rhetoric" is the larger category, and logic can be used as rhetoric. But this leaves your statement as meaningless.

This is a minor quibble. He says that all of his ideas are contained in Hegel's philosophy, or are contained at least in tendency. That is, interpreted a certain way, everything he's saying can be spun out of Hegel. I don't think that's the same as saying he adheres firmly to Hegelian principles. — Jamal

Ok, what I said was completely an exaggeration, not an interpretation which remains true to Adorno's intention. It seems I have an odd subconscious habit of seizing on quirky lines and directing attention to them by interpreting them in a strange way. So what exactly is Adorno's intention in mentioning this?
The quirky lines often betray secrets which the author has no intention of revealing.

This what he actually said:

The enormous power of Hegel – that is the power which
impresses us so hugely today and, God knows,
it is a power that impresses me today to the point where I
am fully aware that, of the ideas that I am presenting to you, there
is not a single one that is not contained, in tendency at least, in
Hegel’s philosophy.

So, to pay respect for the difference you point out, what I see is a trick of rhetoric. He apprehends Hegel as hugely powerful in influencing the minds of men, and he has a desire to tap into that power, perhaps having political objectives. To support this end, he has mentioned some work of the younger Hegel, which is somewhat inconsistent with the older Hegel, and with reference to this, he claims everything he says is "contained" (in a qualified sense) in Hegel.

The trickery is this. He implies that he and the thoughts he presents, originate from, or have been greatly influenced by ("contained") by Hegel, suggesting that he is Hegelian. In reality, he is not, but he knows that Hegel is understood as a powerful authority, and he desires to gain support for his project by appearing to be consistent with Hegel.

I don't see it. Wikipedia tells me reification is a form of alienation. So that would be the opposite of this negation of the negation, which leads to the positive synthesis. Are you saying that Adorno's negative dialectics, which disputes this interpretation, is itself a reification?

Yes, but that "it's not a static thing" does not imply that it's not an object. Objects are not necessarily static things, so how is reification implicated?.

OK, but objects are not static things either. So how do you draw the conclusion of reification?

And so... Where's the reification?

But rhetoric certainly existed, with its own logic in which even as a matter of necessity both sides of a contradiction are "entertained." There will be a sea battle; there won't. The ultimate reduction being either-or, to which A. added also neither-nor. And Achilleus, "in the division of his heart," weighting competing courses of action. — tim wood

We are not talking about the situation after a future reduction though, we are talking about the current situation now. At the present time, neither "there will be a sea battle tomorrow" nor "there will not be a sea battle tomorrow" is true. "It is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow" is true, but obviously this violates the law of excluded middle. However, under the principles of determinism, one or the other is considered to be true, even at the current time. But this leaves "it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow" as false. (Note to Banno: this use of "possible" is not consistent with modal logic, but there is a number of different ways "possible" is commonly used). Also, determinism leaves deliberation as superfluous, so only a fool would accept that perspective.

What is it a reification of, "society"?

So, he goes through a bunch of meanings for "positive" and distinguishes two principal uses, "positive" in the sense of good, and positive in the sense of what is posited, or postulated as actual fact. The latter is the sense associated with positivism, and he warns about a sort of equivocation whereby the word "positive" in positivism has connotations from the other meaning, good, approvable, and ideal.

I will add that there is another sense of "positive" which sort of bridges between those two principle senses, it is the sense of a sort of certitude about what is the actual fact. "I am positive that I put the file in the folder, therefore unless someone removed it, it must be there." This appears to signify the positive attitude which Adorno's negative dialectics is opposed to, as a sort of Socratic skepticism. In analogy, the positivists are to Adorno, like the sophists were to Plato.

‘

For this reason,
therefore, we might say, putting it in dialectical terms, that what
appears as the positive is essentially the negative, i.e. the thing that
the negation of negation is to be criticized.
And that is the motive, the essential motive, for
the conception and nomenclature of a negative dialectic. — p18-19

So he describes his negative dialectics as a form of critical theory which goes beyond conventional critical theory, by affecting not only the way that we think, but also the way that we act. By affecting the way that we act, it has an affect on reality itself. This proposition we can reflect back on Hegel's distinction between "being-in-itself" as passive critical thought, and "being-for-itself" as active negative dialectics.

In this context, I remember very well a junior seminar
I gave with Paul Tillich shortly before the outbreak of the Third
Reich. A participant spoke out very sharply on one occasion against
the idea of the meaning of existence. She said life did not seem very
meaningful to her and she didn’t know whether it had a meaning.
The very voluble Nazi contingent became very excited by this and
scraped the floor noisily with their feet. Now, I do not wish to maintain
that this Nazi foot-shuffling proves or refutes anything in particular,
but I do find it highly significant. I would say it is a touchstone
for the relation of thinking to freedom. It raises the question whether
thought can bear the idea that a given reality is meaningless and that
mind is unable to orientate itself; or whether the intellect has become
so enfeebled that it finds itself paralysed by the idea that all is not
well with the world. It is for this reason in my view that the theoretical
notion of a positivity that represents the sum of all negativities is
no longer possible – unless philosophy wishes to live up to its reputation
of worldly innocence, something it always deserves most when
it attempts to become overly familiar with the world and to ascribe
a positive meaning to it. — 19-20

He then proceeds to dismiss the positivist interpretations of Hegel, which I interpret as addressing them as a sort of misinterpretation. They are misinterpretations because they focus on a part, but not the whole of Hegel's work. This thinking, which accepts a part as the whole leads to that positivist notion which he rejects, that the sum of all negatives produces something positive. Further, he explains how dialectics must address the primary question of the hypostasis of mind, which is very appealing to the philosophical mind which apprehends it.

We shall see that the thesis of the identity of concept
and thing is in general the vital nerve of idealist thought, and indeed
traditional thought in general. Furthermore, this assertion of the
identity of concept and thing is inextricably intertwined with the
structure of reality itself. And negative dialectics as critique means
above all criticism of precisely this claim to identity – a claim that
cannot of course be tested on every single object in a kind of bad
infinity, but which certainly can be applied to the essential structures
the negation of negation confronting philosophy either directly
or as mediated through the themes of philosophy.
Furthermore, dialectics as critique implies the
criticism of any hypostasization of the mind as the primary thing, the
thing that underpins everything else. — 20-21

The lecture is concluded by assertions that he adheres firmly to Hegelian principles.

It's good to see that we agree, once in a while.

I don't doubt the consistency of S5. Did I say that one system of logic, or another is not consistent? No, I pointed out two systems of logic which are not consistent with each other.

I'm sorry, Meta, but your post is again risible. You say no one is restricting themselves to Aristotle and then go and do exactly that. — Banno

You seem to have a limited capacity for understanding.

What I said was:

What I am recommending is that we acknowledge the inconsistency between modal logic and the fundamental three laws, and not attempt to argue that there is consistency between them.

I then proceeded to explain the reason why the two are inconsistent.

If that produces for you, the conclusion that I am restricting myself to one or the other, then you have a significant problem in your ability to interpret a simple piece of writing.

Not quite. Running the statement through the law of excluded middle gives: "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" or "there will not possibly be a sea battle tomorrow (i.e. a sea battle tomorrow is impossible)". If, in reality, a sea battle is possible, then the first statement is true and the second one is false. — A Christian Philosophy

The issue, is that you are making "possibly be" into a predicate. By doing this you violate the law of excluded middle, because the meaning of "possible" (what may or may not) is a violation.

The law of excluded middle is a law concerning predication. Now, we introduce a very special predicate named "possible", which we accept as being excluded from the applicability of this law. My argument is that we must respect the fact that this is an exclusion, and not attempt to represent "possible worlds", or "modal" logic as consistent with the fundamental three laws.

As shown in the links above, the logic of possibility and necessity - modal logic - has a strong standing in modern logic. Those who restrict themselves to Aristotle still have difficulties. — Banno

No one here is suggesting that anyone ought to restrict themselves to Aristotelian logic. What I am recommending is that we acknowledge the inconsistency between modal logic and the fundamental three laws, and not attempt to argue that there is consistency between them. Arguing for consistency signifies misunderstanding.

In ancient Greece the three laws were applied religiously, modal logic did not exist. Aristotle demonstrated how sophists (like Zeno who proved that motion cannot be real), could prove absurdities when those fundamental laws were strictly adhered to. He proceeded to expose the root of the problem as being the reality of potential, possibility, as the basis of change and becoming, and showed that we need to allow violation of either non-contradiction or excluded middle to understand this reality.

Aristotle's best examples were future possible events, which needed to be decided upon by human choice, like the sea battle. He determined that the way we understand human choice implies that the law of excluded middle must be violated to enable that understanding. However, he insisted that the law of non-contradiction must be adhered to avoid absolute unintelligibility. This violation of excluded middle, proposed by Aristotle, is the foundation of modern modal logic which is the manifestation of that violation.

Hegel's logical dialectics, on the other hand, allows that being and not being are subsumed within becoming. This is a violation of non-contradiction, which provides the foundation for dialectical materialism. Notice, that Aristotle's violation of excluded middles is based in the potential associated with human choice, while Hegel's violation of non-contradiction is based in the potential of matter.

yeah - there it is — AmadeusD

Yeah, there it is. A relatively new type of logic which is not based in the fundamental three laws, and openly averts these laws. It's really not a big deal, but to deny that modal logic intentionally avoids those laws, because of a perceived need to violate those laws, is to demonstrate a basic misunderstanding of logic.

Yes. Funnily enough, i actually picked up Tractatus for hte bus this morning, so read these exact passages before responding.
The point of Many Worlds is that you can think, logically, of a world which does not exist, but is coherent and possible.

Nothing illogical about that. My comment about Witty leading to the type of thoughts Meta is putting forward was about not contextualizing Wittgenstein as coming out of Russell per On Denoting. Not a great way to move from language use, to what 'can be'. — AmadeusD

I am not saying it's illogical. No principles dictate that all forms of logic must obey those three basic laws, to be classed as "logic". Those three laws are ancient, and concern what we can say about a thing, starting with the law of identity, a thing is the same as itself. If, for some purposes, we find that we need a logic which applies to possibilities (possible worlds), then we would need a different set of laws, because possibilities are categorically different from actual things. However, the fact that one set of logical laws is not compatible with another, because the two apply to completely different aspects of reality, does not imply that one or the other is illogical. It simply demonstrates that there is a significant difference between the different aspects of reality.