..proposing a more flexible and relational understanding of "object"... — Mapping the Medium

I agree with this, but I prefer the term "ambiguous" over "flexible".

You are suggesting that Peirce’s approach violates the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle, but Peirce doesn’t see these laws as universally applicable to all aspects of reality. — Mapping the Medium

That's true, these laws are not universally applicable. That's exactly what I was arguing with RusselA earlier in the thread. In the case of a thinking subject, in the process of deliberation, and decision making in general, the person has the two opposing and contradictory ideas in one's mind, at the same time. As we discussed, having opposing ideas at the same time, "I should stay", I should go" violates the law of noncontradiction. This violation is because the person has as a property of one's mind, contradictory ideas.

However, these fundamental laws of logic are intended to dictate what we can and cannot say about physical objects. A physical object has an identity, as itself, and it does not have contradictory properties. Thinking subjects though, along with all of their thoughts and ideas, are not objects. and that is why they can violate those fundamental laws with their thoughts. The conceptions we produce do not need to follow the laws which apply to physical objects. This demonstrates a very clear difference between physical objects and ideas.

Peirce, with his "semiotic framework" attempts to annihilate this difference with his "flexible" understanding of "object". But this is a recipe for problems, because it removes the boundary, the principles of distinction, which separates the aspects of reality which obey those fundamental laws and those which do not.

Instead of the simple, and very useful division between the mind which interprets, and the thing which is interpreted (be it the physical world in general, an object, or a sign), Peirce posits the object as what is represented by the sign, as in my example, the numeral 2 represents the number two. This adds an unnecessary layer, and leaves the sign itself as a distinct category, outside our capacity to understand. The sign itself is impossible to understand, because understanding consists of knowing its object. This leaves signs themselves as inherently unintelligible, because a sign would have to be represented by another sign, and another sign, in an infinite regress.

The "sameness" in Peirce’s framework is not about static, metaphysical identity but rather about functional continuity across interpretations. — Mapping the Medium

Yes, well this is the problem. An "object", as a physical object, is "the same as itself" in every aspect, that's what makes it an object, it's uniqueness. But if we look at "functional continuity across interpretations" as what defines "sameness", relying on the concept of "differences which don't make a difference", and call this the defining feature of "the object", then we have no words left to describe the reality of physical objects in their uniqueness. "Object" now has been taken to be used in referring to this new type of object, which has a compromised form of sameness. And so we must also compromise the meaning of "same" so as to exclude the relevance of differences which don't make a difference. Then "same" just means similar. Clearly this is debilitating to ontology.

He views the "object" in the triadic relation as that to which the representamen refers, not necessarily something with a rigid ontological identity. — Mapping the Medium

This is exactly the ambiguity I am talking about. A representamen could refer to a physical object, as is common in day to day speaking, or it could refer to an idea, or concept, as is common in higher education. Traditionally we'd distinguish between these two, and assign identity to physical objects, and apply the basic laws of logic in speaking about these physical objects. The other type of referent we'd understand as an idea, a concept, a subject of study, or something like that. So we'd have a clear distinction between these two.

Now Peirce allows both of the two types of referent to be classed together as "object". But since the one type, ideas and concepts, don't have a proper identity, by the law of identity, yet he wants to give them some form of identity as the object referred to, he is inclined toward a compromised meaning of "same". This is a meaning of "same" which allows for differences, and it really means similar. But "similar" will not do the task required by Peirce, to support "the object", as one rather than many.

This is not really a problem in itself, to corrupt the use of "same" this way, but it robs us of the capacity to talk about, and understand the reality of what we know as physical objects, in their uniqueness, by stealing that word "same", and giving it a different meaning. Of course, if you're a staunch idealist like Peirce seems to be, you'll deny that there is any reality to the assumption of independent physical objects, but this denies the capacity for truth, as correspondence. And so it really just produces more problems.

Thanks for your patience ucarr, sticking with me, and your encouragement to help me through this process. I think you will find that this post will elucidate a lot, and thorough reading of it should give you a much better understanding of my perspective on this.

The main premise of the theory says: a) the truth resides within the present_natural; b) the present_natural supplies the true picture of reality to the observer. — ucarr

I'd clarify this by saying that an understanding of the present_natural would supply a true picture of reality, but we do not have that required understanding.

Question - Does the future_past continuum of this theory assert a unidirectional arrow of time from future to past? — ucarr

Since it is the case, as I described, that the present must be dimensional, then this dimension (which I call the breadth of the present) would be a qualification to the unidirectionalness.

Try looking at it this way. We understand "the flow of time" from our observations of motions. And, we observe motions as relative. The relativity of our perception of motion is the important feature of reality revealed when the heliocentric model of the solar system replaced the geocentric model. We now know, from the application of relativity theory, that "the flow of time" must also be understood as being perceived as relative, and this forces unintuitive conclusions about "the natural present", produced from our perceptions which make time relative. This is demonstrated by the principle called the relativity of simultaneity.

What I believe is demonstrated, is that if we model a single dimensional line, "an arrow of time", the present cannot be adequately positioned on that line, because the different types of objects moving relative to each other (massive vs massless), would require a different position on the line. We could simply make the area called "the present" wider, but the way that relativity theory deals with massless objects would require that the whole line would need to be "the present" at one boundary, and the other boundary would assumingly be a point. This allows for an infinitely wide present.

Clearly this is not an acceptable representation. So, if instead, we model a number of parallel lines, each representing a different type of object, from the most massive to the most massless, then each could have its own point of "the present" which would distinguish that type of objects future from its past. Then the multitude of lines, marking the flow of time for each different type of object, would be placed in relation to each other, revealing how "the past" for some types of objects is still the future for other types, in relation to the overall flow of time. This allows for the breadth of the present, the second dimension of time, where the past and the future actually overlap because of the multitude of different types of object in the vast field of reality, each having a specific "present" at a different time, making the general "present" wide..

This is a reversal of the conventional conception of the unidirectional arrow of time from present_theoretical to future. Moreover, the flow of time from future to past feels strange and counter-intuitive. In terms of human history, this reversal suggests human progress is going backwards from sophisticated to primitive. What would be reason for that? — ucarr

Modeling the flow of time as from future to past is actually much more intuitive than modeling it as past to future. The past to future model is a learned (acquired) way, derived from empirical observation, and the concept of "causation", which is entrenched by our scientific/deterministic world view. This is the model derived from the perspective of having the present as independent from (outside) of time. When we observe the passage of time from outside of time, at a point of "the present", we observe an order of the occurrence of events. One event is seen as prior to another, meaning it goes into the past first. This inclines us to position furthest past events as first (prior) and later events as posterior.

In reality, I believe, we must actually learn to suppress our truly intuitive way of looking at time, to construct that perspective which puts the observer outside of time. This is done at a very young age with the learning of moral principles, and even earlier, derived from the act/reward process. Certain types of acts result in rewards or punishments, and this is conducive to us learning the cause/effect, determinist flow of time.

But that type of moral training suppresses our true perspective, which is a more selfish perspective, placing priority on future events, what is wanted, desired. This more natural perspective assigns priority to intentions, representing the individual as a person active in the world, attempting to do things, and get what one wants. We really have very little, if any "representation" of this, because it is inherently not a representation. it is an understanding of one's own actual role in the world, as agent.

Now, when the person understands oneself to be an actual individual within the world, the eternal present, outside of time, is gone. The person is inundated with duties, responsibilities, obligations, and simple needs, things which must be done. The future then, is a source of stress and anxiety, and the passing of time is a force of immense pressure on the person, so that the individual is inclined by instinct to rush around like a squirrel collecting nuts before winter sets in.

So from this perspective, the flow of time is an oppressive future, attempting to force all that is at the present, into the past. For us this is death, and for inanimate objects, this is their breakdown and annihilation. This is why it is ultimately more intuitive to place the future as prior to the past. The coming event, the anticipated, predicted, "future event", is in the future before it is in the past. And, there is a critical condition which must be fulfilled before it can even get into the past, it must actually occur, therefore we have anxiety and stress. So the event is in the future first, as potential. The critical condition of occurrence (with its lack of necessity, which forms the concept of "contingency") is second, the present, and the event being in the past is third, posterior to the occurrence, which is posterior to the potential..

Notice that the difference may be exemplified by the way that we understand freedom of choice. The determinist way places priority in the past, making all future events caused by the past. The free choice way recognizes a lack of necessity in the occurrence of events at the present, and this invalidates the determinist model. That produces the need for a model which includes as real, the contingency of being. This model needs to include the freely willed choice, and that puts priority in the future, because the choice is the will toward a future state.

Question - If what is perceived is in the past at the time of its perception, then there's only perception of the past. So there's only perception of the past (as if the present) in MU's description of present_natural. — ucarr

Well yes, this has to be a key point, which comes from our modern understanding of light, electrical energy, and the nervous system in general. There is always a medium between the thing perceived, and the mind which perceives. You see an object a metre away, a hundred metres away, whatever, you do not see the light in between which acts as the medium. The required activity of this medium ensures that the thing seen is in the past by the time it's seen. And the same thing occurs within the nervous system itself, with the sense of touch for instance, there is a time delay, reflex time.

Question - Is there not a difference between the actual future and the anticipation of the future, a mere speculation about what the future might be? If so, then we see the present is just whatever is happening presently, including speculations about the future. So, again, there's only perception of the past (as if the present) in MU's description of present_natural. — ucarr

Talking about "the future" is when words fail us. This is due to the representative nature of the most common words. We watch, and talk about what we have experienced, and when we turn around to face the future, we get absorbed into our own minds, where our own goals and intentions take priority. Since we are always looking out for ourselves, we must fend against deception when talking about the future. So, we learn the moral principles of cause/effect, described above, and this allows us to talk about the future objectively, in the sense of predictions which are grounded in good scientific principles. However, this suppresses the individual's true view toward the future, the subjective perspective, and replaces it with the false determinist perspective. This false perspective being the one imposed by educational institutions facilitates talk about the future, but in an untrue way.

So, I think it is important to note, that "the true future" is the anticipation of the future. This is the truest view of the future that we have, just like observation and memory is the truest view of the past. The other view, where we use determinist principles of causation, to project in "objective predictions" is not a true view. It's not true because it produces a view of the future which does not respect the contingency of the present, by making the cause/effect relation necessary.

The failing of words inclines us to say things like "the actual future". Because activity occurs at the present, and anticipated events of the future have not yet reached the present, they cannot be "actual" in thi sense. "Actual" here means having activity. But there is another sense of "actual" and the difference between the two was well described by Aristotle in his Metaphysics. The second sense of "actual" means real, substantial, "having actual existence" rather than imaginary or theoretical. This sense applies only to the past. What has actually occurred at the present, is now in the past, and this is real, substantial. Future events are not substantial in that way, and have no actual existence in that sense. However, under the determinist principles of cause/effect, and objective prediction, we may extend this form of "actuality" to talk about "the actual future", to say things like "the sun actually will rise tomorrow". But this way of using "actual", to refer to things which are essentially possible, having not yet crossed the boundary of contingency, the present, is really very misleading. The determinist perspective then denies the real (substantial) difference between past and future, by referring to both with "actual"..

The two above questions point to the possibility MU's language, in both instances, circles back around to a theoretical point both dimensionless and timeless as the representation of the present. — ucarr

The theoretical "present" has some truth in its representation, as a divisor between future and past. It's principal fault is the "dimensionless point" representation, which facilitates the illusion of accurate temporal measurements. That it puts the separation between future and past outside of time, causing the interaction problem of idealism, is evidence that it is faulty. So we do not need to throw away the entire conception of "present", just what is required to bring consistency between the theoretical present and the natural present.

MU's conception of the correct representation of present_natural entails a confluence of past/present/future into one unified whole. As an example, consider: the combination of red, green and blue to form gray. — ucarr

Not quite. It's not a unified whole in the sense of your example, where the distinct colours combine to make one colour. That is more like what some people think now, future, present, and past are commonly combined and presented as a unified whole, "time". But this always involves inconsistencies. So the need is somewhat opposite, to see the distinct elements, future, and past, as completely distinct, because the present exists between these two, inserting contingency. The determinist way is to ignore contingency, represent a unified past and future, and dismissed the "the present" as unreal eternalist ideal, which is problematic. But this provides no base for understanding of the natural present, and what we call the passing of time.

So instead of "unified whole", it is an attempt to establish compatibility, consistency, commensurability between distinct features which appear to be incompatible. That is, if we deny the determinist unification because of the faults that it shows, as not a true representation, we need to come up with something else. The principles which invalidate the determinist representation, essentially the contingency factor, leave the past and future as completely distinct, with a mere appearance of incompatibility. That produces a very difficult problem.

I contemplate with horror a temporal complex of undecidability, e.g. an inhabitant of such a realm could not know where s/he was in time. — ucarr

The "undecidability" you refer to is due to the breadth of time, and the fact that we do not know our position on that spectrum. This is because our understanding of concepts like mass and energy is very primitive. It's comparable to the geocentric model of astronomy. We didn't know where we were in space. Now "the universe" is a temporal concept, having been detached from the idea of an eternal background, and we use it to provide us with a position in time, X number of years past the big bang. But in reality, we really don't know where we are in time because we do not apprehend the breadth of the present, so our way of relating small objects to huge masses like galaxies, is very faulty. .

Again, Secondness is not an object, as in your interpretation. — Mapping the Medium

As I said, "object" is left ambiguous by Peirce. I haven't offered any interpretation of "object" due to this problem. And you are wrong to say that secondness is not the object.

My point is to notice that he says "called' its object. He is not calling it "object", he is referring to what is commonly "called" 'object'. — Mapping the Medium

Mapping the Medium, face the reality, he is explicitly saying that it is what is commonly called "object". And he uses that term to say that it's called "its object". Why argue this. it's essential to understanding the triadic relation he proposes? Secondness is what we commonly call "object",

Now the problem is that there is ambiguity as.to what is commonly called "object". There is a physical object, and there is an object of the mind which is better known as an idea. Peirce intentionally exploits this ambiguity, because he seems to think that this will somehow solve some ontological problems.

It does not, and that is because physical "objects" have an identity according to the law of identity. Mental objects (ideas) cannot be assigned identity. So when you say "the REPRESENTAMEN determines its interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant", it could only be "the same object" if it was a physical object. Only physical objects have this "sameness" assignment by the law of identity. But Peirce wants this principle to apply to mental objects (ideas) as well, and this forces him to make exceptions to the law of noncontradiction, and the law of excluded middle, to account for the reality of these supposed mental objects, which are not really objects with identity, at all.

You're really touchy aren't you? It's as if you are actually afraid of being infected by the dreaded "nominalism thought virus".

I also want to mention here that it is absolutely necessary to study Peirce and not "those who have followed him". It is a severe problem in the arena of Peirce studies that there are all sorts of 'gleanings' of snippets of his work to support ideas that would cause him to jump out of his grave and beat someone over the head. — Mapping the Medium

Let me remind you, that when I engaged you above, I discussed explicitly the quote you brought from Peirce himself, and I addressed directly what I believed to be "The fault in the quoted passage". That fault is labeled as "taking the object for granted".

You told me, "Please take Peirce as a whole" as your way of avoiding my criticism of that passage. So when I then turned to what others say about Peirce, as a whole, you criticized me for using secondary sources.

How can I take your essays as anything other than secondary sources? And it appears like you will not discuss the problems with Peirce's philosophy with anyone other than someone who has read all of his material, and is able to take him as a whole, without referring to secondary sources. At this point you would probably just dismiss the person anyway, as having an incorrect interpretation, because you seem to think that Peirce has solved all the ontological problems of the world.

Here's a link to some notes I wrote some time back. .... Phenomenology or Phaneroscopy? — Mapping the Medium

So, I read the notes you linked to, and I'll show you how "the problem" I referred to above is revealed in that writing.

First, Peirce's term "Phaneron" characterizes a consciousness as an object instead of as an activity. It is the sum total of one's thoughts at any particular moment in time, rather than characterizing a consciousness as actively changing thoughts, all the time. So he uses that proper name "Phaneron" to name that object. So he starts from a mistaken assumption, a premise that the entirety of a consciousness can be taken as "an object". That's expressed here:

I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the total content of anyone consciousness (for anyone is substantially any other,) the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of its cognitive value.

Then, in the quote from Merleau-Ponty we can see the difference between this perspective, Peirce's which takes the object for granted, and the phenomenological perspective. Here:

Attention, then, is neither an association of ideas nor the return to itself of a thought that is already the master of its objects; rather, attention is the active constitution of a new object that develops and thematizes what was until then only offered as an indeterminate horizon.

Notice the difference. What is given is an "indeterminate horizon", and from this an "object" is constructed.

The problem which develops from Peirce's "taking the object for granted" is demonstrated later in your writing about "secondness", what is described as "bumping up against hard fact". Here we find the root of the problem, what I called Peirce's category mistake. Secondness is described as the physical constraints of the material world, such as walls and doors, yet it is also describe as "hard fact", and this refers to a description of the physical constraints, "fact" is corresponding truth about the physical world. So secondness, as the assumed "object", has dual existence which crosses a boundary of separation between the traditional categories of material and ideal. The "object" may be the physical constraint which we actually bump into, or it may be the supposed "hard fact" concerning that constraint.

The problem ought to be very evident to you now, as the ambiguous nature of "object". An "object" can be an aspect of the physical world, or it could also be an idea in a mind. "Secondness" is an attempt to make it a sort of medium between the two, but as I argue, that medium is fictitious, imaginary, created as a part of the interpretant.

Referring to the quote from Merleau-Ponty, we can see that "the object" is really a creation of the mind. Now Peirce, in his desire to take the object for granted, when it really cannot be taken for granted, because it is created within the mind, introduces ambiguity with his concept of "secondness", which allows "the object" to be conceptualized as either a mental object or a material object. It really cannot be conceived as something distinct and independent from the two, as a third category, like Peirce desires with the proposal of "secondness", because Peirce has not properly provided that category which is required to serve as that medium which he desires. He's really only provided ambiguity in "object" which allows "object" to be conceived of (constructed) as on one side or the other, of the two traditional categories, depending on one's purpose.

Nominalism is deeply ingrained in Western culture (and the now-global-world in general), and it is very difficult for most to step outside of it and look at its history and influence when they are so influenced by it themselves due to 'thought as a system'. ... We are within what we are trying to examine. Nominalism tends to evoke the idea that the examination is objective. It is a case of recursive smoke and mirrors.

Again, I have written about this extensively. I don't want to spend a lot of time on it in threads here. It's just not a productive use of the forum. — Mapping the Medium

As much as you think that nominalism holds sway in the western world, I find that it has been supplanted by Platonic realism, in the last few hundred years as the ontological support for materialism, "matter" being nothing but a concept. Not only that, but all forms of realism are grounded in Platonic realism. Realism is generally the default perspective, but since it requires no philosophy, many realists refuse to admit to the Platonic premises required to support their metaphysical perspective.

Since realism is what gives importance to the idea of "objects", while "object", as a concept loses importance in nominalism, it is really Platonic realism which evokes the idea that any examination is "objective". In nominalism, interpretation by the subject, is what is important, so it is inherently a subjective perspective. If nominalists claim objectivity, then they are hypocritical or self-contradicting.

I also want to mention here that it is absolutely necessary to study Peirce and not "those who have followed him". It is a severe problem in the arena of Peirce studies that there are all sorts of 'gleanings' of snippets of his work to support ideas that would cause him to jump out of his grave and beat someone over the head. — Mapping the Medium

I've read enough Peirce to see the problems I point to. As I said, I have a lot of respect for him, being very intelligent and keenly able to expose ontological problems. The issue though, is that he proposed solutions when he ought not have, because the solutions just aren't there. So his proposals aren't solutions at all, they simply mislead. In other words, his analysis is good, his synthesis is not. His proposed solutions only blur the subject/object distinction so as to veil the category mistake which the supposed solution is built on.

I can either point you to my essays or post the very long essays in entirety here. Which would you prefer? — Mapping the Medium

OK, post some links, quote some relevant passages, or just express some of what you think, whatever. Thank you.

If this is a mis-reading of your theory, then I'm still fundamentally unclear about the structure and logic of the continuum of past_present_future within your theoretical context. — ucarr

What I keep saying, is that there is no such past_present_future continuum. The continuum would be future-past, and the present is distinct, outside time. This is the discrete/continuous incompatibility. If there actually is a present within the continuum, it would break the continuum into discrete sections, annihilating the continuum.

I'm now inclined to think your theory can be rendered with greater clarity through mathematical language. For example, by interposing a timeless present between a temporal past and future, it makes sense to think of a timeless present as a theoretical point of zero dimensions. — ucarr

This rendering sort of works, so long as you adhere to the point you made, that this is a "theoretical present". In this particular model, there is no "natural present". This "present", the zero dimension point of the model, is artificial, a theoretical point and the "interposing" you refer to must be understood as a theoretical act of inserting the the theoretical point into the future-past continuum in various places, for the purpose of temporal measurements, discrete temporal units.

However, we must still respect the reality of "the present", the true, "natural present" which serves as the perspective of the living subject. This natural present is what the human subject has tried to represent with the artificial, conceptual "zero dimension point" which serves as the means for measurement. The natural present is much more difficult to understand.

There's some difficulty of communication of your theory because verbal language, being about actions and actors and thus being rooted in animation, does a poor job of representing non-temporal phenomena, which are, by definition, devoid of animation. — ucarr

Now we approach the key point. The "theoretical present", in its traditional form, as a zero dimension point served us well for hundreds, even thousands of years, in its service of measuring temporal duration. However, though it is useful, it is not acceptable as an accurate representation of the "natural present". The "natural present" is the perspective of the human mind, the human being, in relation to the future-past continuum. This is the natural perspective, how we actually exist, observe and act, at the present in time, rather than the model which makes the present a point in time.

The traditional representation of the theoretical present puts the human soul as "outside of time", as discussed, and this, as you say, renders it "by definition, devoid of animation". This is a representation of the classical "interaction problem" of dualism. The properties of the immaterial soul, ideas etc., being eternal, and outside of time (because they exist at the zero dimension present), have not the capacity to interact with the future-past continuum.

What this indicates is that the conceptualization of time employed, with a zero dimension point that can be inserted as the present, for the purpose of measurement, is faulty. It's not a true representation of the "natural present". To understand the natura present, we need to review the human perspective. What I glean from such a review, is that the natural present consists of both, the past, as sensory perception (what is perceived is in the past by the time it is perceived), and the future, as what is anticipated. Therefore to provide a true modal of time we need an overlap of past and future at the present, instead of a zero dimension point which separates the two.

This implies that future-past is improperly modeled, if modeled as a continuum. We need overlap of future and past, at the present, to allow for the real interaction of the living subject. This implies a dimensional present.

Can you tell me what written work of his you are referring to? — Mapping the Medium

That "unnecessary" layer is my interpretation. As I explained, it can be understood with reference to mathematical Platonism. We understand "the number two" as the object between the numeral "2", and the interpretation performed by a person's mind. I believe this "object" is superfluous, a completely unnecessary layer added into the interpretation for various reasons within mathematical theory. In other words, it's simply part of the interpretation, serving a specific purpose, rather than a separate layer.

As for Peirce's 'representamen' and triadic model, we need to recognize that he is pointing to what the sign means to the interpreter. ... It does take on a different identity than just considering what some might refer to as a specific ideal form.

For instance, here is an image that can mean different things to different cultures. ...



The 'object' is exactly the same, but the 'representamen' has a different identity. — Mapping the Medium

This issue is, why do you, and Peirce assume "an object", which is "exactly the same"? I apprehend a sign, and I interpret the sign. The sign is interpreted by me, in a way which may be different from others. For what purpose is "an object" posited? The only answer I can find for this question, is that it provides a grounding for the claim that there is a right, or correct, interpretation.

The problems with Peirce's triadic model become evident in the work of those who have followed him, and actually employ it. The issue is 'the rules for interpretation', as indicated by Wittgenstein. The rules must comprise 'the object', in order that "the object' supports a correct interpretation. In other words, the supposed 'object' is nothing but the rules for interpretation. With Peirce's model, the rules for interpretation cannot be within the mind of the interpreter because the differences between various minds would not support the premise that "the 'object' is exactly the same". And since there is nothing between the sign and the mind which interprets, to support the independent reality of those rules, the rules must be within the sign itself. This is evident in biosemiotics.

Placing the rules for interpretation within the sign itself is very problematic because these rules would need to be interpreted. The interpretations of the rules by various minds would differ, and nothing would support the premise that "the 'object' is exactly the same", unless the sign itself, and the rules for interpretation are one and the same, as 'the object'. But then there is just the interpreter and the sign, while 'the object' is superfluous, and there is no intermediate layer.

Furthermore, placing the rules for interpretation as within the sign itself is very problematic because then it is not the mind which is doing the interpretation, having no rules for that, but the sign must be interpreting itself, and this ends up leaving the interpreting mind itself as superfluous, unnecessary. And this is exactly how biosemiotics has been mislead. The sign becomes self-interpreting and the requirement of an agent which interprets is lost, as the sign is both passively interpreted, and actively interpreting.

This all indicates that the triadic model has as a premise, an unnecessary third aspect. The superfluous aspect 'the object' may be placed as desired, depending on the application. In mathematical Platonism 'the object' is associated with the mind of the interpreter, as an independent idea grasped by that mind. In biosemiotics, 'the object' is associated with the sign, as the rules for interpretation inhering with the sign itself.

Phenomenology is definitely not my cup of tea, due to it being historically influenced by nominalism that was nurtured in the arms of religious theology. — Mapping the Medium

You seem to have a strong prejudice against nominalism. Why?

There is a science of perception. — Janus

The science of perception, like every other science suffers the same problem. Why would you think that it would be exempt? Suggesting that it would be exempt only demonstrates a denial of the problem, which is a display of the attitudinal illness I referred to.

My question was as to how including considerations of the subject (however that might be conceived) would improve the methods and results in sciences such as chemistry, geology, ecology or biology. — Janus

Respecting the reality of the subjective input in science greatly improves one's understanding of the results, through an enhanced ability to recognize where deficiencies lie. This provides the scientist, philosopher, or anyone reviewing any scientific results, with an approach which is known as "critical thinking".

Accordingly, the scientist might also look for ways of minimizing the subjective input, or even devising ways of exposing it as much as possible, to be studied by philosophers. This is in stark contrast to the attempt to hide the subjective influence which results from the aforementioned attitudinal illness.

↪180 Proof :100: As I have pointed out several times science performs a methodological epoché in the opposite direction to the epoché of phenomenology. But this falls on deaf ears. I have repeatedly asked Wayfarer to explain how the idea of the subjective would be helpful in the pursuit of any of the hard sciences. He does not even attempt to answer, but rather just ignores the question. — Janus

I can give you a very clear answer to this question by way of the tinted glass analogy. When looking at the world through a tinted glass, it is necessary to determine what the tinting of the glass "adds" to the observation, in order to derive a "true" interpretation of the observation.

Since the method applied by the hard sciences, as "the scientific method" is carried out by human subjects, it is necessary to understand what the subject "adds" to the scientific method, as the subjective aspect of science, in the very same way that it is necessary to understand what the tinting of the glass "adds" to the observation.

When the existence of the subjective element is known about, and respected as a true feature, and a deficiency of the scientific method, we naturally account for the reality of this "blind spot", and there is no great problem, just a healthy scientific skepticism and a respect for the fallibility of science. But when the reality of the blind spot is denied, and the relevant deficiencies of the scientific method are ignored, that is an attitudinal illness which is a problem.

I have a lot of respect for Charles Peirce, but from what I've read, he misses the mark with his ontology of "the object". This might be due to a desire to disprove nominalism, but he allows unintelligibility to be an essential aspect of "the object" and this leads to the acceptance of vagueness as an ontological principle.

He posits an unnecessary separation between sign and object. For example, the sign is the numeral 2, and the object is the number two. There is no need for "the number two", as the numeral might serve as both the sign and the object. This unnecessary separation produces an unnecessary layer between the sign and the interpretation of the sign, the unnecessary layer being "the object".

That produces an inaccessible, unknowable, relation between sign and object. Therefore both the object and the sign, lose their otherwise assumed to be necessary identity, as identity being the same as the thing itself, by the law of identity. Neither the sign has a necessary identity, nor does the object have a necessary identity, as there is merely an undefined relation between these two. The result is that the object is no longer restricted by the law of identity, because of the assumed relation between the object and the sign which is not a relation of identity, i.e. the sign is other than the object. So if the sign, and the object are both present to the mind, these two are distinct, not the same, and there can be no necessary relation between the two, unlike when the sign and the object are one and the same by an identity relation.

I believe that phenomenology, especially as developed by Derrida, provides a better ontology of objects by allowing that the sign is the object.

I'm trying to picture what it means for temporal experience to be distinct from a world timeless. If the present is outside of time, how can observations, which take time to be made, be carried out from its perspective? — ucarr

Imagine standing still, and watching something pass you from right to left. You, in your perspective, or point of view, are "outside" that motion, being not a part of it. You can, however, choose to act with your body, and interfere with that motion. Or, you can simply observe.

This is what I mean about your point of view at "the present". You can watch from that perspective, as the entire world around you, passes you, proceeding from future to past, while you maintain your perspective at the present. You might choose to move your body, and interfere in that temporal world, or you might just choose to observe the temporal world as it go past. The meditative position is to do neither, observe nor interfere.

Since neither past nor future can approach the present, how does past become present, and how does present become future? It seems common sense to think the past and the future somehow connect with the present. Is this not the case? — ucarr

As I said, "present" is distinct as referring to that position from which the passage of time may be observed and interfered with. The only connection is through observation and interference. These two, observation and interference, are intertwined in experimentation, and this forms the base of "the connection". That is how the past and future "connect with the present". The meditative position, mentioned above disconnects the present, so that the future simply becomes the past, all around the meditating subject, and the subject has removed the connection by neither observing nor interfering.

Do I exist in the past_present_future, abstract concepts, outside of time? If past_present_future all exist as abstract concepts, where does my physical life occur? — ucarr

Your "physical life" remains the unknown. All that is known, is known through the means of abstract ideas.

You're saying we observe and act with free will within a timeless realm called "the present?" — ucarr

Yes.

You're saying that when I act with free will, I'm doing things outside of time, but somehow my actions crossover from the outside of time to the inside of time? — ucarr

Yes.

Explain "...outside of time (to the inside)." — ucarr

I thought I did explain this. Time is the world of change, which we experience as external to our mind or consciousness. The immaterial, nonchanging perspective of the mind, as "the present" is deep within us, as internal. This perspective, being the nonchanging "present", is outside of time (timeless). But since this timeless perspective is internal, and time is external, then it is "outside time to the inside".

Consider the existence of a physical object for an explanatory analogy. We may posit an external boundary to that object, and this serves us as a means of judging that object's activities relative to other objects, it's relative motion. We might model the object as a bounded area of space, or we might model it as a center of gravity, a point, but no matter which way, its external relations determine its changing position, and this provides for what we know as its temporal existence, its position relative to other things. Now the present, as I described, is derived from our experience of an internal principle. The internal principle provides the perspective of "the present" which is demonstrated as necessarily outside of time, but to the inside of the subject. So this produces the need for an internal boundary to separate the temporal (external) from the nontemporal internal. If the material body is modeled as a point which marks the center of gravity, then the boundary which provides for the non-temporal must be internal to the point.

By what means is a point of separation established and maintained? — ucarr

This separation, as any theory, may be established and maintained, through expression of the principle, and validation through experimentation. In other words, the principle "there must be no time within the point of separation between past and future, in order for temporal measurement to be accurate", is expressed as a principle (theory), and then it may be verified by experimentation. The success of relativity theory helps to verify that principle.

Since the immaterial aspect is non-dimensional, how do you go about ascertaining its position "deep within us"? — ucarr

This is verified by experience. But it doesn't really matter if it is inside or outside, as we could turn the whole thing around, and argue that everything we experience as external is really internal. Then, what we experience as internal, our perspective of "the present", is really external, flipping the whole thing around. This turn around assumes s true, the skeptic\s claim that the external world is entirely an illusion. It is all internal. Everything, the entire physical world, is within, and there is nothing outside us whatsoever, as we ourselves form the outside boundary, as the static, unchanging "present". Then all physical existence is internal to us, and also inside time, while the immaterial, that which is outside time, is properly external to this. Therefore the skeptic's claim that the external is an illusion might actually provide a better representation of reality, as it allows for what is outside time, to be properly external.

Does our free will and intellection connect to our brain? Are you talking about our everyday thoughts and decisions? — ucarr

The free will and intellection, being immaterial aspects of the immaterial "soul' (for lack of a better word), which has the timeless perspective of "the present", are connected to "the brain", as a temporal, physical aspect. This way of connection is described above. There are two aspects of the connection, observational, and active. The meditative mode moves to disconnect both.

The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief. It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make us reject every belief which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so by creating a doubt in the place of that belief. With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. And it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for mental effort. The most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true. But we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so. — Mapping the Medium

I think we need to distinguish between doubting the means, and doubting the end. Notice that this passage takes the ends (desires) for granted, so that the doubt being talked about is doubt of the means.

"It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires;...".

When the belief 'satisfies our desire', as the means to the end, then we are not inspired to doubt the means because the result, end, is insured as that satisfaction. So long as the desire itself, the end, is never doubted, and the means are observed to be successful, then doubt is only relative to the efficiency of the means. Now means are empirically justifiable, as we demonstrate that action A produces the desired end Z. Then various ways of producing Z can be compared, A, B, C, analyzed, and the resulting "settlement", which method best produces Z, can obtain to a level higher than mere opinion.

However, such justified settlements rely on taking the end for granted. It is only relative to the assumption that the end Z is what is truly desired, that the means are in this way justified. Doubting the end itself puts us squarely into the field of opinion, unless the end itself can be justified as the means to a further end. In traditional moral philosophy there is a distinction made between the real good, and the apparent good. The apparent good is nothing but personal opinion, but the real good is assumed to somehow transcend personal opinion.

The fault in the quoted passage is the following:

" And it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for mental effort."

This statement inverts the real, or true, relation between the being with knowledge and the object of that being, which is its goal or end. Knowledge, as justified opinion, explained above, is always justified as the means to the end. But the end which justifies the knowledge is simply assumed as an opinion, and this places "our object", which is the goal that motivates us, as outside of knowledge itself, as unjustified opinion. This is what Plato demonstrated in "The Republic", "the good" must be apprehended as outside of knowledge.

So the statement incorrectly asserts that the motivating object, the end, or the good, cannot be outside "the sphere of our knowledge". A proper analysis indicates that only the means to the end can be justified as knowledge, while the object itself, the end or good, must be apprehended as outside the sphere of knowledge. Therefore moral traditionalists characterize the apparent good as opinion, and the real good as understood only by God. This places "our object" as firmly outside "the sphere of our knowledge".

Making this switch produces a completely different understanding and conceptualization of the division between active and passive elements of reality, outlined by Aristotle. Notice in the quoted statement, that the mind must be "affected" by its object, to be motivated by it. This characterizes the end, or object, as active, and affecting the mind. But when the end, or object is understood as opinion, then it is necessary to assume something within the mind which is other than knowledge. Opinion is not knowledge. Being created within the mind, by the mind, opinion is the effect of the mind, and improperly represented as affecting the mind, with "the motive for mental effort".

This reversal is what allows us to doubt the object, or end. Being created by the mind, it is within the mind, and therefore can motivate, but being unjustified leaves it outside of knowledge. Therefore it ought to be doubted. In other words, the mind creates its object, goal, end, or good, and this created object "acts" as the source of motivation for knowledge, and the means, as human actions in general. When we take the object, goal, end, or good, for granted, we represent this as the object affecting the mind to produce knowledge in the form of means. And this is what is expressed in the passage. But to properly understand, we need to doubt that which is taken for granted in this representation, the object, goal, end, or good. Therefore we ought to doubt, that which is taken for granted in this passage, the object, goal, end, or good. And this exercises the mind's true capacity to actively create the object, rather than simply allowing the object to affect the mind, by taking the obect for granted.

And when we get beyond this assumption, of taking the object for granted, we learn that the mind actually creates its own object, goal, end, or good, in a field which is other than knowledge, the field of opinion. Then the "motive for mental effort" is not something which affects the mind, but something created by the mind, and this places that object firmly within the mind, but outside of knowledge. And of course this validates, the self-evident truth that the motive for mental effort, the existence of the unknown, is outside the sphere of knowledge.

If Determinism is the case, a person has no choice in what they choose. — RussellA

OK, I'll accept this as what you are trying to say then. By "determinism" you mean that a person chooses but they have no choice in what they choose, i.e. something is chosen without a choice having been made.

And I'll present this as very good evidence of what I said before:

"This is why any rational person will reject determinism."

— various sources including Wikipedia — Wayfarer

"Various sources"? What does that mean, that it's an AI generated piece of crap, compiled from cherry picking sites most often visited? Isn't that just internet mob mentality?

If Determinism is the case, their choice had been determined, not by themselves, not by someone else, but by the physical temporal nature of the Universe. A Universe of fundamental particles and forces existing in space and time over which no person has control. — RussellA

As we discussed, and you agreed, choice is impossible if determinism is true. Simply put, "choice" is not an appropriate word in this context, otherwise we'd be saying that water makes choices, rocks make choices, etc.. But we don't say that, because we recognize the difference between the moves which these inanimate things make, and the moves that a human being makes.

Do not qualify yet. Once infinity and it's opposite are well defined (and infinity isn't just taken as an axiom), they likely would be Platonic objects. At least I have enough belief in the "logicism" of mathematics that it is so. — ssu

The point though, is that "infinity" and "infinitesimal" refer to completely different things. That "infinity" refers to a Platonic object does not imply that "infinitesimal" does.

Another meaning of "choice" is "a person or thing chosen", such as a person chose the option to stay.

If Determinism is the case, in one sense people do make choices, such as do I stay or do I go, but in another sense cannot choose, as their choice to stay has already been determined. — RussellA

So if determinism is true, then someone made the choice for the person? Who would that be, God?

So, time -- if it exists, and it may not -- can only approach the present from the past, or from the future, without arriving. You say the present is outside of time. — ucarr

Being outside of time, the present would be categorically distinct from the future and past which are the components of time. So neither can be said to "approach the present". "The present" refers to a perspective from which time is observed. Think of right and left as an analogy, where "here" is similar to "the present". Right and left are determined relative to the perspective which is "here".

According to my understanding, I exist in the present and not in either the past or the future. By this understanding, the past and the future are abstract concepts that occupy my mindscape as relativistic things; I know mentally, but not existentially, both the past and the future in relation to my existential presence within the present. — ucarr

The first sentence here is good. You, as the observer, and the free willing agent, exist in the present. But the next part appears to be confused. "The present" is an abstract concept, we use it to substantiate our existence. But so is "future and past" an abstract concept. The future and past are what we attribute to the external world, what is independent from us. But since it is the way we understand the world, it is still conceptual.

And since the future and past are time, this is what makes us outside of time. But we are "outside" time in a strange way, because we understand time as external to us, and this makes us "outside time" to the inside. Our position at "the present", from which we observe and act with free will, is beyond the internal boundary, This makes us outside of time to the inside, beyond the internal boundary.

If the present contains no time elapsed, then must I conclude my perception of time elapsing occurs in response to my existential presence in either the past or in the future? — ucarr

Imagine your perspective, at the present, to be a static point, and everything is moving around you. It is this movement around you which provides the perception of time passing. But your point is not necessarily completely static in an absolute way, because you can act, by free will. This act comes from outside of time, to the inside.

What does it mean to say we live in the past or in the future only? It suggests we aren't present anywhere. The pun is intended because presence denotes the present, but I don't immediately see how there can be presence of a thing in the past as the past, or in the future as future. Is it not so that wherever we are, we are there in the present? Where are you now? How can you be present in your own past? — ucarr

I'm not saying we live in the past and future. I am saying the opposite, that we are at the present. This is our perspective. But this puts us outside of time (to the inside). It has to be this way in order that we can measure time passing. If our perspective was not outside time, then any measurement of time passing would be tainted because there would be time passing within us, just like judging colour through a tinted lens.

If the present is timeless, how does it maintain the separation of past/future? Maintaining the separation implies an indefinite duration of time for the maintenance of the separation. Also, separation implies both a spatial and temporal duration keeping past/future apart, but spatial and temporal durations are not timeless, are they? — ucarr

There must be no duration of time in the point of separation. If there was we couldn't have an accurate measurement of time. Imagine if the duration was a day, then our measurements would be accurate to within a day. If it was an hour, our measurements would be accurate to within an hour. If the duration was a minute, our measurements would be accurate within a minute. And so on. If there is any time within the moment of the present, this would affect the accuracy of our measurements by the amount within the moment, because there would be a corresponding vagueness in the start and end point of the measurement.

How does a material thing sustain its dimensional expansion, a physical phenomenon, outside of time? Consider a twelve-inch ruler. Its twelve inches of extension continuously consume time. Relativity tells us the physical dimensions of a material thing change with acceleration of velocity accompanied by time dilation, so we know from this that physical dimensions consume time. — ucarr

It is the immaterial (nondimensional) aspect, deep within us, what is responsible for free will and intellection, that is outside of time, not our physical bodies.

I'm asking if infinitesimals exist in the sense that would satisfy mathematical platonism. — Michael

Have you still not answered this question? I think it's very clear that "infinitesimals" do not qualify as Platonic objects, because they do not have the "well-defined", or even "definable" nature which is required of a Platonic object.

This creates a schism in mathematics because calculus requires infinitesimals, while set theory assumes Platonism. So instead of employing infinitesimals, set theory views infinities as well-defined objects.

Of course mathematicians will not admit to an inconsistency between calculus and set theory, they would just claim that one is an extension of the other, just like many physicists would not admit to an inconsistency between Newtonian laws (governing objects) and Einsteinian laws (governing spacetime) . What they do instead, is veil the inconsistency behind a whole lot of extra axioms and principles, designed to smooth out the bumps, and hide the inconsistencies which exist between different applications which use different principles.

Simply put, "infinitesimal" refers to the continuity (like a "dimensional line", or space) which is assumed to lie between discrete objects (which may be infinite in number), as required to maintain separation between the assumed objects, making them discrete.

So the two, infinitesimal space, and infinite objects, require completely different accounting principles. The infinite objects are given by Platonism, but they require a "space" to be, in order to account for them being discrete objects, and since the objects are infinite, the "space' where they exist must be infinitesimal. Notice that "infinitesimal" refers to what is outside the Platonic objects.

Not true.

If a person believes in Determinism, not only i) do they believe that their choices have been determined but also ii) it has been determined that they do make choices. — RussellA

You agreed with my argument which showed that having both of two contrary ideas in the mind, at the same time, is a requirement for making a choice between them. This is necessary to be able to compare and choose between them. Then you said, if determinism is true, choosing is not required: "3) This means that it is not necessary to choose between two contradictory ideas at 1pm."

Therefore you contradict yourself. You admitted that people do not choose if determinism is true, based on my explanation of the requirements for "making a choice". Now you claim a premise which contradicts this. You say "it has been determined that they do make choices". Clearly, it has been determined that if determinism is true people do not make choices, if we adhere to what has been agreed to, about what constitutes "making a choice".

Sure, and working out complex problems is where the use of symbols is very effective, for the reason I just explained. That's why mathematics, which employs symbols, is the means by which very complex problems are worked out.

But I would say that the use of symbols is what enables advanced thinking to work with entirely different types of ideas at the same time. And that's exactly what complex mathematics is doing, combining completely different types of thoughts by establishing relations of value. So, I believe that "higher levels of complexity" in a sense, actually refers to "thinking entirely different types of thoughts" at the same time, if we allow the condition that the different thoughts are just represented by symbols, rather than the whole idea being thought of in completion. For example, "mass" and "acceleration" are completely different types of ideas, which are combined in the conception of "force", which is a complex concept, but made quite simple, and easy to use with f=ma.

I'm mulling over the idea that time as you describe it above doesn't exist at any time: the present exists outside of time; the past, once the non-existent present, continues to be non-existent as time gone by; the future derived from the non-existent present, does not yet exist until it becomes the non-existent present and then continues its non-existence as the past. — ucarr

The question of whether time exists or not is not relevant here, it's just a distraction. What is relevant is that all of time is either in the past or in the future, and the moment of "the present" separates these two and contains no time itself. This make the present outside of time.

I glean from the above you think a first cause exists outside of time. — ucarr

No, I think "first cause", without serious explanation and manipulation, is an incoherent notion. However, "final cause" is not incoherent, and can be conceived of as outside of time in the way I described.

Does time pass within the present? This is an issue because if it doesn't, the question arises: How does the present become the future?; coming at this same issue from the opposite direction: If time doesn't pass within the present, how does the present become the past? — ucarr

In the model I described, the present does not become the future, nor does the present become the past. The present is outside of time, and time consists of future and past. The future becomes the past, as time passes, and the present is a perspective from which this is observed. Also final cause acts from this perspective, as a cause from outside of time, which intervenes in the events which are occurring as time passes.

This is a description of causation outside of time? Consider: The accumulation of falling snow on the roof caused it to cave in. Is this an example of timeless causation? — ucarr

No, causation outside of time would be the freely made choice (free will act) which causes a shovel to be picked up and the roof to be shoveled, which would be an intervening in the "accumulation of falling snow on the roof", preventing the roof from collapsing. The being with free will, observing from the perspective of "the present" which is outside of time, makes a choice which causes the event of the roof being shoveled, and this would prevent the roof from collapsing. The cause of this event, shoveling the roof, is outside of time.

Time is a universal context, unless you can think of something that exists outside of time. — ucarr

The present, "now" exists outside of time. All existent time consists of past time and future time, whereas the present, now, is a point or moment, which separates the past from the future. So all of time has either gone by (past) or not yet gone by (future), and the present is what it goes past. This means that the present is "outside of time" by being neither past nor future.

The upshot of what I'm saying is that time is relevant to everything, even the supposedly totally self-sufficient first cause. If first cause pre-dates everything else, doesn't that put first cause into a temporal relationship with what follows from it? — ucarr

It doesn't make sense to speak of that which is outside of time, as pre-dating everything, because that is to give it a temporal context, prior in time to everything else. So "first cause" is not a good term to use here. This is why it is better to think of the present as that which is outside of time, rather than a first cause as being outside of time. The latter becomes self-contradicting.

This provides a perspective from which the passing of time is observed and measured, "now" or the present. Then also, the cause which is outside of time, the free will act, is understood as derived from the present. But, you should be able to see why it is incorrect to call this cause a "first cause", or a cause which "pre-dates everything else". It is better known as a final cause.

Finally, I'm saying the practice of cons of any type involves elapsing time, so that includes cons_creative. — ucarr

I agree, the practices of con-creative, i.e. its actions, necessarily involve elapsing time. However, the cause of those actions, the free will act itself, may occur at the moment of the present, and this need not involve any elapsing time; the moment of the present being outside of time as described above.

You make a strong argument. — RussellA

Thank you RussellA, I take back what I said about you refusing to acknowledge things which are contrary to your belief.

If Determinism is the case
1) It has already been determined at 12.50pm that I go at 1pm
2) This means that no decision needs to be made at 1pm whether to stay or to go, as the decision has already been made prior to 1pm.
3) This means that it is not necessary to choose between two contradictory ideas at 1pm. — RussellA

This is why any rational person will reject determinism. It means that choice is not real, and this implies that we do not need to deliberate or weigh options. And if we do not do this we will be overcome by various forces, and rapidly exterminated.

However, Determinism can also account for my going at 1pm without any necessity to fuse two contradictory ideas into a single idea. — RussellA

Sure, but believing in determinism is by this description, a belief that choice is impossible. This would also mean that only an irrational person (a person who believes that doing the impossible is possible) would even attempt to make a choice if that person believed in determinism. Therefore the person who believes in determinism, in order to be consistent with one's believe, would not choose to do anything, would be overcome by forces, and would be dead very soon.

By Occams Razor, Determinism is the simplest explanation, as it doesn't require the metaphysical problem of how two contradictory ideas may be fused into a single idea. — RussellA

Sure, and not choosing to do anything is simpler than having to choose, and dying is simpler than having to stay alive. Therefore by Occam's Razor we should all believe in determinism, choose to do noting, be dead soon, and get it over with.

I'm sure it can be done to at least some degree, even if not to that which people generally assume. — Patterner

Having a multitude of different thoughts at exactly the same time, is exactly what a complex concept is. Consider a relatively simple complex concept, like "right angle triangle". That concept consists of "triangle", which is itself complex, and also "right angle" which is complex. So there's a number of different ideas tied up in understanding "right angle triangle". Now consider "Pythagorean theorem". This consists not only of "right angle triangle", but a bunch more ideas about the relationships between the lengths of the sides of that type of triangle. It appears that to adequately understand "Pythagorean theorem", a person must be able to have all these ideas in one's mind at the same time.

But this brings up the issue of the use of symbols. One symbol can adequately replace a complex concept, which consists of a number of united ideas. So the spoken word "triangle" for example is one aural symbol which represents a number of ideas. Then, when we think in words, the one word can stand in for a number of ideas, instead of needing to have all those ideas in the mind at the same time. I think that this, in a sense, is "the meaning" of a word, a complex relation of ideas which the word itself substitutes for in the act of thinking.

Both indecision and deliberation require consecutive ideas. Perhaps I will stay, no, perhaps I will go. — RussellA

That you are wrong, is logically demonstrated in the following way:

Consider our example, "should I stay, or should I go". Suppose I think first "should I go?", then I relegate this thought to memory, and I start to think "should I stay?". According to your stipulation, each of these thoughts could only occur while the other is in memory, one following the other, without the two ever intermingling. This means that no thought could ever be produced which includes both of these two. Accordingly, the two could never actually be compared to each other.

One would consider "should I go", and all the merits and reasons for going, independently from "should I stay", and all of its merits and reasons. But the two distinct groups of values could never be compared, or related to each other in any way, because that would require having both of the two contradictory thoughts united within the same thought. Of course this would completely incapacitate one's ability to choose, because a person could never have the two distinct, and incompatible sets of values within one's mind at the same time. To think of one the other would have to be completely relegated to memory, Therefore the two could never be compared.

Obviously though, we do actually compare and unite contradictory thoughts within the same idea, when comparing the value of each, in order to decide. Ideas are often very complex, having many distinct ideas, as elements, united within, and nothing prevents the imaginative mind from uniting contradictory ideas. So when the person in the example, compares the value of staying as value X, and the value of going as value Y, and is able to decide one over the other, it must be the case that the two have existed together, in thought, at the same time, or else no comparison could have ever been made.

We can see this very clearly in simple arithmetic. The value assigned to "1" is inconsistent with, or contrary to the value assigned to "0". When a person says "1 is not equal to 0", it is necessary that the two contrary ideas, "1", and "0", must exist within the person's thinking, at the same time. Otherwise the person could only state the value of "1" at one time, then the value of "0" at another time, and never be able to actually compare the two, and understand that the two are contrary values. In reality therefore the entire complexity of mathematical ideas, which is constructed to compare inequalities, relies on the coexistence of contrary ideas. Without such coexistence of unequal values in one's mind at the same time, no one could understand or do any mathematics.

You are saying that a person can have two contradictory ideas at the same time. — RussellA

Yes, that is what I am saying. And, I think that any degree of serious introspection will reveal that any type of decision making would be impossible if the contradictory ideas could not actively exist within the same mind at the same time. In fact, if distinct ideas could not coexist then no relations between ideas, or comparisons between them could ever be established. But that is exactly what complex ideas consist of, comparisons and relations made concerning distinct ideas.

So the most simple logical demonstration that you are wrong, is this. The simple judgement, that two distinct ideas (such as should I stay and should I go) are contradictory, is itself a relation established between the two distinct ideas. In order to make such a judgement truthful, or accurate, the two ideas must be compared (i.e. exist together in the mind at the same time) or else any such judgement would be arbitrary or random. Therefore if one contrary idea could only come into the mind after the other left, it would be impossible to even judge, in any way other than a random guess, that the two are contradictory. To judge them as contradictory requires that both actively coexist within the mind at the same time, to be able to decide that the two fulfill the criteria of "contradictory".

I don't know, you'd have to put that into context. Anyway, "time", and "cons-creative" are not at all the same thing, so I don't see how that would be relevant here.

I still cannot understand how a person can feel a pain and not feel a pain in their finger at the same time. — RussellA

You are changing the subject we are not talking about what the person is feeling, we are talking about the ideas that at a person has. So, as I said, if the person is just learning the word "pain", the person might have a feeling, and consider both thoughts at the same time, "this is pain", "this is not pain", not knowing whether it is pain or not pain, and trying to decide which it is. You should have no problem imagining this, in the case of a tickle or something like that, for example. The person might at the same time think "this is pain", yet "this is not pain" being unsure whether it ought to be called "pain" or not.

That is exactly what I am saying, attention is switched between events, first one, then the other. But not at the same time. — RussellA

I noticed your quoted passage from Wikipedia mentions "little" conscious effort. Little effort is still effort. So these cases of multitasking where the secondary action requires little effort, and the primary action requires much effort, refute your claims and support mine.

That's my position, where attention is directed towards one activity only. — RussellA

If one activity requires a lot of attention, and the other a little attention, this does not mean that all the attention is directed at one activity.

Even if it were impossible, as I think it is, to have a single thought about two contradictory events, this raise the question as whether it is possible to have a single thought about the relation between two contradictory events — RussellA

Again, you are changing the subject. We were talking about having contradictory ideas, at the same time, concerning one event. I don't see why this is so hard for you to understand, It's called "indecision". It appears you want to deny the obvious just because it's evidence against what you believe.

I totally agree that people have contradictory ideas within their memories, but not that they are thinking about two contradictory ideas at the same time. — RussellA

Thinking about two contradictory ideas at the same time is commonly called "deliberation". The example was "should I stay or should I go". Your counter argument was that because we state these ideas one after the other, this implies that we must think them one after the other. But, as I explained, this is a faulty conclusion because thinking and stating are two very different actions with different limitations. So. I'll tell you again, you deny the obvious because it's evidence against your belief.

P1 - If Determinism is false, then my thoughts have not been determined
P2 - If Determinism is true, then my thoughts have been determined
P3 - I have the thought that I am writing this post
C1 - Therefore my thought may or may not have been determined

P1 - If Determinism is false, then my thoughts have not been determined,
P2 - I have the thought that I am writing this post
C1 - Therefore my thought has not been determined

P1 - If Determinism is true, then my thoughts have been determined
P2 - I have the thought that I am writing this post
C1 - Therefore my thought has been determined

Having a thought is not sufficient evidence for either Determinism or Free Will. — RussellA

I don't see the point to any of this. As I said, free will concerns the capacity to act, in general. Thinking is one type of act, and the question is whether having contradictory thoughts at the same time is evidence of free will or determinism. You fear that it is evidence against determinism, so you deny the obvious, that we have contradictory thoughts.

2. The determinator catches up and re-determines from when an improbable act occurs. — Barkon

What's "the determinator", the hand of God? Is that like if your clock gets left behind, you have to reset it or else all your actions get at the wrong time?

If it were possible to have two contradictory thoughts at the same time, then I could feel pain in my finger and not feel pain in my finger at the same time. — RussellA

One example of contradictory thoughts, which you personally would not have, does not prove that contradictory thoughts, in general are impossible. As I said, contradictory thoughts are present in deliberation. Accordingly, if a person does not know whether oneself is feeling pain in the finger or not (perhaps that person is just learning the meaning of "pain"), and the person is deliberating on this, one could be considering both thoughts, I am feeling pain in my finger, I am not feeling pain in my finger, as real possibilities, at the same time.

A cyclist multi-tasks when they pedal and watch the road ahead at the same time. But thoughts about the road ahead should not be confused with the muscle memory of pedalling, which doesn't require thoughts.

A student multi-tasks when writing an essay and listens to music at the same time. But thoughts about what to write should not be confused with an instinctive pleasure in hearing music. — RussellA

Muscle memory does not exclude conscious thought. People whistle while they work. The work clearly requires conscious thought, but so does the whistling, just like pedaling a bike, and walking require conscious thought. We do not pedal, or walk without any conscious thought.

The issue is that when we multitask in this way, we prioritize one action over the other, paying more attention to one than the other. However, if you have ever taken a look at how this multitasking actually occurs, you'll see that there is constant switching of which act receives priority. So if whistling while you work involves a difficult aspect of work, attention will be focused on the work, but if the work is significantly mundane, effort can be focused on practising the whistle. In general, there is a continuous balance of priority between the two, enabling both efforts to flow smoothly, but the moment that a difficult aspect of one or the other is apprehended, more attention is focused in that direction. Notice, that's "more attention", not all of one's attention. this is the way that goals and intention work in general, we prioritize things.

I agree that there is ongoing debate amongst neurologists etc., concerning how many different tasks a person can "focus" on. But the problem with most experimental data available is that the scientists involved in these questions start with a faulty premise of what "focus one's attention" means. They assume the phrase to mean directing one's attention toward one activity only, and they judge experimental data from this perspective, neglecting the other things of lower priority, within one's field of attention, assuming the one thing is the only thing focused on . However, this excludes from the outset, the possibility that "focus one's attention" means to prioritize a number of things within one's field of attention. From that faulty premise, the prioritized activity becomes the only activity within one's attention.

I have many memories, none of which I am actively thinking about at this moment in time. — RussellA

This does not resolve the problem. The issue is the existence within a person's mind, of contradictory ideas. You deny the reality of this fact, so you point to a person's actions, and say that a person cannot express, or demonstrate, through speaking, or writing, contradictory ideas at the very same moment. But all this really does, is demonstrate the physical limitations to a human beings actions.

So, I have proposed that we look at a person's memory, where we can see very clearly that a person very often holds contradictory ideas within one's mind, through the use of memory. You reply by saying that you are never "actively thinking" about all your memories at the same time, again appealing to the limitations of activity. However, your appeal does not provide the argument you need. It is very clear that we actively think about a multitude of ideas at the same time, that's exactly what the act of thinking is, to relate ideas to each other. The use of memory allows us to increase the number of ideas currently being thought about, by relegating those with lower priority at a specific moment, to memory, then bringing them back when priority demands. Further, it is very clear that we "actively think" about contradictory ideas in the process of deliberation.

What has become very clear, is that when we include memory as part of the mind, there is no doubt whatsoever as to the fact that a person can have contradictory ideas within one's mind. However, since you are unwilling to accept the reality that people have contradictory ideas within their minds, you have now proceed to exclude the memory as part of the mind. All your are doing is demonstrating that you will take ridiculously absurd steps to support an untenable position.

Philosophy has as its purpose the desire to learn. If your prejudice is so strong, that you are forced into absurd assumptions to support this prejudice, instead of relinquishing it, to adopt a more true path, I consider you are not practising philosophy at all, but professing faulty ideas.

If I had not been born, then I would not be writing this post
I am writing this post
Therefore I was born

If Determinism is the case
then all thoughts are determined
I have the thought that my thoughts are not determined
therefore my thought that my thought has not been determined has been determined — RussellA

To make a proper comparison, you would need to say, as the second premise in the first argument, "I have the thought that I am writing this post". But then you do not have a valid conclusion. So, to be consistent in your analogy, and to have valid conclusions, we have to state the second premise of the second argument as ""my thoughts are not determined".

This is why the words in the proposition "should I stay or should I go" are sequential. First one asks "should I stay" and then at a later time one asks "should I go". — RussellA

Speaking is a physical act, and that requires a choice to say one or the other first, as I said. However, the fact that they cannot both be said by the person at the same time does not imply that the person cannot have both ideas within one's mind at the same time.

Clearly people multitask, so they are thinking different ideas at the same time, required to do a number of different things at the same time, even though they cannot say everything that they are doing, all at the same time. S o why can they not have contradictory ideas at the same time?

The fact that people have many different ideas in their minds at the same time (required for multitasking) demonstrates that the subject matter of your criticism is just a limitation on the physical capacity of speaking, not a limitation on the capacity of thinking. How do you account for a person having many different ideas, in one's memory, all at the same time, which one cannot all say at the same time? Not being able to say everything which one has in one's memory, all at the same time, does not imply that the person doesn't have all those ideas in one's memory, all at the same time.

If Determinism is the case, and determines all our thoughts and actions, then your thought that you are free to choose is just another of those thoughts that have already been determined. — RussellA

Sure, you can state irrelevant conditionals, just like I can say that if I was not born yet, I would not be writing this right now, but such conditionals are not relevant to reality.

The question was, how does introspection reveal to you that determinism is the case, and free will is an illusion. Your if/then statement reveals nothing more than "if I was not born yet I would not be writing this right now" reveals. How do I get from this to believing that I was not born yet? And how do you get from your if/then statement to believing that determinism is the case?

This is what you are saying: it was determined since the beginning, thus I have no control. That's false. What's true is that if it was determined since the beginning, it's probable that the acts that follow are the determined ones. — Barkon

In this form of determinism, how do you account for acts which fall outside of being probable, the acts that occur which were not probable? These would not be deterministic, and there would be a whole lot of acts which follow from each improbable act, all not determined from the beginning.

Cons-creative, itself, must have a cause, and therefore is not the first cause.

Are you positing cons_creative as the first cause? — ucarr

No, like I said, it's the cause of cons-reactive, not necessarily the first cause. This makes the rest of your post seem irrelevant

Therefore, free will only applies if I choose between picking up the cup of coffee and not picking up the cup of coffee at 1pm exactly. — RussellA

This is a faulty argument because your designated time of "1pm" is completely arbitrary, and not representative of the true nature of time. As indicated by the relativity of simultaneity a precise designation of "what time it is", is frame of reference dependent.

But this means that at 1pm I have two contradictory ideas in my mind at exactly the same time. But this is impossible, meaning that free will cannot be a valid theory.

I have seen evidence that a person can have two contradictory ideas consecutively, but I have never seen any evidence that a person can have two contradictory ideas at the same time. — RussellA

As I explained in my last post, having two contradictory ideas at the same time is exactly what deliberation consists of. "Should I stay or should I go". The Clash, a fitting name.

"Critical thinking", and philosophy in general, is all about comparing contradictory ideas. A philosopher holds these contradictory ideas within one's mind, at the same time. It is the judgement, the choice to act on one or the other, consequently the physical action itself, that results from the judgement, which cannot be both. Furthermore, denying that people can hold contradictory ideas at the same time, denies the reality of much human misunderstanding.

The problem here, is that you are treating a human subject as if one is a material object, to which the fundamental laws of logic (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle), apply. This is a mistake of sophistry which Aristotle keenly exposed, and he demonstrated the misunderstanding which this sophistry propagates, thousands of years ago. The reality, as shown by Aristotle, is that if we adhere to the three fundamental laws of logic in cases involving human decisions, sophists can logically prove absurdities. The "sea battle tomorrow" is his famous example, of why the fundamental laws cannot be applied to subjects. In more recent times, C.S. Peirce has done considerable work on this issue.

You have described a world where things obey the laws of nature, but I don't see where you have explained why things obey the laws of nature. — RussellA

Why would I even try to do that? What I explained, is that some people use "laws of nature" to explain why things behave in a consistent way, describable by the laws of physics. This is a sort of governance, similar to the governance of "God". What's the point to even asking why matter obeys God, if you do not even believe that matter obeys God. That would be a ridiculous question to ask. You'd be asking why does Y follow X, when you do not even believe that Y does follow X. Any one who tried to answer you would be engaged in an exercise in futility.

I thought free will referred to our being free to have whatever thoughts we wanted — RussellA

Free will is the ability to choose freely.

I agree that a person can have two contradictory thoughts consecutively, but it would be impossible for a person to have two contradictory thoughts contemporaneously. — RussellA

Do you agree, that by the special theory of relativity, event A could be prior to event B from one frame of reference, and posterior from another frame of reference? Since a human being is composed of many different parts, moving in many different ways, many different frames of reference are available within one human body. Therefore your stipulation of "contemporaneously" is completely unwarranted, and nothing but an arbitrary, fictional condition, imposed for the sake of your argument, when it's not a truthful representation of reality in any way.

How do you know that we are free to choose?

How do you know that we don't live in a causally determined world, where our actions have been causally determined? — RussellA

I know that I am free to choose, from introspection, analysis of my own experience.

Here's a simple experiment you can try yourself, in the comfort of your own home. Hold a small, soft object in your fingers, extended at arms length, and decide that you will drop it at some random time in the near future. Hold it for a short time, and notice that you can decide to drop it at any random time, without any causal influence, just a freely willed choice to let it go.

Unlike a pool table, where, once in motion, the balls can only end up in one exact arrangement, due to the laws of physics. — Patterner

However, someone can at any moment, reach in and stop the balls from moving in that predetermined way. And this demonstrates that free will has superiority over determinism, a phenomenon known as "the hand of God", which renders "miracles" as other than impossible.

Grab them by the pussy and see if they let him force himself on them, while the peanut gallery enjoys vicariously.

No. Suppose a person has the idea to reach out for a cup of coffee.

On the one hand, assuming free will, a person can have the idea to reach out for a cup of coffee. On the other hand, assuming there is no free will, a person can also have the idea to reach out for a cup of coffee.

Having an idea is nether evidence for or against free will. — RussellA

I don't see how this is relevant.

My point has been that I don't accept that a law of nature precedes an event and makes things act the way they do. — RussellA

Then you do not accept my explanation.

At 1pm a person has the thought to reach out for a cup of coffee.

Free will means that at 1pm that person could equally have had the thought not to reach out for the cup of coffee. — RussellA

Free will is not about the thoughts, it concerns the acts.

It is not possible to have two contradictory thoughts contemporaneously, both to reach out and not reach out. — RussellA

Yes it is possible, and your example demonstrates this. The person, at 1Pm, entertains both, the thought of reaching out for a coffee, and the thought of not reaching out for a coffee. That's what choice and deliberation is all about, having contradictory thoughts at the same time. From this condition, a choice is made. And because it is possible for the person to choose either of the two contradictory ways of acting, we conclude that the will is free. It is not forced by any cause, in one direction or another. There is a cause of the act, which is the will itself, but the will is not caused to choose one or the other.

It seems that if free will is equally free to act on the thought of reaching out rather than not reaching out, then it is equally free to act of the thought of not reaching out as rather than reaching out. — RussellA

Right, doesn't your own personal experience demonstrate the truth of free will to you? You are equally free to reach out for the coffee, or to not reach out for the coffee. You are free to choose.

I don't believe in particular that thoughts can cause themselves, and I don't believe in general in spontaneous self-causation.

One reason for my disbelief in spontaneous self-causation is that it is something I have never observed.

When I see a billiard ball on a billiard table start to move for no reason at all, then I may change my mind. — RussellA

Haven't you seen parts of your body start to move without being acted on by an external force? If the "reason" for movement is an immaterial "idea", then this is evidence of free will. Isn't it?

Law of nature has more than one meaning. — RussellA

I was the one who used "law of nature", and I gave you the explanation of the sense in which I was using it. It makes no sense for you to say that you want me to have been using it in a different way, because that would better support what you belief in.

One of the reasons I don't believe in free will is that it requires self-causation, where the thought one has is contemporaneous with the decision to have the thought. — RussellA

The concept of "free will" does not involve self-causation. I don't see where you get that idea from. Thoughts are the property of a being with free will, just like arms and legs are. We do not decide to have thoughts, just like we do not decide to have arms and legs, but this doesn't mean that we do not also have a free will.

When you talk about the conflict between cons_creative and cons_reactive, you invoke an implication there is something that cons distorts when one of the modes is embedded in the other mode. This distortion implies something causal to cons that cons, in its effort to perceive it, distorts. This causal something seems to be Kant's noumenal realm. — ucarr

What is distorted when cons-creative is embedded within cons-reactive, is cons-creative. This is because that embedding is a fundamental misunderstanding which requires a distortion, of cons-creative, to allow for that model. The "something causal" is cons-creative itself, and attempting to understand cons-creative as embedded within cons-reactive is a misunderstanding because it fails to recognize the priority of cons-creative, and the fact that cons-reactive is a creation of con-creative.

My main premise in our dialogue says that Russell's Paradox shows how logically there can be no unified and local totality. I infer from your argument you posit cons in the position of first cause. In the context of our dialogue, this looks like a version of panpsychism, since you think cons exists at the level of elementary particles. Although this seems to be an argument for cons as first cause, Russell's Paradox, by my argument, forestalls cons (and everything else) as first cause; it shows that logically there is no first cause. — ucarr

It only produces the conclusion of "panpsychism" through equivocation between less-restrictive definitions, and more-restrictive definitions. This problem, I pointed out earlier. That is also the base of Russel's paradox, equivocation of "set". In one sense, "set" means a collection of objects, in another sense, "set" means a defined type. The latter sense allows for an empty set, the former sense does not.

A man might imagine the problem of getting through a rough mountain pass is solved by human flight over the mountain range. This act of imagination, however, will go nowhere if it's not eventually supported by facts, science and engineering. Can you show how facts, science and engineering support free will and immaterial soul? — ucarr

I told you how free will is supported. All you did was insist that free will may be an illusion. I invited you to take a look at the support and explain how it is possible to apprehend free will as an illusion. I'm still waiting for that.

Introspection
If a person has free will, through introspection they are free to reject the idea that they have free will, and conclude that they live in a deterministic world.

If a person has no free will, during introspection, it may have been pre-determined that they accept the idea that they have free will.

Introspection is no guide as to whether free will is an illusion or not. — RussellA

The issue is not "whether free will is an illusion or not". It is whether the person believes in free will or not. If you can demonstrate to me how introspection revealed to you that free will is an illusion, and you live in a deterministic world, and how this introspective perspective inclined you to believe that free will is an illusion, I will listen to you. Perhaps I misunderstood my introspection which inclined me to believe that free will is true.

It depends what you mean by "Law of Nature", because it has two possible interpretations. — RussellA

That is why I have been very explicit in explaining to you the meaning which I intended, and I even quoted a reference.

Possible meaning two is the reason why an object at rest will remain at rest until acted upon by an external force — RussellA

This is not a possible meaning for Newton's first law. It would be a misinterpretation, a misunderstanding. No "reason why" is given for that law, it is stated as a descriptive fact, just like "the sky is blue" states a descriptive fact. And to interpret "the sky is blue" as giving a reason why the sky is blue would be a misunderstanding of what is stated, just like interpreting "an object will remain at rest or continue moving in a straight line at a constant velocity unless acted upon by an external force" as giving a reason why an object will remain at rest or continue moving in a straight line at a constant velocity unless acted upon by an external force, would be a misunderstanding of what is stated.

If this Law is external and prior to any particular object, and applies equally to all objects in space and time, then this raises the practical problem of where exactly does this Law exist?

If the Law is internal and contemporaneous within particular objects, and all objects in space and time follow the same Law, then this raises the practical problem as to why all these individual Laws, both spatially and temporally separate, are the same?

How exactly can there be a single Law of Nature that determines what happens to objects that are spatially and temporally separate? — RussellA

Yes, these are problems which could be discussed. However, I see no reason to discuss them if they are just proposed as reason to accept the illogical premise of contemporaneousness. Once you reject contemporaneousness as illogical, I'll be ready to discuss these other issues.

Consider a symbol whose rule for its interpretation is lost. Though meaningless, the symbol still exists.

Consider a symbol whose rule for its interpretation is known. The rule can be read and understood. The logic supporting the rule can be read and learned. Where in this sequence is something created from nothing? — ucarr

Who said anything about "something created from nothing"? I said that the rule, for using the symbol, is prior in time to the symbol's existence, as the reason for its existence.

Consider that in our dialogue, as dialogue, there is nothing prior to consciousness. Can there be something prior to consciousness? — ucarr

How does this make sense to you? You are asking me to take as a premise, that there is nothing prior to consciousness, and then asking me if there can be something prior to consciousness. That would be blatant contradiction.

If creativity means something from nothing, that's the paradox of nothingness being an existing thing. If creativity means re-arranging pre-existent things, that's equating creativity with permutation, a false equivalence. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. — ucarr

I think the problems that you have with this issue are due to the conditions which you set up for yourself. Why do yo see the need to set out conditions such as these? Just like the above example where you asked for a blatant contradiction, this makes no sense to me. Why do you insist on "something from nothing" as a condition?

Distinct and incompatible are non-equivalent. — ucarr

Sure, but I am explaining them as incompatible. And "distinct" is a form or type of "incompatible". Incompatible is the broader term, with a wider application, and "distinct" is more specific.

Reverse engineering has no problem recreating the creation of the apparatus from the opposite direction: final state →
→
initial state. — ucarr

Perhaps, but that doesn't address the point, which is to get to the reason behind the existence of the thing, what is prior to the initial state. Consider the title of the thread, "what does consciousness do". I answer that it is an act which produces "the initial state". If reverse engineering looks at "states", it does not apprehend the activity which produces the states. Therefore reverse engineering does not apprehend the activity prior to the initial state. This issue is very evident in quantum mechanics. The engineering produces "particles" (states), but it does not apprehend the activity which produces the particle (referred to as wave function, and wave function collapse).

The will to create pre-supposes a sentient. The existence of a sentient in turn pre-supposes an environment from which the sentient is emergent. — ucarr

Again, you are just employing contradictory conditions. Why do this to yourself? You impose terms upon yourself which create an impossible to solve problem.

The issue here pertains to accessing Kant's noumenal realm of things in themselves, i.e., "being" without encountering the problem of the perceptual distortion you describe. If what you say is something you know, and not merely conjecture, then it must be true that you can do this. Show me that you can. — ucarr

I never said anything about "Kant's noumenal realm". Again, you are imposing terms designed to create difficulty in understanding. Why do this to yourself?

What do you make of Russell's Paradox as it relates to the origin boundary ontology you equate with omnipresent mind?

Note - The paradox shows that, logically, a set cannot be a sub-set of itself. In order to overthrow "existence precedes essence," you have to produce some logic showing there exists a context wherein a set being a sub-set of itself doesn't entail an uncontainable paradox. It's the uncontainability of the paradox that explodes establishment of an internally consistent origin of existence.

The problem is the reason for a posited material reality independent of mind. It's this originating part of the Big Bang science can't reach. — ucarr

Now, you describe things in terms of Russel's paradox, and set theory. Then you say "you have to produce some logic showing there exists a context wherein a set being a sub-set of itself doesn't entail an uncontainable paradox". But why do you even refer to set theory at all. By defining "objects" in terms of "sets", all you do is impose extremely difficult conditions on yourself. These conditions are designed to place "objects" outside our capacity of understanding, by making the constituent elements of a set unintelligible, and telling us to simply take them for granted.

Again, why use terms which create difficulty for yourself, rather than looking to actually understand the issue?

I'm wondering how a zero-mass apparatus could be built by the positive-mass agency of humans. — ucarr

If you believe in free will, and the immateriality of the soul, then you would not represent the agency of human beings as "positive-mass". Therefore this would not be an issue.

See what your post demonstrates? You reject the terms and conditions (free will, immaterial, soul) which are specifically designed to make all the aspects of these problems you bring up intelligible, comprehensible, and solvable. And you insist on employing terms which create contradictions, and paradoxes, creating unsolvable problems. Since we construct and choose our premises and axioms, why not take the ones designed to solve the problems, which the other ones create?

I think it is more likely that Free Will is an illusion than an actual thing. — RussellA

Personally, I don't see too much point in discussing philosophy with someone who doesn't believe in free will. The entire discussion would then have to revolve around persuading the person that they have the power (free will) to change that belief. And this "persuading" would have to carry the force of a deterministic cause, to change that person's mind, which is contrary to the principles believed in by the person who believes in free will. This makes the task of convincing a person of the reality of free wil an exercise in futility. The only way that a person will come to believe in the reality of free will is through introspection, examination of one's own personal experiences.

The question is, is it strictly true that "descriptions of the way the world is" are posterior to events and "principles which govern the natural phenomena of the world" are prior to events? — RussellA

The answer to that question is "yes", by the reasoning I gave.

There is an overlap in Laws of Physics and Laws of Nature. — RussellA

No, there is no overlap, for the same reason that there is no overlap of the map and the territory. An overlap would require that the map is mapping itself, but that would produce an unintelligible infinite regress, like looking into a mirror with a mirror behind you.

The Laws of Physics are the map (description), and the Laws of Nature are what is supposedly described by the map, as explained in the article I referred.

By observing many times that the sun rises in the east, by inductive reasoning, I can propose the law that "the sun rises in the east". It is true that this law is posterior to my observations. But it is equally true that this law is prior to my observing the next sun rise.

When does a law become a Law of Nature? — RussellA

OK, so take your example here. "the sun rises in the east" is the inductive, descriptive "law", which is posterior to your observations. The proposed "Laws of Nature" are what forces the earth to spin the way that it does, causing the appearance of the sun rising in the east.

If for hundreds of years hundreds of scientist have observed that F=ma, then this is sufficient for F=ma to become a Law of Nature. — RussellA

Not at all. The proposed "Laws of Nature", are whatever it is which causes bodies to act in that consistent way, the way which makes F=ma appear to be true.

Speaking in a parallel, I don't believe grammar, an organizing principle that takes words and organizes them into sentences, paragraphs, chapters and books, creates written language. No, grammar organizes written language. The organized sounds of the spoken word get organized into written signs that can be interpreted by a standardized organization, i.e., grammar. — ucarr

I think you need to look at written symbols independently from written words. Then you'll see that there is necessarily "a grammar" behind any writing of symbols. The written symbol may be essentially a memory aid, or something like that, and there is necessarily a rule, as to what the symbol represents. Without that grammar, which tells one how to read the symbol, the symbol would be useless. Likewise, in the organizing of letters to create words, there is a grammar required. Generally, in English, each letter represents a sound. You'll notice that in some languages, a written symbol often represents an idea, and hieroglyphics is taken to be a combination of these two. In an acronym each letter represents a word. These are all different "grammars".

You might wish to restrict the meaning of "grammar" to a more formal sense, so that this type of rule does not qualify as "grammar", but then we still have to account for the reality of this type of "rule", which is used to create written language.

Likewise, as I'm saying, consciousness takes partially independent material objects that, at the quantum level, exist prior to consciousness - itself a construction from parts - and organizes them into navigable environments. So, consciousness is a material phenomenon that provides a function that parallels the syntactical function of grammar. — ucarr

This analogy does not work. As demonstrated above, with the reality of written language, the parts themselves, each mark or symbol, is created according to a rule or rules. So if we wish to maintain your analogy with quantum particles, we must say that the "material objects" are not independent, they are created intentionally, according to some rules. So if you want to maintain the principle that these parts exist prior to consciousness, then we need to allow intention prior to consciousness, as what creates the parts. Then we have a formal meaning of "consciousness", as what arranges the parts, just like the formal meaning of "grammar", as what arranges the symbols, but we still need "intention" as prior to the parts, creating them, just like we need "rules" as prior to the symbols.

First, you say there are aspects of reality consciousness can work with. That's consciousness in reactive mode. — ucarr

Working with something is not the reactive mode, it is the creative mode. This is evident from the fact that we can work with completely passive things, moving them around to build something. That you interpret what I wrote, in this way, demonstrates misunderstanding.

Didn't you already say consciousness_reactive and consciousness_creative are fundamentally incompatible? Doesn't this imply that consciousness can only be one or the other, with switching between the two modes being impossible? — ucarr

No, I meant that the descriptive principles, the descriptive modes are fundamentally incompatible. If we describe consciousness as reactive, that description is fundamentally incompatible with a description of consciousness as creative. This is a feature of the rules which apply to making such descriptions. Consider the difference between describing a past event, and describing a future event for example. We use the past tense of verbs to describe the past, and future tense to describe the future.

Notice how the incompatibility between the two descriptive modes is understood as an incompatibility between two features of reality. This is a product of the reactive mode. All such "representation of reality" is the reactive mode. So adherence to the reactive mode produces the appearance that "consciousness can only be one or the other". This is because the reactive mode cannot apprehend the creative mode except by analyzing the effects of the creative mode. This is what I described as observations through the apparatus. This approach cannot understand the creative mode which built the apparatus, because it always interprets through effects, what have occurred, the past.

From the perspective of the creative mode, however, both of the two apparently incompatible features of reality can be understood, as incompatible due to the descriptive modes employed, and these are created. This means that the supposed independent reality does not necessarily consist of incompatible features, only our (created) modes of representing reality has produced this appearance. This leaves the consciousness itself as capable of understanding reality. The required separation is not between the consciousness and the independent reality, as an independent reality is only "supposed" by the consciousness, as part of its creative functions. The required separation is between the will to create, and the effects of this, the creation.

The will to create, itself, does not require the assumption of a separate independent reality, as it takes absolute freedom as its premise. And absolute freedom denies any external constraints. It is only after the act of creating, when the consciousness observes what has been created, that the constraints of the external world are observed, in their effects, that the consciousness is inclined to create the two incompatible representations, one representing the will to create, in absolute freedom, and the other representing what has been created, as having been restricted.

If I'm not mistaken, there is no continuity between incompatible things. By this reasoning, past and future must be compatible given the natural continuity between them. Clearly, the functional present, when seen relativistically as the future in relation to the past, contains overlap with the past. If there were no compatibility between the two - not to elaborate on the problem of them existing as such only in relationship to each other - it seems to me there could only be an eternal present. An eternal present is hard to make sense of when we entertain the concept of progress. — ucarr

The issue outlined here helps to demonstrate that the problem of incompatibility is a problem with the representation, not a problem with "reality" itself. The concepts of "past" and "future" are aspects of the representation. The incompatibility exists here, within this conceptualization. The "being" of consciousness, at the present, demonstrates the continuity between the two, and that the incompatibility is somehow an incorrect representation.

The problem can be seen to be the assumption of an "independent reality". Placing reality as "independent" removes the consciousness, and its creative acts, from "reality", leaving only the observed "past" as "reality". Then the consciousness's creative acts are interpreted as reactive. Modeling the consciousness's creative acts as reactive rather than creative is what produces the incompatibility. This misplaces the creative acts, as "at the present" instead of modeling them as "in the future" with an overlap of future and past, as you describe. The reality of the overlap of future and past is what allows for the incompatibility to be resolved. But this idea necessitates a breakdown of "independent reality", which is what "special relativity" accomplishes. Then we are left with the consciousness only, no assumption of "independent reality", and we must start with a primary premise which respects the reality of the consciousness itself, as the will to create.

This argument seems to contradict your prior argument: "...the past in its reality, is incompatible with the future, in its reality." — ucarr

That is what happens when we assume an "independent reality". We assume the consciousness to be at the present. The independent reality is the past and future, and all of temporal existence, as distinct from the perspective of the consciousness, which then is understood as a "point in time", which provides the grounds for temporal measurements. But the "point in time" then is distinct from the "independent reality", which is a requirement for the idea of "independent". Now, the "point in time" is an eternal principle, as distinct from temporal existence, which the consciousness can insert anywhere into the supposed independent temporal existence, to produce temporal measurements.

However, this "point in time", which is derived from that assumption of "independent reality", is really a faulty principle, as "special relativity" indicates. Now the "point in time", which is representative of the consciousness's "present", as distinct from "independent reality", must be reworked, to allow that "the present" is actually a duration of time combining both future and past. This is the way to dissolve, or resolve, the apparent incompatibility between past and future. We take the consciousness's "present" as a combination of the will to create, and the experiencing of the effects of this will to create, without the need to assume any "independent reality".

Your above statement contains an issue. Inertia can be overcome, and it is overcome too many times to count. Einstein's equation, by explaining change of momentum through mass/energy equivalence,
establishes the fact that where's there's inertia, there's also energy, and thus past and future, being consistent along the channel of mass/energy equivalence, are not incompatible. — ucarr

We do not need to discuss this, but the incompatibility is evident in the difference between invariant (inertial) mass, and variant (relativistic) mass.

I take your above statement to be a logic-based attack upon E=MC2

=


2
. As I see it, the gist of your argument says: the equation tries to make a claim based on Mode A interpreted in the context of Mode B, but this must be a faulty claim because Mode A and Mode B are incompatible. — ucarr

Yes, the problems of E=MC2, as demonstrated by the difference between invariant mass and variant mass, demonstrate the incompatibility between the Newtonian (mass) perspective, and the Einsteinian (energy) perspective.

Can you show how inertia examples determinism? — ucarr

The inertia perspective, is derived from Newtonian laws of motion, which state as the first law, that a body will continue to move in a regular way, as it has in the past, indefinitely into the future, unless forced to change. That is the determinist perspective, that a cause of change is required. Notice that the way I stated it, as "indefinitely into the future" the determinist infinite regress of efficient causation is signified.

Are you assuming the human individual can exist untethered from mass/energy? — ucarr

I don't understand the question. These are temporal concepts, "mass", "energy". We do not need to employ them. In theory we could completely annihilate them, and build a different conceptual structure.