“It is not worth the bother of killing yourself, since you always kill yourself too late.” — Cioran
The problem is that Nietzsche tries to "abundance the hell" out of life.. by embracing the tragedy and having unbridled enthusiasm for life, we can somehow overcome it, and become some sort of ubermensch. This all rings hollow- — schopenhauer1
"I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain! One always finds one's burden again. But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises rocks. He too concludes that all is well. This universe henceforth without a master seems to him neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that night-filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy." — Albert Camus
The quietude of antinatalism, the rebellion against furthering the objectives of foisting more challenges on yet more people, is the rebellious stance against existence itself. — schopenhauer1
Just as a tiny bit of faeces has a bad smell, so I do not recommend even a tiny bit of existence, not even for so long as a fingersnap. — AN 1, 18
As I said, if the Buddhist path was simply that life is suffering, then indeed it would be pessimistic philosophy, but it says there is an end to suffering. You're assuming that the goal of the path is non-existence, which it isn't; it is said to be a state of utmost bliss. — Wayfarer
“Suppose, bhikkhus, a man would remove a hot clay pot from a potter’s kiln and set it on smooth ground: its heat would be dissipated right there and potsherds would be left. So too, when he feels a feeling terminating with the body … terminating with life…. He understands: ‘With the breakup of the body, following the exhaustion of life, all that is felt, not being delighted in, will become cool right here; mere bodily remains will be left.’ “What do you think, bhikkhus, can a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed generate a meritorious volitional formation, or a demeritorious volitional formation, or an imperturbable volitional formation?”
“No, venerable sir.”
“When there are utterly no volitional formations, with the cessation of volitional formations, would consciousness be discerned?” “No, venerable sir.”
“When there is utterly no consciousness, with the cessation of consciousness, would name-and-form be discerned?”
“No, venerable sir.”
“When there is utterly no name-and-form … no six sense bases … … no contact … no feeling … no craving … no clinging … no existence … no birth, with the cessation of birth, would aging-and-death be discerned?”
“No, venerable sir.”
“Good, good, bhikkhus! It is exactly so and not otherwise! Place faith in me about this, bhikkhus, resolve on this. Be free from perplexity and doubt about this. Just this is the end of suffering.” — SN 12.51
Well, the problem is posited with a solution. Otherwise, it would be pessimistic. — Wayfarer
I see you saying that life is mainly about the meaning one gets from it through roles in society or esteem from a role in society. That can be added maybe as another category, I'll grant that. However, it is not really saying much more than there is more intrinsic positive goods you can add to the equation, not that the hedonic view is wrong itself. Perspective can be simply part of the hedonic equation.
But you answered the question in the negative- no, the goods are not worth the negatives in purely hedonic terms. I'm adding "meaning through perspective" in hedonic terms. How else would you answer then? — schopenhauer1
Humans have a natural stance to fear death and fear the pain of death- that whole suicide trope is not a very good argument. — schopenhauer1
My only observation is, if it can happen once....... — Wayfarer
There is very much the utilitarian calculus of whether life is worth these six goods. If someone said, that all the neutral/negative states that are necessary to maintain these six intrinsic good states, are the cost of the six intrinsic goods, would you feel that it is worth it? — schopenhauer1
There is very much the utilitarian calculus of whether life is worth these six goods. If someone said, that all the neutral/negative states that are necessary to maintain these six intrinsic good states, are the cost of the six intrinsic goods, would you feel that it is worth it? — schopenhauer1
I think coming into existence as a conscious entity from nothing and ending up as one specific person at one specific location is puzzling. — Andrew4Handel
Yes, because there isn't a shred of credible evidence in its favour. — S
You don't exist as a person, as something conscious, etc. prior to conception, by the way. — Terrapin Station
Yeah, pretty much everything you said is in those two quotes. Ta-da! — Wallows
However, Locke continues, pleasure is an impermanent reward for the satiation of desires. True happiness arises from acting for the greater good. — ernestm
1. Pleasure is a drug
2. Medicine is bitter
What do you make of that? — TheMadFool
So, if I recall correctly Schopenhauer never advocated masking suffering with pleasure. He was for the idea of reducing suffering, not increasing pleasure. Not sure if this is pertinent, just wanted to point that out. — Wallows
Happiness is of a negative rather than positive nature, and for this reason cannot give lasting satisfaction and gratification, but rather only ever a release from a pain or lack, which must be followed either by a new pain or by languor, empty yearning and boredom. — Schophenaur
I know of no greater absurdity than that propounded by most systems of philosophy in declaring evil to be negative in its character. Evil is just what is positive; it makes its own existence felt. Leibnitz is particularly concerned to defend this absurdity; and he seeks to strengthen his position by using a palpable and paltry sophism. It is the good which is negative; in other words, happiness and satisfaction always imply some desire fulfilled, some state of pain brought to an end. — Schophenaur
It is a mistake all right, but who actually makes that mistake? When I say that I did not exist prior to my birth, I do not necessarily commit myself to such a self-contradictory notion as existing in a state of nonexistence - that is just your uncharitable interpretation — SophistiCat
When someone says ''nothingness before birth'' s/he's referring to the fact that we didn't/can't experience anything at all before we're born. In a sense we popped into existence at birth and some might say even later to, say when you're 5 or 6 years old, the earliest memories of experiencing something of this world. — TheMadFool
I agree that a Barbie doll is, in some way, already existent in the rubber and plastic material that go into constructing one BUT the form that is recognizable as a Barbie comes into being at a particular point in time and will disintegrate at another. — TheMadFool
"Well it's just inevitable. We have to just try to navigate it the best we can". But where is this have to get into the equation, as if there was no choice? We certainly can't take a break from the laboring and the keeping oneself alive altogether. It is something we can't get out of. A bad obstacle course or maze that we have to navigate, and cannot be escaped. — schopenhauer1
Is it actually coherent that before our births we did not exist in any sense? As if from a 'state' of parinirvana, a mind-stream has been formed (with it's inherent sufferings that have to be dealt with) for just a single blip of a lifetime, only to have its causes disassemble and the mind-steam ceases eternally. Like some sort of cosmic blip of suffering, in between timeless noncondition.
— Inyenzi
Actually, that's not too far off :D. — schopenhauer1
When I view a cube from any direction, at least two of the cube’s six faces will always be out of my view. For I must rotate the cube in order to see the hidden side. However, when I rotate the cube to view the hidden sides, at least two different faces (which were formerly visible) have now been obstructed by the now present faces. I am unable to see the entirety of the cube at once; however, I may be able to feel the entirety of the cube in my palm or if I trace my fingers around its edges and faces. I am, however, in possession of the Idea of the cube, I know how the cube can be put together as a whole from the contact with its parts. I have in mind a general Idea of how the cube is (through logical proofs), yet I am unable to perceive the cube in its entirety--relying solely on it being an Idea. — Fobidium
I don't think it is a mistake to find life burdensome, any more than it is to find it a fascinating and joyful privilege, well worth a few slings and arrows. But it is perhaps a mistake to make one's own condition a universal philosophy. — unenlightened
All satisfaction, or what is commonly called happiness, is really and essentially always negative only, and never positive. It is not a gratification which comes to us originally and of itself, but it must always be the satisfaction of a wish. For desire, that is to say, want [or will], is the precedent condition of every pleasure; but with the satisfaction, the desire and therefore the pleasure cease; and so the satisfaction or gratification can never be more than deliverance from a pain, from a want. — Schopenhauer
If the soul interacted with the body via a very weak force, it might elude the observation of physicists but its influence on the body would seem insignificant. If on the other hand the soul interacted with the body via a relatively strong force, this force should be detectable by physicists. —
I think part of what's going on with the philosophical pessimist 'mindset' is a projection from ones (miserable) conscious experience, out into the structure of the world.
So instead of, "my own conscious experience is a burden to me, I feel like all I do is get pushed and prodded by various sufferings/pains/deprivations into making various actions to strive against them, in some endless process with no overreaching purpose/meaning", the very personal, individualized nature of this conscious experience is projected outwards into the structure of the world: "the world is at it's core just suffering and striving". Schopenhauer's philosophy probably being the most flagrant example of this projection.
I think a solution to the pessimist mindset may be to stop the projection/extrapolation from your own conscious experience outwards entirely, and then to view your own conscious experience as being an individual, private, pathological experience. So what I mean is, instead of "the structure of the world is [as the pesimisst describes]", it's "my own life is experienced as a burden to me, and this is because I am a sick human being".
What difference does this make? Well, when the burdensome nature of your own experience is projected into the structure of the world, then there is no solution, or hope. What can you possibly do to alter the structure of the world? The only real 'solutions' seem to be suicide, or total world annihilation/antinatalism. Whereas when there is no projection outwards from your burdensome experience into the structure/nature of the world, the issue seems far more manageable. You can't change the structure of the world, but the structure of the world is not the issue here - the problem is merely your own pathological experience. You are just sick, and you can get better.
The whole project of philosophical pessimism strikes me as a sort of intellectual learned helplessness. People with quite obvious psychological sickness (call it anhedonia, depression, despair, etc) are drawn to the very philosophy that attacks and stifles any chance they have of getting better. Philosophical pessimism is something not to be argued against/debated, it's a pathology that is dissolved by getting well again.
So for example, to the anhedonic, it seems as if we merely eat because we're embodied within a being that has perpetual caloric needs, that suffers and pains us when it runs low, causing us to act against these pains/hungers. And so through this avoidance of hunger by the consumption of food, our existence and suffering (and ongoing need for calories) is therefore perpetuated. Which is actually what is happening for the anhedonic - it's not a wrong view of their own conscious experience. But the philosophical anhedonic/pessimist takes this very individual experience and projects it outwards into the structure of the world. It is as if everyone eats due to these same reasons. But the vast majority of the world gets actual genuine joy from eating, and judge the hunger pangs as a small, almost insignificant price to pay for the pleasure. The solution here is not for an ending of the anhedonics life, or a total ending of lives altogether - it's for the anhedonic/pessimist to find joy in eating again. — inyenzi
Most importantly, if we agree on what is the case, we can talk within the same context about what to do. — schopenhauer1
If this kind of being - one that reacted to all its perceptions in a way a human would, but did not have the perception of the conscious experiences or thoughts - what would its reaction to this then be like? — BlueBanana
Suicide I see as an ideation coping technique. The thought of it is more relief than the actual action. As Schopenhauer stated, — schopenhauer1
Suicide may also be regarded as an experiment — a question which man puts to Nature, trying to force her to an answer. The question is this: What change will death produce in a man’s existence and in his insight into the nature of things? It is a clumsy experiment to make; for it involves the destruction of the very consciousness which puts the question and awaits the answer. — schopenhauer
That is to say, that happiness is always on the horizon (hope swinging I mentioned in other posts). When goals are "obtained" are often not as good or too fleeting compared to the effort to get it. — schopenhauer1
So what exactly is the need for more people? What is the X reason? I think you have a well-stated post. Actually, it might be the most coherent response to the pessimist argument as it attacks the premises head on. So kudos to you. I still think the rebuttal, though well-stated, is still lacking in response to the pessimist's argument. As I mentioned with csalisbury, even if people do not see the bigger picture, it does not mean that something is still not going on here. Why does that new person need to be born? What is this trying to accomplish? Eventually the argument will come back to the idea of circularity, instrumentality, absurdity, etc. That is a vicious circle that would be hard to break in argument. — schopenhauer1
You try to make the not-so-subtle switch from apokrisis preferences to the world-writ-large. What apokrisis does is balance, what the evil antinatalists do is romanticism. Yet, we are both doing choosing our habit patterns to look away from the void. I am just peeling off the layers to see the barebones of it- what Schopenhauer called "will", I'll call existential striving at the bottom, dressed in goals we give ourselves. Keep outrunning the boredom at the bottom of things etc. etc. — schopenhauer1