Well, condolences, if they are due, but then family lore has it that my own mother miscarried five times before I was conceived, so it’s not the end.

It might be worth recalling that the origin of the word ‘person’ is ‘persona’ which was the mask worn by the actors in Greek dramas, to depict the character they were playing. I think ‘person’, ‘self’ and ‘ego’ are pretty well interchangeable terms. And, I don’t think that newborns are persons - they have yet to form as personalities. This however doesn’t mean they don’t have the intrinsic rights accorded to individuals. But until they learn to differentiate themselves, or recognise themselves as ‘me’, then I don’t think they’re persons as such.

As for the existential issues that you’re grappling with - I have found a measure of solace through Buddhist meditation and philosophy. An important part of that is actually seeing through the sense of the apparent solidity of the person or ego; that we exist in relationship with others and indeed with everything. That is the work of meditation - gaining insight into the way ‘thought creates thinker’. Actually on that note, there are some very good centres and teachers around teaching mindfulness meditation as an antidote to existential dread - see for example the books of Jon Kabat-Zinn and Mark Epstein, or the Oxford Centre for Mindfulness Research.

http://oxfordmindfulness.org/

https://amzn.com/0465050948

https://amzn.com/0316411752

When do we begin to have personhood?

Somewhere between zygote and the grave, I suppose. I view "personhood" as a continuum.

All that a zygote 'has' is the DNA of its parents, and a temporary location. With luck, the zygote will move through the stages of development and become a human baby in about 9 months, and then be thrust out into the world. A cigar, but no person. Another much longer period of time is required before the young human can begin to apprehend "self" and begin to direct its self-development. All this time DNA, parents, siblings, playmates, caregivers, teachers, climate, diet, the biome--the terroir (think of what gives a wine a particular flavor) is shaping this person. Personhood is beginning to emerge. We can see the sculpture emerging from the stone

By adulthood, the human is closing in on personhood. Perhaps we have 'built out' 50% to 99.9% of the personhood we might ultimately have. For the next 15 minutes on to 80 years, we progress, but we are always on the way to the final act of becoming. We never arrive at Full Personhood. So, personhood may become richer and deeper and wider and higher. It may plateau early on. It may begin to shrink--by disease, for instance (Alzheimers) or by a slow flagging of will, of interest, of vitality.

A 'more fulfilled personhood' is possible and I wish it for any and all. Alas, not all will progress the same way.

Dying is the person's final experience and death is the end.

Sorry for the personal nature of this post. However, where does a philosopher go for therapy? As if the psychologist or psychiatrist could be prepared to deal with the kind of existential depression that comes hand in hand with increasing ones understanding of the nature of reality, or the clear ethical conflicts of duty that arise when our personal lives are rocked by tragedy and we have to consider the world we bring our children into or whether we even should bring any into it? — Mark Dennis

For some problems, you may have to heal yourself. There ain't no cure for the global warming blues Terrifying? Indeed it is. Difficult choices? Absolutely.

IF you need a therapist, I think you will find that there are psychologists and psychiatrists who are familiar with existential despair. Finding a good practitioner is always tricky. Good luck.

Sorry for the personal nature of this post. However, where does a philosopher go for therapy? As if the psychologist or psychiatrist could be prepared to deal with the kind of existential depression that comes hand in hand with increasing ones understanding of the nature of reality, or the clear ethical conflicts of duty that arise when our personal lives are rocked by tragedy and we have to consider the world we bring our children into or whether we even should bring any into it? — Mark Dennis

I’m sorry for your loss. Truly.

Psychiatry cannot help the existential depression of a philosopher. They prescribe meds, and I don’t think meds would be helpful in your case. IMO meds should only be used to treat serious disorders where the person would be a danger to herself or others without them. A lot of people need meds, but I think they’re overprescribed.

As @Bitter Crank suggested, there may be psychologists or therapists out there who can help a philosopher, but I haven’t had such luck myself. I see a psychiatrist, but I’ve had bad experiences with therapists.

What @Wayfarer suggested about meditation may be helpful. I’ve not been successful with it due to my thought disorder, but it probably would help you if you found the right guide.

Best wishes to you.

I genuinely feel for your loss. The immense value that these unborn children had for you and your fiancé is real, regardless of any evidence of being in time, and their impact on you in this respect reflects their personhood in your experience, despite what anyone else believes. So if they had died at the age of one, I would say that the loss you now feel would seem to be shared by others to the extent that they shared your experience of valuing that child’s personhood, their unique potential, and had opened themselves up to its impact upon their own. Then I guess the child’s value would at least appear more real, and you would perhaps feel less alone in your grief, so long as you had the courage to connect and work together in coming to terms with your loss, as I imagine you would now with your fiancé. But otherwise I would think the grief itself would be the same.

In the same respect, the value that you then attribute to future generations, regardless of your genetic connection to them, is a choice only you can make. If you value anything about the potential universe beyond your own finite physical existence, then you can work towards realising that potential in some way. You make the connection and attribute value to it. You open yourself up to being aware of and valuing the unique potential of others, to allowing their potential to collaborate with your own and enable you to contribute in greater, more meaningful ways. Genetics has nothing to do with it, in my opinion. It’s only an awareness that contributes to your perception of value, in the end.

In doing so, however, you also open yourself up to experiencing more pain and loss, because each of us only has a finite physical impact on the universe anyway, despite our efforts. I’m afriad I can’t sugar-coat that for you. You can attempt to disconnect from what you value, pretend to value less and try to minimise your impact on the universe in an effort to minimise suffering, but in my view that isn’t really living, is it? I think at some point we have to realise that pain, loss and vulnerability are part of life, humbly accept our share of it, and focus on what we can do together to share the load without adding to it. Because I think our unique potential to achieve anything is only increased by our connection and collaboration with others.

With the way things are going now, does my grief make logical sense? Or should I feel glad that my child won’t share in the probably horrible fate bringing them into this world will bring to them? Should I keep trying to make this world a better place for future generations so the grief makes more sense? What if my worst fears should be realised and I find out I cannot have children? Should I still contribute even though none of those future generations will be of me? — Mark Dennis

I don't know if you've seen them, but there are lots of discussions on the forum about anti-natalism. "On Anti-natalism" is currently on the front page, but it's already 500 posts long, so it may be hard to get into.

Sorry for the personal nature of this post. However, where does a philosopher go for therapy? As if the psychologist or psychiatrist could be prepared to deal with the kind of existential depression that comes hand in hand with increasing ones understanding of the nature of reality, or the clear ethical conflicts of duty that arise when our personal lives are rocked by tragedy and we have to consider the world we bring our children into or whether we even should bring any into it? — Mark Dennis

I've read that some philosophers who convinced themselves that there is not free will committed suicide. There is plenty of psychological, physiological depression around without creating more out of thin air.

All that a zygote 'has' is the DNA of its parents, and a temporary location. With luck, the zygote will move through the stages of development and become a human baby in about 9 months, and then be thrust out into the world. A cigar, but no person. — Bitter Crank

When a person becomes a person is a matter of convention. Some thoughts:

• Black people used to be considered 3/5 of a person. Or was it 2/3.
• It says "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all [People] Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness…." So, that doesn't apply to newborns?
• I've said this many times - babies come out of their mothers already the people they are and will be. So much of temperament and personality is there from the very beginning. Probably before the beginning.
• Which brings us to the problem of abortion. I support women's right to choose whether or not to have a child. That doesn't mean I don't recognize that personhood develops sometime between conception and birth. Something important is lost when a pregnancy is ended. Abortion is a bad method of birth control.
• Of course, Republicans think that life, and personhood, begins at incorporation.

When a person becomes a person is a matter of convention. Some thoughts: — T Clark

I had intended to say that very thing, but didn't. Quite so: For various purposes we can define a person as an object, and we do. From the POV of the person as subject, personhood develops over time, with a gradual awareness of personhood. This gradual appreciation of ones own personhood continues to develop throughout life. All persons pursue their self realization within the constraints of their individual reality, which can range from impoverished to rich (in various ways).

Let me drag in another contentious issue: the movement of humans across borders, and the term "Illegals".

There is nothing at all inappropriate about defining an unauthorized entrant into a country as an "illegal"--illegal alien, illegal immigrant, illegal whatever, because this definition is limited to whether they are here or there with authorization from the state, or not. It doesn't affect or apply to their existential personhood.

Immigration activists, it seems to me, behave as if the term "illegal" applied to the person's existential quality. It does not.

Nations are fully entitled to differentiate between legal and illegal entrants into the country, in order to protect the interests of the citizens who make up the nation. Both authorized and unauthorized border crossers are full persons with the usual human mix of laudable and lamentable motivations and characteristics, but they are also "legal" or "illegal".

States and citizens had better sort out this very difficult problem, because more and more people are going to wish to be somewhere else as life on the planet becomes more difficult. On the one hand, we feel for the suffering of persons; on the other hand, we want to protect--we should protect--our own interests.

There will not be enough room in the coolest, richest, most pleasant geography for the populations of the hottest, poorest, least pleasant places on the heating, overcrowded map, especially if the most pleasant places have a chance of remaining pleasant. I don't know what the solution should be -- I don't know how we are even going to attempt a conclusion on the matter.

It isn't even a question of race. People in Scotland won't want all the southern English people fleeing heat and flooding. People in Northern France won't want everyone from the hot parts of France and Spain to move there. People in Northwestern European countries certainly won't be happy if all the hot, thirsty, hungry people from France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, et all decide to move into Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and NW Russia. 4 million lily white Minnesotans don't want 30 million lily white southerners arriving on their doorstep.

States and citizens had better sort out this very difficult problem, because more and more people are going to wish to be somewhere else as life on the planet becomes more difficult. On the one hand, we feel for the suffering of persons; on the other hand, we want to protect--we should protect--our own interests. — Bitter Crank

The governments of Europe opened their borders to refugees from the Syrian civil war. If my memory is correct, about a million. The migration has had a significant negative impact on the host countries. The amazing, heartening thing to me is that they agreed to let them in. Somebody, probably someone in Germany, probably more than one, deserves a Nobel Peace Prize. I can't imagine that will be a feasible solution if what you fear comes to pass.

It wasn't as if Europe had a lot of choice. The refugees from the Syrian state disaster just "arrived". Hungary was excoriated (or praised) in the press for putting up a fence, and channeling refugees THROUGH, but not TO Hungary.

Arrivals by the ones and twos ask to come in, because before 1 or 2 at a time, the door is easily kept closed. Hundreds of thousands of refugees, economic migrants, opportunity seekers, people fleeing disaster don't generally ask if they can come in, because they are more like a fluid mass who push the door open. Short of setting up banks of machine guns on their shores and borders, how was Greece to resist the arrival of so many? They, being civilized people, did their best to care for the arrivals before they moved on. Once in Greece, the refugees had arrived in Europe.

One of the lessons here is: If you don't want near by countries to collapse into shit holes, then help them. This idea certainly applies to Central America. We could stem, even reverse, the flow of migrants from Central America by a comprehensive development program which could do for the area what the Marshal Plan did for Europe. And we should, since we have been fucking this region over for what, a century at least, and longer.

One of the lessons here is: If you don't want near by countries to collapse into shit holes, then help them. This idea certainly applies to Central America. We could stem, even reverse, the flow of migrants from Central America by a comprehensive development program which could do for the area what the Marshal Plan did for Europe. And we should, since we have been fucking this region over for what, a century at least, and longer. — Bitter Crank

That seems very intelligent and moral to me. Good luck getting the conservatives to tax and spend, though.

“This however doesn’t mean they don’t have the intrinsic rights accorded to individuals.” Here we have run into where classical person and the modern personhood differ. Personhood has also been defined as “An individual worthy of moral consideration.”. However not many like this definition as it leads to potentially defining non-human individuals as persons for we give moral consideration to both fictional characters and animals. Parents start considering their moral obligations to future offspring quite early, sometimes even before conception. Although they don’t fully consider it until pregnancy has been confirmed.

So, in the case of the Greek persona; We need to be cognisant that one can predict some of the aspects of a persona before the bearer of it arrives. Some of it will be predictable by knowing the parents, family history and even by the culture they are born in. For example, it is quite easy for me to be accurate when I say, all children born in Mecca are Muslim, because only Muslims are allowed in Mecca. So any children born in Mecca will identify their persona having Islam in it in some way whether this is lifelong faith or a later life rejection of the faith.

I think this ties into what T Clark was saying earlier
“I've said this many times - babies come out of their mothers already the people they are and will be. So much of temperament and personality is there from the very beginning. Probably before the beginning.
Which brings us to the problem of abortion. I support women's right to choose whether or not to have a child. That doesn't mean I don't recognize that personhood develops sometime between conception and birth. Something important is lost when a pregnancy is ended. Abortion is a bad method of birth control.”

So, if we are defining personhood as someone who is due moral consideration, or as someone who is getting moral consideration regardless of whether it is right that they do so; Does this change the outlook at all?

Side bar: Thank you for all your messages of support and advice. I find this community to be immensely fruitful and helpful when it comes to philosophical questions making an appearance in our personal lives.

I’m against anti-natalism for one reason, impractical and impossible. While I can see the logic in the anti-Natalist view, there is simply no way for a society to enforce this as a prescriptive methodology without overstepping peoples human rights and it would be near impossible to police. Case and point; Apartheid Africa, where despite being illegal at the time, many mixed race children were still born, for example Trevor Noah.

Then we have the issue of downs, there is a professor with Down’s syndrome who spoke about abortion in the instance of downs being detected. I forget his name but it’s probably an easy search away which I’ll do later to satisfy my curiousity then I’ll put a link here to what he says. However the point of what he said, was that people with Down’s syndrome live very happy and meaningful lives despite their shortcomings. Low IQ is only really a good measure of learning rate and they can learn, adapt and overcome some of their shortcomings just like anyone else.

So for me, I agree with the idea that a person is someone who is given moral consideration, even if their identity only exists in the abstract to the parents up until it becomes a physical object where personhood resides.

So for me, I agree with the idea that a person is someone who is given moral consideration, even if their identity only exists in the abstract to the parents up until it becomes a physical object where personhood resides. — Mark Dennis

First of all, I appreciate this thread. You're digging deeper than the whole "is abortion right or wrong" into what really matters to that debate: personhood.

Also, my condolences to you and your wife. Having been through the same thing recently, I can sympathize with your pain and the uniqueness thereof. It's like grieving, but over what or whom?

As for the where this current discussion stands, I'd like to make a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value. (See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry here for a more detailed explanation, if you're so inclined.)

Briefly, intrinsically valuable is a thing or person who is valuable in and of themselves, regardless of the value judgments of others, while extrinsically valuable is that which is valuable only on the basis of the value we ascribe to it (dollar bills, for example, which other than our agreeing to see them as being so and so valuable, are just fairly gross cotton rags).

I think a person is usually placed in the intrinsic category. You and I are valuable just because we are persons and because we exist. We also can be extrinsically valuable to our friends, family, and society, but that is not the only way in which we matter.

What you describe above is a description of an unborn child being considered a person because of their extrinsic value. I agree that this value exists and that it is important and makes the child matter morally. However, it does not make it a person. It is a potential person, but not yet fully there.

A person is, in my opinion, defined by a list of necessary and sufficient conditions, such as sentience and cognizance. These develop over time in the womb, and it may be hard or even impossible to pin point where the fetus is a full person. However, we can clearly see that an ovum is not a person, a fertilized ovum isn't either, but a 8 and 1/2 month old baby is.

As for the worries about differences between Downs people, low IQ people, and highly intelligent people if we rest personhood on cognizance, I think the analogy of a beach is apt. You can't quite say where the ocean ends and land begins, because of the moving tide and so on. But at some distance away from the beach you know, this is land, and it doesn't matter how far you go inland, it doesn't become more land just because it's further away from the ocean. It's all equally land.

Anywho, just a couple of thoughts.

I really appreciate your contribution to this discussion.

“What you describe above is a description of an unborn child being considered a person because of their extrinsic value. I agree that this value exists and that it is important and makes the child matter morally. However, it does not make it a person. It is a potential person, but not yet fully there.”

I agree with the sentiment that extrinsic value alone cannot grant personhood. However, in the case of whether or not the grief of a lost child is the same as the grief of a lost pregnancy; If we say that the parents have intrinsic value and hold extrinsic value to the unborn child, then can’t we say the unborn child has an anchor of intrinsic value through its parents?

As far as psychology is concerned, the trauma of losing a pregnancy and of losing a child have the same impact on the parents, the difference lies in how we seek support for this. Typically because they know others hold no extrinsic value for their unborn child they keep quiet as miscarriage has an air of taboo in our society. Whereas the grief is generally better understood and supported externally when it was a born child. Yet there is no difference psychologically?

I’m for abortion in the instances of rape, underage, far greater threat to life of the mother than is generally acceptable.

When parents identify with really wanting the child however, I think it might in fact already be a person by this argument.

Would you say animals are persons?

Conservatives spend plenty, and all they have to do is divert a few billion from weapons systems to Central American Reconstruction (or some such moniker.

And what do you know; at the end of the previous sentence my laptop once again died. Screen went dark and it won’t reboot. So I am using a tablet now, which sucks. That’s twice since May. Perhaps it is time for the old computer to receive its last rites.

Conservatives spend plenty, and all they have to do is divert a few billion from weapons systems to Central American Reconstruction (or some such moniker. — Bitter Crank

That’s true, but as a Democrat or Democratic-leaning person, I was working under the assumption that we actually had to pay for these things and not just put it on Uncle Sam’s credit card. I seemed to forget how Republican minds work.

It wasn't as if Europe had a lot of choice. The refugees from the Syrian state disaster just "arrived". Hungary was excoriated (or praised) in the press for putting up a fence, and channeling refugees THROUGH, but not TO Hungary. — Bitter Crank

Germany let in more than 1,000,000. The US wouldn't let in 10,000.

One of the lessons here is: If you don't want near by countries to collapse into shit holes, — Bitter Crank

Well, we sure turned the whole middle east into a shit hole. Now Bolton and Trump want to do it in Iran too.

I’m against anti-natalism for one reason, impractical and impossible. While I can see the logic in the anti-Natalist view, there is simply no way for a society to enforce this as a prescriptive methodology without overstepping peoples human rights and it would be near impossible to police. Case and point; Apartheid Africa, where despite being illegal at the time, many mixed race children were still born, for example Trevor Noah. — Mark Dennis

Many anti-natalists, e.g. @schopenhauer1 here on the forum, do not propose legally enforcing their principles.

The greatest experiment in anti-natalism in human history - the one child policy in China - has turned out to be a disaster.

However, we can clearly see that an ovum is not a person, a fertilized ovum isn't either, but a 8 and 1/2 month old baby is. — NKBJ

I agree that a fertilized ovum is not a person, but many people do not. So, it's clear to you and me, but not to everyone.

As for the worries about differences between Downs people, low IQ people, and highly intelligent people if we rest personhood on cognizance, I think the analogy of a beach is apt. You can't quite say where the ocean ends and land begins, because of the moving tide and so on. But at some distance away from the beach you know, this is land, and it doesn't matter how far you go inland, it doesn't become more land just because it's further away from the ocean. It's all equally land. — NKBJ

I'm not trying to be cute, but for engineering and legal purposes in the US, land is generally said to begin at the mean high water (MHW) elevation, which varies from location to location. I think MHW is established by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). That's the sort of approach some legislatures are trying to use for the beginning of personhood by restricting abortion after a certain term of pregnancy.

As far as psychology is concerned, the trauma of losing a pregnancy and of losing a child have the same impact on the parents, the difference lies in how we seek support for this. — Mark Dennis

I think you'll find that many (most?) people will disagree with this. It certainly isn't true for me.

And what do you know; at the end of the previous sentence my laptop once again died. Screen went dark and it won’t reboot. So I am using a tablet now, which sucks. That’s twice since May. Perhaps it is time for the old computer to receive its last rites. — Bitter Crank

I think there's a pretty good chance that @Baden banned your computer. You should check with him.

First, it's important to realize that there are no true normatives. That is, truth is not a property that a normative can have. (This is with respect to your "should" questions, for example.)

Most takes on personhood have it that sentience is one of the most important aspects. Definitely fetuses are not sentient at the start--they don't even have brains at the start. It would at least require a particular stage of brain development for sentience to obtain (barring a good reason to believe that mentality, subjective experiences, etc. can obtain in other materials, which we'd need to specify). Are newborn babies sentient? That's more difficult to say. So personhood may not really kick in until sometime between late infancy/toddlerhood/being a young kid.

The reason that we consider babies due moral consideration is typically the fact that they'll develop into persons, and eventually into entities that are capable of and due consideration for granting or withholding consent, where that doesn't kick in fully until we consider them adults. So it's a very gradual process to that point--a process with lots of fuzzy boundaries, especially because we're dealing with individuals who don't all develop the same.

Most takes on personhood have it that sentience is one of the most important aspects. Definitely fetuses are not sentient at the start--they don't even have brains at the start. It would at least require a particular stage of brain development for sentience to obtain (barring a good reason to believe that mentality, subjective experiences, etc. can obtain in other materials, which we'd need to specify). Are newborn babies sentient? That's more difficult to say. So personhood may not really kick in until sometime between late infancy/toddlerhood/being a young kid. — Terrapin Station

A couple of definitions of "sentience:"

• Feeling or sensation as distinguished from perception and thought
• Sentience is the capacity to feel, perceive or experience subjectively.

I don't think you are saying that babies don't feel, perceive, or experience. Or are you? Is "sentience" the right word? Do you mean self-aware or conscious?

If we say that the parents have intrinsic value and hold extrinsic value to the unborn child, then can’t we say the unborn child has an anchor of intrinsic value through its parents? — Mark Dennis

I don't think it works that way. :) The unborn child is then extrinsically valuable to an intrinsically valuable entity, which makes it very valuable indeed, but not intrinsically so.

Whereas the grief is generally better understood and supported externally when it was a born child. Yet there is no difference psychologically? — Mark Dennis

Personally, if I ever lost my son, that would be much worse than the grief I've had over a miscarriage. I think most people feel the same way once they actually have a live, born child. But I assume that it's highly individual and I would understand a grieving parent's feelings at any stage in development.

When parents identify with really wanting the child however, I think it might in fact already be a person by this argument. — Mark Dennis

I just don't see on what basis you're defining personhood here. That would imply that unwanted fetuses are not persons, or fetuses who's existence is yet unknown are not persons. There is no physical difference between a wanted and an unwanted fetus, and from the perspective of the fetus, nothing changes. I think it's important to come up with a definition of personhood that applies equally to all fetuses regardless of their external circumstances.

Would you say animals are persons? — Mark Dennis

'Animals' is a very large category. It ranges from mollusks to the great apes. I think great apes, dolphins, and dogs (for example) are persons. I think clams mostly likely are not persons. And I'm uncertain about insects and the like, though I have read some interesting articles about the cognitive abilities of spiders, which pushes me toward a strong maybe.

'm not trying to be cute, but for engineering and legal purposes in the US, land is generally said to begin at the mean high water (MHW) elevation, which varies from location to location. I think MHW is established by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). That's the sort of approach some legislatures are trying to use for the beginning of personhood by restricting abortion after a certain term of pregnancy. — T Clark

Well, okay. But you get my point.
And, yes, I agree with legislation that tries to find a reasonable point within pregnancy to identify fetuses as persons. I realize that makes the laws complicated, but I think it's more accurate and ethical that way.

I agree that a fertilized ovum is not a person, but many people do not. So, it's clear to you and me, but not to everyone. — T Clark

I assume most people to whom it may not be clear are making those claims on the grounds of what some deity allegedly said or on the basis of ensoulment. Once you have that talk in the mix, the conversation is over--you no longer have enough common ground to stand on.

But, okay, since Mark is making this case on the basis of extrinsic value contributing to personhood, I'll rephrase: we can clearly see that a fertilized ovum has neither the sentience nor the cognizance to be intrinsically valuable to itself. Along the lines of my argument, that makes it a non-person, though a potential one.

I assume most people to whom it may not be clear are making those claims on the grounds of what some deity allegedly said or on the basis of ensoulment. Once you have that talk in the mix, the conversation is over--you no longer have enough common ground to stand on. — NKBJ

I don't think that's fair. I am not a member of any religion and don't have any beliefs in a specific God, but I don't think saying personhood begins at conception is ridiculous. I don't agree, but there is a legitimate non-religious, non-moralistic case to be made.

I don't agree, but there is a legitimate non-religious, non-moralistic case to be made. — T Clark

I did go on to entertain Mark's theory about personhood, which would include conception for at least some very wanted blastocysts--so I think your charge of unfairness is unfair :joke: :smile:

Anywho: what is the "legitimate, non-religious, non-moralistic" case you're referring to? (Assuming you're not referring to Mark's theory.)

It is not my theory at all. The post-enlightenment definition of personhood is "an entity who recieves moral consideration." So, if a couple decide they dont want their child then they arent morally considering it. If they do then they are. Therefore their choice to morally consider is what gives it personhood. I mean, even Harry potter has personhood as we give moral consideration to fictional worlds too.

The classical "Persona" is simply not fit for purpose anymore when it comes to defining personhood.

Furthermore, I mentioned the grief a parent in either case from a psychological perspective because that is the empirical basis. Studies after studies into trauma all say the same thing, the grief is the same. All the same stress chemicals released in the same amounts. Your culture dictates your reaction to it though. You can tell youself it isnt the same and consciously feel like it isnt the same, but neurology and endocrinology dont lie.

So, why cant I call my now lost child a person? Why should I listen or believe in the classical interpretation of personhood when it renders my lost child inferior to born ones? It had just as much promise and potential as any newborn and it meant just as much.

What is pragmatically true for our species, is holding future generations dear to us now is the best thing for our species. The potential for any newborn can be intrinsically valuable to humanity in and of itself as is the very idea of offspring.

I'm sorry we dont agree. Pragmatic ethics is all about using non-religious or non-moralistic arguments. Quite frankly if sciences is telling us that nuerologically the grief in either case is the same when the child is wanted, then whenever the child is wanted it is a person.

In an ideal world where all children were wanted and where childcare works the way it should then I'd encourage less people to get abortions simply because they are now persons in my perspective.

You might think this sounds strange or "That's not the way it works" but I ask, how could you possibly know if it works this way or not? It can work either way.

A few questions I have for you; Why do you think personhood can only be granted to intrinsically valuable entities and what argument do you employ to justify that which is intrinsically valuable must physically exist in the present?

what argument do you employ to justify that which is intrinsically valuable must physically exist in the present? — Mark Dennis

That indeed is the question.

It is not my theory at all. The post-enlightenment definition of personhood is "an entity who recieves moral consideration." — Mark Dennis

That's really an incomplete definition.

I mean, even Harry potter has personhood as we give moral consideration to fictional worlds too. — Mark Dennis

No, he doesn't. He doesn't exist.

Studies after studies into trauma all say the same thing, the grief is the same. — Mark Dennis

That is entirely compatible with either of our positions.

it renders my lost child inferior to born ones? — Mark Dennis

But it really doesn't. It just says that it's value doesn't come from its personhood. A person derives value intrinsically as well as extrinsically. Many other things only derive it extrinsically. It's not a competition or a point-scale system though of what is most or more or equally valuable. You value the fetus, and therefore the fetus is valuable--this does not mean the fetus is or needs to be a person.

I'm sorry we dont agree. — Mark Dennis

That's okay. We don't have to. :grin:

"That's not the way it works" but I ask, how could you possibly know if it works this way or not? It can work either way. — Mark Dennis

I was very specifically saying your attempt to change the application of intrinsic value doesn't work that way. Which it just, by definition, doesn't.

Why do you think personhood can only be granted to intrinsically valuable entities and what argument do you employ to justify that which is intrinsically valuable must physically exist in the present? — Mark Dennis

To the former: Because I define persons as sentient and cognizant beings, and such beings value their own existence (by and large), which makes them intrinsically valuable.

To the latter: Because if it existed in the past, I'd have to way "it was intrinsically valuable" and if it will exist in the future, I'd say "it will be intrinsically valuable" and if it doesn't exist at all in any space-time continuum, it can't be valuable and it is in fact nonsensical to talk of its value.