Which British accent? — Beverley

The Oxford or Cambridge accent sound clearer and easier to understand for me.

There are rather a lot! — Beverley

This is true.

His is RP, but he was born in Monmouthshire. I wonder if he ever had a Welsh twang? — Beverley

Didn't know Russell was from Wales. I couldn't trace any Welsh accent from his accent. Russell's accent must be from his education.

I'd have to say I like a Geordie accent, and a liverpool accent is full of character, as well as a Black Country/Brummie twang. — Beverley

These are difficult to understand accent, unless one is used to them.

RP kind of grates on me if it's overdone. It seems so pretentious. — Beverley

Yes, I heard some folks saying that too. I don't mind it at all. They tend to speak slower, and maybe that's what makes them easier to understand.

I also really love the sing song nature of a South Welsh accent. — Beverley

Yes, they are interesting to listen to. I might misunderstand them about half.

It's actually almost impossible for me to say which I like best though. — Beverley

What's yours?

What science would a mathematician be an expert in, if not mathematical science? — Mww

Mathematics is its own subject. No one calls Mathematics Science. It would be like saying Poetry is Science. Science is for the natural science, which deals with the phenomenon and objects in the empirical world.

Kant fixed….or at least changed…. Hume’s meaning of idea in order to change the reasoning on their relations. — Mww

In that case, why would Kant had said that Hume woke him up from the dogmatic slumbers? Something doesn't sound quite right here.

As I said….your reference: Treatise on Human Nature 1.4.1., Of Scepticism Regard to Reason, although it should read…scepticism with regard to reason. — Mww

OK, I see it. I would interpret the quote "

“…. There is no Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science, as to place entire confidence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it, or regard it as any thing, but a mere probability….” — Mww

in his science must be, the empirical science, not Mathematics or Geometry. He seems to be talking about the Mathematicians cannot have confidence in the empirical scientific observations and theories at first, but they feel what they discover are mere probability. It can't be Mathematics or Geometry knowledge Hume was talking about. Because Hume acknowledges Reasoning on Relations of Ideas are "which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain."

Now I see you’ve switched to E.C.H.U. And “demonstrably” certain is the very criteria of experience. So yes, Euclidean figures are demonstrably certain in their relations, but it does not follow from the demonstrations, that the relations themselves are given by them. — Mww

Yes, we must look at both Enquiries and Treatise at the same time when reading Hume.

Anyway, it shows you that Hume's reason is not just one sided all probability affairs. There wasn't anything that Kant could have fixed in CPR, was there?

From your reference….

“…. There is no Algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science, as to place entire confidence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it, or regard it as any thing, but a mere probability….” — Mww

Where is that quote from?

Hume took for granted pure reason could not provide the principles necessary to make math more than mere probability. If you prefer, we could just say Hume was skeptical reason could so provide, but if so, we must also admit he was skeptical to the point of denying the possibility, which just is to take it for granted they could not. — Mww

Hume divides Reason into two different types. One is for Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact.
The former deals with Geometry, Algebra, Arithmetic, and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.

The 2nd type is Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing.

"ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, is a proposition, which expresses a relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere opera-tion of thought, without dependence on what is any where existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths, demonstrated by EUCLID, would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.

Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible;t because it can never imply a con-tradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and dis-tinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more con-tradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, there-fore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. " - Enquiries (4.1.20)

I addressed what Kant thought was the very problem Hume took for granted as not being one, that the critical examination of reason regarding its own powers for the originating and employment of principles, is a necessary prerequisite for philosophical demonstrations. Such was my idea on “this”. — Mww

Hume didn't take anything for granted. He had done his own critical examination regarding its own powers and its capacities and limits in Treatise 1.4.1. Of Scepticism Regard to Reason.

Why Hume didn’t do this, and the ramifications for not doing it, resides in various Kant texts, specifically in CPR, wherein in A you’re supposed to dig it out, but in B Hume is mentioned more often in direct relation to the text, so the distinctions in the two philosophies more readily apparent. — Mww

Hume had done it in his own way, and obviously Kant read it, and that was the part that he took from Hume to launch his own way to investigate and criticise on Pure reason, hence CPR. That is the part of Hume's idea which woke up Kant from his dogmatic slumbers which Kant himself admitted. This was my idea, and I was trying to confirm it was correct. But you seem to have different ideas saying Hume didn't do that, and Kant was trying to fix Hume's problems.

Didn’t sound that way to me. You didn’t ask about any exact thing. Wouldn’t matter anyway; there wasn’t any one exact thing. I gave what I thought explained the awakening in its most general sense, that being, Hume’s proclivity for philosophical demonstrations without sufficient criticism of the principles used to justify them. — Mww

My question was from your own points on Hume and Kant.
Recall this?

Yep, from his dogmatic slumbers. So it depends on what he means by dogmatic, to figure out just what Hume woke him from. Was he slumbering and proper dogmatic criticisms heretofore escaped him, or, was he slumbering in a dogmatic fashion from which Hume disturbed him.
— Mww
I think one needs a rather extensive understanding of Kant’s knowledge of Hume’s philosophy, and moreso, how Kant tackled what he thought was the very problem Hume took for granted as not being one,
— Mww
What is your idea on this? — Corvus

Remember this?

Having devised me to read Hume in conjunction with Kant, I might ask if you’ve done the same. If so, then perhaps, as did I, you might have discerned the important aspect missing from Hume’s philosophy that leaves it at dogmatism, according to Kant, as opposed to his own, which is dogmatic. — Mww

Yes, I am reading Hume too. Hume is one of my favourite philosophers. I like his arguments in Treatise.

Ask and ye shall receive, or, be careful what you wish for. — Mww

I was asking exclusively about the part Kant had admitted having been indebted to Hume's awakening his dogmatic slumbers from i.e. exactly what part of Hume's ideas awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumbers?

The problem:
“….as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error….” — Mww

They had Aristotle's Metaphysics for almost 2000 years. What were the problems or deficiencies of Aristotle's Metaphysics did Kant think need to be fixed? Or would it rather be the contemporary of Kant's Metaphysics polluted by Wolff, Leibniz and Spinoza crowds, which Kant wasn't happy with? What did Kant think of the problems of his previous or his contemporary metaphysics were?

On the groping after results:
“…..dogmatism, that is, the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition (…) according to the principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing without first inquiring in what way and by what right reason has come into the possession of these principles….”

“….This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, rest on sure principles a priori. (….) Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason without previous criticism of its own powers….” — Mww

What do you think "pure cognition" is in detail?

Yep, from his dogmatic slumbers. So it depends on what he means by dogmatic, to figure out just what Hume woke him from. Was he slumbering and proper dogmatic criticisms heretofore escaped him, or, was he slumbering in a dogmatic fashion from which Hume disturbed him. — Mww

I think one needs a rather extensive understanding of Kant’s knowledge of Hume’s philosophy, and moreso, how Kant tackled what he thought was the very problem Hume took for granted as not being one, — Mww

What is your idea on this?

re: reason was merely a slave to the passions, and if habit and common sense couldn’t fix it, then there isn’t a fix to be had. Kant understood the problem before his critical period, around 1750 or so, but didn’t proceed to solve it until the first edition of CPR thirty years on. — Mww

Has Kant succeeded in what he intended to achieve?

Therefore I advise you to read Hume while reading Kant.

I find the British accent cool.


https://www.youtube.com/shorts/JUOXOQR_yyA

Yeah….one of the things he says I either didn’t bother with, or couldn’t wrap my head around, dunno which….is that he frowns on dogmatism, but grants pure reason is always dogmatic. — Mww

Pure reason knows dogmatism, and usually discerns the antinomies. However, psychology of thinking might go wrong, overriding pure reason. Reason is a slave of passion. Hume woke up Kant from his slumber - remember? :)

It seems to me that in the section on Refutation of Idealism, Kant does argue that we can use reason to transcend our sensibilities.[/quote — RussellA

He argues that we can prove using reason the existence of objects in space outside our sensibilities. — RussellA

Reason's duty is to tell truth from falsity and warranting judgements. It doesn't get involved in trying to prove external objects as real existence. Our intuition and concepts perceive and know them in the sensibility with immediacy.

Kant was not a Transcendental Realist. From the SEP article Kant’s Transcendental Idealism — RussellA

Kant was a Transcendental Realist in a sense that he propounded that the transcendental objects such as God, Immortality, Soul, Freedom exist in Noumena. It has nothing to do with the physical objects in empirical reality, because they don't belong to Noumena.

As an Indirect Realist, I believe that a mind-independent world exists, which is the Realism part of Indirect Realism. — RussellA

You say the postoffice exists in your mind and also in the world, so you have 2x postoffice when you see 1x postoffice. Is this not a contradiction?

Well it way the girl of my dreams knocking on my door it would not disturb me, although I might be hot and bothered. — Fooloso4

Biology can precede meanings suppose. :nerd:

I’m ok with that. I don’t like the notion of psychological activities particularly, but modern times finds value therein, somehow. — Mww

Acts of knowing and thinking are topics of psychology. How and what can be known and thought, are the topics of Epistemology.

Just remember…reason does not apply directly to experience, so that part of your comment that says reason only deals with objects, etc, etc,. Isn’t the whole story. — Mww

When reason sees the intuitions with no objects, it will resort to either scepticism or conclude unknowability. If it keeps asserting the existence without the objects in empirical reality, it would be a dogmatism.

That’s the whole problem: pure reason has no limit. The sole raison d’etre for the Critique of it, is what can be done about that problem. — Mww

All reason is pure in the sense that it is not a product of experience. Reason judges and analyses the content of experience. Knowing and thinking are psychological activities. Reason is a priori property of the mind.

Reason can only deal with the objects appearing in our sensibility via experience, and that is the limit of pure reason.
— Corvus

This sounds like Berkeley's Subjective Idealism, which denies the existence of material substance in the world and contends that familiar objects like tables and chairs are no more than ideas perceived by the mind, and as a result cannot exist without being perceived. IE, reason is limited by what we are able to perceive. (Wikipedia - George Berkeley) — RussellA

That is nothing to do with Berkeley's idealism. Berkeley's idealism treats your perception identical to the existence. In Kant, you need the empirical object affecting your sensibility. He doesn't deny the existence of empirical reality. He says what appears in your sensibility can be dealt by reason, but what doesn't appear in your sensibility, but what you can think of, are Thing-in-itself.

For the Direct Realist, the thing in itself in the world does appear in appearance as phenomena, ie, when we perceive the colour red there is a colour red existing in the world. This is why Kant is not a Direct Realist. — RussellA

No, I change my mind. Kant can't be a direct realist. He really doesn't say much about what he is i.e. he doesn't care about isms. He just says there are objects in the world which appear in your sensibility, and the intuition and reason deal with them to produce judgements. That's all he says. If you really have to brand him what he was, he would more likely had been a transcendental realist.

Perhaps because that's not something I said. As an Indirect Realist, as the colour red exists in the mind and the not the world, the postbox also exists in the mind and not the world. — RussellA

Now that is Berkeley's immaterial idealism, because you deny the existence in the world, but think they all exist in your mind.

I really hope I haven’t broken any rules in this post by the way :/ Please excuse me if I have, as I am new to this site. — Beverley

Welcome to TPF. You are doing great. No problems. Thank you for your great post.
Yes, I see your point. Language is also for understanding the world, and this could be actually the foremost purpose and point. Because from the early age, people learns the native language interacting with the world, not necessarily communicating with the people. Communication is for the later stage of life, where one wants to extend one's scope of knowledge or the world vista.

I can also see how you have inner dialogue, and it is critical process in thinking. I think in Locke and Hume, our ideas are same as the words, so perceiving meant understanding, and understanding meant ability to express in language.

And you are correct in saying that English is a complex language with multitude of mixture with the other languages, and there is no such a thing for clear criteria which language is better.
I personally chose to use English from purely practical point that the most countries I have been, more people seem to be speaking it as their 2nd language, and also the amount of books published and translated into English in all subjects. Price and availability of books in English were also very practical for accessing and being able to afford them too.

Anyhow, thanks for your points on the topic. I hope we can exchange more points on the topics we share as our mutual interests in the future. cheers.

Then where does Kant get his solid ground for infallible knowledge of solid material existence in the empirical world? — RussellA

Kant just explains how our perception works with the existence in the empirical world. He is not concerned with them too much. It is our intuitions and concepts which interact immediately with the objects for producing experience - it sounds like he was a direct realist.

Nothing special in our perception of the empirical reality objects in the way that he doesn't try to make them sound as if they belong to in some mysterious unknown realm of psychic world, but he tries to identify A priori elements in perception i.e. the intuitions, concepts and principles which construct our experience. Furthermore, it is mathematics, geometry and synthetic a priori knowledge he was focusing on how they work.

What he is concerned is clarifying how metaphysical knowledge works and why it has solid ground as knowledge like Scientific knowledge. Metaphysics deals with God, Immortality, Souls and Freedom..etc. These are the real topics Kant was interested in demonstrating for their solid existence, not some cups, trees or postbox in the empirical world.

Reason can only deal with the objects appearing in our sensibility via experience, and that is the limit of pure reason. What is not appearing in our sensibility but can be thought of are in the world of noumena as thing-in-itself, and reason has no capability in dealing with them. They would be then, in the world of unknown, which need postulation of faith for access.

If Thing-in-itself exists in the empirical world, and thought to appear in phenomenon, then it would be contradiction. They must exist in the world of noumena, and you need faith or postulation to access them. This makes sense.

Do you believe that the colour red exists in the world? — RussellA

I feel that when you say a postbox with red roof exists, then both the postbox and red colour patch must be in one object. It doesn't make sense to me, when you say, the postbox exist in the empirical world, but the red patch exists in your mind. They must be one entity, not separate. The postbox with red roof exists in the reality as one object. What you have in your mind is an image of it.

My understanding of this point is that, while we must infer something "in-itself" causes our phenomenal impressions, which in turn create our perceptions, our perceptions are not those impressions and cannot, in any meaningful sense, access them or the object which causes them. — AmadeusD

I would have thought when we infer things, it is the internal operation in the mind, which doesn't involve the external objects.  In that case, would it not just work of intuition itself involving the concepts? When you say phenomenal impressions, it reminds me of the Humean impression which is for the external sensical objects.  I am not sure if Kant uses the term sense impression for the external objects.  As far as I can recall, he doesn't use the Humean terms such as impressions and ideas.

Logically speaking if you are inferring something in your mind, you wouldn't need to think about the external object at all, because it would be with the contents in your mind and intuition works with them.  Or if you are seeing objects in the empirical world, and inferring something, then it wouldn't be about the object itself, but it would be something else relating what-if scenarios or changes of the situation etc. The point here is that inferring something doesn't need reliance with Thing-in-itself or noumena.

"The estimate of our rational cognition à priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phenomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its sphere. " — AmadeusD

Could this be further explicated using real life examples of perception?

but that our impressions are removed from the objects enough to make it impossible to access. — AmadeusD

Looked at this point again, but cannot quite follow what it means. Could you please elaborate with the CPR passage (if possible)? Thanks.

This is more apt than you might have intended. That it was my door did not even occur to me. — Fooloso4

If you were asleep, and didn't want to get disturbed by any visitors, then any knocking on the door will disturb you, even if it was you who knocked on the door (via sleepwalking).

But in the Netherlands and Scandinavia I suspect most people do speak English. — Jamal

This is true. When I went to the Netherlands, I recall all of them spoke English everywhere we went. I have not been to Scandinavia, but had friends from Finland and Norway. They spoke good English.

However, significantly more native speakers of Mandarin - about 955mil vs 450mil in English. — AmadeusD

Agreed. Yes, this sounds accurate.

Not that it matters much, but this is not remotely the case, unless you just mean that all European countries have significant numbers of English-speakers. — Jamal

Yes, you could be correct. My statement was again from my guessing having met many continental European students from Germany, Norway, Italy, France, Spain, .. even from Romania, they all spoke perfect English. But in their own countries, I am not sure how it would be like. I have not been to many of the countries personally.

Agreed. I do recall passages in which it's essentially said that by inference, we can't get away from accepting that there are things-in-themselves causing our impressions of them, but that our impressions are removed from the objects enough to make it impossible to access. — AmadeusD

Yes, good point. :ok:

I would say i've somewhat experienced the same, but only in a commercial sense.

Most random locals don't speak English in the, lets say, 'exotic' places i've visited. I had to pick up some Arabic to work my way around, socially, in Egypt (don't read in to that - i recall about six words), despite every commercial interaction being super-easy due to English being taken on for that purpose in Egypt. — AmadeusD

Yeah, I was in some sceptic mood there in my previous message. :)
I had a wee word about this with folks here, and they say that if you only count native language speakers total, then Mandalin is 1.1 billion speakers and the top. But if you include the native speakers and the 2nd language speakers in the world, then English comes the top with 1.45 billion speakers in the world.
This is no surprise, because every country in Europe, they all speak English at least up to daily conversational level. And almost all countries in the world, English is taught and learnt as 2nd language in school.
I had some Chinese & Japanese friends, they all spoke English, and we used to communicate in English no bother at all.

My point is that number for English speakers includes those people.

It doesn’t exclude them. So nothing to add to the number :) — AmadeusD

Well fair enough. My estimation of total English speakers being the top in the world came from guessing, and it was maybe wrong. I am not sure. But having said that, are you 100% certain your number is correct? :D I am not actually sure if the total number of Mandarin speakers would be correct. The quoted figure would be some statistic data from somewhere (of which I have no clue what it could be). Why should I trust it? What is the ground for its accuracy?
My point was, whatever countries I visited, if didn't know their native local language, I was able to communicate with the most locals in English. No other language would have been able to do that.

those are overlapping numbers - not single-language speakers. — AmadeusD

Yes, many folks in the world speak 2-3 languages.

I think this isn't quite right - about 1.3bil English speakers and about 1.8bil Mandarin speakers last I saw anything about it.. — AmadeusD

A lot of them would also speak English in some degree. So you must add about 15-30% of them into the English speakers. Every country in the world you think of, you should be adding 20-30% of them into the number of English speakers.
Thinks of India, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong and some African countries. Their 2nd or official language is English. Whatever countries you go, if you don't know their own native language, then you would communicate with them in English.

I might think that if anyone else was knocking it would be a disturbance but surely not if I was. — Fooloso4

But you wouldn't be knocking on your own door. :rofl:

For me it is clear that languages are different and that if there is a difference then one is to be better than another. — I like sushi

You should have asked "in what sense" better, rather than just better. It sounds vague and unclear without some quantifier when asking which is better.

Language is a tool to communicate for foremost purpose. Tools must be useful for their worthy of existence. So if you say which language is most useful, then it must be the one which you can communicate with most people in the world. And which language has most books written, published and translated from other language books. These are the questions you must ask.

There is no point a language great in whatever reasons for, but only 10 people in the world speaks, and has only 2 books published and 5 books translated from the other languages. It would be not very useful, flexible or interesting at all to be confined in using a language with the limitations.

If you read this far, then the answer is clear. It is English which is the most useful language in the world for the number of speakers in the world (don't know how many exactly but it would be spoken in every country you place you foot in), all the books written and published (again must be the most), and also has the most translated copies of the books in the world than any other languages.

It would depend on the situations too. Words can be super accurate in most situations too.
If you see a sign saying on the door "Don't disturb", how can you be mistaken for to knock on the door or ring the bell?

I agree that words and sentences can be vague. But maybe due to lack of supplied or accuracy of the information. With more detailed information and accuracy in writing in the supplied sentences, maybe it could deliver clearer meanings. Not sure, if it is to do with the natural inadequacy of language in general, or fault of the writers.

It seemed fairly clear to me that Noumena is the placeholder for things in themselves, beyond sensible intuition - of whcih we can know nothing. Not that they aren't related... Just that we can't actually know anything of them. Or be certain they exist.. only infer. But as usual, im looking to be set straight, not offering an actual take. — AmadeusD

I understood Noumena is the placeholder for Thing-in-itslef, and Thing-in-itself is for the abstract existences which appear in our minds without the matching objects in the empirical world such as God, Souls, Freedom etc.

It gets all strange, if you place the ordinary objects like cups or trees into Noumena, and say they are Thing-in-itself, which are unknowable and cannot be talked about.

Here is one that my students found amusing. This actually happened. I was running a few minutes late to my class. One of the double doors to the classroom building was not working. It has a sign on it: "Not working. Use other door" and an arrow pointing to the other door. I explained that I was late because I could not figure out whether the arrow was pointing to door that was broken or if the sign was on the door that was broken. — Fooloso4

Good point. Must admit sentences we see in daily life can be vague at many times.
Would it have been clearer, if it said "This door is not working. Use the other door."?

Where does Kant get his solid ground for infallible knowledge of noumena? — RussellA

Solid ground for infallible knowledge is about the objects in the empirical world. Noumena is for the A priori perceptions which have no objects in the world of appearance. Noumena has nothing to do with the solid material existence in the empirical world.

The symbols used for logic are not imprecise, scientists are not guessing when they use symbols for chemical compounds etc. — jkop

Without the contents, the logic symbols would mean nothing meaningful at all. It would only mean something with the contents.

The chemical compounds symbols are not symbols as such, but they are type of abbreviations or codified words.

I don't know of a good reason to exclude words from symbols. Do you? — jkop

Words are read, and understood by its meaning alone. There is no room for guessing or imagining just by reading alone (although people do them but there must be extra information such as situation or the source of the words come from). Words says what they mean, and no more. Otherwise, words cannot be used in Logic or Science.

Symbols are visual perception only, and their meanings are not precise. One has to imagine, guess or relate to the real world objects, activities or lives in order to get the meanings. Symbols are also for aiding religious meditations for the enlightenments or deciphering the divine and esoteric messages from them.

I would say they are totally different form of carrying and delivering meanings, and also for the purpose too.

For a simple example, can a poetry be written in symbols? No.
Can symbols write a History of Philosophy? No.
What words do, symbols can't. What symbols do, words can. (Words are more powerful, versatile and flexible with its capability making up sentences, and forming logical arguments, propositions ...etc)

"Matter" and "red" are words in language and concepts in the mind. As I perceive a red postbox in the world, I can also perceive solid matter in the world. — RussellA

There seem to be some problems here.
1. You are talking about only the things in your mind. It will not give you any further knowledge on the external world itself. You say you are seeing the red postbox, but it is in your mind, and it doesn't exist in the world. So it is not an empirical knowledge, but it is your belief in your mind, which you admit that it doesn't exist in the world.

2. There is also high possibility of illusion and hallucination on the perception and also talking about, because you believe that they are not the reality in the empirical world, but they are caused by the reality of the empirical world. Is the reality always accurate? Are the causation always consistent and accurate without errors? Is the content of the perception accurate?

3. These are not what Kant thinks how perception works. He was seeking to establish a solid ground for infallible knowledge. He would be seriously worried to see someone looking at things not existing in the world, and keeps talking about them as if they do exist in the world, and at the same time saying they don't exist in the world.