What operation? For this operation it doesn’t, for that operation it does. I’m not going to guess which one you’re talking about. — Mww

If you traced back what you wrote, you just kept on saying that judgement has nothing to do with reason. But then now you seem to have changed your words talking about "the other operation.", and tell us you won't guess which one. It is not a straight forward way of discourse.

Good luck finding where I said judgement are concepts. If I didn’t say it, what possible ground could there be for you to claim a misunderstanding of mine related to it? — Mww

It would be much helpful if you could / would just explain the unclear things in straight forward manner instead of keep beating around the bush.

While this is correct, do you see the fault in judgement in supposing it has been the case with respect to this conversation? And if there’s no evidence for the case other than mere observation of the disparity in our respective comments, and even if that assertion never was directed towards this conversation in the first place, what purpose is served by stating the obvious? — Mww

Your misunderstanding seems to come from thinking judgements are concepts, and judgements have no association with reasoning in the operation. If this is the case, what is the purpose of reason in CPR? What does reason supposed to be doing in the minds?

Nahhhh. To understand Kant is to think as if in his place and time. Work with what he worked with. You didn’t read in that link, where the author said pretty much the same thing? That people are apt to misunderstand him because they’re using asymmetrical conditions in attempting to arrive at congruent conclusions. Sadly, KAnt must be wrong because he’s three hundred years ago. — Mww

Judgement is an act of judging. Concept is more close to definition. Judgement can have concepts in its content, and it is always in propositional form. That is what Bolzano said in The Theory of Science. I think that makes sense. If one says concept is judgement and they are the same, then it doesn't sound right logically. If that is what Kant said, then one should point it out as an absurd idea.

Anyways, ok, we agree to disagree. :) Worshipping Kant as if he is some God, and CPR is the bible is not a good philosophy. It is, rather, a religion in disguise of the philosophy. :grin:

Further? This implies concepts are judgements, when they are in fact only representations. — Mww

It breaks the traditional meaning of judgement and concept. I am not sure if there is a point for insisting on the point apart from creating confusion.

For why judgement is needed, when there are already conceptions, consult A67-76/B92-101. — Mww

If that is really what Kant said, then you, as a serious reader of CPR, should be in a position to criticise the point, rather than blindly accepting it, and worshiping CPR as if it were a bible. If concept were judgements, then is the Sun the Moon? Is a dog a cat? Is an apple a bucket? It just creates unnecessary and unacceptable confusions.

CPR is not a bible to be worshipped. It has to be interpreted and understood in the making sense way for the present days. If it is not making sense, it is not worth it. I try to read it making sense way. Someone said "To understand Kant is to transcend him." I think he was right in saying so.

All judgements having to do with things, are of conceptions only. — Mww

If you already have the concepts of things, why do you need further judgements on them?
What are there to judge with things?

We will have to bring Kant back from the dead, — Lionino

You could join the time travel thread, and travel into the 1700s. :nerd:

Voilà, another interpretation of the term. — Lionino

Yes, there are many different interpretations even in the academic communities. Which one is the absolute true one?

All and each sensation, depending on its mode of intuition, is represented by its own conceptions. The compendium of those conceptions, synthesized in an aggregate series of relations to each other, gives the cognition of the thing as a whole. For those singular sensations, by themselves, not in conjunction with other modes of intuition, only judgements relative to that mode of intuition, that sensation, are possible.

Sufficient to explain why not all possible sensations are necessary to judge an object, and, that each sensation manifests in a possible judgement of its own, in accordance initially with its physiology, henceforth in accordance with the rules implicit in the faculty of understanding. — Mww

Not quite clear what you are trying to say here. Could you give some real life examples, where you can make judgements with conception only without any other mental faculties associated?

Judgement needs conceptions for its operation, proper or otherwise, such operation being the functional unity in understanding. — Mww

It sounds absurd to say judgements only need conceptions for its operation. It needs more than conception to operate. How can you judge if the apple taste good without having eaten it? Just by conception of apple, it is impossible to judge if the apple tastes good.

How can you judge if the Eiffel tower is taller than the Tokyo tower without measuring the heights and comparing the measurements of them? Can you do that with just the concepts of the towers?

What….so the associative theory of mind works like the relation of car parts, I understand the relation of car parts….obviously, since I presented it…..yet I don’t understand the associative theory of mind which is just like it?

Didn’t I mention that each member of a system works in conjunction with the others? — Mww

Maybe you did. Not sure. Anyway the point is that judgement needs reason for its proper operation.
Without reason, judgement will work. But without support of reason judgement will arrive at irrational conclusions.

Crap, I spoke too fast. Imagination synthesizes; judgement merely represents the synthesis. My badly stated shortcut, sorry. Productive imagination synthesizes conceptions, that is, relates the conception in the subject of a possible cognition, to the conception in the predicate, the unity of that relation is then called judgement. — Mww

:ok: Every mental operation is actually synthesis of the other mental operation and the sensibility. And human perception is not all automatic process. They must make efforts to perceive better in the case of perceiving tricky looking objects or the world objects with the scarce data due to the remote distance or the size of the objects which are difficult to observe.

In the case of the bent stick, initially it appears bent when it is not. It is a tricky case. Some folks wonder if the stick is really bent. This is due to reason has not been applied to their visual perception. Or they applied their reasons but not correctly. They synthesise into the wrong conclusions. Synthesis is the process of combining all the data available, but judgement concludes for the best validity or what appears to be truth with the available data with the help of reason.

That each member of a system operates in conjunction with the others, does not make explicit any have to do with the other. Pretty simple, really: the engine in a car has nothing to do with the rear axle, each being specific in itself for purpose and function, but without both, the car goes nowhere. — Mww

The association theory of mind for Hume and Kant doesn't say different mental faculties are the same entities. It means they work together just like the different car parts working together to get the car running example as you presented. But you seem to misunderstand the association theory of mind. It doesn't say different mental faculties are the same. It says that they work together under the principle of causality.

Judgement doesn’t conclude, it synthesizes. — Mww

Why does it synthesise? What is synthesis for, if it doesn't offer conclusion?

Just ask yourself….what did Hume say reason couldn’t do? And if the major raison d’etre of CPR was to expose what reason can do, such that Hume’s philosophy was proved incomplete, then it is the case reason has nothing to do with experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement, which Hume’s empirical philosophy covered well enough on its own. It has to do with, not all those, but how all those are possible in the first place, and they are all only possible iff it is the case synthetic, and altogether pure a priori cognitions are themselves possible.

THAT….is what reason does, and we call them…..waaiiiitttt for itttttt…..principles!!!!! — Mww

I have a few AI book here, and all of them talk about the association theory of mental faculties in Hume and Kant. Of course reason has limitations for its capabilities, and that is what Hume and Kant professed. But it doesn't mean that reason has nothing to do with the other mental faculties.

That reason has for its object understanding, and understanding has for its object experience, it does not follow that reason has to do with experience or empirical knowledge itself. — Mww

From Hume to Kant, they all agree on the connection theory that all the mental faculties operate on the basis of the causality between each and every mental functions and events. Reason can serve nothing useful or rational if it stood itself in the mind with no connections to experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement.

This point had been confirmed, upheld and propounded by William James 200 years later for establishing his Psychological Theories of Human Mind. Even this day and age, this perspective has not changed. Without the causal operations between reason and judgement, AI system would have no logical footings for their design ideas and operandi principia.

Illusory or outright mistaken understandings relative to real things, is a function of judgement, not reason. — Mww

How can judgement function for arriving at rational conclusions, if it were severed from reason?

It is a planet called Vulcan. It is not observable in physical form in the sky, — Corvus

Classical logic is useful, even just in its sentential component, which is the Boolean logic used in ordinary computing, and further as classical logic is the logic for the ordinary mathematics for the sciences and for the study of recursive functions and the theory or computability that are at the very heart of the invention and development of the digital computer. And, while predicate logic cannot account for all forms of inference, predicate logic is usually prerequisite for study of the more advanced logics. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Good point. Yes, I agree with that. Classic logic is very useful in checking out logical validity and soundness in the spoken languages and written documents. It is also the foundation of all the other non-classic logic too. One must learn classic logic first in order to understand all the non-classical logics.

It does have the meaning of 'having through the senses', which is contrary to how Kant uses it, but it also shows "given by the spirit", which is how some dictionaries define the (modern) word noumenon. — Lionino

I was reading "A Kant Dictionary" by H. Caygill last night, and it says, Noumenon is not a being or existence in Kant. But it is a boundary of human knowledge and pure reason for the limitation. Phenomenon presents us with the appearance to our sensibility, but not in full. It does so only to a certain degree, then there is a boundary that reason cannot handle due to the non appearance of phenomenon. The boundary and beyond of phenomenon is called Noumenon. In that case, it sounds like Noumenon is just part of Phenomenon where the appearance ends and beyond.

From what I have heard there is no scholarly agreement on the (in)equality of noumenon and Ding an sich. Some are confident in their interpretation that they are absolutely distinct. But being that the problematic of Kant's language is that you don't know when something is being used as a synonym of a word or of another, as is the case with "object", I don't think we will ever know. Ecce maledictio linguarum naturalium. — Lionino

I agree with this. There is no such a thing as the officially accepted definition or interpretation of Ding-An-Sich and Noumenon even in the academic communities. Insisting that the one in SEP or some other internet site definitions are right, and the casual readers or students definitions and points are wrong, just because they are hobby readers and students has no logical ground for the argument.

Kant proves the outside world by showing that some appearances are indeed phenomenons, and due to their causal relationship, phenomenons imply real world objects. — Lionino

I think this is a good point. I could go with that. However, G E Moore proved the existence of the external world by waving his two hands - saying, "Here is one hand, and here is another hand." Seeing the hands and being able to wave them proves that there exists the external world.

I don’t agree with much of this. — AmadeusD

Ok, we agree to disagree. That is fine.

I have provided where, in Kant, the two concepts are objectively removed from one another. Not sure what else to say, but I very much respect your dedication here. — AmadeusD

Thanks. I thought this thread had ended when it had around 600 posts. It disappeared for a while, but then it reemerged with the new points continuing the discussions. I wasn't following the batman brain stuff as I know nothing about it, but when Kant was being mentioned, I thought I could join again for a wee reading and discussing.

My opinion on that account: the use of transcendental conceptions of reason, re: that which underlies appearances as immaterial or simply conceived as something, is what the critique was all about, that is, an exposition on what not to do. Or, technically, what reason has no warrant or entitlement to do, in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, which is all that appearances concern. — Mww

This sounds like the point I was getting across to RussellA in the other thread. But I am not sure if reason has no warrant or entitlement to do in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, because it is all that appearance concern. Reason still does warrant on all the appearances coming in via sensibility - in the case of the bent stick in the glass of water, some people think the stick is bent. But reason when applied to the appearance, tells them no it is the refracted light by the water which makes it look bent. It is not really bent.

In the cases of perception with appearance, but the perceiver still thinks or intuits on the unobservable objects, Kant tells us that is the limit of our reason. We then have to transcend reason, and employ some other mental faculties such as imagination, beliefs and faith to deal with the perception.

The cases of the unobservable physical objects exist in Scientific enquiries in reality. I think I have written about it before somewhere in the TPF. It is a planet called Vulcan. It is not observable in physical form in the sky, but with all the calculations of the movements based on the gravities of the other planets, there must exist this planet called Vulcan. This unobservable planet had been in existence for many years in the scientists calculated conjectures and imagination.

I am not sure if they have actually confirmed the existence of the planet Vulcan yet. But even the scientists don't rule out the existence of unobservable physical objects just because it is invisible. I am sure it is the rational induction of reasoning which has been applied in this case of believing in the existence of the object which has no appearance by the scientists.

I think the Ding an sich is an epistemological being, not an ontological one. — Lionino

I was thinking about this today, and this idea came to my mind. If something is an existence, how can it be without ontology or epistemology? They go together. Without perception, ontology is not seen and not known. Without ontology, there is nothing to perceive. If something is an ontological being, then it must be also epistemological being for it to be qualified as an existence. If something is an epistemic being, then it must be also ontological being. If not, then it would be unknowable even whether it exists or not. No?

That’s fine, provided proper account is taken for it. — Mww

What would be the proper account in your opinion?

I'm unsure what an 'officially accepted' interpretation is, but it seems to be the most common. — AmadeusD

Indeed. That was what I meant. When you said that my post was not adequately outlined, I was wondering then what is the right outline on the topic? Was there the officially accepted and verified outline on noumenon and thing-in-itself? No. There is not, and you agreed with that. In that case, every interpretation is more plausible, plausible or less plausible. No interpretation is wrong. If it was felt as wrong in someone's mind, that doesn't mean it is objectively wrong. It is not a matter of an analytic judgement. It is a matter of belief, understanding and opinion.

I have around 20 different books on Kant, and they all have somewhat different interpretations on the topic, but I found Graham Bird's books were more plausible, and were agreeing with my ideas, hence I kept on sticking with the books as the bible of understanding Kant's CPR. I don't have the book by Palmquist by the way.

Bird clearly says Thing-in-itself and Noumena are the same concept, and I agree with the point. Kant makes various different remarks on the concepts in CPR in various different places in the book depending on the context, hence it would be difficult to say, this or that is the correct definition of them. It really depends on what you are talking them with in what context and what arguments you are presenting with, which makes either more plausible, plausible or less plausible.

And whatever definition one comes up with, there will be someone who will disagree with it, and prove the definition is illogical, or come up with quotes from the CPR which says exactly the opposite.

It is not something that anyone could prove logically right or wrong, hence they are in the category of the antinomies. They are still very useful concepts, if one had some thoughts on epistemic, ontological or metaphysical ideas, and those concepts fit nicely for explaining or positing something which would be difficult otherwise to do due to the abstract nature of the arguments or ideas.

Did you read the “Multi-Layered Conception….” paper linked on the previous page? — Mww

Not the paper itself (Is there a link for the full paper?). Just the quote. The following is the point I used to agree with, and still do. What is your own point?

Yet he goes on to note that we do not have to conceive of the ‘something’ that underlies appearances as a material object. It might as well be considered as something that is immaterial and can only be thought. — Kant’s Multi-Layered Conception of Things in Themselves

For example, what are they? What are the things that you find in your mind whose origin you don't know?
— Corvus

For example, perceptions, hunger, pain. — Lionino

Aren't they the obvious sensations from your biological bodily workings telling your senses, that it needs food and something is pinching you, or why are you using your hair dryer too close to the skin? :grin:

Please give constructive feedback and arguments — Ashriel

I reject the dichotomy of the 2 realisms. They are not direct and indirect realism. There is no such difference or categories in the realism.

They are rather sense perception and sense perception with reasoning.
Every perception is via sense, and this is the primary perception for all animals with the sense organs.
We see apples, and know they are apples. We eat apples, and also taste the apple via the sense organs.

But there are times, we think about apples. We see the apples, and try to figure out what type of apples they are i.e. are they cooking apples, or the Golden Delicious types? In this type of perception, we are applying the reasonings on the apples, and infer or deduce the data from the apples. This is sense perception with reasoning, which they used to call as indirect realism. Indirect realists think they are not perceiving the object directly. But that is not true. All perception is direct. It would be nonsensical to say that you were eating and tasting the sense data of the apples.

When you see a bent stick in the glass of water, you are just using your sense perception. It looks bent when perceived via the sense organ only i.e. your eyes. But when you apply your reasoning on the sense perception, you know it is the visual effect of the lights refracted in the water of the glass.

Therefore, it is not meaningful distinction to say Direct or Indirect Realism. They are just different type of perceptions. One is sense perception, and the other is sense perception with reasoning.

It is defined as otherwise. So thats incoherent.

If you accept the existence of the Kantian Thing-in-itself in Noumena,
— Corvus

The Noumena is not hte thing-in-itself. It is the existent as perceived by something other than human sense-perception. So, unknown to us, but theoretically knowable. The Ding-en-sich is that existent without any perception of it is my understanding.

So perhaps it (the argument of Kant) is not being adequately outlined. — AmadeusD

I have various commentaries on Kant by different authors, but the one I accept and follow is the commentary books by Graham Bird. His 2x books on Kant are my favourite, which are "Kant's Theory of Knowledge" and "The Revolutionary Kant".

I wonder what books and commentaries you are using for your readings or studies on Kant. But this issue in TI can be contentious and a new thread on its own.

Anyhow Graham Bird says there have been different interpretations on Noumena and Thing-in-itself in Kant, and he propounds the both concepts are same entities, which is opposite views of yours. But if you could present your arguments for your points with the source information, that would be helpful.

Some folks seem to believe that the Thing-in-itself exists in the mind.
— Corvus

It is defined as otherwise. So thats incoherent. — AmadeusD

Ok, was just trying to see the concept from a solipsist's point.

The Noumena is not hte thing-in-itself. It is the existent as perceived by something other than human sense-perception. So, unknown to us, but theoretically knowable. The Ding-en-sich is that existent without any perception of it is my understanding.

So perhaps it (the argument of Kant) is not being adequately outlined. — AmadeusD

Since this is not about interpreting Kant accurately, it was an attempt to see it from a solipsist's perspective. But would you say that your claim is the officially accepted interpretation of Nounmena and Thing-in-itself in Kant?

But I imagine that for Kant the noumenon is always outside of the mind, and to prove the existence of a noumenon is to disprove solipsism.
Solipsists would have to deny noumenons. — Lionino

It looks to be difficult to prove the existence of noumenon if not impossible. And logically, if a noumenon was proven to be existent, then would it be still a noumenon? Or a phenomenon?

Semantic proof may not be taken to be conclusive, because there would be a solipsist who claims that his noumenon is in his mind, and he visits there every night in his intuition. It would be difficult to disprove his claim.

What Corvus should have said is that they are not very good at cognizing in the way living systems do, as Hubert Dreyfus famously showed 60 years ago with his ‘What Computers Can’t Do’ and his more recent update ‘What Computers still can’t do’. Of course they are a part of the real world. — Joshs

The traditional classic logic wouldn't be able to deal with the dynamic and unpredictable nature of the real world. From quite some time ago, various types of non classic logics seem to have been implemented, and used such as Temporal Logic, Description Logic, Fuzzy Logic, Epistemic Logic, Many-Valued Logic, Probability Logic, Topological Logic, Assertion Logic, Deontic Logic ... etc to deal with the dynamics of the real world.

Above point tells us Logic is not just simple symbolic formula manipulation.

I'm a bit more cautious about that. It seems like the die is already cast on logic generally referring to formal systems in philosophy. I was searching around for a good term to refer to the idea of "what we use logic to describe in nature," but I haven't thought of a catchy one. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yeah, that was written sometime ago, when I knew little about logic. Since then I have read a few different logic textbooks, which totally changed my ideas and views on logic.

They are at the very heart of the development of digital computers, such as the one you're reading right now. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Sure, logic must be the working engines of all the computers and even AI agents suppose. But there would also some custom logics they set up, and embed into the programs in the devices depending on what they are used for. It wouldn't be just the plain classic symbolic logics only in use.

I think the Ding an sich is an epistemological being, not an ontological one. — Lionino

How could something be an epistemic being, if it is unknowable and has no physical referent? How could something be an ontological being, if it is unknowable? You wouldn't know whether it exists or not? Is it a being at all?

But that is the matter of whether the Ding an sich is ideal or double or monadic or material or whatever. Whether the noumenon is automatically an outside world, whether mental or physical, is another question. Since the very idea of noumenon assumes of a world besides the perception of a transcendental agent, it would make sense that without the noumenon there is nothing to perceive. I think the semantics of Vorstellung pretty much imply an outside world, so solipsism implies no Vorstellung. Coming up with a view in which there are things outside of perception and yet solipsism obtain seems to be a contradiction of the semantics of solipsism.

So to answer your question, yes. — Lionino

:ok:
If you accept the existence of the Kantian Thing-in-itself in Noumena, then that would be a proof of the existence of the outside world. No? Because Noumena exists in the physical or external world. It cannot exist in your mind according to Kant, or do you believe it does exist in your mind?

Some folks seem to believe that the Thing-in-itself exists in the mind. The only problem is, again they don't know what it is. Isn't it contradictory to say, it exists but it is unknowable? How do you know it exists, if it is unknowable? But then some folks believe that Thing-in-itself can be knowable if you tried to perceive it, i.e. via intuition and imagination.

But can knowledge come from imagination or intuition? It wouldn't be very accurate knowledge if it was from imagination and intuition alone without sensibility and reason. Or if you were a religious, then you could say, you experience Thing-in-itself via your faith.

a quick introspection shows there are things in my mind whose origin I don't know — Lionino

For example, what are they? What are the things that you find in your mind whose origin you don't know?

Having said all that, I can see the point that language is a significant factor in connecting self and external world. If there were no external world, how could one have acquired the language? How could one communicate linguistically with other minds at all? How could one make any semantic expressions about the outside world at all?

Does this mean that transcendental idealism is in the end unavoidable and there is no realistic alternative to this world-view? And is the possibility and success of science proof, that Kant was rightfully claiming that we can never attain to a knowledge of things surrounding us per se i.e. independent of us? — Pez

Every scientific law is based on induction i.e. inference from particular observations.  But all observations are unique in time and place.  No observations can be repeated at the same space at the same moments.  Therefore the ground of scientific laws are contingent i.e. not absolute.  They can be disproved any time when the physical factors change in the universe, or new discoveries and observations reveal the new facts.

With these reasons, I think the OP is correct in saying that Kantian Transcendental Idealism is evidently true and unavoidable.  We know the objects in phenomena due to our sensibility and perceptual schema which operate both in empirical and a priori foundation of our mind.

There are parts of the world we can never sense due to the limitation and nature of our sensibility which are in noumena as things-in-itself.  We tend to think that we know objects like cups and trees and books in daily life with infallible certainty.  But the moment we ask ourselves deeper into the nature of existence such as what is the book made of? What molecules and particles make up the book, cups or trees?  We immediately are not sure about all the information hidden in the objects, which proves the obvious limitation of our knowledge even of the objects in phenomena too.

B: There are things in the world I am not aware of.
C: Therefore there are things outside of my mind. — Lionino

Not sure if B entails C. Because if you are not aware of the things in the world, then how do you know there are things outside of your mind?

Which is that there is scientific knowledge to be learned, the fact I don't have this knowledge implies there are some things that I am not aware of, therefore there are things outside of my mind. There is some X I am unaware of, X is outside of my mind, there are things outside of my mind. But this only works because the implication {unaware of X} → {X outside of mind} is accepted, and it can be assumed only if we define my mind in such a way (A) to rule out the existence of some unknown-to-me part of my mind. A semantic argument therefore. — Lionino

Yes, you have given out your reason for the conclusion, but I am not sure if a semantic argument would be enough evidence for the ground. Because your language reflects the content of your mind, but not the other way around i.e. your belief is not based on what you said.

B: There are things in the world I am not aware of. — Lionino

Could this be an implication of accepting the Kantian thing-in-itself in empirical world? Or does it mean just there are things that you have no experience of, therefore no awareness of them?

As said, I am not interested in keeping talking with you on who has done what. We have done that enough. If you haven't kept on the walls of the negative postings here, I wouldn't have replied to you at all. The same goes with Banno.

You don't see a point in them, but that doesn't stop you from posting insults.

And, again, it is very important to distinguish between an ad hominem ARGUMENT and, on the other hand, stating an non-ad hominem argument but in addition remarking that a poster is confused, ignorant and dishonest, especially when detailed explanation is given the poster as to what his ignorance, confusion and dishonesty are. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I wasn't in the direct discussions on the topic of identity you have been discussing. But when I connected to the thread, the first thing I saw in your post was you throwing out the sentence saying "ignorance and confusion" to the other interlocutor. I immediately recalled what you have been saying to me in the similar way previously, and it gave a strong impression, that you have been insulting not just me, but the others who don't agree with your opinions.

Bottom line is, that you should try to avoid doing that if possible. It can happen during the discussions in the heat of the moment unintentionally. But if you keep doing that constantly, and especially at the start of your posts, then your posts will look as if they are intentionally meant for insulting others.

As usual, you evaded the point. Again:

"distortion [...] bias, prejudice and false judgement." — TonesInDeepFreeze

This is truth. He just comes along says that the others interpretations are wrong, and there is no arguments or logical ground for that judgement. No one can think differently from him.

That is not an insult but "ignorant and confused" is? — TonesInDeepFreeze

If you call someone ignorant and confused from the start of your posts, when it is you who are ignorant and confused, then that is an insult to the person. You may not know that, because he is not saying anything, but just thinking about it. It is also unnecessary to say things like that in philosophical discussions.

I am sure if someone said that to you, it would be because you said it to him first. I know you said something like that first to me, and wasn't pleasant.

You can look back in this thread to see that I posted back and forth with you with my not saying anything remotely personal, until I pointed out that you were skipping the points.

And copious evidence and argument have been given showing that the main crank in this thread is ignorant and confused about this subject - including right up to this very moment. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I have not been replying to all of your walls and walls of off topic posts to me. I don't see a point in ad hominem posts. I have no time or inclination for getting involved in non-philosophical quibbles with you. I was just pointing out problems in your posts for the inaccuracies and personal comments you were putting out.