(1) You have no idea what a and b are. They're variables. I'm not asking you to plug anything into the variables. That's why they're presented as variables. — Terrapin Station

Then a = b is redundant

(2) I'm asking whether you think the argument, as presented, with variables, is a valid argument or not. Whether premises are false has nothing to do with whether it's a valid argument. — Terrapin Station

To be honest I can't tell, you are not using a notation convention, and I don't want to transcribe it.

In world y there is logic, hence there is a contradiction when you claim that it is true that there are no truths.

I pointed out that a is not identical to b.
I also pointed out that if a is identical to b and a has no truth value then neither does b.

That would mean that b only occurs in F's has no truth value

in domain x there are no F's is fine

Therefor in domain x a does not occur has no true value

I am glad I did not make that argument then.

Yes you can assert that, but it is still a contradiction in world y.
There are no contradictions in world x.

But in world y to say that there is no truths in world x still leads to a contradiction in world y because the contradiction is being caused by the logic in world y.
So in world y it can't true about world x that in world x there are no truths, that would be a contradiction about world x.

Also I never claimed truth is mind-idependent.

I claimed it is reasonable to say truth is mind dependent and world dependent.
So far nothing I have encountered in this thread has caused me to doubt this view..

I also agreed that it maybe that we can't know if there is or is not truth in a world without minds because it may be the case that there are no truth values in a world without minds.

The only thing I am advocating, my only hiden premise, is that perhaps you guys should consider the possibility that you cannot prove the things that you believe with logic. At least so far you have not done so without issues.
There is no shame in that I don't think.

It means an argument with a valid or sound form.

No I have already pointed out the issues with this argument.

because nothing is true in world x. — aletheist

This cannot be true in logic without contradiction.

Guys I am tired now, I say we just chalk it up to agree to disagree.

Yes I realize that.

You are comfortable with your beliefs and that is fine.
But I am merely pointing out why I do not accept your beliefs as logically valid.

The reason there is no truth value to obtain is because of logic, the logic in world y would not permit you to simply obtain a truth value where there is none.

If there is no truth value to obtain in world x then there is no truth value to obtain in world y.

Yes but we are talking about world x not world y

Then it is neither true or false that there is no logic in world x

Yes, the conditions of a conditional statement that leads to contradiction do not have to be met in actuality.
The argument is still a contradiction, even if the conditions of the argument are not met.

I think that is where we disagree most when it comes to truth.
You believe that where you lack any doubt then there is truth.
That is not my view of truth.

It is not a fact that is true in world x

Yes but it is not true in world x that there is no logic.

I also pointed out another possible issue with Terrapin's views.
Terrapin might hope to argue that we can be sure that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon minds, because minds exist now and thus the truth of what is said about anything depends entirely and exclusively upon them and there is no issue because as of now those minds do exist.
This would be circular argumentation.
That minds exist now proves only that there are minds now, it does not prove that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon those minds and these are not logically equivalent things. — m-theory

How could it be true that there is no logic in world x if there is no logic in world x?

I addressed that issue in post 484.
It is a circular argument.

It is possible to talk about the contrapositive, they simply have no truth value.

Yes I know I pointed out the issues with that already.
In post 484

I am talking contrapositives where there is no truth value.

If there is no judgments = P (Which has no truth value because truth value is equal to judgement)
then there are no truth values (which cannot be considered true or false)
Q(there is no truth value to negate) therefor P (again no truth value to negate)

The point is that it takes a mind to distinguish one time from another time. So perhaps things "exist as they do", but it takes a mind to distinguish this time from that time, in order to say what exists at this time, and what exists at that time. — Metaphysician Undercover

And my point is how do you know that it takes a mind and that it does not occur in nature without minds?

To "navigate reality" is not a justifiable end, because it fails to give us any direction, which is what an end is supposed to do, and it leaves "what is necessary" as completely arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by justifiable end?
Further this does not answer the question of why, if it is as you say one arbitrary abstraction is as good as the next, is it that our models prove so useful?

Yes I realize that you don't understand.
But there is nothing more I can do.
I have explained it as clearly as I can.
I am pointing out the contrapositive consequence of your claims about the absence of truth value.

I am saying in logic your claims do not obtain truth value because they are claims that depended upon things without truth value.

I am saying logic.

If there is no truth value in a world without minds, then it does not obtain that it is false that truth value is world dependent.

Similarly with your claim that truth and judgment are logically equivalent.
If it does not obtain because there is no truth value in a world without minds, it does not obtain that it is true that judgments are logically equivalent to truth.

Again as I have pointed out already.
Claiming that there is no truth value will mean, as a consequence that the claim that truth is equal to judgments has no truth value either.

It seems to me that the disagreement here is over the very definition of truth, — aletheist

Yes I pointed out a contradiction with Terrapins view that truths were logically equivalent to judgments.
We imagined a world x where there were no minds.
The dilemma then becomes is it true in world x that there are no judgments?
If it is true then truths do not depend on minds and judgments are not equal to truths.
If it is not true then judgments do not depend on minds and judgments are not equal to truths..
Our disagreement about what truth ought to mean does not resolve the logical issues associated with Terrapins position I am afraid.

there are no truths in a world without minds, because (I gather) there are no propositions (true or false) in such a world. — aletheist

I conceded this point, but it has a consequence, if there is no truth value in a world without minds, then we cannot know the truth value of the claim that truth value is exclusively and entirely dependent upon minds.

The proposition that truth depends on minds cannot be validated even if it avoids invalidation from contradiction.

Answering his yes-or-no question will reveal whether you fully understand his position, so I encourage you to do so. Admitting that his view is not self-contradictory does not entail that it is correct; you can still reasonably disagree with it (as I do), but on other grounds. — aletheist

No, I will not have him dictate to me how I can post to the forum.
I can answer his questions how I choose.
That I fail to follow his desires in my answering does not prove that I don't understand his position.
That does not follow.

lol
This again?

You said there were no truths in world x, which does not deal with the issue, it is still a contradiction that it cannot be true that there are no truths.

Terrapin's view is that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon minds such that if there were no minds there would be no truths.
This leads to a contradiction.
If there were no minds then it could not be true that there were no truths.

Notice that I use the word if here.

Terrapin does not see this as an issue because there are minds now, so the condition in which there would be a contradiction is not met.
However in logic we do not have to meet the condition of the argument to see that it is contradictory.

I also pointed out another possible issue with Terrapin's views.
Terrapin might hope to argue that we can be sure that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon minds, because minds exist now and thus the truth of what is said about anything depends entirely and exclusively upon them and there is no issue because as of now those minds do exist.
This would be circular argumentation.
That minds exist now proves only that there are minds now, it does not prove that truth is entirely and exclusively dependent upon those minds and these are not logically equivalent things.

I don't think the vid covers much new ground if you have read thinking fast and slow.
I have not read the book myself, but in the vid he does mention fast and slow thinking.
He also encourages the view that there are separate but distinct ways in which people use the term know.
One in which people are expressing that they do not doubt something.
Then there is the way that science employs the term which is to indicate there is strong evidence and valid logic to accept the truth of something.
He goes further to explain the different ways in which we associate our immediate experience with knowledge, where at that point he covers the notion of fast and slow thinking.

I thought you might appreciate this vid.

I think one of the reasons conservatism is associated with religiousness is because that political party made great efforts to secure them as a voter block.
I am not sure, but I believe at different points in US history voting habits and religious views were not so clearly defined as they have come to be in more recent times.
.

I have no clue why, I just recall surveys that show that those who express religious beliefs also tend to be politically conservative or vice versa if you like.

The reason I do this is because there is a statistical correlation.