I wince and am piqued by a righteous anger. Like I said, you can only ever suspend your disbelief to a certain extent, but it does get suspended. — thewonder

So, then, like I said, it's not full or actual belief. It's some kind of semi, quasi, pretend belief.

So, when playing Baldur's Gate, do you cry out in pain when the slime hurts your characters?
Or when your beserker goes beserk, do you run around on a rampage?

And "could be" implies that this is a pretty atypical scenario. So, it doesn't really apply to the majority of people most of the time when engaging fiction. So what are the majority of movie goers experiencing most of the time when they watch The Slime?

How would that be a pleasurable movie experience for you?

You think you feel the same kind and magnitude of fear watching a film-slime as you would a real-slime?

So do you run from the room when the Slime appears on the screen?

Even better: pretend belief. I'm only pretending to believe for the duration of the book.

So you don't actually fully believe the story you're reading. You just mildly believe it? Or semi-believe it? Or almost believe? Or only kinda believe?

Getting back to your original contention: thus I was perfectly correct in stating that I even as a child never actually believed illogical things without losing the ability to imagine them, because those are two entirely different forms of belief (if you want to stick with the word belief, which I still think is wrong, but we can call it "semi-belief" for the sake of the argument).

So how do you explain not running from the Green Slime when watching a horror movie? If you, even temporarily, believe the Slime to be real, then you'd run for the hills, or smash your tv with a baseball bat, or some other safety maneuvers rather than sit their and munch your popcorn.

Pattern-chaser seemed to be saying it's the case for him. — Terrapin Station

Just cause he says it, doesn't make it so.
I think he's confusing imagination, suspension of disbelief and actual belief.

Not all the ideas resulting from a creative excursion are good ideas. :wink: — Pattern-chaser

Not when you believe fiction to be a true account of history.

I wouldn't doubt that maybe some people actually believe fictions in some way. — Terrapin Station

In what way?
Sure, some people who read Tolkien might believe theoretically in magic or elves or stuff like that, but do they believe LoR is a historical account of a real world?

If you truly immerse yourself in a story, and its world, you might start to think in terms of the story and its environment being real, — Pattern-chaser

That's how we wind up with stuff like Scientology.

Again, I'm just curious about what you have in mind.

It seems like maybe we're using "belief" differently. — Terrapin Station

Of course it's belief. It's acceptance of the story, and the world wherein it takes place, for the duration of that story. This is NOT worth disputing to this degree. It's a side-point of a side-point. Let's leave it here. — Pattern-chaser

As many philosophers have already pointed out (Kendall Walton for example) you don't actually believe fiction you're engaging with. If you did, then watching The Green Slime would send you screaming from the room, seeking help and safety.

Walton also points out, that (for example) when you're playing monster with a little kid, you can tell the moment they forget they're just imagining, because they go from smiling and laughing and shrieking in pretend terror to crying and being actually upset.

https://www.academia.edu/38273657/le_bon_dieu_nest_pas_comme_%C3%A7a.docx?auto=download

This is the most sensible talk about transgender people and transgender metaphysics I have come across so far. Perfectly captures my view on the matter at least.

How sad. Even as a child, when your imagination and creative-learning ability was at its peak? What a shame. :fear: — Pattern-chaser

Terrapin already pointed this out, but I'll reiterate: creativity and imagination have nothing to do with actually believing. I still very much enjoy Tolkien, but was unaware that I therefore believe in Ents and the Dark Lord!

I'm late to the party, but what is "new atheism" and how is it different from "old atheism"?

I can't imagine there's much more to say than, "I gave up believing in that which is impossible, illogical, and for which there is no evidence when I was a child."

There's perfectly a coherent metaphysics of sex, gender or sexual orientation. People just have to realise they aren't talking about the fact a penis exists. Or that any instance of anatomy exist. Or the fact of someone being attracted to the opposite sex. That sex, gender or sexual orientation is it's own fact about a person itself. A truth not given by properties (e.g. "I'm a man because I have a penis"), but rather one given in itself (e.g. "I am a man") which occurs alongside their properties (whatever those might be, be they a penis or a vagina, burly or scrawny, short hair or long, etc.) — TheWillowOfDarkness

I can accept that (many, not all) aspects of gender are social constructions.

It makes no sense to define sex as such. Sex refers only to biology. You're born male/female/intersex, and that's just the reality you have to live with and can choose to shape your gender presentation around.

Those claims can be categorised along with many religious, supernatural, and conspiracy theory claims. They can be filed away in the "special cabinet", i.e. the dustbin. — S

That's my intuition as well.

I've been told that they'd rather people just ask them directly instead of staring and being awkward around them, — S

I can imagine that would be weird :snicker:
I don't think philosophical differences should be a reason to stare or be awkward. Anything beyond the theoretical aspects is just none of my business.

Simple - if a man were to tell me he feels like a woman, considers himself one, and would like to be treated like one, I would respond "ok." What more do we need to know. — T Clark

I would agree with treating anyone how they like to be treated. I'm not sure why that entails believing them about their self-id. There are countless examples of self-id that we do not and should not take at face value, so there have to be other criteria to believe it.

I don't literally believe the part about being in the wrong body, but other than that, I don't see why the rest of it should be so hard for you to understand. Just go watch a few videos about transgender females by transgender females themselves on YouTube, or better yet, meet some in person. I've done both. And I think it has little to do with metaphysics. It has more to do with psychology and social science. — S

I agree it's boils down to psychology and social science in essence. But then you still have many (not all, it's not a uniform group in their thinking) transgenders insisting that they "really are" a woman/man. And that is a metaphysical claim, which they have (to my knowledge) never fully explained.

If you have an resources that do explain it, I'd appreciate it if you provided them here instead of just waving nebulously into the wilds of the interwebs. :wink:

Oh, and I have met many transgender and gender fluid people. The latter tend to make more sensible claims, in my opinion. But apparently it's not good form to ask them to explain transgenderism. It's considered "questioning their existence." Which is unphilosophical, but, hey, that's what fora like this one are for.

This is way outside my experience, but it seems to me that biological men who feel as if they're women and who want to live as women in their societies would see living in accordance with society's gender roles as a benchmark to show that they are truly women — T Clark

I have yet to hear or read an explanation by anyone that maps out the metaphysics of transgenderism.
What is a "true woman"?
What does it mean to "feel" like one?
What about you can be "in the wrong body"?

Yes, it's a totally different experience. For one, you're staring at the words half the time, not the picture.

But specifically regarding the language, there are thousands of little linguistic phrases and witticisms that just don't translate.

Example:
Hard enough to translate something like "It's like the pot calling the kettle black." This a foreigner might be able to figure out after a moment's thought. But then you have native speakers so used to the phrase, they play around with it, like "Hey Pot! Meet Kettle" which couldn't make much sense to a foreigner who's unaware of the original quip.

Also, if you're not a speaker of the language, you may not understand the cultural references. For example, in German (my second language) we say something is 08/15 if it is common, standard, and often not very exciting. To understand, you'd have to know that the standard gun used by German soldiers in WW1 was an MG 08/15, and it crept into the colloquial from there.

So, I think watching something even as a fluent non-native might lead you to miss out on some things, if you're not also fluent in the culture.

But, with a really good movie, you're only going to miss out on a very tiny percentage of the overall experience that way, and I don't think it should cause anyone to stop watching foreign films they enjoy!

Define suicide.

Is a terminally ill patient who will die in 3 months of agonizing pain and suffering anyway and who therefore intentionally ODs on morphine or just refuses treatment committing suicide?

Is a pack-a-day smoker committing suicide?

Is a soldier who throws himself on a grenade to save his comrades committing suicide? Or the mother who shields her son from gun-fire in an active shooter scenario?

Or is it just the depressed guy who shoots himself because his girlfriend cheated on him and took all his money?

Some of these are irrational and immoral, others are rational and moral, perhaps even altruistic.

Riddle me how these two statements are compatible:

This whole issue is one of human value, not truth. — T Clark

I can't trust them to understand the true value of other people. — T Clark

I dont think youre ready for it. Thats why I'm done. — Mark Dennis

Okay. You're welcome to feel that way.

I guess you're not ready for this conversation right now.

Let me know when you want to be kinder toward a fellow griever. I'm here for you then.

I thought you were done talking to me?

I'm really very much open to having this conversation with you. I think it could be cathartic for the both of us. But it won't work if you get angry with me for disagreeing with you.

I'm done talking about this with you. You arent understanding what I'm saying and you clearly lack the background knowledge of the material on this matter that I have. — Mark Dennis

I'm sorry you feel that way. I hope you can come back when your feelings about the matter are less raw.

This seems like a very dangerous idea to me. Saying humans are to be valued in the same manner as spiders may increase the respect paid to animals, but it will devalue the respect due to people. — T Clark

Whether it's dangerous has no bearing on whether it's true.
But I also deny that it's dangerous, because I deny that it could devalue humans. When we recognized the personhood of black people, it did not devalue white people.

Both trivialize our humanity. — T Clark

That's just silly. We don't need to be at the apex of some silly hierarchy in order to be valued and valuable.

Ok, at the time of conception, we agree that the fetus is not a person. Do we also agree that five minutes before birth, it is? — T Clark

I've already pointed out that personhood begins sometime between conception and birth.

I’m sorry but this here is nonsensical. — Mark Dennis

Okay...

If someone isn’t part of our moral community then they are a person. — Mark Dennis

Did you mean to say "aren't"? Cause I'm not sure what you're saying here otherwise.

In philosophy personal identity “persona” and your “personhood” are not the same. One is metaphysical, the other is a purely moral term. — Mark Dennis

Persona is actually a psychology term, but okay.
Personhood is a metaphysical concept in philosophy that has ethical implications. Like so much in philosophy, the categories overlap here. Like, whenever you debate "murder" in philosophy, you must first define what that means and then what the ethical implications are.

If something that isn’t on the time-space continuum can’t be valuable then why would philosophers ever think thought experiments, fictional literature, movies, TV and art ever be worth discussing through any form of value theory? Ethics is largely the study of value. — Mark Dennis

I thought I was pretty clear when I said they aren't intrinsically valuable? What you describe are all extrinsic or instrumental values.

You need to understand one thing in particular, the idea that foetus’s don’t have personhood is the very idea that leads to people causing harm to the grieving parents of miscarried children through denying their grief as real or equal to that of losing a child. — Mark Dennis

I don't know what psycho would deny that grief, but I deny the personhood of unborn babies before a certain gestational age, and yet I also understand (having, might I remind you, recently lived through it myself) that the grief is very much real.

Does a foetus have a persona or a personal identity as it where? No, is it part of our moral community? Yes. Are it’s parents? Yes. Can we see an allegory to real life racism within the world of Harry Potter? Yes? Does Harry Potter try to prescribe us ways of overcoming prejudice through virtues? Absolutely. So, if Harry Potter is a part of our moral community, by the way philosophy as a field defines it, Harry Potter has Personhood and so does my 10week miscarried child. — Mark Dennis

I was with you until you made the unjustified jump to personhood. Again, Harry Potter is valuable, but not a person just because of that. My gold watch is valuable, my laptop is valuable, heck, even my wedding dress as value to me--none of these things are persons. (Note, I am not equating the amount of value of any of these items with a fetus, merely the kind, and that only in a sense of extrinsic versus intrinsic).

It is not my theory at all. The post-enlightenment definition of personhood is "an entity who recieves moral consideration." — Mark Dennis

That's really an incomplete definition.

I mean, even Harry potter has personhood as we give moral consideration to fictional worlds too. — Mark Dennis

No, he doesn't. He doesn't exist.

Studies after studies into trauma all say the same thing, the grief is the same. — Mark Dennis

That is entirely compatible with either of our positions.

it renders my lost child inferior to born ones? — Mark Dennis

But it really doesn't. It just says that it's value doesn't come from its personhood. A person derives value intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Many other things only derive it extrinsically. It's not a competition or a point-scale system though of what is most or more or equally valuable. You value the fetus, and therefore the fetus is valuable--this does not mean the fetus is or needs to be a person.

I'm sorry we dont agree. — Mark Dennis

That's okay. We don't have to. :grin:

"That's not the way it works" but I ask, how could you possibly know if it works this way or not? It can work either way. — Mark Dennis

I was very specifically saying your attempt to change the application of intrinsic value doesn't work that way. Which it just, by definition, doesn't.

Why do you think personhood can only be granted to intrinsically valuable entities and what argument do you employ to justify that which is intrinsically valuable must physically exist in the present? — Mark Dennis

To the former: Because I define persons as sentient and cognizant beings, and such beings value their own existence (by and large), which makes them intrinsically valuable.

To the latter: Because if it existed in the past, I'd have to way "it was intrinsically valuable" and if it will exist in the future, I'd say "it will be intrinsically valuable" and if it doesn't exist at all in any space-time continuum, it can't be valuable and it is in fact nonsensical to talk of its value.

I don't agree, but there is a legitimate non-religious, non-moralistic case to be made. — T Clark

I did go on to entertain Mark's theory about personhood, which would include conception for at least some very wanted blastocysts--so I think your charge of unfairness is unfair :joke: :smile:

Anywho: what is the "legitimate, non-religious, non-moralistic" case you're referring to? (Assuming you're not referring to Mark's theory.)

'm not trying to be cute, but for engineering and legal purposes in the US, land is generally said to begin at the mean high water (MHW) elevation, which varies from location to location. I think MHW is established by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). That's the sort of approach some legislatures are trying to use for the beginning of personhood by restricting abortion after a certain term of pregnancy. — T Clark

Well, okay. But you get my point.
And, yes, I agree with legislation that tries to find a reasonable point within pregnancy to identify fetuses as persons. I realize that makes the laws complicated, but I think it's more accurate and ethical that way.

I agree that a fertilized ovum is not a person, but many people do not. So, it's clear to you and me, but not to everyone. — T Clark

I assume most people to whom it may not be clear are making those claims on the grounds of what some deity allegedly said or on the basis of ensoulment. Once you have that talk in the mix, the conversation is over--you no longer have enough common ground to stand on.

But, okay, since Mark is making this case on the basis of extrinsic value contributing to personhood, I'll rephrase: we can clearly see that a fertilized ovum has neither the sentience nor the cognizance to be intrinsically valuable to itself. Along the lines of my argument, that makes it a non-person, though a potential one.

If we say that the parents have intrinsic value and hold extrinsic value to the unborn child, then can’t we say the unborn child has an anchor of intrinsic value through its parents? — Mark Dennis

I don't think it works that way. :) The unborn child is then extrinsically valuable to an intrinsically valuable entity, which makes it very valuable indeed, but not intrinsically so.

Whereas the grief is generally better understood and supported externally when it was a born child. Yet there is no difference psychologically? — Mark Dennis

Personally, if I ever lost my son, that would be much worse than the grief I've had over a miscarriage. I think most people feel the same way once they actually have a live, born child. But I assume that it's highly individual and I would understand a grieving parent's feelings at any stage in development.

When parents identify with really wanting the child however, I think it might in fact already be a person by this argument. — Mark Dennis

I just don't see on what basis you're defining personhood here. That would imply that unwanted fetuses are not persons, or fetuses who's existence is yet unknown are not persons. There is no physical difference between a wanted and an unwanted fetus, and from the perspective of the fetus, nothing changes. I think it's important to come up with a definition of personhood that applies equally to all fetuses regardless of their external circumstances.

Would you say animals are persons? — Mark Dennis

'Animals' is a very large category. It ranges from mollusks to the great apes. I think great apes, dolphins, and dogs (for example) are persons. I think clams mostly likely are not persons. And I'm uncertain about insects and the like, though I have read some interesting articles about the cognitive abilities of spiders, which pushes me toward a strong maybe.

So for me, I agree with the idea that a person is someone who is given moral consideration, even if their identity only exists in the abstract to the parents up until it becomes a physical object where personhood resides. — Mark Dennis

First of all, I appreciate this thread. You're digging deeper than the whole "is abortion right or wrong" into what really matters to that debate: personhood.

Also, my condolences to you and your wife. Having been through the same thing recently, I can sympathize with your pain and the uniqueness thereof. It's like grieving, but over what or whom?

As for the where this current discussion stands, I'd like to make a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value. (See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry here for a more detailed explanation, if you're so inclined.)

Briefly, intrinsically valuable is a thing or person who is valuable in and of themselves, regardless of the value judgments of others, while extrinsically valuable is that which is valuable only on the basis of the value we ascribe to it (dollar bills, for example, which other than our agreeing to see them as being so and so valuable, are just fairly gross cotton rags).

I think a person is usually placed in the intrinsic category. You and I are valuable just because we are persons and because we exist. We also can be extrinsically valuable to our friends, family, and society, but that is not the only way in which we matter.

What you describe above is a description of an unborn child being considered a person because of their extrinsic value. I agree that this value exists and that it is important and makes the child matter morally. However, it does not make it a person. It is a potential person, but not yet fully there.

A person is, in my opinion, defined by a list of necessary and sufficient conditions, such as sentience and cognizance. These develop over time in the womb, and it may be hard or even impossible to pin point where the fetus is a full person. However, we can clearly see that an ovum is not a person, a fertilized ovum isn't either, but a 8 and 1/2 month old baby is.

As for the worries about differences between Downs people, low IQ people, and highly intelligent people if we rest personhood on cognizance, I think the analogy of a beach is apt. You can't quite say where the ocean ends and land begins, because of the moving tide and so on. But at some distance away from the beach you know, this is land, and it doesn't matter how far you go inland, it doesn't become more land just because it's further away from the ocean. It's all equally land.

Anywho, just a couple of thoughts.

Looks to me like maybe you have done some of this wish washy, half lie, half truth rubbish and you want some positive reinforcement. — Razorback kitten

Well, that ad hominem just came out of nowhere.

That it's not the same as lying? — Razorback kitten

I'm afraid you seem to be missing the whole point here. He IS lying. But he IS telling the truth technically. It's both at the same time.

Well, yes, but since it is technically the truth, it is both the truth and a lie at the same time.

I'm trying to come up with a good example...

Like, for instance, if wife confronts husband about cheating:
"I saw you with Susan in the park yesterday! Admit it, you're cheating on me!!"
"Honey, I would never cheat on you with Susan! I love you, and anyway, Susan is gay."

She (perhaps) hears that he's not cheating on her, but actually he is, it's just with Mary, who is not gay, but bi-curious, and even though he does love his wife, he's gotten a little bored in their marriage, and furthermore she spends more time at the country club than with him, so who could blame him, really?

:joke:

It depends what you mean.

I can say something that is technically true, but know that the person I'm speaking to will hear it a certain way that is actually a lie.

Or his son-in-law and daughter!

The Angry Creamsicle

Orange-Tufted Imbecile Intent on Armageddon