Can you give a clue re a few words that the explanation started with so that I can look it up again? — Terrapin Station

It's the post where you focused on my claims as to what physicists have determined rather than on the content of the post. Here's the specifics. "Change" and "motion" refer to activities of physical things. As per my explanation in that other post, time can be passing (proceeding) without any change or motion occurring. Therefore "pass" and "proceed" (as in what time does) do not necessarily imply change or motion.

If you want to insist that "pass" and "proceed" (as in what time does) necessarily implies change, then we'll have to allow that "change" doesn't necessarily refer to physical things, and a non-physical thing (time) could change

Otherwise, re "pass" and "proceed" you'd have to explain the definition you're using that doesn't involve change or motion. — Terrapin Station

What kind of nonsense is this? First you asked me to define "pass", so I did with reference to "proceed". Now you want me to define "proceed". I think this will be a never ending (continuous) adventure, as you seem to have difficulty understanding the English language. Nevertheless, I'll oblige you, I mean "proceed" in the sense of "continue".

First, if you can hold to the notion "...that an individual is made of social relations", then it will sound less strange to talk about what a culture is aware of, rather than what an individual is aware of. (The cult of the individual is a culture) — unenlightened

Until you recognize that the identity of the individual is proper to the individual, qua individual, rather than as a member of any particular group, the existence of divisions and boundaries within the population will remain unintelligible to you. That is because the only real boundary or division within the population is the one that separates the individual from everyone else. The boundaries which separate groups are ideological boundaries. To identify an individual by designating one as part of a group, culture, or whatever, is an identity based in the ideology of the person doing the identifying, rather than in the true identity of the individual. The individual is not "made of social relations", ideologies are made of social relations.

The problem is that "pass" and "proceed" are terms that imply change or motion, unless you have some novel definition of them that you'd need to explain for the idea of time not requiring change or motion to make any sense. — Terrapin Station

Those terms do not necessarily imply change or motion, that's just what your claim is. I've already explained to you how time can pass or proceed without any change or motion. So you simply have a faulty understanding of those terms if you think that they necessarily imply change or motion.

I didn't actually specify "physical change" in anything I said, by the way. Just change. So if you want to posit "nonphysical change"--whatever that would be--okay, but it's still change. — Terrapin Station

I suggested non-physical change as a compromise, a way of resolving our impasse. I would allow that time is a type of change, if you would allow that the type of change which is time is, is non-physical.

Time may require change to be meaningful, but change is not what it is. — noAxioms

That's pretty close to what I've been trying to tell Terrapin, change requires time, but change is not what time is.

Another fallacious mistake. I said you cannot assert that a change has not taken place just because it cannot be measured. But you are asserting exactly that. — noAxioms

I was not asserting that. I've been saying that time is not change. It's Terrapin's assumption, that time is change, which leads to the conclusion that change which cannot be measured has occurred.

I have the same problem with "proceed." You'd have to explain how we could have something proceed without changing. — Terrapin Station

As per my explanation, time may pass, or "proceeds" without any physical change. That was my explanation. Don't create the illusion of circular reasoning by asking me to repeat the explanation I've already made. Remember when I made the explanation, you had difficulty distinguishing between the part of the explanation which I said physicists had demonstrated and the part which was my conception.

You just won't accept my explanation because you refuse to consider the possibility of proceeding without change, even though I explained it as time passing without change. If this is too difficult for you, then let's consider the possibility of non-physical change. Then we might create compatibility between you assertion "time is change", and my description of something (time) proceeding without any physical change. What do you think, will this make "non-physical change" coherent, if we say that time is change, yet we allow that time can pass without physical change occurring?

I think that you cannot truthfully state that a change has taken place unless that change has been measured. To judge that a change has occurred is to have performed some kind of measurement. To say that a change has occurred, but it cannot be measured is contradictory, because to determine change is to make some sort of measurement.

don't know what nonphysical anything would be. But who knows what you'd claim, and you specified physical change, as if there might be some other sort of change. — Terrapin Station

That's the point, you're the one arguing time is change. Why would I accept time is a non-physical change as justification of your claim? You would need to explain what you mean by that.

Okay, so you're using the word "pass" to refer to an absence of change? Could you explain that sense of "pass," as I'm unfamiliar with it. — Terrapin Station

No, "pass" is not necessarily an absence of change, it can occur, as in the case of time, with an absence of change. I mean it in the sense of to proceed. Time may proceed without physical change.
If you insist that this procedure is some sort of change, then we'd have to consider the possibility of non-physical change. But that would require some explaining.

I don't know what you would mean by "nonphysical change". You'd have to explain how such a thing could be possible.

I have explained, and distinguished, between what has been determined by physicist, that change occurs in quantum units, and what I have conceived of, a period of time shorter than that required for a quantum of change.

I am sorry for any ambiguity, it was unintentional.

Can we proceed to the justification of your assertion, that time is change?

I explained what I meant. Now you're just changing the subject because you have no defense for your assertion.

I told you, this is my conception. to prove your assertion you need to demonstrate that my conception is impossible.

Physicists have determined that physical change occurs in quantum units. I can conceive of a period of time shorter than the amount of time required for a quanta of physical change. This short period of time must pass without any physical change.

I said:
"Physicists have determined that no physical change can occur in a shorter period of time."
My conclusion is that in a shorter period of time change does not occur.

Wikipedia:
"The Planck time is by many physicists considered to be the shortest possible measurable time interval; however, this is still a matter of debate."

No, of course not. And obviously I'd say that if I'm saying that time and change are identical. — Terrapin Station

OK, that's you're assertion. Can you justify it? I see no problem conceiving of time passing without any change. Imagine a very short period of time, Planck length or shorter. Physicists have determined that no physical change can occur in a shorter period of time. However, that short period of time must pass, and this time must pass without any physical change, according to what the physicists have determined. Therefore time passes without any change. To justify your assertion you need to demonstrate that this conception is impossible.

Of course. "Changes that haven't happened yet change into changes that already happened" is incoherent, isn't it? — Terrapin Station

Right, the difference between "changes that haven't happened yet" (future) and "changes that already happened" (past), is something other than a change. Therefore time is other than change.

I'm not denying temporal differences, so pointing out that I'm specifying temporal differences isn't an argument against what I'm saying, it's a feature of what I'm saying. Yes, those are temporal differences. That's the whole point. — Terrapin Station

"Time is change" is incompatible with "the difference between future and past is temporal", because this difference which is an aspect of time, is not itself a change. Future never changes into past. So, yes it is an argument against what you've said.

Let's try it this way: could you have a change or motion if one "thing" didn't happen after another "thing"? — Terrapin Station

I agree that change requires time, but this does not imply that time is change. To support your claim that time is change, I think you need to demonstrate that change is required for time. So let's try it this way. Could time pass without any change occurring?

To tell you the truth, I don't know what you're denying. You have claimed time is change, and that's nonsense to me, so I'm trying to figure out exactly what you mean by this.

Time has different aspects, change is one, the difference between future and past is another. The two are not the same.

OK, then I agree, if A changes to B, that is a uniquely particular event which cannot be exactly replicated.

No two instances of something are actually identical. (I'm a nominalist.) — Terrapin Station

I agree, identical ought to mean one and the same. If they are two, then they are not identical. This is expressed by Leibniz as the identity of indiscernibles.

You just said the difference. Changes that happened are different than changes that haven't happened. One thing happened. One has not. (And a third option is that it's a change that's happening.) — Terrapin Station

OK, but if there is a difference between changes which have happened and changes which have not yet happened, then this is a temporal difference. Therefore time is something other than change. Or, is it your claim that the difference between future and past is not temporal?

And size is not something different than an object, either. — Terrapin Station

What? "Size" has the same meaning as "object"?

I don't think you need a notion of "past change" in order to hold that when you change 1)A to B, 2)B to A and then 3) A to B again 1) is not identical to 3), unless the state you change is the state of the entire universe. Because under that condition, — Echarmion

1) and 3) are identical unless "A changes to B" does not mean the same thing as "A changes to B". But that would be nonsense if it didn't.

Because under that condition, 1) happens in a different universe from 3), and so the full descriptions of the states would not be identical. If you did change the entire state of the universe, then you would time travel, but since this presumably includes your internal state, you wouldn't notice. — Echarmion

I don't see where you get the premise that it would be a different universe. Anyway, "A changes to B" means the same thing as "A changes to B", and whatever universe your referring to is irrelevant unless you allow for violation of the law of identity..

That comment simply makes no sense. I'm not saying anything like "There is no time." I'm in no way eliminating time. There is time. I'm simply saying what time is ontologically. Time is change. Past time is changes that have happened.

You completely ignored the entire content of the post explaining the issues by the way. — Terrapin Station

I read your post, but it's not relevant to your premise that time is change, which is what I am interested in. So if time is change, and past time is changes that have happened, then how do we differentiate between changes which have already happened and changes which have not yet happened? You can't refer to time to make that differentiation, because time is simply change.

Would your premise be something like "If time isn't different than change/motion, then there would be no difference between motion/changes that are occurring, motion/changes that occurred, and motion/changes that have yet to occur"?

If that's your premise, you'd have to explain how you arrived at it, as it makes no sense to me. — Terrapin Station

I thought that it was obvious. Time is change, and nothing else. By what principle then would you differentiate between past changes, present changes and future changes. You cannot refer to time to differentiate these categories of change because time is change. That would be like differentiating the categories of change by referring to change. We can't do that we need a means for defining different types of change, past, present, and future. If time defines the types of change, then it is not simply change, but a defining aspect of change.

To differentiate categories of change (past, present and future), by referring to time, time must be something other than change. For example, to differentiate categories of objects according to size, size must be something other than an object.

So you could have identified yourself as a member of some commune or tribe, and you might not have known who your parents were or your date of birth. But as it happens, you did identify yourself as the child of particular parents and thus as a member of a family, and not a member of a tribe or commune. — unenlightened

Yes, this is the means of identity which is commonly enforced in today's society, In contrast, the commune I described attempts to enforce a different form of identity by denying public knowledge of one's parents. And, in today's societies, many people choose to identify by one's citizenry, race or other types of group. There's profiling, stereotyping, and all sorts of ways of identifying a person by positioning the person as within a particular group.

Whoever said it was the only way? But I really don't want to labour this point, which is just preventing the discussion I want to have, by calling into question what should be obvious. So I am going to presume you are wrong without engaging further, and if you want to start a thread on the nature of identity I may contribute there. — unenlightened

I'm wrong about what? I don't see what you're disagreeing with. The point is that you can either identify a person as the individual which one is, or as a member of a group. The latter method leads to all sorts of societal boundaries, exclusionary ideologies and attitudes like racism and bigotry. The "paradox" you speak of in the op, which is better described as hypocrisy, is the result of the common practise of identifying people as members of a group, when we say that individuals ought to be judged as the individual which one is. How can you judge a person as an individual when you can only identify that individual as a member of a group?

You mentioned your mother and father. Another term for that is "family." — Terrapin Station

No it isn't. "Family" has many meanings. None of them is "mother", nor "father". I stated the relevant facts, that I have a mother and a father, and you've drawn the conclusion that I have a family.



If you've read Plato's Republic you'll understand that he suggests a type of community in which the identity of an individual's mother and father are not revealed to that child. The child is a baby of the commune, and is identified as a member of that group, not so and so's daughter or son. (There may be a noble lie required here). Now if you look into naming traditions, it hasn't always been the case that a person's family name is representative of that person's father (or mother). That is a relatively recent trend. If you look back into some family name histories, you'll find some instances where the family name means member of such and such tribe, or group, rather than son or daughter of so and so. The modern rendition of one's identity, where the family name signifies son or daughter of so and so is only one of a number of possible forms of identity.

I didn't say anything about a family. See, you're already using my identity information to classify me into a group, "a family", for some ideological purpose.

Now, no matter what we do, A was five feet to the right of B — Terrapin Station

Your premise is that time is change. So "was" in the sense of "past time" is meaningless by that premise. You have nothing to differentiate past change from future change. All we have is either A is five feet to the right of B, or A is not five feet to the right of B. And either of these can be changed through time, which is change.

If you want to introduce a premise which states that something which has occurred in the past cannot be changed, then you need to allow that time is more than just change. You need a premise which gives past changes special status over future changes, as being unchangeable.

I wonder what you mean by this? Identity always does this - subsumes the individual to a group - I am a doctor, or I am a melancholic - or whatever. And curiously, unique identifiers are the worst of the lot for it, one is reduced to a number. — unenlightened

I don't think so. Identifying myself as MU, born at such a place, at such time, of such mother, and father, does not place me into a group. That simply identifies me as an individual as distinct from all other individuals. It is the further relations, the place where I was born is part of X country, the time I was born puts me in Q demographic, and my parents are of L and M descent, are what subsumes me into various groups.

Nor does that unique identification reduce my identification to a number, because it provides valuable information, unique identifiers, which could ultimately be used to classify me to various groups. But there are many possible ways to classify me. If there is a problem, it probably lies in the way that the person is classified, and for which purposes. So it comes down to "purpose", which again is a matter of ideology. People are classified according to ideology. And, according to my last post, the ideologies seek to maintain the frontiers, as supportive to the existence of 'the group". it's a feedback situation. The ideology creates the group, then the boundaries are enhanced to maintain the reality of the group. This supports and strengthens the ideology.

I think it's a matter of habit. Habits develop over time. A child may like playing with a particular toy, but it's relatively easy to replace the toy with something else. The child quickly forgets the old toy and focuses on the new. It's not so easy with adults who have developed long standing patterns of "play".

So for the educator there's a matter of identifying and differentiating healthy play from unhealthy play. Then there is the matter of discouraging the latter and encouraging the former. If this fails, the bad habits develop.

§77: "In this sort of predicament, always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word (“good”, for instance)? From what sort of examples? In what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings”.

In other words, if one has lost one’s bearings on a concept, look to the language-game in which that concept is employed: that language-game - and not a definition - will (help) provide those lost bearings. — StreetlightX

There's a discrepancy here between your use of "language-game" and Wittgenstein's use of "language-games". The "family of meanings" is associated with a multitude of "language-games". To find one's bearings on a concept (as you say) requires identifying the appropriate language-game. But this is a type of comparison, as to a sample or a paradigm, and it is what Wittgenstein is trying to avoid.

So he doesn't exactly choose this route. Choosing the appropriate language-game would be like choosing a definition. Wittgenstein appears to me, to be advocating restraint from even making such a choice, and this would leave "the meaning" if there was such a thing, as ambiguous. Instead, there is a family of "meanings". It's like a matter of possibilities, and to understand this requires understanding the very nature of "possibility". Choosing one possibility, as the correct one, negates the others as possibilities. They are no longer possibilities if another has been selected. To leave them in their true state as "possibilities" requires not choosing. Therefore there is no "meaning", only the possibility of meaning, which is intelligible as a family of possible "meanings", represented by numerous related language-games.

I didn't say that change is an identity violation. I said that the idea that we could "take back" something that changed is. — Terrapin Station

How is this different from any type of change? All change is a matter of taking back something that already is. that's just what change is, and it is by definition an identity violation.

You seem to be suggesting that some things have special status. Some things we can change, but others we cannot. What validates that special status of being unchangeable?

Look at what I wrote again: "You mean change something that changed so that it doesn't change that way?" That's what would be an identity violation. Change isn't. — Terrapin Station

I don't see how this is any different from any standard matter of "possibility". The way that something has already changed is only one of the many possible ways in which it could have changed. Why not choose a different way, and make the thing change in that way instead? You simply negate one possibility in preference of another. It doesn't violate identity any more than any case of choosing one possibility over another. The act of changing what has already changed violates its identity, but that's what change does, ipso facto.

By not making the slightest bit of sense. You'd have to explain what it would be to "travel in change." Changing isn't the same thing as "traveling in change." Change isn't a place that you can move around in. Change is a process. "Traveling in change" would mean that change is some sort of "thing" that we can move around in . . . which is a difficult idea to even clearly express in words, because it's just completely nonsensical. — Terrapin Station

Obviously you've got everything backward here, and it's you whose not making sense. We travel in space, and space is not a thing. So your claim that there must be some sort of "thing" for us to travel in, is the opposite of what is the case. "Things" just hinder travel, as being in the way. So if change is a process, and this is a lack of "things", I think it would be the most conducive for efficient travel.

You want to propose somehow "traveling back to that change," to experience it again, or to change it some other way, or whatever. — Terrapin Station

Your premise is that time is simply change. If this is the case, then there is no difference between changes which have not yet occurred, and changes which have already occurred. We can consider each, future change and past change, as a possibility of change, and act accordingly, whether we like or dislike those possible changes.

How exactly would it make sense to "travel back to that (particular) change"? — Terrapin Station

In the very same way that it makes sense to travel toward a possible change in the future, it also makes sense to travel toward a possible change in the past, if time is simply change, which is your premise.

Let's say that all that you really mean is changing D, E, and F back to A, B and C, and then A, B and C change to G, H and I instead. Well, that's just two additional changes. It doesn't somehow erase the initial change. That's still there. We just had further changes.

So you'd have to explain how it would make sense to "travel back in change." — Terrapin Station

I don't know what you mean here. If G, H, and I are chosen instead of D, E, and F, then D, E, and F, are possibilities which are not actualized. It's not a matter of erasing these possibilities, it's a matter of choosing other possibilities instead.

Adults are punished by children are not. I guess children are motivated more by reward and adults more by punishment. — TheMadFool

There's more to it than just motivation. Children are fundamentally different from adults, there's a much higher degree of tabula rasa there within the children, while adults have formed habits. So the childhood years are the years in which habits are formed. Habits are formed by repetition, so good behaviour must be repeated, and this requires the rewarding program. The possibility of punishment is more like the "carrot", held out there, at arms length as a deterrent, but seldom used in childhood. The "stick" is the reward. Act well, do what I tell you, and I'll shower you with praise, affection, and other things which you like.

It bears mentioning that this actually hints at failure of moral education because it literally means that we failed to educate our children in morality and so must control them through punishment when they're adults.

Something's wrong. What do you think is a better method of educating children and adults in morals? — TheMadFool

I'd say that's true, the need to punish adults reflects a failed moral training in childhood. I don't think there's an easy solution, as the matter is complicated. Maybe not enough time is spent with the very young children directing them and rewarding them. Maybe we don't know exactly which behaviours to reward. Maybe we don't know exactly which rewards to use. Maybe different children, having different aptitudes, need to be guided in different directions. I think it's a complicated matter.

You mean change something that changed so that it doesn't change that way? How would the idea of that even make sense? It would be an identity violation for one. Remember that time only is those changes. It's not something aside from them. — Terrapin Station

That change is an identity violation is tautological.

You said time is change. There must be something which changes or else there could be no change. The only thing that could change is something which already is, and this is events which have occurred in the past. If it's an identity violation to change something which has already changed, then time is an identity violation. Where's the problem?

You can't "travel in change," the idea of that is just nonsensical . — Terrapin Station

How is the idea of traveling in change nonsensical? Change is all around us, We exist in change. I travel in change everyday. Sometimes I even pay for my travel with change. With free will, why can't we change the change? Or are you determinist?

Not really. I was just surprised to find out that there is, despite creativity being our forte, only one method, punishment, that we employ to guide people onto the right moral path.

Of course we have a reward system in place to but punishment is more effective in imparting moral lessons. Think of it. Quite odd isn't it that there's no reward for good behavior in terms of a legal sense. Yes, you get recognition, admiration, even fame, like Mother Teresa or Bill Gates, but we're under no legal obligation to praise, admire or the like such people.

If it was that people were moved more by reward than punishment it would have been the law that we should do good and praise, admire, respect the good. — TheMadFool

Maybe you've hit the nail right on the head here. We have two judgements, good and bad. We can treat the good with reward, and we can penalize the bad with punishment. It seems to me, that we are far more inclined to reward good behaviour of children than we are good behaviour of adults, and also far more inclined to punish the bad behaviour of adults than we are to punish the bad behaviour of children.

So maybe this is the difference right here. We reward children for good behaviour, encouraging them to act well and develop good habits, while we warn them that bad behaviour is punishable. When they've grown up, they're beyond the need of reward to develop good habits, and if they do proceed to act badly there is nothing left to do but punish them. So rewarding good behaviour is the first step, taken early in the child's life, hopefully producing good habits and leading that person toward a good life. When that fails, we resort to punishment.

Past events occurred. They're no longer occurring. Time is simply change or motion. It's not something you can "travel in." It rather is the traveling so to speak. — Terrapin Station

OK, so if time is simply change, why can't we change what has already occurred then? There must be more to time than simple change, or else we could change what has already occurred.

Suppose one says,"I belong to the tribe, and the tribe belongs to the land." This is a very different inverse form of identification from one who identifies as a 'land owner'. The sovereignty of the individual over his tribe and environment is a very modern fantasy, although in a sense identity has always ranged from complete subsumption into Nature, the drop in the ocean, to the Almighty alienated Solipsist God. — unenlightened

There's probably more than one such inversion involved here, and that's why the issue is complex. Take a look at this particular inversion though. We tend to identify with where we're from, a place on the earth. This is consistent with "I belong to the tribe, and the tribe belongs to the land", because this places me as from the land, at this place. The inversion comes about because I am given identity, citizenship, and this is distinct from the identity which I give myself, as from this place. The citizenship gives me rights in this land where I am from, but by the same token, it denies me rights within other lands. This is done by the powers of government. But the government belongs to the people, it does not belong to the land, hence the inverted way of seeing things.

What the citizenship does is take away my individual identity, making me a member of the tribe. I am not "MU" from this particular place, instead I am a citizen from this country, or if you like, member of this tribe. It's a generality which is imposed upon me by these tribal, or government forces . Now the tribe, or government, has this inverted perspective. It is a type of idealism, or ideology, where the government sees itself not as having a material basis, "from the land", it sees itself as being derived from the ideals of the people. Then it must act as "land owner", caretaker of the land. It sees the people in their material basis, as from the land, and dependent on the land, so for the sake of the people (their ideals), the tribe or government must take ownership of the land. This is what I mean by land ownership, rather than private ownership, ownership by the tribe, the government. Divisions, frontiers, are produced along the lines of ideological differences, and by the powers of the tribe, or government, the people are not allowed to intermix.

So we are supporters of oppressed minorities, of black folks, the disabled, women, etc etc. And thus supporters of the Sentinelese, in so far as we interpret their murderous treatment of immigrants as a legitimate demand for privacy.

And there is the beginning of the problem. Because we do not, elsewhere, at the Israeli-Palestinian border, or the US -Mexican border, or the European-African border, take the same respectful understanding view of those cultures that want to maintain their own privacy/purity/security/cultural integrity.

We can fix this problem ad hoc, with an appropriate distinction between refugees and colonials,
even if there are hard cases, but the problem is wider. — unenlightened

I agree, the problem is far wider. It is not just a matter of cultural identity, because there is also the matter of land ownership thrown into the mix. You mix these two together, as they always are, and you cannot separate them. Are the actions of the Sentinelese meant to defend their own principles, allowing them to sustain their own value system, and cultural identity, or are they meant to defend their rights of ownership to the piece of property which they live on. The two cannot be separated. Colonialism demonstrates that you cannot take a society's property, and tell them that they can continue to live there and maintain their culture. You end up with clashing legal systems. One must submit to the other.

There are wide ranging human attitudes with respect to migration. Some people have a home, getting very attached to the place where they live, thinking I'll defend my right to this patch of ground until the day I die. If you're comfortable, and it's others who are actually defending you rights, then why not? What is a "demand for privacy" other than the claim of rights to a place? But many are quick to wander, not having that patch of ground, or that right, perhaps seeking it, perhaps not even considering the possibility, just roaming. With billions of people in the world and changing weather patterns, the dynamics are complex. I don't think there's any ad hoc solution.

Let's try looking at it from the point of view of authority. Here are the premises. We are all human beings alike, child and adult. There are standards which distinguish good and bad. There are people with authority to enforce the standards. Good may be rewarded, bad may be punished.

Do we agree that there is a difference of authority between the adults and the children? The law enforcement agency has authority over parents, while the parents have authority over the children. The parents are free to choose their standards of good and bad, and the method of enforcement, to the point that they do not step outside the law.

Notice that there is an element of freedom, which the parents have, to raise their children and manage their families in the way that the parents think will work the best for them. Some societies value freedom, and seek to increase individual freedoms in these family matters to maximize the individual's own power of choice.

You seem to be arguing that the freedom of parents to cooperate amongst themselves, and raise their children the way that they think is the best way, ought to be more strictly regulated by the authority of the laws. Is this what you are arguing?

Statements like: It is raining. It's my birthday. It's 20 miles to New Jersey. These are all possibly true statements without a reference. — Purple Pond

Aren't you referring to "it" in these statements? "It" in this case is an unnamed subject. In many cases "it" refers to an already named subject. That "it" refers to an unnamed subject here just means that you can refer to something without naming it. "It" substitutes for a name even when the thing referred to has no name.

Interaction implies two way relationship, so perhaps a 1-way interaction. — noAxioms

I can't see how a 1-way interaction could be possible. How could one thing have an effect on another, without itself being affected? But a two way relationship does not imply measurement.

You're describing a different dictionary definition of the word. A QM measurement is nothing of the sort, unless you ascribe to the Wigner interpretation I guess. I'd rather not limit myself to such a solipsistic interpretation of QM. Even Wigner himself bailed on support of his own interpretation for that reason. — noAxioms

A QM measurement is clearly a comparison. I don't know how you can think that it's not. There's an experiment and the results are compared to standards, mathematics is applied, to produce a conclusion which constitutes the measurement. The equipment is like any other measurement tool, it doesn't just sit there and give a measurement. Whatever it gives must be interpreted according to a standard (compared), in order that there has been a measurement. Consider a thermometer. It sits there and produces a reading, a number. But that number is meaningless, it's not a measurement until it's put into the context of a scale, K, C, or F. Then, in comparison to this scale, the number recorded has meaning as a measurement.

An interaction not only needs to be recorded (remembered), but it also needs to be compared to a scale in order that it be measured.

You make comparison sound like a decision. — noAxioms

It is a decision, that's what measurement is, it's a matter of deciding which things to compare to which scales, to get a valid measurement. You wouldn't compare a thermometer reading to a colour chart, to see if 30 degrees is green or red, rather, you'd compare it to a temperature chart to see if it's warm or cold..

Rocks have great memory. Ask the geologists. But that is on a classic scale. From a QM standpoint, all matter has perfect memory, hence physics' conservation of information principle. There, now I've used the term 'information', but the physics definition, not the one you're using. — noAxioms

I actually know quite a few geologists and none of them talk about rocks having memory.

Anyway, I think we cannot communicate on this subject. You insist on the everyday language meaning of my words and not the physics ones. — noAxioms

I think that the real problem here is that you make up nonsense meanings for words and then you pretend that these are the meanings which the words have in physics. I happen to know some physicists too.

Then choose another word to refer to what I'm describing, else we cannot communicate. — noAxioms

How about we say that things interact with each other, but interacting things do not necessarily measure each other. Otherwise we'd have no difference between interacting with something and measuring something. Measuring is a special activity of comparison which human beings with minds do. Things which interact with each other are not necessarily gather information into one point. Do you know what it means to gather information? Or are you just making up a nonsense definition of that, to go along with your nonsense definition of measurement?

The rock is doing a comparison of photon detected vs photon not detected. The state of the rock is different depending on this comparison. — noAxioms

So the rock compares it's own state prior to its interaction with the photon to its own state posterior to its interaction with the photon? That requires a memory. The day you find a rock capable of doing that comparison, let me know.

Just speaking from experience.

I had mentioned the rock above. Yes, it very much is a measurement. Thing X (source of photon) has now caused an effect on said rock, and X now exists to the rock. That's how QM measurements work. It causes the state of X and the state of the rock to become entangled. The special equipment in labs is only special because it records the measurement precisely for the purpose of the knowledge of the lab guys, but measurement itself is trivial. — noAxioms

It seems like you do not know what measurement is. Measurement, by definition requires a comparison. The measurement devices in QM are calibrated to perform comparisons.

You can assert otherwise, but then we're just talking about different things. You asked me what it means for an extended object (not all in one point in space) to not be in a defined state at the present, and this is what I mean by that. — noAxioms

Yes, we're talking about different things. You've created a fictitious definition of "measurement", and now you've drifted off into your imaginary realm where rocks and toes are performing measurements of light energy. So I see your explanation of what I asked is completely irrelevant and imaginary. It's nonsense.

We have different definitions of measurement. I'm speaking of measurement in the QM wave-function collapse sort of way. That interaction is 'actually measuring it'. — noAxioms

Sure, but not every interaction is an act of measuring. An act of measuring is a particular type of act. So it makes no sense to say that light hitting your toe, or hitting your eye is an act of measuring that light. This would be like saying that light hitting a rock is an act of measurement. In QM experiments, the interaction is with a special type of equipment, a measuring device, it is not a case of light hitting a rock, and the rock measuring that light.

Yes, in theory ignorance of the law is not protection thereof. However, we do allow for extenuating circumstances. (The legal system is flawed, biased, and corrupt, so I'm talking ideally here.) If it's clear from someone's upbringing that they were never taught right and wrong, that gets taken into account. If we found a person raised by wolves and upin integration in society he committed a crime, the courts would likely be lenient. — NKBJ

I think that this type of mitigation is actually very minor, and minimal. If you go to a foreign country, and break some laws because you were not brought up that way, I think you need some serious political influence to get favourable treatment. In some cases they might even set you up for harsher punishment as a deterrence to other foreigners being so stupid.

Measurement doesn't require processing. — noAxioms

Of course measurement requires processing, it is a process. You cannot measure something without actually measuring it. That's the measurement problem which SR claims to resolve, the problem that we cannot get to the another pov to measure what happens from that pov. The fastest relation between one point of view and another is the speed of light, so light speed becomes the standard for comparing one pov to another. But even to measure something using light takes time, and the thing might be moving in that time which it takes to measure it.

The processing is only necessary for me to know it exists, but knowing doesn't define existence except under idealism where the photon never hit me at all. — noAxioms

Measuring creates a knowing. If there is no knowing, then there has been no measuring.

Choosing different frames of reference just defines a different set of events to be 'my state'. Under presentism, there is only the preferred frame, and other frames don't represent my actual state. — noAxioms

Wouldn't you agree that the movements of my arms and legs ought to be understood as occurring in a different frame of reference from the movements occurring within the neurology of my brain, and my nervous system?